WO2009018743A1 - Système de connexion à un réseau de confiance destiné à améliorer la sécurité - Google Patents

Système de connexion à un réseau de confiance destiné à améliorer la sécurité Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2009018743A1
WO2009018743A1 PCT/CN2008/071700 CN2008071700W WO2009018743A1 WO 2009018743 A1 WO2009018743 A1 WO 2009018743A1 CN 2008071700 W CN2008071700 W CN 2008071700W WO 2009018743 A1 WO2009018743 A1 WO 2009018743A1
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WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
access
integrity
interface
network
requester
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PCT/CN2008/071700
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English (en)
French (fr)
Inventor
Yuelei Xiao
Jun Cao
Xiaolong Lai
Zhenhai Huang
Original Assignee
China Iwncomm Co., Ltd.
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
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Publication date
Application filed by China Iwncomm Co., Ltd. filed Critical China Iwncomm Co., Ltd.
Priority to JP2010519328A priority Critical patent/JP5187397B2/ja
Priority to US12/672,860 priority patent/US8336081B2/en
Priority to EP08826948A priority patent/EP2178241A4/en
Publication of WO2009018743A1 publication Critical patent/WO2009018743A1/zh

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Classifications

    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/08Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
    • H04L63/0876Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities based on the identity of the terminal or configuration, e.g. MAC address, hardware or software configuration or device fingerprint
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L41/00Arrangements for maintenance, administration or management of data switching networks, e.g. of packet switching networks
    • H04L41/08Configuration management of networks or network elements
    • H04L41/0893Assignment of logical groups to network elements
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/20Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for managing network security; network security policies in general
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0816Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
    • H04L9/0838Key agreement, i.e. key establishment technique in which a shared key is derived by parties as a function of information contributed by, or associated with, each of these
    • H04L9/0841Key agreement, i.e. key establishment technique in which a shared key is derived by parties as a function of information contributed by, or associated with, each of these involving Diffie-Hellman or related key agreement protocols
    • H04L9/0844Key agreement, i.e. key establishment technique in which a shared key is derived by parties as a function of information contributed by, or associated with, each of these involving Diffie-Hellman or related key agreement protocols with user authentication or key authentication, e.g. ElGamal, MTI, MQV-Menezes-Qu-Vanstone protocol or Diffie-Hellman protocols using implicitly-certified keys
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3263Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving certificates, e.g. public key certificate [PKC] or attribute certificate [AC]; Public key infrastructure [PKI] arrangements
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L41/00Arrangements for maintenance, administration or management of data switching networks, e.g. of packet switching networks
    • H04L41/08Configuration management of networks or network elements
    • H04L41/0894Policy-based network configuration management
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/08Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
    • H04L63/0823Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities using certificates
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/10Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for controlling access to devices or network resources
    • H04L63/102Entity profiles
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/12Applying verification of the received information
    • H04L63/126Applying verification of the received information the source of the received data

Definitions

  • the invention belongs to the technical field of network security, and in particular relates to a trusted network connection system for enhancing security.
  • malware such as viruses and worms
  • More than 35,000 malware have been reported, and more than 40 million computers are infected every year.
  • To contain such attacks it is necessary not only to solve the security transmission and data input check, but also to start defense from the source, that is, from each terminal connected to the network.
  • Traditional security defense technologies are no longer able to defend against a wide variety of malicious attacks.
  • TCG-TNC Trusted Computing Technology - Trusted Network Connection TNC
  • TCG-TNC Trusted Computing Technology - Trusted Network Connection TNC
  • the root kits are attack scripts, modified system programs, or a set of attack scripts and tools for illegally obtaining the highest control of a system in a target system.
  • the existing TCG-TNC architecture is shown in Figure 1. It has three types of logical entity entities: access requester AR, policy enforcement point PEP, and policy decision point PDP, which can be distributed anywhere in the network.
  • the TCG-TNC architecture can be divided into three levels: the network access layer, the integrity evaluation layer, and the integrity measurement layer.
  • the network access layer has three components: a network access requester NAR, a policy performer PE, and a network access licensor NAA, and a network authorization transport protocol interface IF-T and a policy enforcement interface IF-PEP.
  • the network access layer is used to support traditional network connectivity technologies.
  • the integrity assessment layer is responsible for evaluating the integrity of all entities requesting access to the network.
  • This layer has two important interfaces: the integrity metrics collection interface IF-IMC and the end The integrity measurement interface IF-IMV. In addition, there is an integrity evaluation interface IF-TNCCS between the TNC client and the TNC server.
  • the integrity metric layer has two components, the integrity collector IMC and the integrity checker IMV, which are responsible for collecting and verifying the integrity information of the requesting visitor.
  • the information transfer process of a complete TCG-TNC architecture for a complete trusted network connection is: Before establishing a network connection, the TNC client TNCC needs to prepare the required platform integrity information and hand it to the integrity collector IMC. In a terminal with a trusted platform module, this means that the platform information required by the network policy is hashed and stored in each platform configuration register. The TNC server TNCS needs to pre-establish the platform integrity verification requirements and hand it over to the TNCS. Integrity checker IMV.
  • the specific process is: 1.
  • the network access requester NAR initiates an access request to the policy performer. 2.
  • the policy executor sends the access request description to the network access licensor. 3.
  • the network access authorizer After receiving the access request description of the network access requester NAR, the network access authorizer performs a user authentication protocol with the network access requester NAR. When the user authentication is successful, the network access authorizer sends the access request and the user authentication success information to the TNC server TNCS. ⁇ . TNC server After receiving the access request and user authentication success message sent by the network access authorizer, the TNCS starts the bidirectional platform certificate authentication with the TNC client TNCC, such as the authentication platform's identity certificate key AIK. 5. When the platform credential authentication is successful, the TNC client TNCC tells the integrity collector that the IMC has started a new network connection and needs to perform a full handshake protocol.
  • the IMC collects the required platform integrity information through the integrity metrics collection interface IF-IMC.
  • the TNC server TNCS passes these platform integrity information to the integrity checker IMV through the integrity metric check interface IF-IMV. 6.
  • the TNC client TNCC exchanges data with the TNC server TNCS one or more times until the TNCS is satisfied by the TNC server. 7.
  • the TNC server completes the integrity handshake protocol for the TNC client TNCC, it will send a recommendation letter to the network access licensor requesting access. If there are additional security considerations, the policy decision point can still not allow access to the requester AR.
  • the network access licensor passes the access decision to the policy executor, and the policy executor ultimately performs the decision to control access by the access requester AR.
  • TCG-TNC architecture At present, there are no mature TCG-TNC architecture products entering the market. Some important technologies of the TCG-TNC architecture are still in the research and specification stage, and they mainly have the following defects:
  • the key negotiation process is complicated. Because the data on the network access layer is to be secured, it is necessary to establish a secure channel between the access requester AR and the policy decision point, that is, session key negotiation between them; however, access requester AR and policy Data protection is also required between the execution points, so that session key negotiation needs to be performed again between the access requester AR and the policy enforcement point, which complicates the key negotiation process.
  • the security is relatively low.
  • the master key negotiated by the access requester AR and the policy decision point is passed from the policy decision point to the policy enforcement point.
  • the key is passed over the network, introducing a new security attack point that reduces security.
  • the same master key is used for both session key negotiation, which also reduces the security of the entire trusted network connection architecture.
  • Access Requester The AR may not be able to verify the validity of the AIK certificate for the policy decision point.
  • the access requester AR and the policy decision point use the AIK private key and certificate for bidirectional platform credential authentication, and both ends need to verify the validity of the AIK certificate. If the policy decision point is the access service provider of the access requester AR, the access requester AR cannot access the network before the trusted network connection, that is, the validity of the AIK certificate of the policy decision point cannot be verified, so it is not safe.
  • Platform integrity assessment is not equal. In the TCG-TNC architecture, the policy decision point performs platform integrity evaluation on the access requester AR, but the access requester AR does not perform platform integrity evaluation on the policy decision point. If the platform of the policy decision point is not trusted, it is not safe for the access requester AR to connect to the untrusted device. Peer-to-peer trust is a must in Ad hoc networks.
  • the present invention provides a trusted network connection system with enhanced security, which can solve the technical problem that the security of the background is relatively low, and the access requester AR may not be able to verify the validity of the AIK certificate and the evaluation of the platform integrity is not equal.
  • a secure network connection system that enhances security, including access requesters AR and policy enforcement points
  • the system further includes an access licensor AA and a policy manager PM;
  • the access requester AR and the policy enforcement point PEP are in network communication in an authentication protocol manner, and the access requester AR and the access authorizer AA are connected through a network authorization transmission protocol interface IF-T and an integrity evaluation interface IF-TNCCS network.
  • the access requester AR and the access authorizer AA are both Having an integrity metric interface IF-M
  • the policy enforcement point PEP and the access licensor AA are connected through a policy implementation interface IF-PEP network
  • the access licensor AA and the policy manager PM pass the user authentication authorization interface IF-
  • the UAA and the platform evaluation authorization interface IF-PEA network are connected; wherein: the network authorization transmission protocol interface IF-T is a two-way user authentication and key agreement between the access requester AR and the access authority AA, and access is implemented. a protocol interface for mutual access control between the requester AR and the access authorizer AA;
  • the integrity assessment interface IF-TOCCS verifies the validity of the AIK certificate of the access requester AR and the access authorizer AA through the policy manager PM, and verifies the access requester AR and the access authorizer AA through the policy manager PM.
  • Platform integrity to implement a protocol interface for platform integrity assessment between the access requester AR and the access licensor AA;
  • the integrity metric interface IF-M is a protocol interface for collecting and verifying information about the platform integrity of the access requester AR and the access licensor AA;
  • the policy implementation interface IF-PEP is a protocol interface for performing a decision to access the licensor AA;
  • the user authentication authorization interface IF-UAA is a two-way user authentication and confidentiality between the access requester AR and the access licensor AA.
  • the platform evaluation authorization interface IF-PEA is an implementation of the platform integrity assessment between the access requester AR and the access authority AA, the implementation of the policy manager PM verification access requester AR, and the access authorization AA AIK certificate validity, And a protocol interface that implements the platform integrity of the Policy Manager PM to verify the access requester AR and access the Authorizer AA.
  • the access requester AR includes a network access requester NAR, a TNC client TNCC, and an integrity collector IMd and an integrity checker IMVi of the access requester AR, wherein the network access requester NAR and TNC
  • the client TNCC is connected in a data bearer manner, and the TNC client TNCC and the integrity collector of the access requester AR are connected through an integrity metric collection interface IF-IMC, and the TNC client TNCC and the access requester AR
  • the integrity checker IMVi is connected through the integrity metric verification interface IF-IMV;
  • the policy enforcement point PEP includes a policy performer PE that performs a decision to access the licensor AA; the access licensor AA includes a network access licensor NAA, a TNC server TNCS, and an integrity certifier of the access licensor AA.
  • the network access licensor NAA is connected to the TNC server TNCS in a data bearer manner, and the TNC server TNCS is connected to the integrity evaluator IMC 2 of the access licensor AA through an integrity metric collecting interface IF-IMC, The integrity checker IMV 2 of the TNC server TNCS and the access licensor AA is connected through the integrity metric check interface IF-IMV;
  • the policy manager PM includes a user authentication service unit UASU and a platform evaluation service unit PESU, wherein the user authentication service unit UASU and the platform evaluation service unit PESU are connected in a data bearer manner;
  • the network access requester NAR is connected to the policy executor PE in an authentication protocol manner, and the policy executor PE and the network access licensor NAA are connected through a policy implementation interface IF-PEP, and the network access requester NAR and The access licensor NAA is connected through the network authorization transport protocol interface IF-T, and the network access licensor NAA and the user authentication service unit UASU are connected through the user authentication authorization interface IF-UAA;
  • the TNC client TNCC and the TNC server TNCS are connected through an integrity evaluation interface IF-TNCCS, and the TNC server TNCS and the platform evaluation service unit PESU are connected through the platform evaluation 4 authorized interface IF-PEA;
  • the integrity collector IMd of the access requester AR communicates with the integrity checker IMV 2 of the access authority AA through the integrity metric interface IF-M, the integrity checker IMVi of the access requester AR passes through The metrics interface IF-M is in communication with the integrity collector IMC 2 of the access licensor AA.
  • the integrity collector of the access requester AR is collecting the TNC client.
  • a component of platform integrity information prepared in advance by the TNCC, the integrity checker IMVi of the access requester AR is a component that verifies the platform integrity information of the access licensor AA sent by the TNC server TNCS, the access licensor
  • the integrity collector IMC 2 of the AA is a component that collects platform integrity information prepared in advance by the TNC server TNC, and the integrity checker IMV 2 of the access authority AA checks the access requester sent by the TNC client TNCC.
  • the component of the platform integrity information of the AR is a component that verifies the platform integrity information of the access licensor AA sent by the TNC server TNCS, the access licensor
  • the integrity collector IMC 2 of the AA is a component that collects platform integrity information prepared in advance by the TNC server TNC, and the integrity checker IMV 2 of the access authority AA checks the access requester sent by the TNC client TNCC.
  • the component of the platform integrity information of the AR is a component that ver
  • the access requester AR includes a network access requester NAR, a TNC client TNCC, and an integrity collector IMd of the access requester AR, where the network access requester NAR and the TNC client TNCC are in data bearer mode. Connected, the TNC client TNCC and the integrity collector of the access requester AR pass the integrity metric collection interface IF-IMC Connected
  • the policy enforcement point PEP includes a policy performer PE that performs a decision to access the licensor AA; the access licensor AA includes a network access licensor NAA, a TNC server TNCS, and an integrity evaluator IMC of the access licensor AA. 2 , wherein the network access licensor NAA and the TNC server TNCS are connected in a data bearer manner, and the TNC server TNCS and the access licensor AA integrity collector IMC 2 collect the interface IF through the integrity metric.
  • the IMC is connected to each other;
  • the policy manager PM includes a user authentication service unit UASU, a platform evaluation service unit PESU, and an integrity checker IMV, wherein the user authentication service unit UASU and the platform evaluation service unit PESU are carried by data
  • the platform evaluation service unit PESU and the integrity checker IMV are connected by the integrity metric verification interface IF-IMV;
  • the network access requester NAR is connected to the policy executor PE in an authentication protocol manner, and the policy executor PE and the network access licensor NAA are connected through a policy implementation interface IF-PEP, and the network access requester NAR and The access licensor NAA is connected through the network authorization transport protocol interface IF-T, and the network access licensor NAA and the user authentication service unit UASU are connected through the user authentication authorization interface IF-UAA;
  • the TNC client TNCC and the TNC server TNCS are connected through an integrity evaluation interface IF-TNCCS, and the TNC server TNCS and the platform evaluation service unit PESU are connected through the platform evaluation 4 authorized interface IF-PEA;
  • the integrity collector IMd of the access requester AR communicates with the integrity checker IMV of the policy manager PM through the integrity metric interface IF-M, the integrity collector IMC 2 of the access licensor AA passes the integrity
  • the metric interface IF-M is in communication with the integrity checker IMV of the Policy Manager PM.
  • the integrity collector IMC of the access requester AR is a component that collects platform integrity information prepared in advance by the TNC client TNC, and the integrity collector IMC 2 of the access authority AA collects the TNC server TNCS.
  • a component of the platform integrity information prepared in advance, the integrity checker IMV of the policy manager PM is a pre-established platform integrity verification request received by the TNC client TNCC and the TNC server TNCS, and the access requester AR and A component that accesses the Authorizer AA for platform integrity verification.
  • the access requester AR and the access authorizer AA are both having a trusted platform module. Logical entity.
  • the access control method based on the ternary peer authentication is used in the network access layer, which enhances the security of the trusted network connection architecture and simplifies the key management of the architecture.
  • the platform integrity assessment of the present invention may be implemented according to actual conditions.
  • the first is to implement centralized authentication of the AIK certificate of the access requester and the access authorizer by the policy manager, and the access requester and the access authorizer locally verify the integrity of the other platform, which is applicable to the access request.
  • Both the accessor and the access licensor have access to a database that stores standard integrity metrics for each component, which enhances the security of the trusted network connection architecture and simplifies key management for the trusted network connection architecture.
  • the second is that the authentication of the AIK certificate and the verification of the platform integrity of the access requester and the access authorizer are all completed by the policy manager, which simplifies the key management and integrity check mechanism of the trusted network connection architecture, The security of the trusted network connection architecture is further enhanced, and the scope of application of the trusted network connection can be extended.
  • the present invention not only realizes two-way user authentication of the access requester and the access authorizer in the network access layer, but also implements the two-way platform integrity evaluation of the access requester and the access authorizer at the integrity evaluation layer, thereby improving the entire The security of the trusted network connection architecture. Furthermore, since the ternary peer authentication protocol is used in both the network access layer and the integrity assessment layer, that is, the third-party authentication protocol based on the third party further enhances the security of the trusted network connection architecture.
  • FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram of the basic architecture of the existing TCG-TNC
  • FIG. 2 is a schematic diagram of a basic structure of a TNC according to the present invention.
  • FIG. 3 is a schematic diagram of a complete information transmission process corresponding to the first platform integrity evaluation method of the present invention
  • FIG. 4 is a schematic diagram of a complete information transmission process corresponding to the second platform integrity evaluation method of the present invention.
  • PDP Policy Decision Point
  • AR Access Requester
  • PEP Policy Execution Point
  • AA Access Authorizer
  • PM Policy Manager
  • IMd Access Requester AR Integrity Collector
  • IMV 2 Integrity Checker of Access Authorizer AA
  • IMC 2 Integrity Collector of Access Authorizer AA
  • IMV Integrity Checker of Policy Manager PM
  • TNCC TNC client
  • TNCS TNC server
  • PESU platform evaluation service unit
  • NAR network access requester
  • PE policy executor
  • NAA network access licensor
  • UASU user authentication service unit
  • IF-T The network authorization transport protocol interface is a protocol interface between the network access requester NAR and the policy performer PE
  • IF-PEP the policy implementation interface, which is a protocol interface between the policy enforcer PE and the network access authorizer NAA
  • IF- UAA User authentication and authorization interface, which is a protocol interface between the network access licensor NAA and the user authentication service unit
  • the protocol interface between 2 is the protocol interface between the integrity checker IMV of the access requester AR and the integrity collector IMC 2 of the access authorizer AA; is the integrity collector IMC 2 of the access authorizer AA and The protocol interface between the integrity checkers IMV of the Policy Manager PM; also the protocol interface between the integrity collector IMCi of the Access Requestor AR and the integrity checker IMV of the Policy Manager PM.
  • the present invention is an enhanced security trusted network connection architecture established on the TCG-TNC architecture.
  • the present invention mainly consists of an access requester AR, a policy enforcement point PEP, and an access granter.
  • the access requester AR is also referred to as a requester, a subscriber station, etc.
  • the policy manager PM is also referred to as an authentication server, a trusted server, a background server, and the like.
  • the access requester AR and the policy enforcement point PEP are connected in network by the authentication protocol mode, and the policy enforcement point PEP and the access authority AA implement the interface IF-PEP network through the policy.
  • the access requester AR and the access authorizer AA are connected through the network authorization transport protocol interface IF-T and the integrity assessment interface IF-TNCCS, and both the access requester AR and the access granter AA have an integrity measurement interface IF-M.
  • the access licensor AA and the policy manager PM are connected through the user authentication authorization interface IF-UAA and the platform evaluation authorization interface IF-PEA network.
  • the access requester AR is mainly composed of a network access requester NAR, a TNC client TNCC, an integrity collector IMC of the access requester AR, and an integrity checker IMVi of the access requester AR.
  • the network access requester NAR and the TNC client TNCC are connected in a data bearer manner for the TNC client TNCC to forward the message.
  • the TNC client TNCC is connected to the integrity collector of the access requester AR through the integrity metric collection interface IF-IMC, and is connected to the integrity certifier IMVi of the access requester AR through the integrity metric verification interface IF-IMV.
  • the policy enforcement point PEP is mainly composed of the policy performer PE and is responsible for executing the decision of the access authorizer.
  • the access licensor AA is mainly composed of a network access licensor NAA, a TNC server TNCS, an access certifier AA's integrity checker IMV 2, and an access licensor AA's integrity collector IMC 2 .
  • the network access licensor NAA is connected to the TNCS data bearer mode of the TNC server for the TNC server to forward messages.
  • the TNC server TNCS communicates with the integrity evaluator IMC 2 of the access licensor AA through the integrity metrics collection interface IF-IMC, and the integrity certifier IMV 2 with the access licensor AA passes the integrity metric verification interface IF.
  • -IMV is connected to achieve integrity of the integrity verifier IMV 2 of the access authorizer AA and the integrity collector IMD of the access requester AR and the integrity collector IMC 2 of the access authorizer AA and the access requester AR Verifier IMVi communication.
  • the Policy Manager PM is mainly composed of the User Authentication Service Unit UASU and the Platform Evaluation Service Unit PESU.
  • User Authentication Service Unit UASU and Platform Evaluation Service Unit PESU is connected in data bearer mode for platform evaluation service unit PESU to forward messages.
  • the access requester AR is mainly composed of a network access requester NAR, a TNC client TNCC, and an integrity collector IMd of the access requester AR.
  • the network access requester NAR is connected to the TNC client TNCC in data bearer mode for TNC client TNCC transfer. Send a message.
  • the TNC client TNCC communicates with the integrity requester IMd of the access requester AR through the integrity metrics collection interface IF-IMC to implement the integrity checker IMd of the access requester AR and the integrity checker of the policy manager PM. IMV communication.
  • the policy enforcement point PEP is mainly composed of the policy performer PE and is responsible for executing the decision of the access authorizer.
  • the access authorizer AA is mainly composed of the network access authorizer NAA, the TNC server TNCS, and the integrity collector IMC 2 of the access authority AA.
  • the network access licensor NAA is connected to the TNCS data bearer mode of the TNC server for forwarding messages by the TNC server TNCS.
  • the TNC server TNCS communicates with the access licensor AA's integrity collector IMC 2 through the integrity metrics collection interface IF-IMC to achieve the integrity of the access licensor AA's integrity collector IMC 2 and the Policy Manager PM. The communication of the examiner IMV.
  • the Policy Manager PM is mainly composed of a User Authentication Service Unit UASU, a Platform Evaluation Service Unit PESU, and an Integrity Checker IMV.
  • the user authentication service unit UASU and the platform evaluation service unit PESU are connected in a data bearer manner for the platform evaluation service unit PESU to forward the message.
  • the platform evaluation service unit PESU and the integrity checker IMV are connected through the integrity metric verification interface IF-IMV to implement the integrity checker IMV and the integrity requester IMd of the access requester AR and the access licensor AA. Integrity collector IMC 2 communication.
  • the four components of the network access requester NAR, the policy performer PE, the network access authorizer NAA, and the user authentication service unit UASU of the present invention constitute a network access layer.
  • the network access requester NAR communicates with the network access licensor NAA through the network authorization transport protocol interface IF-T, and the policy performer PE and the network access licensor NAA communicate through the policy implementation interface IF-PEP, the network access licensor NAA and the user authentication service
  • the unit UASU is connected through the user authentication authorization interface IF-UAA.
  • a secure channel is pre-established between the policy enforcement point PEP and the access authority AA.
  • the network access requester NAR, the network access authorizer NAA, and the user authentication service unit UASU perform a ternary peer authentication protocol through the policy performer PE to implement two-way user authentication and key agreement between the access requester AR and the access licensor AA.
  • the master key generated by the authentication process is transmitted by the network access authorizer NAA to the policy performer PE through the secure channel.
  • the policy performer PE performs key agreement with the access requester AR by using the master key to protect the security of data transmission between the policy enforcement point PEP and the access requester AR.
  • the network access layer is responsible for implementing two-way user authentication and key agreement between the access requester AR and the access authority AA, and key negotiation between the access requester AR and the policy enforcement point PEP. Inter-access control between the accessor AA and the access requester AR.
  • TNC Client TNCC, TNC Server TNCS and Platform Evaluation Service Unit PESU three entities form the integrity assessment layer.
  • the TNC client and the TNC server TNCS are connected through the integrity evaluation interface IF-TNCCS.
  • the TNC server TNCS and the platform evaluation service unit PESU are connected through the platform evaluation authorization interface IF-PEA.
  • integrity assessment includes platform integrity verification and platform credential authentication. There are two ways to evaluate the platform integrity of the integrity assessment layer.
  • the first platform integrity evaluation method is shown in Figure 3.
  • the validity of the AIK certificate of the access requester AR and the access authorizer AA is verified by the policy manager PM, and is verified locally by the access requester AR and the access authorizer AA.
  • the integrity of the other platform, the method is applicable to both the access requester AR and the access authorizer AA can access the database storing the standard integrity metrics of each platform component, which can enhance the security of the trusted network connection architecture and simplify the trust. Key management for the network connection architecture.
  • the implementation of the first platform integrity assessment is as follows: 1. Platform integrity check: The platform integrity check of the access requester AR is performed on the TNC server TNCS, and the platform integrity check of the access authorizer AA is TNC client TNCC. 2.
  • Access requester AR and access authorizer AA's platform credential authentication is implemented using a ternary peer-to-peer authentication protocol.
  • the AIK certificate authentication of the access requester AR and the access authorizer AA is performed by the platform evaluation service unit PESU.
  • the second platform integrity evaluation method is shown in Figure 4.
  • the AIK certificate validity verification and platform integrity check of the access requester AR and the access authorizer AA are all completed by the policy manager PM, which simplifies the trusted network connection architecture.
  • the key management and integrity verification mechanism further enhances the security of the trusted network connection architecture and extends the scope of the trusted network connection.
  • the implementation of the second platform integrity assessment is as follows: 1. Platform integrity check: Access requester AR and access authorizer AA's platform integrity check is performed by the platform evaluation service unit PESU. 2.
  • the integrity metric layer is responsible for collecting and verifying the platform integrity information of the access requester AR and the access licensor AA.
  • the integrity metric layer of the structure is mainly composed of the integrity collector IMd of the access requester AR, the integrity checker IMVi of the access requester AR, the integrity checker IMV 2 of the access licensor AA, and the access licensor AA.
  • the integrity collector IMC 2 consists of four components.
  • the integrity collector IMC 1 of the access requester AR communicates with the integrity checker IMV 2 of the access authority AA through the integrity metric interface IF-M, and the integrity checker of the access requester AR passes the integrity metric interface IF -M is connected to the integrity collector IMC 2 of the access authority AA.
  • the integrity metric layer of the structure is mainly composed of three components: the integrity collector IMd of the access requester AR, the integrity collector IMC 2 of the access licensor AA, and the integrity checker IMV of the policy manager PM.
  • the integrity collector IMC of the access requester AR communicates with the integrity checker IMV of the Policy Manager PM through the integrity metric interface IF-M, accessing the integrity of the Authorizer AA 2 and the integrity of the Policy Manager PM
  • the sex checker IMV is connected through the integrity measurement interface IF-M.
  • the specific steps of implementing the trusted network connection for enhancing security by using the present invention are as follows:
  • the TNC client accessing the requestor AR TNCC prepares the platform integrity information in advance, and submits it to the integrity collector IMd of the access requester AR; the TNC server TNCS accessing the authorized AA prepares the platform integrity information in advance, and gives it to the Access the Authorizer AA's integrity collector IMC 2 .
  • the TNC Client TNCC and the TNC Server TNCS pre-establish an integrity verification request that includes a PCRs table in which the Access Requestor AR and the Access Authorizer AA mutually request the other party to verify.
  • the TNC client TNCC and the TNC server TNCS pass the pre-established integrity verification requirements directly to the integrity requester IMV ⁇ of the access requester AR. Access the Authorizer AA's integrity checker IMV 2 .
  • the TNC client TNCC and the TNC server TNCS pass the pre-established integrity verification requirements to the integrity checker IMV of the policy manager PM during the platform integrity evaluation process.
  • Figure 4. (1.3)
  • the trusted platform module of the access requester AR and the access authorizer AA hashes the platform information required by the network policy into the platform configuration register.
  • the network access requester NAR initiates an access request to the policy performer PE, and the policy performer PE forwards the access request to the network access authorizer NAA.
  • the network access authorizer NAA After receiving the access request, the network access authorizer NAA starts the two-way user authentication process, and the network access requester NAR, the network access authorizer NAA and the user authentication service unit UASU start to perform the ternary peer authentication.
  • the protocol implements two-way user authentication and key agreement between the access requester AR and the access authorizer AA.
  • the network access licensor NAA transmits the master key generated by the two-way user authentication process to the policy enforcement point PEP through the pre-established secure channel. Finally, the policy enforcement point PEP uses the master key to perform key agreement with the access requester AR.
  • the network access requester NAR and the network access authorizer NAA send the user authentication success information to the TNC client TNCC and the TNC server TNCS of the integrity assessment layer respectively.
  • the Platform Evaluation Service Unit PESU utilizes a ternary peer-to-peer authentication protocol to implement a two-way platform integrity assessment of the Access Requestor AR and the Access Authorizer AA.
  • platform integrity assessment includes: 1. Platform integrity check: The access requester verifies the platform integrity of the access grantor, and the access grantor verifies the integrity of the access requester; 2. Platform Credential Authentication: The AIT certificate validity of the access requester and access authorizer is verified by the Policy Manager.
  • the implementation of the second platform integrity assessment includes: 1. Platform integrity check: The platform integrity of the access requester and the access licensor is verified by the policy manager; 2. Platform credential authentication: by policy The manager verifies the validity of the AIK certificate for the access requester and the access authorizer.
  • the TNC client TNCC and the TNC server TNCS each aggregate access to the licensor AA and access Requester AR's platform integrity assessment results. Then, the recommendation is sent to the network access requester NAR and the network access authorizer NAA, respectively.
  • the network access requester NAR and the network access authorizer NAA respectively control the port according to the recommendation received by each, and implement mutual access control of the access requester AR and the access authorizer AA.
  • the recommendation sent by the TNC client TNCC and the TNC server TNCS to the network access requester NAR and the network access authorizer NAA is to allow access information, prohibit access information or isolation patch information, and the like.
  • the access control method based on the ternary peer authentication is used in the network access layer, which enhances the security of the trusted network connection architecture and simplifies the key management of the architecture.
  • the platform integrity assessment of the present invention may be implemented according to actual conditions.
  • the first is to implement centralized authentication of the AIK certificate of the access requester and the access authorizer by the policy manager, and the access requester and the access authorizer locally verify the integrity of the other platform, which is applicable to the access request.
  • Both the accessor and the access licensor have access to a database that stores standard integrity metrics for each component, which enhances the security of the trusted network connection architecture and simplifies key management for the trusted network connection architecture.
  • the second is that the authentication of the AIK certificate and the verification of the platform integrity of the access requester and the access authorizer are all completed by the policy manager, which simplifies the key management and integrity check mechanism of the trusted network connection architecture, The security of the trusted network connection architecture is further enhanced, and the scope of application of the trusted network connection can be extended.
  • the present invention not only realizes two-way user authentication of the access requester and the access authorizer in the network access layer, but also implements the two-way platform integrity evaluation of the access requester and the access authorizer at the integrity evaluation layer, thereby improving the entire The security of the trusted network connection architecture. Furthermore, since the ternary peer authentication protocol is used in both the network access layer and the integrity assessment layer, that is, the third-party authentication protocol based on the third party further enhances the security of the trusted network connection architecture.

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Description

一种增强安全性的可信网络连接系统
本申请要求于 2007 年 8 月 8 日提交中国专利局、 申请号为 200710018437.8、 发明名称为"一种增强安全性的可信网络连接系统"的中国专 利申请的优先权, 其全部内容通过引用结合在本申请中。
技术领域
本发明属于网络安全技术领域,具体涉及一种增强安全性的可信网络连接 系统。
背景技术
随着信息化的发展, 病毒、 蠕虫等恶意软件的问题异常突出。 目前已经出 现了超过三万五千种的恶意软件,每年都有超过四千万的计算机被感染。要遏 制住这类攻击, 不仅需要解决安全的传输和数据输入时的检查, 还要从源头, 即从每一台连接到网络的终端开始防御。而传统的安全防御技术已经无法防御 种类繁多的恶意攻击。
国际可信计算组织 TCG针对这个问题, 专门制定了一个基于可信计算技 术的网络连接规范——可信网络连接 TNC, 简记为 TCG-TNC, 其包括了开放 的终端完整性架构和一套确保安全互操作的标准。这套标准可以在用户需要时 保护一个网络, 且由用户自定义保护到什么程度。 TCG-TNC本质上就是要从 终端的完整性开始建立连接。 首先,要创建一套在可信网络内部系统运行状况 的策略。 只有遵守网络设定策略的终端才能访问网络, 网络将隔离和定位那些 不遵守策略的设备。 由于使用了可信平台模块, 所以还可以阻挡 root kits的攻 击。 root kits是一种攻击脚本、 经修改的系统程序, 或者成套攻击脚本和工具, 用于在一个目标系统中非法获取系统的最高控制权限。
现有 TCG-TNC架构如图 1所示, 具有访问请求者 AR、 策略执行点 PEP、 策略决策点 PDP三类逻辑实体实体,可以分布在网络的任意位置。该 TCG-TNC 架构在纵向上可分为网络访问层、 完整性评估层、 完整性度量层三个层次。 网 络访问层具有网络访问请求者 NAR、 策略执行者 PE和网络访问授权者 NAA 三个组件, 以及网络授权传输协议接口 IF-T和策略实施接口 IF-PEP。 网络访 问层用于支持传统的网络连接技术。完整性评估层负责评估所有请求访问网络 的实体的完整性。 该层有两个重要的接口: 完整性度量收集接口 IF-IMC和完 整性度量校验接口 IF-IMV。 此外, 在 TNC客户端和 TNC服务端之间还具有 一个完整性评估接口 IF-TNCCS。完整性度量层有完整性收集者 IMC和完整性 校验者 IMV两个组件, 负责收集和校验请求访问者的完整性相关信息。
现有 TCG-TNC架构一次完整的可信网络连接的信息传输过程是: 在建立 网络连接之前, TNC客户端 TNCC需要准备好所需要的平台完整性信息, 交 给完整性收集者 IMC。 在一个拥有可信平台模块的终端里面, 这也就是将网 络策略所需的平台信息经散列后存入各个平台配置寄存器, TNC服务端 TNCS 需要预先制定平台完整性的验证要求, 并交给完整性校验者 IMV。 具体过程 是:①.网络访问请求者 NAR向策略执行者发起访问请求。②.策略执行者将访 问请求描述发送给网络访问授权者。 ③.网络访问授权者收到网络访问请求者 NAR的访问请求描述后, 与网络访问请求者 NAR执行用户鉴别协议。 当用户 鉴别成功时, 网络访问授权者将访问请求和用户鉴别成功的信息发往 TNC服 务端 TNCS。 ©.TNC服务端 TNCS收到网络访问授权者发送的访问请求和用 户鉴别成功的信息后, 与 TNC客户端 TNCC开始执行双向平台凭证认证, 比 如验证平台的身份证明密钥 AIK。 ⑤.当平台凭证认证成功时, TNC客户端 TNCC告诉完整性收集者 IMC开始了一个新的网络连接且需要进行一个完整 性握手协议。完整性收集者 IMC通过完整性度量收集接口 IF-IMC返回所需平 台完整性信息。 TNC服务端 TNCS将这些平台完整性信息通过完整性度量校 验接口 IF-IMV交给完整性校验者 IMV。 ⑥.在完整性握手协议过程中, TNC 客户端 TNCC与 TNC服务端 TNCS要交换一次或多次数据, 直到 TNC服务 端 TNCS满意为止。 ⑦.当 TNC服务端 TNCS完成了对 TNC客户端 TNCC的 完整性握手协议, 它将发送一个推荐信给网络访问授权者, 要求允许访问。 如 果还有另外的安全考虑,此时策略决策点仍旧可以不允许访问请求者 AR的访 问。 ⑧.网络访问授权者将访问决定传递给策略执行者, 策略执行者最终执行 该决定, 来控制访问请求者 AR的访问。
目前, 尚无成熟的 TCG-TNC架构产品进入市场。 TCG-TNC架构的一些 重要技术还处于研究及规范阶段, 其主要还存在如下缺陷:
1.可扩展性差。 由于在策略执行点和策略决策点之间存在预定义的安全通 道, 而策略决策点可能管理着大量的策略执行点, 这将迫使它配置大量的安全 通道, 造成管理的复杂性, 因此, 可扩展性差。
2.密钥协商过程复杂。 因为要对网络访问层之上的数据进行安全保护, 所 以需要在访问请求者 AR和策略决策点之间建立安全通道, 即在它们之间进行 会话密钥协商; 但是, 访问请求者 AR和策略执行点之间也需要进行数据保护, 从而需要在访问请求者 AR和策略执行点之间再次进行会话密钥协商, 使密钥 协商过程复杂化。
3.安全性相对较低。 访问请求者 AR和策略决策点协商出来的主密钥由策 略决策点传递给策略执行点。 密钥在网络上传递, 引入了新的安全攻击点, 使 安全性降低。 此外, 两次会话密钥协商使用了相同的主密钥, 也使整个可信网 络连接架构的安全性降低。
4.访问请求者 AR可能无法验证策略决策点的 AIK证书有效性。在平台凭证 认证过程中, 访问请求者 AR和策略决策点使用 AIK私钥及证书进行双向平台 凭证认证, 两端都需要对 AIK证书进行有效性验证。 若策略决策点是访问请求 者 AR的上网服务提供者, 访问请求者 AR在可信网络连接之前不能访问网络, 也即无法验证策略决策点的 AIK证书的有效性, 所以是不安全的。
5.平台完整性评估是不对等的。 在 TCG-TNC架构中, 策略决策点对访问 请求者 AR进行平台完整性评估,但访问请求者 AR对策略决策点不进行平台 完整性评估。 如果策略决策点的平台不可信, 那么访问请求者 AR连接到不可 信的设备上是不安全的。 而对等可信在 Ad hoc网络中是必须的。
发明内容
本发明提供一种增强安全性的可信网络连接系统,能够解决背景技术中安 全性相对较低、 访问请求者 AR可能无法验证 AIK证书有效性和平台完整性 评估不对等的技术问题。
本发明的技术实现方案如下:
一种增强安全性的可信网络连接系统, 包括访问请求者 AR和策略执行点
PEP, 其中, 所述系统还包括访问授权者 AA和策略管理器 PM;
所述的访问请求者 AR与策略执行点 PEP以认证协议方式网络连通,所述 的访问请求者 AR与访问授权者 AA通过网络授权传输协议接口 IF-T及完整 性评估接口 IF-TNCCS网络连通, 所述的访问请求者 AR与访问授权者 AA均 具有完整性度量接口 IF-M, 所述的策略执行点 PEP与访问授权者 AA通过策 略实施接口 IF-PEP网络连通, 所述的访问授权者 AA与策略管理器 PM通过 用户鉴别授权接口 IF-UAA及平台评估授权接口 IF-PEA网络连通; 其中: 所述的网络授权传输协议接口 IF-T是实现访问请求者 AR与访问授权者 AA之间的双向用户鉴别和密钥协商、 以及实现访问请求者 AR与访问授权者 AA相互访问控制的协议接口;
所述的完整性评估接口 IF-TOCCS是通过策略管理器 PM验证访问请求者 AR及访问授权者 AA的 AIK证书有效性、 以及通过策略管理器 PM校验访问 请求者 AR及访问授权者 AA的平台完整性来实现访问请求者 AR与访问授权 者 AA之间的平台完整性评估的协议接口;
所述的完整性度量接口 IF-M是收集和校验访问请求者 AR和访问授权者 AA的平台完整性相关信息的协议接口;
所述的策略实施接口 IF-PEP是执行访问授权者 AA的决策的协议接口; 所述的用户鉴别授权接口 IF-UAA是实现访问请求者 AR与访问授权者 AA之间的双向用户鉴别和密钥协商、 以及实现访问请求者 AR与访问授权者 AA相互访问控制的协议接口;
所述的平台评估授权接口 IF-PEA是实现访问请求者 AR与访问授权者 AA 之间的平台完整性评估、 实现策略管理器 PM验证访问请求者 AR及访问授权 者 AA的 AIK证书有效性、以及实现策略管理器 PM校验访问请求者 AR及访 问授权者 AA的平台完整性的协议接口。
优选的, 上述访问请求者 AR 包括网络访问请求者 NAR、 TNC客户端 TNCC及访问请求者 AR的完整性收集者 IMd和完整性校验者 IMVi, 其中, 所述的网络访问请求者 NAR与 TNC客户端 TNCC以数据承载方式连通, 所 述的 TNC客户端 TNCC与访问请求者 AR的完整性收集者 通过完整性 度量收集接口 IF-IMC相连通, 所述的 TNC客户端 TNCC与访问请求者 AR 的完整性校验者 IMVi通过完整性度量校验接口 IF-IMV相连通;
所述的策略执行点 PEP包括执行访问授权者 AA的决策的策略执行者 PE; 所述的访问授权者 AA包括网络访问授权者 NAA、 TNC服务端 TNCS及 访问授权者 AA的完整性校验者 IMV2和完整性收集者 IMC2,其中,所述的网 络访问授权者 NAA与 TNC服务端 TNCS以数据承载方式连通, 所述的 TNC 服务端 TNCS与访问授权者 AA的完整性收集者 IMC2通过完整性度量收集接 口 IF-IMC相连通,所述的 TNC服务端 TNCS与访问授权者 AA的完整性校验 者 IMV2通过完整性度量校验接口 IF-IMV相连通;
所述的策略管理器 PM包括用户鉴别服务单元 UASU及平台评估服务单 元 PESU, 其中, 所述的用户鉴别服务单元 UASU与平台评估服务单元 PESU 以数据承载方式连通;
所述的网络访问请求者 NAR与策略执行者 PE以认证协议方式连通, 所 述的策略执行者 PE与网络访问授权者 NAA通过策略实施接口 IF-PEP连通 , 所述的网络访问请求者 NAR与访问授权者 NAA通过网络授权传输协议接口 IF-T连通 ,所述的网络访问授权者 NAA与用户鉴别服务单元 UASU通过用户 鉴别授权接口 IF-UAA连通;
所述的 TNC客户端 TNCC与 TNC服务端 TNCS通过完整性评估接口 IF-TNCCS连通, 所述的 TNC服务端 TNCS与平台评估服务单元 PESU通过 平台评估 4受权接口 IF-PEA连通;
所述访问请求者 AR的完整性收集者 IMd通过完整性度量接口 IF-M与访 问授权者 AA的完整性校验者 IMV2连通, 所述访问请求者 AR的完整性校验 者 IMVi通过完整性度量接口 IF-M与访问授权者 AA的完整性收集者 IMC2连 通。
优选的, 上述访问请求者 AR的完整性收集者 是收集 TNC客户端
TNCC预先准备的平台完整性信息的组件, 所述访问请求者 AR的完整性校验 者 IMVi是校验 TNC服务端 TNCS发送的访问授权者 AA的平台完整性信息 的组件,所述访问授权者 AA的完整性收集者 IMC2是收集 TNC服务端 TNCS 预先准备的平台完整性信息的组件 ,所述访问授权者 AA的完整性校验者 IMV2 是校验 TNC客户端 TNCC发送的访问请求者 AR的平台完整性信息的组件。
优选的, 上述访问请求者 AR 包括网络访问请求者 NAR、 TNC客户端 TNCC和访问请求者 AR的完整性收集者 IMd , 其中, 所述的网络访问请求 者 NAR与 TNC客户端 TNCC以数据承载方式连通,所述的 TNC客户端 TNCC 与访问请求者 AR的完整性收集者 通过完整性度量收集接口 IF-IMC相 连通;
所述的策略执行点 PEP包括执行访问授权者 AA的决策的策略执行者 PE; 所述的访问授权者 AA包括网络访问授权者 NAA、 TNC服务端 TNCS及 访问授权者 AA的完整性收集者 IMC2,其中,所述的网络访问授权者 NAA与 TNC服务端 TNCS以数据承载方式连通,所述的 TNC服务端 TNCS与访问授 权者 AA的完整性收集者 IMC2通过完整性度量收集接口 IF-IMC相连通; 所述的策略管理器 PM包括用户鉴别服务单元 UASU、平台评估服务单元 PESU及完整性校验者 IMV,其中,所述的用户鉴别服务单元 UASU与平台评 估服务单元 PESU以数据承载方式连通,所述的平台评估服务单元 PESU与完 整性校验者 IMV通过完整性度量校验接口 IF-IMV相连通;
所述的网络访问请求者 NAR与策略执行者 PE以认证协议方式连通, 所 述的策略执行者 PE与网络访问授权者 NAA通过策略实施接口 IF-PEP连通 , 所述的网络访问请求者 NAR与访问授权者 NAA通过网络授权传输协议接口 IF-T连通 ,所述的网络访问授权者 NAA与用户鉴别服务单元 UASU通过用户 鉴别授权接口 IF-UAA连通;
所述的 TNC客户端 TNCC与 TNC服务端 TNCS通过完整性评估接口 IF-TNCCS连通, 所述的 TNC服务端 TNCS与平台评估服务单元 PESU通过 平台评估 4受权接口 IF-PEA连通;
所述访问请求者 AR的完整性收集者 IMd通过完整性度量接口 IF-M与策 略管理器 PM的完整性校验者 IMV连通, 所述访问授权者 AA的完整性收集 者 IMC2通过完整性度量接口 IF-M与策略管理器 PM的完整性校验者 IMV连 通。
优选的, 上述访问请求者 AR的完整性收集者 IMC 是收集 TNC客户端 TNCC预先准备的平台完整性信息的组件,所述的访问授权者 AA的完整性收 集者 IMC2是收集 TNC服务端 TNCS预先准备的平台完整性信息的组件, 所 述策略管理器 PM的完整性校验者 IMV是接收 TNC客户端 TNCC与 TNC服 务端 TNCS预先制定的平台完整性验证要求、并对访问请求者 AR和访问授权 者 AA进行平台完整性校验的组件。
优选的,上述访问请求者 AR和访问授权者 AA均是具有可信平台模块的 逻辑实体。
通过本发明上述技术方案可知,在网络访问层釆用了基于三元对等鉴别的 访问控制方式,增强了可信网络连接架构的安全性,简化了该架构的密钥管理。
另外, 本发明平台完整性评估可根据实际情况选用实现方式。 第一种是由 策略管理器实现访问请求者和访问授权者的 AIK证书的集中鉴别, 而由访问 请求者和访问授权者在本地实现对方平台完整性的校验,这种方式适用于访问 请求者和访问授权者都可访问存储有各个组件的标准完整性度量值的数据库 , 可增强可信网络连接架构的安全性, 简化可信网络连接架构的密钥管理。 第二 种是访问请求者和访问授权者的 AIK证书的鉴别和平台完整性的校验都由策 略管理器完成, 其简化了可信网络连接架构的密钥管理和完整性校验机制, 更 进一步地增强可信网络连接架构的安全性,而且可扩展可信网络连接的适用范 围。
此外,本发明不但在网络访问层实现了访问请求者和访问授权者的双向用 户鉴别,而且在完整性评估层也实现了访问请求者和访问授权者的双向平台完 整性评估, 因而可提高整个可信网络连接架构的安全性。 再有, 由于在网络访 问层和完整性评估层都釆用了三元对等鉴别协议,也就是基于第三方的双向鉴 别协议, 进一步增强了可信网络连接架构的安全性。
附图说明
图 1为现有 TCG-TNC基本架构的示意图;
图 2为本发明 TNC基本架构的示意图;
图 3 为本发明第一种平台完整性评估方式对应的一次完整的信息传输过 程示意图;
图 4 为本发明第二种平台完整性评估方式对应的一次完整的信息传输过 程示意图。
附图符号说明如下:
PDP: 策略决策点; AR: 访问请求者; PEP: 策略执行点; AA: 访问授 权者; PM: 策略管理器; IMd: 访问请求者 AR的完整性收集者; IMV 访 问请求者 AR的完整性校验者; IMV2:访问授权者 AA的完整性校验者; IMC2: 访问授权者 AA的完整性收集者; IMV: 策略管理器 PM的完整性校验者; TNCC: TNC客户端; TNCS: TNC服务端; PESU: 平台评估服务单元; NAR: 网络访问请求者; PE: 策略执行者; NAA: 网络访问授权者; UASU: 用户鉴 别服务单元; IF-T: 网络授权传输协议接口, 是网络访问请求者 NAR与策略 执行者 PE之间的协议接口; IF-PEP: 策略实施接口 , 是策略执行者 PE与网 络访问授权者 NAA之间的协议接口; IF-UAA: 用户鉴别授权接口, 是网络访 问授权者 NAA与用户鉴别服务单元 UASU之间的协议接口; IF-TNCCS: 完 整性评估接口, 是 TNC客户端 TNCC与 TNC服务端 TNCS之间的协议接口; IF-PEA:平台评估授权接口,是 TNC服务端 TNCS与平台评估服务单元 PESU 的协议接口; IF-IMC: 完整性度量收集接口, 是 TNC客户端 TNCC与访问请 求者 AR的完整性收集者 之间的协议接口,也是 TNC服务端 TNCS与访 问授权者 AA的完整性收集者 IMC2之间的协议接口; IF-IMV: 完整性度量校 验接口, 是 TNC客户端 TNCC与访问请求者 AR的完整性校验者 IMV1之间 的协议接口, 是 TNC服务端 TNCS与访问授权者 AA的整性校验者 IMV2之 间的协议接口,也是平台评估服务单元 PESU与策略管理器 PM的完整性校验 者 IMV之间的协议接口; IF-M: 完整性度量接口, 是访问请求者 AR的完整 性收集者 IMd与访问授权者 AA的完整性校验者 IMV2之间的协议接口; 是 访问请求者 AR的完整性校验者 IMV与访问授权者 AA的完整性收集者 IMC2 之间的协议接口; 是访问授权者 AA的完整性收集者 IMC2与策略管理器 PM 的完整性校验者 IMV之间的协议接口; 也是访问请求者 AR的完整性收集者 IMCi与策略管理器 PM的完整性校验者 IMV之间的协议接口。
具体实施方式
由于现有的各种网络大部分釆用 TCG-TNC的架构部署,尤其是有线网络, 所以,本发明是在 TCG-TNC架构上建立的一种增强安全性的可信网络连接架 构。
参见图 2, 本发明主要由访问请求者 AR、 策略执行点 PEP、 访问授权者
AA和策略管理器 PM四个逻辑实体构成, 其可以分布在网络的任意位置。 访 问请求者 AR又称为请求者、 用户站等, 策略管理器 PM又称为鉴别服务器、 可信服务器、后台服务器等。访问请求者 AR与策略执行点 PEP以认证协议方 式网络连通, 策略执行点 PEP与访问授权者 AA通过策略实施接口 IF-PEP网 络连通, 访问请求者 AR与访问授权者 AA通过网络授权传输协议接口 IF-T 及完整性评估接口 IF-TNCCS网络连通,访问请求者 AR和访问授权者 AA都 具有完整性度量接口 IF-M, 访问授权者 AA与策略管理器 PM通过用户鉴别 授权接口 IF-UAA和平台评估授权接口 IF-PEA网络连通。
本发明实施例一中, 访问请求者 AR主要由网络访问请求者 NAR、 TNC 客户端 TNCC、 访问请求者 AR的完整性收集者 IMC^访问请求者 AR的完 整性校验者 IMVi构成。网络访问请求者 NAR与 TNC客户端 TNCC以数据承 载方式连通,用于 TNC客户端 TNCC转发消息。 TNC客户端 TNCC与访问请 求者 AR的完整性收集者 通过完整性度量收集接口 IF-IMC相连通, 而 与访问请求者 AR的完整性校验者 IMVi通过完整性度量校验接口 IF-IMV相 连通, 以实现访问请求者 AR的完整性收集者 IMd与访问授权者 AA的完整 性校验者 IMV2以及访问请求者 AR的完整性校验者 IMVi与访问授权者 AA 的完整性收集者 IMC2的通信。
策略执行点 PEP主要由策略执行者 PE构成,负责执行访问授权者的决策。 访问授权者 AA主要由网络访问授权者 NAA、 TNC服务端 TNCS、 访问 授权者 AA的完整性校验者 IMV2和访问授权者 AA的完整性收集者 IMC2构 成。网络访问授权者 NAA与 TNC服务端 TNCS数据承载方式连通,用于 TNC 服务端 TNCS转发消息。 TNC服务端 TNCS与访问授权者 AA的完整性收集 者 IMC2通过完整性度量收集接口 IF-IMC相连通, 而与访问授权者 AA的完 整性校验者 IMV2通过完整性度量校验接口 IF-IMV相连通, 以实现访问授权 者 AA的完整性校验者 IMV2与访问请求者 AR的完整性收集者 IMd以及访 问授权者 AA的完整性收集者 IMC2与访问请求者 AR的完整性校验者 IMVi 的通信。
策略管理器 PM 主要由用户鉴别服务单元 UASU和平台评估服务单元 PESU构成。用户鉴别服务单元 UASU与平台评估服务单元 PESU以数据承载 方式连通, 用于平台评估服务单元 PESU转发消息。
本发明实施例二中, 访问请求者 AR主要由网络访问请求者 NAR、 TNC 客户端 TNCC和访问请求者 AR的完整性收集者 IMd构成。 网络访问请求者 NAR与 TNC客户端 TNCC以数据承载方式连通, 用于 TNC客户端 TNCC转 发消息。 TNC客户端 TNCC与访问请求者 AR的完整性收集者 IMd通过完整 性度量收集接口 IF-IMC相连通,以实现访问请求者 AR的完整性收集者 IMd 与策略管理器 PM的完整性校验者 IMV的通信。
策略执行点 PEP主要由策略执行者 PE构成,负责执行访问授权者的决策。 访问授权者 AA主要由网络访问授权者 NAA、 TNC服务端 TNCS和访问 授权者 AA的完整性收集者 IMC2构成。 网络访问授权者 NAA与 TNC服务端 TNCS数据承载方式连通,用于 TNC服务端 TNCS转发消息。 TNC服务端 TNCS 与访问授权者 AA的完整性收集者 IMC2通过完整性度量收集接口 IF-IMC相 连通, 以实现访问授权者 AA的完整性收集者 IMC2与策略管理器 PM的完整 性校验者 IMV的通信。
策略管理器 PM主要由用户鉴别服务单元 UASU、平台评估服务单元 PESU 及完整性校验者 IMV构成。 用户鉴别服务单元 UASU与平台评估服务单元 PESU以数据承载方式连通, 用于平台评估服务单元 PESU转发消息。 平台评 估服务单元 PESU与完整性校验者 IMV通过完整性度量校验接口 IF-IMV相连 通,以实现完整性校验者 IMV与访问请求者 AR的完整性收集者 IMd及访问 授权者 AA的完整性收集者 IMC2的通信。
本发明的网络访问请求者 NAR、 策略执行者 PE、 网络访问授权者 NAA 和用户鉴别服务单元 UASU四个组件构成网络访问层。 网络访问请求者 NAR 与网络访问授权者 NAA通过网络授权传输协议接口 IF-T连通, 策略执行者 PE与网络访问授权者 NAA通过策略实施接口 IF-PEP连通, 网络访问授权者 NAA与用户鉴别服务单元 UASU通过用户鉴别授权接口 IF-UAA连通。 在网 络访问层, 策略执行点 PEP与访问授权者 AA之间预先建立有一个安全通道。 网络访问请求者 NAR、 网络访问授权者 NAA与用户鉴别服务单元 UASU通 过策略执行者 PE执行三元对等鉴别协议, 以实现访问请求者 AR和访问授权 者 AA的双向用户鉴别及密钥协商。鉴别过程生成的主密钥由网络访问授权者 NAA通过安全通道传送给策略执行者 PE。 策略执行者 PE利用主密钥与访问 请求者 AR进行密钥协商,以保护策略执行点 PEP与访问请求者 AR之间数据 传输的安全。 网络访问层负责实现访问请求者 AR与访问授权者 AA之间的双 向用户鉴别及密钥协商、 访问请求者 AR与策略执行点 PEP之间的密钥协商, 访问授权者 AA与访问请求者 AR之间的相互访问控制。
TNC客户端 TNCC、 TNC服务端 TNCS和平台评估服务单元 PESU三个 实体构成完整性评估层。 TNC客户端 TNCC与 TNC服务端 TNCS通过完整性 评估接口 IF-TNCCS连通, TNC服务端 TNCS与平台评估服务单元 PESU通 过平台评估授权接口 IF-PEA连通。 在完整性评估层, 完整性评估包括平台完 整性校验和平台凭证认证。 完整性评估层的平台完整性评估方式有二种, 具体 说明 ^下:
第一种平台完整性评估方式参见图 3 , 是由策略管理器 PM验证访问请求 者 AR和访问授权者 AA的 AIK证书的有效性,而由访问请求者 AR和访问授 权者 AA在本地校验对方平台的完整性,该方式适用于访问请求者 AR和访问 授权者 AA都可访问存储有各个平台组件的标准完整性度量值的数据库,可增 强可信网络连接架构的安全性, 简化可信网络连接架构的密钥管理。 其中, 第 一种平台完整性评估的实现方式为: ①. 平台完整性校验: 访问请求者 AR的 平台完整性校验在 TNC服务端 TNCS进行, 访问授权者 AA的平台完整性校 验在 TNC客户端 TNCC进行。 ②. 平台凭证认证: 访问请求者 AR和访问授 权者 AA的平台凭证认证釆用三元对等鉴别协议来实现。访问请求者 AR和访 问授权者 AA的的 AIK证书鉴别均由平台评估服务单元 PESU来完成。
第二种平台完整性评估方式参见图 4, 访问请求者 AR和访问授权者 AA 的 AIK证书有效性验证和平台完整性的校验都由策略管理器 PM完成, 其简 化了可信网络连接架构的密钥管理和完整性校验机制,更进一步地增强可信网 络连接架构的安全性, 且可扩展可信网络连接的适用范围。 其中, 第二种平台 完整性评估的实现方式为: ①. 平台完整性校验: 访问请求者 AR和访问授权 者 AA的平台完整性校验均由平台评估服务单元 PESU来完成。 ②. 平台凭证 认证: 访问请求者 AR和访问授权者 AA的平台凭证认证釆用三元对等鉴别协 议来实现。访问请求者 AR和访问授权者 AA的 AIK证书有效性验证均由平台 评估服务单元 PESU来完成。
完整性度量层负责收集和校验访问请求者 AR和访问授权者 AA的平台完 整性信息。
当釆用第一种平台完整性评估方式时, 访问请求者 AR和访问授权者 AA 二者既要收集平台的完整性信息, 又要校验平台完整性信息。该结构的完整性 度量层主要由访问请求者 AR的完整性收集者 IMd、 访问请求者 AR的完整 性校验者 IMVi、访问授权者 AA的完整性校验者 IMV2和访问授权者 AA的完 整性收集者 IMC2四个组件构成。 访问请求者 AR的完整性收集者 IMC1通过 完整性度量接口 IF-M与访问授权者 AA的完整性校验者 IMV2连通, 访问请 求者 AR的完整性校验者 通过完整性度量接口 IF-M与访问授权者 AA 的完整性收集者 IMC2连通。
当釆用第二种平台完整性评估方式时, 访问请求者 AR和访问授权者 AA 只需收集平台完整性信息, 而平台完整性信息的校验由策略管理器 PM来实 现。 该结构的完整性度量层主要由访问请求者 AR的完整性收集者 IMd、 访 问授权者 AA的完整性收集者 IMC2和策略管理器 PM的完整性校验者 IMV三 个组件构成。 访问请求者 AR的完整性收集者 IMC 与策略管理器 PM的完整 性校验者 IMV通过完整性度量接口 IF-M连通,访问授权者 AA的完整性收集 者 IMC2与策略管理器 PM的完整性校验者 IMV通过完整性度量接口 IF-M连 通。
参见图 3、 图 4, 釆用本发明实现增强安全性的可信网络连接的具体步骤 下:
(1.) 进行初始化。 在建立网络连接之前, 进行下列步骤:
(1.1)访问请求者 AR的 TNC客户端 TNCC预先准备平台完整性信息,交 给访问请求者 AR的完整性收集者 IMd;访问授权者 AA的 TNC服务端 TNCS 预先准备平台完整性信息, 交给访问授权者 AA的完整性收集者 IMC2
(1.2) TNC客户端 TNCC和 TNC服务端 TNCS预先制定完整性验证要求, 该完整性验证要求包括访问请求者 AR与访问授权者 AA相互请求对方验证的 PCRs表。 对于第一种平台完整性评估方式, TNC客户端 TNCC和 TNC服务 端 TNCS将预先制定的完整性验证要求直接交给访问请求者 AR的完整性校验 者 IMV^。访问授权者 AA的完整性校验者 IMV2。 对于第二种平台完整性评 估方式, TNC客户端 TNCC和 TNC服务端 TNCS在平台完整性评估过程中才 将预先制定的完整性验证要求交给策略管理器 PM的完整性校验者 IMV, 参 见图 4。 (1.3)访问请求者 AR和访问授权者 AA的可信平台模块将网络策略所需 平台信息经散列后存入平台配置寄存器。
(2.) 进行用户鉴别。
(2.1) 在网络访问层, 网络访问请求者 NAR向策略执行者 PE发起访问请 求, 策略执行者 PE将该访问请求转发给网络访问授权者 NAA。
(2.2) 网络访问授权者 NAA收到访问请求后,启动双向用户鉴别过程, 网 络访问层的网络访问请求者 NAR、网络访问授权者 NAA和用户鉴别服务单元 UASU之间开始执行三元对等鉴别协议, 实现访问请求者 AR与访问授权者 AA的双向用户鉴别及密钥协商。 之后, 网络访问授权者 NAA将双向用户鉴 别过程生成的主密钥通过预建立的安全通道传送给策略执行点 PEP。 最后, 策 略执行点 PEP用主密钥与访问请求者 AR进行密钥协商。
(2.3) 当双向用户鉴别成功时, 网络访问请求者 NAR和网络访问授权者 NAA将用户鉴别成功的信息分别发往完整性评估层的 TNC客户端 TNCC和 TNC服务端 TNCS。
(3.) 进行完整性评估。
当访问授权者 AA的 TNC服务端 TNCS收到网络访问授权者 NAA发送 的用户鉴别成功的信息时, 访问授权者 AA的 TNC服务端 TNCS、 访问请求 者 AR的 TNC客户端 TNCC和策略管理器 PM的平台评估服务单元 PESU利 用三元对等鉴别协议来实现访问请求者 AR和访问授权者 AA的双向平台完整 性评估。
参见图 3 , 第一种平台完整性评估的实现方式包括: ①. 平台完整性校验: 访问请求者校验访问授权者的平台完整性,而访问授权者校验访问请求者的完 整性; ②. 平台凭证认证: 由策略管理器验证访问请求者和访问授权者的 AIK 证书有效性。
参见图 4, 第二种平台完整性评估的实现方式包括: ①. 平台完整性校验: 由策略管理器校验访问请求者和访问授权者的平台完整性; ②. 平台凭证认 证: 由策略管理器验证访问请求者和访问授权者的 AIK证书有效性。
(4.) 进行访问控制。
TNC客户端 TNCC和 TNC服务端 TNCS各自汇总访问授权者 AA和访问 请求者 AR的平台完整性评估结果。 然后, 分别向网络访问请求者 NAR和网 络访问授权者 NAA发送推荐。 网络访问请求者 NAR和网络访问授权者 NAA 分别依据各自收到的推荐对端口进行控制, 实现访问请求者 AR和访问授权者 AA的相互访问控制。 TNC客户端 TNCC和 TNC服务端 TNCS向网络访问请 求者 NAR和网络访问授权者 NAA发送的推荐是允许访问信息、 禁止访问信 息或隔离修补信息等。
本发明上述实施例中,在网络访问层釆用了基于三元对等鉴别的访问控制 方式, 增强了可信网络连接架构的安全性, 简化了该架构的密钥管理。
另外, 本发明平台完整性评估可根据实际情况选用实现方式。 第一种是由 策略管理器实现访问请求者和访问授权者的 AIK证书的集中鉴别, 而由访问 请求者和访问授权者在本地实现对方平台完整性的校验,这种方式适用于访问 请求者和访问授权者都可访问存储有各个组件的标准完整性度量值的数据库 , 可增强可信网络连接架构的安全性, 简化可信网络连接架构的密钥管理。 第二 种是访问请求者和访问授权者的 AIK证书的鉴别和平台完整性的校验都由策 略管理器完成, 其简化了可信网络连接架构的密钥管理和完整性校验机制, 更 进一步地增强可信网络连接架构的安全性,而且可扩展可信网络连接的适用范 围。
此外,本发明不但在网络访问层实现了访问请求者和访问授权者的双向用 户鉴别,而且在完整性评估层也实现了访问请求者和访问授权者的双向平台完 整性评估, 因而可提高整个可信网络连接架构的安全性。 再有, 由于在网络访 问层和完整性评估层都釆用了三元对等鉴别协议,也就是基于第三方的双向鉴 别协议, 进一步增强了可信网络连接架构的安全性。
以上对本发明所提供的增强安全性的可信网络连接系统进行了详细介绍, 说明只是用于帮助理解本发明的方案; 同时, 对于本领域的一般技术人员, 依 据本发明的思想, 在具体实施方式及应用范围上均会有改变之处, 综上所述, 本说明书内容不应理解为对本发明的限制。

Claims

权 利 要 求
1.一种增强安全性的可信网络连接系统, 包括访问请求者 AR和策略执行 点 PEP, 其特征在于, 还包括: 访问授权者 AA和策略管理器 PM;
所述的访问请求者 AR与策略执行点 PEP以认证协议方式网络连通,所述 的访问请求者 AR与访问授权者 AA通过网络授权传输协议接口 IF-T及完整 性评估接口 IF-TNCCS网络连通, 所述的访问请求者 AR与访问授权者 AA均 具有完整性度量接口 IF-M, 所述的策略执行点 PEP与访问授权者 AA通过策 略实施接口 IF-PEP网络连通, 所述的访问授权者 AA与策略管理器 PM通过 用户鉴别授权接口 IF-UAA及平台评估授权接口 IF-PEA网络连通; 其中: 所述的网络授权传输协议接口 IF-T是实现访问请求者 AR与访问授权者
AA之间的双向用户鉴别和密钥协商、 以及实现访问请求者 AR与访问授权者 AA相互访问控制的协议接口;
所述的完整性评估接口 IF-TOCCS是通过策略管理器 PM验证访问请求者 AR及访问授权者 AA的 AIK证书有效性、 以及通过策略管理器 PM校验访问 请求者 AR及访问授权者 AA的平台完整性来实现访问请求者 AR与访问授权 者 AA之间的平台完整性评估的协议接口;
所述的完整性度量接口 IF-M是收集和校验访问请求者 AR和访问授权者 AA的平台完整性相关信息的协议接口;
所述的策略实施接口 IF-PEP是执行访问授权者 AA的决策的协议接口; 所述的用户鉴别授权接口 IF-UAA是实现访问请求者 AR与访问授权者
AA之间的双向用户鉴别和密钥协商、 以及实现访问请求者 AR与访问授权者 AA相互访问控制的协议接口;
所述的平台评估授权接口 IF-PEA是实现访问请求者 AR与访问授权者 AA 之间的平台完整性评估、 实现策略管理器 PM验证访问请求者 AR及访问授权 者 AA的 AIK证书有效性、以及实现策略管理器 PM校验访问请求者 AR及访 问授权者 AA的平台完整性的协议接口。
2.根据权利要求 1所述的增强安全性的可信网络连接系统, 其特征在于, 所述的访问请求者 AR包括: 网络访问请求者 NAR、 TNC客户端 TNCC 及访问请求者 AR的完整性收集者 IMC^完整性校验者 IMV^ 其中, 所述的 网络访问请求者 NAR与 TNC客户端 TNCC以数据承载方式连通,所述的 TNC 客户端 TNCC与访问请求者 AR的完整性收集者 IMd通过完整性度量收集接 口 IF-IMC相连通, 所述的 TNC客户端 TNCC与访问请求者 AR的完整性校 验者 IMVi通过完整性度量校验接口 IF-IMV相连通;
所述的策略执行点 PEP包括执行访问授权者 AA的决策的策略执行者 PE; 所述的访问授权者 AA包括: 网络访问授权者 NAA、 TNC服务端 TNCS 及访问授权者 AA的完整性校验者 IMV2和完整性收集者 IMC2; 其中,所述的 网络访问授权者 NAA与 TNC服务端 TNCS以数据承载方式连通,所述的 TNC 服务端 TNCS与访问授权者 AA的完整性收集者 IMC2通过完整性度量收集接 口 IF-IMC相连通,所述的 TNC服务端 TNCS与访问授权者 AA的完整性校验 者 IMV2通过完整性度量校验接口 IF-IMV相连通;
所述的策略管理器 PM包括: 用户鉴别服务单元 UASU及平台评估服务 单元 PESU,所述的用户鉴别服务单元 UASU与平台评估服务单元 PESU以数 据承载方式连通;
所述的网络访问请求者 NAR与策略执行者 PE以认证协议方式连通, 所 述的策略执行者 PE与网络访问授权者 NAA通过策略实施接口 IF-PEP连通 , 所述的网络访问请求者 NAR与访问授权者 NAA通过网络授权传输协议接口 IF-T连通 ,所述的网络访问授权者 NAA与用户鉴别服务单元 UASU通过用户 鉴别授权接口 IF-UAA连通;
所述的 TNC客户端 TNCC与 TNC服务端 TNCS通过完整性评估接口
IF-TNCCS连通, 所述的 TNC服务端 TNCS与平台评估服务单元 PESU通过 平台评估 4受权接口 IF-PEA连通;
所述访问请求者 AR的完整性收集者 IMd通过完整性度量接口 IF-M与访 问授权者 AA的完整性校验者 IMV2连通, 所述访问请求者 AR的完整性校验 者 通过完整性度量接口 IF-M与访问授权者 AA的完整性收集者 IMC2连 通。
3.根据权利要求 2所述的增强安全性的可信网络连接系统, 其特征在于, 所述访问请求者 AR的完整性收集者 IMC是收集 TNC客户端 TNCC预先准 备的平台完整性信息的组件; 所述访问请求者 AR的完整性校验者 IMV1是校 验 TNC服务端 TNCS发送的访问授权者 AA的平台完整性信息的组件; 所述 访问授权者 AA的完整性收集者 IMC2是收集 TNC服务端 TNCS预先准备的 平台完整性信息的组件; 所述访问授权者 AA 的完整性校验者 IMV2是校验 TNC客户端 TNCC发送的访问请求者 AR的平台完整性信息的组件。
4.根据权利要求 1所述的增强安全性的可信网络连接系统, 其特征在于, 所述的访问请求者 AR包括: 网络访问请求者 NAR、 TNC客户端 TNCC 和访问请求者 AR的完整性收集者 IMd; 其中, 所述的网络访问请求者 NAR 与 TNC客户端 TNCC以数据承载方式连通, 所述的 TNC客户端 TNCC与访 问请求者 AR的完整性收集者 IMd通过完整性度量收集接口 IF-IMC相连通; 所述的策略执行点 PEP包括执行访问授权者 AA的决策的策略执行者 PE; 所述的访问授权者 AA包括: 网络访问授权者 NAA、 TNC服务端 TNCS 及访问授权者 AA的完整性收集者 IMC2; 其中, 所述的网络访问授权者 NAA 与 TNC服务端 TNCS以数据承载方式连通,所述的 TNC服务端 TNCS与访问 授权者 AA的完整性收集者 IMC2通过完整性度量收集接口 IF-IMC相连通; 所述的策略管理器 PM包括: 用户鉴别服务单元 UASU、 平台评估服务单 元 PESU及完整性校验者 IMV; 其中, 所述的用户鉴别服务单元 UASU与平 台评估服务单元 PESU以数据承载方式连通, 所述的平台评估服务单元 PESU 与完整性校验者 IMV通过完整性度量校验接口 IF-IMV相连通;
所述的网络访问请求者 NAR与策略执行者 PE以认证协议方式连通, 所 述的策略执行者 PE与网络访问授权者 NAA通过策略实施接口 IF-PEP连通, 所述的网络访问请求者 NAR与访问授权者 NAA通过网络授权传输协议接口 IF-T连通 ,所述的网络访问授权者 NAA与用户鉴别服务单元 UASU通过用户 鉴别授权接口 IF-UAA连通;
所述的 TNC客户端 TNCC与 TNC服务端 TNCS通过完整性评估接口 IF-TNCCS连通, 所述的 TNC服务端 TNCS与平台评估服务单元 PESU通过 平台评估 4受权接口 IF-PEA连通;
所述访问请求者 AR的完整性收集者 IMd通过完整性度量接口 IF-M与策 略管理器 PM的完整性校验者 IMV连通, 所述访问授权者 AA的完整性收集 者 IMC2通过完整性度量接口 IF-M与策略管理器 PM的完整性校验者 IMV连 通。
5.根据权利要求 4所述的增强安全性的可信网络连接系统, 其特征在于, 所述访问请求者 AR的完整性收集者 IMC是收集 TNC客户端 TNCC预先准 备的平台完整性信息的组件; 所述的访问授权者 AA的完整性收集者 IMC2是 收集 TNC服务端 TNCS预先准备的平台完整性信息的组件; 所述策略管理器 PM的完整性校验者 IMV是接收 TNC客户端 TNCC与 TNC服务端 TNCS预 先制定的平台完整性验证要求、并对访问请求者 AR和访问授权者 AA进行平 台完整性校验的组件。
6.根据权利要求 1至 5之任一所述的增强安全性的可信网络连接系统, 其 特征在于,所述的访问请求者 AR和访问授权者 AA均是具有可信平台模块的 逻辑实体。
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KR101083152B1 (ko) 2011-11-11
CN101242401A (zh) 2008-08-13
EP2178241A4 (en) 2011-12-07
CN100512313C (zh) 2009-07-08
US20120005718A1 (en) 2012-01-05
KR20100041869A (ko) 2010-04-22
RU2437228C2 (ru) 2011-12-20
JP2010536203A (ja) 2010-11-25
US8336081B2 (en) 2012-12-18
JP5187397B2 (ja) 2013-04-24
RU2010107864A (ru) 2011-09-20

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