WO2008135921A1 - Method and system for preparing, personalizing and issuing identification tokens - Google Patents
Method and system for preparing, personalizing and issuing identification tokens Download PDFInfo
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- WO2008135921A1 WO2008135921A1 PCT/IB2008/051685 IB2008051685W WO2008135921A1 WO 2008135921 A1 WO2008135921 A1 WO 2008135921A1 IB 2008051685 W IB2008051685 W IB 2008051685W WO 2008135921 A1 WO2008135921 A1 WO 2008135921A1
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- WIPO (PCT)
- Prior art keywords
- blank
- data
- personalization
- encrypted data
- station
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Classifications
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- B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
- B60—VEHICLES IN GENERAL
- B60R—VEHICLES, VEHICLE FITTINGS, OR VEHICLE PARTS, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- B60R13/00—Elements for body-finishing, identifying, or decorating; Arrangements or adaptations for advertising purposes
- B60R13/10—Registration, licensing, or like devices
Definitions
- This invention relates to a method and system for preparing, personalizing and issuing identification tokens, including but not limited to number plates for vehicles and identification documents for people.
- Dishonest operators and/or users may cause plates to migrate from one vehicle to another and it is often very difficult and time consuming to identify perpetrating manufacturers, personalization stations and/or users. Policing of actions relating to plates manufactured, personalized and issued according to the known systems and methods is difficult, if not impossible.
- a method of preparing an identification token comprising a blank and which blank is subsequently personalized at a personalization station, the method comprising the steps of: generating first encrypted data comprising at least data relating to an identity of an intended personalization station; and - applying the first encrypted data to the blank, before personalization of the blank.
- the method may comprise the steps of generating second encrypted data comprising personalization data; causing the second encrypted data to be applied to the blank; and causing the personalization data to be applied to the blank in human perceivable form.
- the personalization step may comprise any suitable process of applying the personalization data in human perceivable form on or to the blank.
- the personalization step may comprise the step of embossing personalization data in the form of a registration number for the vehicle into the blank, so that the number may be read by a human from a suitable distance.
- the blank may comprise one of a blank for an identification token for identifying an authorized human bearer thereof and a blank plate for forming a registration plate for a host article.
- the blank plate may be a blank plate for forming a registration plate for a vehicle
- the personalization data may comprise a registration number for the vehicle
- the step of applying the personalization data in human perceivable form may comprise the step of embossing the registration number into the blank plate.
- a blank code may be applied to the blank during or after manufacturing of the blank and may be stored in at least one of a registration authority database and a database which is accessible by a registration authority information system.
- the first encrypted data may be applied to the blank in at least one of: applying a first encrypted data carrying bar code to the token; and writing the data into a memory arrangement of a radio frequency transponder mounted on the token.
- the second encrypted data may be caused to be applied to the blank in at least one of: applying a second encrypted data carrying bar code to the token; and writing the second encrypted data into the memory arrangement of the radio frequency transponder.
- the method as hereinbefore defined is preferably performed by a trusted third party, which is independent of a manufacturer of the blank and the personalization station.
- the first encrypted data may further comprise at least one of identity data relating to a manufacturer of the blank; data relating to a unique ID of the transponder; data relating to a token code (TC) relating to the blank; and time and date data relating to a time and date of generation of the first encrypted data.
- identity data relating to a manufacturer of the blank
- data relating to a unique ID of the transponder data relating to a token code (TC) relating to the blank
- TC token code
- the second encrypted data may further comprise at least one of data relating to the host object; the data relating to the unique ID of the transponder; data relating to an owner of the host object; and time and date data relating to a time and date of generation of the second encrypted data.
- the invention also includes within its scope a method of personalizing a blank to form an identification token comprising the steps of; receiving the blank at a receiving personalization station; verifying authenticity of the blank by decrypting first encrypted data applied to the blank and comprising at least data relating to an intended personalization station, to provide decrypted data relating to the intended personalization station; if the decrypted data relating to the intended personalization station corresponds to the receiving personalization station, applying personalization data in human perceivable form to the blank; and applying second encrypted data to one of the blank and token, the second encrypted data comprising at least the personalization data.
- a token comprising a blank carrying first encrypted data in the form of at least one of: a first encrypted data carrying bar code and data written into a memory arrangement of a radio frequency transponder on the blank, the first encrypted data comprising at least data relating to an identity of an intended personalization station, for applying to the blank personalization data in human perceivable form.
- the token may also carry personalization data in human perceivable form and second encrypted data in the form of at least one of: a second encrypted data carrying bar code and data written into the memory arrangement of the radio frequency transponder, the second encrypted data comprising the personalization data.
- a system for preparing, personalizing and issuing identification tokens comprising: at least one blank manufacturing station; a trusted third party center; and at least one personalized station;
- the trusted third party center comprising an encryption processor for generating for each blank manufactured by a manufacturing station respective first encrypted data to be applied to the blank, the first encrypted data comprising at least data relating to an intended one of the personalization stations authorized to personalize the blank.
- figure 1 is a block diagram of a system for carrying out a method according to the invention
- figure 2 is a more detailed diagram of a blank manufacturing station forming part of the system
- figure 3 is a more detailed diagram of a trusted third party centre of the system
- figure 4 is a more detailed diagram of a personalisation or embossing station forming part of the system
- figure 5 is a front view of a vehicle comprising tokens prepared and issued in accordance with the method according to the invention
- figure 6 is a representation of a vehicle number plate according to the invention
- figure 7 is a flow diagram of an alternative form of the method.
- FIG 1 there is shown a system 10 for preparing or manufacturing, personalizing and issuing an identification token in the form of a number plate for a vehicle in accordance with a method according to the invention.
- the plate is prepared, personalized and issued in a manner to enable subsequent policing of actions relating to the plate and to facilitate making operators involved in the manufacturing, personalizing and use of the plate accountable, in the event of unauthorized actions or inferior quality being detected.
- the system 10 comprises at least one manufacturing station 12, a trusted third party authentication station or plate trust centre (PTC) 14, and at least one personalisation station 16, typically an embossing station.
- a user vehicle 18 hosts a pair of number plates 20.1 and 20.2 prepared, personalized and issued in accordance with a method according to the invention.
- the vehicle is associated with an owner 21.
- the system 10 interfaces with one or more central information systems 22 such as a national, state or provincial transport information system (NaTIS) 24 and/or a home affairs national information system (HANIS) 26.
- NaTIS national, state or provincial transport information system
- HANIS home affairs national information system
- the plate comprises a blank plate 28 comprising a substrate 29 made of a suitable material, such as metal, carrying a reflective or retro-reflective film 31 .
- the plate is personalised in any suitable manner, for example by embossing a registration number 30 therein.
- the plate further comprises of tag 32 comprising an active or passive radio frequency (RF ⁇ transponder 34 comprising a memory arrangement wherein there is stored, as will hereinafter be described, first encrypted data
- RF ⁇ transponder 34 comprising a memory arrangement wherein there is stored, as will hereinafter be described, first encrypted data
- [BlankSig] comprising at least data relating to an identity of an intended embossing station 16 where the blank is to be personalized, and preferably data relating to a unique ID relating to the transponder, data relating to a token code (TC) relating to the blank; and second encrypted data flssueSig] comprising at least data relating to the registration number 30 and preferably date relating to the embossing station 16, the data relating to the unique ID of the transponder and identity data relating to the owner 21 .
- TC token code
- the data is encrypted as hereinafter described and may be used after suitable decryption by a law enforcement officer 35 (shown in figure 1 ) utilising a suitable reader and decrypter 23, to determine off-line, but in substantially real time, whether the plates 20.1 , 20.2 on a host vehicle 18 are genuine or not.
- the aforementioned encrypted data after suitable decryption into plain text data, also enables the participants 12, 14, 16 and 21 in the supply chain to verify at any stage in the chain whether the plates are what they purport to be, and law enforcement officers to determine accountability, if necessary.
- the blanks are manufactured at a manufacturing station which obtains the raw materials 36 from a suitable source.
- the blank plates are made and each is stamped with a respective TC conforming to a suitable standard.
- the TC may be integrated in and displayed by the film 31 of the blank.
- the TC may also be stamped on a back face of the blank plate in the form of a machine-readable code, such as a linear bar code 38.
- the TC may be augmented to comprise one or more of data relating to the identity of the manufacturing station 1 2, data relating to a class of the item and data relating to a unique item identification number.
- the TC is stored in a database 39 associated with the manufacturing station 12, which is electronically accessible by the authority information systems 22.
- the blanks are delivered to the PTC 14.
- an agent of the PTC may share premises with the manufacturing station and may be connected to the PTC 16 by a PTC terminal 41 . In other cases, the PTC and agent may be remote from the manufacturing stations.
- the blank plates from a plurality of manufacturing stations 12.1 to 12.n are received at the PTC, the physical and other parameters of each blank 28 are verified against a specification and bad blanks are rejected and/or returned to the relevant manufacturing station.
- a respective tag 32 with RF transponder 34 is applied to each acceptable blank 28, by means of a suitable applicator.
- the TC is read and the blank is registered in the authority database 24 shown in figure 1 .
- the PTC is associated with an asymmetric encryption key pair comprising a private signing key 40.1 and a public verification key 40.2 and an encryption processor 37 shown in figures 1 and 3.
- the PTC with processor 37 When an embossing station 16.1 of a plurality of embossing stations 16.1 to 16.m orders a batch 44 of blanks 28.1 to 28. n, the PTC with processor 37 generates in respect of each blank the respective first encrypted data [BlankSig] comprising data relating to the identity of the intended or destination embossing station 16.1 and preferably also data relating to the TC, data relating to time and date and a PTC batch code, all encrypted utilising the private key 40.1 , thereby to authorize the blanks.
- This [BlankSig] is applied on the blank 28 by means of a bar code printer in a suitable two-dimensional bar code 42 and/or is electronically written or programmed into the memory arrangement of the transponder 34.
- the PTC is a trusted third party whose responsibility it is to provide a secure audit trail for the manufacture, personalization, issuance to users and verification of the identity tokens, in this case vehicle number plates.
- the PTC should function as an agent of the vehicle registration authority, but be independent of the operators 12 and 16.
- the PTC is also responsible for the encryption process and encryption key management. The use of encryption methods allows for off-line verification of the vehicle identification tokens.
- the batch of blanks 44 is then dispatched to the destination embossing station 16.1 .
- the batch 44 of blanks are received and, by means of a suitable reader 46 ⁇ shown in figure 1 ), the bar code 38 comprising the TC, the bar code 42 and transponder data are read and decrypted, where necessary, utilizing the public key 40.2.
- the decrypted plain text data is used to verify the blanks and to confirm that the blanks are from an authorized source and intended for the embosser 16.1 .
- the [IssueSig] comprises data relating to the personalization data in the form of the registration number 30 and preferably data relating to the embossing station 16.1 , the TC, data relating to the unique ID of the transponder, data relating to the owner and the date of issue, all encrypted utilising the private key 40.1 .
- the [IssueSig] is electronically written into the memory arrangement of the transponder 34 and/or applied in the form of a second two-dimensional bar code 48 on the plates 20.1 and 20.2.
- the aforementioned data is captured in the database 24 to update the database 24.
- An issue certificate is issued by the PTC on successful programming and/or application of the [IssueSig] as aforesaid.
- the certificate is handed by the embossing station 16.1 to the owner 21 .
- the personalization data is applied to the plate in human perceivable form by embossing the registration number would be capable of being read by a human in third party specified circumstances
- the host vehicle 18 is shown in more detail.
- the issued personalized plates 20.1 and 20.2 are secured to the vehicle body in conventional manner in the conventionai front and rear positions, respectively.
- a conventional licence disc or an electronic license disc (ELD) 52 comprising a transponder 54.
- An ELD 52 prepared and personalized in a similar manner, used together with the plates, may be used to detect migration of number plates.
- a tamper destruct number plate verification label 56 alternatively referred to as a vehicle identification sticker, further alternatively referred to as a so- called third number plate, comprising a transponder 58.
- the label 56 is preferably positioned such on the vehicle body as to allow a policing officer 35 (shown in figure 1 ) to interrogate and/or view the label 56 and a plate 20.1 or 20.2 simultaneously.
- the method may include the steps as shown in figure 7, which would be clear to a person skilled in the art from the aforegoing description.
- the embosser 16 is provided with a blank 28 comprising the first bar code 42 permanently applied to the blank and a copy thereof on a removable sticker on the blank.
- the blank is embossed as hereinbefore described, but instead of applying second encrypted data to the blank, the sticker is removed from the blank and applied to an issue confirmation certificate (ICC) as shown at 76.
- ICC issue confirmation certificate
- the ICC is returned to the PTC, and measures may be put in place at 78, to ensure that an embosser is not supplied with further authorized blanks, unless a corresponding number of proper and complete ICCs have been received back from that embosser. If a problem with returning ICCs is detected, the embosser may be reported and appropriate steps may be taken, including withdrawing the embosser's authority to emboss or personalize blanks for or on behalf of the registration authority.
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Abstract
A system for preparing, personalizing and issuing identification tokens comprises at least one blank manufacturing station ( 12) and at least one personalization station (16). A trusted third party centre ( 14) is independent of the manufacturing stations and the personalization stations. The trusted third party centre comprises an asymmetric encryption processor (37) for generating for each blank manufactured by a manufacturing station, respective first encrypted data to be applied to the blank. The first encrypted data comprises at least data relating to an intended one of the personalization stations (16) authorized to personalize the blank on behalf of a registration authority. Subsequently and in a supply chain, the blank is received at a receiving personalization station. The first encrypted data is decrypted and the personalization station is authorized to personalize the blank, for example to emboss the blank with a vehicle registration number, only if the decrypted data relating to the intended personalization station corresponds to the receiving personalization station.
Description
METHOD AND SYSTEM FOR PREPARING, PERSONALIZING AND ISSUING IDENTIFICATION TOKENS
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND This invention relates to a method and system for preparing, personalizing and issuing identification tokens, including but not limited to number plates for vehicles and identification documents for people.
There are known methods and systems for manufacturing blanks for number plates for vehicles and for personalizing the blanks by applying or embossing a registration number for the vehicle in the blank. However, a problem associated with the known systems and methods is the relative ease of cloning the blanks and/or genuine plates and using the cloned blanks in an unauthorised manner or cloned plates on unregistered or unauthorized vehicles, without being detected or caught. It is necessary to be able to control both manufacturers and personalization stations. Effective control depends on effective detection. Furthermore, genuine plates of an inferior quality which are difficult to read by law enforcers are often made and distributed by authorized manufacturers, without significant or any accountability.
Dishonest operators and/or users may cause plates to migrate from one vehicle to another and it is often very difficult and time consuming to identify perpetrating manufacturers, personalization stations and/or
users. Policing of actions relating to plates manufactured, personalized and issued according to the known systems and methods is difficult, if not impossible.
OBJECT OF THE INVENTION
Accordingly, it is an object of the present invention to provide an alternative method and associated system for preparing and/or personalizing and/or issuing an identifying token with which the applicants beiieve the aforementioned disadvantages may at least be alleviated.
SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION
According to the invention there is provided a method of preparing an identification token comprising a blank and which blank is subsequently personalized at a personalization station, the method comprising the steps of: generating first encrypted data comprising at least data relating to an identity of an intended personalization station; and - applying the first encrypted data to the blank, before personalization of the blank.
The method may comprise the steps of generating second encrypted data comprising personalization data; causing the second encrypted data to be applied to the blank; and causing the personalization data to be applied to the blank in human perceivable form.
The personalization step may comprise any suitable process of applying the personalization data in human perceivable form on or to the blank. For example, in a number plate application, the personalization step may comprise the step of embossing personalization data in the form of a registration number for the vehicle into the blank, so that the number may be read by a human from a suitable distance.
The blank may comprise one of a blank for an identification token for identifying an authorized human bearer thereof and a blank plate for forming a registration plate for a host article.
The blank plate may be a blank plate for forming a registration plate for a vehicle, the personalization data may comprise a registration number for the vehicle and the step of applying the personalization data in human perceivable form may comprise the step of embossing the registration number into the blank plate.
A blank code may be applied to the blank during or after manufacturing of the blank and may be stored in at feast one of a registration authority database and a database which is accessible by a registration authority information system.
The first encrypted data may be applied to the blank in at least one of: applying a first encrypted data carrying bar code to the token; and writing the data into a memory arrangement of a radio frequency transponder mounted on the token.
The second encrypted data may be caused to be applied to the blank in at least one of: applying a second encrypted data carrying bar code to the token; and writing the second encrypted data into the memory arrangement of the radio frequency transponder.
The method as hereinbefore defined, is preferably performed by a trusted third party, which is independent of a manufacturer of the blank and the personalization station.
The first encrypted data may further comprise at least one of identity data relating to a manufacturer of the blank; data relating to a unique ID of the transponder; data relating to a token code (TC) relating to the
blank; and time and date data relating to a time and date of generation of the first encrypted data.
The second encrypted data may further comprise at least one of data relating to the host object; the data relating to the unique ID of the transponder; data relating to an owner of the host object; and time and date data relating to a time and date of generation of the second encrypted data.
The invention also includes within its scope a method of personalizing a blank to form an identification token comprising the steps of; receiving the blank at a receiving personalization station; verifying authenticity of the blank by decrypting first encrypted data applied to the blank and comprising at least data relating to an intended personalization station, to provide decrypted data relating to the intended personalization station; if the decrypted data relating to the intended personalization station corresponds to the receiving personalization station, applying personalization data in human perceivable form to the blank; and
applying second encrypted data to one of the blank and token, the second encrypted data comprising at least the personalization data.
Also included within the scope of the present invention is a token comprising a blank carrying first encrypted data in the form of at least one of: a first encrypted data carrying bar code and data written into a memory arrangement of a radio frequency transponder on the blank, the first encrypted data comprising at least data relating to an identity of an intended personalization station, for applying to the blank personalization data in human perceivable form.
The token may also carry personalization data in human perceivable form and second encrypted data in the form of at least one of: a second encrypted data carrying bar code and data written into the memory arrangement of the radio frequency transponder, the second encrypted data comprising the personalization data.
Still further included within the scope of the invention is a system for preparing, personalizing and issuing identification tokens, the system comprising: at least one blank manufacturing station;
a trusted third party center; and at least one personalized station;
- the trusted third party center comprising an encryption processor for generating for each blank manufactured by a manufacturing station respective first encrypted data to be applied to the blank, the first encrypted data comprising at least data relating to an intended one of the personalization stations authorized to personalize the blank.
BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE ACCOMPANYING DIAGRAMS
The invention will now further be described, by way of example only, with reference to the accompanying diagrams wherein: figure 1 is a block diagram of a system for carrying out a method according to the invention; figure 2 is a more detailed diagram of a blank manufacturing station forming part of the system; figure 3 is a more detailed diagram of a trusted third party centre of the system; figure 4 is a more detailed diagram of a personalisation or embossing station forming part of the system;
figure 5 is a front view of a vehicle comprising tokens prepared and issued in accordance with the method according to the invention; figure 6 is a representation of a vehicle number plate according to the invention; and figure 7 is a flow diagram of an alternative form of the method.
DESCRIPTION OF A PREFERRED EMBODIMENT OF THE INVENTION
In figure 1 there is shown a system 10 for preparing or manufacturing, personalizing and issuing an identification token in the form of a number plate for a vehicle in accordance with a method according to the invention. The plate is prepared, personalized and issued in a manner to enable subsequent policing of actions relating to the plate and to facilitate making operators involved in the manufacturing, personalizing and use of the plate accountable, in the event of unauthorized actions or inferior quality being detected.
The system 10 comprises at least one manufacturing station 12, a trusted third party authentication station or plate trust centre (PTC) 14, and at least one personalisation station 16, typically an embossing station. A user vehicle 18 hosts a pair of number plates 20.1 and 20.2 prepared, personalized and issued in accordance with a method
according to the invention. The vehicle is associated with an owner 21. The system 10 interfaces with one or more central information systems 22 such as a national, state or provincial transport information system (NaTIS) 24 and/or a home affairs national information system (HANIS) 26.
Referring to figure 6, a complete and issued identification token in the form of a number plate 20.1 for a vehicle is shown. The plate comprises a blank plate 28 comprising a substrate 29 made of a suitable material, such as metal, carrying a reflective or retro-reflective film 31 . The plate is personalised in any suitable manner, for example by embossing a registration number 30 therein. The plate further comprises of tag 32 comprising an active or passive radio frequency (RF} transponder 34 comprising a memory arrangement wherein there is stored, as will hereinafter be described, first encrypted data
[BlankSig] comprising at least data relating to an identity of an intended embossing station 16 where the blank is to be personalized, and preferably data relating to a unique ID relating to the transponder, data relating to a token code (TC) relating to the blank; and second encrypted data flssueSig] comprising at least data relating to the registration number 30 and preferably date relating to the embossing station 16, the data relating to the unique ID of the transponder and
identity data relating to the owner 21 . The data is encrypted as hereinafter described and may be used after suitable decryption by a law enforcement officer 35 (shown in figure 1 ) utilising a suitable reader and decrypter 23, to determine off-line, but in substantially real time, whether the plates 20.1 , 20.2 on a host vehicle 18 are genuine or not. The aforementioned encrypted data, after suitable decryption into plain text data, also enables the participants 12, 14, 16 and 21 in the supply chain to verify at any stage in the chain whether the plates are what they purport to be, and law enforcement officers to determine accountability, if necessary.
Referring now to figure 2, the blanks are manufactured at a manufacturing station which obtains the raw materials 36 from a suitable source. The blank plates are made and each is stamped with a respective TC conforming to a suitable standard. Alternatively, the TC may be integrated in and displayed by the film 31 of the blank. The TC may also be stamped on a back face of the blank plate in the form of a machine-readable code, such as a linear bar code 38. The TC may be augmented to comprise one or more of data relating to the identity of the manufacturing station 1 2, data relating to a class of the item and data relating to a unique item identification number. The TC is stored in a database 39 associated with the manufacturing station 12, which
is electronically accessible by the authority information systems 22. The blanks are delivered to the PTC 14. As shown in figure 1 , an agent of the PTC may share premises with the manufacturing station and may be connected to the PTC 16 by a PTC terminal 41 . In other cases, the PTC and agent may be remote from the manufacturing stations.
Referring to figure 3, the blank plates from a plurality of manufacturing stations 12.1 to 12.n are received at the PTC, the physical and other parameters of each blank 28 are verified against a specification and bad blanks are rejected and/or returned to the relevant manufacturing station. A respective tag 32 with RF transponder 34 is applied to each acceptable blank 28, by means of a suitable applicator. The TC is read and the blank is registered in the authority database 24 shown in figure 1 . The PTC is associated with an asymmetric encryption key pair comprising a private signing key 40.1 and a public verification key 40.2 and an encryption processor 37 shown in figures 1 and 3.
When an embossing station 16.1 of a plurality of embossing stations 16.1 to 16.m orders a batch 44 of blanks 28.1 to 28. n, the PTC with processor 37 generates in respect of each blank the respective first encrypted data [BlankSig] comprising data relating to the identity of
the intended or destination embossing station 16.1 and preferably also data relating to the TC, data relating to time and date and a PTC batch code, all encrypted utilising the private key 40.1 , thereby to authorize the blanks. This [BlankSig] is applied on the blank 28 by means of a bar code printer in a suitable two-dimensional bar code 42 and/or is electronically written or programmed into the memory arrangement of the transponder 34. The PTC is a trusted third party whose responsibility it is to provide a secure audit trail for the manufacture, personalization, issuance to users and verification of the identity tokens, in this case vehicle number plates. The PTC should function as an agent of the vehicle registration authority, but be independent of the operators 12 and 16. The PTC is also responsible for the encryption process and encryption key management. The use of encryption methods allows for off-line verification of the vehicle identification tokens. The batch of blanks 44 is then dispatched to the destination embossing station 16.1 .
Referring now to figure 4, at the embossing station 16.1 the batch 44 of blanks are received and, by means of a suitable reader 46 {shown in figure 1 ), the bar code 38 comprising the TC, the bar code 42 and transponder data are read and decrypted, where necessary, utilizing the public key 40.2. The decrypted plain text data is used to verify
the blanks and to confirm that the blanks are from an authorized source and intended for the embosser 16.1 .
When a vehicle owner 21 presents his registration papers at the embossing station 16.1 to request a pair of plates 20, 1 , 20.2, the registration papers are checked by the embossing station against data in the database 24. The plates 20.1 and 20.2 are then personalized and the second encrypted data [IssueSig] is requested, typically online, by the embossing station from the PTC. The PTC will only generate and provide the second encrypted data, after having received from the embossing station, a valid [BlankSig]. The [IssueSig] comprises data relating to the personalization data in the form of the registration number 30 and preferably data relating to the embossing station 16.1 , the TC, data relating to the unique ID of the transponder, data relating to the owner and the date of issue, all encrypted utilising the private key 40.1 . The [IssueSig] is electronically written into the memory arrangement of the transponder 34 and/or applied in the form of a second two-dimensional bar code 48 on the plates 20.1 and 20.2. The aforementioned data is captured in the database 24 to update the database 24. An issue certificate is issued by the PTC on successful programming and/or application of the [IssueSig] as aforesaid. The certificate is handed by the embossing station 16.1 to the owner 21 .
The personalization data is applied to the plate in human perceivable form by embossing the registration number would be capable of being read by a human in third party specified circumstances.
In figure 5, the host vehicle 18 is shown in more detail. The issued personalized plates 20.1 and 20.2 are secured to the vehicle body in conventional manner in the conventionai front and rear positions, respectively. On the windscreen 50 there ts provided a conventional licence disc or an electronic license disc (ELD) 52 comprising a transponder 54. An ELD 52 prepared and personalized in a similar manner, used together with the plates, may be used to detect migration of number plates. Also on the windscreen or on any other suitable part of the body of the vehicle, there is provided a tamper destruct number plate verification label 56, alternatively referred to as a vehicle identification sticker, further alternatively referred to as a so- called third number plate, comprising a transponder 58. Data corresponding to the data stored in the memory arrangement of transponder 34- on the plate 20.1 is stored in the memory arrangement of the transponder 58. The label 56 is preferably positioned such on the vehicle body as to allow a policing officer 35 (shown in figure 1 ) to interrogate and/or view the label 56 and a plate 20.1 or 20.2 simultaneously.
In situations where the issuing stations are not on-line (for example in remote and/or underdeveloped regions) and therefore not capable of communicating electronically with the PTC, the method may include the steps as shown in figure 7, which would be clear to a person skilled in the art from the aforegoing description. However, in this form of the method and referring to step 72, the embosser 16 is provided with a blank 28 comprising the first bar code 42 permanently applied to the blank and a copy thereof on a removable sticker on the blank. At 74, the blank is embossed as hereinbefore described, but instead of applying second encrypted data to the blank, the sticker is removed from the blank and applied to an issue confirmation certificate (ICC) as shown at 76. The ICC is returned to the PTC, and measures may be put in place at 78, to ensure that an embosser is not supplied with further authorized blanks, unless a corresponding number of proper and complete ICCs have been received back from that embosser. If a problem with returning ICCs is detected, the embosser may be reported and appropriate steps may be taken, including withdrawing the embosser's authority to emboss or personalize blanks for or on behalf of the registration authority.
Claims
1 . A method of preparing an identification token comprising a blank and which blank is subsequently personalized at a personalization station, the method comprising the steps of: - generating first encrypted data comprising at least data relating to an identity of an intended personalization station; and applying the first encrypted data to the blank, before personalization of the blank,
2. A method as claimed in claim 1 comprising the steps of generating second encrypted data comprising personalization data; causing the second encrypted data to be applied to the blank; and causing the personalization data to be applied to the blank in human perceivable form.
3. A method as claimed in claim 1 or claim 2 wherein the blank comprises one of a blank for an identification token for identifying an authorized human bearer thereof and a blank plate for forming a registration plate for a host article.
4. A method as claimed in claim 3 wherein the blank is a blank plate for forming a registration plate for a vehicle, wherein the personalization data comprises a registration number for the vehicle and wherein the step of applying the personalization data in human perceivable form comprises the step of embossing the registration number into the blank plate.
5. A method as claimed in claim 4 wherein a blank code is applied to the blank during or after manufacturing of the blank and is stored in at least one of a database associated with a manufacturer of the blank, a database of a registration authority, and a data base which is accessible by a registration authority information system.
6. A method as claimed in any one of claims 1 to 5 wherein the first encrypted data is applied to the blank in at least one of: applying a first encrypted data carrying bar code to the token; and writing the data into a memory arrangement of a radio frequency transponder mounted on the token.
7. A method as claimed in claim 6 wherein the second encrypted data is caused to be applied to the blank in at least one of: applying a second encrypted data carrying bar code to the token; and writing the second encrypted data into the memory arrangement of the radio frequency transponder.
8. A method as claimed in any one of claims 1 to 7 when performed by a trusted third party, which is independent of a manufacturer of the blank and the personalization station.
9. A method as claimed in any one of claims 1 to 8 wherein the first encrypted data further comprises at least one of identity data relating to a manufacturer of the blank; and time and date data relating to a time and date of generation of the first encrypted data.
10. A method as claimed in any one of claims 4 to 9 wherein the second encrypted data further comprises at least one of data relating to the host object; and data relating to an owner of the host object,
1 1 . A method of personalizing a blank to form an identification token comprising the steps of: receiving the blank at a receiving personalization station; verifying authenticity of the blank by decrypting first encrypted data applied to the blank and comprising at least data relating to an intended personalization station, to provide decrypted data relating to the intended personalization station;
- if the decrypted data relating to the intended personalization station corresponds to the receiving personalization station, applying personalization data in human perceivable form to the blank; and - applying second encrypted data to one of the blank and token, the second encrypted data comprising at least the personalization data.
12. A token comprising a blank carrying first encrypted data in the form of at least one of: a first encrypted data carrying bar code and data written into a memory arrangement of a radio frequency transponder on the blank, the first encrypted data comprising at least data relating to an identity of an intended personalization station, for applying to the blank personalization data in human perceivable form.
13. A token as claimed in claim 12 carrying personalization data in human perceivable form and second encrypted data in the form of at least one of: a second encrypted data carrying bar code and data written into the memory arrangement of the radio frequency transponder, the second encrypted data comprising the personalization data.
14. A system for preparing, personalizing and issuing identification tokens, the system comprising; - at least one blank manufacturing station; a trusted third party center; and - at least one personalized station; the trusted third party center comprising an encryption processor for generating for each blank manufactured by a manufacturing station respective first encrypted data to be applied to the blank, the first encrypted data comprising at least data relating to an intended one of the personalization stations authorized to personalize the blank.
Applications Claiming Priority (2)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
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ZA200703559 | 2007-05-03 | ||
ZA2007/03559 | 2007-05-03 |
Publications (1)
Publication Number | Publication Date |
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WO2008135921A1 true WO2008135921A1 (en) | 2008-11-13 |
Family
ID=39680921
Family Applications (1)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
---|---|---|---|
PCT/IB2008/051685 WO2008135921A1 (en) | 2007-05-03 | 2008-04-30 | Method and system for preparing, personalizing and issuing identification tokens |
Country Status (2)
Country | Link |
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WO (1) | WO2008135921A1 (en) |
ZA (1) | ZA200803800B (en) |
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FR2988349A1 (en) * | 2012-03-26 | 2013-09-27 | Novatec | Method for manufacturing single and non-duplicable number plate for vehicle, involves fixing authentification element, and matching serial number of plate with signature of authentification element in database stored independent of plate |
WO2017125175A1 (en) * | 2016-01-20 | 2017-07-27 | Erich Utsch Ag | Packaging container for license plates; method for operating an embossing press using the packaging container; and embossing press |
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EP3374276B1 (en) | 2016-01-20 | 2019-11-27 | Erich Utsch AG | Packaging container for license plates; method for operating an embossing press using the packaging container; and embossing press |
Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
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ZA200803800B (en) | 2010-01-27 |
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