WO2008087435A2 - Authentification de données provenant de dispositifs d'enregistrement de type gps - Google Patents

Authentification de données provenant de dispositifs d'enregistrement de type gps Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2008087435A2
WO2008087435A2 PCT/GB2008/000181 GB2008000181W WO2008087435A2 WO 2008087435 A2 WO2008087435 A2 WO 2008087435A2 GB 2008000181 W GB2008000181 W GB 2008000181W WO 2008087435 A2 WO2008087435 A2 WO 2008087435A2
Authority
WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
data array
logging device
data
digital signature
message digest
Prior art date
Application number
PCT/GB2008/000181
Other languages
English (en)
Other versions
WO2008087435A3 (fr
Inventor
Andrew Roxburgh
Original Assignee
Link Direct Limited
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Link Direct Limited filed Critical Link Direct Limited
Priority to GB0914425A priority Critical patent/GB2459227A/en
Publication of WO2008087435A2 publication Critical patent/WO2008087435A2/fr
Publication of WO2008087435A3 publication Critical patent/WO2008087435A3/fr

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Classifications

    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3236—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using cryptographic hash functions
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/12—Applying verification of the received information
    • H04L63/123—Applying verification of the received information received data contents, e.g. message integrity
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3247—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W4/00—Services specially adapted for wireless communication networks; Facilities therefor
    • H04W4/02—Services making use of location information
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
    • G07C5/00—Registering or indicating the working of vehicles
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G08—SIGNALLING
    • G08G—TRAFFIC CONTROL SYSTEMS
    • G08G1/00—Traffic control systems for road vehicles
    • G08G1/123—Traffic control systems for road vehicles indicating the position of vehicles, e.g. scheduled vehicles; Managing passenger vehicles circulating according to a fixed timetable, e.g. buses, trains, trams
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
    • H04L2209/80—Wireless
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
    • H04L2209/84—Vehicles

Definitions

  • the present invention relates to public key/private key authentication of log files from devices designed to record geographical location data over time, such data derived from a global positioning system (GPS) receiver.
  • GPS global positioning system
  • the devices are commonly called 'GPS Loggers'.
  • GPS Loggers have become popular devices for recording the location history of certain people or things; good examples of which are joggers (where the jogger wishes to record his or her performance over, or details of, particular routes) and vehicles (tracking the location history of a delivery vehicle for instance, or a fleet vehicle). Because speed can be calculated using recorded positions and times, runners use them to determine their running speed, and companies with fleet vehicles can determine if, for example, drivers have been speeding.
  • a message digest is created for the logged GPS data, with the message digest being derived mainly from the data itself, but can also include such information as the serial number of the device.
  • the message digest is encrypted with a private key secure within the logger, and a data file is created.
  • the encrypted message digest forms a digital signature which verifies the authenticity of the logged GPS location and time data, and which also verifies the identity of the device that recorded it.
  • the invention is verification of the logged GPS location and time data.
  • a public key is obtained, for example, from a trusted party, or as a secure part of a manufacturer-supplied software tool.
  • the public key is used to decrypt the private- key-encrypted message digest, so as to obtain a message digest for the logged data.
  • a trial message digest is calculated, using the same hashing function as was used by the logger to form the original message digest.
  • the trial message digest is compared to the decrypted message digest for equality. If the two message digests agree, then the logged location data and the identity of the logging device are authenticated; conversely, if the two message digests do not agree, the logged location data and the identity of the logging device cannot be trusted.
  • FIG. 1 is a flow diagram explaining how a digital signature is derived from logged journey data.
  • FIG. 2 is a flow diagram explaining how to verify the authenticity of logged journey data.
  • FIG. 3 is a block diagram illustrating the systems that make up the device in an embodiment of the invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE PREFERRED EMBODIMENT
  • FIG. 1 is a flow diagram illustrating the process steps carried out by the invention, those steps stored in a non-volatile memory medium such as ROM (Read Only Memory) 10.
  • ROM Read Only Memory
  • step S101 after being switched on as in step S101, and upon receiving a signal to commence logging in step S102, which for example could be from a button on the outer case, or a signal received via an interface to the logging device 11 , the logging device 11 begins storing data containing GPS Receiver Status (i.e. whether the receiver 2 has achieved a satellite fix or not), current longitude, latitude and absolute time at that position, as given by the GPS Receiver module 2, at regular intervals - as shown in step S104.
  • Each data item consists of: GPS Receiver Status s, longitude lo, latitude Ia, altitude a, and time t, is appended to previous recordings and stored as a data array d in a non-volatile electronic memory such as Flash Storage 7. So
  • d ⁇ si, loi, la-i, a-i, ti, S n , lo n , Ia n , a n , t n ⁇
  • array d contains all of the information needed to reconstruct the journey taken by the logging device since being switched on. Should the GPS satellite fix be lost along the way, and hence an accurate position is unable to be determined for some recordings, this is reflected in the s parameter for those recordings; for instance in this embodiment a value of "1" represents a valid satellite fix, and a value of "0" represents no satellite fix, so invalidating any GPS data for that particular recording.
  • Step S104 repeats until such time as a signal has been issued, for example from a button on the outer case, indicating that the device should stop logging (Step S105). This could also be a signal from an attached host computer 12.
  • step S106 calculates a message digest MD for the data array d.
  • the message digest is calculated using a hashing function, which through prearrangement is the same hashing function as is used to validate the authenticity of the data.
  • the purpose of the hashing function is to derive a digest of the data array such that if even a single bit of the original array is changed, a completely different digest would result.
  • the Message Digest MD for the journey data is derived from hashing function H as follows:
  • i is optional additional information stored within device 11 - this could be data pertaining to the delivery job being carried out, such as the identity of the client, the identity of the individual distributor, or the identity of the distribution company. This information can be held preferably in non-volatile program memory 10, or alternatively in Flash Storage 7.
  • message digest MD is encrypted with private key Kpriv
  • the device has associated with it a unique private encryption key not known outside of logging device 11.
  • the private key K priv has a complementary public key K pUb which operates such that only the public key can decrypt information encrypted by the private key, and only the private key can decrypt information encrypted by the public key.
  • This encrypted message digest now represents a digital signature, DS, of the journey data. Because the private encryption key K priv is unique to the device, it also serves as a way of subsequently identifying the device on which the data was recorded. In step S108, the digital signature DS is stored in non-volatile storage memory 7.
  • step S109 the device waits for a download request signal from a host computer, for example from a notebook or desktop personal computer.
  • This download request signal could come by way of connecting the device to the host computer, by a physical connection 8 such as USB (Universal Serial Bus) interface, or by a wireless connection 9 such as via a Bluetooth interface.
  • the journey data array d is uploaded to the host computer.
  • additional information i is uploaded.
  • the digital signature DS is then uploaded to the host computer. It is preferable keep the journey data array d and the additional information i together as one data file. It is also preferable to link the journey data and the signature in some way for ease of identification, perhaps by storing them as two separate files with similar or obviously linked filenames; "journey_data_1.txt" and
  • this medium (such as a Flash Memory Card) could be removed from the logging device and inserted directly into the host computer, whereupon the files could be directly read by the host pc.
  • FIG. 2 is a flow diagram illustrating process steps on a memory medium such as a disk in a personal computer (PC), by which the authenticity of journey data and event data (time and location data) are verified.
  • a memory medium such as a disk in a personal computer (PC)
  • PC personal computer
  • a public key is obtained such as from a trusted party, and is used to decrypt the digital signature so as to obtain a decrypted message digest.
  • a trial message digest is calculated using a previously agreed-upon hashing function, and based on the journey data, in the journey data file. The trial message digest is compared against the decrypted message digest, and if the two message digests are identical then the journey data is validated as authentic; conversely, if the two message digests are different, then the journey data cannot be trusted.
  • step S201 obtains the public key K pUb that complements the private key K pr i V used by logging device 11.
  • the public key K pUb is preferably obtained from a trusted source such as the supplier of the logging device.
  • Step S202 uses the public key K pUb to decrypt the digital signature DS.
  • the decrypted digital signature thus represents a message digest MD.
  • Step S203 obtains the journey data array, preferably in a computer-readable file format.
  • Step S204 calculates a trial message digest MD'.
  • the trial message digest is calculated with the same hashing function as was used by logging device 11 , through pre-arrangement.
  • the trial message digest is calculated using the same information used by logging device 11 to create the original message digest.
  • the trial message digest is based on the unencrypted journey data, as well as the optional additional data i' containing information such as the identity of the client, the identity of the individual distributor, or the identity of the distribution company:
  • primes e.g., " i' ”
  • Step S205 compares the trial message digest MD' to the decrypted message digest MD. If the two message digests are the same, then the authenticity of both the journey data, and the additional data, including the identity of the logging device, is validated. Conversely, if the two message digests differ, the journey data cannot be trusted.
  • FIG. 3 shows the make-up of the hardware subsystems of the invention.
  • Antenna 1 is an integrated GPS-compatible antenna in the preferred embodiment but it is also acceptable to have a detachable external antenna, attached by means of a suitable detachable connector.
  • GPS Receiver 2 is an electronic system capable of receiving signals via antenna 1 from the Global Positioning System satellites, and from those signals, outputting the receiver's geographical position, in latitude, longitude, and altitude above the Earth's surface.
  • the preferred system is the US-built GPS system; however in another embodiment, a receiver for the Russian equivalent GLONASS (GLObal Navigation Satellite System) is used, and in a future embodiment, a receiver for the European Galileo system is used.
  • GLONASS Globalbal Navigation Satellite System
  • GPS Data Feed 3 transmits the positional data from the GPS Receiver 2 to the CPU 5. Because of the possibility of fraud by an unscrupulous user intercepting the positional data and masquerading as a GPS unit, it should be protected as much as possible, either by making the link as short as possible (by constructing the GPS receiver circuitry within the same module or integrated circuit as the CPU), or alternatively it should be cryptographically secured, by means of an encryption key in the receiver and a decryption key held in non-volatile program memory 10.
  • Processor module 4 this could be a physically independent module consisting of CPU, volatile memory, non-volatile memory and interface connections, capable of carrying out computer instructions. Alternatively it could also contain the GPS Receiver, or the wired interfaces, or the wireless interfaces.
  • Central Processing Unit 5 is the electronic circuit capable of executing the instructions held in non-volatile program memory 10. It uses volatile memory 6 for temporary storage during calculations and operations.
  • Volatile Memory 6 is read-write memory used by the CPU during computation, especially during the message digest calculation stage, and the encryption stage. It could be dynamic RAM (DRAM) or static RAM (SRAM).
  • DRAM dynamic RAM
  • SRAM static RAM
  • Non-volatile storage memory 7 - This is the device that will store the logged data for later retrieval. In the preferred embodiment this is programmable memory such as Flash ROM, however other non-volatile memory technologies may be used.
  • Physical Interface 8 - such as RS232, Universal Serial Bus, Firewire, or any other physical interface that enables the device to communicate with a host computer.
  • Wireless Interface 9 is a system that allows communication between the device and a host computer 12 without the use of a physical connection, such as Wi-Fi (IEEE 802.11 Wireless Networking), GSM (Global System for Mobile communications), Bluetooth, or an IrDA (Infrared Data Association) port.
  • this interface is Bluetooth, but in an arrangement where GSM is used, via the use of GPRS (General Packet Radio Service) or SMS (Short Message Service) the device can transmit its journey data files and associated digital signature files automatically at regular intervals during the journey, rather than at the end of the journey.
  • GPRS General Packet Radio Service
  • SMS Short Message Service
  • Non-volatile program memory 10 The purpose of this item is to store the program instructions that are executed as described in FIG 1. Although it is envisaged that this will be programmable memory such as Flash ROM, so as to allow the manufacturer to easily change unit-specific data such as the Private Key Kp r iv , other non-volatile memory technologies may be used. Authenticating GPS-Logging Device 11 - for use in the present invention.
  • Host computer 12 - This could be a desktop Personal Computer (PC), or a Notebook PC, a Laptop PC, a Personal Digital Assistant, a Smartphone, or any other device capable of communicating with the GPS logging device.
  • Power controller 13 The power controller controls voltage regulation, battery charging (if necessary), and power consumption.
  • Power source 14 - This could be a rechargeable battery such as a Nickel- Cadmium, Nickel metal hydride, Lithium ion, or Lithium-ion Polymer battery, or could be a disposable battery.
  • the power source could be the vehicle's electrical supply, connected via a suitable power connector.
  • the power supply could be the host PC, transmitted for example via the USB port.

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
  • Computing Systems (AREA)
  • General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Position Fixing By Use Of Radio Waves (AREA)

Abstract

Avec la multiplication des dispositifs proposés qui intègrent des systèmes de suivi de position basés sur des récepteurs GPS (géopositionnement par satellite), on observe également une multiplication des applications, notamment dans les secteurs de la livraison et de la distribution, qui sont améliorées grâce à l'utilisation de dispositifs capables d'enregistrer et de stocker en permanence leurs propres coordonnées géographiques dans le temps. Par exemple, ces dispositifs peuvent être placés dans des véhicules, sur des coursiers, dans des paquets ou transportés par des distributeurs individuels. Ces informations servent ensuite à visualiser en rétrospective les trajets géographiques empruntés par ces articles. Dans certains cas, ces données sont extrêmement importantes, par exemple pour prouver à un client que telle ou telle livraison a été effectuée, ou tentée, avec la date et l'heure de l'opération. Or, on peut penser qu'une fois que les données enregistrées ont été récupérées du dispositif d'enregistrement et stockées ailleurs - généralement sur un système informatique - elles peuvent faire l'objet de manipulations frauduleuses. Il n'est pas très difficile de modifier les données d'un fichier pour montrer qu'une livraison a apparemment été faite alors qu'en réalité, elle ne l'a pas été. En revanche, si on crée une signature numérique cryptographique des données avant leur sortie du dispositif, de sorte que toute manipulation frauduleuse des données apparaisse lors d'un processus de validation, on peut prouver l'authenticité des données. Selon l'invention, la validité et l'authenticité des données de position et d'heure enregistrées, ainsi que l'identité unique du dispositif d'enregistrement, sont protégées grâce à un système de signature avec clé publique qui fournit une signature numérique permettant d'authentifier la collecte des données.
PCT/GB2008/000181 2007-01-20 2008-01-18 Authentification de données provenant de dispositifs d'enregistrement de type gps WO2008087435A2 (fr)

Priority Applications (1)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
GB0914425A GB2459227A (en) 2007-01-20 2008-01-18 Authenticating data from GPS logging devices

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
GBGB0701125.7A GB0701125D0 (en) 2007-01-20 2007-01-20 Authenticating data from GPS logging devices
GB0701125.7 2007-01-20

Related Child Applications (2)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
US12/602,431 A-371-Of-International US20100277561A1 (en) 2007-05-29 2008-05-29 Laser reactive media and apparatus and method for writing an image onto such media
US13/932,589 Continuation US9358806B2 (en) 2007-05-29 2013-07-01 Laser reactive media and apparatus and method for writing an image onto such media

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WO2008087435A2 true WO2008087435A2 (fr) 2008-07-24
WO2008087435A3 WO2008087435A3 (fr) 2008-12-24

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Cited By (7)

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Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
WO2008142236A2 (fr) * 2007-04-03 2008-11-27 France Developpement Conseil Sarl Procede visant a prouver la realisation d'un evenement et/ou l'existence d'un bien, en un lieu et/ou a un temps donne (s)
GB2462834A (en) * 2008-08-20 2010-02-24 Edward Carvell Andrew Secure GPS data logger for storing tamper-proof encrypted GPS data to a removable memory card
EP2199943A1 (fr) * 2008-12-17 2010-06-23 Pitney Bowes, Inc. Procédé et appareil d'attestation de transaction utilisant des informations d'emplacement
TWI489426B (zh) * 2010-05-14 2015-06-21 Alibaba Group Holding Ltd Method and apparatus for multimedia information based on GPS and
WO2015139026A3 (fr) * 2014-03-14 2016-03-03 Go Tenna Inc. Système et procédé de communication numérique entre des dispositifs informatiques
WO2017204653A1 (fr) * 2016-05-24 2017-11-30 Polarcus Dmcc Détection d'hydrocarbures
CN112102053A (zh) * 2020-07-31 2020-12-18 大众金服信息科技有限公司 应收账款调查管理方法、装置、计算机设备及存储介质

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EP1758366A1 (fr) * 2005-08-23 2007-02-28 Agere Systems, Inc. Authentification de données dans un dispositif de communication mobile

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WO1997013208A1 (fr) * 1995-10-06 1997-04-10 Scientific-Atlanta, Inc. Livre de bord electronique pour vehicules
US6269446B1 (en) * 1998-06-26 2001-07-31 Canon Kabushiki Kaisha Authenticating images from digital cameras
US20030159044A1 (en) * 2001-01-17 2003-08-21 International Business Machines Corporation Secure integrated device with secure, dynamically-selectable capabilities
US6490513B1 (en) * 2001-08-22 2002-12-03 Matsushita Electrical Industrial Co., Ltd. Automobile data archive system having securely authenticated instrumentation data storage
WO2004066219A1 (fr) * 2003-01-22 2004-08-05 Francotyp-Postalia Ag & Co. Kg Procede et dispositif de transmission de donnees mobile
EP1758366A1 (fr) * 2005-08-23 2007-02-28 Agere Systems, Inc. Authentification de données dans un dispositif de communication mobile

Cited By (10)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
WO2008142236A2 (fr) * 2007-04-03 2008-11-27 France Developpement Conseil Sarl Procede visant a prouver la realisation d'un evenement et/ou l'existence d'un bien, en un lieu et/ou a un temps donne (s)
WO2008142236A3 (fr) * 2007-04-03 2009-01-29 France Dev Conseil Sarl Procede visant a prouver la realisation d'un evenement et/ou l'existence d'un bien, en un lieu et/ou a un temps donne (s)
GB2462834A (en) * 2008-08-20 2010-02-24 Edward Carvell Andrew Secure GPS data logger for storing tamper-proof encrypted GPS data to a removable memory card
EP2199943A1 (fr) * 2008-12-17 2010-06-23 Pitney Bowes, Inc. Procédé et appareil d'attestation de transaction utilisant des informations d'emplacement
TWI489426B (zh) * 2010-05-14 2015-06-21 Alibaba Group Holding Ltd Method and apparatus for multimedia information based on GPS and
WO2015139026A3 (fr) * 2014-03-14 2016-03-03 Go Tenna Inc. Système et procédé de communication numérique entre des dispositifs informatiques
WO2017204653A1 (fr) * 2016-05-24 2017-11-30 Polarcus Dmcc Détection d'hydrocarbures
RU2720734C1 (ru) * 2016-05-24 2020-05-13 ПОЛАРКУС ДиЭмСиСи Обнаружение углеводородов
CN112102053A (zh) * 2020-07-31 2020-12-18 大众金服信息科技有限公司 应收账款调查管理方法、装置、计算机设备及存储介质
CN112102053B (zh) * 2020-07-31 2023-11-21 大众金服信息科技有限公司 应收账款调查管理方法、装置、计算机设备及存储介质

Also Published As

Publication number Publication date
WO2008087435A3 (fr) 2008-12-24
GB2459227A (en) 2009-10-21
GB0914425D0 (en) 2009-09-30
GB0701125D0 (en) 2007-02-28

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