WO2008034653A1 - Procédé et arrangement pour constater une manipulation non autorisée d'un équipement électrique - Google Patents

Procédé et arrangement pour constater une manipulation non autorisée d'un équipement électrique Download PDF

Info

Publication number
WO2008034653A1
WO2008034653A1 PCT/EP2007/056930 EP2007056930W WO2008034653A1 WO 2008034653 A1 WO2008034653 A1 WO 2008034653A1 EP 2007056930 W EP2007056930 W EP 2007056930W WO 2008034653 A1 WO2008034653 A1 WO 2008034653A1
Authority
WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
electrical device
spectrum
impedance
electrical
signal line
Prior art date
Application number
PCT/EP2007/056930
Other languages
German (de)
English (en)
Inventor
Bernd Burchardt
Original Assignee
Siemens Aktiengesellschaft
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Siemens Aktiengesellschaft filed Critical Siemens Aktiengesellschaft
Publication of WO2008034653A1 publication Critical patent/WO2008034653A1/fr

Links

Classifications

    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/38—Payment protocols; Details thereof
    • G06Q20/40—Authorisation, e.g. identification of payer or payee, verification of customer or shop credentials; Review and approval of payers, e.g. check credit lines or negative lists
    • G06Q20/403—Solvency checks
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
    • G07F19/00—Complete banking systems; Coded card-freed arrangements adapted for dispensing or receiving monies or the like and posting such transactions to existing accounts, e.g. automatic teller machines
    • G07F19/20—Automatic teller machines [ATMs]

Definitions

  • seals and seals customarily be designed so that the basis of their damage an unwanted ⁇ laubtes open the electrical device can be detected and their reproduction after damage only by authorized persons is possible.
  • seals or seals to protect an electrical device against unauthorized manipulation has the disadvantage that a check whether an unauthorized opening of the electrical device and thus possibly a manipulation has been made, usually only by a visual inspection the seal or the seal is possible. It should be noted, however, that a user of the electrical device often the exact shape and the exact appearance of the seal or the seal are not known, so that a damage or a change of the seal or the seal is not necessarily on will fall. Thus, a reliable protection against manipulation of the electrical device is usually not given even if a regular review of the seal or the seal by the user of the electrical device is possible and actually takes place.
  • the present invention has for its object to provide a particularly reliable method for detecting an unauthorized manipulation of an electrical device.
  • This object is achieved by a method for detecting an unauthorized manipulation of an electrical device with the following steps: Creating an impedance spectrum by measuring the impedance of an electrical lektrischen signal line of the electrical device at a plurality of frequencies, comparing the created impedance spectrum with an unmanipulated state the electrical device or a similar electrical device on the signal line measured reference spectrum and detecting an unauthorized manipulation of the electrical device, provided that the created impedance spectrum deviates from the reference spectrum.
  • the term “comparisons” encompasses not only a direct comparison of the generated impedance spectrum with the reference spectrum, but generally any evaluation of the created impedance spectrum using the reference spectrum or reference data characteristic for the reference spectrum certain measuring points of the reference spectrum or otherwise promo ⁇ preparing of the reference spectrum data, such as the slope of the reference ⁇ spectrum at certain frequency values act.
  • the characteristic reference data allow a comparison with the created impedance spectrum in such a way that unauthorized manipulation of the electrical device can be detected without, however, being able to deduce the reference spectrum in the knowledge of the characteristic reference data.
  • Creating impedance spectra is also known under the term of the impedance spectroscopy and in particular in some areas of electrochemistry, such as for Un ⁇ investigations in the field of corrosion performed.
  • methods for recording and using an impedance spectrum are known from the following documents: "Handheld Impedance Measurement System With Seven-Decade Cartridge.” pability and Potentiostatic Function, Emma Angelini Alessio Carullo, Simone Corbellini, Franco Ferrari, Vincenzo Gal ⁇ lone, Sabrina Grassini, Marco Parvis and Alberto Vallan, IEEE Transactions on Instrumentation and Measurement, Vol. 55, No.
  • Impe ⁇ danzspektrums can for example take place in that a network analyzer is connected to the electrical signal line and a measurement of the impedance of the electrical signal line, for example, to a ground potential Runaway ⁇ leads is.
  • a network analyzer As an example of an integrated circuit, which can be used in this context as a network analyzer, is called the network analyzer AD5933 company Analog Devices, which is specially designed for creating an impedance ⁇ spectrum.
  • the inventive method is advantageous as it provided ⁇ light, unauthorized manipulation of electrical Einrich- processing with high reliability and accuracy to detect.
  • the method according to the invention is advantageous, in particular, also in connection with such unauthorized manipulations, in which changes are made to the electrical signal line of the electrical device itself.
  • Such changes may involve, for example, connecting components for intercepting or copying data transmitted via the electrical signal line to the electrical signal line.
  • This may for example relate to the case that the electric signal ⁇ line serves to transmit safety-related information by a reading device, in the form of a card reader, a communication interface.
  • a corresponding About ⁇ transmission to the communication interface can beispielswei ⁇ se done for the purpose subsequent sending data over a communications network in the form of a fixed network or a mobile network.
  • a copy of the security-relevant data from the electrical signal line is tapped by means of a corre ⁇ sponding manipulation of the electrical device and subsequently made accessible to an unauthorized person.
  • the unauthorized introduction of a corresponding device to copy the security-relevant data can be advantageously characterized it be ⁇ recognized that at multiple frequencies created by measuring the impedance at the electric signal line of the electrical device, an impedance spectrum and this having a non-manipulated state of the electrical device according to the invention or a similar electrical device is measured on the signal line measured reference spectrum.
  • a corresponding reference spectrum can for example be ent ⁇ already been measured either directly after manufacture of the electrical device or immediately after its start-up at the location of their operation.
  • the impedance spectrum in this case thus represents an individual "fingerprint" with respect to the respective electrical signal line of the relevant electrical device.
  • an unauthorized manipulation of the electrical signal line of the electrical device can be achieved by creating an impedance spectrum and then comparing the created impedance signal. Spectrum are detected with the measured in the unmanipulated state reference spectrum.
  • a corresponding check is not only possible at any time, but also offers a high level of reliability, since it will usually not be possible for an unauthorized person to perform a manipulation in such a way that the impedance spectrum measured on the electrical signal line does not change at the same time.
  • the method according to the invention after the provision of the components required to create the impedance spectrum, is relatively simple in its course and can also be executed in an automated manner. This means that a regular check of the electrical ⁇ 's device, the inventive method is possible with little effort and without appropriate personnel expenses, so that an unauthorized manipulation due to a PERIODIC ⁇ gene carrying out the method can be advantageously recognized promptly.
  • the method according to the invention runs such that a further impedance spectrum is created by measuring the impedance at a further electrical signal line of the electrical device or by measuring the impedance between the electrical signal line and the further electrical signal line.
  • Re impedance spectrum is compared with a measured in the unmanipulated state of the electrical device or a similar electrical device on the other signal line or between the signal line and the other signal line further reference spectrum and unauthorized nipulation of the electrical device is detected, if at least one of the two created Impedance spectra deviates from the respective reference spectrum. If the electrical device via a further electrical signal ⁇ circuit has, therefore, there is advantageously the possibility ability to create another impedance spectrum and also to compare this with a measured in unmanipulated state further reference spectrum.
  • the created further impedance spectrum can be measured on the further electrical signal line or between the electrical signal line and the further electrical signal line.
  • the further reference spectrum in turn may have been obtained from the same electrical device or an identical electrical device.
  • an unauthorized manipulation with respect to the further electrical signal line can thus also be ascertained, so that overall unauthorized manipulation of the electrical device is detected when at least one of the two created impedance spectra deviates from the respective reference spectrum.
  • a separate impedance spectrum can thus be created for each of these signal lines and compared with a reference spectrum measured on the respective electrical signal line in the unmanipulated state.
  • the invention further relates to another method for detecting unauthorized manipulation of an electrical device.
  • a reli ⁇ Another particularly permeable method of detecting tampering of an electrical device.
  • This object is achieved by a method for detecting an unauthorized manipulation of an electrical device with the following steps: Creating an impedance spectrum by measuring the impedance between two electrical signal lines of the electrical device at multiple frequencies, comparing the created impedance spectrum with an unmanipulated state of the electrical Device or a similar electrical device between the two signal lines measured reference spectrum and determining an unauthorized manipulation of the electrical device, provided that the created impedance spectrum deviates from the reference spectrum.
  • the further method according to the invention differs from the aforementioned development of the method according to the invention in that for the case that the electrical device has two electrical signal lines, an impedance spectrum exclusively by measuring the impedance between the two electrical signal lines of the electrical device at several Frequencies is created.
  • This offers the advantage that as an alternative to creating an impedance spectrum for the respective electrical signal line, an impedance spectrum can also be created by measuring the impedance between the two electrical signal lines.
  • the electrical device has more than two electrical signal lines ⁇ has, so the impedance spectrum between any combinations of these signal lines can still be measured.
  • the process of the invention may be designed such that for comparing the impedance-created danzspektrums the impedance spectrum created or for which he ⁇ presented impedance spectrum characteristic data from the electrical device via one of the electrical device associated with external communication interface to a server are transmitted or Reference spectrum or characteristic reference data for the reference spectrum are transmitted from the server via the external communication interface to the electrical device.
  • This execution ⁇ form is preferred because it allows the reference ⁇ spectrum or characteristic of the reference spectrum re- ference data, which are needed for comparison with the created impedance spectrum, not in e- lektrischen device itself must be stored necessarily.
  • the possibility that the Create ⁇ te impedance spectrum or the characteristic impedance for the created spectrum data from the electric device via one of the electrical device associated with external communication interface to a server can be transferred.
  • the server processing for example, especially for Studentsprü ⁇ fen the proper condition of the electrical Einrich-, that may be for detecting a possible manipulation, is provided, performs the comparison of the impedance spectrum created with the reference spectrum in this case, optionally with the use of created for the Impedance spectrum characteristic data, through. This is advantageous liable, as a manipulation of the server itself can usually be excluded and thus access to the reference spectrum or characteristic for the reference spectrum reference data is avoided by unauthorized persons.
  • the server immediately initiates further measures when detecting an unauthorized manipulation. This can be done in the form of alerts, informing security personnel or blocking the function of the electrical equipment. It should be appreciated that the server may be used in connection with monitoring a variety of electrical devices for possible manipulation.
  • the reference spectrum, or the characteristic of the reference spectrum reference data from the server through the external communication interface to the electrical Device to be transferred.
  • a transmission preferably takes place in such a way that access by unauthorized persons to the reference spectrum or the reference data characteristic of the reference spectrum is avoided.
  • the comparison between the established impedance spectrum and the reference spectrum can be made by the electrical device itself.
  • the electrical ⁇ A direction from the created impedance spectrum and the reference spectrum or the characteristic of the reference spectrum reference data determined earnings and returns this result to the server.
  • a number or function is determined by a mathematical algorithm that allows the server to determine whether the created impedance spectrum and reference spectrum match.
  • the transmission of data from which the reference spectrum could be derived is advantageously avoided via the communication interface.
  • the processes can continue to run well so that the transmission is encrypted and / or electro ⁇ nic signed occurs. This is advantageous since it prevents the transmitted data from being monitored during the transmission or ensures the authenticity of the respective transmitter of the data, ie the server or the electrical device. In general, any known methods which ensure the confidentiality of the transmitted data or prevent access by unauthorized persons to the created impedance spectrum and the reference spectrum or to the respective characteristic data can be used.
  • the creation of the impedance spectrum can be triggered in many ways. This can be done by the electrical device itself or by a connected to the electrical device measuring device that creates the impedance spectrum happen. In this example, it is also possible that the creation of the impedance spectrum and the following comparison manually, can be, for example, by the Drue ⁇ CKEN a button, triggered for example by a user of the electrical device. In a particularly preferred embodiment, the inventive method However, designed such that the creation of the impedance ⁇ spectrum is triggered via the external communication interface of the electrical device. This embodiment is preferred since it offers the possibility on the part of the server to initiate a check of the state of the electrical device. Thus, for example, an impedance spectrum can be created at regular time intervals predetermined by the server and a comparison can be made with the reference spectrum.
  • the external communication interface may be any type of communication interface that allows the electrical device access to a communication network of any kind.
  • the communication interface can be designed in such a way that it allows access to a telephone network via a landline line, via which communication with the server is possible.
  • a radio interface is used as the external communication interface. This offers the advantage that the method is also applicable to those electrical devices that do not have a fixed network connection.
  • the data transmission in mobile networks usually takes place in encrypted form, so that in this case protection against unauthorized interception of exchanged between the server and the electrical equipment data is given.
  • the electrical device may be any type of electrical device.
  • SEN methods are designed such that a safety-related device is used as electrical device. This is advantageous because, in particular in the case of relevant devices manipulation by unauthorized persons must be avoided.
  • the safety device may be in principle be any type of device for which the part of the operator a high degree of tamper ⁇ protection is desired. This concerns for example Vorrich ⁇ obligations in the military field, ranging from alarm systems or in the financial sector, such as systems for machining processing of financial transactions or ATM. That a device is used for cashless payment as safety-relevant device Particularly preferred is the embodiment of the invention shown SEN method. Particularly with devices to make cashless payments is both part of the operator and on the part of users a strong interest to avoid unauthorized tampering with the device or to erken ⁇ nen immediately.
  • the card used by the user may be, for example, a credit card or a so-called debit card for cashless payment.
  • Appropriate maps are widespread. Copying the data of his card has, for the user of the relevant device for cashless payment, ie, for example, the customer of a department store, the unpleasant consequence that unauthorized persons use the same to which he has used for the electronic, cashless payment process.
  • used card-related data at the expense of his account withdrawals, for example, at ATMs can make. Reports on such incidents and in this regard best ⁇ rising vulnerabilities continue to lead to the fact that the acceptance of the use of appropriate devices for cashless payments among users is reduced.
  • the invention further relates to an arrangement for detecting unauthorized manipulation of an electrical device.
  • the present invention has the object to provide a particularly reliable arrangement for detecting an unauthorized manipulation of an electrical device.
  • Anord ⁇ tion for detecting an unauthorized manipulation of an e- lektrischen device with a measuring device for creating an impedance spectrum by measuring the impedance to an electrical signal line of the electrical device at a plurality of frequencies, memory means for storing a unmanipulated state of electrical device or a ner identically constructed electrical device on the signal line measured reference spectrum and analysis means for Verglei ⁇ chen the created impedance spectrum with the Referenzspekt ⁇ rum and to detect an unauthorized manipulation of the e- lektrischen device, if the created impedance spectrum deviates from the reference spectrum.
  • the analysis means may be configured such that comparing the impedance spectrum created with the Refe ⁇ rence spectrum also indirectly using characteristic for the created impedance spectrum data and / or for also applies to the inventive arrangement, the reference spectrum can be characteristic reference data.
  • the inventive arrangement is preferred because it an identical electrical means of creating an impedance spectrum by measuring the Impe ⁇ impedance on the electric signal line of the electrical equipment of the electrical device at a plurality of frequencies and comparing the impedance spectrum generated with an in unmanipulated state of the electrical device or Device on the signal line measured reference spectrum allows precise detection of unauthorized manipulation. At the same time there after successes of tampering for the perpetrators usually no way this ⁇ veils so to ver that the impedance spectrum created still matches the reference spectrum.
  • erfindungsge ⁇ MAESSEN arrangement can be nachge ⁇ showed highly reliable, yet simple way tampering therefore, a visual inspection of the electrical equipment by a person advantageously is not necessary.
  • the inventive arrangement may be such wei ⁇ ned, and that the measuring means for creating a further impedance spectrum by measuring the impedance at a further electric signal line of the electrical device or by measuring the impedance between the electric signal line and the further electrical signal line at multiple frequencies is formed, the storage means are designed for storing a measured in the unmanipulated state of the electrical device or a similar electrical device on the other signal line or between the signal line and the other signal line further reference spectrum and the Analysemit ⁇ tel for comparing the created further impedance spectrum with the other Reference spectrum and for detecting an unauthorized manipulation of the electrical device, provided that the created further impedance spectrum deviates from the other reference spectrum t are.
  • this embodiment provides in part the advantage that in the event that the electrical equipment ei ⁇ ne further electrical signal line having another impedance spectrum can be created for this, that by the analysis means upon detection an unauthorized manipulation can be considered.
  • the invention further relates to another arrangement for detecting unauthorized manipulation of an electrical device.
  • the invention has for its object to provide a further particularly zuver ⁇ casual arrangement for detecting an unauthorized manipulation of an electrical device.
  • This object is achieved by a Anord ⁇ tion for detecting an unauthorized manipulation of e- lektrischen device with a measuring device for creating an impedance spectrum by measuring the impedance between see two electrical signal lines of the electrical device at multiple frequencies, memory means for storing an unmanipul Being State of the electrical device or of an identical electrical device between the two signal lines measured reference spectrum and Analy- means for comparing the created impedance spectrum with the reference spectrum and for detecting unauthorized manipulation of the electrical device, provided that the created impedance spectrum deviates from the reference spectrum.
  • the further arrangement according to the invention is advantageous since it allows an impedance spectrum to be created by measuring the impedance between two electrical signal lines of the electrical device and compared by the analysis means with a corresponding reference spectrum can be.
  • comparisons reference should again be made to the previous explanations relating thereto, in particular in connection with the method according to the invention.
  • the arrangements according to the invention are designed such that the measuring device is integrated into the electrical device.
  • the measuring device can also be used outside the electrical be arranged direction and be electrically connected to this via lines.
  • the integration of the measuring device into the electrical device is particularly preferred, since this makes it difficult to manipulate the measuring device itself or the lines between the measuring device and the electrical signal line or between the measuring device and the electrical signal lines of the electrical device unauthorized.
  • inventive arrangements can also be so pronounced that they have a an external communication interface ⁇ point of the electrical device connected to the electrical device server.
  • This embodiment of the arrangement according to the invention is advantageous because it allows the electrical device via the external communication ⁇ interface communication with the server.
  • the storage means are assigned to the server. This is advantageous since the server can thus store the reference spectrum measured on the signal line in the unmanipulated state of the electrical device or a similar electrical device. As a result, the deposition of the reference spectrum by the electrical device is advantageously avoided.
  • the arrangements according to the invention can also be designed such that they are designed to transmit the created impedance spectrum or data characteristic of the created impedance spectrum from the electrical device via the external communication interface to the server and the analysis means are assigned to the server.
  • a server-side evaluation of the created impedance spectrum is advantageously made possible. light. This evaluation can be carried out using both the impedance spectrum created itself and under Ver ⁇ application of characteristic for the created impedance spectrum data.
  • a central check of the state of the electrical device can thus take place, ie the server itself can determine whether an unauthorized manipulation of the electrical device has been made or not.
  • the arrangements according to the invention are designed such that they are designed to transmit the reference spectrum or characteristic reference data from the server to the electrical device via the external communication interface and the analysis means are assigned to the electrical device.
  • This offers the advantage that comparing the generated Impe ⁇ danzspektrums with the reference spectrum, optionally with the use of characteristic of the respective spectrum data can be done on the part of the electrical equipment. In this case, the transmission of the reference spectrum to the electrical device itself or to the measuring device can take place.
  • the analysis means may be an integral part of the electrical device itself or be associated with it in such a way that they are designed together with the measuring device as a separate component which is connected to the electrical device.
  • the arrangements according to the invention can furthermore also be so pronounced that the storage means are assigned to the electrical device.
  • This offers the advantage that the reference spectrum or the reference data characteristic for the reference spectrum can be stored by the electrical device.
  • the terms "electrical equipment” As “associated with the electrical device” that the storage means are not part of the electrical device itself, but instead, for example, part of a connected via an external interface with the e- lektrischen device measuring device.
  • the measuring device can be activated via the external communication interface. This offers the advantage that the proper status of the electrical device can be monitored or determined by means of a remote diagnosis.
  • the inventive arrangements can also be so constructed that the external communication interface of the ⁇ le is a radio interface.
  • the inventive arrangements can be ⁇ resorted by in the transfer of data between the electrical device and the server to the security mechanisms that are usually available on mobile networks here. Further advantageously, the need for a wired connection to a Kiru ⁇ nikationsnetz is avoided.
  • the electrical device is a safety-relevant device. This is advantageous because the ⁇ special at safety devices the tamper protection plays a very important.
  • the inventive arrangements can also be designed such that the safety-relevant Before ⁇ device is a device for cashless payment.
  • This embodiment is preferred because especially Vorrichtun ⁇ gen cashless payment because of their wide dissemination and their usually good accessibility are at risk of being manipulated by unauthorized persons.
  • a ⁇ he followed manipulation can be found advantageously reliably and in an automated form that is simple in its application by the inventive arrangement.
  • Figure 1 is a schematic sketch of an exemplary embodiment of the inventive arrangement
  • FIG. 2 shows an exemplary embodiment of an impedance spectrum measured in the unmanipulated state of an electrical device
  • Figure 3 shows an embodiment of a manipulated in
  • FIG. 1 shows a schematic sketch of an exemplary embodiment of the inventive arrangement. Shown is an electrical device E, which has four electrical signal lines 1, 2, 3 and 4.
  • the electrical device E is intended to be a device for cashless payment.
  • This has a card reader KL, which is connected via the electrical signal lines 1, 2, 3 and 4 with a communication interface KSS of the electrical Ein ⁇ direction E.
  • the electrical signal lines 1, 2, 3 and 4 may, for example, be a Bussys ⁇ tem which the card reader with the communication KL Onsterrorismstelle KSS connects.
  • different types of data are transferred via the individual ⁇ nen electrical signal lines 1, 2, 3 and 4 in unidirectional or bidirectional direction ü.
  • it may be in the electrical signal line 1, for example, also be a power supply ⁇ line.
  • the communication interface KSS is a radio interface via which the electrical device E is in the form of the
  • wireless connection 10 is connected to a cent ⁇ cal server S of the billing or payment ⁇ system.
  • a corresponding electrical device E can be installed at any point of sale, ie for example in a supermarket. Dement ⁇ speaking, such devices for cashless payments are also referred to as POS (Point of Sales) terminals.
  • POS Point of Sales
  • the server S can now perform based on the received data, for example, a check of the account balance of the Kun ⁇ den or the electronic card used by him associated account and a corresponding Provide confirmation signal to the electrical device E, if the electronic card used is valid and the associated account has sufficient coverage.
  • the server S can initiate an automated transfer of funds from the customer's account, ie generally the buyer, to the account of the point of sale which makes the electrical device E available in the form of the device for cashless payment.
  • the electrical device E also has a measuring device ME for creating impedance spectra by measuring the impedance of the electrical signal lines 1, 2, 3 and 4 of the electrical device E at a plurality of frequencies.
  • the measuring device ME which may be, for example, the integrated circuit AD5933 of the Analog Devices or tured for example from the integ ⁇ circuit AD5933 and other electrical Comp ⁇ components may be constructed, via electrical connections 5, 6, 7 and 8 are connected to the electrical signal lines 1, 2, 3 and 4.
  • the measuring device ME is integrated in the embodiment shown in Figure 1 in the electrical device E in the form of the device for cashless payment, ie the measuring device ME is located in the housing of the electrical device E.
  • the measuring device ME could, for example, via an external interface to the electrical device E be ⁇ closed or connectable.
  • the measuring device ME can now be created on each of the electrical signal lines 1, 2, 3 and 4, a separate impedance spectrum.
  • the measuring device ME it would also be possible for the measuring device ME to have an impedance characteristic for only part of the electrical signal lines 1, 2, 3 and 4. Spectrum created. This could be the case, for example, if only via the electrical signal line 2 a transmission of sensitive, ie safety-related, data would take place.
  • impedance spectra it is additionally or alternatively also possible for impedance spectra to be created between in each case two of the electrical signal lines 1, 2, 3 and 4.
  • the transmission of the respective impedance spectrum or created of characteristic for the respective created ⁇ impedance spectrum data from the measuring device ME to the communication interface takes place in the KSS exporting ⁇ approximately example of Figure 1 via a separate connection 9 between these two components.
  • at least one of the electrical signal lines 1, 2, 3 and 4 may be used instead of the separate connection 9.
  • the server S has a server-side communication interface KSS2, via which communication via the
  • Radio link 10 with the communication interface KSS of the electrical device E is possible. Via the radio link 10, the server S can now receive the impedance spectrum o-generated by the measuring device ME of the electrical device E or the data characteristic of the created impedance spectrum . This data is provided by the server-side communication interface KSS2 via an internal connection 11 analysis means AM.
  • Impedanzspektren in each case for each of the spectra - a comparison of the received data, ie the created impedance spectrum or the characteristic of the created impedance spectrum ⁇ data with a in Speicherermit- SM settled reference spectrum.
  • the storage means SM are connected via a further internal connection 12 to the analysis means AM.
  • characteristic reference data of the most varied types can also be stored in the memory means SM for the reference spectrum.
  • the analysis means AM and / or the storage means SM can also be arranged on the part of the electrical device E.
  • the relevant components on the one hand can be formed as part of the electrical device E itself, or, for example, can be formed together with the measuring device ME as a separate, connectable to the electrical device E device.
  • the server S is not required for carrying out the method according to the invention.
  • the communication interface KSS is not needed to detect an unauthorized manipulation of the electrical device E. It should be noted that in the context of the invention shown SEN procedures and the inventive arrangement in principle any type of electrical equipment E can be used.
  • these electrical devices E are those for which there is an interest to prevent unauthorized manipulation to ver ⁇ or recognize this in a reliable and simple way.
  • the process of creating the impedance spectrum can be triggered in different ways.
  • the initiation of the process can be done not only directly by the server S, but for example, by a user of the electrical device E in the form of the device for cashless payment.
  • the method is triggered by a mechanical actuating about ei ⁇ nes switch or using a further communication channel. This can be done, for example, by the user of the electrical device E dialing a predetermined telephone number with his mobile telephone or sending an SMS (Short Message Service) short message.
  • SMS Short Message Service
  • FIG. 2 shows an exemplary embodiment of an impedance spectrum measured in the unmanipulated state of an electrical device.
  • an impedance spectrum of an exemplary electrical device in a frequency range from 2 MHz to 100 MHz is shown for exemplary clarification of the sequence of the method according to the invention.
  • FIG. 2 The representation of the created impedance spectrum is shown in FIG. 2 in a so-called Smith diagram. This is a type of representation which is usual in the representation of line structures in high frequency technology. In Figure 2, the measurement result in the form of a spiral curve is clearly visible. This is the created impedance spectrum for which the measured impedance values are plotted clockwise starting from a measured value of 2 MHz up to a measured value of 100 MHz. For better illustration, the values of 2 MHz and 100 MHz are each marked by a thick dot.
  • FIG. 3 shows an exemplary embodiment of an impedance spectrum measured in the manipulated state of the same electrical device.
  • the type of representation of the ⁇ person you would like Figure 2 corresponds, but the manipulation, ie a change of the electrical device by the connection of a further element to the electrical Signallei- tung at which the impedance spectrum of FIG was measured 2 was made ,
  • the minimum frequency value of 2 MHz used for the measurement and the maximum frequency value of 100 MHz used for the measurement are denoted by thick dots at the ends of the frequency spectrum, which in turn are clockwise as the frequency value increases.
  • FIGS. 2 and 3 is merely an example which serves to explain and clarify the invention with reference to an exemplary embodiment.
  • both the JE abili curves as well as the chosen representation ⁇ shape are exemplary, ie depending on the type of electrical equipment used and depending on the type of equipment connected to each elekt ⁇ generic signaling components also impedance spectra with totally different gradients may arise.
  • the measuring range of 2 MHz to 100 MHz used in the embodiments of Figures 2 and 3 is determined in any way, ie the measurement of the impedance spectra can be done in a narrower, another or in a completely different frequency range.
  • any other types of display of measured values and evaluating relationship ⁇ example of comparing the impedance spectrum created are used with reference spectrum.
  • an evaluation of the created impedance spectrum as a function of the Frequency course for example, in a non-compliant mapping, ie, for example, in Cartesian representation or projection separated by real and imaginary value done.

Landscapes

  • Business, Economics & Management (AREA)
  • Accounting & Taxation (AREA)
  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Finance (AREA)
  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Strategic Management (AREA)
  • General Business, Economics & Management (AREA)
  • Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
  • Control Of Vending Devices And Auxiliary Devices For Vending Devices (AREA)

Abstract

L'invention concerne un procédé particulièrement fiable pour constater une manipulation non autorisée d'un équipement (E) électrique comprenant les étapes suivantes : - Établissement d'un spectre d'impédance en mesurant l'impédance sur une ligne (par exemple 1) de signal électrique de l'équipement (E) électrique à plusieurs fréquences, - Comparaison du spectre d'impédance établi avec un spectre de référence mesuré sur la ligne (1) de signal de l'équipement (E) électrique n'ayant subi aucune manipulation ou d'un équipement (E) électrique équivalent et - Constatation d'une manipulation non autorisée de l'équipement (E) électrique si le spectre d'impédance établi est différent du spectre de référence. L'invention concerne également un autre procédé ainsi que des arrangements pour constater une manipulation non autorisée d'un équipement (E) électrique.
PCT/EP2007/056930 2006-09-19 2007-07-09 Procédé et arrangement pour constater une manipulation non autorisée d'un équipement électrique WO2008034653A1 (fr)

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
DE200610044328 DE102006044328A1 (de) 2006-09-19 2006-09-19 Verfahren und Anordnung zum Feststellen einer unbefugten Manipulation einer elektrischen Einrichtung
DE102006044328.4 2006-09-19

Publications (1)

Publication Number Publication Date
WO2008034653A1 true WO2008034653A1 (fr) 2008-03-27

Family

ID=38669731

Family Applications (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
PCT/EP2007/056930 WO2008034653A1 (fr) 2006-09-19 2007-07-09 Procédé et arrangement pour constater une manipulation non autorisée d'un équipement électrique

Country Status (2)

Country Link
DE (1) DE102006044328A1 (fr)
WO (1) WO2008034653A1 (fr)

Cited By (1)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
WO2009103136A2 (fr) * 2008-02-21 2009-08-27 Redecard S/A Procédé et équipement pour indiquer la falsification d'un terminal de lecture de carte

Citations (2)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US20030037264A1 (en) * 2001-08-15 2003-02-20 Tadashi Ezaki Authentication processing system, authentiation processing method, authentication device, and computer program
US6799274B1 (en) * 2000-03-30 2004-09-28 Western Digital Ventures, Inc. Device comprising encryption circuitry enabled by comparing an operating spectral signature to an initial spectral signature

Family Cites Families (3)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
DE3036029C2 (de) * 1980-09-24 1984-05-30 Peter 8000 München Schubert Schaltungsanordnung zur Überwachung einer Verbindungsleitung
DE29813738U1 (de) * 1997-09-09 1999-01-21 Haberger Karl Vorrichtung zum manipulationssicheren Kennzeichnen von Gegenständen
FR2770013B1 (fr) * 1997-10-16 1999-11-26 Pierre Mousel Procede de surveillance d'equipements informatiques et systeme de mise en oeuvre

Patent Citations (2)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US6799274B1 (en) * 2000-03-30 2004-09-28 Western Digital Ventures, Inc. Device comprising encryption circuitry enabled by comparing an operating spectral signature to an initial spectral signature
US20030037264A1 (en) * 2001-08-15 2003-02-20 Tadashi Ezaki Authentication processing system, authentiation processing method, authentication device, and computer program

Cited By (2)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
WO2009103136A2 (fr) * 2008-02-21 2009-08-27 Redecard S/A Procédé et équipement pour indiquer la falsification d'un terminal de lecture de carte
WO2009103136A3 (fr) * 2008-02-21 2009-10-22 Redecard S/A Procédé et équipement pour indiquer la falsification d'un terminal de lecture de carte

Also Published As

Publication number Publication date
DE102006044328A1 (de) 2008-03-27

Similar Documents

Publication Publication Date Title
DE2760486C2 (fr)
EP3372442B1 (fr) Station de chargement et procédé de fonctionnement correspondant
DE2738113C2 (de) Vorrichtung zur Durchführung von Bearbeitungsvorgängen mit einem Identifikanden
DE69734898T2 (de) Verfahren und system zur absicherung von fernsprech-anrufssteuerungseinrichtungen
DE69735166T2 (de) Verfahren und einrichtung zur sicherung der ferndienstleistungen der finanzinstitute
EP2070030A1 (fr) Système d'enregistrement automatique d'appareils avec reconnaissance de code a barres et génération d'informations d'entretien
DE112019001531T5 (de) Authentifizierung verpackter Produkte
DE102004033092A1 (de) Verfahren für den Nachweis der Herkunft von Banknoten
EP2722788B1 (fr) Dispositif de lecture d'une carte à puce et procédé de détection d'un module de skimming
EP0570924A2 (fr) Méthode d'authentification d'une partie d'un système par une autre partie du système dans un système de transfert d'informations composé d'un terminal et d'un support de données portatif
EP3347880B1 (fr) Procédé et dispositif de détermination de l'intégrité d'un dispositif lecteur de carte et terminal de distribution automatique en étant équipé
EP2188763B1 (fr) Compteur d'utilisations pour carte à puce
WO2008034653A1 (fr) Procédé et arrangement pour constater une manipulation non autorisée d'un équipement électrique
DE102020124154A1 (de) Ladestation für Elektrofahrzeuge mit einer manipulationsgeschützten Bezahlvorrichtung
DE102005030657B3 (de) Codierverfahren und Codiereinrichtung zum Sichern eines Zählerstands eines Zählwerks vor einer nachträglichen Manipulation, sowie Prüfverfahren und Prüfeinrichtung zum Prüfen einer Authentizität eines Zählerstands eines Zählwerks
EP2816537A1 (fr) Système de caisse et procédé de fonctionnement d'un système de caisse
EP2722784B1 (fr) Dispositif électronique
DE102012004542A1 (de) Elektronisches Typenschild für Messgeräte
EP4183618A1 (fr) Colonne de charge électrique pour véhicules électriques
DE102022102911A1 (de) Verfahren zur automatischen Durchführung von physischen Kontrollen von elektronischen Geräten unter Berücksichtigung von latent unsicheren Lieferketten und Betriebsumgebungen
DE102011015318B4 (de) Sicherung einer Transaktion, insbesondere an einem Geldautomaten
EP3923221A1 (fr) Procédé de détermination d'une quantité de gaz hydrogène distribuée à un véhicule à une station-service en hydrogène
DE102011003393A1 (de) Verfahren und Prüfgerät zur Prüfung eines Objekts
WO2021052935A1 (fr) Procédé et dispositif pour vérifier l'authenticité d'un produit
EP2833342A1 (fr) Dispositif de scellement

Legal Events

Date Code Title Description
121 Ep: the epo has been informed by wipo that ep was designated in this application

Ref document number: 07787212

Country of ref document: EP

Kind code of ref document: A1

NENP Non-entry into the national phase

Ref country code: DE

122 Ep: pct application non-entry in european phase

Ref document number: 07787212

Country of ref document: EP

Kind code of ref document: A1