WO2008024936A2 - Procédé et système pour propager une politique de réseau - Google Patents

Procédé et système pour propager une politique de réseau Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2008024936A2
WO2008024936A2 PCT/US2007/076686 US2007076686W WO2008024936A2 WO 2008024936 A2 WO2008024936 A2 WO 2008024936A2 US 2007076686 W US2007076686 W US 2007076686W WO 2008024936 A2 WO2008024936 A2 WO 2008024936A2
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WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
network
directory name
rule
directory
rules
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PCT/US2007/076686
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English (en)
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WO2008024936A3 (fr
Inventor
Tomas L. Byrnes
Original Assignee
Diss
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Publication of WO2008024936A2 publication Critical patent/WO2008024936A2/fr
Publication of WO2008024936A3 publication Critical patent/WO2008024936A3/fr

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Classifications

    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/02—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for separating internal from external traffic, e.g. firewalls
    • H04L63/0227—Filtering policies
    • H04L63/0263—Rule management
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L61/00—Network arrangements, protocols or services for addressing or naming
    • H04L61/45—Network directories; Name-to-address mapping
    • H04L61/4505—Network directories; Name-to-address mapping using standardised directories; using standardised directory access protocols
    • H04L61/4511—Network directories; Name-to-address mapping using standardised directories; using standardised directory access protocols using domain name system [DNS]
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/14—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for detecting or protecting against malicious traffic
    • H04L63/1441—Countermeasures against malicious traffic
    • H04L63/145—Countermeasures against malicious traffic the attack involving the propagation of malware through the network, e.g. viruses, trojans or worms

Definitions

  • At least one embodiment of the present disclosure pertains to network traffic management, and more particularly to network security solutions.
  • IP Internet Protocol
  • Devices can be a client, subscriber or a user and the information propagated can be an IP address or subnet associated with a host or domain name.
  • IP address is a unique address that certain electronic devices use in order to identify and communicate with each other on a computer network utilizing the Internet Protocol standard.
  • the Internet Protocol is an example of a method or protocol by which data is sent from one computer to another on the Internet. Any participating network device including routers, computers, time-servers, printers, Internet fax machines, and some telephones can have their own unique address.
  • IP addresses can appear to be shared by multiple client devices either because they are part of a shared hosting web server environment or because a network address translator (NAT) or proxy server acts as an intermediary agent on behalf of its customers, in which case the real originating IP addresses might be hidden from the server receiving a request.
  • NAT network address translator
  • proxy server acts as an intermediary agent on behalf of its customers, in which case the real originating IP addresses might be hidden from the server receiving a request.
  • DNS Domain Name System
  • a system collects information from one or more sources regarding the character of a node in a network.
  • the character of the node in the network can be related to the quality of information traffic originating from or terminating to that node in the network.
  • a node is an originating or terminating point of information or signal flow in a communications network.
  • a node can also be a device that is connected as part of a computer network.
  • a node may be a computer, personal digital assistant, cell phone, router, switch, or hub.
  • the system may rank information relating to one or more specific locations in a network (e.g. node) into one or more lists, using at least one or more selected metric or parameter.
  • a parameter merits making traffic handling decisions when the list they produce can be used at a client to effectively screen out information traffic based on a formulated rule that utilizes domain names.
  • One parameter may be based on a weighted count of how often a network address or list of network addresses appears on each source. Another parameter may be based on the weight each source places on the network address or list of network addresses, while another parameter may be based on the accuracy of a source or a combination of the various parameters.
  • the one or more lists of IP addresses/subnets are then associated with a host name in one or more directory servers, for example a DNS server.
  • the information associated with a host/domain name is then propagated to devices on the network (e.g.
  • the system takes a variety of lists of known threat sources, bogon IP addresses and sites that should always be allowed to send traffic, and produces DNS lookups that allow those lists to be used very simply in firewall rules.
  • the list generated by the system is a list of IP addresses.
  • the IP addresses associated with host/domain names can be provided in response to requests to resolve a pre-selected host/domain name that is associated with a list. The request may be received from any interested party, for example, a client or a subscriber.
  • the system can return at least one IP address associated with the host name.
  • the term host name, domain name, directory name is used interchangeably throughout this document.
  • the system can acquire or receive one or more lists, for example, block lists, from a single or multiple sources.
  • the lists can be in formats including text, HTML, or XML so that they can be conveniently divided and grouped into various categories depending on the character of the information originating from or terminating at each network address.
  • An example of the various categories of lists include attacker, open proxy, open relay, phishing site, spamvertised site and spammer.
  • a proxy server allows users within a network group to store and forward internet services such as DNS or web pages so that the bandwidth used by the group is reduced and controlled. With an "open" proxy, however, any user on the Internet is able to use this forwarding service.
  • An open mail relay is an SMTP (e-mail) server configured in such a way that it allows anyone on the Internet to relay (i.e. send) e-mail through it.
  • SMTP e-mail
  • phishing is a criminal activity using social engineering techniques. Phishers attempt to fraudulently acquire sensitive information, such as usernames, passwords and credit card details, by masquerading as a trustworthy entity in an electronic communication. Spamvertising is the practice of sending E-mail spam, advertising a website, and spamming is the abuse of electronic messaging systems to indiscriminately send unsolicited bulk messages.
  • the system is based on user configuration information, to ensure that the information produced for a specific user is compatible with (based on available memory and/or processing power/load) the specific network elements they will be used with.
  • different domain names can be associated with different size list(s) of IP addresses. A user merely needs to select the correct domain name in formulating rules.
  • the system can provide information back to users who submit their logs to the system.
  • the logs can be in the form of ranked and correlated reports showing how their network elements handled traffic based on rules (not just the rules that use the list of IP addresses from the server) and, optionally, how that correlates with known attackers and attacks based on all the block list sources known to the system.
  • submitting logs is not required to use the system, doing so however, increases its utility to all users, and provides reporting functions to the user that submits the logs.
  • the system can be designed to be flexible enough to take in any kind of feed that establishes an IP address of a particular node as a communications partner, rank it, put it in a list, and then disseminate that information via any directory system.
  • Additional uses for the list of domain names resolved to a list of IP addresses, other than block or forward, are traffic prioritization, traffic redirection, deeper inspection, or other special handling.
  • Another aspect of the described systems and methods is that they can take or create lists of network node addresses that indicate the value or behavioral characteristics of the node or which users requests to treat in a specific manner (e.g., block or forward, etc.), and propagate the network node addresses to user devices through one or more dynamic, machine readable medium via a directory lookup list of nodes that enable a network element (user device) to make a handling decision based on membership in the list.
  • Figure 1 is a schematic drawing of an exemplary network environment within which embodiments described herein can be implemented.
  • Figure 2 is a block diagram of an exemplary procedure for gathering and disseminating IP values associated with domain names to enable policy decisions.
  • Figure 3 is a block diagram of an exemplary process for configuring a network device with a server to enable policy decisions.
  • Figure 4 is a block diagram of an exemplary procedure for evaluating the rules to be implemented in a network device.
  • FIG. 5 is a block diagram of an exemplary system configured in accordance with aspects of the disclosure.
  • FIG. 1 is a schematic drawing of an exemplary network environment within which embodiments of the present disclosure can be implemented.
  • Network environment 110 comprises a number of clients 12 (only a few of which have been shown) each of which is able to communicate with a server 14 via a network 16, for example a wide area network (WAN) or local area network (LAN) using conventional network protocols.
  • a client can be a computer system or process that requests a service of another computer system or process (a "server") using some kind of protocol and accept the server's responses.
  • a client can also be, for example one or more computers, a computer application or software such as a web browser that runs on a user's local computer or workstation and connects to a server as necessary or a combination of both.
  • a client can be firewalls, switches, routers, servers, and any other system capable of applying a rule.
  • a server can be one or more computers or devices on a network that manages network resources.
  • a server can also refer to one or more programs managing resources rather than the entire computer. The simplest servers are for example switches, routers, gateways, print servers and net modems.
  • the network 16 may be the Internet and the communications protocol used may be the Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP).
  • HTTP Hypertext Transfer Protocol
  • client 12 generates requests 12.1 to 12.3 to server 14. Each request 12.1 to 12.4 reaches the server 14 via network 16.
  • Figure 2 is a block diagram of an exemplary procedure for gathering and disseminating IP values associated with domain names to enable policy decisions.
  • Figure 2 provides various exemplary operational procedures in accordance with the system for acquiring and disseminating IP values associated with domain names in a network as described above with reference to Figure 1.
  • the procedure starts with the server acquiring information relating to at least one specific location in a network from one or more sources.
  • the information acquired can be, for example, an internet protocol address, an internet protocol subnet or any unique information necessary for developing a network policy for screening network traffic. Additionally further information can be acquired regarding the character of at least one specific location in a network.
  • the specific location in the network can be a node and the character of the node in the network can be "good” or "bad” depending on the source of information originating from or terminating at that node.
  • the character of the node in the network can be based on at least one parameter relating to traffic to or from the at least one specific location in the network.
  • the character of the node can be essential in formulating rules for evaluating network traffic for a network device.
  • the network device can be a client device.
  • IP address, IP subnet or information regarding a specific location in the network is used interchangeably throughout this document.
  • the process of acquiring information from various sources can be implemented after receiving a resolution request from the network device.
  • the process can be manual, automated via software or a combination of both.
  • the process can be automated through software that visits or crawls web pages that are known to list, for example, IP addresses and or IP subnets of spammers.
  • clients, subscribers or volunteers can send in IP addresses and subnets based on the character of the node relating to the addresses and subnets.
  • One or more lists of the information (e.g. IP address) regarding the at least one specific location in the network is then generated in step 2002.
  • the process then continues to step 2003 where the information (e.g., IP address) regarding the specific locations in the network are ranked into one or more lists based on one or more parameters.
  • the parameters can include a weighted count of how often the information regarding the specific location appears on a list from various sources combined with the weight each source places on the character of the specific location and a weight for the accuracy of each source. These parameters determine, for example, whether a specific location in a network is associated with a known threat source, whether the IP address is from a Bogon source or whether the specific location is associated with a site that should always be allowed to send traffic.
  • the multiple lists are also ranked based on the parameters of the information regarding the specific locations on each list.
  • the system receives block lists provided by a number of sources in a format including text, HTML or XML and divides and groups them into types, for example, attacker, Bogon, open proxy, open relay, phishing site, spamvertised site, and spammer.
  • Bogon is an informal name for an IP packet on the public Internet that claims to be from an area of the IP address space reserved, but not yet allocated or delegated.
  • step 2004 the information (e.g. IP address) regarding the at least one specific location in the network belonging to a generated list is associated with a host/domain name from at least one directory server, for example, a Domain Name System/Server (DNS) forming an associated list.
  • DNS Domain Name System/Server
  • Additional types of directories of information that can be disseminated are, for example, LDAP (Lightweight Directory Access Protocol), UDDI (Universal Description, Discovery and Integration), YP/NIS (Yellow Pages/Network Information Services) or any other system that provides names to IP addresses (e.g., IPv4 and IPv6) or IP to name mapping.
  • LDAP is an Internet protocol that email and other programs use to look up information from a server.
  • UDDI is an XML-based registry for businesses worldwide to list them on the Internet. Its ultimate goal is to streamline online transactions by enabling companies to find one another on the Web and make their systems interoperable for e-commerce.
  • YP/NIS is a client-server directory service protocol for distributing system configuration data such as user and host names between computers on a computer network.
  • DNS lookups are produced from a variety of lists including a list of known threat sources, Bogon IP addresses and sites that should always be allowed to send traffic can be used in, for example, firewall rules. This step creates, for example, lists of IP addresses having similar characteristics (e.g., threat sources) under a domain name.
  • information for example at least one IP address associated with a host/domain name, from the associated list can be propagated to the network device.
  • the information can be sent in a form that enables decision making about traffic originating from and or destined to a specific location in the network.
  • the propagation can be in response to requests to resolve a pre-selected host name that is associated with a list.
  • the information can be propagated as Multi-Host A (address mapping) records in private DNS Zones. Given that DNS data is broken up into a hierarchy of domains some servers are responsible to know only a small portion of data, such as a single sub-domain. The portion of a domain for which the server is directly responsible is called a zone.
  • DNS data is divided into manageable sets of data called zones where the zones contain name and IP address information about one or more parts of a DNS domain.
  • a DNS zone database is made up of a collection of resource records. Each resource record specifies information about a particular object. For example, address mapping A (Multi-Host A) records maps a host name to an IP address. The server uses these records to answer queries for hosts in its zone. Users or clients can send address resolution requests for preselected host names and receive the information in response as illustrated in Step 2006.
  • address mapping A Multi-Host A
  • One implementation is to take a specific list (of IP addresses), and to make a single multi-A record lookup for all hosts that are members of that list. These records are then used in step 2006, by, for example, firewalls, switches, routers, servers, and any other system capable of applying a rule where one of the conditions of the rule is a DNS lookup for the Multi-Host A record, to block traffic to and/or from the specified list of IP addresses.
  • Additional embodiments can be used to create the following: white-lists, user- specified zones with filters based on user-specified weights for the character of the sources, protocol specific lists (SMTP, HTTP, etc.), include or exclude filters based on a user's specific business needs (this can be automated through the user uploading their current configuration and having the lists de-conflicted against that), and exploit/vulnerability weighted lists (where the presence of an exploit for a vulnerability and/or attackers that are attacking a user system that may or may not be exploitable by that attack are used to include or exclude particular list elements or reprioritize the lists for the specific user).
  • SMTP Secure Transfer Protocol
  • HTTP HyperText Transfer Protocol
  • exploit/vulnerability weighted lists where the presence of an exploit for a vulnerability and/or attackers that are attacking a user system that may or may not be exploitable by that attack are used to include or exclude particular list elements or reprioritize the lists for the specific user).
  • a White list is a list of IP addresses and domains of trusted e-mail addresses and domains that are always allowed to send email, no matter what the content is. White lists can require that senders authenticate their identity prior to e-mail being delivered to a recipient. All of these types of information (IP addresses associated with a host name) described above can be transmitted to devices as a response to a request to resolve a host name.
  • FIG. 3 is a block diagram of an exemplary process for configuring a network device with a server to enable policy decisions.
  • the procedure starts with a network device or client accessing a server over a network to establish a communications link between the server and the network device.
  • the server is a private directory server, for example the DISS server made by DISS, in La Jolla, California.
  • the network device can be a firewall, or other traffic management device, that can make a forwarding decision based on a DNS lookup.
  • the network device is configured in accordance with a private directory server in order to establish a communications link. In this case the network device can be configured to resolve names (e.g. domain names) using the private directory service.
  • scripts can be written to configure network devices to resolve domain names using the private directory service.
  • the process then continues to step 3002 where custom allow or deny lists of, for example, domain names associated with a list of IP addresses or IP subnets are configured.
  • custom allow or deny lists are created for the network devices that the network devices can subsequently query against in an implementation utilizing the server.
  • This process can simplify the management of, for example, black and white listing the same IP addresses across multiple devices.
  • a user can, for example, implement a "Deny all except." security policy, or "No matter what, I need to talk to ." security policy (with the blanks filled in with a domain name) without implementing the policy on each individual network device.
  • step 3003 a decision is made to determine the lists of domain names to block and or allow.
  • step 3004 rules to be implemented at the network device are formulated using domain names that determine the outcome of information originating or terminating at IP addresses associated with the domain names in the rules.
  • attack sources can be blocked, connections to and from compromised hosts can be blocked and "Trojaned machines” cannot connect back to their "botmasters" that are on the lookup lists.
  • a Trojan is a program that installs malicious software while under the guise of doing something else. Trojans are more notorious for installing backdoor programs that allow unauthorized remote access to the victim's machine by unwanted parties - normally with malicious intentions.
  • a bot may be a software program designed to do a specific task such as gathering a listing of web sites with the latest news.
  • a botmaster is a Term used to describe an entity that is responsible for and/or maintains a bot.
  • a simple example, to block the top 10 current attackers according to, for example, Dshield, is a firewall rule of the form:
  • the rules are then ready in the final step 3005 to be enabled, for example, by evaluating against the rule as illustrated in the description of Figure 4 below.
  • FIG 4 is a block diagram of an exemplary procedure for evaluating the rules to be implemented in a network device.
  • the rules are formulated at a server and installed at the network device. This procedure is initiated in step 4001 when a rule is applied. A decision is then made in step 4002 to determine whether IP values for the domain names used in the formulated rules are available. If the IP value for the domain names used in the formulated rules is available, an evaluation is made in step 4004 to determine whether the source or destination of the IP value is referenced in the rules. If the source or destination of the IP value is referenced in the formulated rules, then in step 4006 the formulated rules are applied, otherwise a default rule is applied in step 4005.
  • step 4002 Alternatively if in step 4002 it is determined that the IP value for the names used in the rules is unavailable, a directory query for domain name resolution is sent to a directory server in step 4003. The response to the query provides the IP addresses.
  • step 4004 an evaluation is made to determine whether the source or destination of the IP value is referenced in the formulated rules which now include the list of IP addresses.
  • step 4005 and 4006 as previously described.
  • the enabling process can occur automatically, for example, when the first packet is received that triggers the evaluation of the rule.
  • the process of enabling the formulated rules can occur on either the expiration of the record time to live (TTL), as configured by the server or some locally defined refresh timer or rule (such as when it ages resolved IPs to free memory).
  • FIG. 5 is a block diagram of an exemplary system configured in accordance with aspects of the disclosure.
  • a DISS server 10 acquires IP addresses and/or IP subnets from various sources and groups them by characteristic or reputation.
  • the characteristic or reputation is based on at least one parameter relating to traffic to or from the at least one specific location in a network, where the parameters merit making traffic handling decisions.
  • This process can be manual, automated via software or a combination of both. For example, the process can be automated through software that visits or crawls web pages that are known to list IP addresses and or IP subnets of spammers. Additionally, customers, subscribers or volunteers to the system can send in IP addresses and subnets via log transmission 15.
  • Each list is then associated with a host name on one or more DNS or other directory servers, for example, private directory servers 20, with one or more connections to a network (e.g., the Internet).
  • a request or directory query 30 received by the private directory servers 20 to resolve a host domain name will result in it being resolved to an associated list of IP addresses or subnets.
  • the requests are received from clients 40 via the network 16 described in Figure 1.
  • the associated lists can then be propagated to clients or client elements (client/user device) 40 as host lookups in a directory service.
  • the list propagation can also be accomplished using other protocols or systems that resolve names to IP addresses or IP Subnets.
  • a DNS server 20 is configured so that a selected name will resolve to selected (one or more) IP addresses and/or subnets when queried.
  • This selected name can be a "fake" name in the sense that it is not being used in the typical manner for a name to address resolution.
  • the DNS server 20 resolves the selected name to a list of selected IP addresses (e.g., a list of IP addresses to block) and not to one or more IP addresses associated with the selected name in the typical sense.
  • the service can propagate the top 10 attackers listed on, for example, a DShield web page, via a selected domain name, for example, dshield- top.diss.byrneit.net.
  • DShield is an example of a community-based collaborative firewall log correlation system. It receives logs from volunteers world wide and uses them to analyze attack trends.
  • this selected domain name is a multi-A record in a DNS zone and the DNS server 20 returns the IP addresses of the top 10 attackers as currently reported by Dshield in response to a directory query for that selected domain name.
  • Network filtering and forwarding rules can be defined at the client device 40.
  • the filtering and forwarding rules can be accomplished in, switches, routers, firewalls, load balancers, and other equipment generally indicated as network/client device 40 that use the selected names, instead of locally configured lists of IP addresses and subnets.
  • the system can propagate highly dynamic lists of IP addresses and subnets, such as the current list of most active attackers, without requiring reconfiguration of equipment, or expensive and complex central management consoles.
  • the system includes a list of selected names with each selected name having an associated list of IP addresses and subnets with certain characteristics. For example some of the selected names can have associated lists of addresses that a user would want to block and other selected names can have associated lists of addresses that a user would want to forward.
  • the desired selected name or names are put in place of the traditional IP address and subnet mask, or address list entry, in the rule base.
  • an automated script on a workstation that is capable of resolving the IP addresses and turning them into rules on the network elements may be used.
  • the system propagates host records that are not the real names of the hosts, but that indicate their reputation or other characteristics that merit making traffic handling decisions on, and therefore allow network operators to use much simpler sets of rules, and little or no additional equipment, to manage dynamic lists of IP addresses.
  • This can be used to solve the problem of configuring dynamic rules to meet dynamic network conditions, without the need for complex, expensive, and typically single-platform specific, management systems.
  • the choice of DNS in one embodiment is due to its ubiquity, but the longer term view holds that any widely enough used directory system that resolves names to IP addresses can be used in this manner. Nor is the system limited to being used for blocking.
  • the system allows for automatic updates from a central point of all devices in the user network to control inbound and outbound connections to threat sources, for example. This relieves users of the effort required to react to evolving threats in a timely manner. Additionally, the implementation can require no special hardware or traffic rerouting and can be wholly managed through a web service.
  • Various embodiments may also be implemented primarily in hardware using, for example, components such as application specific integrated circuits ("ASICs"), or field programmable gate arrays ("FPGAs"). Implementation of a hardware state machine capable of performing the functions described herein will also be apparent to those skilled in the relevant art. Various embodiments may also be implemented using a combination of both hardware and software.
  • ASICs application specific integrated circuits
  • FPGAs field programmable gate arrays
  • DSP digital signal processor
  • a general-purpose processor can be a microprocessor, but in the alternative, the processor can be any processor, controller, microcontroller, or state machine.
  • a processor can also be implemented as a combination of computing devices, for example, a combination of a DSP and a microprocessor, a plurality of microprocessors, one or more microprocessors in conjunction with a DSP core, or any other such configuration.
  • a software module can reside in RAM memory, flash memory, ROM memory, EPROM memory, EEPROM memory, registers, hard disk, a removable disk, a CD-ROM, or any other form of storage medium including a network storage medium.
  • An exemplary storage medium can be coupled to the processor such that the processor can read information from, and write information to, the storage medium.
  • the storage medium can be integral to the processor.
  • the processor and the storage medium can also reside in an ASIC.

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Abstract

L'invention concerne un procédé pour acquérir et disséminer des caractéristiques de nœuds de réseau pour permettre des décisions de politique comprenant la réception d'une demande de résolution provenant d'un ou plusieurs clients dans un environnement de réseau. Une information, par exemple, une adresse de réseau, est ensuite acquise à partir d'une ou plusieurs sources concernant un emplacement spécifique dans un réseau, par exemple, un nœud de réseau. Une liste des adresses de réseau est ensuite générée et classée sur la base d'un ou plusieurs paramètres qui méritent de prendre des décisions de gestion de trafic. Les adresses de réseau sont ensuite associées à un nom d'hôte sur au moins un serveur d'annuaire et ensuite propagées vers ledit ou lesdits clients.
PCT/US2007/076686 2006-08-23 2007-08-23 Procédé et système pour propager une politique de réseau WO2008024936A2 (fr)

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US20050204050A1 (en) * 2004-03-10 2005-09-15 Patrick Turley Method and system for controlling network access
US6973488B1 (en) * 2000-03-31 2005-12-06 Intel Corporation Providing policy information to a remote device
US20060143703A1 (en) * 2003-12-10 2006-06-29 Chris Hopen Rule-based routing to resources through a network

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US6973488B1 (en) * 2000-03-31 2005-12-06 Intel Corporation Providing policy information to a remote device
US20030065762A1 (en) * 2001-09-28 2003-04-03 Cable & Wireless Internet Services, Inc. Configurable adaptive global traffic control and management
US20040047349A1 (en) * 2002-08-20 2004-03-11 Nec Corporation Packet transfer equipment, packet transfer method resolution server, DNS server, network system and program
US20060143703A1 (en) * 2003-12-10 2006-06-29 Chris Hopen Rule-based routing to resources through a network
US20050204050A1 (en) * 2004-03-10 2005-09-15 Patrick Turley Method and system for controlling network access

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