WO2008004498A1 - Security risk management system, device, method, and program - Google Patents

Security risk management system, device, method, and program Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2008004498A1
WO2008004498A1 PCT/JP2007/063087 JP2007063087W WO2008004498A1 WO 2008004498 A1 WO2008004498 A1 WO 2008004498A1 JP 2007063087 W JP2007063087 W JP 2007063087W WO 2008004498 A1 WO2008004498 A1 WO 2008004498A1
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WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
countermeasure
target system
vulnerability
threat
model
Prior art date
Application number
PCT/JP2007/063087
Other languages
French (fr)
Japanese (ja)
Inventor
Hiroshi Sakaki
Kazuo Yanoo
Original Assignee
Nec Corporation
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Nec Corporation filed Critical Nec Corporation
Priority to JP2008523664A priority Critical patent/JP5304243B2/en
Publication of WO2008004498A1 publication Critical patent/WO2008004498A1/en

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Classifications

    • GPHYSICS
    • G06COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06FELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/50Monitoring users, programs or devices to maintain the integrity of platforms, e.g. of processors, firmware or operating systems
    • G06F21/57Certifying or maintaining trusted computer platforms, e.g. secure boots or power-downs, version controls, system software checks, secure updates or assessing vulnerabilities
    • G06F21/577Assessing vulnerabilities and evaluating computer system security

Definitions

  • the present invention relates to a security risk management system, apparatus, method, and program for managing security risks in a target system, and in particular, a security risk management system, apparatus, method, and program used for security risk management during operation of the target system. And programs. Background art
  • Patent Document 1 is based on the inspection result by the vulnerability inspection tool. Discloses a method for notifying unauthorized access countermeasure tools to protect discovered vulnerabilities. This is called prior art 1.
  • Patent Document 2 attribute information such as loss amount 'confidentiality' is assigned to a file with asset value, and file access to the file 'network access is based on Discloses a method for updating the risk value. In the method described in Patent Document 2, if the updated risk value exceeds a pre-specified threshold, measures such as file access restriction and file deletion are taken.
  • Patent Document 3 discloses a method for taking countermeasures (patch application or firewall network access control) to deal with detected attacks based on the detection results of the unauthorized intrusion detection tool.
  • Patent Document 4 discloses a method for generating countermeasures by performing risk analysis in consideration of security incident information and information asset information corresponding to the discovered vulnerability. Such a technique disclosed in Patent Documents 2, 3, and 4 is referred to as Conventional Technique 2.
  • Non-Patent Document 1 is based on pre-defined information such as the frequency of occurrence of vulnerabilities, the amount of damage at the time of the occurrence of a threat, and the cost (expense) of an implementation method for dealing with it.
  • a method for selecting a candidate set of countermeasure targets that can reduce risk most efficiently at low cost has been proposed.
  • Non-Patent Document 2 there is a method for selecting a countermeasure target candidate set that can reduce risk most efficiently at a low cost based on the relationship between the occurrence probability of a predefined threat and the value of information assets. Proposed.
  • Such technology disclosed in Non-Patent Documents 1 and 2 is referred to as Conventional Technology 3.
  • Patent Document 1 Japanese Patent Application Laid-Open No. 2002-328896
  • Patent Document 2 Japanese Patent Laid-Open No. 2005-190066
  • Patent Document 3 Japanese Patent Laid-Open No. 2005-301551
  • Patent Document 4 Japanese Patent Laid-Open No. 2005-242754
  • Non-Patent Document 1 Nagai et al., “Proposal for Basic Design of Security for Information Systems Considering Functional Compatibility”, Journey to the Journal of Information Processing, April 2004, Vol. 45, No. 4
  • Non-Patent Document 2 Nakamura et al., "Proposal and Evaluation of a Practical Method for Selecting Security Measures” , Journey to the Journal, August 2004, Vol. 45, No. 8
  • Patent Documents 1 to 4 and Non-Patent Documents 1 to 2 described above are incorporated herein by reference.
  • Conventional technology 2 solves the problem of conventional technology 1 by introducing a risk analysis method to some extent when detecting the state power vulnerability of the system and deriving the detected countermeasures against the vulnerability. .
  • Conventional Technology 2 the means for determining which countermeasure should be derived from multiple countermeasures is fixed, and is not always optimal. Measures are now available!
  • Prior art 3 is intended to be used when selecting the optimal configuration at the time of system design 'introduction, and has the function to determine the current risk of the operating system and output the optimal countermeasures. do not have. In addition, it is necessary to input all information such as the frequency of vulnerability occurrence and the value of information assets. However, it is difficult to update such information according to the operating status of the system. In addition, although the cost of implementing measures is taken into account, restrictions such as availability are taken into account! [0015] In other words, the first problem with the conventional technology is that the risk is reduced after analyzing the risk based on the state of the operating system (whether there is a vulnerability, the frequency of occurrence of the vulnerability, the asset value, etc.).
  • the second problem is that when multiple countermeasures are considered, it is not possible to prioritize the countermeasures in consideration of multifaceted side effects such as costs and reduced availability when taking countermeasures. Or the security administrator cannot determine what side effects will occur and to what extent.
  • Prior art 3 has proposed a method to reduce the risk in consideration of the cost at the time of introduction, but it does not consider other constraints such as reduced availability.
  • the third problem is that step-by-step measures are not taken into account when measures that can be easily taken are taken as an emergency measure and gradually shifted to an ideal measure.
  • the reason for this is that the conventional technology has realized a countermeasure plan that takes into account the reduction in availability due to countermeasures and the lead time (deployment time) until countermeasures are taken.
  • the present invention analyzes the risk based on the state of the operating system, and considers various constraints that occur in the operating system from the countermeasure candidates for reducing the risk, and is optimal.
  • the purpose is to provide a security risk management system, apparatus, method and program capable of presenting countermeasures.
  • state analysis means for example, current state analysis means, asset analysis
  • a risk determination means for example, a risk analysis means for determining the security risk of the target system based on the analysis result of the state analysis means, and the security risk exceeds a predetermined allowable range by the risk determination means.
  • the Security risk management system that manages the security risk in the target system, with a measure plan selection means (for example, a measure plan generation means) that selects a measure plan to reduce the security risk based on the degree of constraint Is provided.
  • a measure plan selection means for example, a measure plan generation means
  • the security risk management system outputs countermeasure plan information including a risk reduction degree of the countermeasure and a degree of restriction of the countermeasure for the countermeasure proposal selected by the countermeasure proposal selecting means.
  • Countermeasure plan information output means for example, countermeasure priority order determination means
  • countermeasure execution means for executing predetermined processing to reduce security risks according to the countermeasure plan selected by the countermeasure plan selection means (for example, implementation of countermeasures) And means 203).
  • a process to reduce the security risk for example, in order to set a password for the disk encryption tool, a process for displaying a warning screen when the user logs on, or a password is set. It is desirable to adopt a process that sends an email alerting the user.
  • the state analysis means analyzes at least the presence / absence of the vulnerability of the target system and the value of the target system
  • the risk judgment means analyzes the presence / absence of the vulnerability of the target system and the target system.
  • a threat model that predefines the asset value, the threat model that defines the frequency of occurrence of security threats in advance, and the vulnerabilities related to the manifestation of threats based on the presence or absence of vulnerabilities in advance; and Based on the threat asset model that defines the relationship between the threat and the threat related to the impact of asset manifestation in advance, the risk value indicating the security risk level of the target system is calculated, and the above countermeasures are taken.
  • the draft selection means includes a vulnerability-one countermeasure model that defines countermeasure means for reducing the security risk due to each vulnerability in advance, and is created in the target system by implementing each countermeasure means in advance. Based on the countermeasure constraint model that defines the degree of constraint that indicates the size of various constraints, countermeasure measures that meet the specified conditions after the implementation of the risk value and various constraint degrees can be selected as countermeasure plans. Good.
  • the security risk management system described above is a countermeasure stage that is defined according to the implementation stage of the countermeasure, and the transition condition of the countermeasure stage power is set for each countermeasure stage to which the countermeasure to be implemented is associated.
  • a storage means for example, a countermeasure model storage means
  • defined countermeasure stage transition rules for example, a countermeasure scenario model
  • countermeasure proposal selecting means for example, a countermeasure proposal selected by the countermeasure proposal selecting means according to a predetermined condition.
  • countermeasure scenario generation means for example, countermeasure scenario generation means
  • countermeasure scenario generation means that generates a countermeasure scenario that indicates which countermeasure proposal is executed at which timing by assigning it to each countermeasure stage indicated by the countermeasure stage transition rule.
  • countermeasure scenario generation means for example, countermeasure scenario generation means
  • the security risk management system generates the countermeasure scenario based on at least the state change of the target system, the current time, or the elapsed time since the countermeasure was implemented, according to the countermeasure stage transition rule.
  • a measure execution decision means (measure measure determination means) that determines the measure plan to be executed by transitioning the measure stage on the measure scenario generated by the measure may be provided! / ⁇ .
  • the security risk management system includes a target system that is a target of risk management, and a risk management device that is connected to the target system via a communication network, and the target system includes the target system.
  • a current state analysis means for determining whether there is a vulnerability and transmitting the determination result to the risk management system; and an asset analysis means for determining the value of the target system and transmitting the determination result to the risk management system.
  • the risk management device determines a security risk from information collection means for collecting vulnerability information indicating whether there is a vulnerability in the target system and asset information indicating the value of the target system from the target system.
  • a risk model there are at least a threat model that is information indicating the frequency of occurrence of each security threat and a threat model.
  • the threat vulnerability model which is the relationship between the existence of each vulnerability related to the threat manifestation, and each threat indicated by the threat model, Implemented at least for each vulnerability indicated by the threat vulnerability model as a risk model storage means for storing the threat asset model, which is information indicating the degree of impact on the asset, and a countermeasure model for determining the countermeasure means Measures that store the vulnerability one countermeasure model, which is information indicating possible countermeasure means, and the countermeasure constraint model, which is information indicating the degree of various restrictions of the countermeasure means, for each countermeasure means indicated by the vulnerability one countermeasure model
  • a risk analysis means for calculating a risk value based on the frequency of occurrence of each threat in the target system, the degree of vulnerability to each threat, and the degree of impact on the assets of the target system when each threat becomes apparent; Risk analysis hand When the risk value calculated by the step exceeds the predetermined tolerance, it is implemented by analyzing counter
  • a risk determination means for determining the security risk of the target system, and the security risk is determined by the risk determination means. If it is determined that the allowable range is exceeded, the risk reduction degree indicating the degree of security risk that is reduced by implementing the prescribed countermeasures on the target system, and the occurrence of the prescribed measures on the target system
  • a security risk management device is provided for managing the security risk in the target system, including a measure plan selection means for selecting a measure plan for reducing the security risk based on the constraint level indicating the size of various constraints.
  • the security risk management apparatus outputs countermeasure plan information including a risk reduction degree of the countermeasure and a degree of restriction of the countermeasure for the countermeasure proposal selected by the countermeasure proposal selecting means. It is also possible to provide countermeasure proposal information output means and countermeasure execution means for executing predetermined processing for reducing security risk according to the countermeasure proposal selected by the countermeasure proposal selection means.
  • the risk determination means includes the presence / absence of vulnerability of the target system, the asset value of the target system, a threat model in which the occurrence frequency of security threats is defined in advance, and a threat based on the presence / absence of vulnerability in advance.
  • a threat vulnerability model that defines the relationship between vulnerabilities and threats related to the manifestation of threats in advance
  • a threat asset model that defines the relationship between threats and assets related to the impact on assets due to the manifestation of threats in advance.
  • the security risk management device described above is a countermeasure stage that is defined according to the implementation stage of the countermeasure, and for each countermeasure stage to which the countermeasure to be implemented is associated, a countermeasure that defines a transition condition for the countermeasure stage power.
  • the security risk management device generates the countermeasure scenario based on at least the state change of the target system, the current time, or the elapsed time of the power when the countermeasure is implemented in accordance with the countermeasure stage transition rule.
  • countermeasure execution decision means for deciding a countermeasure plan to be executed by changing the countermeasure stage on the countermeasure scenario generated by the means.
  • the security risk management device includes, from the target system, information collection means for collecting vulnerability information indicating whether there is a vulnerability in the target system and asset information indicating the value of the target system, security risk,
  • the threat model is information that indicates at least the frequency of occurrence of each threat on the security and each threat indicated by the threat model.
  • Threat model which is information indicating the relationship
  • risk model that stores the threat asset model which is information indicating the degree of impact on the assets of the target system due to the manifestation of the threat for each threat indicated by the threat model
  • a countermeasure model for determining the storage means and countermeasure means at least for each vulnerability indicated in the threat vulnerability model
  • the vulnerability one countermeasure model which is information indicating the countermeasure means to be stored
  • the countermeasure constraint model which is information indicating the degree of various restrictions of the countermeasure means, are stored for each countermeasure means indicated by the vulnerability one countermeasure model.
  • the countermeasure model storage means and the vulnerability information and asset information collected by the information collection means are stored in the risk model storage means and analyzed by using each model, and each threat in the target system is analyzed.
  • Risk analysis means that calculates the risk value based on the frequency of occurrence, the size of the vulnerability to each threat, and the degree of impact on the assets of the target system when each threat emerges, and the risk analysis means Risk value
  • the countermeasures against the vulnerabilities whose existence has been discovered are analyzed using each model stored in the countermeasure model storage means, so that the risk value and various degrees of restriction after implementation are predetermined. It is also possible to adopt a configuration comprising countermeasure means generating means for selecting countermeasure means that meet the above conditions as a countermeasure proposal.
  • a state analysis step for analyzing the state of the target system a risk determination step for determining the security risk of the target system based on the analysis result, When it is determined that the risk exceeds the predetermined allowable range, the risk reduction degree indicating the degree of security risk V, which is reduced by implementing the predetermined countermeasures on the target system, and the predetermined countermeasures are implemented.
  • Security measures to manage the security risks in the target system including a measure proposal selection step for selecting a measure plan for reducing the security risk based on the degree of restriction indicating the size of each type of constraint generated in the target system.
  • a risk management method is provided.
  • the security risk management method outputs a countermeasure plan information output step including, for the selected countermeasure plan, countermeasure plan information including a risk reduction degree of the countermeasure and a degree of constraint of the countermeasure. And a countermeasure execution step for executing a predetermined process for reducing the security risk in accordance with the selected countermeasure plan.
  • the state analysis step at least the presence / absence of the vulnerability of the target system and the value of the target system are analyzed, and in the risk determination step, the presence / absence of the vulnerability of the target system and the assets of the target system are analyzed.
  • a threat model that defines the value and frequency of occurrence of security threats in advance, a threat that predefines the relationship between vulnerabilities and threats related to the emergence of threats based on the presence or absence of vulnerabilities, and a threat model Based on the threat asset model that defines the relationship between the asset and the threat related to the impact on the asset due to the materialization of risk, a risk value indicating the security risk level of the target system is calculated and
  • a vulnerability countermeasure model that defines countermeasures to reduce the security risk due to each vulnerability in advance, and the target scenario by implementing each countermeasure in advance.
  • the countermeasure means that the risk value after implementation and the degree of restriction meet the specified conditions is selected as a countermeasure proposal. That's right.
  • the security risk management method described above is a countermeasure stage that is defined according to the implementation stage of a countermeasure, according to a predetermined condition, according to a predetermined condition. For each countermeasure stage to be associated, assign it to each countermeasure stage indicated by the countermeasure stage transition rule that defines the transition conditions from the countermeasure stage. Including a countermeasure scenario generation step that generates a countermeasure scenario that indicates
  • the security risk management method is based on the countermeasure scenario based on at least the state change of the target system, the current time, or the elapsed time of the force when the countermeasure is implemented according to the countermeasure stage transition rule. It includes a measure execution decision step that decides a measure plan to be executed by transitioning the measure stage.
  • the target system determines whether there is a vulnerability in the target system, sends the determination result to the risk management system, and the target system power determines the value of the target system.
  • the step of sending the judgment results to the risk management system, and the risk management device collects the vulnerability information indicating the presence or absence of the vulnerability of the target system and the asset information indicating the value of the target system from the target system
  • the risk management device uses the vulnerability model and asset information collected by the information collection means, the threat model that is the information indicating the occurrence frequency of each security threat, and each threat indicated by the threat model.
  • Is indicated by the threat vulnerability model which is information indicating the relationship between the existence of each vulnerability related to the manifestation of the threat
  • the threat model Analyzing threats using the threat asset model, which is information indicating the degree of impact of threats on the assets of the target system, the frequency of occurrence of each threat in the target system and the vulnerability to each threat.
  • For each vulnerability indicated in the vulnerability vulnerability model there is a vulnerability one countermeasure model that is information indicating the countermeasures that can be implemented, and each countermeasure means indicated in the vulnerability one countermeasure model!
  • the measure means may be a method including a step of selecting as a measure plan.
  • a state analysis process for analyzing the state of the target system on a computer a risk determination process for determining the security risk of the target system based on the analysis result, The degree of security risk that can be reduced by implementing the prescribed measures on the target system when it is determined that the security risk exceeds the prescribed tolerance!
  • a countermeasure plan for reducing the security risk is selected.
  • a security risk management program is provided to execute countermeasure selection processing and manage security risks in the target system.
  • the security risk management program outputs to the computer a countermeasure plan information including a risk reduction degree of the countermeasure and a constraint degree of each countermeasure for the selected countermeasure plan.
  • the countermeasure execution process for executing a predetermined process for reducing the security risk may be executed.
  • the security risk management program causes the computer to analyze at least whether there is a vulnerability in the target system and the value of the target system in the state analysis process, and in the risk determination process,
  • Risk value that indicates the degree of security risk of the target system based on the defined threat vulnerability model and the threat asset model that defines the relationship between the asset and the threat related to the asset impact caused by the manifestation of the threat in advance.
  • a vulnerability pair that defines countermeasures to reduce the security risk due to each vulnerability in the countermeasure proposal selection process in advance.
  • the risk value and various constraint levels after implementation are the specified conditions. It is possible to select a countermeasure means that matches the above as a countermeasure plan.
  • the security risk management program defines, in the computer, any of the selected countermeasure proposals according to the implementation stage of the countermeasures according to a predetermined condition. For each countermeasure stage to which the countermeasure to be implemented is associated, assigning it to each countermeasure stage indicated by the countermeasure stage transition rule that defines the transition conditions from the countermeasure stage, V, deviation of Measure scenario generation processing may be executed to generate a measure scenario indicating whether the measure plan is to be executed at the timing of deviation.
  • the countermeasure execution decision process for determining the countermeasure plan to be executed may be executed by changing the countermeasure stage on the countermeasure scenario.
  • the security risk management program collects information from a target system on the computer, such as vulnerability information indicating the presence or absence of the vulnerability of the target system and asset information indicating the value of the target system.
  • Vulnerability information and asset information collected by means of the threat model which is information indicating the frequency of occurrence of each security threat, and each vulnerability indicated by the threat model for each vulnerability related to the manifestation of the threat.
  • the threat vulnerability model which is information indicating the presence / absence relationship
  • the threat asset model which is information indicating the degree of impact on the assets of the target system due to the realization of the threat, for each threat indicated by the threat model.
  • the risk determination means determines the security risk based on the analysis result of the state of the system that is the object of risk management, and then the measure proposal selection means determines the risk reduction degree and various restriction degrees. Is generated in the target system because it is configured to select countermeasures based on It is possible to present an optimal countermeasure plan in consideration of various constraints.
  • the security administrator determines how much various costs are incurred when implementing the countermeasures. Can implement optimal measures. The reason is, for example, whether to prioritize the decline in availability or prioritize rapid countermeasure deployment by defining multiple costs such as equipment cost, availability cost, and deployment cost as a countermeasure model. Whether to give priority to minimizing the overall cost, t can present several different countermeasures, and what measures should be taken by the security administrator and what cost This is because it will be possible to grasp whether it will occur.
  • the security administrator implements step-by-step countermeasures when a simple countermeasure is taken as an emergency measure and gradually transitions to an ideal countermeasure. it can.
  • the reason for this is that when a measure with a low deployment cost is implemented first, and then an optimum measure is taken in consideration of other conditions (costs), a typical measure implementation pattern is generated as a measure scenario. It is because it can be implemented.
  • FIG. 1 is a block diagram showing a configuration example of a security risk management system according to the present invention.
  • FIG. 2 is a flowchart showing an example of an operation in which the security risk management system implements countermeasures according to the security risk of the target system.
  • FIG. 3 is an explanatory diagram showing an example of the data structure of vulnerability information stored in the state storage means. 4) It is an explanatory diagram showing an example of the confidential level of a document file and its value.
  • FIG. 5 is an explanatory diagram showing an example of the data structure of asset information stored in the state storage means.
  • FIG. 6 is an explanatory diagram showing an example of a threat model.
  • V12 Vulnerability—An explanatory diagram showing an example of a countermeasure model.
  • ⁇ 14 This is an explanatory diagram showing an example of a combination of vulnerability—countermeasure model and measure—cost model 104b.
  • ⁇ 16 It is an explanatory diagram showing an example of a threat-vulnerability-countermeasure model.
  • ⁇ 21 This is a flowchart showing an example of the process of generating a countermeasure proposal for threat-vulnerability-measure model power using countermeasure-related operators.
  • FIG. 22 is a block diagram showing a configuration example of a security risk management system according to a second example.
  • FIG. 23 is an explanatory diagram showing an example of a countermeasure scenario model 114c for “information leakage due to occurrence of a worm”.
  • Figure 24 This is an example of a measure confirmation screen when each measure is assigned to a measure stage according to cost.
  • FIG. 26 is a flowchart showing an example of countermeasure scenario generation processing performed by the countermeasure scenario generation means.
  • the security of the system in operation is In addition to generating multiple countermeasure proposals when the risk is beyond the allowable range, it also shows how many restrictions (various side effects such as cost and availability reduction) that occur when each countermeasure is implemented.
  • a first embodiment of the present invention that assists the security administrator in making an appropriate decision will be described.
  • FIG. 1 is a block diagram showing a configuration example of a security risk management system according to the present invention.
  • the security risk management system includes a risk management system 100 and a target system 200.
  • the risk management system 100 and the target system 200 are connected via a communication network such as the Internet, for example.
  • the risk management system 100 is realized by an information processing apparatus such as a workstation or a personal computer.
  • the risk management system 100 includes a state storage means 101, a risk model storage means 102, a risk analysis means 103, a countermeasure model storage means 104, a countermeasure plan generation means 105, a policy storage means 106, Countermeasure priority order determining means 107 and policy setting means 108 are provided. Further, the target system 200 subject to risk management includes a current state analyzing means 201, an asset analyzing means 202, and a countermeasure implementing means 203.
  • the target system 200 is specifically an information processing apparatus such as a personal computer in which an operating system (OS) is installed.
  • the target system 200 is a terminal used by a user (hereinafter referred to as a client PC) or various servers.
  • the target system is a client PC or server on which Microsoft Windows (registered trademark) is installed, and is not limited to this.
  • Microsoft Windows registered trademark
  • Linux registered trademark
  • a force security risk management system showing one target system 200 includes a plurality of target systems 200, and one risk management system 100 may manage a plurality of target systems 200.
  • Oh ,.
  • the current state analyzing means 201 checks the state of the target system 200, determines whether or not there is a vulnerability, and notifies the risk management system 100 of it.
  • the target system 200 provided with the current state analysis means 201 determines whether or not there is a vulnerability on the target system 200, and transmits it to the risk management system 100 as vulnerability information of the target system 200 for status analysis. It is stored in the payment means 101.
  • Vulnerability refers to the nature of an information system (system defects, specification problems, user usage, etc.) that can be a cause of information security threats in an information system. Vulnerabilities are, for example, “Disk encryption tool installed! / ⁇ ”, information on the installation of software, and system status such as “USB memory is available”. User account information such as “Guest account is not disabled”, or “The telnet service is executed” and the status of the operating system.
  • the asset analysis means 202 examines the state of the target system 200, determines the security level (an index required for confidentiality, integrity, and availability) of the asset, and notifies the risk management system 100 of it.
  • the confidentiality of the document file existing on the target system 200 is determined, and the risk management system is used as the asset information of the target system 200. It is transmitted to 100 and stored in the state storage means 101.
  • the confidentiality of the document file is an index that represents a classification (degree) relating to the confidentiality of the document, which is determined in advance according to the security policy, such as “personal information”, “handling information”, and “confidential information”. It is determined by the contents of the document stored as a file.
  • the countermeasure execution unit 203 executes processing for eliminating the security risk in the target system 200 including the countermeasure execution unit 203 according to the countermeasure plan instructed by the risk management system 100.
  • the current state analyzing means 201, the asset analyzing means 202, and the countermeasure implementing means 203 are specifically realized by a CPU that operates according to a program.
  • the current state analysis means 201, the asset analysis means 202, and the countermeasure execution means 203 are provided in each system (target system) that is subject to risk management, for example, by installing a program in each target system. It is assumed that
  • the state storage means 101 stores information indicating the current system state of the target system 200.
  • the state storage unit 101 stores vulnerability information indicating whether or not there is a system vulnerability collected (received) from the target system 200 and asset information indicating the asset value of the system.
  • the target system 200 has a predetermined type.
  • the state storage means 101 may include a collection means, and the collection means may ask the target system and receive it as a response.
  • the risk model storage means 102 stores (stores) a risk model necessary for analyzing a risk value indicating the system state capability of the target system and the degree of security risk.
  • the risk model storage unit 102 stores a threat model 102a, a threat-vulnerability model 102b, and a threat-asset model 102c.
  • the threat model 102a is a model (information) for defining security threats and the frequency of occurrence of those threats.
  • the threat vulnerability model 102b is a model for defining the relationship between the vulnerabilities detected by the current state analysis means 201 and the threats defined in the threat model 102a (relationships related to the realization of threats). is there.
  • the threat—asset model 102c is a model for defining the relationship between the threat defined in the threat model 102a and the asset on the target system (the relationship related to the impact on the asset). These models are prepared in advance based on security expertise. These models may be created as XML files or HTML files, for example!
  • the risk analysis unit 103 stores information (vulnerability information, asset information) indicating the current system state of the target system 200 stored in the state storage unit 101 in the risk model storage unit 102. Analyze using a recurring risk model to calculate the current risk value of the target system 200.
  • the countermeasure model storage means 104 stores (stores) a countermeasure model necessary for analyzing an optimal countermeasure against the current security risk of the target system 200. Specifically, the countermeasure model storage means 104 stores vulnerability—the countermeasure model 104a and countermeasure—cost model 104b defined for each countermeasure.
  • the vulnerability-countermeasure model 104a is a model for defining countermeasures that can be implemented for the vulnerabilities defined in the threat-vulnerability model 102b.
  • the countermeasure-cost model 104b is a model for defining various costs that are incurred when implementing the countermeasure means for the countermeasure means defined in the vulnerability-countermeasure model 104a.
  • Countermeasure plan generation means 105 performs analysis using a risk model and a countermeasure model when the risk value calculated by risk analysis means 103 exceeds an allowable range, and performs several measures to reduce security risk. Generate a countermeasure plan.
  • As the risk value tolerance range it is possible to use a value set by the security administrator, in addition to using a predetermined value.
  • the policy storage means 106 stores (stores) a countermeasure order determination policy 106a that is information indicating an evaluation formula of cost and cost to be prioritized when a countermeasure is applied to the target system.
  • the countermeasure order determination policy 106a may include an allowable risk value indicating the maximum allowable risk value in the target system. It is assumed that the countermeasure order determination policy 106a is registered in advance as a security policy by the security administrator.
  • the countermeasure order determination method 106a may be stored after being converted into specific numerical values or expressions expressing the security policy by the policy setting means 108 described later.
  • the countermeasure priority order determining means 107 determines the countermeasure to be implemented by prioritizing the countermeasure plans in accordance with the countermeasure order determining policy 106a stored in the policy storage means 106.
  • the countermeasure priority order determination means 107 rearranges the countermeasure proposals according to the priority order just by determining the countermeasure proposals according to the priority order, and presents it to the security administrator, for example, by outputting it on the selection screen, and implements which countermeasure. You may decide by letting you choose what to do.
  • the countermeasure priority order determination means 107 performs various controls for implementing the determined countermeasures. For example, the countermeasure priority order determination means 107 transmits a request to the countermeasure implementation means 203 of the target system 200 to implement the determined countermeasure.
  • the policy setting means 108 sets a countermeasure order determination policy 106a that reflects the security policy. For example, the policy setting unit 108 prepares a predetermined setting screen, and the policy storage unit 106 sets the condition or evaluation formula expressing the security policy input by the security administrator using the input unit as the countermeasure order determination policy 106a. Store.
  • the state storage unit 101, the risk model storage unit 102, the countermeasure model storage unit 104, and the policy storage unit 106 are specifically realized by a storage device.
  • the stage 108 is realized by a CPU that operates according to a program.
  • the state storage unit 101 includes a collection unit
  • the state storage unit 101 is realized by a storage device, a communication device, and a CPU that operates according to a program.
  • FIG. 2 is a flowchart showing an example of an operation in which the security risk management system implements countermeasures according to the security risk of the target system 200.
  • the system administrator operates the risk management system 100 and inputs an instruction to execute the security risk check process of the target system 200. Then, the risk management system 100 instructs the target system 200 to execute the current state analysis and the asset analysis.
  • the current state analyzing means 201 of the target system 200 determines whether there is a vulnerability on the target system 200, and transmits the determination result to the risk management system 100 as vulnerability information (step S11).
  • the risk management system 100 stores the received vulnerability information in the state storage unit 101.
  • the asset analysis unit 202 of the target system 200 determines the confidentiality of the document file existing on the target system 200, and transmits the determination result to the risk management system 100 as asset information (step S12).
  • the risk management system 100 stores the received asset information in the state storage means 101.
  • the risk analysis unit 103 of the risk management system 100 stores the information (vulnerability information, asset information) stored in the state storage unit 101 in the risk model storage unit 102! Analysis is performed using the model, and a risk value in the current system state of the target system 200 is calculated (step S13).
  • the measure plan generation means 105 of the risk management system 100 determines whether or not the risk value calculated by the risk analysis means 103 exceeds the allowable range (step S14).
  • the countermeasure plan generation means 105 stores the risk model stored in the risk model storage means 102 and the countermeasure model stored in the countermeasure model storage means 104. Analyze and generate several countermeasures to reduce security risks (Step S15).
  • the countermeasure plan generating means 105 selects, for example, a countermeasure means that can satisfy the predetermined conditions among various countermeasure means that can keep the risk value after implementation within an allowable range.
  • the processing contents indicating what kind of processing the selected countermeasure means performs and the size of each cost generated when the countermeasure is implemented are output. Generate as XML file or HTML file to help.
  • the countermeasure priority order determination means 107 of the risk management system 100 determines the countermeasure to be implemented from the countermeasure proposals generated by the countermeasure proposal generation means 105 (step S16).
  • the countermeasure priority order determination means 107 may prioritize the countermeasure proposals according to the countermeasure priority determination policy 106a stored in the policy storage means 106, for example, and determine the countermeasure with the highest priority.
  • the countermeasure proposal is evaluated according to the priority order of each cost, the evaluation result (the influence according to each cost, etc.) is presented, and the security administrator makes a selection. It may be decided whether to take measures.
  • the countermeasure priority order determining means 107 transmits the determined countermeasure proposal to the countermeasure implementing means 203 of the target system 200.
  • the countermeasure execution means 203 of the target system 200 executes processing for eliminating the security risk in accordance with the received countermeasure proposal (step S17).
  • the current state analyzing means 201 is a means for examining the state of the system and determining whether or not there is a vulnerability.
  • the vulnerabilities for determining whether or not the current state analysis means 201 exists are the vulnerabilities listed in the threat vulnerability model 102b stored in the risk model storage means 102 of the risk management system 100.
  • the risk management system 100 indicates the analysis method for each vulnerability in the threat-vulnerability model 102b.
  • Information may also be stored in the risk model storage means 102 and sent to the target system 200 at the timing when the analysis instruction is sent or when the threat-vulnerability model 102b is updated. Further, for example, the target system 200 may access the network and read directly. It should be noted that the specific processing contents of the current state analysis means 201 are different for each vulnerability for determining the presence or absence.
  • the current state analysis means 201 for example, when determining the vulnerability “disk encryption tool is not installed”, the registry “HKEY ⁇ OCAL_MACHINE ⁇ SOFT WARE ⁇ Microsoft ⁇ Windows (registered trademark) ⁇ Current Version It can be realized by using a program that checks if ⁇ UninstallJ is installed and checks whether an existing disk encryption tool is installed, and existing vulnerabilities such as Microsoft Baseline Security analyzer. It may be possible to activate a sex inspection tool and determine whether there is a vulnerability from the output.
  • FIG. 3 is an explanatory diagram showing an example of the data structure of vulnerability information stored in the state storage means 101.
  • client PC1 which is one of the target systems, has a vulnerability of “notebook PC”, a vulnerability of “disk encryption tool not installed”, and “file encryption key”. “Tools not yet implemented” and “vulnerabilities” are shown to exist.
  • the client PC2 which is another target system, has a vulnerability of “notebook PC”, a vulnerability of “disk encryption tool password is empty”, and a “file encryption tool”.
  • the server SERVER1 which is another target system, does not have the vulnerability of “notebook PC”, but other vulnerabilities exist as well as the client PC 1.
  • the client PC 1 is a notebook personal computer (hereinafter referred to as a notebook PC), and neither a disk encryption tool nor a file encryption tool is installed.
  • the client PC 2 is a notebook PC, and the disk encryption tool is installed, but the password is set.
  • Server SERVER1 also has a disk encryption tool and a file encryption tool that are not installed in a notebook PC.
  • the asset analysis unit 101 is a unit that examines the state of the target system and determines the security level of the asset.
  • the security level represents an index required for confidentiality, integrity, and availability.
  • the security level related to confidentiality (referred to as the confidentiality level) is an index that represents the degree to which the confidentiality of files in the target system must be secured.
  • the confidentiality level is an index that represents the confidentiality of the document that is determined in advance by the information security policy in the organization. For example, “confidentiality of related parties” that restricts disclosure to those other than related parties, These are indicators such as “confidentiality” that restricts disclosure outside the company and “careful handling” that restricts disclosure outside the company and partner companies.
  • the asset value of the confidential level that is, the average amount of damage when information is leaked, is set. Good. By doing so, it is possible to calculate the final risk value with a specific index called damage amount.
  • Fig. 4 is an explanatory diagram showing an example of the confidential level of document files and their value. In the example shown in FIG. 4, it is shown that L4 to L0 are set as the security level. In addition, the example shown in Fig. 4 shows that the asset values (average damage amount) of document files with confidential levels LI, L2, L3, and L4 are 10, 100, 100, and 1000 [1,000 yen], respectively. .
  • the asset analysis means 202 regarding confidentiality can be realized by using a program that analyzes the contents of a file and returns the confidential level.
  • a program that analyzes the contents of a file and returns the confidential level.
  • the amount of personal information and confidential information obtained by taking out the character string in the file and the structure information such as the position of the character string, and determining the character string according to a predetermined dictionary The file may be analyzed using a known technique such as determining the sensitivity and importance of the file based on the importance obtained by determining the structure information, and the result may be used.
  • the file analysis method shown above is, for example, the document “Hosomi et al.,“ Information leakage threat analysis method based on document analysis and setting verification (2) Sensitivity determination using document content analysis and structure analysis ”, It is described in the 67th Annual Meeting of the Information Processing Society of Japan, 3E-7J.In addition, when targeting a system in a company, even if the office is simply judging whether the confidentiality is based on text or not. Good, because the files stored on the client PCs in the company are often confidential information in the company.In this case, it is not possible to determine whether the information is confidential or confidential. .
  • the determined confidentiality level is stored in the state storage unit 101 as asset information together with the collected location (information for identifying the target system 200).
  • FIG. 5 is an explanatory diagram showing an example of the data structure of the asset information stored in the state storage means 101.
  • asset information the asset value of the entire system multiplied by the asset value of the confidential level shown in Fig. 4 is combined with the number of files for each confidential level held by each target system.
  • the client PC 1 does not hold any files with the confidentiality levels L1 to L4, and the asset value of the entire system is 0 [thousand yen].
  • server SERVER1 has 100 files with security level L1, 80 files with security level L2, and 80 files with security level L3. It is shown that 3 files and 1 confidential level L4 file are retained, and the asset value of the entire system is 10 300 [thousand yen]!
  • the risk analysis means 103 is a means for calculating a risk value in the current system state of the target system 200 as already described. Specifically, by analyzing the vulnerability information and asset information collected from the target system 200 using the risk model registered in the risk model storage means 102, the current risk for each threat in the target system 200 is analyzed. Calculate the value.
  • the threat model 102a is information that enumerates security threats and indicates the frequency of occurrence of those threats.
  • the threat model 102a is created in advance based on statistical data or the like.
  • FIG. 6 is an explanatory diagram showing an example of the threat model 102a. In the example shown in Fig.
  • the threat vulnerability model 102b is information indicating a relationship related to the manifestation of the threat defined by the threat model 102a and the vulnerability.
  • the relationship between threats and vulnerabilities can be expressed by an AND (logical product) or OR (logical sum) relationship or a combination thereof. AND indicates that the threat becomes apparent only when all the input vulnerabilities exist. OR indicates that the threat becomes apparent if any of the input vulnerabilities exist.
  • the threat-vulnerability model 102b also includes a numerical value (maximum vulnerability level) that indicates how much a threat is manifested in the presence of a certain vulnerability, and how much threat is present in the absence of a certain vulnerability. It may also contain a numerical value (minimum vulnerability) that indicates whether it will manifest. In this embodiment, the maximum vulnerability level and the minimum vulnerability level take values from 0 to 1.
  • FIG. 7 is an explanatory diagram showing an example of the threat-vulnerability model 102b.
  • the example shown in Fig. 7 shows the relationship between the four vulnerabilities (vl to v4) that can be the cause of the emergence of “information leakage due to PC loss / theft (threat tl)”.
  • the numerical value above the arrow drawn from each vulnerability indicates the maximum vulnerability level of the vulnerability, and the numerical value below the arrow indicates the minimum vulnerability level of the vulnerability. .
  • the threat vulnerability model 102b shown in FIG. 7 is an example described based on the following expertise on vulnerabilities. “If it is not a laptop, it will not be stolen or lost. (Knowledge 1)”, “Even if a laptop is lost or stolen, the disk encryption tool power s Will not leak because the file is encrypted. (Knowledge 2) ”,“ If the password of the disk encryption tool is not set, it will be stolen even if it is encrypted. However, since the user name must be estimated, the possibility of leakage is at most 10%. (Knowledge 3) ”,“ Files in the user directory are automatically encrypted. If a file encryption tool is installed, even if a laptop is lost or stolen, important files are encrypted and are not easily leaked. Because when there may be stored incorrectly outside Li, as it can completely prevent some potential leakage about 5% Nag. (Knowledge 4) ".
  • the threat-vulnerability model 102b as shown in Fig. 7 can be defined using the expertise related to vulnerability.
  • the threat-vulnerability model 102b may be stored as XML format data as shown in Fig. 8, or a logic gate may be applied to the calculation formula, as shown in the following formula (2).
  • FIG. 9 shows a list of values taken by the function shown in equation (2).
  • the threat asset model 102c is information indicating the relationship between the threat defined in the threat model 102a and the impact level of the asset. Specifically, it is information indicating how much assets are affected when a certain threat becomes apparent.
  • FIG. 10 is an explanatory diagram showing an example of the threat asset model 102c.
  • a threat tl information loss due to PC loss 'theft'
  • the assets on the client PC 1 are affected by 100%, and other assets are affected. It has been shown not to give.
  • threat t3 information leakage due to erroneous email transmission
  • assets on client PC1 are affected by 10%
  • assets on server SERV ER1 are also affected by 10%.
  • threat t3 is affected only by files that are sent in error rather than all files being affected, so the numerical value indicating the impact is set to a small value of 0.1. ing.
  • FIG. 11 is a flowchart showing an example of risk analysis processing (risk value calculation processing) performed by the risk analysis means 103.
  • the risk analysis means 103 first applies the vulnerability information of the target system stored in the state storage means 101 to the threat vulnerability model 102b, thereby making it possible to Find the size of the vulnerability (step S101).
  • the risk analysis unit 103 calculates the asset value affected by the manifestation of each threat by applying the asset information stored in the state storage unit 101 to the threat-asset model 102c. (Step S102). For example, the risk analysis means 103 obtains, from the threat-asset model 102c, a calculation formula for calculating the asset value affected by the manifestation of each threat for each target threat.
  • the asset value on the client PC1 is pl
  • the asset value on the client PC2 is p2
  • the asset value on the server SERVER1 is p3
  • the client PC1 based on the threat-asset model 102c example shown in Figure 10
  • the asset value ass affected by the manifestation of threats tl, t2, and t3 is expressed by the following equation (3) Indicated by
  • the asset values pi, p2, and p3 on each target system are based on the asset information stored in the state storage means 101.
  • the risk analysis means 103 refers to the threat occurrence rate (occurrence frequency) f from the threat model 102a (step S103), and affects the asset value ass and the occurrence frequency f affected by each threat.
  • the risk value Risk for the threat is calculated (step S104).
  • the risk value Risk (PC2tl) for threat tl on client PC2 is calculated to be 24 [thousand yen] according to the following equation (4).
  • a countermeasure plan generation unit 105 when the obtained risk value exceeds a predetermined allowable range (risk allowable value), a countermeasure plan generation unit 105 generates a countermeasure plan.
  • the countermeasure proposal generation means 105 is stored in the risk model storage means 102 and stored in the risk model and countermeasure model storage means 104 when the risk value exceeds the allowable range. This is a means of analyzing the risk value using a countermeasure model and generating several countermeasure plans for reducing the risk value.
  • the vulnerability-countermeasure model 104a is information indicating what countermeasure means is available for the vulnerability defined in the threat vulnerability model 102b.
  • FIG. 12 is an explanatory diagram showing an example of the vulnerability-countermeasure model 104a.
  • the vulnerability-countermeasure model 104a is created in advance based on the knowledge about the vulnerability and countermeasures thereof, as in the case of the threat-vulnerability model 102b. Multiple countermeasures may be associated with one vulnerability.
  • an example for example as a countermeasure against vulnerability v3, “Warn to change if empty password (Countermeasure c3)” is associated with “Forcibly assign password if empty password (Countermeasure c4)”. It has been. There may be no countermeasures against vulnerabilities.
  • the countermeasure-cost model 104b is information indicating various costs generated when implementing the countermeasure means for each countermeasure means defined in the vulnerability-countermeasure model 104a.
  • the cost means a “constraint” that collectively refers to the side effects caused by implementing measures that are not just the costs necessary for the measures.
  • countermeasures are defined in terms of three costs: “equipment cost”, “availability cost”, and “deployment cost”.
  • Equipment cost refers to an indicator of the cost that is continuously incurred by introducing the measure. Equipment costs are a major constraint because you cannot spend unlimited money on security.
  • Availability cost refers to an index indicating a decrease in availability (convenience) caused by introducing the countermeasure. For example, banning the use of notebook PCs can greatly reduce availability, such as disrupting work on the go. Since countermeasures against information leakage often impair the availability, it becomes an important constraint when planning countermeasures.
  • the "deployment cost” refers to an index indicating the time required to implement the countermeasure.
  • Countermeasure—Cost model 104b is information in which equipment cost, availability cost, and deployment cost are associated with each countermeasure (see FIG. 13).
  • FIG. 13 is an explanatory diagram showing an example of the countermeasure-cost model 104b.
  • Figure 13 shows the costs incurred for implementing each countermeasure for each countermeasure defined in the vulnerability-countermeasure model 104a shown in Figure 12.
  • the restrictions are so strong that cost is large.
  • the countermeasure cl “prohibiting taking out notebook PCs” is an administrative measure, so the equipment cost must be reduced.
  • the deployment cost is also set high (equipment cost 0, availability cost 100, deployment cost 100).
  • the measure c2 “Installing a disk encryption tool,” requires equipment costs because it requires a license agreement for the tool, but has little impact on availability (equipment cost 80, availability cost 10 Deployment cost 80).
  • each cost unit is assumed to be a dimensionless quantity.
  • the equipment cost may be expressed in units of [Amount Z years] as well as the risk value. Doing so makes it easier to compare risk and cost, and makes it easier for security administrators to take appropriate measures.
  • FIG. 14 is an explanatory diagram in which the example of the vulnerability-measure model 104a shown in FIG. 12 is combined with the example of the measure-cost model 104b shown in FIG.
  • the vulnerability-countermeasure model 104a and the countermeasure-cost model 104b are created in advance based on specialized knowledge regarding countermeasure means, as in the risk model.
  • FIG. 15 is a flowchart showing an example of countermeasure plan generation processing performed by the countermeasure plan generation means 105.
  • the countermeasure plan generation means 105 first divides vulnerabilities with multiple countermeasures and ANDs them, so that there is a one-to-one correspondence between the existence of vulnerabilities and the presence or absence of countermeasures.
  • Threat A vulnerability countermeasure model is generated (step S201).
  • FIG. 16 is an explanatory diagram showing an example of the threat vulnerability one countermeasure model.
  • vulnerability v3 and countermeasures c3 and c4 for vulnerability v3 are made to correspond one-to-one so that vulnerability v3 ⁇ v31 and v32 are defeated ij and ANDed.
  • Measures c3 and c4 are associated with 3 ⁇ 4 '
  • This threat-vulnerability-countermeasure model may be generated in advance when threat-vulnerability model 102b and vulnerability-countermeasure model 104a are determined.
  • the countermeasure plan generation means 105 generates a countermeasure plan that minimizes the total cost, for example, while keeping the risk value below the allowable range for each threat (step S202). Further, the countermeasure plan generating means 105 generates a countermeasure plan that minimizes the deployment cost, for example, while keeping the risk value below the allowable range (step S203). Further, the countermeasure plan generation means 105 generates a countermeasure plan that minimizes the total availability cost, for example, while keeping the risk value below the allowable range (step S204).
  • 2400 is the affected asset value ass (PC2tl), 0.1 behind it is the frequency f (tl) of threat tl, and behind it is the threat-vulnerability model 102b.
  • the risk formula (1) is applied to the threat vulnerability countermeasure model shown in Fig. 16.
  • the presence or absence of the current vulnerability stored in the state storage means 101 corresponds to the presence or absence of the current countermeasure, and if the current yi value is set to Yi, in the example shown in FIG.
  • the value of availability cost can be expressed as ⁇ Ci (Yi—yi) when the availability cost of a measure ci is Ci.
  • a measure ci 0
  • the availability cost is power !, but must be implemented!
  • the value of the deployment cost can be expressed as ⁇ YiCi (l ⁇ yi) when the deployment cost of a certain measure ci is Ci.
  • a measure ci 0
  • Yi 0
  • the measure has already been taken, so the deployment cost does not increase.
  • step S 203 is expressed as an integer programming problem shown in the following equation (7).
  • Goal function 100X (1-yl) + 80X (l-y2) + 30X (l-y3) + 40 X (l-y5) ⁇ min
  • the countermeasure priority order determination means 107 presents the countermeasure proposal obtained by the countermeasure proposal generation means 105 to the security administrator, and transmits the countermeasure selected by the security administrator to the countermeasure implementation means 203. Is provided.
  • FIG. 17 is an explanatory diagram showing an example of a screen output by the countermeasure priority order determination means 107.
  • the countermeasure plan with the smallest deployment cost is the emergency countermeasure plan
  • the countermeasure plan with the lowest availability cost is the normal countermeasure plan
  • the sum of all costs is the smallest.
  • the plan is presented as an optimal measure plan.
  • the current risk against information leakage (threat tl) due to PC loss / theft is 24 (warning state), and the risk after implementation is 0 as an emergency measure against this threat t1.
  • c3 warning to change if there is an empty password
  • the current risks, the risks after implementation of each measure, and the costs incurred when implementing the measure are color-coded according to their size (shaded in Fig. 17). May be.
  • the countermeasure implementation means 203 is a means for implementing the countermeasure determined by the countermeasure priority order determination means 107. For example, when the optimum countermeasure plan shown in FIG. 17 is implemented, the countermeasure implementation means 203 executes a process for warning the user to set a password for the disk encryption tool. This process can be realized, for example, by using a program that displays a warning screen when the user logs on on the client PC.
  • the countermeasure implementation means 203 does not necessarily have to be realized using a program that runs on the target system 200. That is, the risk management system 100 may include the countermeasure implementation means 203. In such a case, for example, the countermeasure implementation means 203 of the risk management system 100 is a program that sends an email warning the user to set a password for the disk encryption tool that operates on the risk management system 100. It can be realized using.
  • the countermeasure priority order determination means 107 when the countermeasure order determination policy 106a is stored in the policy storage means 106, is the priority and target of various costs defined in the countermeasure order determination policy 106a. Based on the value, you can select and rank the proposed measures!
  • the policy setting means 108 displays a setting screen for the countermeasure order determination policy as shown in FIG.
  • the countermeasure order decision policy 106a corresponding to the security policy is set by presenting it and allowing the security administrator to input it.
  • FIG. 18 is an explanatory diagram showing an example of a setting screen for setting the countermeasure order determination policy 106a. As shown in FIG.
  • the setting screen includes, for example, input items that can set risk tolerances and input items that can specify cost evaluation methods (minimize risk, minimize the sum of specified costs, For example, the cost may be evaluated in a specified order), and an input item for specifying a target value for each cost may be included.
  • the countermeasure order determination policy 106a which is a condition for generating countermeasure proposals, is determined based on the security policy corresponding to each organization, and the security administrator can determine the cost evaluation formula and risk tolerance according to the security policy. By entering values, it is possible to generate more desirable countermeasures.
  • the risk tolerance (allowable risk in the figure) is set to 1,000 yen Z year and deployment cost of 2 months or less, and the sum of equipment cost, deployment cost, and availability cost. Assume that the evaluation method of minimizing is set. In such a case, if E01 to E04 in Eq. (6) and Eq. (7) are used, the objective function: E02 + E03 + E04 ⁇ min, constraint 1: E01 ⁇ 1000, constraint 2: E0 4 ⁇ 60.
  • the risk value using the risk model determined in advance from the asset value and vulnerability information in the target system obtained by examining the system state is possible to implement countermeasures that take into account the reduction in equipment costs and availability caused by implementing countermeasures and the time required for deployment. Deployment costs and availability costs are calculated based on the current vulnerability status (countermeasurement status), so the optimal countermeasure plan is proposed to the security administrator according to the current system status. be able to.
  • the security administrator can implement the optimal countermeasures while judging how much various costs are incurred when implementing the countermeasures. Become.
  • the reason for this is, for example, by defining multiple costs such as equipment cost, availability cost, and deployment cost as a countermeasure model, whether to prioritize a decline in availability or prioritize rapid countermeasure deployment, It is possible to present a number of different countermeasures, such as whether to prioritize minimizing costs, and to understand what costs are incurred and what costs are incurred by the security administrator. This is because
  • the threat / vulnerability one countermeasure model is an example of a force threat vulnerability one countermeasure model expressed as AND and OR.
  • the threat-vulnerability model 102b can also be expressed using countermeasure relational operators such as OR, MAX, MIN, SUB, and XOR.
  • the countermeasure relational operator is the relationship between countermeasures in which multiple countermeasures can be effective independently, only one of them can be implemented, or effective only when a certain vulnerability is implemented. It expresses.
  • FIG. 20 is an explanatory diagram showing an example of a threat-vulnerability-countermeasure model expressed using countermeasure-related operators.
  • vulnerability and countermeasures can be replaced in a one-to-one relationship, so the vulnerability is not shown.
  • OR means that measures combined with OR can be freely combined and implemented, and the effect on threats when these measures are implemented is added.
  • measures A and B (1) implement only measure A
  • (2) implement only measure B (2) implement only measure B
  • (3) implement both measure A and measure B. You can choose from three countermeasures, and (3) is more effective than (1) and (2).
  • MAX is the power that can be implemented by freely combining measures combined with MAX. Only those measures that have the greatest effect are effective in reducing threats. Represents that.
  • MIN is the opposite of MAX and means that only the combined measures that have the minimum effect can exert the effect.
  • SUB represents a combination of measures that can implement a subordinate measure only when the main measure is implemented.
  • a measure that enables the password measure restriction which is a subordinate measure, to be implemented only when the main measure, “Introduction of authentication mechanism”, is implemented.
  • XOR represents the relationship between measures that cannot be implemented simultaneously by two or more measures combined by XOR. For example, the “encryption of communication path” countermeasure and the “detection of confidential document in communication path” countermeasure cannot detect confidential documents in the communication path if the communication path is encrypted. Cannot be implemented. XOR represents the relationship between these measures.
  • a more precise threat vulnerability countermeasure model can be created by defining the relationship between countermeasures.
  • constraints such as SUB that cannot be described with only descriptive operators such as AND, OR, and NOT can be added.
  • the effectiveness of each countermeasure is indicated by a numerical value (a numerical value added to the arrow with each countermeasure power drawn in the figure).
  • the numerical value indicating effectiveness is a value between 0 and 1, and corresponds to the maximum vulnerability level in the threat-vulnerability model 102b using AND and OR described above (in practice, the maximum It is the reciprocal of the vulnerability level). In other words, the effectiveness and maximum vulnerability can be converted to each other by taking the reciprocal of each other.
  • the countermeasure-related operators described above can be calculated as shown in the following equation (8).
  • FIG. 21 is a flowchart showing an example of processing for generating a threat vulnerability vulnerability countermeasure model countermeasure plan using countermeasure relational operators.
  • the threat vulnerability countermeasure model using countermeasure relational operators includes SUB relational operators (countermeasure relational operators)
  • SUB is AND, OR,!
  • a constraint equation is added (step S 201).
  • xl and x2 are in a SUB relationship
  • xl—x2 ⁇ 0 is stored in the constraint expression.
  • XOR is AND, OR,!
  • a constraint equation is added (step S202).
  • FIG. 22 is a block diagram illustrating a configuration example of the security risk management system according to the second embodiment.
  • the risk management system 100 includes a countermeasure scenario generation means 111 instead of the policy storage means 106 and the countermeasure priority determination means 107.
  • the countermeasure execution determination unit 112 is different from the target system 200 in that the target system 200 includes an event collection unit 211.
  • the countermeasure model storage means 104 includes a countermeasure scenario model 114c.
  • the event collection means 211 detects changes in security (for example, the occurrence of attacks and worms) in the target system 200. Then, the risk management system 100 is notified (transmitted) as an event.
  • the event collection unit 211 is realized by, for example, an IDS (Intrusion Detection System) that can monitor a packet or log, detect an attack or worm occurrence, and send an event.
  • IDS Intrusion Detection System
  • the countermeasure scenario generation means 111 assigns the countermeasure proposal generated by the countermeasure proposal generation means 105 to the same day countermeasure, emergency countermeasure, normal countermeasure, final countermeasure, etc., based on the countermeasure scenario model 114c. Generate a countermeasure model that indicates which countermeasures will be implemented. Based on the generated countermeasure scenario and the event notified from the event collecting means 211, the countermeasure execution determining means 112 determines which countermeasure is to be implemented and notifies the countermeasure implementing means 203.
  • the countermeasure scenario model 114c is a model described as a state transition model in which each countermeasure transitions according to an event.
  • the countermeasure implementation stage hereinafter referred to as countermeasure stage
  • Figure 23 shows a specific example of the countermeasure scenario model 11 4c.
  • FIG. 23 is an explanatory diagram showing an example of a countermeasure scenario model 114c for “information leakage due to the occurrence of a worm”. In the example shown in Fig.
  • the same-day countermeasure stage force Transitions to conditions are defined, such as transition from the normal countermeasure stage to the emergency countermeasure stage on the condition of the occurrence of a worm.
  • the transition condition may include the elapsed time and time of the countermeasure execution ability that is not limited to the event notified from the event collection means 211.
  • the countermeasure scenario model 114c is created in advance by the security administrator.
  • the countermeasure scenario generation unit 111 generates a countermeasure scenario by assigning the countermeasure plan generated by the countermeasure plan generation unit 105 to each countermeasure stage defined in the countermeasure scenario model 114c. Which countermeasure stage is assigned depends on a predetermined condition. For example, as an example of determining by cost, after setting the allowable risk value high, the countermeasure with the lowest availability cost is the same day countermeasure, the countermeasure with the lowest deployment cost is the emergency countermeasure, the availability cost And the sum of the equipment costs is the lowest, the countermeasure is the normal countermeasure, the allowable risk value is set low, and the countermeasure with the smallest sum of all costs may be the final countermeasure. The same countermeasure may be assigned to multiple countermeasure stages. Fig.
  • the countermeasure scenario model 114c may include a constraint equation for determining the countermeasure to be assigned to each countermeasure stage, together with the countermeasure stage name and transition conditions between countermeasure stages. .
  • FIG. 26 is a flowchart showing an example of countermeasure scenario generation processing performed by the countermeasure scenario generation means 111.
  • the countermeasure scenario generation means 111 first extracts a constraint equation (measure priority determination policy) of the countermeasure stage from the countermeasure scenario model 114c (step S301).
  • the measure scenario generation unit 111 evaluates the measure plan generated by the measure plan generation unit 105 according to the constraint formula, selects a measure that best matches the constraint formula, and assigns it to the stage (step S302). This is performed for all countermeasure stages defined in the countermeasure scenario model 114c.
  • the countermeasure execution determination means 112 determines a countermeasure to be executed according to the event notified from the event collection means 211. For example, when the event received from the event collection unit 211 satisfies a transition condition to another countermeasure stage, the countermeasure execution determination unit 112 transitions the countermeasure stage (updates the current state), and The countermeasure assigned to the transition countermeasure stage is determined as the countermeasure to be executed. When the measure stage changes and the measure to be executed is determined, the measure execution determination unit 112 notifies the measure execution unit 203 of the measure.
  • the measure execution determination unit 112 determines whether the current measure stage power is a condition that satisfies the transition condition to another measure stage at a fixed timing only when an event is received from the event collection unit 211. If the current time exceeds the threshold time, or if the elapsed time since the current countermeasure has been exceeded exceeds the threshold time, the countermeasure stage is transitioned in the same way as the state transition due to the occurrence of an event. .
  • the countermeasure execution determining means 112 is , The same day measure stage power thing transition condition " ⁇
  • the state is shifted from the current countermeasure stage to the emergency countermeasure stage, and the countermeasure implementation means 203 is requested to implement the countermeasure assigned to the emergency countermeasure stage.
  • the event collection means 211 notifies the event of worm convergence and the current time exceeds a predetermined threshold, it follows the transition condition “Warm convergence 'time> threshold 1” from the emergency countermeasure stage.
  • the current countermeasure stage is transitioned to the normal countermeasure stage, and the countermeasure implementation means 203 is requested to implement the countermeasure assigned to the normal countermeasure stage.
  • the countermeasure execution determination means 112 analyzes the event and determines the countermeasure to be executed, so that it is possible to implement a dynamic countermeasure according to the situation of the attack and the network usage situation.
  • the security administrator can implement step-by-step measures, such as taking measures that can be easily done as an emergency measure and gradually shifting to ideal measures.
  • step-by-step measures such as taking measures that can be easily done as an emergency measure and gradually shifting to ideal measures.
  • costs the reason for this is that when a measure with a low development cost is implemented first, and then the optimum measure is taken into account other conditions (costs), a typical measure implementation pattern is generated as a measure scenario. It is because it can be implemented.
  • the present invention can be applied to uses such as a security operation management tool that collects system vulnerabilities and applies appropriate countermeasures. It can also be applied to security policy compliance tools that guarantee the security status of the system based on the policy.

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Abstract

A security risk management system for presenting a countermeasure most suitable for the state of the running system from countermeasure candidates mitigating the risk by analyzing the risk from the state (presence/absence of fragility, occurrence frequency of fragility, and property value) of the running system. The security risk management system comprises current state analyzing means (201) for checking for presence/absence of fragility from a system (200) which is the object of risk management, property analyzing means (202) for checking property information, risk analyzing means (103) for calculating the risk value according to the collected fragility information and the property information and a risk model presenting the relation among the fragility, the property, and the threat, countermeasure plan creating means (105) for creating countermeasure plans to reduce the risk value within an allowable range according to a countermeasure model representing the relation among the threat, the countermeasure, and various costs (restrictions), and countermeasure priority order determining means (107) for presenting countermeasure plans arranged in the priority order according to the countermeasure order determining policy determining a cost valuation method.

Description

明 細 書  Specification
セキュリティリスク管理システム、装置、方法、およびプログラム  Security risk management system, apparatus, method, and program
技術分野  Technical field
[0001] (関連出願)本願は、先の日本特許出願 2006— 187236号(2006年 7月 6日出願 )の優先権を主張するものであり、前記先の出願の全記載内容は、本書に引用をもつ て繰込み記載されて ヽるものとみなされる。  [0001] (Related application) This application claims the priority of the previous Japanese patent application No. 2006-187236 (filed on July 6, 2006). It shall be deemed to have been incorporated with citations.
本発明は、対象システムにおけるセキュリティリスクを管理するセキュリティリスク管 理システム、装置、方法、およびプログラムに関し、特に、対象システムの運用中にお けるセキュリティリスク管理に用いるセキュリティリスク管理システム、装置、方法、およ びプログラムに関する。 背景技術  The present invention relates to a security risk management system, apparatus, method, and program for managing security risks in a target system, and in particular, a security risk management system, apparatus, method, and program used for security risk management during operation of the target system. And programs. Background art
[0002] 組織における情報システムへの依存度が増すとともに、情報セキュリティの重要性 もますます大きなものとなりつつある。情報セキュリティの最終的な目的は、予め定め られた要件 (セキュリティポリシー)に則って、情報システムが運営されることを保障す ることである。し力しながら、情報セキュリティを常に 100%完全に確保することは現実 的には困難である。その理由として 3つの理由が挙げられる。  [0002] As an organization becomes more dependent on information systems, the importance of information security is becoming increasingly important. The ultimate goal of information security is to ensure that the information system is operated in accordance with predetermined requirements (security policy). However, it is practically difficult to ensure 100% information security at all times. There are three reasons for this.
[0003] 1つ目は、セキュリティを確保するメカニズムが不十分であるという技術的な課題に よるものである。 2つ目は、セキュリティを強化したり運用したりする費用が限られてい て常に十分な対策を取ることができないという経済的な制約によるものである。 3つ目 は、セキュリティを構成する 3つの要件 機密性 ·完全性 '可用性 が本質的に相反 するものであり、多くの場合それらを同時に保障することはできないためである。  [0003] The first is due to a technical problem that the mechanism for ensuring security is insufficient. The second is due to the economic constraints that the costs of strengthening and operating security are limited and sufficient measures cannot always be taken. Third, the three requirements that make up security are: Confidentiality / Integrity 'Availability' is essentially the opposite, and in many cases they cannot be guaranteed at the same time.
[0004] 従って、情報システムのセキュリティ管理者は、システムが晒されているセキュリティ 上のリスクを評価し、技術的制約や経済的制約を考慮し、更に、相反する要件の折り 合いをつけつつ、最適なシステムの構成を構築、維持、改善していかなくてはならな い。これをセキュリティリスク管理と呼ぶ。システムのセキュリティリスクを管理する方法 として、幾つかの手法が開示されている。  [0004] Therefore, the information system security administrator evaluates the security risks to which the system is exposed, considers the technical and economic constraints, and concludes conflicting requirements. An optimal system configuration must be built, maintained, and improved. This is called security risk management. Several methods have been disclosed for managing system security risks.
[0005] 従来技術の一つとして、特許文献 1では、脆弱性検査ツールによる検査結果を元 に、発見された脆弱性を保護するように、不正アクセス対処ツールに通知する方式が 開示されている。これを従来技術 1と呼ぶ。 [0005] As one of the prior arts, Patent Document 1 is based on the inspection result by the vulnerability inspection tool. Discloses a method for notifying unauthorized access countermeasure tools to protect discovered vulnerabilities. This is called prior art 1.
[0006] また、別の従来技術として、特許文献 2では、資産価値を持つファイルに対して予 め損失額'機密度といった属性情報を割り当てておき、当該ファイルに対するフアイ ルアクセス 'ネットワークアクセスを元にリスク値を更新する方式が開示されている。特 許文献 2に記載の方式では、更新したリスク値が予め指定された閾値を超えたら、フ アイルのアクセス制限やファイルの削除といった対策を行う。  [0006] In addition, as another conventional technique, in Patent Document 2, attribute information such as loss amount 'confidentiality' is assigned to a file with asset value, and file access to the file 'network access is based on Discloses a method for updating the risk value. In the method described in Patent Document 2, if the updated risk value exceeds a pre-specified threshold, measures such as file access restriction and file deletion are taken.
[0007] また、特許文献 3では、不正侵入検知ツールによる検知結果を元に、検知された攻 撃に対処するための対策 (パッチ適用やファイアウォールによるネットワークアクセス 制御)をする方式が開示されている。また、特許文献 4では、発見した脆弱性に対応 するセキュリティインシデント情報と情報資産情報を勘案してリスク分析を行うことによ つて、対策を生成する方式が開示されている。このような特許文献 2、 3、 4で開示され て 、る技術を従来技術 2と呼ぶ。  [0007] In addition, Patent Document 3 discloses a method for taking countermeasures (patch application or firewall network access control) to deal with detected attacks based on the detection results of the unauthorized intrusion detection tool. . Patent Document 4 discloses a method for generating countermeasures by performing risk analysis in consideration of security incident information and information asset information corresponding to the discovered vulnerability. Such a technique disclosed in Patent Documents 2, 3, and 4 is referred to as Conventional Technique 2.
[0008] また、別の従来技術として、非特許文献 1では、脆弱性の発生頻度、脅威の発現時 における損害額、それに対策する実現方式のコスト (費用)といった事前に定義され た情報を元に、低コストで最も効率よくリスクを減らせる対策目標候補集合を選定する 方式が提案されている。  [0008] Further, as another conventional technique, Non-Patent Document 1 is based on pre-defined information such as the frequency of occurrence of vulnerabilities, the amount of damage at the time of the occurrence of a threat, and the cost (expense) of an implementation method for dealing with it. In addition, a method for selecting a candidate set of countermeasure targets that can reduce risk most efficiently at low cost has been proposed.
[0009] また、非特許文献 2では、予め定義される脅威の発生確率と情報資産の価値との 関係を元に、低コストで最も効率よくリスクを減らせる対策目標候補集合を選定する 方式が提案されている。このような非特許文献 1、 2で開示されている技術を従来技 術 3と呼ぶ。  [0009] Further, in Non-Patent Document 2, there is a method for selecting a countermeasure target candidate set that can reduce risk most efficiently at a low cost based on the relationship between the occurrence probability of a predefined threat and the value of information assets. Proposed. Such technology disclosed in Non-Patent Documents 1 and 2 is referred to as Conventional Technology 3.
[0010] 特許文献 1:特開 2002— 328896号公報  [0010] Patent Document 1: Japanese Patent Application Laid-Open No. 2002-328896
特許文献 2 :特開 2005— 190066号公報  Patent Document 2: Japanese Patent Laid-Open No. 2005-190066
特許文献 3:特開 2005— 301551号公報  Patent Document 3: Japanese Patent Laid-Open No. 2005-301551
特許文献 4:特開 2005 - 242754号公報  Patent Document 4: Japanese Patent Laid-Open No. 2005-242754
非特許文献 1:永井他、 "機能的適合性を考慮した情報システムのセキュリティ基本設 計方の提案"、情処論文誌、 2004年 4月、 Vol. 45、 No. 4  Non-Patent Document 1: Nagai et al., “Proposal for Basic Design of Security for Information Systems Considering Functional Compatibility”, Journey to the Journal of Information Processing, April 2004, Vol. 45, No. 4
非特許文献 2 :中村他、 "セキュリティ対策選定の実用的な一手法の提案とその評価" 、情処論文誌、 2004年 8月、 Vol. 45、 No. 8 Non-Patent Document 2: Nakamura et al., "Proposal and Evaluation of a Practical Method for Selecting Security Measures" , Journey to the Journal, August 2004, Vol. 45, No. 8
発明の開示  Disclosure of the invention
発明が解決しょうとする課題  Problems to be solved by the invention
[0011] 以上の特許文献 1〜4及び非特許文献 1〜2の開示事項は、本書に引用をもって 繰り込み記載されて ヽるものとする。  [0011] The disclosures of Patent Documents 1 to 4 and Non-Patent Documents 1 to 2 described above are incorporated herein by reference.
従来技術 1では、運用中のシステムのセキュリティリスクを一定レベル以下に保つこ とは実現している。しかしながら、対象とする脆弱性と対策との関係が固定的に定め られているため、システムの状況に応じた適応的な対策がとれるようなセキュリティリス ク管理は実現されていない。  With the prior art 1, it is possible to keep the security risk of the operating system below a certain level. However, since the relationship between the target vulnerabilities and countermeasures is fixed, security risk management that can take adaptive countermeasures according to the system status has not been realized.
[0012] 従来技術 2では、システムの状態力 脆弱性を検出し、検出した脆弱性力 対策を 導く際に、リスク分析の手法をある程度導入することによって、従来技術 1の課題を解 消している。し力しながら、一般に、ある脅威に対して複数の対策方法が存在するが 、従来技術 2では、複数の対策方法からどの対策手段を導くべきかを判定する手段 が固定的であり、必ずしも最適な対策が得られるようになって!/ヽな 、。  [0012] Conventional technology 2 solves the problem of conventional technology 1 by introducing a risk analysis method to some extent when detecting the state power vulnerability of the system and deriving the detected countermeasures against the vulnerability. . However, in general, there are multiple countermeasures against a given threat, but in Conventional Technology 2, the means for determining which countermeasure should be derived from multiple countermeasures is fixed, and is not always optimal. Measures are now available!
[0013] 特に、運用中のシステムに対策を施す場合、その対策によっては、サーバの停止 による業務の中断、アクセス権限の強化による利便性の低下などの副作用が生じるこ とがある。このため、リスクを最大限低減させる対策よりも他の副作用の小さい対策が 望まれる場合がある。従って、運用中のシステムに対策を施す場合、その対策によつ て生じる副作用がどの程度のものであるかをセキュリティ管理者が判断できることが望 ましい。また、複数の対策方法が考えられる場合、簡単にできる対策を応急処置的に 施し、次第に理想的な対策に移行するといつた、段階的な対策がとれることが望まし い。  [0013] In particular, when a countermeasure is taken for an operating system, side effects such as interruption of business due to a server stop and reduced convenience due to enhanced access authority may occur depending on the countermeasure. For this reason, measures with less side effects may be desired than measures that minimize the risk. Therefore, when taking measures on a system in operation, it is desirable that the security administrator can determine how much side effects are caused by the measures. In addition, when multiple countermeasures are possible, it is desirable to take step-by-step countermeasures as soon as possible, taking measures that can be easily implemented as an emergency measure and gradually shifting to an ideal measure.
[0014] 従来技術 3は、システムの設計'導入時に最適な構成を選択する際に利用すること を目的としており、運用中システムの現状のリスクを判定し、最適な対策を出力する機 能を持たない。また、脆弱性の発生頻度や情報資産の価値といった情報を全て入力 しておく必要があるが、このような情報をシステムの運用中の状況に応じて更新して いくのは困難である。また、対策実施の費用は考慮されているものの、可用性などの 制約につ 、ては考慮されて!、な!/、。 [0015] すなわち、従来技術における第 1の問題点は、運用中のシステムの状態 (脆弱性の 有無、脆弱性の発生頻度、資産価値等)を元にリスクを分析した上で、リスクを軽減す るための対策候補から、最適な対策方法を提示することができないということである。 その理由は、従来の技術では、対策を実施することによる副作用(導入に要する費用 や、サーバの停止による業務の中断、アクセス権限の強化による利便性の低下など) を評価する際に、運用中のシステムの状態を考慮していないためである。 [0014] Prior art 3 is intended to be used when selecting the optimal configuration at the time of system design 'introduction, and has the function to determine the current risk of the operating system and output the optimal countermeasures. do not have. In addition, it is necessary to input all information such as the frequency of vulnerability occurrence and the value of information assets. However, it is difficult to update such information according to the operating status of the system. In addition, although the cost of implementing measures is taken into account, restrictions such as availability are taken into account! [0015] In other words, the first problem with the conventional technology is that the risk is reduced after analyzing the risk based on the state of the operating system (whether there is a vulnerability, the frequency of occurrence of the vulnerability, the asset value, etc.). This means that it is not possible to present an optimal countermeasure method from candidate countermeasures. The reason for this is that the conventional technology is in operation when evaluating side effects (cost required for introduction, interruption of work due to server shutdown, reduced convenience due to enhanced access authority, etc.). This is because the state of the system is not considered.
[0016] 第 2の問題点は、複数の対策案が考えられる場合、対策をする際に生じる費用や 可用性の低下といった副作用を多面的に考慮して、対策案を優先づけることができ ない、または、どのような副作用がどの程度生じるかをセキュリティ管理者が判断する ことができないということである。従来技術 3では、導入時の費用を考慮してリスクを低 減する方式が提案されているが、可用性の低下など費用以外の制約条件について は考慮されていない。  [0016] The second problem is that when multiple countermeasures are considered, it is not possible to prioritize the countermeasures in consideration of multifaceted side effects such as costs and reduced availability when taking countermeasures. Or the security administrator cannot determine what side effects will occur and to what extent. Prior art 3 has proposed a method to reduce the risk in consideration of the cost at the time of introduction, but it does not consider other constraints such as reduced availability.
[0017] 第 3の問題点は、簡単にできる対策を応急処置的に施し、次第に理想的な対策に 移行するといつた、段階的な対策が考慮されていないということである。その理由は、 従来技術では、対策をすることによる可用性の低下や、対策がなされるまでのリード タイム (展開時間)を考慮した対策立案が実現されて 、な 、ためである。  [0017] The third problem is that step-by-step measures are not taken into account when measures that can be easily taken are taken as an emergency measure and gradually shifted to an ideal measure. The reason for this is that the conventional technology has realized a countermeasure plan that takes into account the reduction in availability due to countermeasures and the lead time (deployment time) until countermeasures are taken.
[0018] そこで、本発明は、運用中のシステムの状態に基づいてリスクを分析し、リスクを軽 減するための対策候補から、運用中のシステムに生じる各種制約を考慮した上で、 最適な対策方法を提示することができるセキュリティリスク管理システム、装置、方法、 およびプログラムを提供することを目的とする。  [0018] Therefore, the present invention analyzes the risk based on the state of the operating system, and considers various constraints that occur in the operating system from the countermeasure candidates for reducing the risk, and is optimal. The purpose is to provide a security risk management system, apparatus, method and program capable of presenting countermeasures.
課題を解決するための手段  Means for solving the problem
[0019] 本発明の第 1の視点によれば、対象システムの状態 (例えば、脆弱性の有無、脅威 の発生頻度、資産価値)を分析する状態分析手段 (例えば、現状分析手段、資産分 析手段)と、状態分析手段の分析結果に基づいて、対象システムのセキュリティリスク を判定するリスク判定手段 (例えば、リスク分析手段)と、リスク判定手段によってセキ ユリティリスクが所定の許容範囲を超えていると判定された場合に、対象システムに所 定の対策を実施することによって低減するセキュリティリスクの度合いを示すリスク低 減度と、所定の対策を実施することによって対象システムに生じる各種制約の大きさ を示す制約度とに基づいて、セキュリティリスクを低減するための対策案を選定する 対策案選定手段 (例えば、対策案生成手段)とを備え、対象システムにおけるセキュ リティリスクを管理するセキュリティリスク管理システムが提供される。 [0019] According to the first aspect of the present invention, state analysis means (for example, current state analysis means, asset analysis) that analyzes the state of the target system (for example, presence or absence of vulnerability, occurrence frequency of threat, asset value). And a risk determination means (for example, a risk analysis means) for determining the security risk of the target system based on the analysis result of the state analysis means, and the security risk exceeds a predetermined allowable range by the risk determination means. If the target system is determined to be, the risk reduction that indicates the degree of security risk that is reduced by implementing the predetermined countermeasures on the target system, and the various restrictions that occur on the target system by implementing the predetermined countermeasures The Security risk management system that manages the security risk in the target system, with a measure plan selection means (for example, a measure plan generation means) that selects a measure plan to reduce the security risk based on the degree of constraint Is provided.
[0020] また、上記セキュリティリスク管理システムは、前記対策案選定手段によって選定さ れた対策案について、当該対策のリスク低減度と、当該対策のそれぞれの制約度と を含む対策案情報を出力する対策案情報出力手段例えば、対策優先順位決定手 段)と、対策案選定手段によって選定された対策案に従って、セキュリティリスクを低 減するための所定の処理を実行する対策実行手段 (例えば、対策実施手段 203)と を備えていてもよい。ここで、セキュリティリスクを低減するための処理としては、例え ば、ディスク暗号化ツールのパスワードを設定させるために、ユーザがログオンしたと きに警告画面を表示する処理や、パスワードを設定するようにユーザに警告する電 子メールを送信する処理を望ましく採用できる。  [0020] In addition, the security risk management system outputs countermeasure plan information including a risk reduction degree of the countermeasure and a degree of restriction of the countermeasure for the countermeasure proposal selected by the countermeasure proposal selecting means. Countermeasure plan information output means (for example, countermeasure priority order determination means) and countermeasure execution means for executing predetermined processing to reduce security risks according to the countermeasure plan selected by the countermeasure plan selection means (for example, implementation of countermeasures) And means 203). Here, as a process to reduce the security risk, for example, in order to set a password for the disk encryption tool, a process for displaying a warning screen when the user logs on, or a password is set. It is desirable to adopt a process that sends an email alerting the user.
[0021] また、前記状態分析手段は、少なくとも対象システムの脆弱性の有無と、対象シス テムの価値とを分析し、前記リスク判定手段は、対象システムの脆弱性の有無と、対 象システムの資産価値と、予めセキュリティ上の脅威の発生頻度を定義した脅威モデ ルと、予め脆弱性の有無による脅威の顕在化に係る脆弱性と脅威との関係を予め定 義した脅威 脆弱性モデルと、予め脅威の顕在化による資産への影響度に係る脅 威と資産との関係を定義した脅威 資産モデルとに基づいて、対象システムのセキ ユリティリスクの度合いを示すリスク値を算出し、前記対策案選定手段は、予め各脆弱 性によるセキュリティリスクを低減するための対策手段を定義した脆弱性一対策モデ ルと、予め各対策手段を実施することによって対象システムに生じる各種制約の大き さを示す制約度を定義した対策 制約モデルとに基づいて、実施後のリスク値およ び各種制約度が所定の条件に合致する対策手段を、対策案として選定してもよい。  [0021] Further, the state analysis means analyzes at least the presence / absence of the vulnerability of the target system and the value of the target system, and the risk judgment means analyzes the presence / absence of the vulnerability of the target system and the target system. A threat model that predefines the asset value, the threat model that defines the frequency of occurrence of security threats in advance, and the vulnerabilities related to the manifestation of threats based on the presence or absence of vulnerabilities in advance; and Based on the threat asset model that defines the relationship between the threat and the threat related to the impact of asset manifestation in advance, the risk value indicating the security risk level of the target system is calculated, and the above countermeasures are taken. The draft selection means includes a vulnerability-one countermeasure model that defines countermeasure means for reducing the security risk due to each vulnerability in advance, and is created in the target system by implementing each countermeasure means in advance. Based on the countermeasure constraint model that defines the degree of constraint that indicates the size of various constraints, countermeasure measures that meet the specified conditions after the implementation of the risk value and various constraint degrees can be selected as countermeasure plans. Good.
[0022] また、上記セキュリティリスク管理システムは、対策の実施段階に応じて定義される 対策ステージであって、実施する対策が対応づけられる各対策ステージにつ 、て、 対策ステージ力 の遷移条件を定義した対策ステージ遷移ルール (例えば、対策シ ナリオモデル)を記憶する記憶手段 (例えば、対策モデル格納手段)と、前記対策案 選定手段によって選定された対策案のうちのいずれかを、所定の条件に従って、対 策ステージ遷移ルールで示される各対策ステージに割り当てることによって、いずれ の対策案をいずれのタイミングで実行するかを示す対策シナリオを生成する対策シ ナリオ生成手段 (例えば、対策シナリオ生成手段)とを備えて 、てもよ 、。 [0022] In addition, the security risk management system described above is a countermeasure stage that is defined according to the implementation stage of the countermeasure, and the transition condition of the countermeasure stage power is set for each countermeasure stage to which the countermeasure to be implemented is associated. Either a storage means (for example, a countermeasure model storage means) for storing defined countermeasure stage transition rules (for example, a countermeasure scenario model) or a countermeasure proposal selected by the countermeasure proposal selecting means according to a predetermined condition. ,versus It is provided with countermeasure scenario generation means (for example, countermeasure scenario generation means) that generates a countermeasure scenario that indicates which countermeasure proposal is executed at which timing by assigning it to each countermeasure stage indicated by the countermeasure stage transition rule. Well, okay.
[0023] また、上記セキュリティリスク管理システムは、前記対策ステージ遷移ルールに従つ て、少なくとも対象システムの状態変化、現在時刻、または対策を実施したときからの 経過時間に基づいて、前記対策シナリオ生成手段によって生成された対策シナリオ 上で対策ステージを遷移させることによって、実行する対策案を決定する対策実行 決定手段 (対策実行判定手段)を備えて!/ヽてもよ ヽ。  [0023] In addition, the security risk management system generates the countermeasure scenario based on at least the state change of the target system, the current time, or the elapsed time since the countermeasure was implemented, according to the countermeasure stage transition rule. A measure execution decision means (measure measure determination means) that determines the measure plan to be executed by transitioning the measure stage on the measure scenario generated by the measure may be provided! / ヽ.
[0024] また、セキュリティリスク管理システムは、リスク管理の対象とする対象システムと、該 対象システムと通信ネットワークを介して接続されるリスク管理装置とを備え、前記対 象システムは、当該対象システムの脆弱性の有無を判定し、判定結果をリスク管理シ ステムに送信する現状分析手段と、当該対象システムの価値を判定し、判定結果をリ スク管理システムに送信する資産分析手段とを有し、前記リスク管理装置は、対象シ ステムから、当該対象システムの脆弱性の有無を示す脆弱性情報と、当該対象シス テムの価値を示す資産情報とを収集する情報収集手段と、セキュリティリスクを判定 するためのリスクモデルとして、少なくともセキュリティ上の各脅威の発生頻度を示す 情報である脅威モデルと、脅威モデルで示される各脅威について、脅威の顕在化に 係る各脆弱性の有無の関係性を示す情報である脅威 脆弱性モデルと、脅威モデ ルで示される各脅威にっ 、て、脅威の顕在化による対象システムの資産への影響度 を示す情報である脅威 資産モデルとを記憶するリスクモデル記憶手段と、対策手 段を決定するための対策モデルとして、少なくとも脅威 脆弱性モデルで示される各 脆弱性に対し、実施しうる対策手段を示す情報である脆弱性一対策モデルと、脆弱 性一対策モデルで示される各対策手段について、当該対策手段の各種制約度を示 す情報である対策 制約モデルとを記憶する対策モデル記憶手段と、情報収集手 段によって収集された脆弱性情報および資産情報を、リスクモデル記憶手段に記憶 されている各モデルを用いて分析することによって、対象システムにおける各脅威の 発生頻度と、各脅威に対する脆弱性の大きさと、各脅威が顕在化した際の対象シス テムの資産への影響度とに基づくリスク値を算出するリスク分析手段と、リスク分析手 段によって算出されたリスク値が所定の許容範囲を超えた場合に、対策モデル格納 手段に記憶されている各モデルを用いて、存在が発見された脆弱性に対する対策 手段を分析することによって、実施後のリスク値および各種制約度が所定の条件に 合致する対策手段を、対策案として選定する対策案生成手段とを有する構成とする ことちでさる。 [0024] Further, the security risk management system includes a target system that is a target of risk management, and a risk management device that is connected to the target system via a communication network, and the target system includes the target system. A current state analysis means for determining whether there is a vulnerability and transmitting the determination result to the risk management system; and an asset analysis means for determining the value of the target system and transmitting the determination result to the risk management system, The risk management device determines a security risk from information collection means for collecting vulnerability information indicating whether there is a vulnerability in the target system and asset information indicating the value of the target system from the target system. As a risk model, there are at least a threat model that is information indicating the frequency of occurrence of each security threat and a threat model. For each threat, the threat vulnerability model, which is the relationship between the existence of each vulnerability related to the threat manifestation, and each threat indicated by the threat model, Implemented at least for each vulnerability indicated by the threat vulnerability model as a risk model storage means for storing the threat asset model, which is information indicating the degree of impact on the asset, and a countermeasure model for determining the countermeasure means Measures that store the vulnerability one countermeasure model, which is information indicating possible countermeasure means, and the countermeasure constraint model, which is information indicating the degree of various restrictions of the countermeasure means, for each countermeasure means indicated by the vulnerability one countermeasure model By analyzing the vulnerability information and asset information collected by the model storage means and the information collection means using each model stored in the risk model storage means A risk analysis means for calculating a risk value based on the frequency of occurrence of each threat in the target system, the degree of vulnerability to each threat, and the degree of impact on the assets of the target system when each threat becomes apparent; Risk analysis hand When the risk value calculated by the step exceeds the predetermined tolerance, it is implemented by analyzing countermeasures against vulnerabilities that have been discovered using each model stored in the countermeasure model storage means. This means that the countermeasure means that the risk value and the degree of restriction later meet the predetermined condition is equipped with the countermeasure proposal generation means for selecting the countermeasure proposal.
[0025] また、本発明の第 2の視点によれば、対象システムの状態に基づ!/、て、対象システ ムのセキュリティリスクを判定するリスク判定手段と、リスク判定手段によってセキユリテ ィリスクが所定の許容範囲を超えていると判定された場合に、対象システムに所定の 対策を実施することによって低減するセキュリティリスクの度合いを示すリスク低減度 と、所定の対策を実施することによって対象システムに生じる各種制約の大きさを示 す制約度とに基づいて、セキュリティリスクを低減するための対策案を選定する対策 案選定手段とを備え、対象システムにおけるセキュリティリスクを管理するセキュリティ リスク管理装置が提供される。  [0025] Further, according to the second aspect of the present invention, based on the state of the target system! /, A risk determination means for determining the security risk of the target system, and the security risk is determined by the risk determination means. If it is determined that the allowable range is exceeded, the risk reduction degree indicating the degree of security risk that is reduced by implementing the prescribed countermeasures on the target system, and the occurrence of the prescribed measures on the target system A security risk management device is provided for managing the security risk in the target system, including a measure plan selection means for selecting a measure plan for reducing the security risk based on the constraint level indicating the size of various constraints. The
[0026] また、上記セキュリティリスク管理装置は、前記対策案選定手段によって選定された 対策案について、当該対策のリスク低減度と、当該対策のそれぞれの制約度とを含 む対策案情報を出力する対策案情報出力手段と、対策案選定手段によって選定さ れた対策案に従って、セキュリティリスクを低減するための所定の処理を実行する対 策実行手段とを備えて 、てもよ 、。  [0026] Further, the security risk management apparatus outputs countermeasure plan information including a risk reduction degree of the countermeasure and a degree of restriction of the countermeasure for the countermeasure proposal selected by the countermeasure proposal selecting means. It is also possible to provide countermeasure proposal information output means and countermeasure execution means for executing predetermined processing for reducing security risk according to the countermeasure proposal selected by the countermeasure proposal selection means.
[0027] また、前記リスク判定手段は、対象システムの脆弱性の有無と、対象システムの資 産価値と、予めセキュリティ上の脅威の発生頻度を定義した脅威モデルと、予め脆弱 性の有無による脅威の顕在化に係る脆弱性と脅威との関係を予め定義した脅威 脆弱性モデルと、予め脅威の顕在化による資産への影響度に係る脅威と資産との関 係を定義した脅威 資産モデルとに基づ!/、て、対象システムのセキュリティリスクの 度合いを示すリスク値を算出し、前記対策案選定手段は、予め各脆弱性によるセキ ユリティリスクを低減するための対策手段を定義した脆弱性一対策モデルと、予め各 対策手段を実施することによって対象システムに生じる各種制約の大きさを示す制約 度を定義した対策 制約モデルとに基づいて、実施後のリスク値および各種制約度 が所定の条件に合致する対策手段を、対策案として選定してもよい。 [0028] また、上記セキュリティリスク管理装置は、対策の実施段階に応じて定義される対策 ステージであって、実施する対策が対応づけられる各対策ステージについて、対策 ステージ力 の遷移条件を定義した対策ステージ遷移ルールを記憶する記憶手段と 、前記対策案選定手段によって選定された対策案のうちのいずれかを、所定の条件 に従って、対策ステージ遷移ルールで示される各対策ステージに割り当てることによ つて、 V、ずれの対策案を 、ずれのタイミングで実行するかを示す対策シナリオを生成 する対策シナリオ生成手段とを備えて 、てもよ 、。 [0027] In addition, the risk determination means includes the presence / absence of vulnerability of the target system, the asset value of the target system, a threat model in which the occurrence frequency of security threats is defined in advance, and a threat based on the presence / absence of vulnerability in advance. A threat vulnerability model that defines the relationship between vulnerabilities and threats related to the manifestation of threats in advance, and a threat asset model that defines the relationship between threats and assets related to the impact on assets due to the manifestation of threats in advance. Based on the above, the risk value indicating the degree of security risk of the target system is calculated, and the countermeasure proposal selection means is a vulnerability that defines countermeasure means for reducing the security risk due to each vulnerability in advance. Based on a countermeasure model and a countermeasure constraint model that defines the degree of constraint that indicates the size of various constraints that occur in the target system by implementing each countermeasure measure in advance. In addition, countermeasures with various degrees of restriction that meet predetermined conditions may be selected as countermeasures. [0028] In addition, the security risk management device described above is a countermeasure stage that is defined according to the implementation stage of the countermeasure, and for each countermeasure stage to which the countermeasure to be implemented is associated, a countermeasure that defines a transition condition for the countermeasure stage power. By allocating one of the storage means for storing the stage transition rule and the countermeasure proposal selected by the countermeasure proposal selecting means to each countermeasure stage indicated by the countermeasure stage transition rule according to a predetermined condition, V. It is possible to provide a countermeasure scenario generation means for generating a countermeasure scenario indicating whether a countermeasure plan for deviation is executed at the timing of deviation.
[0029] また、上記セキュリティリスク管理装置は、前記対策ステージ遷移ルールに従って、 少なくとも対象システムの状態変化、現在時刻、または対策を実施したとき力ゝらの経 過時間に基づいて、前記対策シナリオ生成手段によって生成された対策シナリオ上 で対策ステージを遷移させることによって、実行する対策案を決定する対策実行決 定手段を備えていてもよい。  [0029] Further, the security risk management device generates the countermeasure scenario based on at least the state change of the target system, the current time, or the elapsed time of the power when the countermeasure is implemented in accordance with the countermeasure stage transition rule. There may be provided countermeasure execution decision means for deciding a countermeasure plan to be executed by changing the countermeasure stage on the countermeasure scenario generated by the means.
[0030] また、セキュリティリスク管理装置は、対象システムから、当該対象システムの脆弱性 の有無を示す脆弱性情報と、当該対象システムの価値を示す資産情報とを収集する 情報収集手段と、セキュリティリスクを判定するためのリスクモデルとして、少なくともセ キユリティ上の各脅威の発生頻度を示す情報である脅威モデルと、脅威モデルで示 される各脅威について、脅威の顕在化に係る各脆弱性の有無の関係性を示す情報 である脅威 脆弱性モデルと、脅威モデルで示される各脅威について、脅威の顕在 化による対象システムの資産への影響度を示す情報である脅威 資産モデルとを記 憶するリスクモデル記憶手段と、対策手段を決定するための対策モデルとして、少な くとも脅威 脆弱性モデルで示される各脆弱性に対し、実施しうる対策手段を示す情 報である脆弱性一対策モデルと、脆弱性一対策モデルで示される各対策手段につ いて、当該対策手段の各種制約度を示す情報である対策 制約モデルとを記憶す る対策モデル記憶手段と、情報収集手段によって収集された脆弱性情報および資 産情報を、リスクモデル記憶手段に記憶されて 、る各モデルを用いて分析することに よって、対象システムにおける各脅威の発生頻度と、各脅威に対する脆弱性の大きさ と、各脅威が顕在化した際の対象システムの資産への影響度とに基づくリスク値を算 出するリスク分析手段と、リスク分析手段によって算出されたリスク値が所定の許容範 囲を超えた場合に、対策モデル格納手段に記憶されている各モデルを用いて、存在 が発見された脆弱性に対する対策手段を分析することによって、実施後のリスク値お よび各種制約度が所定の条件に合致する対策手段を、対策案として選定する対策 案生成手段とを備える構成とすることもできる。 [0030] In addition, the security risk management device includes, from the target system, information collection means for collecting vulnerability information indicating whether there is a vulnerability in the target system and asset information indicating the value of the target system, security risk, As a risk model for determining whether or not there are vulnerabilities related to the realization of threats, the threat model is information that indicates at least the frequency of occurrence of each threat on the security and each threat indicated by the threat model. Threat model, which is information indicating the relationship, and risk model that stores the threat asset model, which is information indicating the degree of impact on the assets of the target system due to the manifestation of the threat for each threat indicated by the threat model As a countermeasure model for determining the storage means and countermeasure means, at least for each vulnerability indicated in the threat vulnerability model The vulnerability one countermeasure model, which is information indicating the countermeasure means to be stored, and the countermeasure constraint model, which is information indicating the degree of various restrictions of the countermeasure means, are stored for each countermeasure means indicated by the vulnerability one countermeasure model. The countermeasure model storage means and the vulnerability information and asset information collected by the information collection means are stored in the risk model storage means and analyzed by using each model, and each threat in the target system is analyzed. Risk analysis means that calculates the risk value based on the frequency of occurrence, the size of the vulnerability to each threat, and the degree of impact on the assets of the target system when each threat emerges, and the risk analysis means Risk value When the limit is exceeded, the countermeasures against the vulnerabilities whose existence has been discovered are analyzed using each model stored in the countermeasure model storage means, so that the risk value and various degrees of restriction after implementation are predetermined. It is also possible to adopt a configuration comprising countermeasure means generating means for selecting countermeasure means that meet the above conditions as a countermeasure proposal.
[0031] また、本発明の第 3の視点によれば、対象システムの状態を分析する状態分析ステ ップと、分析結果に基づいて、対象システムのセキュリティリスクを判定するリスク判定 ステップと、セキュリティリスクが所定の許容範囲を超えて 、ると判定された場合に、 対象システムに所定の対策を実施することによって低減するセキュリティリスクの度合 V、を示すリスク低減度と、所定の対策を実施することによって対象システムに生じる各 種制約の大きさを示す制約度とに基づいて、セキュリティリスクを低減するための対策 案を選定する対策案選定ステップとを含み、対象システムにおけるセキュリティリスク を管理するセキュリティリスク管理方法が提供される。  [0031] According to the third aspect of the present invention, a state analysis step for analyzing the state of the target system, a risk determination step for determining the security risk of the target system based on the analysis result, When it is determined that the risk exceeds the predetermined allowable range, the risk reduction degree indicating the degree of security risk V, which is reduced by implementing the predetermined countermeasures on the target system, and the predetermined countermeasures are implemented. Security measures to manage the security risks in the target system, including a measure proposal selection step for selecting a measure plan for reducing the security risk based on the degree of restriction indicating the size of each type of constraint generated in the target system. A risk management method is provided.
[0032] また、上記セキュリティリスク管理方法は、前記選定された対策案について、当該対 策のリスク低減度と、当該対策のそれぞれの制約度とを含む対策案情報を出力する 対策案情報出力ステップと、前記選定された対策案に従って、セキュリティリスクを低 減するための所定の処理を実行する対策実行ステップとを含んで 、てもよ 、。  [0032] Further, the security risk management method outputs a countermeasure plan information output step including, for the selected countermeasure plan, countermeasure plan information including a risk reduction degree of the countermeasure and a degree of constraint of the countermeasure. And a countermeasure execution step for executing a predetermined process for reducing the security risk in accordance with the selected countermeasure plan.
[0033] また、前記状態分析ステップで、少なくとも対象システムの脆弱性の有無と、対象シ ステムの価値とを分析し、前記リスク判定ステップで、対象システムの脆弱性の有無と 、対象システムの資産価値と、予めセキュリティ上の脅威の発生頻度を定義した脅威 モデルと、予め脆弱性の有無による脅威の顕在化に係る脆弱性と脅威との関係を予 め定義した脅威 脆弱性モデルと、予め脅威の顕在化による資産への影響度に係 る脅威と資産との関係を定義した脅威 資産モデルとに基づいて、対象システムの セキュリティリスクの度合いを示すリスク値を算出し、前記対策案選定ステップで、予 め各脆弱性によるセキュリティリスクを低減するための対策手段を定義した脆弱性 対策モデルと、予め各対策手段を実施することによって対象システムに生じる各種制 約の大きさを示す制約度を定義した対策 制約モデルとに基づいて、実施後のリス ク値および各種制約度が所定の条件に合致する対策手段を、対策案として選定して ちょい。 [0034] また、上記セキュリティリスク管理方法は、前記選定された対策案のうちのいずれか を、所定の条件に従って、対策の実施段階に応じて定義される対策ステージであつ て、実施する対策が対応づけられる各対策ステージについて、対策ステージからの 遷移条件を定義した対策ステージ遷移ルールで示される各対策ステージに割り当て ること〖こよって、 V、ずれの対策案を 、ずれのタイミングで実行するかを示す対策シナ リオを生成する対策シナリオ生成ステップを含んで 、てもよ 、。 [0033] In the state analysis step, at least the presence / absence of the vulnerability of the target system and the value of the target system are analyzed, and in the risk determination step, the presence / absence of the vulnerability of the target system and the assets of the target system are analyzed. A threat model that defines the value and frequency of occurrence of security threats in advance, a threat that predefines the relationship between vulnerabilities and threats related to the emergence of threats based on the presence or absence of vulnerabilities, and a threat model Based on the threat asset model that defines the relationship between the asset and the threat related to the impact on the asset due to the materialization of risk, a risk value indicating the security risk level of the target system is calculated and In addition, a vulnerability countermeasure model that defines countermeasures to reduce the security risk due to each vulnerability in advance, and the target scenario by implementing each countermeasure in advance. Based on the countermeasure constraint model that defines the degree of restriction that indicates the size of various restrictions that occur in the system, the countermeasure means that the risk value after implementation and the degree of restriction meet the specified conditions is selected as a countermeasure proposal. That's right. [0034] In addition, the security risk management method described above is a countermeasure stage that is defined according to the implementation stage of a countermeasure, according to a predetermined condition, according to a predetermined condition. For each countermeasure stage to be associated, assign it to each countermeasure stage indicated by the countermeasure stage transition rule that defines the transition conditions from the countermeasure stage. Including a countermeasure scenario generation step that generates a countermeasure scenario that indicates
[0035] また、上記セキュリティリスク管理方法は、前記対策ステージ遷移ルールに従って、 少なくとも対象システムの状態変化、現在時刻、または対策を実施したとき力ゝらの経 過時間に基づいて、前記対策シナリオ上で対策ステージを遷移させることによって、 実行する対策案を決定する対策実行決定ステップを含んで 、てもよ 、。  [0035] Further, the security risk management method is based on the countermeasure scenario based on at least the state change of the target system, the current time, or the elapsed time of the force when the countermeasure is implemented according to the countermeasure stage transition rule. It includes a measure execution decision step that decides a measure plan to be executed by transitioning the measure stage.
[0036] また、セキュリティリスク管理方法は、対象システムが、当該対象システムの脆弱性 の有無を判定し、判定結果をリスク管理システムに送信するステップと、対象システム 力 当該対象システムの価値を判定し、判定結果をリスク管理システムに送信するス テツプと、リスク管理装置が、対象システムから、当該対象システムの脆弱性の有無を 示す脆弱性情報と、当該対象システムの価値を示す資産情報とを収集するステップ と、リスク管理装置が、情報収集手段によって収集された脆弱性情報および資産情 報を、セキュリティ上の各脅威の発生頻度を示す情報である脅威モデルと、脅威モデ ルで示される各脅威について、脅威の顕在化に係る各脆弱性の有無の関係性を示 す情報である脅威 脆弱性モデルと、脅威モデルで示される各脅威について、脅威 の顕在化による対象システムの資産への影響度を示す情報である脅威 資産モデ ルとを用いて分析することによって、対象システムにおける各脅威の発生頻度と、各 脅威に対する脆弱性の大きさと、各脅威が顕在化した際の対象システムの資産への 影響度とに基づくリスク値を算出するステップと、リスク管理装置が、算出されたリスク 値が所定の許容範囲を超えた場合に、脅威 脆弱性モデルで示される各脆弱性に 対し、実施しうる対策手段を示す情報である脆弱性一対策モデルと、脆弱性一対策 モデルで示される各対策手段につ!、て、当該対策手段の各種制約度を示す情報で ある対策 制約モデルとを用いて、存在が発見された脆弱性に対する対策手段を分 析することによって、実施後のリスク値および各種制約度が所定の条件に合致する対 策手段を、対策案として選定するステップとを含んだ方法とすることもできる。 [0036] Further, in the security risk management method, the target system determines whether there is a vulnerability in the target system, sends the determination result to the risk management system, and the target system power determines the value of the target system. The step of sending the judgment results to the risk management system, and the risk management device collects the vulnerability information indicating the presence or absence of the vulnerability of the target system and the asset information indicating the value of the target system from the target system And the risk management device uses the vulnerability model and asset information collected by the information collection means, the threat model that is the information indicating the occurrence frequency of each security threat, and each threat indicated by the threat model. Is indicated by the threat vulnerability model, which is information indicating the relationship between the existence of each vulnerability related to the manifestation of the threat, and the threat model Analyzing threats using the threat asset model, which is information indicating the degree of impact of threats on the assets of the target system, the frequency of occurrence of each threat in the target system and the vulnerability to each threat. The step of calculating the risk value based on the size and the impact on the assets of the target system when each threat becomes apparent, and the risk management device, when the calculated risk value exceeds the predetermined allowable range For each vulnerability indicated in the vulnerability vulnerability model, there is a vulnerability one countermeasure model that is information indicating the countermeasures that can be implemented, and each countermeasure means indicated in the vulnerability one countermeasure model! By analyzing countermeasures against vulnerabilities that have been discovered using countermeasure constraint models, which are information indicating the degree of various constraints on the means, the risk values and various constraints after implementation are analyzed. Pairs but which meets a predetermined condition The measure means may be a method including a step of selecting as a measure plan.
[0037] また、本発明の第 4の視点によれば、コンピュータに、対象システムの状態を分析す る状態分析処理、分析結果に基づいて、対象システムのセキュリティリスクを判定す るリスク判定処理、およびセキュリティリスクが所定の許容範囲を超えていると判定さ れた場合に、対象システムに所定の対策を実施することによって低減するセキユリテ ィリスクの度合!/、を示すリスク低減度と、所定の対策を実施することによって対象シス テムに生じる各種制約の大きさを示す制約度とに基づ 、て、セキュリティリスクを低減 するための対策案を選定する対策案選定処理を実行させ、対象システムにおけるセ キユリティリスクを管理するためのセキュリティリスク管理プログラムが提供される。  [0037] Further, according to the fourth aspect of the present invention, a state analysis process for analyzing the state of the target system on a computer, a risk determination process for determining the security risk of the target system based on the analysis result, The degree of security risk that can be reduced by implementing the prescribed measures on the target system when it is determined that the security risk exceeds the prescribed tolerance! Based on the degree of risk reduction that indicates /, and the degree of restriction that indicates the size of various restrictions that occur in the target system by implementing the prescribed countermeasures, a countermeasure plan for reducing the security risk is selected. A security risk management program is provided to execute countermeasure selection processing and manage security risks in the target system.
[0038] また、上記セキュリティリスク管理プログラムにより、コンピュータに、前記選定された 対策案について、当該対策のリスク低減度と、当該対策のそれぞれの制約度とを含 む対策案情報を出力する対策案情報出力処理、および選定された対策案に従って 、セキュリティリスクを低減するための所定の処理を実行する対策実行処理を実行さ せてもよい。  [0038] Further, the security risk management program outputs to the computer a countermeasure plan information including a risk reduction degree of the countermeasure and a constraint degree of each countermeasure for the selected countermeasure plan. In accordance with the information output process and the selected countermeasure plan, the countermeasure execution process for executing a predetermined process for reducing the security risk may be executed.
[0039] また、上記セキュリティリスク管理プログラムにより、コンピュータに、前記状態分析 処理で、少なくとも対象システムの脆弱性の有無と、対象システムの価値とを分析さ せ、前記リスク判定処理で、対象システムの脆弱性の有無と、対象システムの資産価 値と、予めセキュリティ上の脅威の発生頻度を定義した脅威モデルと、予め脆弱性の 有無による脅威の顕在化に係る脆弱性と脅威との関係を予め定義した脅威 脆弱 性モデルと、予め脅威の顕在化による資産への影響度に係る脅威と資産との関係を 定義した脅威 資産モデルとに基づいて、対象システムのセキュリティリスクの度合 いを示すリスク値を算出させ、前記対策案選定処理で、予め各脆弱性によるセキユリ ティリスクを低減するための対策手段を定義した脆弱性一対策モデルと、予め各対 策手段を実施することによって対象システムに生じる各種制約の大きさを示す制約度 を定義した対策 制約モデルとに基づいて、実施後のリスク値および各種制約度が 所定の条件に合致する対策手段を、対策案として選定させてもよい。  [0039] Further, the security risk management program causes the computer to analyze at least whether there is a vulnerability in the target system and the value of the target system in the state analysis process, and in the risk determination process, The relationship between the presence of vulnerabilities, the asset value of the target system, the threat model that predefines the occurrence frequency of security threats, and the vulnerabilities and threats related to the manifestation of threats based on the presence or absence of vulnerabilities in advance Risk value that indicates the degree of security risk of the target system based on the defined threat vulnerability model and the threat asset model that defines the relationship between the asset and the threat related to the asset impact caused by the manifestation of the threat in advance. A vulnerability pair that defines countermeasures to reduce the security risk due to each vulnerability in the countermeasure proposal selection process in advance. Based on the model and the countermeasure constraint model that defines the degree of constraint that indicates the size of various constraints that occur in the target system by executing each countermeasure measure in advance, the risk value and various constraint levels after implementation are the specified conditions. It is possible to select a countermeasure means that matches the above as a countermeasure plan.
[0040] また、上記セキュリティリスク管理プログラムにより、コンピュータに、前記選定された 対策案のうちのいずれかを、所定の条件に従って、対策の実施段階に応じて定義さ れる対策ステージであって、実施する対策が対応づけられる各対策ステージにつ ヽ て、対策ステージからの遷移条件を定義した対策ステージ遷移ルールで示される各 対策ステージに割り当てることによって、 V、ずれの対策案を 、ずれのタイミングで実 行するかを示す対策シナリオを生成する対策シナリオ生成処理を実行させてもよい。 [0040] Further, the security risk management program defines, in the computer, any of the selected countermeasure proposals according to the implementation stage of the countermeasures according to a predetermined condition. For each countermeasure stage to which the countermeasure to be implemented is associated, assigning it to each countermeasure stage indicated by the countermeasure stage transition rule that defines the transition conditions from the countermeasure stage, V, deviation of Measure scenario generation processing may be executed to generate a measure scenario indicating whether the measure plan is to be executed at the timing of deviation.
[0041] また、セキュリティリスク管理プログラムにより、コンピュータに、前記対策ステージ遷 移ルールに従って、少なくとも対象システムの状態変化、現在時刻、または対策を実 施したときからの経過時間に基づ!/、て、対策シナリオ上で対策ステージを遷移させる こと〖こよって、実行する対策案を決定する対策実行決定処理を実行させてもよい。  [0041] Further, according to the security risk management program, at least based on the state change of the target system, the current time, or the elapsed time since the countermeasure was taken according to the countermeasure stage transition rule! The countermeasure execution decision process for determining the countermeasure plan to be executed may be executed by changing the countermeasure stage on the countermeasure scenario.
[0042] また、セキュリティリスク管理プログラムは、コンピュータに、対象システムから、当該 対象システムの脆弱性の有無を示す脆弱性情報と、当該対象システムの価値を示す 資産情報とを収集する処理、情報収集手段によって収集された脆弱性情報および資 産情報を、セキュリティ上の各脅威の発生頻度を示す情報である脅威モデルと、脅威 モデルで示される各脅威について、脅威の顕在化に係る各脆弱性の有無の関係性 を示す情報である脅威 脆弱性モデルと、脅威モデルで示される各脅威にっ 、て、 脅威の顕在化による対象システムの資産への影響度を示す情報である脅威 資産 モデルとを用いて分析することによって、対象システムにおける各脅威の発生頻度と 、各脅威に対する脆弱性の大きさと、各脅威が顕在化した際の対象システムの資産 への影響度とに基づくリスク値を算出する処理、および算出されたリスク値が所定の 許容範囲を超えた場合に、脅威 脆弱性モデルで示される各脆弱性に対し、実施し うる対策手段を示す情報である脆弱性一対策モデルと、脆弱性一対策モデルで示さ れる各対策手段について、当該対策手段の各種制約度を示す情報である対策 制 約モデルとを用いて、存在が発見された脆弱性に対する対策手段を分析すること〖こ よって、実施後のリスク値および各種制約度が所定の条件に合致する対策手段を、 対策案として選定する処理を実行させるプログラムとすることができる。  [0042] Further, the security risk management program collects information from a target system on the computer, such as vulnerability information indicating the presence or absence of the vulnerability of the target system and asset information indicating the value of the target system. Vulnerability information and asset information collected by means of the threat model, which is information indicating the frequency of occurrence of each security threat, and each vulnerability indicated by the threat model for each vulnerability related to the manifestation of the threat. The threat vulnerability model, which is information indicating the presence / absence relationship, and the threat asset model, which is information indicating the degree of impact on the assets of the target system due to the realization of the threat, for each threat indicated by the threat model. To analyze the frequency of occurrence of each threat in the target system, the level of vulnerability to each threat, and the target when each threat becomes apparent Risk level based on the impact on system assets, and when the calculated risk value exceeds a predetermined tolerance, it can be implemented for each vulnerability indicated in the threat vulnerability model Existence exists by using the vulnerability one countermeasure model that is information indicating countermeasure means and each countermeasure means indicated by the vulnerability one countermeasure model using a countermeasure constraint model that is information indicating the degree of various restrictions of the countermeasure means. By analyzing countermeasures against discovered vulnerabilities, it is possible to create a program that executes a process of selecting countermeasure means that meet the specified conditions for the risk value and various constraints after implementation. it can.
発明の効果  The invention's effect
[0043] 本発明は、リスク判定手段がリスク管理の対象とするシステムの状態の分析結果に 基づ 、てセキュリティリスクを判定した上で、対策案選定手段がリスク低減度と各種制 約度とに基づいて対策案を選定するよう構成されているので、対象システムに生じる 各種制約を考慮した上で最適な対策案を提示することができる。 [0043] According to the present invention, the risk determination means determines the security risk based on the analysis result of the state of the system that is the object of risk management, and then the measure proposal selection means determines the risk reduction degree and various restriction degrees. Is generated in the target system because it is configured to select countermeasures based on It is possible to present an optimal countermeasure plan in consideration of various constraints.
[0044] 例えば、運用中のシステムの状態 (脆弱性の有無、脆弱性の発生頻度、資産価値 等)に基づいて分析した現在のセキュリティリスクを軽減する対策候補から、その対策 を実施することによって生じる各種制約を考慮した上で、最適な対策方法を提示する ことができること〖こある。その理由は、システムの状態を調べることにより得られた、対 象システム内の資産価値とその脆弱性の情報から、予め定められたセキュリティリスク を分析するためのリスクモデルを用いてリスク値を算出し、さらに予め定められた対策 手段を決定するための対策モデルを用いて、対策を実施する際に生じる各種コスト( 制約度)を算出した上で対策案を生成するためである。  [0044] For example, by implementing countermeasures from candidate countermeasures that reduce current security risks analyzed based on the state of the operating system (existence of vulnerabilities, frequency of occurrence of vulnerabilities, asset value, etc.) In consideration of various constraints that occur, it is possible to present the most appropriate countermeasures. The reason is that the risk value is calculated using a risk model for analyzing a predetermined security risk from the asset value and vulnerability information in the target system obtained by examining the state of the system. Furthermore, this is because a countermeasure model for determining countermeasure means determined in advance is used to generate a countermeasure plan after calculating various costs (constraints) generated when the countermeasure is implemented.
[0045] また、本発明の、特定の視点ないし実施の形態において、複数の対策案が考えら れる場合、対策を実施する際に生じる各種コストがどの程度生じるかを判断しつつ、 セキュリティ管理者が最適な対策を実施できる。その理由は、例えば、対策モデルと して、機器コスト、可用性コスト、展開コストといった複数のコストを定義しておくことに より、可用性の低下を優先するか、速やかな対策の展開を優先するか、全体的にコス トを最小限にすることを優先するか、 t 、つた複数の異なる対策案を提示することがで き、セキュリティ管理者がどの対策を取れば、どのようなコストがどの程度生じるかが 把握できるようになるためである。  [0045] Further, in a specific viewpoint or embodiment of the present invention, when a plurality of countermeasures are conceivable, the security administrator determines how much various costs are incurred when implementing the countermeasures. Can implement optimal measures. The reason is, for example, whether to prioritize the decline in availability or prioritize rapid countermeasure deployment by defining multiple costs such as equipment cost, availability cost, and deployment cost as a countermeasure model. Whether to give priority to minimizing the overall cost, t can present several different countermeasures, and what measures should be taken by the security administrator and what cost This is because it will be possible to grasp whether it will occur.
[0046] 更に、本発明の特定の視点ないし実施の形態において、簡単にできる対策を応急 処置的に施して次第に理想的な対策に移行するといつた、段階的な対策をセキユリ ティ管理者が実施できる。その理由は、展開コストの小さい対策を先に実施し、その 後、その他の条件 (コスト)も考慮した最適な対策を実施するといつた、典型的な対策 実施のパターンを対策シナリオとして生成し、実施することができるためである。  [0046] Further, in a specific viewpoint or embodiment of the present invention, the security administrator implements step-by-step countermeasures when a simple countermeasure is taken as an emergency measure and gradually transitions to an ideal countermeasure. it can. The reason for this is that when a measure with a low deployment cost is implemented first, and then an optimum measure is taken in consideration of other conditions (costs), a typical measure implementation pattern is generated as a measure scenario. It is because it can be implemented.
図面の簡単な説明  Brief Description of Drawings
[0047] [図 1]本発明によるセキュリティリスク管理システムの構成例を示すブロック図である。  FIG. 1 is a block diagram showing a configuration example of a security risk management system according to the present invention.
[図 2]セキュリティリスク管理システムが対象システムのセキュリティリスクに応じて対策 を実施する動作の例を示す流れ図である。  FIG. 2 is a flowchart showing an example of an operation in which the security risk management system implements countermeasures according to the security risk of the target system.
[図 3]状態格納手段に格納される脆弱性情報のデータ構造の例を示す説明図である 圆 4]文書ファイルの機密レベルとその価値の例を示す説明図である。 FIG. 3 is an explanatory diagram showing an example of the data structure of vulnerability information stored in the state storage means. 4) It is an explanatory diagram showing an example of the confidential level of a document file and its value.
[図 5]状態格納手段に格納される資産情報のデータ構造の例を示す説明図である。  FIG. 5 is an explanatory diagram showing an example of the data structure of asset information stored in the state storage means.
[図 6]脅威モデルの例を示す説明図である。  FIG. 6 is an explanatory diagram showing an example of a threat model.
圆 7]脅威—脆弱性モデルの例を示す説明図である。 7] It is an explanatory diagram showing an example of a threat-vulnerability model.
圆 8]脅威—脆弱性モデルのデータ格納形式の例を示す説明図である。 8] It is an explanatory diagram showing an example of the data storage format of the threat-vulnerability model.
圆 9]脅威—脆弱性モデル力も導出される関数の解の一例を示す説明図である。 圆 10]脅威—資産モデルの例を示す説明図である。 9) An explanatory diagram showing an example of a solution of a function that also derives threat-vulnerability model power. [10] Threat is an explanatory diagram showing an example of an asset model.
圆 11]リスク分析手段が行うリスク分析処理の例を示す流れ図である。 [11] This is a flowchart showing an example of risk analysis processing performed by the risk analysis means.
圆 12]脆弱性—対策モデルの例を示す説明図である。 V12] Vulnerability—An explanatory diagram showing an example of a countermeasure model.
圆 13]対策—コストモデルの例を示す説明図である。 [13] Countermeasure—An explanatory diagram showing an example of a cost model.
圆 14]脆弱性—対策モデルと対策—コストモデル 104bを組み合わせた例を示す説 明図である。 圆 14] This is an explanatory diagram showing an example of a combination of vulnerability—countermeasure model and measure—cost model 104b.
圆 15]対策案生成手段が行う対策案生成処理の例を示す流れ図である。 15) This is a flowchart showing an example of countermeasure plan generation processing performed by the countermeasure plan generation means.
圆 16]脅威—脆弱性―対策モデルの例を示す説明図である。 圆 16] It is an explanatory diagram showing an example of a threat-vulnerability-countermeasure model.
圆 17]対策優先順位決定手段が出力する画面の例を示す説明図である。 圆 17] It is explanatory drawing which shows the example of the screen which a countermeasure priority order determination means outputs.
圆 18]対策順位決定方針を設定するための設定画面の例を示す説明図である。 圆 19]対策順位決定方針を設定するための設定画面の例を示す説明図である。 圆 20]対策関係演算子を用いて表現した脅威—脆弱性—対策モデルの例を示す説 明図である。 圆 18] It is an explanatory view showing an example of a setting screen for setting a countermeasure order determination policy.圆 19] It is explanatory drawing which shows the example of the setting screen for setting a countermeasure ranking decision policy. [20] It is an explanatory diagram showing an example of threat-vulnerability-countermeasure model expressed using countermeasure-related operators.
圆 21]対策関係演算子を用いた脅威—脆弱性—対策モデル力も対策案を生成する 処理の例を示す流れ図である。 圆 21] This is a flowchart showing an example of the process of generating a countermeasure proposal for threat-vulnerability-measure model power using countermeasure-related operators.
[図 22]第 2の実施例によるセキュリティリスク管理システムの構成例を示すブロック図 である。  FIG. 22 is a block diagram showing a configuration example of a security risk management system according to a second example.
[図 23]「ワーム発生による情報漏洩」に対する対策シナリオモデル 114cの例を示す 説明図である。  FIG. 23 is an explanatory diagram showing an example of a countermeasure scenario model 114c for “information leakage due to occurrence of a worm”.
[図 24]コストに応じて対策ステージに各対策を割り当てた場合の対策確認画面の例 である。  [Figure 24] This is an example of a measure confirmation screen when each measure is assigned to a measure stage according to cost.
圆 25]対策シナリオモデルの構成要素の例を示す説明図である。 [図 26]対策シナリオ生成手段が行う対策シナリオ生成処理の例を示す流れ図である 符号の説明 圆 25] It is an explanatory diagram showing an example of the components of the countermeasure scenario model. FIG. 26 is a flowchart showing an example of countermeasure scenario generation processing performed by the countermeasure scenario generation means.
[0048] 100 リスク管理システム [0048] 100 risk management system
101 状態格納手段  101 State storage means
102 リスクモデル格納手段  102 Risk model storage means
102a 脅威モデル  102a Threat model
102b 脅威—脆弱性モデル  102b Threat—Vulnerability Model
102c 脅威 資産モデル  102c Threat Asset Model
103 リスク分析手段  103 Risk analysis tools
104 対策モデル格納手段  104 Countermeasure model storage means
104a 脆弱性—対策モデル  104a Vulnerability—the countermeasure model
104b 対策—コストモデル  104b Countermeasure—Cost Model
105 対策案生成手段  105 Proposal generation method
106 ポリシー格納手段  106 Policy storage means
106a 対策順位決定方針  106a Policy for determining the order of measures
107 対策優先順位決定手段  107 Countermeasure priority determination means
200 対象システム  200 target system
201 現状分析手段  201 Analysis method
202 資産分析手段  202 Asset analysis tools
203 対策実施手段  203 Countermeasure implementation measures
111 対策シナリオ生成手段  111 Countermeasure scenario generation means
112 対策実行判定手段  112 Countermeasure execution judgment means
114c 対策シナリオモデル  114c Countermeasure scenario model
211 イベント収集手段  211 Event collection means
発明を実施するための最良の形態  BEST MODE FOR CARRYING OUT THE INVENTION
[0049] 実施例 1. [0049] Example 1.
続いて、本発明を実施するための最良の形態として、運用中のシステムのセキユリ ティリスクが許容範囲を超える場合に複数の対策案を生成するとともに、各対策を実 施する際に生じる各種制約 (費用や可用性の低下といった様々な副作用)がどの程 度生じるかを提示して、セキュリティ管理者が適切な判断を下せるように支援する本 発明の第 1実施例を説明する。 Subsequently, as the best mode for carrying out the present invention, the security of the system in operation is In addition to generating multiple countermeasure proposals when the risk is beyond the allowable range, it also shows how many restrictions (various side effects such as cost and availability reduction) that occur when each countermeasure is implemented. A first embodiment of the present invention that assists the security administrator in making an appropriate decision will be described.
[0050] 以下、本発明の第 1の実施例を図面を参照して説明する。図 1は、本発明によるセ キユリティリスク管理システムの構成例を示すブロック図である。図 1に示すように、セ キユリティリスク管理システムは、リスク管理システム 100と、対象システム 200とを含む 。リスク管理システム 100と対象システム 200とは、例えば、インターネット等の通信ネ ットワークを介して接続される。リスク管理システム 100は、具体的には、ワークステー シヨンやパーソナルコンピュータ等の情報処理装置によって実現される。  Hereinafter, a first embodiment of the present invention will be described with reference to the drawings. FIG. 1 is a block diagram showing a configuration example of a security risk management system according to the present invention. As shown in FIG. 1, the security risk management system includes a risk management system 100 and a target system 200. The risk management system 100 and the target system 200 are connected via a communication network such as the Internet, for example. Specifically, the risk management system 100 is realized by an information processing apparatus such as a workstation or a personal computer.
[0051] リスク管理システム 100は、状態格納手段 101と、リスクモデル格納手段 102と、リス ク分析手段 103と、対策モデル格納手段 104と、対策案生成手段 105と、ポリシー格 納手段 106と、対策優先順位決定手段 107と、ポリシー設定手段 108とを備える。ま た、リスク管理の対象となる対象システム 200には、現状分析手段 201と、資産分析 手段 202と、対策実施手段 203とが含まれる。  [0051] The risk management system 100 includes a state storage means 101, a risk model storage means 102, a risk analysis means 103, a countermeasure model storage means 104, a countermeasure plan generation means 105, a policy storage means 106, Countermeasure priority order determining means 107 and policy setting means 108 are provided. Further, the target system 200 subject to risk management includes a current state analyzing means 201, an asset analyzing means 202, and a countermeasure implementing means 203.
[0052] 対象システム 200は、具体的には、オペレーティングシステム(OS)がインストール されているパーソナルコンピュータ等の情報処理装置である。例えば、対象システム 200は、ユーザが使用する端末 (以下、クライアント PCという。)や各種サーバである 。なお、本実施例では、対象システムが Microsoft Windows (登録商標)がインスト ールされて 、るクライアント PCやサーバであると仮定して具体例を示す力 これに限 らず、例えば、 Linux (登録商標)がインストールされているサーバワークステーション であってもよい。また、図 1では、 1つの対象システム 200を示している力 セキュリティ リスク管理システムは、複数の対象システム 200を備え、 1つのリスク管理システム 10 0で複数の対象システム 200を管理するようにしてもょ 、。  The target system 200 is specifically an information processing apparatus such as a personal computer in which an operating system (OS) is installed. For example, the target system 200 is a terminal used by a user (hereinafter referred to as a client PC) or various servers. In this embodiment, it is assumed that the target system is a client PC or server on which Microsoft Windows (registered trademark) is installed, and is not limited to this. For example, Linux (registered) It may be a server workstation on which (trademark) is installed. In addition, in FIG. 1, a force security risk management system showing one target system 200 includes a plurality of target systems 200, and one risk management system 100 may manage a plurality of target systems 200. Oh ,.
[0053] 現状分析手段 201は、対象システム 200の状態を調べ、脆弱性が存在するか否か を判断し、リスク管理システム 100に通知する。本実施例では、その現状分析手段 20 1を備える対象システム 200において、対象システム 200上の脆弱性の有無を判定し 、対象システム 200の脆弱性情報として、リスク管理システム 100に送信して状態格 納手段 101に格納させる。ここで脆弱性とは、情報システムにおいて、情報セキユリテ ィ上の脅威となる行為の要因となりうる情報システムの性質 (システム上の欠陥、仕様 上の問題点、ユーザによる利用形態等)をいう。脆弱性は、例えば、「ディスク暗号ィ匕 ツールがインストールされて!/ヽな 、」 t 、つたソフトウェアのインストール情報であった り、 「USBメモリが利用可能である」といったシステムの状態であったり、「ゲストアカウ ントが無効にされていない」といったユーザアカウント情報であったり、「telnetサービ スが実行されて 、る」と 、つた OSの状態であったりする。 The current state analyzing means 201 checks the state of the target system 200, determines whether or not there is a vulnerability, and notifies the risk management system 100 of it. In this embodiment, the target system 200 provided with the current state analysis means 201 determines whether or not there is a vulnerability on the target system 200, and transmits it to the risk management system 100 as vulnerability information of the target system 200 for status analysis. It is stored in the payment means 101. Vulnerability refers to the nature of an information system (system defects, specification problems, user usage, etc.) that can be a cause of information security threats in an information system. Vulnerabilities are, for example, “Disk encryption tool installed! / ヽ”, information on the installation of software, and system status such as “USB memory is available”. User account information such as “Guest account is not disabled”, or “The telnet service is executed” and the status of the operating system.
[0054] 資産分析手段 202は、対象システム 200の状態を調べ、その資産のセキュリティレ ベル (機密性、完全性、可用性に関して要求される指標)を判定し、リスク管理システ ム 100に通知する。本実施例では、その資産分析手段 202を備える対象システム対 象システム 200にお 、て、対象システム 200上に存在する文書ファイルの機密度を 判定し、対象システム 200の資産情報として、リスク管理システム 100に送信して状態 格納手段 101に格納させる。ここで文書ファイルの機密度とは、例えば、「個人情報」 、「取扱注意情報」、「社外秘情報」といった、予めセキュリティポリシーに従って定め られた文書の機密性に関する分類 (度合い)を表す指標であり、ファイルとして記憶さ れている文書の内容によって決定される。  The asset analysis means 202 examines the state of the target system 200, determines the security level (an index required for confidentiality, integrity, and availability) of the asset, and notifies the risk management system 100 of it. In this embodiment, in the target system target system 200 including the asset analysis means 202, the confidentiality of the document file existing on the target system 200 is determined, and the risk management system is used as the asset information of the target system 200. It is transmitted to 100 and stored in the state storage means 101. Here, the confidentiality of the document file is an index that represents a classification (degree) relating to the confidentiality of the document, which is determined in advance according to the security policy, such as “personal information”, “handling information”, and “confidential information”. It is determined by the contents of the document stored as a file.
[0055] 対策実施手段 203は、その対策実施手段 203を備える対象システム 200において 、リスク管理システム 100から指示された対策案に従って、セキュリティリスクを解消す るための処理を実行する。  The countermeasure execution unit 203 executes processing for eliminating the security risk in the target system 200 including the countermeasure execution unit 203 according to the countermeasure plan instructed by the risk management system 100.
[0056] 現状分析手段 201、資産分析手段 202、対策実施手段 203は、具体的には、プロ グラムに従って動作する CPUによって実現される。なお、本実施例では、現状分析 手段 201、資産分析手段 202、対策実施手段 203は、各対象システムがプログラム をインストールする等して、リスク管理の対象とするシステム (対象システム)それぞれ に、備えられているものとする。  [0056] The current state analyzing means 201, the asset analyzing means 202, and the countermeasure implementing means 203 are specifically realized by a CPU that operates according to a program. In this embodiment, the current state analysis means 201, the asset analysis means 202, and the countermeasure execution means 203 are provided in each system (target system) that is subject to risk management, for example, by installing a program in each target system. It is assumed that
[0057] 状態格納手段 101は、対象システム 200の現在のシステム状態を示す情報を格納  [0057] The state storage means 101 stores information indicating the current system state of the target system 200.
(記憶)する。具体的には、状態格納手段 101は、対象システム 200から収集 (受信) したシステムの脆弱性の有無を示す脆弱性情報と、システムの資産価値を示す資産 情報とを記憶する。なお、脆弱性情報、資産情報は、対象システム 200が所定のタイ ミングで送信したものを受信してもよいし、状態格納手段 101が収集手段を含み、収 集手段が対象システムに問 、合わせて、その応答として受信してもよ 、。 (Remember. Specifically, the state storage unit 101 stores vulnerability information indicating whether or not there is a system vulnerability collected (received) from the target system 200 and asset information indicating the asset value of the system. For vulnerability information and asset information, the target system 200 has a predetermined type. The state storage means 101 may include a collection means, and the collection means may ask the target system and receive it as a response.
[0058] リスクモデル格納手段 102は、対象システムのシステム状態力もセキュリティリスクの 度合 、を示すリスク値を分析するために必要なリスクモデルを格納 (記憶)する。具体 的には、リスクモデル格納手段 102は、脅威モデル 102aと、脅威—脆弱性モデル 1 02bと、脅威—資産モデル 102cとを記憶する。脅威モデル 102aは、セキュリティ上 の脅威と、それら脅威の発生頻度を定義するためのモデル (情報)である。脅威 脆 弱性モデル 102bは、現状分析手段 201が検出する脆弱性と、それら脆弱性と脅威 モデル 102aで定義される脅威との関係(脅威の顕在化に係る関係)を定義するため のモデルである。脅威—資産モデル 102cは、脅威モデル 102aで定義される脅威と 対象システム上の資産との関係 (資産への影響度に係る関係)を定義するためのモ デルである。なお、これら各モデルは、セキュリティに関する専門知識を元にしてあら かじめ作成されているものとする。これらのモデルは、例えば、 XMLファイルや HTM Lファイルとして作成されてもよ!、。  [0058] The risk model storage means 102 stores (stores) a risk model necessary for analyzing a risk value indicating the system state capability of the target system and the degree of security risk. Specifically, the risk model storage unit 102 stores a threat model 102a, a threat-vulnerability model 102b, and a threat-asset model 102c. The threat model 102a is a model (information) for defining security threats and the frequency of occurrence of those threats. The threat vulnerability model 102b is a model for defining the relationship between the vulnerabilities detected by the current state analysis means 201 and the threats defined in the threat model 102a (relationships related to the realization of threats). is there. The threat—asset model 102c is a model for defining the relationship between the threat defined in the threat model 102a and the asset on the target system (the relationship related to the impact on the asset). These models are prepared in advance based on security expertise. These models may be created as XML files or HTML files, for example!
[0059] リスク分析手段 103は、状態格納手段 101に格納されている対象システム 200の現 在のシステム状態を示す情報 (脆弱性情報、資産情報)を、リスクモデル格納手段 10 2に格納されて ヽるリスクモデルを用いて分析し、対象システム 200の現在のリスク値 を算出する。  [0059] The risk analysis unit 103 stores information (vulnerability information, asset information) indicating the current system state of the target system 200 stored in the state storage unit 101 in the risk model storage unit 102. Analyze using a recurring risk model to calculate the current risk value of the target system 200.
[0060] 対策モデル格納手段 104は、対象システム 200の現在のセキュリティリスクに対す る最適な対策を分析するために必要な対策モデルを格納 (記憶)する。具体的には、 対策モデル格納手段 104は、脆弱性—対策モデル 104aと、対策毎に定義される対 策—コストモデル 104bとを記憶する。脆弱性—対策モデル 104aは、脅威—脆弱性 モデル 102bで定義される脆弱性に対し、実施しうる対策手段を定義するためのモデ ルである。対策—コストモデル 104bは、脆弱性—対策モデル 104aで定義される対 策手段に対し、その対策手段を実施する際に生じる各種コストを定義するためのモ デルである。以下、「コスト」と表現した場合には、単純に「費用」をいうのではなぐ対 策に必要な費用や、対策を実施したことにより生じる副作用などを総称した、対策を 実施する際に生じる「制約」をいう。これらのモデルは、例えば、 XMLファイルや HT MLファイルとして作成されてもよ!、。 The countermeasure model storage means 104 stores (stores) a countermeasure model necessary for analyzing an optimal countermeasure against the current security risk of the target system 200. Specifically, the countermeasure model storage means 104 stores vulnerability—the countermeasure model 104a and countermeasure—cost model 104b defined for each countermeasure. The vulnerability-countermeasure model 104a is a model for defining countermeasures that can be implemented for the vulnerabilities defined in the threat-vulnerability model 102b. The countermeasure-cost model 104b is a model for defining various costs that are incurred when implementing the countermeasure means for the countermeasure means defined in the vulnerability-countermeasure model 104a. In the following, when expressed as “cost”, it will occur when implementing measures that collectively refer to costs necessary for measures that do not simply refer to “costs” and side effects caused by the implementation of measures. A “constraint”. These models are, for example, XML files or HT It may be created as an ML file!
[0061] 対策案生成手段 105は、リスク分析手段 103によって算出されたリスク値が許容範 囲を超える場合に、リスクモデルおよび対策モデルを用いて分析し、セキュリティリス クを低減させるためのいくつかの対策案を生成する。なお、リスク値の許容範囲は、 予め定めておいた値を用いるだけでなぐセキュリティ管理者が設定した値を用いる ことも可能である。 [0061] Countermeasure plan generation means 105 performs analysis using a risk model and a countermeasure model when the risk value calculated by risk analysis means 103 exceeds an allowable range, and performs several measures to reduce security risk. Generate a countermeasure plan. As the risk value tolerance range, it is possible to use a value set by the security administrator, in addition to using a predetermined value.
[0062] ポリシー格納手段 106は、対象システムに対策を施すに当たって、優先すべきコス トゃ、コストの評価式を示す情報である対策順位決定方針 106aを格納 (記憶)する。 なお、対策順位決定方針 106aには、対象システムにおいて許容できるリスク値の最 大値を示すリスク許容値を含めてもよい。対策順位決定方針 106aは、セキュリティ管 理者によって予めセキュリティポリシーとして登録されているものとする。なお、対策順 位決定方式 106aは、後述のポリシー設定手段 108によってセキュリティポリシーを表 現する具体的な数値や式などに変換した上で格納してもよい。  [0062] The policy storage means 106 stores (stores) a countermeasure order determination policy 106a that is information indicating an evaluation formula of cost and cost to be prioritized when a countermeasure is applied to the target system. The countermeasure order determination policy 106a may include an allowable risk value indicating the maximum allowable risk value in the target system. It is assumed that the countermeasure order determination policy 106a is registered in advance as a security policy by the security administrator. The countermeasure order determination method 106a may be stored after being converted into specific numerical values or expressions expressing the security policy by the policy setting means 108 described later.
[0063] 対策優先順位決定手段 107は、ポリシー格納手段 106に格納されている対策順位 決定方針 106aに従って対策案を優先順位づけることによって、実施する対策を決定 する。対策優先順位決定手段 107は、優先順位に従って対策案を決定するだけで なぐ優先順位に従って対策案を並び替えて、例えば選択用画面に出力することに よってセキュリティ管理者に提示し、どの対策を実施すべきかを選択させることによつ て決定してもよい。また、対策優先順位決定手段 107は、決定した対策を実施するた めの各種制御を行う。例えば、対策優先順位決定手段 107は、対象システム 200の 対策実施手段 203に決定した対策を実施する旨の要求を送信する。  The countermeasure priority order determining means 107 determines the countermeasure to be implemented by prioritizing the countermeasure plans in accordance with the countermeasure order determining policy 106a stored in the policy storage means 106. The countermeasure priority order determination means 107 rearranges the countermeasure proposals according to the priority order just by determining the countermeasure proposals according to the priority order, and presents it to the security administrator, for example, by outputting it on the selection screen, and implements which countermeasure. You may decide by letting you choose what to do. The countermeasure priority order determination means 107 performs various controls for implementing the determined countermeasures. For example, the countermeasure priority order determination means 107 transmits a request to the countermeasure implementation means 203 of the target system 200 to implement the determined countermeasure.
[0064] ポリシー設定手段 108は、セキュリティポリシーを反映する対策順位決定方針 106a を設定する。ポリシー設定手段 108は、例えば、所定の設定用画面を用意し、入力 手段を用いてセキュリティ管理者が入力したセキュリティポリシーを表現する条件や 評価式等を対策順位決定方針 106aとしてポリシー格納手段 106に格納する。  The policy setting means 108 sets a countermeasure order determination policy 106a that reflects the security policy. For example, the policy setting unit 108 prepares a predetermined setting screen, and the policy storage unit 106 sets the condition or evaluation formula expressing the security policy input by the security administrator using the input unit as the countermeasure order determination policy 106a. Store.
[0065] なお、状態格納手段 101、リスクモデル格納手段 102、対策モデル格納手段 104、 ポリシー格納手段 106は、具体的には、記憶装置によって実現される。また、リスク分 析手段 103、対策案生成手段 105、対策優先順位決定手段 107、ポリシー設定手 段 108は、具体的には、プログラムに従って動作する CPUによって実現される。なお 、状態格納手段 101が収集手段を備える場合には、状態格納手段 101は、記憶装 置と、通信装置と、プログラムに従って動作する CPUとによって実現される。 Note that the state storage unit 101, the risk model storage unit 102, the countermeasure model storage unit 104, and the policy storage unit 106 are specifically realized by a storage device. Risk analysis means 103, countermeasure plan generation means 105, countermeasure priority order determination means 107, policy setting means Specifically, the stage 108 is realized by a CPU that operates according to a program. When the state storage unit 101 includes a collection unit, the state storage unit 101 is realized by a storage device, a communication device, and a CPU that operates according to a program.
[0066] 次に、動作について説明する。図 2は、セキュリティリスク管理システムが対象システ ム 200のセキュリティリスクに応じて対策を実施する動作の例を示す流れ図である。シ ステム管理者は、例えば、リスク管理システム 100を操作して、対象システム 200のセ キユリティリスクのチェック処理の実行を入力指示する。すると、リスク管理システム 10 0は、対象システム 200に対して現状分析及び資産分析の実行を指示する。  Next, the operation will be described. FIG. 2 is a flowchart showing an example of an operation in which the security risk management system implements countermeasures according to the security risk of the target system 200. For example, the system administrator operates the risk management system 100 and inputs an instruction to execute the security risk check process of the target system 200. Then, the risk management system 100 instructs the target system 200 to execute the current state analysis and the asset analysis.
[0067] 対象システム 200の現状分析手段 201は、対象システム 200上の脆弱性の有無を 判定し、判定結果を脆弱性情報としてリスク管理システム 100に送信する (ステップ S 11)。リスク管理システム 100は、受信した脆弱性情報を状態格納手段 101に格納す る。また、対象システム 200の資産分析手段 202は、対象システム 200上に存在する 文書ファイルの機密度を判定し、判定結果を資産情報としてリスク管理システム 100 に送信する (ステップ S 12)。リスク管理システム 100は、受信した資産情報を状態格 納手段 101に格納する。  [0067] The current state analyzing means 201 of the target system 200 determines whether there is a vulnerability on the target system 200, and transmits the determination result to the risk management system 100 as vulnerability information (step S11). The risk management system 100 stores the received vulnerability information in the state storage unit 101. Further, the asset analysis unit 202 of the target system 200 determines the confidentiality of the document file existing on the target system 200, and transmits the determination result to the risk management system 100 as asset information (step S12). The risk management system 100 stores the received asset information in the state storage means 101.
[0068] 次に、リスク管理システム 100のリスク分析手段 103は、状態格納手段 101に格納 されている情報 (脆弱性情報、資産情報)を、リスクモデル格納手段 102に格納され て!、るリスクモデルを用いて分析し、対象システム 200の現在のシステム状態におけ るリスク値を算出する (ステップ S 13)。  [0068] Next, the risk analysis unit 103 of the risk management system 100 stores the information (vulnerability information, asset information) stored in the state storage unit 101 in the risk model storage unit 102! Analysis is performed using the model, and a risk value in the current system state of the target system 200 is calculated (step S13).
[0069] 次に、リスク管理システム 100の対策案生成手段 105は、リスク分析手段 103が算 出したリスク値が許容範囲を超える力否かを判定する (ステップ S 14)。リスク値が許 容範囲を超える場合には、対策案生成手段 105は、リスクモデル格納手段 102に格 納されて 、るリスクモデルと、対策モデル格納手段 104に格納されて 、る対策モデル とを用いて分析し、セキュリティリスクを低減させるための 、くつかの対策案を生成す る (ステップ S15)。対策案生成手段 105は、例えば、実施後のリスク値を許容範囲内 に収めることができる対策手段のうち、その対策の各種コストが所定の条件に合致す るものを選定する。そして、対策案として、例えば、選定した対策手段がどのような処 理をするかを示す処理内容と、実施する際に生じるそれぞれのコストの大きさとを出 力するための XMLファイルや HTMLファイルとして生成する。 [0069] Next, the measure plan generation means 105 of the risk management system 100 determines whether or not the risk value calculated by the risk analysis means 103 exceeds the allowable range (step S14). When the risk value exceeds the allowable range, the countermeasure plan generation means 105 stores the risk model stored in the risk model storage means 102 and the countermeasure model stored in the countermeasure model storage means 104. Analyze and generate several countermeasures to reduce security risks (Step S15). The countermeasure plan generating means 105 selects, for example, a countermeasure means that can satisfy the predetermined conditions among various countermeasure means that can keep the risk value after implementation within an allowable range. Then, as a countermeasure plan, for example, the processing contents indicating what kind of processing the selected countermeasure means performs and the size of each cost generated when the countermeasure is implemented are output. Generate as XML file or HTML file to help.
[0070] 次に、リスク管理システム 100の対策優先順位決定手段 107は、対策案生成手段 1 05が生成した対策案の中から、実施する対策を決定する (ステップ S16)。対策優先 順位決定手段 107は、例えば、ポリシー格納手段 106に格納されている対策順位決 定方針 106aに従って対策案を優先順位づけ、最も優先順位の高い対策に決定して もよい。また、例えば、対策順位決定方針 106aに従って各コストの優先順位に従つ て対策案を評価し、評価結果 (各コストに応じた影響等)を提示し、セキュリティ管理 者に選択させることによって、どの対策を実施するかを決定してもよい。実施する対 策が決定した場合には、対策優先順位決定手段 107は、決定した対策案を対象シ ステム 200の対策実施手段 203に送信する。  Next, the countermeasure priority order determination means 107 of the risk management system 100 determines the countermeasure to be implemented from the countermeasure proposals generated by the countermeasure proposal generation means 105 (step S16). The countermeasure priority order determination means 107 may prioritize the countermeasure proposals according to the countermeasure priority determination policy 106a stored in the policy storage means 106, for example, and determine the countermeasure with the highest priority. In addition, for example, according to the countermeasure order decision policy 106a, the countermeasure proposal is evaluated according to the priority order of each cost, the evaluation result (the influence according to each cost, etc.) is presented, and the security administrator makes a selection. It may be decided whether to take measures. When the countermeasure to be implemented is determined, the countermeasure priority order determining means 107 transmits the determined countermeasure proposal to the countermeasure implementing means 203 of the target system 200.
[0071] そして、対象システム 200の対策実施手段 203は、受信した対策案に従って、セキ ユリティリスクを解消するための処理を実行する (ステップ S 17)。  [0071] Then, the countermeasure execution means 203 of the target system 200 executes processing for eliminating the security risk in accordance with the received countermeasure proposal (step S17).
[0072] 次に、各手段の処理の詳細について述べる。現状分析手段 201は、既に説明した ように、システムの状態を調べ、脆弱性が存在する力否かを判定する手段である。現 状分析手段 201が存在の有無を判定する脆弱性は、リスク管理システム 100のリスク モデル格納手段 102に格納されている脅威 脆弱性モデル 102bに列挙されている 脆弱性である。なお、判定する脆弱性は、リスク管理システム 100と対象システム 200 とで共通に認識されていればよぐ例えば、リスク管理システム 100が、脅威—脆弱 性モデル 102bに各脆弱性の分析方法を示す情報を含めてリスクモデル格納手段 1 02に格納しておき、分析指示を送信するタイミングや脅威—脆弱性モデル 102bが 更新されたタイミングで対象システム 200に送信してもよい。また、例えば、対象シス テム 200がネットワークアクセスをし、直接読み出してもよい。なお、現状分析手段 20 1の具体的な処理内容は、存在の有無を判定する脆弱性毎に異なる。  [0072] Next, details of the processing of each means will be described. As already described, the current state analyzing means 201 is a means for examining the state of the system and determining whether or not there is a vulnerability. The vulnerabilities for determining whether or not the current state analysis means 201 exists are the vulnerabilities listed in the threat vulnerability model 102b stored in the risk model storage means 102 of the risk management system 100. For example, the risk management system 100 indicates the analysis method for each vulnerability in the threat-vulnerability model 102b. Information may also be stored in the risk model storage means 102 and sent to the target system 200 at the timing when the analysis instruction is sent or when the threat-vulnerability model 102b is updated. Further, for example, the target system 200 may access the network and read directly. It should be noted that the specific processing contents of the current state analysis means 201 are different for each vulnerability for determining the presence or absence.
[0073] 現状分析手段 201は、例えば、「ディスク暗号ィ匕ツールがインストールされていない 」という脆弱性について判定する場合、レジストリ「HKEY丄 OCAL_MACHINE ¥SOFT WARE ¥Microsoft ¥Windows (登録商標) ¥Current Version ¥UninstallJ以下を調べ、 既存のディスク暗号化ツールがインストールされているかどうかを調べるプログラムを 用いて実現できる。また、 Microsoft Baseline Security analyzerのような、既存の脆弱 性検査ツールを起動し、その出力から脆弱性の有無を判定してもよい。 [0073] The current state analysis means 201, for example, when determining the vulnerability “disk encryption tool is not installed”, the registry “HKEY 丄 OCAL_MACHINE \ SOFT WARE \ Microsoft \ Windows (registered trademark) \ Current Version It can be realized by using a program that checks if \ UninstallJ is installed and checks whether an existing disk encryption tool is installed, and existing vulnerabilities such as Microsoft Baseline Security analyzer. It may be possible to activate a sex inspection tool and determine whether there is a vulnerability from the output.
[0074] 判定された脆弱性の有無は、脆弱性情報として、リスク管理システム 100にお 、て、 収集された場所 (対象システム 200を識別するための情報)と合わせて、状態格納手 段 101に格納される。図 3は、状態格納手段 101に格納される脆弱性情報のデータ 構造の例を示す説明図である。図 3では、例えば、対象システムの 1つであるクライァ ント PC1には、「ノート PCである」という脆弱性と、「ディスク暗号ィ匕ツール未導入」とい う脆弱性と、「ファイル暗号ィ匕ツール未導入」と ヽぅ脆弱性とが存在して ヽることが示さ れている。また、例えば、別の対象システムであるクライアント PC2には、「ノート PCで ある」という脆弱性と、「ディスク暗号ィ匕ツールのパスワードが空」という脆弱性と、「ファ ィル暗号ィ匕ツール未導入」と ヽぅ脆弱性とが存在して ヽることが示されて!/ヽる。また、 例えば、別の対象システムであるサーバ SERVER1には、「ノート PCである」という脆 弱性は存在しないが、他の脆弱性はクライアント PC1と同様に存在していることが示 されている。図 3に示す例から、クライアント PC1は、ノート型パーソナルコンピュータ( 以下、ノート PC)であり、かつ、ディスク暗号化ツールもファイル暗号化ツールもインス トールされていないことがわかる。また、クライアント PC2は、ノート PCであり、ディスク 暗号化ツールがインストールされて 、るが、そのパスワードが設定されて ヽな 、ことが わかる。また、サーバ SERVER1は、ノート PCではなぐディスク暗号化ツールもファ ィル暗号化ツールもインストールされて 、な 、ことがわ力る。  [0074] The presence / absence of the determined vulnerability is combined with the location (information for identifying the target system 200) collected by the risk management system 100 as vulnerability information, and the state storage means 101 Stored in FIG. 3 is an explanatory diagram showing an example of the data structure of vulnerability information stored in the state storage means 101. In FIG. 3, for example, client PC1, which is one of the target systems, has a vulnerability of “notebook PC”, a vulnerability of “disk encryption tool not installed”, and “file encryption key”. “Tools not yet implemented” and “vulnerabilities” are shown to exist. In addition, for example, the client PC2, which is another target system, has a vulnerability of “notebook PC”, a vulnerability of “disk encryption tool password is empty”, and a “file encryption tool”. It has been shown that there are “unintroduced” and “vulnerabilities”! Also, for example, the server SERVER1, which is another target system, does not have the vulnerability of “notebook PC”, but other vulnerabilities exist as well as the client PC 1. . From the example shown in Fig. 3, it can be seen that the client PC 1 is a notebook personal computer (hereinafter referred to as a notebook PC), and neither a disk encryption tool nor a file encryption tool is installed. In addition, it can be seen that the client PC 2 is a notebook PC, and the disk encryption tool is installed, but the password is set. Server SERVER1 also has a disk encryption tool and a file encryption tool that are not installed in a notebook PC.
[0075] 資産分析手段 101は、既に説明したように、対象システムの状態を調べ、その資産 のセキュリティレベルを判定する手段である。ここで、セキュリティレベルとは、機密性 、完全性、可用性に関して要求される指標を表す。例えば、機密性に関するセキユリ ティレベル (機密レベルと呼ぶ)は、対象システム内に存在するファイルの機密性をど の程度確保しなくてはならないかを表す指標である。  As described above, the asset analysis unit 101 is a unit that examines the state of the target system and determines the security level of the asset. Here, the security level represents an index required for confidentiality, integrity, and availability. For example, the security level related to confidentiality (referred to as the confidentiality level) is an index that represents the degree to which the confidentiality of files in the target system must be secured.
[0076] ここで、機密レベルとは、予め組織内の情報セキュリティポリシーによって定められ た文書の機密度を表す指標であり、例えば、関係者以外への開示を制限する「関係 者外秘」、社外への開示を制限する「社外秘」、社内および協力会社以外への開示 を制限する「取扱注意」といった指標である。それぞれの機密レベルに対して、その 機密レベルの資産価値、すなわち、情報が漏洩した場合の平均被害額を設定しても よい。そのようにすれば、最終的なリスク値を被害額という具体的な指標で算出するこ とが可能になる。図 4は、文書ファイルの機密レベルとその価値の例を示す説明図で ある。図 4に示す例では、機密レベルとして、 L4〜L0まで設定されていることが示さ れている。また、図 4に示す例では、機密レベル LI, L2, L3, L4の文書ファイルの 資産価値 (平均被害額)がそれぞれ 10, 100, 100, 1000 [千円]であることが示さ れている。 Here, the confidentiality level is an index that represents the confidentiality of the document that is determined in advance by the information security policy in the organization. For example, “confidentiality of related parties” that restricts disclosure to those other than related parties, These are indicators such as “confidentiality” that restricts disclosure outside the company and “careful handling” that restricts disclosure outside the company and partner companies. For each confidential level, the asset value of the confidential level, that is, the average amount of damage when information is leaked, is set. Good. By doing so, it is possible to calculate the final risk value with a specific index called damage amount. Fig. 4 is an explanatory diagram showing an example of the confidential level of document files and their value. In the example shown in FIG. 4, it is shown that L4 to L0 are set as the security level. In addition, the example shown in Fig. 4 shows that the asset values (average damage amount) of document files with confidential levels LI, L2, L3, and L4 are 10, 100, 100, and 1000 [1,000 yen], respectively. .
[0077] 機密性に関する資産分析手段 202は、ファイルの内容を解析して、その機密レべ ルを返すプログラムを用いて実現できる。このような手段として、例えば、ファイル内の 文字列と文字列の位置などの構造情報とを取り出し、予め決められた辞書に従って 文字列を判定することによって得た個人情報や機密情報の量や、構造情報を判定 することによって得た重要度に基づいてファイルの機密度や重要度を判定するような 公知の技術を使用してファイルの解析を行い、その結果を利用してもよい。なお、上 記に示したファイル解析方法は、例えば、文献「細見他、 "文書解析と設定検証に基 づく情報漏洩脅威分析方式 (2)文書内容解析と構造解析を用いた機密度判定"、 第 67回情報処理学会全国大会、 3E- 7Jに記載されている。また、企業内のシステ ムを対象とする場合、単にオフィスら 、文章かどうかに基づ ヽて機密度を判定して もよい。なぜなら、企業内のクライアント PCに保存されているファイルは、企業内秘密 情報である場合が多いためである。なお、この場合「関係者外秘」か「社外秘」かの判 定はできない。  The asset analysis means 202 regarding confidentiality can be realized by using a program that analyzes the contents of a file and returns the confidential level. As such means, for example, the amount of personal information and confidential information obtained by taking out the character string in the file and the structure information such as the position of the character string, and determining the character string according to a predetermined dictionary, The file may be analyzed using a known technique such as determining the sensitivity and importance of the file based on the importance obtained by determining the structure information, and the result may be used. The file analysis method shown above is, for example, the document “Hosomi et al.,“ Information leakage threat analysis method based on document analysis and setting verification (2) Sensitivity determination using document content analysis and structure analysis ”, It is described in the 67th Annual Meeting of the Information Processing Society of Japan, 3E-7J.In addition, when targeting a system in a company, even if the office is simply judging whether the confidentiality is based on text or not. Good, because the files stored on the client PCs in the company are often confidential information in the company.In this case, it is not possible to determine whether the information is confidential or confidential. .
[0078] 判定された機密レベルは、資産情報として、収集された場所 (対象システム 200を 識別するための情報)と合わせて、状態格納手段 101に格納される。図 5は、状態格 納手段 101に格納される資産情報のデータ構造の例を示す説明図である。なお、図 5に示す例では、資産情報として、各対象システムが保持している機密レベル毎のフ アイル数とともに、図 4に示す機密レベルの資産価値を掛け合わせたシステム全体の 資産価値も合わせて格納している。図 5に示す例では、例えば、クライアント PC1に は、機密レベル L1〜L4のファイルがーつも保持されておらず、システム全体の資産 価値が 0 [千円]であることが示されている。また、例えば、サーバ SERVER1には、 機密レベル L1のファイルが 100、機密レベル L2のファイルが 80、機密レベル L3の ファイルが 3、機密レベル L4のファイルが 1保持され、システム全体の資産価値が 10 300 [千円]であることが示されて!/、る。 The determined confidentiality level is stored in the state storage unit 101 as asset information together with the collected location (information for identifying the target system 200). FIG. 5 is an explanatory diagram showing an example of the data structure of the asset information stored in the state storage means 101. In the example shown in Fig. 5, as asset information, the asset value of the entire system multiplied by the asset value of the confidential level shown in Fig. 4 is combined with the number of files for each confidential level held by each target system. Stored. In the example shown in FIG. 5, for example, the client PC 1 does not hold any files with the confidentiality levels L1 to L4, and the asset value of the entire system is 0 [thousand yen]. Also, for example, server SERVER1 has 100 files with security level L1, 80 files with security level L2, and 80 files with security level L3. It is shown that 3 files and 1 confidential level L4 file are retained, and the asset value of the entire system is 10 300 [thousand yen]!
[0079] リスク分析手段 103は、既に説明したように、対象システム 200の現在のシステム状 態におけるリスク値を算出する手段である。具体的には、対象システム 200から収集 した脆弱性情報、資産情報を、リスクモデル格納手段 102に予め登録されているリス クモデルを用いて分析することによって、対象システム 200における各脅威に対する 現在のリスク値を算出する。  The risk analysis means 103 is a means for calculating a risk value in the current system state of the target system 200 as already described. Specifically, by analyzing the vulnerability information and asset information collected from the target system 200 using the risk model registered in the risk model storage means 102, the current risk for each threat in the target system 200 is analyzed. Calculate the value.
[0080] まず、リスクモデル格納手段 102に格納されるリスクモデルについて説明する。脅威 モデル 102aは、セキュリティ上の脅威を列挙し、それら脅威の発生頻度を示す情報 である。脅威モデル 102aは、統計的なデータなどを元にして予め作成される。図 6は 、脅威モデル 102aの例を示す説明図である。図 6に示す例では、「PCの紛失'盗難 による情報漏洩 (脅威 tl)」と、「マルウェアによる情報漏洩 (脅威 t2)」、 「メール誤送 信による情報漏洩 (脅威 t3)」という情報漏洩についての 3つの脅威 (tl〜t3)が列挙 され、それぞれの脅威の発生頻度として、 0. 1、0. 5、0. 1 [回 Z年]が設定されてい ることが示されている。なお、発生頻度は必ずしも [回 Z年]という定量的な単位で設 定する必要はなぐ大 ·中'小の 3段階のような値で設定するようにしてもよい。  First, the risk model stored in the risk model storage means 102 will be described. The threat model 102a is information that enumerates security threats and indicates the frequency of occurrence of those threats. The threat model 102a is created in advance based on statistical data or the like. FIG. 6 is an explanatory diagram showing an example of the threat model 102a. In the example shown in Fig. 6, the information leakage of “information leakage due to PC loss / theft (threat tl)”, “information leakage due to malware (threat t2)”, and “information leakage due to incorrect email transmission (threat t3)” 3 threats (tl to t3) are listed, and it is shown that 0.1, 0.5, and 0.1 [times Z years] are set as the frequency of occurrence of each threat. The frequency of occurrence may be set to a value such as three levels of large, medium, and small, which need not be set in a quantitative unit of [times Z years].
[0081] また、脅威 脆弱性モデル 102bは、脅威モデル 102aで定義された脅威と、脆弱 性との顕在化に係る関係性を示す情報である。脅威と脆弱性の関係性は、 AND (論 理積)または OR (論理和)の関係またはその組み合わせによって表現することができ る。 ANDは、入力される脆弱性が全て存在する場合のみ脅威が顕在化することを表 す。 ORは、入力される脆弱性のいずれかが存在すれば、脅威が顕在化することを表 す。また、脅威—脆弱性モデル 102bには、ある脆弱性が存在する状態でどの程度 脅威が顕在化するかを示す数値 (最大脆弱度)と、ある脆弱性が存在しない状態でど の程度脅威が顕在化するかを示す数値 (最小脆弱度)とを含んでいてもよい。なお、 本実施例では、最大脆弱度と最小脆弱度とは 0から 1までの値をとる。  [0081] The threat vulnerability model 102b is information indicating a relationship related to the manifestation of the threat defined by the threat model 102a and the vulnerability. The relationship between threats and vulnerabilities can be expressed by an AND (logical product) or OR (logical sum) relationship or a combination thereof. AND indicates that the threat becomes apparent only when all the input vulnerabilities exist. OR indicates that the threat becomes apparent if any of the input vulnerabilities exist. The threat-vulnerability model 102b also includes a numerical value (maximum vulnerability level) that indicates how much a threat is manifested in the presence of a certain vulnerability, and how much threat is present in the absence of a certain vulnerability. It may also contain a numerical value (minimum vulnerability) that indicates whether it will manifest. In this embodiment, the maximum vulnerability level and the minimum vulnerability level take values from 0 to 1.
[0082] ここで、脆弱性 viが存在する場合に xi= 1、存在しない場合に xi=0となる変数 xiを 定義し、 viの最大脆弱度を ai、最小脆弱度を biとすると、ある 2つの脆弱性 (vl, v2) の有無によるある脅威の顕在化に係る関係性 (脆弱性の大きさ)は、 ANDと ORとで 、それぞれ以下の式(1)で表すことができる。 [0082] Here, we define a variable xi that has xi = 1 if the vulnerability vi exists and xi = 0 if it does not exist, and if the maximum vulnerability of vi is ai and the minimum vulnerability is bi The relationship (magnitude of vulnerability) related to the manifestation of a threat based on the presence or absence of two vulnerabilities (vl, v2) is expressed as AND and OR. These can be represented by the following formula (1).
[0083] AND: (alxl+bl(l-xl))(a2x2+b2(l-x2))  [0083] AND: (alxl + bl (l-xl)) (a2x2 + b2 (l-x2))
OR: l-(l-(alxl+bl(l-xl)))(l-(a2x2+b2(l-x2)))- · ·式(1)  OR: l- (l- (alxl + bl (l-xl))) (l- (a2x2 + b2 (l-x2)))-· · · Equation (1)
[0084] なお、これらの情報は、脆弱性に関する専門知識を元にして予め作成される。図 7 は、脅威—脆弱性モデル 102bの例を示す説明図である。図 7に示す例では、「PC の紛失 ·盗難による情報漏洩 (脅威 tl)」の顕在化に対し、その要因となりうる 4つの脆 弱性 (vl〜v4)の関係性を示している。なお、図 7において、各脆弱性から引かれた 矢印の上に示す数値はその脆弱性の最大脆弱度を示し、矢印の下に示す数値はそ の脆弱性の最小脆弱度を示して 、る。  It should be noted that these pieces of information are created in advance based on expertise related to vulnerability. FIG. 7 is an explanatory diagram showing an example of the threat-vulnerability model 102b. The example shown in Fig. 7 shows the relationship between the four vulnerabilities (vl to v4) that can be the cause of the emergence of “information leakage due to PC loss / theft (threat tl)”. In Figure 7, the numerical value above the arrow drawn from each vulnerability indicates the maximum vulnerability level of the vulnerability, and the numerical value below the arrow indicates the minimum vulnerability level of the vulnerability. .
[0085] 図 7に示す脅威 脆弱性モデル 102bは、以下に示す脆弱性に関する専門知識を 元にして記述された例である。「ノート PCでない場合は、盗難 ·紛失は生じない。(知 識 1)」、「ノート PCが紛失'盗難に遭っても、ディスク暗号ィ匕ツール力 sインストールされ ていれば、 PC内の全てのファイルが暗号化されているので漏洩は生じない。(知識 2 )」、「ただし、ディスク暗号化ツールのパスワードが設定されていなければ、暗号化さ れていたとしても盗難'紛失時に漏洩の可能性が生じる。ただし、ユーザ名を推定し なくてはならないので、漏洩の可能性はたかだか 10%程度である。(知識 3)」、「ユー ザディレクトリ内のファイルを自動的に暗号ィ匕するファイル暗号ィ匕ツールがインスト一 ルされていれば、ノート PCが紛失'盗難に遭っても、重要なファイルは暗号ィ匕されて いるので漏洩は生じにくい。ただし、重要なファイルがユーザディレクトリ外に誤って 保存されている場合もありうるので、完全に防止できるのではなぐ 5%程度の漏洩の 可能性がある。(知識 4)」。  [0085] The threat vulnerability model 102b shown in FIG. 7 is an example described based on the following expertise on vulnerabilities. “If it is not a laptop, it will not be stolen or lost. (Knowledge 1)”, “Even if a laptop is lost or stolen, the disk encryption tool power s Will not leak because the file is encrypted. (Knowledge 2) ”,“ If the password of the disk encryption tool is not set, it will be stolen even if it is encrypted. However, since the user name must be estimated, the possibility of leakage is at most 10%. (Knowledge 3) ”,“ Files in the user directory are automatically encrypted. If a file encryption tool is installed, even if a laptop is lost or stolen, important files are encrypted and are not easily leaked. Because when there may be stored incorrectly outside Li, as it can completely prevent some potential leakage about 5% Nag. (Knowledge 4) ".
[0086] すなわち、図 7に示す例では、知識 2,知識 3より、「ディスク暗号ィ匕ツール未導入( 脆弱性 v2)」と「ディスク暗号ィ匕ツールのパスワードが空 (脆弱性 v3)」のどちらかが存 在すると脅威 tlは顕在化するので、脆弱性 v2と脆弱性 v3は ORゲートで結合される 。また、知識 1,知識 2,知識 4より、「ノート PCである (脆弱性 vl)」と脆弱性 v2,脆弱 性 v3の両方と、「ファイル暗号ィ匕ツール未導入 (脆弱性 v4)」の 、ずれかが存在しな ければ、脅威 tlは顕在化しないので、それらは ANDゲートで結合される。また、知識 4より、脆弱性 v4が存在しない状態でも、 5%の漏洩の可能性があるので、脆弱性 v4 の最小脆弱度 b4は 0. 05となっている。また、知識 3より、脆弱性 v3が存在する状態 でも 10%の漏洩の可能性しかないので、脆弱性 v3の最小脆弱度 a3は 0. 1となって いる。 In other words, in the example shown in FIG. 7, from knowledge 2 and knowledge 3, “disk encryption tool not installed (vulnerability v2)” and “disk encryption tool password is empty (vulnerability v3)” If either of them exists, the threat tl becomes apparent, and vulnerabilities v2 and v3 are combined with an OR gate. In addition, from Knowledge 1, Knowledge 2, Knowledge 4, both "Notebook PC (Vulnerability vl)", Vulnerability v2, Vulnerability v3, and "File encryption tool not yet introduced (Vulnerability v4)" If there is no gap, the threat tl will not manifest, so they are combined with an AND gate. Also, from Knowledge 4, there is a possibility of 5% leakage even in the absence of vulnerability v4. The minimum vulnerability b4 is 0.05. Also, from Knowledge 3, there is only a 10% possibility of leakage even in the presence of vulnerability v3, so the minimum vulnerability a3 of vulnerability v3 is 0.1.
[0087] このようにして、脆弱性に関する専門知識を用いて、図 7に示すような脅威-脆弱 性モデル 102bを定義することができる。なお、脅威—脆弱性モデル 102bとして、例 えば、図 8に示すような XML形式データとして格納してもよいし、または、論理ゲート を計算式に適用し、以下の式 (2)に示すような脆弱性の大きさ Sを求める関数として 格糸内してちょい。  [0087] In this way, the threat-vulnerability model 102b as shown in Fig. 7 can be defined using the expertise related to vulnerability. For example, the threat-vulnerability model 102b may be stored as XML format data as shown in Fig. 8, or a logic gate may be applied to the calculation formula, as shown in the following formula (2). As a function to find the size of the vulnerable vulnerability S
[0088] S(tl)=xl X (1-(1-χ2)(1-0.1 X x3》 X (χ4+0.05(1-χ4)) · · ·式(2)  [0088] S (tl) = xl X (1- (1-χ2) (1-0.1 X x3) X (χ4 + 0.05 (1-χ4)) · · · · Equation (2)
[0089] 図 9に、式(2)で示した関数のとる値を列挙して示す。図 9において、 S1で示される 解(S (tl) =0)は、ノート PCでないので脅威 tlが全く顕在化しないことを示している 。また、 S2で示される解(S (tl) =0)は、ディスク暗号化ツールがインストールされ、 かつ、パスワードが設定されているため、脅威 tlが全く顕在化しないことを示している 。また、 S3で示される解(S (tl) =0. 005)は、ディスク暗号化ツールとファイル暗号 化ツールの両方がインストールされて!/、るが、ディスク暗号化ツールのパスワードが 設定されていないため、わずかながら漏洩の可能性 (0. 5%)があることを示している 。また、 S4で示される解(S (tl) =0. 1)は、ディスク暗号化ツールのみインストールさ れているが、パスワードが設定されていないため、 10%の漏洩可能性があることを示 している。 S5で示される解(S (tl) =0. 05)は、ファイル暗号化ツールのみインスト一 ルされているため、少し漏洩の可能性(5%)があることを示している。 S6で示される 解(S (tl) = 1)は、ディスク暗号化ツールもファイル暗号化ツールもインストールされ て ヽな 、ので、脅威 tlが完全に顕在化されることを示して 、る。 FIG. 9 shows a list of values taken by the function shown in equation (2). In FIG. 9, the solution indicated by S1 (S (tl) = 0) indicates that the threat tl does not manifest at all because it is not a notebook PC. The solution indicated by S2 (S (tl) = 0) indicates that the threat tl does not appear at all because the disk encryption tool is installed and the password is set. In addition, the solution shown in S3 (S (tl) = 0.005) has both the disk encryption tool and the file encryption tool installed! /, But the disk encryption tool password is not set. This indicates that there is a slight possibility of leakage (0.5%). The solution indicated by S4 (S (tl) = 0.1) indicates that there is a possibility of leakage of 10% because only the disk encryption tool is installed but no password is set. is doing. The solution shown in S5 (S (tl) = 0.05) indicates that there is a possibility of leakage (5%) because only the file encryption tool is installed. The solution shown in S6 (S (tl) = 1) indicates that both the disk encryption tool and the file encryption tool should be installed, so that the threat tl is fully manifested.
[0090] また、脅威 資産モデル 102cは、脅威モデル 102aで定義される脅威と資産の影 響度に係る関係性を示す情報である。具体的には、ある脅威が顕在化した場合に、 どの資産がどの程度影響を受けるかを示す情報である。図 10は、脅威 資産モデ ル 102cの例を示す説明図である。図 10では、例えば、クライアント PC1で脅威 tl (P Cの紛失 '盗難による情報漏洩)が顕在化した場合に、クライアント PC1上の資産が 1 00%影響を受けること、および、他の資産には影響を与えないことが示されている。 また、例えば、クライアント PCIで脅威 t3 (メール誤送信による情報漏洩)が顕在化し た場合に、クライアント PC1上の資産が 10%影響をうけること、および、サーバ SERV ER1上の資産にも 10%影響を与えることが示されている。このような設定は、クライア ント PC1からアクセス可能なサーバ SERVER1上のファイルをユーザが誤って送信 する力もしれないためである。また、脅威 tlとは異なり、脅威 t3の場合、全てのフアイ ルが影響を受けるのではなぐ誤って送信されたファイルのみが影響をうけるため、影 響度を示す数値は 0. 1と小さく設定されている。 [0090] The threat asset model 102c is information indicating the relationship between the threat defined in the threat model 102a and the impact level of the asset. Specifically, it is information indicating how much assets are affected when a certain threat becomes apparent. FIG. 10 is an explanatory diagram showing an example of the threat asset model 102c. In Figure 10, for example, when a threat tl (information loss due to PC loss 'theft') occurs on the client PC 1, the assets on the client PC 1 are affected by 100%, and other assets are affected. It has been shown not to give. In addition, for example, when threat t3 (information leakage due to erroneous email transmission) becomes apparent in client PCI, assets on client PC1 are affected by 10%, and assets on server SERV ER1 are also affected by 10%. Has been shown to give. This is because the user cannot accidentally send a file on the server SERVER1 that can be accessed from the client PC1. Also, unlike threat tl, threat t3 is affected only by files that are sent in error rather than all files being affected, so the numerical value indicating the impact is set to a small value of 0.1. ing.
[0091] 次に、上記で説明したリスクモデルを用いて、リスク分析手段 103が行うリスク分析 について説明する。図 11は、リスク分析手段 103が行うリスク分析処理 (リスク値の算 出処理)の例を示す流れ図である。図 11に示すように、リスク分析手段 103は、まず、 状態格納手段 101に格納されている対象システムの脆弱性情報を、脅威 脆弱性 モデル 102bに当てはめることによって、対象システムの各脅威に対する現在の脆弱 性の大きさを求める (ステップ S101)。リスク分析手段 103は、例えば、脆弱性情報で 示される各脆弱性の有無 (xi=0, 1)を脅威—脆弱性モデル 102bから導き出させる 関数に代入することによって脆弱性の大きさ S (t)を算出する。例えば、クライアント P C2から、図 3に示すような脆弱性情報が収集されたとする。また、例えば、脅威—脆 弱性モデル 102bとして、図 7に示す関係性から導出される式(2)が登録されていると する。このような場合、クライアント PC2における脅威 tlに対する脆弱性の大きさ S (P C2tl)は、現在のクライアント PC2における各脆弱性の有無(xl = l, x2 = 0, x3 = 1, x4= l)を、式(2)に代入することによって、 0. 1であると求まる。  [0091] Next, risk analysis performed by the risk analysis means 103 using the risk model described above will be described. FIG. 11 is a flowchart showing an example of risk analysis processing (risk value calculation processing) performed by the risk analysis means 103. As shown in FIG. 11, the risk analysis means 103 first applies the vulnerability information of the target system stored in the state storage means 101 to the threat vulnerability model 102b, thereby making it possible to Find the size of the vulnerability (step S101). The risk analysis means 103, for example, substitutes the presence / absence (xi = 0, 1) of each vulnerability indicated in the vulnerability information into a function that is derived from the threat-vulnerability model 102b, thereby calculating the size of the vulnerability S (t ) Is calculated. For example, assume that vulnerability information as shown in Figure 3 is collected from client PC2. Further, for example, it is assumed that Expression (2) derived from the relationship shown in FIG. 7 is registered as the threat-vulnerability model 102b. In such a case, the vulnerability size S (P C2tl) for threat tl in client PC2 is the presence or absence of each vulnerability in current client PC2 (xl = l, x2 = 0, x3 = 1, x4 = l) By substituting into equation (2), it is found to be 0.1.
[0092] 次に、リスク分析手段 103は、状態格納手段 101に格納されている資産情報を、脅 威—資産モデル 102cに当てはめることによって、各脅威の顕在化によって影響をう ける資産価値を算出する (ステップ S 102)。例えば、リスク分析手段 103は、脅威— 資産モデル 102cから、対象とする脅威毎に、その脅威の顕在化によって影響をうけ る資産価値を算出する計算式を求めておく。例えば、クライアント PC1上の資産価値 を pl、クライアント PC2上の資産価値を p2、サーバ SERVER1上の資産価値を p3と すると、図 10に示す脅威—資産モデル 102cの例に基づぐクライアント PC1上の脅 威 tl、 t2、 t3の顕在化によって影響をうける資産価値 assは、それぞれ以下の式(3) で示される。 [0092] Next, the risk analysis unit 103 calculates the asset value affected by the manifestation of each threat by applying the asset information stored in the state storage unit 101 to the threat-asset model 102c. (Step S102). For example, the risk analysis means 103 obtains, from the threat-asset model 102c, a calculation formula for calculating the asset value affected by the manifestation of each threat for each target threat. For example, if the asset value on the client PC1 is pl, the asset value on the client PC2 is p2, and the asset value on the server SERVER1 is p3, the client PC1 based on the threat-asset model 102c example shown in Figure 10 The asset value ass affected by the manifestation of threats tl, t2, and t3 is expressed by the following equation (3) Indicated by
[0093] ass(PCltl) = pi  [0093] ass (PCltl) = pi
ass(PClt2) = 0.5pl + 0.5p3  ass (PClt2) = 0.5pl + 0.5p3
ass(PClt3) = O.lpl + 0.1ρ3 · · '式(3)  ass (PClt3) = O.lpl + 0.1ρ3 · · 'Expression (3)
[0094] ここで、各対象システム上の資産価値 pi, p2, p3は、状態格納手段 101に格納さ れている資産情報に基づき、例えば、図 5に示す例では、 pl =0, p2 = 2400, p3 = 10300 [千円]と導出することができるので、これらを式(3)に代入することによって、 各対象システム上の各脅威の顕在化によって影響をうける資産価値 assを算出するこ とがでさる。  Here, the asset values pi, p2, and p3 on each target system are based on the asset information stored in the state storage means 101. For example, in the example shown in FIG. 5, pl = 0, p2 = 2400, p3 = 10300 [thousand yen], and by substituting these into equation (3), the asset value ass affected by the manifestation of each threat on each target system can be calculated. Togashi.
[0095] 最後に、リスク分析手段 103は、脅威モデル 102aから各脅威の発現率 (発生頻度) fを参照し (ステップ S103)、各脅威に対し、影響をうける資産価値 assと発生頻度 fと 脆弱性の大きさ Sとを掛け合わせることによって、その脅威に対するリスク値 Riskを算 出する(ステップ S104)。例えば、クライアント PC2上の脅威 tlに対するリスク値 Risk (PC2tl)は、以下の式 (4)によって、 24 [千円]であると求められる。  [0095] Finally, the risk analysis means 103 refers to the threat occurrence rate (occurrence frequency) f from the threat model 102a (step S103), and affects the asset value ass and the occurrence frequency f affected by each threat. By multiplying by the vulnerability size S, the risk value Risk for the threat is calculated (step S104). For example, the risk value Risk (PC2tl) for threat tl on client PC2 is calculated to be 24 [thousand yen] according to the following equation (4).
[0096] Risk(PC2tl) = ass(PC2tl) X Ktl) X S(tl)  [0096] Risk (PC2tl) = ass (PC2tl) X Ktl) X S (tl)
= 2400 X 0.1 X 0.1…式(4)  = 2400 X 0.1 X 0.1 ... Formula (4)
[0097] なお、求めたリスク値が所定の許容範囲(リスク許容値)を超える場合には、対策案 生成手段 105によって、対策案が生成されることになる。  Note that, when the obtained risk value exceeds a predetermined allowable range (risk allowable value), a countermeasure plan generation unit 105 generates a countermeasure plan.
[0098] 対策案生成手段 105は、既に説明したように、リスク値が許容範囲を超える場合に 、リスクモデル格納手段 102に格納されて 、るリスクモデルと対策モデル格納手段 10 4に格納されて 、る対策モデルとを用いてリスク値を分析し、リスク値を低減させるた めのいくつかの対策案を生成する手段である。  [0098] As already described, the countermeasure proposal generation means 105 is stored in the risk model storage means 102 and stored in the risk model and countermeasure model storage means 104 when the risk value exceeds the allowable range. This is a means of analyzing the risk value using a countermeasure model and generating several countermeasure plans for reducing the risk value.
[0099] まず、対策モデル格納手段 104に格納される対策モデルにっ 、て説明する。脆弱 性-対策モデル 104aは、脅威 脆弱性モデル 102bで定義される脆弱性に対して 、どのような対策手段があるかを示す情報である。図 12は、脆弱性—対策モデル 10 4aの例を示す説明図である。脆弱性—対策モデル 104aは、脅威—脆弱性モデル 1 02bと同様に、脆弱性とその対策手段に関する知識を元に予め作成される。なお、 1 つの脆弱性に対して、複数の対策手段を関連づけてもよい。図 12に示す例では、例 えば、脆弱性 v3に対する対策手段として、「空パスワードであれば変更するように警 告する (対策 c3)」と、「空パスワードであれば強制的にパスワードを割り振る (対策 c4 )」とが関連づけられている。なお、脆弱性に対して対策手段が一つも存在しない場 合もありうる。 First, the countermeasure model stored in the countermeasure model storage means 104 will be described. The vulnerability-countermeasure model 104a is information indicating what countermeasure means is available for the vulnerability defined in the threat vulnerability model 102b. FIG. 12 is an explanatory diagram showing an example of the vulnerability-countermeasure model 104a. The vulnerability-countermeasure model 104a is created in advance based on the knowledge about the vulnerability and countermeasures thereof, as in the case of the threat-vulnerability model 102b. Multiple countermeasures may be associated with one vulnerability. In the example shown in Figure 12, an example For example, as a countermeasure against vulnerability v3, “Warn to change if empty password (Countermeasure c3)” is associated with “Forcibly assign password if empty password (Countermeasure c4)”. It has been. There may be no countermeasures against vulnerabilities.
[0100] また、対策—コストモデル 104bは、脆弱性—対策モデル 104aで定義される対策 手段毎に、その対策手段を実施する際に生じる各種コストを示す情報である。なお、 既に説明したように、コストとは、単に対策に必要な費用だけでなぐ対策を実施する ことによって生じる副作用などを総称した「制約」を意味する。本実施例では、「機器 コスト」、「可用性コスト」、「展開コスト」の 3つのコストによる観点で、対策手段を定義 づける。  [0100] Further, the countermeasure-cost model 104b is information indicating various costs generated when implementing the countermeasure means for each countermeasure means defined in the vulnerability-countermeasure model 104a. As already explained, the cost means a “constraint” that collectively refers to the side effects caused by implementing measures that are not just the costs necessary for the measures. In this example, countermeasures are defined in terms of three costs: “equipment cost”, “availability cost”, and “deployment cost”.
[0101] 「機器コスト」とは、その対策を導入することによって継続的に生じる費用を示す指 標をいう。セキュリティのために際限なくお金をかけることはできないので、機器コスト は大きな制約条件となる。  [0101] “Equipment cost” refers to an indicator of the cost that is continuously incurred by introducing the measure. Equipment costs are a major constraint because you cannot spend unlimited money on security.
[0102] また、「可用性コスト」とは、その対策を導入することによって生じる可用性 (利便性) の低下を示す指標をいう。例えば、ノート PCの使用を禁止すると、外出先での仕事 に支障をきたすなど、可用性を大きく低下させることになる。情報漏洩への対策は可 用性を損なう場合が多いので、対策立案時には重要な制約となる。  [0102] "Availability cost" refers to an index indicating a decrease in availability (convenience) caused by introducing the countermeasure. For example, banning the use of notebook PCs can greatly reduce availability, such as disrupting work on the go. Since countermeasures against information leakage often impair the availability, it becomes an important constraint when planning countermeasures.
[0103] また、「展開コスト」とは、その対策を実施するために要する時間を示す指標をいう。  [0103] Further, the "deployment cost" refers to an index indicating the time required to implement the countermeasure.
例えば、空ノ スワードであれば変更するように警告したとしても、実際にその指示が ユーザに行き渡って実施されるまでにかなり時間がかかる。ウィルス対策のように緊 急の対策が必要な場合、展開コストが大きい対策は役に立たないので、やはり対策 立案時の制約となりうる。  For example, even if an empty password is warned to change, it will take a considerable amount of time before the instruction is actually distributed to the user. When urgent countermeasures are required, such as virus countermeasures, countermeasures with a high deployment cost are not useful, and may still be a constraint when planning countermeasures.
[0104] 対策—コストモデル 104bは、具体的には、それぞれの対策に機器コスト、可用性コ スト、展開コストを対応付けた情報である(図 13参照)。図 13は、対策—コストモデル 104bの例を示す説明図である。図 13では、図 12に示す脆弱性—対策モデル 104a で定義された各対策について、それぞれの対策を実施する際に生じるコストを示して いる。なお、コストが大きいほど、その制約が強いことを表す。例えば、「ノート PCの持 ち出しを禁止する」という対策 clは、管理的対策であるため、機器コストは力からなら いものの、可用性への影響が大きぐ十分に浸透して実施されるまでの時間がかかる ので、展開コストも大きく設定されている (機器コスト 0,可用性コスト 100,展開コスト 1 00)。一方、「ディスク暗号化ツールを導入する」という対策 c2は、ツールのライセンス 契約を結ぶ必要があるため機器コストがかかるものの、可用性への影響は少なく設定 されている (機器コスト 80,可用性コスト 10,展開コスト 80)。 Countermeasure—Cost model 104b is information in which equipment cost, availability cost, and deployment cost are associated with each countermeasure (see FIG. 13). FIG. 13 is an explanatory diagram showing an example of the countermeasure-cost model 104b. Figure 13 shows the costs incurred for implementing each countermeasure for each countermeasure defined in the vulnerability-countermeasure model 104a shown in Figure 12. In addition, it represents that the restrictions are so strong that cost is large. For example, the countermeasure cl “prohibiting taking out notebook PCs” is an administrative measure, so the equipment cost must be reduced. However, since the impact on availability is large and it takes time to be implemented and implemented, the deployment cost is also set high (equipment cost 0, availability cost 100, deployment cost 100). On the other hand, the measure c2, “Installing a disk encryption tool,” requires equipment costs because it requires a license agreement for the tool, but has little impact on availability (equipment cost 80, availability cost 10 Deployment cost 80).
[0105] なお、図 13に示す例では、それぞれのコストの単位は無次元量であるとしているが[0105] In the example shown in Fig. 13, each cost unit is assumed to be a dimensionless quantity.
、機器コストはリスク値と同様に [金額 Z年]の単位で表すようにしてもよい。そのように すれば、リスクとコストの比較が容易になり、セキュリティ管理者がより適切な対策を取 りやすくなる。 The equipment cost may be expressed in units of [Amount Z years] as well as the risk value. Doing so makes it easier to compare risk and cost, and makes it easier for security administrators to take appropriate measures.
[0106] なお、図 14は、図 12に示す脆弱性—対策モデル 104aの例に、図 13に示す対策 —コストモデル 104bの例を組み合わせた説明図である。脆弱性—対策モデル 104a 、対策—コストモデル 104bは、リスクモデルと同様に、対策手段に関する専門知識を 元にして予め作成される。  FIG. 14 is an explanatory diagram in which the example of the vulnerability-measure model 104a shown in FIG. 12 is combined with the example of the measure-cost model 104b shown in FIG. The vulnerability-countermeasure model 104a and the countermeasure-cost model 104b are created in advance based on specialized knowledge regarding countermeasure means, as in the risk model.
[0107] 次に、上記で説明したリスクモデル、対策モデルを用いて、対策案生成手段 105が 行う対策案生成動作について説明する。図 15は、対策案生成手段 105が行う対策 案生成処理の例を示す流れ図である。図 15に示すように、対策案生成手段 105は、 まず、複数の対策をもつ脆弱性を分割して AND結合することによって、脆弱性の有 無と対策の有無が 1対 1に対応する、脅威 脆弱性一対策モデルを生成する (ステツ プ S201)。  Next, the countermeasure plan generation operation performed by the countermeasure plan generation means 105 will be described using the risk model and the countermeasure model described above. FIG. 15 is a flowchart showing an example of countermeasure plan generation processing performed by the countermeasure plan generation means 105. As shown in Fig. 15, the countermeasure plan generation means 105 first divides vulnerabilities with multiple countermeasures and ANDs them, so that there is a one-to-one correspondence between the existence of vulnerabilities and the presence or absence of countermeasures. Threat A vulnerability countermeasure model is generated (step S201).
[0108] 図 16は、脅威 脆弱性一対策モデルの例を示す説明図である。図 16に示す例で は、脆弱性 v3と、脆弱性 v3に対する対策 c3, c4とを 1対 1で対応させるため、脆弱性 v3^v31と v32とに分害 ijして AND結合し、脆 ¾'|4ν31, v32にそれぞれ対策 c3, c4 を対応づけている。分割した脆弱性は AND結合されるので、この変形によって、脅 威—脆弱性モデル 102bと脆弱性—対策モデル 104aの内容は変化しない。この脅 威—脆弱性—対策モデルは、脅威—脆弱性モデル 102bと脆弱性—対策モデル 10 4aが決定した時点で、予め生成してぉ 、てもよ 、。  FIG. 16 is an explanatory diagram showing an example of the threat vulnerability one countermeasure model. In the example shown in Fig. 16, vulnerability v3 and countermeasures c3 and c4 for vulnerability v3 are made to correspond one-to-one so that vulnerability v3 ^ v31 and v32 are defeated ij and ANDed. Measures c3 and c4 are associated with ¾ '| 4ν31 and v32, respectively. Since the divided vulnerabilities are ANDed, the content of the threat—vulnerability model 102b and vulnerability—countermeasure model 104a does not change by this transformation. This threat-vulnerability-countermeasure model may be generated in advance when threat-vulnerability model 102b and vulnerability-countermeasure model 104a are determined.
[0109] 次に、対策案生成手段 105は、それぞれの脅威に対して、リスク値を許容範囲以下 に抑えつつ、例えば、コストの合計が最小となる対策案を生成する (ステップ S202)。 また、対策案生成手段 105は、リスク値を許容範囲以下に抑えつつ、例えば、展開コ ストが最小となる対策案を生成する (ステップ S203)。また、対策案生成手段 105は、 リスク値を許容範囲以下に抑えつつ、例えば、可用性コストの合計が最小となる対策 案を生成する (ステップ S204)。 [0109] Next, the countermeasure plan generation means 105 generates a countermeasure plan that minimizes the total cost, for example, while keeping the risk value below the allowable range for each threat (step S202). Further, the countermeasure plan generating means 105 generates a countermeasure plan that minimizes the deployment cost, for example, while keeping the risk value below the allowable range (step S203). Further, the countermeasure plan generation means 105 generates a countermeasure plan that minimizes the total availability cost, for example, while keeping the risk value below the allowable range (step S204).
[0110] ここで、それぞれの対策案を生成する方法について、脅威 tlを例にして、具体的に 説明する。以下、説明しやすくするため、クライアント PC2のリスク値のみを対象とす る力 複数の PCを対象とする場合も、それらの PCのリスク値を合計することによって[0110] Here, a method for generating each countermeasure plan will be described in detail by taking a threat tl as an example. In the following, for ease of explanation, the ability to target only the risk value of client PC2 Even when targeting multiple PCs, by summing the risk values of those PCs
、同様に算出することが可能である。 It is possible to calculate similarly.
[0111] まず、対策 ciが実施されている場合に yi=0,実施されていない場合に yi= lとなる 変数 yiを定義すると、クライアント PC2上の脅威 tlに対するリスク値は、以下の式(5) のように表すことができる。 [0111] First, if the variable yi is defined such that yi = 0 when countermeasure ci is implemented and yi = l when countermeasure ci is not implemented, the risk value for threat tl on client PC2 is It can be expressed as 5).
[0112] Risk(PC2tl) = E01 = 2400 X 0.1 X (yl X (l-(l-y2) X (1-0.1 X y3 X y4))(y5+0.05 X (1- y5))) [0112] Risk (PC2tl) = E01 = 2400 X 0.1 X (yl X (l- (l-y2) X (1-0.1 X y3 X y4)) (y5 + 0.05 X (1- y5)))
· · ·式 (5)  Formula (5)
[0113] ここで、 2400は影響を受ける資産価値 ass (PC2tl)であり、その後ろの 0. 1は脅 威 tlの発生頻度 f (tl)であり、その後ろは脅威—脆弱性モデル 102bにおけるリスク 計算式( 1 )を図 16の脅威 脆弱性 対策モデルに当てはめたものである。ここで、 状態格納手段 101に格納されている現在の脆弱性の有無は、現在の対策の有無に 対応し、現在の yiの値を Yiとおくと、図 3に示す例では、クライアント PC2における現 在の対策の有無は、 Υ1 = 1, Υ2 = 0, Υ3 = 1, Υ4= 1, Υ5 = 1となる。  [0113] where 2400 is the affected asset value ass (PC2tl), 0.1 behind it is the frequency f (tl) of threat tl, and behind it is the threat-vulnerability model 102b. The risk formula (1) is applied to the threat vulnerability countermeasure model shown in Fig. 16. Here, the presence or absence of the current vulnerability stored in the state storage means 101 corresponds to the presence or absence of the current countermeasure, and if the current yi value is set to Yi, in the example shown in FIG. Current measures are as follows: Υ1 = 1, Υ2 = 0, Υ3 = 1, Υ4 = 1, Υ5 = 1.
[0114] 機器コストの値は、ある対策 ciの機器コストが Ciである場合、∑Ci (l— yi)で表すこ とができる。つまり、ある対策 ciを実施する場合 (yi=0)、既にその対策が導入されて V、るかどうかに関わらず、機器コスト Ciがかかる。  [0114] The value of the device cost can be expressed as ∑Ci (l-yi) when the device cost of a certain measure ci is Ci. In other words, if a measure ci is implemented (yi = 0), the device cost Ci is incurred regardless of whether the measure is already implemented or not.
[0115] 可用性コストの値は、ある対策 ciの可用性コストが Ciである場合、∑Ci (Yi— yi)で 表すことができる。つまり、ある対策 ciを実施する場合 (yi=0)、既にその対策が実施 されて!/、れば (Yi = 0の場合)可用性コストは力からな!、が、実施されて!、なければ ( Yi= l) Ciだけ可用性コストがかかる。また、対策 ciを実施しない場合 (yi= l)、既に その対策が実施されていれば (Yi=0の場合)は可用性コストが減少する。つまり、現 状よりも可用性が向上する。 [0115] The value of availability cost can be expressed as ∑Ci (Yi—yi) when the availability cost of a measure ci is Ci. In other words, if a measure ci is implemented (yi = 0), if the measure has already been implemented! / (If Yi = 0), the availability cost is power !, but must be implemented! For example, (Yi = l) Ci costs an availability cost. Also, if the countermeasure ci is not implemented (yi = l), the availability cost is reduced if the countermeasure is already implemented (when Yi = 0). In other words, the current The availability is better than the situation.
[0116] 展開コストの値は、ある対策 ciの展開コストが Ciである場合、∑YiCi(l— yi)で表す ことができる。つまり、ある対策 ciを実施する場合 (yi=0)、既にその対策が実施され て!ヽれば (Yi=0の場合)既に対策されて 、るので展開コストがかからな 、が、実施さ れて 、なければ (Yi= 1) Ciだけ展開コストがかかる。対策 ciを実施しなければ (yi= 0)、展開コスト Ciは発生しない。  [0116] The value of the deployment cost can be expressed as ∑YiCi (l−yi) when the deployment cost of a certain measure ci is Ci. In other words, if a measure ci is implemented (yi = 0), that measure has already been implemented! If Yi = 0, the measure has already been taken, so the deployment cost does not increase. If not, (Yi = 1) the cost of deployment is Ci. If countermeasure ci is not implemented (yi = 0), deployment cost Ci does not occur.
[0117] 以上の計算式をあてはめると、図 16に示す脅威 脆弱性一対策モデルの場合、 機器コスト、可用性コスト、展開コストを求める計算式は、以下の式 (6)で表すことが できる。  Applying the above formulas, in the threat / vulnerability one countermeasure model shown in Fig. 16, the formulas for obtaining the equipment cost, availability cost, and deployment cost can be expressed by the following formula (6).
[0118] 機器コスト = E02 = 80 X (1- y2) + 70 X (1- y5)  [0118] Equipment cost = E02 = 80 X (1- y2) + 70 X (1- y5)
可用性コスト = E03 = 100X(Yl-yl) + 10X(Y2-y2) + 50X(Y4-y4) + 10X(Y5-y5) 展開コスト = E04 = lOOX(l-yl) + 80X(l-y2) + 30X(l-y3) + 40X(l-y5)  Availability cost = E03 = 100X (Yl-yl) + 10X (Y2-y2) + 50X (Y4-y4) + 10X (Y5-y5) Deployment cost = E04 = lOOX (l-yl) + 80X (l-y2) + 30X (l-y3) + 40X (l-y5)
···式 (6)  Formula (6)
[0119] これらの式力も、ステップ S202, S203, S204の処理は、変数 yl, y2, y3, y4, y 5に関する整数計画問題として表されることが分かる。整数計画問題は、分岐限定法 や遺伝的アルゴリズムなど公知の手法を用いて厳密解または近似解を得ることがで きる。例えば、ステップ S 203は以下の式(7)に示す整数計画問題として表される。  [0119] It can be seen that these formula forces are also expressed as integer programming problems concerning the variables yl, y2, y3, y4, and y5 in steps S202, S203, and S204. For integer programming problems, exact or approximate solutions can be obtained using known methods such as the branch and bound method or genetic algorithm. For example, step S 203 is expressed as an integer programming problem shown in the following equation (7).
[0120] 目標関数: 100X(1- yl) + 80X(l-y2) + 30X(l-y3) + 40 X (l-y5)→min  [0120] Goal function: 100X (1-yl) + 80X (l-y2) + 30X (l-y3) + 40 X (l-y5) → min
制約条件: 2400 X 0.1 X (yl X (1- (1- y2) X (1-0.1 Xy3X y4))(y5+0.05 X (1- y5》) < 10 ···式 (7)  Restriction: 2400 X 0.1 X (yl X (1- (1- y2) X (1-0.1 Xy3X y4)) (y5 + 0.05 X (1- y5 >>)) <10 Equation (7)
[0121] 上記例では、制約条件としてリスク許容値 = 10が与えられ、これらを解くと、ステツ プ S202とステップ S204の解として y3 = 0(対策 c3を実施)という解が得られ、ステツ プ S203の解として y4 = 0 (対策 c4を実施) t ヽぅ解が得られる。  [0121] In the above example, risk tolerance = 10 is given as a constraint, and solving these results in the solution of step S202 and step S204 y3 = 0 (implementing measure c3). The solution of S203 is y4 = 0 (measure c4 is implemented) t ヽ ぅ solution is obtained.
[0122] 対策優先順位決定手段 107は、対策案生成手段 105で得られた対策案をセキユリ ティ管理者に提示し、セキュリティ管理者が選択した対策を、対策実施手段 203に伝 えて実施させる機能を備える。図 17は、対策優先順位決定手段 107が出力する画 面の例を示す説明図である。図 17に示す例では、展開コストが最小の対策案を緊急 対策案、可用性コストが最小の対策案を通常対策案、全てのコストの和が最小の対 策案を最適対策案として提示している。なお、本例では、 PCの紛失 ·盗難による情報 漏洩 (脅威 tl)に対する現在のリスクが 24 (警告状態)であること、および、この脅威 t 1への緊急対策として、実施後のリスクが 0になる、可用性コスト 50、機器コスト 80、展 開コスト 0の対策 c4 (空パスワードであれば強制的にパスワードを割り振る)を提示し ている。また、通常対策案および最適対策案として、実施後のリスクが 0になる、可用 性コスト 0、機器コスト 80、展開コスト 30の対策 c3 (空ノ スワードであれば変更するよう 警告する)を提示している。また、図 17に示すように、現在のリスク、各対策における 実施後のリスクや、対策を実施する際に生じる各コストを、その大きさに応じて色分け (図 17では網掛け)して提示してもよい。 [0122] The countermeasure priority order determination means 107 presents the countermeasure proposal obtained by the countermeasure proposal generation means 105 to the security administrator, and transmits the countermeasure selected by the security administrator to the countermeasure implementation means 203. Is provided. FIG. 17 is an explanatory diagram showing an example of a screen output by the countermeasure priority order determination means 107. In the example shown in Figure 17, the countermeasure plan with the smallest deployment cost is the emergency countermeasure plan, the countermeasure plan with the lowest availability cost is the normal countermeasure plan, and the sum of all costs is the smallest. The plan is presented as an optimal measure plan. In this example, the current risk against information leakage (threat tl) due to PC loss / theft is 24 (warning state), and the risk after implementation is 0 as an emergency measure against this threat t1. It presents a countermeasure c4 (forcibly assigning a password if it is an empty password) with an availability cost of 50, an equipment cost of 80, and a deployment cost of 0. In addition, as countermeasures for normal measures and proposals for optimum measures, c3 (warning to change if there is an empty password) is proposed with zero risk after implementation, zero availability cost, equipment cost 80, and deployment cost 30. is doing. In addition, as shown in Fig. 17, the current risks, the risks after implementation of each measure, and the costs incurred when implementing the measure are color-coded according to their size (shaded in Fig. 17). May be.
[0123] これにより、セキュリティ管理者は、対策を速やかに実施したい場合は「緊急対策案 」を選び、ユーザの可用性への影響を最小に抑えた!/、場合は「通常対策案」を選び、 機器コストも含めて最適な対策を実施した 、場合は「最適対策案」を選ぶことができる 。従って、単に対策に要する費用という観点だけでなぐ対策の実施しやすさやユー ザへの影響も考慮した上で、対策を決定することができる。  [0123] This allows the security administrator to select “Emergency Measures” if they want to take immediate measures, and to minimize the impact on user availability! In the case where the optimal measures including the equipment cost are implemented, the “optimum countermeasure plan” can be selected. Therefore, measures can be determined in consideration of the ease of implementing measures and the impact on users, not only in terms of costs required for measures.
[0124] 対策実施手段 203は、対策優先順位決定手段 107によって決定された対策を実 施する手段である。例えば、図 17に示す最適対策案を実施する場合、対策実施手 段 203は、ディスク暗号ィ匕ツールのパスワードを設定するようにユーザに警告するた めの処理を実行する。この処理は、例えば、クライアント PC上で、ユーザがログオンし たときに警告画面を表示するプログラムを用いて実現できる。なお、対策実施手段 20 3は、必ずしも対象システム 200上で動作するプログラムを用いて実現される必要は ない。すなわち、リスク管理システム 100が対策実施手段 203を備えていてもよい。こ のような場合、例えば、リスク管理システム 100の対策実施手段 203は、リスク管理シ ステム 100上で動作する、ディスク暗号化ツールのパスワードを設定するようにユー ザに警告するメールを送信するプログラムを用いて実現することができる。  [0124] The countermeasure implementation means 203 is a means for implementing the countermeasure determined by the countermeasure priority order determination means 107. For example, when the optimum countermeasure plan shown in FIG. 17 is implemented, the countermeasure implementation means 203 executes a process for warning the user to set a password for the disk encryption tool. This process can be realized, for example, by using a program that displays a warning screen when the user logs on on the client PC. The countermeasure implementation means 203 does not necessarily have to be realized using a program that runs on the target system 200. That is, the risk management system 100 may include the countermeasure implementation means 203. In such a case, for example, the countermeasure implementation means 203 of the risk management system 100 is a program that sends an email warning the user to set a password for the disk encryption tool that operates on the risk management system 100. It can be realized using.
[0125] また、対策優先順位決定手段 107は、ポリシー格納手段 106に対策順位決定方針 106aが格納されている場合には、対策順位決定方針 106aに定義されている各種コ ストの優先順位や目標値に基づ!、て対策案を順位付けて選定してもよ!ヽ。ポリシー 設定手段 108は、例えば、図 18に示すような、対策順位決定方針用の設定画面を 提示し、セキュリティ管理者に入力させることによってセキュリティポリシーに応じた対 策順位決定方針 106aを設定する。図 18は、対策順位決定方針 106aを設定するた めの設定画面の例を示す説明図である。図 18に示すように、設定画面は、例えば、 リスク許容値を設定できる入力項目や、コストの評価方法を指定できる入力項目(リス クを最小にする、指定のコストの和を最小にする、指定の順序でコストの評価を行う等 )、各コストの目標値を指定できるような入力項目を含んでいてもよい。なお、対策案 を生成する条件である対策順位決定方針 106aは、各組織に応じたセキュリティポリ シーに基づいて決定されるものであり、セキュリティ管理者は、セキュリティポリシーに 従ってコスト評価式やリスク許容値を入力することで、より望ましい対策案を生成させ ることがでさる。 [0125] Further, the countermeasure priority order determination means 107, when the countermeasure order determination policy 106a is stored in the policy storage means 106, is the priority and target of various costs defined in the countermeasure order determination policy 106a. Based on the value, you can select and rank the proposed measures! For example, the policy setting means 108 displays a setting screen for the countermeasure order determination policy as shown in FIG. The countermeasure order decision policy 106a corresponding to the security policy is set by presenting it and allowing the security administrator to input it. FIG. 18 is an explanatory diagram showing an example of a setting screen for setting the countermeasure order determination policy 106a. As shown in FIG. 18, the setting screen includes, for example, input items that can set risk tolerances and input items that can specify cost evaluation methods (minimize risk, minimize the sum of specified costs, For example, the cost may be evaluated in a specified order), and an input item for specifying a target value for each cost may be included. Note that the countermeasure order determination policy 106a, which is a condition for generating countermeasure proposals, is determined based on the security policy corresponding to each organization, and the security administrator can determine the cost evaluation formula and risk tolerance according to the security policy. By entering values, it is possible to generate more desirable countermeasures.
[0126] 例えば、図 18に示すように、リスク許容値(図中では許容リスク) 1000円 Z年および 展開コスト 2ヶ月以下という制約条件が設定され、機器コストと展開コストと可用性コス トの和を最小にする、という評価方法が設定されたとする。このような場合には、目標 関数および制約条件式は、前述の式(6)および式(7)における E01〜E04を用いる と、目標関数: E02+E03+E04→min、制約条件 1 :E01≤ 1000、制約条件 2 :E0 4≤ 60となる。  [0126] For example, as shown in Figure 18, the risk tolerance (allowable risk in the figure) is set to 1,000 yen Z year and deployment cost of 2 months or less, and the sum of equipment cost, deployment cost, and availability cost. Assume that the evaluation method of minimizing is set. In such a case, if E01 to E04 in Eq. (6) and Eq. (7) are used, the objective function: E02 + E03 + E04 → min, constraint 1: E01 ≤ 1000, constraint 2: E0 4≤ 60.
[0127] また、図 19に示すように、機器コスト 1000円 Z年という制約条件が設定され、リスク を最小にする、という評価方法が設定された場合には、目標関数および制約条件式 は、目標関数: E01→min、制約条件: E04≤ 10000となる。  [0127] As shown in Fig. 19, when the constraint condition of equipment cost 1000 yen Z years is set and the evaluation method is set to minimize the risk, the objective function and the constraint equation are Target function: E01 → min, constraint: E04≤10000.
[0128] 以上のように、本実施例により、システムの状態を調べることにより得られた、対象シ ステム内の資産価値とその脆弱性の情報から、予め定められたリスクモデルを用いて リスク値を算出し、さらに対策モデルに基づいた対策立案を行うことによって、対策を 実施することによって生じる機器費用や可用性の低下や、展開に要する時間を考慮 した対策実施を実現することができることが分かる。展開コストや可用性コストは、現 在の脆弱性の状態 (対策の実施状態)に基づいて算出されるので、現在のシステム の状態に応じて、最適な対策案をセキュリティ管理者に対して提案することができる。  [0128] As described above, according to the present embodiment, the risk value using the risk model determined in advance from the asset value and vulnerability information in the target system obtained by examining the system state. It can be seen that by implementing measures based on the countermeasure model and implementing countermeasures, it is possible to implement countermeasures that take into account the reduction in equipment costs and availability caused by implementing countermeasures and the time required for deployment. Deployment costs and availability costs are calculated based on the current vulnerability status (countermeasurement status), so the optimal countermeasure plan is proposed to the security administrator according to the current system status. be able to.
[0129] 即ち、複数の対策案が考えられる場合、対策を実施する際に生じる各種コストがど の程度生じるかを判断しつつ、セキュリティ管理者が最適な対策を実施できることに なる。その理由は、例えば、対策モデルとして、機器コスト、可用性コスト、展開コスト といった複数のコストを定義しておくことにより、可用性の低下を優先するか、速やか な対策の展開を優先するか、全体的にコストを最小限にすることを優先するか、とい つた複数の異なる対策案を提示することができ、セキュリティ管理者がどの対策を取 れば、どのようなコストがどの程度生じるかが把握できるようになるためである。 [0129] That is, when multiple countermeasures are possible, the security administrator can implement the optimal countermeasures while judging how much various costs are incurred when implementing the countermeasures. Become. The reason for this is, for example, by defining multiple costs such as equipment cost, availability cost, and deployment cost as a countermeasure model, whether to prioritize a decline in availability or prioritize rapid countermeasure deployment, It is possible to present a number of different countermeasures, such as whether to prioritize minimizing costs, and to understand what costs are incurred and what costs are incurred by the security administrator. This is because
[0130] なお、上記の説明では、脅威 脆弱性一対策モデルを図 16に示すように、 ANDと ORとを用いて表現する例を示した力 脅威 脆弱性一対策モデルは、 ANDと ORと を用いて表現された脅威—脆弱性モデル 102bに代わり、例えば、 OR、 MAX, MI N、 SUB、 XORなどの対策関係演算子を用いて表現することもできる。ここで、対策 関係演算子とは、複数の対策が独立して効果を発揮できるか、どちらか一方しか実 施できないか、または、ある脆弱性を実施したときのみ有効であるといった対策間の 関係を表現するものである。  [0130] In the above description, as shown in Fig. 16, the threat / vulnerability one countermeasure model is an example of a force threat vulnerability one countermeasure model expressed as AND and OR. Instead of the threat-vulnerability model 102b expressed using, it can also be expressed using countermeasure relational operators such as OR, MAX, MIN, SUB, and XOR. Here, the countermeasure relational operator is the relationship between countermeasures in which multiple countermeasures can be effective independently, only one of them can be implemented, or effective only when a certain vulnerability is implemented. It expresses.
[0131] 図 20は、対策関係演算子を用いて表現した脅威—脆弱性—対策モデルの例を示 す説明図である。なお、図 20では、脆弱性と対策は 1対 1の関係で置き換えることが できることから、脆弱性の表記を省略している。  [0131] FIG. 20 is an explanatory diagram showing an example of a threat-vulnerability-countermeasure model expressed using countermeasure-related operators. In Fig. 20, vulnerability and countermeasures can be replaced in a one-to-one relationship, so the vulnerability is not shown.
[0132] 図 20において、 ORとは、 ORで結合された対策を自由に組み合わせて実施できる ことを表し、また、それらの対策を実施したときの脅威に対する効果は加算されること を表す。つまり、対策 Aと対策 Bとがあったときに、(1)対策 Aだけを実施する、(2)対 策 Bだけを実施する、(3)対策 Aと対策 Bの両方を実施する、という 3つの対策案から 選択でき、単独で実施する(1)、(2)よりも同時に実施する(3)の方が、より効果が高 くなる。  [0132] In FIG. 20, OR means that measures combined with OR can be freely combined and implemented, and the effect on threats when these measures are implemented is added. In other words, when there are measures A and B, (1) implement only measure A, (2) implement only measure B, and (3) implement both measure A and measure B. You can choose from three countermeasures, and (3) is more effective than (1) and (2).
[0133] また、 MAXとは、 MAXで結合された対策を自由に組み合わせて実施できる力 脅 威を低減させる効果を発揮するものは、それら対策のうち、最大の効果を持つものだ けであることを表す。また、 MINとは、 MAXの逆で、組み合わせた対策のうち、最小 の効果を持つものだけが効果を発揮することができることを表す。  [0133] In addition, MAX is the power that can be implemented by freely combining measures combined with MAX. Only those measures that have the greatest effect are effective in reducing threats. Represents that. In addition, MIN is the opposite of MAX and means that only the combined measures that have the minimum effect can exert the effect.
[0134] また、 SUBとは、主となる対策を実施したときのみ従となる対策が実施できるような 対策の組み合わせを表す。例えば、主となる対策である「認証機構の導入」を実施し たときのみ、従となる対策である「パスワード長の制限」が実施できるというような対策 間の関係を表す。また、 XORとは、 XORで結合された対策を、 2つ以上同時に実施 することができないような対策間の関係を表す。例えば、「通信経路の暗号化」対策と 、「通信経路中の機密文書検出」対策とでは、通信経路を暗号化すると通信経路中 の機密文書の検出ができなくなるため、この 2つの対策を同時に実施することはでき な 、。このような対策間の関係を表すのが XORである。 [0134] SUB represents a combination of measures that can implement a subordinate measure only when the main measure is implemented. For example, a measure that enables the password measure restriction, which is a subordinate measure, to be implemented only when the main measure, “Introduction of authentication mechanism”, is implemented. Represents the relationship between. XOR represents the relationship between measures that cannot be implemented simultaneously by two or more measures combined by XOR. For example, the “encryption of communication path” countermeasure and the “detection of confidential document in communication path” countermeasure cannot detect confidential documents in the communication path if the communication path is encrypted. Cannot be implemented. XOR represents the relationship between these measures.
[0135] 以上のように、対策間の関係を定義することによって、より精密な脅威 脆弱性 対策モデルを作成することができる。また、 SUBのように、 AND, OR、 NOTといった 記述演算子だけでは記述しきれない制約条件も付加することができる。  [0135] As described above, a more precise threat vulnerability countermeasure model can be created by defining the relationship between countermeasures. In addition, constraints such as SUB that cannot be described with only descriptive operators such as AND, OR, and NOT can be added.
[0136] また、図 20では、各対策の有効性を数値(図中における各対策力も引かれた矢印 に付加した数値)で示している。本実施例において、有効性を示す数値は、 0〜1の 間の数値をとり、上述の ANDと ORとを用いた脅威—脆弱性モデル 102bにおける最 大脆弱度に相当する (実際には最大脆弱度の逆数である)。つまり、有効度と最大脆 弱度とは互いに逆数をとることで、相互に変換可能である。  [0136] Also, in FIG. 20, the effectiveness of each countermeasure is indicated by a numerical value (a numerical value added to the arrow with each countermeasure power drawn in the figure). In this example, the numerical value indicating effectiveness is a value between 0 and 1, and corresponds to the maximum vulnerability level in the threat-vulnerability model 102b using AND and OR described above (in practice, the maximum It is the reciprocal of the vulnerability level). In other words, the effectiveness and maximum vulnerability can be converted to each other by taking the reciprocal of each other.
[0137] 次に、対策関係演算子を用いた脅威 脆弱性一対策モデルからリスク値を計算す るときの動作を説明する。ここで、脆弱性 viが存在する場合に xi= l、存在しない場 合に xi=0となる変数 xiを定義し、脆弱性 viの対策を ciとする。また、 ciの有効度を zi とする。このとき、前述した対策関係演算子は、それぞれ以下の式 (8)のように計算 することができる。  Next, the operation when calculating the risk value from the threat vulnerability one countermeasure model using countermeasure relational operators is explained. Here, a variable xi is defined such that xi = l if the vulnerability vi exists, and xi = 0 if it does not exist, and the countermeasure for the vulnerability vi is ci. In addition, let zi be the validity of ci. At this time, the countermeasure-related operators described above can be calculated as shown in the following equation (8).
[0138] OR:max(zl XAND(xl,!x2),(l— 1— zl)(l— z2) XAND(xl,x2),z2 XAND(!xl,x2》  [0138] OR: max (zl XAND (xl,! X2), (l— 1—zl) (l—z2) XAND (xl, x2), z2 XAND (! Xl, x2 >>
MAX: max(zl X xl,z2 X x2)  MAX: max (zl X xl, z2 X x2)
MIN :min(zl Xxl,z2 Xx2)  MIN: min (zl Xxl, z2 Xx2)
SUB: max(zl X AND(xl , !x2),(l— 1— zl)(l— z2) X AND(xl ,x2))  SUB: max (zl X AND (xl,! X2), (l— 1— zl) (l— z2) X AND (xl, x2))
XOR: max(zl X AND(xl, !x2),z2 X AND(!xl ,x2》 · · ·式(8)  XOR: max (zl X AND (xl,! X2), z2 X AND (! Xl, x2 >> Formula (8)
[0139] 式(8)において、 "! "は、直前の否定を表す演算子である。例えば、 ! xiは xiの否 定であり、 xi= lのとき! xi=0となり、 xi=0のとき! xi= lとなる。また、 max()は、 0 の数値のうち最大の値を取り出す演算子を表し、 min ()は、 0ないの数値のうち最小 の値を取り出す演算子を表す。また、 AND 0は、論理演算子を表す。このように、対 策関係演算子を導入しても、リスク値の計算は可能である。 [0140] 次に、図 21を参照して、対策関係演算子を用いた脅威—脆弱性—対策モデルか ら対策案を生成するときの動作を説明する。図 21は、対策関係演算子を用いた脅威 脆弱性一対策モデル力 対策案を生成する処理の例を示す流れ図である。図 21 に示すように、対策関係演算子を用いた脅威 脆弱性一対策モデルに、 SUBの関 係演算子 (対策関係演算子)が含まれる場合には、 SUBを AND, OR, !に変換し て、制約式を付加する (ステップ S 201)。例えば、 xlと x2が SUBの関係にある場合 には、 xl— x2≥0を制約式にカ卩える。同様に、 XORの関係演算子が含まれる場合 には、 XORを AND, OR, !に変換して、制約式を付加する(ステップ S202)。例え ば、 xlと x2が XORの関係にある場合には、 xl +x2= lを制約式に加える。このよう に、制約式を加えた後は、 ANDと ORとを用いた脅威—脆弱性—対策モデル力 対 策案を生成する手順と同様の手順で生成する。 [0139] In the equation (8), "!" Is an operator representing the previous negation. For example,! xi is a xi denial, when xi = l! When xi = 0, when xi = 0! xi = l. Furthermore, max () represents an operator that extracts the maximum value among the numerical values of 0, and min () represents an operator that extracts the minimum value among the numerical values that are not 0. AND 0 represents a logical operator. In this way, risk values can be calculated even if countermeasure relational operators are introduced. [0140] Next, with reference to FIG. 21, the operation when generating a countermeasure plan from a threat-vulnerability-countermeasure model using countermeasure-related operators will be described. FIG. 21 is a flowchart showing an example of processing for generating a threat vulnerability vulnerability countermeasure model countermeasure plan using countermeasure relational operators. As shown in Fig. 21, if the threat vulnerability countermeasure model using countermeasure relational operators includes SUB relational operators (countermeasure relational operators), SUB is AND, OR,! And a constraint equation is added (step S 201). For example, if xl and x2 are in a SUB relationship, xl—x2≥0 is stored in the constraint expression. Similarly, if the relational operator of XOR is included, XOR is AND, OR,! And a constraint equation is added (step S202). For example, if xl and x2 are in an XOR relationship, add xl + x2 = l to the constraint expression. In this way, after adding the constraint equation, it is generated in the same procedure as the procedure for generating the threat-vulnerability-countermeasure model power countermeasure plan using AND and OR.
[0141] 以上のように、対策関係演算子を含む脅威 脆弱性一対策モデルを用いることで 、通常の AND, ORだけでは表現できない対策間の制約条件を表現することができ 、より精密な対策案を生成することができる。また、対策間の関係を直接表現するモ デルとしたことで、モデルの生成が容易になる。  [0141] As described above, by using the threat vulnerability one countermeasure model including countermeasure-related operators, it is possible to express constraint conditions between countermeasures that cannot be expressed only by ordinary AND and OR, and more precise countermeasures. Proposals can be generated. In addition, the model can be easily generated by directly expressing the relationship between measures.
[0142] 実施例 2.  [0142] Example 2.
続いて、簡単にできる対策を応急処置的に施し、次第に理想的な対策に移行する t ヽつた、段階的な対策実施手順を実施する機能を追加した本発明の第 2実施例を 説明する。  Next, a second embodiment of the present invention will be described in which a function for implementing a step-by-step countermeasure implementation procedure is added.
[0143] 次に、本発明の第 2の実施例について図面を参照して説明する。図 22は、第 2の 実施例によるセキュリティリスク管理システムの構成例を示すブロック図である。図 22 に示すセキュリティ管理システムは、図 1に示す第 1の実施例と比べて、リスク管理シ ステム 100が、ポリシー格納手段 106および対策優先順位決定手段 107に代えて、 対策シナリオ生成手段 111と、対策実行判定手段 112とを備える点、および、対象シ ステム 200がイベント収集手段 211を備える点で異なる。また、対策モデル格納手段 104に、対策シナリオモデル 114cが含まれる点でも異なる。  [0143] Next, a second embodiment of the present invention will be described with reference to the drawings. FIG. 22 is a block diagram illustrating a configuration example of the security risk management system according to the second embodiment. Compared to the first embodiment shown in FIG. 1, in the security management system shown in FIG. 22, the risk management system 100 includes a countermeasure scenario generation means 111 instead of the policy storage means 106 and the countermeasure priority determination means 107. The countermeasure execution determination unit 112 is different from the target system 200 in that the target system 200 includes an event collection unit 211. Another difference is that the countermeasure model storage means 104 includes a countermeasure scenario model 114c.
[0144] 以下、第 2の実施例に特有の動作を説明する。イベント収集手段 211は、対象シス テム 200において、セキュリティに関する変化 (例えば、攻撃やワームの発生)を見知 し、イベントとしてリスク管理システム 100に通知(送信)する。イベント収集手段 211 は、例えば、パケットやログを監視して、攻撃やワームの発生などを見知しイベントを 発信することができる IDS (Intrusion Detection System)によって実現される。 [0144] Hereinafter, operations unique to the second embodiment will be described. The event collection means 211 detects changes in security (for example, the occurrence of attacks and worms) in the target system 200. Then, the risk management system 100 is notified (transmitted) as an event. The event collection unit 211 is realized by, for example, an IDS (Intrusion Detection System) that can monitor a packet or log, detect an attack or worm occurrence, and send an event.
[0145] 対策シナリオ生成手段 111は、対策案生成手段 105が生成した対策案を、対策シ ナリオモデル 114cに基づいて、即日対策、緊急対策、通常対策、最終対策等に割り 当てることによって、どの段階でどの対策を実施するかを示す対策モデルを生成する 。対策実行判定手段 112は、生成された対策シナリオとイベント収集手段 211から通 知されるイベントとに基づいて、どの対策を実施するかを判定し、対策実施手段 203 に通知する。 [0145] The countermeasure scenario generation means 111 assigns the countermeasure proposal generated by the countermeasure proposal generation means 105 to the same day countermeasure, emergency countermeasure, normal countermeasure, final countermeasure, etc., based on the countermeasure scenario model 114c. Generate a countermeasure model that indicates which countermeasures will be implemented. Based on the generated countermeasure scenario and the event notified from the event collecting means 211, the countermeasure execution determining means 112 determines which countermeasure is to be implemented and notifies the countermeasure implementing means 203.
[0146] 次に、対策シナリオの生成および実施する対策の判定動作について詳細に説明す る。まず、対策シナリオモデル 114cについて説明する。対策シナリオモデル 114cは 、それぞれの対策間をイベントによって遷移する状態遷移モデルとして記述されるモ デルであって、対策の実施段階 (以下、対策ステージという。)と、対策ステージ間を 移動する条件 (遷移条件)とを定義するためのモデルである。対策シナリオモデル 11 4cの具体例を図 23に示す。図 23は、「ワーム発生による情報漏洩」に対する対策シ ナリオモデル 114cの例を示す説明図である。図 23に示す例では、初期状態、即日 対策、緊急対策、通常対策、最終対策の 5つの対策ステージが定義され、例えば、 即日対策ステージ力 通常対策ステージへは時刻が所定の閾値を超えたを条件に 遷移すること、通常対策ステージから緊急対策ステージへはワーム発生を条件に遷 移すること等が定義されている。なお、図 23に示すように、遷移条件には、イベント収 集手段 211から通知されるイベントだけでなぐ対策実行力もの経過時間や時刻を含 めてもよい。対策シナリオモデル 114cは、予めセキュリティ管理者によって作成され る。  [0146] Next, the generation of a countermeasure scenario and the determination operation of the countermeasure to be implemented will be described in detail. First, the countermeasure scenario model 114c will be described. The countermeasure scenario model 114c is a model described as a state transition model in which each countermeasure transitions according to an event. The countermeasure implementation stage (hereinafter referred to as countermeasure stage) and the conditions for moving between countermeasure stages ( A transition condition). Figure 23 shows a specific example of the countermeasure scenario model 11 4c. FIG. 23 is an explanatory diagram showing an example of a countermeasure scenario model 114c for “information leakage due to the occurrence of a worm”. In the example shown in Fig. 23, five countermeasure stages are defined: initial condition, same-day countermeasure, emergency countermeasure, normal countermeasure, and final countermeasure.For example, the same-day countermeasure stage force Transitions to conditions are defined, such as transition from the normal countermeasure stage to the emergency countermeasure stage on the condition of the occurrence of a worm. As shown in FIG. 23, the transition condition may include the elapsed time and time of the countermeasure execution ability that is not limited to the event notified from the event collection means 211. The countermeasure scenario model 114c is created in advance by the security administrator.
[0147] 対策シナリオ生成手段 111は、対策案生成手段 105が生成した対策案を、対策シ ナリオモデル 114cに定義されて 、る各対策ステージに割り当てることによって対策シ ナリオを生成する。どの対策ステージに割り当てるかは、所定の条件に従う。例えば、 コストによって決定する例として、許容されるリスク値を高く設定した上で、可用性コス トが最も低い対策を即日対策、展開コストが最も低い対策を緊急対策、可用性コスト と機器コストの和が最も低 、対策を通常対策とし、許容されるリスク値を低く設定した 上で、全てのコストの和が最も小さい対策を最終対策としてもよい。なお、同じ対策を 複数の対策ステージに割り当ててもよい。図 24は、上述した条件に従って各対策を 割り当てた場合の対策確認画面の例である。また、図 25に示すように、対策シナリオ モデル 114cには、対策ステージ名と対策ステージ間の遷移条件と合わせて、各対 策ステージに割り当てる対策を決定するための制約式を含めてもょ 、。 The countermeasure scenario generation unit 111 generates a countermeasure scenario by assigning the countermeasure plan generated by the countermeasure plan generation unit 105 to each countermeasure stage defined in the countermeasure scenario model 114c. Which countermeasure stage is assigned depends on a predetermined condition. For example, as an example of determining by cost, after setting the allowable risk value high, the countermeasure with the lowest availability cost is the same day countermeasure, the countermeasure with the lowest deployment cost is the emergency countermeasure, the availability cost And the sum of the equipment costs is the lowest, the countermeasure is the normal countermeasure, the allowable risk value is set low, and the countermeasure with the smallest sum of all costs may be the final countermeasure. The same countermeasure may be assigned to multiple countermeasure stages. Fig. 24 shows an example of a measure confirmation screen when each measure is assigned according to the conditions described above. In addition, as shown in Figure 25, the countermeasure scenario model 114c may include a constraint equation for determining the countermeasure to be assigned to each countermeasure stage, together with the countermeasure stage name and transition conditions between countermeasure stages. .
[0148] 図 26は、対策シナリオ生成手段 111が行う対策シナリオ生成処理の例を示す流れ 図である。図 26に示すように、対策シナリオ生成手段 111は、まず、対策シナリオモ デル 114cから、対策ステージの制約式 (対策優先順位決定方針)を取り出す (ステツ プ S301)。次に、対策シナリオ生成手段 111は、制約式に従って、対策案生成手段 105が生成した対策案を評価し、最も制約式に当てはまる対策を選び、そのステー ジに割り当てる (ステップ S302)。これを対策シナリオモデル 114cに定義されている 全ての対策ステージに対して行う。  FIG. 26 is a flowchart showing an example of countermeasure scenario generation processing performed by the countermeasure scenario generation means 111. As shown in FIG. 26, the countermeasure scenario generation means 111 first extracts a constraint equation (measure priority determination policy) of the countermeasure stage from the countermeasure scenario model 114c (step S301). Next, the measure scenario generation unit 111 evaluates the measure plan generated by the measure plan generation unit 105 according to the constraint formula, selects a measure that best matches the constraint formula, and assigns it to the stage (step S302). This is performed for all countermeasure stages defined in the countermeasure scenario model 114c.
[0149] 対策実行判定手段 112は、対策シナリオ生成手段 111によって生成された対策シ ナリオに基づいて、イベント収集手段 211から通知されるイベントに従い、実行すべき 対策を決定する。対策実行判定手段 112は、例えば、イベント収集手段 211から受 信したイベントによって、他の対策ステージへの遷移条件を満たしたときに、対策ステ ージを遷移し (現在の状態を更新し)、遷移先の対策ステージに割り当てられた対策 を、実行する対策として決定する。対策実行判定手段 112は、対策ステージが変化 し実行すべき対策を決定した場合には、その対策を対策実施手段 203に通知する。 なお、対策実行判定手段 112は、イベント収集手段 211からイベントを受信した場合 だけでなぐ一定のタイミングで、現在の対策ステージ力 他の対策ステージへの遷 移条件を満たすカゝどうかを判定することで、現在時刻が閾値とする時刻を超えたとき や、現対策を実施してからの経過時間が閾値とする時間を超えたときにも、イベント 発生による状態遷移と同様に対策ステージを遷移させる。  Based on the countermeasure scenario generated by the countermeasure scenario generation means 111, the countermeasure execution determination means 112 determines a countermeasure to be executed according to the event notified from the event collection means 211. For example, when the event received from the event collection unit 211 satisfies a transition condition to another countermeasure stage, the countermeasure execution determination unit 112 transitions the countermeasure stage (updates the current state), and The countermeasure assigned to the transition countermeasure stage is determined as the countermeasure to be executed. When the measure stage changes and the measure to be executed is determined, the measure execution determination unit 112 notifies the measure execution unit 203 of the measure. The measure execution determination unit 112 determines whether the current measure stage power is a condition that satisfies the transition condition to another measure stage at a fixed timing only when an event is received from the event collection unit 211. If the current time exceeds the threshold time, or if the elapsed time since the current countermeasure has been exceeded exceeds the threshold time, the countermeasure stage is transitioned in the same way as the state transition due to the occurrence of an event. .
[0150] 例えば、図 23に示す対策シナリオモデル 114cにおいて、現在の対策ステージが 即日対策ステージであって、イベント収集手段 211からワーム発生のイベントが通知 された場合には、対策実行判定手段 112は、即日対策ステージ力もの遷移条件「ヮ ーム発生」に従って、現在の対策ステージを緊急対策ステージに状態を遷移させ、 対策実施手段 203に緊急対策ステージに割り当てられた対策の実施を要求する。そ の後、イベント収集手段 211からワーム収束のイベントが通知され、かつ、現時刻が 所定の閾値を超えた場合には、緊急対策ステージからの遷移条件「ワーム収束 '時 刻 >閾値 1」に従って、現在の対策ステージを通常対策ステージに遷移させ、対策実 施手段 203に通常対策ステージに割り当てられた対策の実施を要求する。 [0150] For example, in the scenario scenario model 114c shown in FIG. 23, if the current countermeasure stage is the same day countermeasure stage and the event collecting means 211 is notified of a worm occurrence event, the countermeasure execution determining means 112 is , The same day measure stage power thing transition condition "力 In response to the occurrence of a problem, the state is shifted from the current countermeasure stage to the emergency countermeasure stage, and the countermeasure implementation means 203 is requested to implement the countermeasure assigned to the emergency countermeasure stage. After that, when the event collection means 211 notifies the event of worm convergence and the current time exceeds a predetermined threshold, it follows the transition condition “Warm convergence 'time> threshold 1” from the emergency countermeasure stage. The current countermeasure stage is transitioned to the normal countermeasure stage, and the countermeasure implementation means 203 is requested to implement the countermeasure assigned to the normal countermeasure stage.
[0151] このように、所定の条件に従って状態遷移を行う複数の対策ステージを定義した対 策シナリオを生成することで、より現実的な複数の段階を踏む対策を実施することが できる。また、対策実行判定手段 112がイベントを解析して実行すべき対策を決定す ることで、攻撃の状況や、ネットワークの利用状況などに応じた動的な対策実施を実 現できる。 [0151] Thus, by generating a countermeasure scenario that defines a plurality of countermeasure stages that perform state transitions according to a predetermined condition, a more realistic countermeasure can be implemented. Further, the countermeasure execution determination means 112 analyzes the event and determines the countermeasure to be executed, so that it is possible to implement a dynamic countermeasure according to the situation of the attack and the network usage situation.
[0152] 即ち、簡単にできる対策を応急処置的に施して次第に理想的な対策に移行すると いった、段階的な対策をセキュリティ管理者が実施できることになる。その理由は、展 開コストの小さい対策を先に実施し、その後、その他の条件 (コスト)も考慮した最適 な対策を実施するといつた、典型的な対策実施のパターンを対策シナリオとして生成 し、実施することができるためである。  [0152] That is, the security administrator can implement step-by-step measures, such as taking measures that can be easily done as an emergency measure and gradually shifting to ideal measures. The reason for this is that when a measure with a low development cost is implemented first, and then the optimum measure is taken into account other conditions (costs), a typical measure implementation pattern is generated as a measure scenario. It is because it can be implemented.
産業上の利用可能性  Industrial applicability
[0153] 本発明は、システムの脆弱性を収集し適切な対策を適用する、セキュリティ運用管 理ツールといった用途に適用できる。また、ポリシーに基づいてシステムのセキユリテ ィ状態を保障するセキュリティポリシーコンプライアンスツールといった用途に適用で きる。 The present invention can be applied to uses such as a security operation management tool that collects system vulnerabilities and applies appropriate countermeasures. It can also be applied to security policy compliance tools that guarantee the security status of the system based on the policy.
[0154] 本発明の全開示 (請求の範囲を含む)の枠内において、さらにその基本的技術思 想に基づいて、実施形態ないし実施例の変更 '調整が可能である。また、本発明の 請求の範囲の枠内において種々の開示要素の多様な組み合わせないし選択が可 能である。  [0154] Within the scope of the entire disclosure (including claims) of the present invention, the embodiment or examples can be changed and adjusted based on the basic technical idea. Various combinations and selections of various disclosed elements are possible within the scope of the claims of the present invention.

Claims

請求の範囲  The scope of the claims
[1] 対象システムにおけるセキュリティリスクを管理するセキュリティリスク管理システムで あって、  [1] A security risk management system for managing security risks in a target system,
前記対象システムの状態を分析する状態分析手段と、  State analysis means for analyzing the state of the target system;
前記状態分析手段の分析結果に基づ 、て、前記対象システムのセキュリティリスク を判定するリスク判定手段と、  A risk judging means for judging a security risk of the target system based on an analysis result of the state analyzing means;
前記リスク判定手段によってセキュリティリスクが所定の許容範囲を超えていると判 定された場合に、前記対象システムに所定の対策を実施することによって低減するセ キユリティリスクの度合 、を示すリスク低減度と、前記所定の対策を実施することによ つて前記対象システムに生じる各種制約の大きさを示す制約度とに基づいて、前記 セキュリティリスクを低減するための対策案を選定する対策案選定手段とを備えた ことを特徴とするセキュリティリスク管理システム。  Degree of risk reduction that indicates the degree of security risk that is reduced by implementing predetermined measures on the target system when it is determined by the risk determination means that the security risk exceeds a predetermined allowable range. And a measure plan selecting means for selecting a measure plan for reducing the security risk based on the degree of restriction indicating the size of various constraints generated in the target system by implementing the predetermined measure. Security risk management system characterized by
[2] 前記対策案選定手段によって選定された対策案について、当該対策のリスク低減 度と、当該対策のそれぞれの制約度とを含む対策案情報を出力する対策案情報出 力手段と、  [2] With regard to the countermeasure proposal selected by the countermeasure proposal selecting means, countermeasure proposal information output means for outputting countermeasure proposal information including the risk reduction degree of the countermeasure and the degree of restriction of each countermeasure;
前記対策案選定手段によって選定された対策案に従って、セキュリティリスクを低 減するための所定の処理を実行する対策実行手段とを備えた  Measure execution means for executing predetermined processing for reducing security risk in accordance with the measure proposal selected by the measure proposal selection means.
請求項 1に記載のセキュリティリスク管理システム。  The security risk management system according to claim 1.
[3] 前記状態分析手段は、少なくとも対象システムの脆弱性の有無と、対象システムの 価値とを分析し、 [3] The state analysis means analyzes at least the presence / absence of the vulnerability of the target system and the value of the target system,
前記リスク判定手段は、前記対象システムの脆弱性の有無と、前記対象システムの 資産価値と、予めセキュリティ上の脅威の発生頻度を定義した脅威モデルと、予め脆 弱性の有無による脅威の顕在化に係る脆弱性と脅威との関係を予め定義した脅威 脆弱性モデルと、予め脅威の顕在化による資産への影響度に係る脅威と資産との 関係を定義した脅威 資産モデルとに基づ!/、て、前記対象システムのセキュリティリ スクの度合いを示すリスク値を算出し、  The risk determination means includes the presence / absence of vulnerability of the target system, the asset value of the target system, a threat model in which the occurrence frequency of security threats is defined in advance, and the manifestation of threats based on the presence / absence of vulnerability in advance. Based on a threat vulnerability model that defines the relationship between vulnerabilities and threats in advance, and a threat asset model that defines the relationship between threats and assets related to the impact of asset manifestation in advance! / And calculating a risk value indicating the degree of security risk of the target system,
前記対策案選定手段は、予め各脆弱性によるセキュリティリスクを低減するための 対策手段を定義した脆弱性一対策モデルと、予め各対策手段を実施することによつ て前記対象システムに生じる各種制約の大きさを示す制約度を定義した対策 制約 モデルとに基づ!/、て、実施後のリスク値および各種制約度が所定の条件に合致する 対策手段を、対策案として選定する The countermeasure proposal selection means is based on a vulnerability-one countermeasure model that defines countermeasure means for reducing the security risk due to each vulnerability in advance and by implementing each countermeasure means in advance. Based on the countermeasure constraint model that defines the degree of constraint that indicates the size of various constraints that occur in the target system! /, The countermeasure means that the risk value after implementation and the various constraint degrees match the predetermined conditions, Select as a countermeasure plan
請求項 1または請求項 2に記載のセキュリティリスク管理システム。  The security risk management system according to claim 1 or claim 2.
[4] 対策の実施段階に応じて定義される対策ステージであって、実施する対策が対応 づけられる各対策ステージにつ 、て、対策ステージからの遷移条件を定義した対策 ステージ遷移ルールを記憶する記憶手段と、 [4] Measure stage transition rules that define transition conditions from the countermeasure stage for each countermeasure stage that is defined according to the implementation stage of the countermeasure and to which the countermeasure to be implemented is associated are stored. Storage means;
前記対策案選定手段によって選定された対策案のうちのいずれかを、所定の条件 に従って、前記対策ステージ遷移ルールで示される各対策ステージに割り当てること によって、 、ずれの対策案を 、ずれのタイミングで実行するかを示す対策シナリオを 生成する対策シナリオ生成手段とを備えた  By assigning one of the countermeasure proposals selected by the countermeasure proposal selecting means to each countermeasure stage indicated by the countermeasure stage transition rule according to a predetermined condition, the countermeasure countermeasure for deviation is determined at the timing of deviation. And a countermeasure scenario generation means for generating a countermeasure scenario indicating whether to execute
請求項 1から請求項 3のうちのいずれか 1項に記載のセキュリティリスク管理システム  The security risk management system according to any one of claims 1 to 3.
[5] 前記対策ステージ遷移ルールに従って、少なくとも対象システムの状態変化、現在 時刻、または対策を実施したときからの経過時間に基づいて、前記対策シナリオ生成 手段によって生成された対策シナリオ上で対策ステージを遷移させることによって、 実行する対策案を決定する対策実行決定手段を備えた [5] According to the countermeasure stage transition rule, the countermeasure stage is set on the countermeasure scenario generated by the countermeasure scenario generation means based on at least the state change of the target system, the current time, or the elapsed time since the countermeasure was implemented. Measure execution decision means that decides the countermeasure plan to be executed by making a transition
請求項 4に記載のセキュリティリスク管理システム。  The security risk management system according to claim 4.
[6] 対象システムにおけるセキュリティリスクを管理するセキュリティリスク管理システムで あって、  [6] A security risk management system for managing security risks in the target system,
リスク管理の対象とする前記対象システムと、前記対象システムと通信ネットワーク を介して接続されるリスク管理装置とを備え、  The target system for risk management, and a risk management device connected to the target system via a communication network,
前記対象システムは、  The target system is:
当該対象システムの脆弱性の有無を判定し、判定結果を前記リスク管理システムに 送信する現状分析手段と、  A current state analysis means for determining whether the target system has a vulnerability and transmitting the determination result to the risk management system;
当該対象システムの価値を判定し、判定結果を前記リスク管理システムに送信する 資産分析手段とを有し、  Asset analysis means for determining the value of the target system and transmitting the determination result to the risk management system;
前記リスク管理装置は、 前記対象システムから、当該対象システムの脆弱性の有無を示す脆弱性情報と、 当該対象システムの価値を示す資産情報とを収集する情報収集手段と、 セキュリティリスクを判定するためのリスクモデルとして、少なくともセキュリティ上の 各脅威の発生頻度を示す情報である脅威モデルと、前記脅威モデルで示される各 脅威について、脅威の顕在化に係る各脆弱性の有無の関係性を示す情報である脅 威一脆弱性モデルと、前記脅威モデルで示される各脅威について、脅威の顕在化 による前記対象システムの資産への影響度を示す情報である脅威 資産モデルとを 記憶するリスクモデル記憶手段と、 The risk management device includes: Information collection means for collecting vulnerability information indicating the presence or absence of the vulnerability of the target system and asset information indicating the value of the target system from the target system, and at least as a risk model for determining security risk, The threat model, which is the information indicating the frequency of occurrence of each threat in security, and the threat that is the information indicating the relationship between the existence of each vulnerability related to the manifestation of the threat for each threat indicated in the threat model A risk model storage means for storing, for each threat indicated in the threat model, a threat asset model, which is information indicating the degree of influence on the assets of the target system due to the manifestation of the threat,
対策手段を決定するための対策モデルとして、少なくとも前記脅威 脆弱性モデ ルで示される各脆弱性に対し、実施しうる対策手段を示す情報である脆弱性一対策 モデルと、前記脆弱性一対策モデルで示される各対策手段について、当該対策手 段の各種制約度を示す情報である対策 制約モデルとを記憶する対策モデル記憶 手段と、  As a countermeasure model for determining countermeasure means, a vulnerability one countermeasure model that is information indicating countermeasure means that can be implemented at least for each vulnerability indicated by the threat vulnerability model, and the vulnerability one countermeasure model. A countermeasure model storage means for storing a countermeasure constraint model, which is information indicating the degree of various constraints of the countermeasure means,
前記情報収集手段によって収集された脆弱性情報および資産情報を、前記リスク モデル記憶手段に記憶されている各モデルを用いて分析することによって、前記対 象システムにおける各脅威の発生頻度と、各脅威に対する脆弱性の大きさと、各脅 威が顕在化した際の前記対象システムの資産への影響度とに基づくリスク値を算出 するリスク分析手段と、  By analyzing the vulnerability information and asset information collected by the information collection means using each model stored in the risk model storage means, the frequency of occurrence of each threat in the target system and each threat A risk analysis means for calculating a risk value based on the magnitude of the vulnerability of the target system and the degree of impact on the assets of the target system when each threat becomes apparent;
前記リスク分析手段によって算出されたリスク値が所定の許容範囲を超えた場合に 、前記対策モデル格納手段に記憶されている各モデルを用いて、存在が発見された 脆弱性に対する対策手段を分析することによって、実施後のリスク値および各種制約 度が所定の条件に合致する対策手段を、対策案として選定する対策案生成手段とを 有する  When the risk value calculated by the risk analysis means exceeds a predetermined allowable range, the countermeasure means for the vulnerability found to exist is analyzed using each model stored in the countermeasure model storage means Therefore, there is a countermeasure plan generation means for selecting a countermeasure measure whose risk value and various degrees of restriction after the implementation meet predetermined conditions as a countermeasure plan.
ことを特徴とするセキュリティリスク管理システム。  Security risk management system characterized by this.
対象システムにおけるセキュリティリスクを管理するセキュリティリスク管理装置であ つて、  A security risk management device that manages security risks in the target system.
前記対象システムの状態に基づ 、て、前記対象システムのセキュリティリスクを判定 するリスク判定手段と、 前記リスク判定手段によってセキュリティリスクが所定の許容範囲を超えていると判 定された場合に、前記対象システムに所定の対策を実施することによって低減するセ キユリティリスクの度合 、を示すリスク低減度と、前記所定の対策を実施することによ つて前記対象システムに生じる各種制約の大きさを示す制約度とに基づいて、前記 セキュリティリスクを低減するための対策案を選定する対策案選定手段とを備えた ことを特徴とするセキュリティリスク管理装置。 A risk determining means for determining a security risk of the target system based on a state of the target system; Degree of risk reduction that indicates the degree of security risk that is reduced by implementing predetermined measures on the target system when it is determined by the risk determination means that the security risk exceeds a predetermined allowable range. And a measure plan selecting means for selecting a measure plan for reducing the security risk based on the degree of restriction indicating the size of various constraints generated in the target system by implementing the predetermined measure. A security risk management device characterized by comprising:
[8] 前記対策案選定手段によって選定された対策案について、当該対策のリスク低減 度と、当該対策のそれぞれの制約度とを含む対策案情報を出力する対策案情報出 力手段と、  [8] With regard to the countermeasure proposal selected by the countermeasure proposal selection means, countermeasure proposal information output means for outputting countermeasure proposal information including the risk reduction degree of the countermeasure and the degree of restriction of each countermeasure;
前記対策案選定手段によって選定された対策案に従って、セキュリティリスクを低 減するための所定の処理を実行する対策実行手段とを備えた  Measure execution means for executing predetermined processing for reducing security risk in accordance with the measure proposal selected by the measure proposal selection means.
請求項 7に記載のセキュリティリスク管理装置。  The security risk management device according to claim 7.
[9] 前記リスク判定手段は、対象システムの脆弱性の有無と、前記対象システムの資産 価値と、予めセキュリティ上の脅威の発生頻度を定義した脅威モデルと、予め脆弱性 の有無による脅威の顕在化に係る脆弱性と脅威との関係を予め定義した脅威 脆 弱性モデルと、予め脅威の顕在化による資産への影響度に係る脅威と資産との関係 を定義した脅威 資産モデルとに基づ!/、て、前記対象システムのセキュリティリスク の度合いを示すリスク値を算出し、 [9] The risk determination means includes the presence / absence of vulnerability in the target system, the asset value of the target system, a threat model in which the occurrence frequency of security threats is defined in advance, and the manifestation of threats due to the presence / absence of vulnerability in advance. Based on a threat vulnerability model that predefines the relationship between the vulnerabilities and threats related to escalation and a threat asset model that defines the relationship between threats and assets related to the impact of asset manifestation in advance. ! /, Calculate a risk value indicating the degree of security risk of the target system,
前記対策案選定手段は、予め各脆弱性によるセキュリティリスクを低減するための 対策手段を定義した脆弱性一対策モデルと、予め各対策手段を実施することによつ て前記対象システムに生じる各種制約の大きさを示す制約度を定義した対策 制約 モデルとに基づ!/、て、実施後のリスク値および各種制約度が所定の条件に合致する 対策手段を、対策案として選定する  The countermeasure proposal selection means includes a vulnerability one countermeasure model that defines countermeasure means for reducing the security risk due to each vulnerability in advance, and various restrictions that occur in the target system by implementing each countermeasure means in advance. Based on the countermeasure constraint model that defines the degree of constraint that indicates the size of the project! /, Select countermeasure measures that meet the specified conditions for the risk value and various restrictions after implementation.
請求項 7または請求項 8に記載のセキュリティリスク管理装置。  The security risk management device according to claim 7 or 8.
[10] 対策の実施段階に応じて定義される対策ステージであって、実施する対策が対応 づけられる各対策ステージにつ 、て、対策ステージからの遷移条件を定義した対策 ステージ遷移ルールを記憶する記憶手段と、 [10] Measure stage transition rules that define transition conditions from the countermeasure stage are stored for each countermeasure stage that is defined according to the implementation stage of the countermeasure and to which the countermeasure to be implemented is associated. Storage means;
前記対策案選定手段によって選定された対策案のうちのいずれかを、所定の条件 に従って、前記対策ステージ遷移ルールで示される各対策ステージに割り当てること によって、 、ずれの対策案を 、ずれのタイミングで実行するかを示す対策シナリオを 生成する対策シナリオ生成手段とを備えた Any of the countermeasure proposals selected by the countermeasure proposal selecting means is determined according to a predetermined condition. And a countermeasure scenario generation means for generating a countermeasure scenario indicating whether the countermeasure plan for deviation is executed at the timing of deviation by assigning to each countermeasure stage indicated by the countermeasure stage transition rule according to
請求項 7から請求項 9のうちのいずれか 1項に記載のセキュリティリスク管理装置。  The security risk management device according to any one of claims 7 to 9.
[11] 前記対策ステージ遷移ルールに従って、少なくとも対象システムの状態変化、現在 時刻、または対策を実施したときからの経過時間に基づいて、前記対策シナリオ生成 手段によって生成された対策シナリオ上で対策ステージを遷移させることによって、 実行する対策案を決定する対策実行決定手段を備えた [11] According to the countermeasure stage transition rule, the countermeasure stage is set on the countermeasure scenario generated by the countermeasure scenario generation means based on at least the state change of the target system, the current time, or the elapsed time since the countermeasure was implemented. Measure execution decision means that decides the countermeasure plan to be executed by making a transition
請求項 10に記載のセキュリティリスク管理装置。  The security risk management device according to claim 10.
[12] 対象システムにおけるセキュリティリスクを管理するセキュリティリスク管理装置であ つて、 [12] A security risk management device that manages security risks in the target system.
前記対象システムから、当該対象システムの脆弱性の有無を示す脆弱性情報と、 当該対象システムの価値を示す資産情報とを収集する情報収集手段と、 セキュリティリスクを判定するためのリスクモデルとして、少なくともセキュリティ上の 各脅威の発生頻度を示す情報である脅威モデルと、前記脅威モデルで示される各 脅威について、脅威の顕在化に係る各脆弱性の有無の関係性を示す情報である脅 威一脆弱性モデルと、前記脅威モデルで示される各脅威について、脅威の顕在化 による前記対象システムの資産への影響度を示す情報である脅威 資産モデルとを 記憶するリスクモデル記憶手段と、  Information collection means for collecting vulnerability information indicating the presence or absence of the vulnerability of the target system and asset information indicating the value of the target system from the target system, and at least as a risk model for determining security risk, The threat model, which is the information indicating the frequency of occurrence of each threat, and the threat, which is the information indicating the relationship between the existence of each vulnerability related to the manifestation of the threat, for each threat indicated in the threat model A risk model storage means for storing, for each threat indicated in the threat model, a threat asset model, which is information indicating the degree of influence on the assets of the target system due to the manifestation of the threat,
対策手段を決定するための対策モデルとして、少なくとも前記脅威 脆弱性モデ ルで示される各脆弱性に対し、実施しうる対策手段を示す情報である脆弱性一対策 モデルと、前記脆弱性一対策モデルで示される各対策手段について、当該対策手 段の各種制約度を示す情報である対策 制約モデルとを記憶する対策モデル記憶 手段と、  As a countermeasure model for determining countermeasure means, a vulnerability one countermeasure model that is information indicating countermeasure means that can be implemented at least for each vulnerability indicated by the threat vulnerability model, and the vulnerability one countermeasure model. A countermeasure model storage means for storing a countermeasure constraint model, which is information indicating the degree of various constraints of the countermeasure means,
前記情報収集手段によって収集された脆弱性情報および資産情報を、前記リスク モデル記憶手段に記憶されている各モデルを用いて分析することによって、前記対 象システムにおける各脅威の発生頻度と、各脅威に対する脆弱性の大きさと、各脅 威が顕在化した際の前記対象システムの資産への影響度とに基づくリスク値を算出 するリスク分析手段と、 By analyzing the vulnerability information and asset information collected by the information collection means using each model stored in the risk model storage means, the frequency of occurrence of each threat in the target system and each threat The risk value is calculated based on the degree of vulnerability to the system and the degree of impact on the assets of the target system when each threat becomes apparent Risk analysis means to
前記リスク分析手段によって算出されたリスク値が所定の許容範囲を超えた場合に 、前記対策モデル格納手段に記憶されている各モデルを用いて、存在が発見された 脆弱性に対する対策手段を分析することによって、実施後のリスク値および各種制約 度が所定の条件に合致する対策手段を、対策案として選定する対策案生成手段とを 備えた  When the risk value calculated by the risk analysis means exceeds a predetermined allowable range, the countermeasure means for the vulnerability found to exist is analyzed using each model stored in the countermeasure model storage means Therefore, a countermeasure plan generation means is provided for selecting a countermeasure measure that has a risk value after implementation and various restrictions satisfying predetermined conditions as a countermeasure measure.
ことを特徴とするセキュリティリスク管理装置。  Security risk management apparatus characterized by the above.
[13] 対象システムにおけるセキュリティリスクを管理するセキュリティリスク管理方法であ つて、  [13] A security risk management method for managing security risks in the target system.
前記対象システムの状態を分析する状態分析ステップと、  A state analysis step of analyzing the state of the target system;
前記分析結果に基づ 、て、前記対象システムのセキュリティリスクを判定するリスク 判定ステップと、  A risk determination step of determining a security risk of the target system based on the analysis result; and
前記セキュリティリスクが所定の許容範囲を超えていると判定された場合に、前記対 象システムに所定の対策を実施することによって低減するセキュリティリスクの度合い を示すリスク低減度と、所定の対策を実施することによって前記対象システムに生じる 各種制約の大きさを示す制約度とに基づいて、前記セキュリティリスクを低減するた めの対策案を選定する対策案選定ステップとを含む  When it is determined that the security risk exceeds a predetermined allowable range, the risk reduction degree indicating the degree of the security risk to be reduced by implementing the predetermined countermeasure on the target system and the predetermined countermeasure are implemented. And a measure plan selection step for selecting a measure plan for reducing the security risk based on the degree of constraint indicating the size of various constraints generated in the target system.
ことを特徴とするセキュリティリスク管理方法。  Security risk management method characterized by the above.
[14] 前記選定された対策案について、当該対策のリスク低減度と、当該対策のそれぞ れの制約度とを含む対策案情報を出力する対策案情報出力ステップと、 [14] For the selected countermeasure plan, a countermeasure plan information output step for outputting countermeasure plan information including the risk reduction degree of the countermeasure and the degree of constraint of the countermeasure,
前記選定された対策案に従って、セキュリティリスクを低減するための所定の処理を 実行する対策実行ステップとを含む  A countermeasure execution step for executing a predetermined process for reducing the security risk according to the selected countermeasure plan
請求項 13に記載のセキュリティリスク管理方法。  The security risk management method according to claim 13.
[15] 前記状態分析ステップで、少なくとも対象システムの脆弱性の有無と、対象システム の価値とを分析し、 [15] In the state analysis step, at least the presence / absence of the vulnerability of the target system and the value of the target system are analyzed,
前記リスク判定ステップで、前記対象システムの脆弱性の有無と、前記対象システ ムの資産価値と、予めセキュリティ上の脅威の発生頻度を定義した脅威モデルと、予 め脆弱性の有無による脅威の顕在化に係る脆弱性と脅威との関係を予め定義した 脅威 脆弱性モデルと、予め脅威の顕在化による資産への影響度に係る脅威と資 産との関係を定義した脅威 資産モデルとに基づいて、前記対象システムのセキユリ ティリスクの度合いを示すリスク値を算出し、 In the risk determination step, the presence / absence of vulnerabilities in the target system, the asset value of the target system, the threat model in which the occurrence frequency of security threats is defined in advance, and the manifestation of threats due to the presence / absence of vulnerabilities in advance Predefined relationship between vulnerability and threat Threat A risk value that indicates the degree of security risk of the target system based on the vulnerability model and the threat asset model that defines the relationship between the asset and the threat related to the impact on the asset due to the manifestation of the threat. To calculate
前記対策案選定ステップで、予め各脆弱性によるセキュリティリスクを低減するため の対策手段を定義した脆弱性一対策モデルと、予め各対策手段を実施することによ つて前記対象システムに生じる各種制約の大きさを示す制約度を定義した対策 制 約モデルとに基づいて、実施後のリスク値および各種制約度が所定の条件に合致す る対策手段を、対策案として選定する  In the countermeasure proposal selection step, a vulnerability one countermeasure model that defines countermeasure means for reducing security risks due to each vulnerability in advance, and various restrictions that occur in the target system by implementing each countermeasure means in advance. Based on the countermeasure constraint model that defines the degree of constraint indicating the magnitude, select countermeasure measures that meet the prescribed conditions for the risk value and various restrictions after implementation.
請求項 13または請求項 14に記載のセキュリティリスク管理方法。  15. The security risk management method according to claim 13 or claim 14.
[16] 前記選定された対策案のうちのいずれかを、所定の条件に従って、対策の実施段 階に応じて定義される対策ステージであって、実施する対策が対応づけられる各対 策ステージにつ 、て、対策ステージからの遷移条件を定義した対策ステージ遷移ル ールで示される各対策ステージに割り当てることによって、 、ずれの対策案を!、ずれ のタイミングで実行するかを示す対策シナリオを生成する対策シナリオ生成ステップ を含む [16] Any of the selected countermeasure proposals is a countermeasure stage that is defined according to the implementation stage of the countermeasure according to a predetermined condition, and is applied to each countermeasure stage to which the countermeasure to be implemented is associated. Therefore, by assigning to each countermeasure stage indicated by the countermeasure stage transition rule that defines the transition conditions from the countermeasure stage, a countermeasure scenario that indicates whether or not to implement the countermeasure for deviation is executed at the timing of deviation. Including countermeasure scenario generation step to generate
請求項 13から請求項 15のうちのいずれか 1項に記載のセキュリティリスク管理方法  The security risk management method according to any one of claims 13 to 15.
[17] 前記対策ステージ遷移ルールに従って、少なくとも対象システムの状態変化、現在 時刻、または対策を実施したときからの経過時間に基づいて、前記対策シナリオ上で 対策ステージを遷移させることによって、実行する対策案を決定する対策実行決定ス テツプを含む [17] A countermeasure to be executed by transitioning the countermeasure stage on the countermeasure scenario based on at least the state change of the target system, the current time, or the elapsed time since the countermeasure was implemented, according to the countermeasure stage transition rule. Includes steps to determine the implementation of measures
請求項 16に記載のセキュリティリスク管理方法。  The security risk management method according to claim 16.
[18] 対象システムにおけるセキュリティリスクを管理するセキュリティリスク管理方法であ つて、  [18] A security risk management method for managing security risks in the target system.
前記対象システムが、当該対象システムの脆弱性の有無を判定し、判定結果を前 記リスク管理システムに送信するステップと、  The target system determines whether there is a vulnerability in the target system, and transmits the determination result to the risk management system;
前記対象システムが、当該対象システムの価値を判定し、判定結果を前記リスク管 理システムに送信するステップと、 リスク管理装置が、前記対象システムから、当該対象システムの脆弱性の有無を示 す脆弱性情報と、当該対象システムの価値を示す資産情報とを収集するステップと、 リスク管理装置が、前記情報収集手段によって収集された脆弱性情報および資産 情報を、セキュリティ上の各脅威の発生頻度を示す情報である脅威モデルと、前記脅 威モデルで示される各脅威について、脅威の顕在化に係る各脆弱性の有無の関係 性を示す情報である脅威 脆弱性モデルと、前記脅威モデルで示される各脅威に っ 、て、脅威の顕在化による前記対象システムの資産への影響度を示す情報である 脅威 資産モデルとを用いて分析することによって、前記対象システムにおける各脅 威の発生頻度と、各脅威に対する脆弱性の大きさと、各脅威が顕在化した際の前記 対象システムの資産への影響度とに基づくリスク値を算出するステップと、 The target system determining the value of the target system and transmitting the determination result to the risk management system; A step in which the risk management device collects vulnerability information indicating whether or not there is a vulnerability in the target system and asset information indicating the value of the target system from the target system, and the risk management device collects the information Vulnerability information and asset information collected by means of a threat model, which is information indicating the frequency of occurrence of each security threat, and each vulnerability related to the manifestation of threats for each threat indicated in the threat model. Threats, which are information indicating the relationship between the presence of threats and threats, which are information indicating the degree of impact on the assets of the target system due to the manifestation of threats, for each threat indicated by the threat model Analysis using a model, the frequency of occurrence of each threat in the target system, the magnitude of the vulnerability to each threat, and the Calculating the risk value based on the degree of influence asset serial systems,
リスク管理装置が、算出された前記リスク値が所定の許容範囲を超えた場合に、前 記脅威 脆弱性モデルで示される各脆弱性に対し、実施しうる対策手段を示す情報 である脆弱性一対策モデルと、前記脆弱性一対策モデルで示される各対策手段に ついて、当該対策手段の各種制約度を示す情報である対策 制約モデルとを用い て、存在が発見された脆弱性に対する対策手段を分析することによって、実施後のリ スク値および各種制約度が所定の条件に合致する対策手段を、対策案として選定す るステップとを含む  When the calculated risk value exceeds a predetermined allowable range, the risk management device is a vulnerability list that is information indicating countermeasures that can be implemented for each vulnerability indicated in the threat vulnerability model. Using the countermeasure model and the countermeasure countermeasure model indicated by the vulnerability-one countermeasure model, the countermeasure constraint model, which is information indicating the degree of various restrictions of the countermeasure means, is used to determine the countermeasure means against the vulnerabilities that have been discovered. And selecting the countermeasure means that the risk value and various restrictions after implementation meet the specified conditions by analyzing as a countermeasure plan.
ことを特徴とするセキュリティリスク管理方法。  Security risk management method characterized by the above.
対象システムにおけるセキュリティリスクを管理するためのセキュリティリスク管理プロ グラムであって、  A security risk management program for managing security risks in a target system,
コンピュータに、  On the computer,
前記対象システムの状態を分析する状態分析処理、  A state analysis process for analyzing the state of the target system;
分析結果に基づ ヽて、前記対象システムのセキュリティリスクを判定するリスク判定 処理、および  A risk determination process for determining the security risk of the target system based on the analysis result; and
前記セキュリティリスクが所定の許容範囲を超えていると判定された場合に、前記対 象システムに所定の対策を実施することによって低減するセキュリティリスクの度合い を示すリスク低減度と、所定の対策を実施することによって前記対象システムに生じる 各種制約の大きさを示す制約度とに基づいて、前記セキュリティリスクを低減するた めの対策案を選定する対策案選定処理 When it is determined that the security risk exceeds a predetermined allowable range, the risk reduction degree indicating the degree of the security risk to be reduced by implementing the predetermined countermeasure on the target system and the predetermined countermeasure are implemented. To reduce the security risk based on the degree of restriction indicating the size of various restrictions generated in the target system. Measures selection process for selecting measures
を実行させるためのセキュリティリスク管理プログラム。  Security risk management program to execute.
[20] コンピュータに、  [20] On the computer,
前記選定された対策案について、当該対策のリスク低減度と、当該対策のそれぞ れの制約度とを含む対策案情報を出力する対策案情報出力処理、および  About the selected countermeasure plan, countermeasure plan information output processing for outputting countermeasure plan information including the risk reduction degree of the countermeasure and the degree of constraint of the countermeasure, and
前記選定された対策案に従って、セキュリティリスクを低減するための所定の処理を 実行する対策実行処理を実行させるための  In order to execute a countermeasure execution process for executing a predetermined process for reducing the security risk in accordance with the selected countermeasure plan
請求項 19に記載のセキュリティリスク管理プログラム。  20. The security risk management program according to claim 19.
[21] コンピュータに、 [21] On the computer,
前記状態分析処理で、少なくとも対象システムの脆弱性の有無と、対象システムの 価値とを分析し、  In the state analysis process, at least analyze whether the target system is vulnerable and the value of the target system,
前記リスク判定処理で、前記対象システムの脆弱性の有無と、前記対象システムの 資産価値と、予めセキュリティ上の脅威の発生頻度を定義した脅威モデルと、予め脆 弱性の有無による脅威の顕在化に係る脆弱性と脅威との関係を予め定義した脅威 脆弱性モデルと、予め脅威の顕在化による資産への影響度に係る脅威と資産との 関係を定義した脅威 資産モデルとに基づ!/、て、前記対象システムのセキュリティリ スクの度合いを示すリスク値を算出させ、  In the risk judgment process, whether the target system is vulnerable, the asset value of the target system, a threat model in which the frequency of security threats is defined in advance, and the threat manifesting in advance based on the presence of vulnerability Based on a threat vulnerability model that predefines the relationship between vulnerabilities and threats, and a threat asset model that predefines the relationship between threats and assets related to the impact of asset realizations! / And calculating a risk value indicating the degree of security risk of the target system,
前記対策案選定処理で、予め各脆弱性によるセキュリティリスクを低減するための 対策手段を定義した脆弱性一対策モデルと、予め各対策手段を実施することによつ て前記対象システムに生じる各種制約の大きさを示す制約度を定義した対策 制約 モデルとに基づ!/、て、実施後のリスク値および各種制約度が所定の条件に合致する 対策手段を、対策案として選定させるための  In the countermeasure proposal selection process, a vulnerability-one countermeasure model that defines countermeasure means for reducing the security risk due to each vulnerability in advance, and various restrictions that occur in the target system by implementing each countermeasure means in advance. Based on the countermeasure constraint model that defines the degree of constraint indicating the size of the !!, the countermeasure means that the risk value after implementation and the degree of restriction meet the specified conditions is selected as a countermeasure plan.
請求項 19または請求項 20に記載のセキュリティリスク管理プログラム。  21. The security risk management program according to claim 19 or claim 20.
[22] コンピュータに、 [22] On the computer,
前記選定された対策案のうちのいずれかを、所定の条件に従って、対策の実施段 階に応じて定義される対策ステージであって、実施する対策が対応づけられる各対 策ステージにつ 、て、対策ステージからの遷移条件を定義した対策ステージ遷移ル ールで示される各対策ステージに割り当てることによって、 、ずれの対策案を!、ずれ のタイミングで実行するかを示す対策シナリオを生成する対策シナリオ生成処理を実 行させるための One of the selected countermeasure proposals is a countermeasure stage defined according to the implementation stage of the countermeasure in accordance with a predetermined condition, and for each countermeasure stage to which the countermeasure to be implemented is associated. By assigning to each countermeasure stage indicated by the countermeasure stage transition rule that defines the transition conditions from the countermeasure stage, the deviation countermeasure proposal! To generate the countermeasure scenario generation process that generates the countermeasure scenario that indicates when to execute
請求項 19から請求項 21のうちのいずれか 1項に記載のセキュリティリスク管理プロ グラム。  The security risk management program according to any one of claims 19 to 21.
[23] コンピュータに、 [23] On the computer,
前記対策ステージ遷移ルールに従って、少なくとも対象システムの状態変化、現在 時刻、または対策を実施したときからの経過時間に基づいて、前記対策シナリオ上で 対策ステージを遷移させることによって、実行する対策案を決定する対策実行決定 処理を実行させるための請求項 22に記載のセキュリティリスク管理プログラム。  In accordance with the countermeasure stage transition rule, the countermeasure plan to be executed is determined by transitioning the countermeasure stage on the countermeasure scenario based on at least the state change of the target system, the current time, or the elapsed time since the countermeasure was implemented. 23. The security risk management program according to claim 22, wherein the countermeasure execution decision process is executed.
[24] 対象システムにおけるセキュリティリスクを管理するためのセキュリティリスク管理プロ グラムであって、 [24] A security risk management program for managing security risks in the target system,
コンピュータに、  On the computer,
前記対象システムから、当該対象システムの脆弱性の有無を示す脆弱性情報と、 当該対象システムの価値を示す資産情報とを収集する処理、  A process of collecting vulnerability information indicating whether or not there is a vulnerability in the target system and asset information indicating the value of the target system from the target system;
前記情報収集手段によって収集された脆弱性情報および資産情報を、セキュリティ 上の各脅威の発生頻度を示す情報である脅威モデルと、前記脅威モデルで示され る各脅威について、脅威の顕在化に係る各脆弱性の有無の関係性を示す情報であ る脅威 脆弱性モデルと、前記脅威モデルで示される各脅威について、脅威の顕在 化による前記対象システムの資産への影響度を示す情報である脅威 資産モデル とを用いて分析することによって、前記対象システムにおける各脅威の発生頻度と、 各脅威に対する脆弱性の大きさと、各脅威が顕在化した際の前記対象システムの資 産への影響度とに基づくリスク値を算出する処理、および  Vulnerability information and asset information collected by the information collection means are classified into threat models, which are information indicating the frequency of occurrence of security threats, and threats that are manifested for each threat indicated by the threat models. Threats that are information indicating the relationship between the existence of each vulnerability Vulnerability models and threats that are information indicating the impact on the assets of the target system due to the manifestation of threats for each threat indicated in the threat model Analysis using the asset model, the frequency of occurrence of each threat in the target system, the level of vulnerability to each threat, and the degree of impact on the asset of the target system when each threat becomes apparent Processing to calculate a risk value based on
算出された前記リスク値が所定の許容範囲を超えた場合に、前記脅威 脆弱性モ デルで示される各脆弱性に対し、実施しうる対策手段を示す情報である脆弱性一対 策モデルと、前記脆弱性一対策モデルで示される各対策手段について、当該対策 手段の各種制約度を示す情報である対策 制約モデルとを用いて、存在が発見さ れた脆弱性に対する対策手段を分析することによって、実施後のリスク値および各種 制約度が所定の条件に合致する対策手段を、対策案として選定する処理 を実行させるためのセキュリティリスク管理プログラム。 When the calculated risk value exceeds a predetermined allowable range, a vulnerability countermeasure model that is information indicating countermeasures that can be implemented for each vulnerability indicated by the threat vulnerability model; and By analyzing the countermeasures for the vulnerabilities whose existence has been discovered by using the countermeasure constraint model, which is information indicating the degree of various restrictions of the countermeasure means, for each countermeasure means indicated by the vulnerability one countermeasure model, Processing to select countermeasure measures that meet the specified conditions for risk values and various restrictions after implementation as countermeasure measures Security risk management program to execute.
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