WO2008000165A1 - Procédé et système de fourniture de clé dans un réseau sans fil - Google Patents

Procédé et système de fourniture de clé dans un réseau sans fil Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2008000165A1
WO2008000165A1 PCT/CN2007/001959 CN2007001959W WO2008000165A1 WO 2008000165 A1 WO2008000165 A1 WO 2008000165A1 CN 2007001959 W CN2007001959 W CN 2007001959W WO 2008000165 A1 WO2008000165 A1 WO 2008000165A1
Authority
WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
key
user
user equipment
management entity
mobility management
Prior art date
Application number
PCT/CN2007/001959
Other languages
English (en)
French (fr)
Inventor
Weihua Hu
Jing Chen
Original Assignee
Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. filed Critical Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.
Priority to EP20164415.0A priority Critical patent/EP3700127B1/en
Priority to EP17176519.1A priority patent/EP3252992B1/en
Priority to EP18199994.7A priority patent/EP3461058B1/en
Priority to EP07721532.5A priority patent/EP2034658B1/en
Publication of WO2008000165A1 publication Critical patent/WO2008000165A1/zh

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Classifications

    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
    • H04L9/0819—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s)
    • H04L9/083—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s) involving central third party, e.g. key distribution center [KDC] or trusted third party [TTP]
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/06—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network
    • H04L63/061—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network for key exchange, e.g. in peer-to-peer networks
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
    • H04L9/0838—Key agreement, i.e. key establishment technique in which a shared key is derived by parties as a function of information contributed by, or associated with, each of these
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/04—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
    • H04W12/043—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA] using a trusted network node as an anchor
    • H04W12/0431—Key distribution or pre-distribution; Key agreement
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W84/00—Network topologies
    • H04W84/02—Hierarchically pre-organised networks, e.g. paging networks, cellular networks, WLAN [Wireless Local Area Network] or WLL [Wireless Local Loop]
    • H04W84/04—Large scale networks; Deep hierarchical networks

Definitions

  • the present invention relates to the field of wireless communications, and in particular, to a key distribution method and system in a wireless communication network. Background technique
  • 3GPP With the rapid growth of IP-based services and traffic, the access technology of 3GPP is gradually unable to adapt to this change.
  • access technologies such as Wireless Local Area Network (LAN) and Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave Access (WiMAX) have emerged, posing a direct threat to 3GPP networks.
  • LAN Wireless Local Area Network
  • WiMAX Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave Access
  • 3GPP began to consider the long-term evolution of 3GPP network access technology, especially the packet switching technology implemented in the 3GPP system, so that the 3GPP access system is in a leading position in terms of performance and cost.
  • the current wireless evolution network architecture is shown in Figure 1.
  • the main entity of the core network is the Mobility Management Entity (MME). This entity is responsible for the mobility management of the control plane, including user context and mobility state management. Identity, security, etc.;
  • UPE User Plane Entity
  • IASA Inter AS Anchor, inter-system anchor point
  • UPE may exist alone or as an entity with MME. It is also possible for the UPE to be combined with IASA as an entity. It is also possible for the UPE to move down to the access network and to synthesize an entity with the e B of the access network. The function and existence of each interface in the figure has not yet been finalized.
  • User information is stored in the Home Subscriber Server (HSS).
  • HSS Home Subscriber Server
  • the technology evolution of the 3GPP network mainly includes reducing delay and response time, increasing user data rate, enhancing system capacity and coverage, and reducing operator cost.
  • User security mechanisms in evolved networks must ensure that they provide at least the same level of security requirements as current 2G and 3G systems.
  • the secure endpoint is located in the Radio Network Controller (R C ).
  • the user equipment and RNC perform encryption/decryption and integrity protection operations to provide confidentiality protection for user data and confidentiality protection and integrity protection for signaling between user equipment and RC.
  • the user equipment and the RNC only need to use one encryption key CK and one integrity protection key IK.
  • the encryption key and integrity key are distributed as follows:
  • the user equipment and the network perform the authentication process. After the authentication ends, the user equipment and the mobile service switching center/visit location register (MSC/VLR) in the core network obtain the keys CK and IK.
  • MSC/VLR mobile service switching center/visit location register
  • the MSC/VLR or Serving GPRS Support Node (SGSN) in the core network sends the keys CK and IK to the RNC.
  • SGSN Serving GPRS Support Node
  • a wireless evolved network there may be three different security associations to protect the security of the access layer signaling, the non-access stratum signaling, and the user data, that is, the security of the user plane and the security of the access layer signaling plane.
  • non-access layer signaling plane security The security of the user plane is terminated in the core network or the access network, and the access layer signaling and the non-access stratum signaling of the signaling plane are terminated in the access network and the core network respectively.
  • the security of the user plane is terminated on the UPE of the core network or the base station of the access network, and the security of the access layer signaling is terminated on the base station of the wireless evolved network access network, and the security of the non-access layer signaling is It has not yet decided which device on the core network to terminate on the MME, or it may end up on the IASA. Therefore, in a wireless evolved network, the above three sets of keys related to user plane security and signaling plane security need to be distributed to entities and user equipments in the network that perform corresponding security operations.
  • the key distribution method in the existing UMTS system can only derive and distribute a set of keys to entities and user equipments performing security operations in a network. Therefore, for the evolved network, a key derivation and distribution method in the wireless evolution network needs to be developed to ensure the security of the network. Summary of the invention
  • An embodiment of the present invention provides a key distribution method in a wireless communication network, so as to implement Deriving and distributing keys for securing access layer signaling, non-access stratum signaling, and user data security into the network, the method includes the following steps:
  • the network side deduces a key for protecting access layer signaling, non-access stratum signaling, and user data security, and distributes the derived key to an entity in the network that performs corresponding security operations;
  • the user equipment deduces the key for protecting the access layer signaling, the non-access stratum signaling, and the user data security, or receiving the protection access layer signaling, the non-access stratum signaling, and the user that the network side performs The key to data security.
  • Another embodiment of the present invention provides a key distribution system in a wireless communication network, including a network side and a user side, the network side includes a network entity performing security operations, and the network side further includes a key derivation module and a key distribution.
  • Module, user side includes user equipment;
  • the key derivation module is configured to derive a key for protecting access layer signaling, non-access stratum signaling, and user data security;
  • the key distribution module is configured to send the keys that are derived by the key derivation module to the network entity that performs the corresponding security operation;
  • the user equipment is configured to derive a key for protecting access layer signaling, non-access stratum signaling, and user data security, or receiving the protection access layer signaling sent by the key distribution module, Non-access stratum signaling and user data security keys.
  • the key for protecting the access layer signaling, the non-access stratum signaling, and the user data security is deduced by the network side, and the derived key is distributed to the entity in the network to perform the corresponding security operation.
  • the user equipment can also derive the key for protecting the access layer signaling, the non-access stratum signaling, and the user data security by itself, thereby realizing deriving and distributing the protection access layer signaling in the communication network, Access layer signaling and user data security keys, which in turn provide guarantee for network communication security.
  • FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram of a wireless evolution network architecture in the prior art
  • FIG. 2 is a schematic diagram of a key distribution process according to Embodiment 1 of the present invention
  • 3 is a schematic diagram of a HSS or user equipment derivation key according to Embodiment 1 of the present invention
  • FIG. 4 is a schematic diagram of a key distribution process according to Embodiment 2 of the present invention.
  • FIG. 5 is a schematic diagram of a key generated by an HSS or a user equipment in a second embodiment of the present invention
  • FIG. 6 is a schematic diagram of a MME or a user equipment deriving key according to Embodiment 2 of the present invention
  • FIG. 7 is a second embodiment of the present invention
  • 2 is a schematic diagram of a MME or a user equipment derivation key
  • FIG. 8 is a schematic diagram of a key distribution process according to Embodiment 3 of the present invention.
  • FIG. 9 is a schematic structural diagram of a key distribution system of an evolved mobile communication network according to an embodiment of the present invention.
  • FIG. 10 is a schematic structural diagram of a first key distribution system according to an embodiment of the present invention.
  • FIG. 11 is a schematic structural diagram of a second key distribution system according to an embodiment of the present invention.
  • FIG. 12 is a schematic structural diagram of a third key distribution system according to an embodiment of the present invention. detailed description
  • the network side separately deduces the keys for protecting the access layer signaling, the non-access stratum signaling, and the user data security, and then the network side
  • the derived key is distributed to the user equipment and the entity in the network to perform the corresponding security operation, and the user equipment can also derive the key for protecting the access layer signaling, the non-access stratum signaling and the user data security.
  • the network side pushes the performance protection access layer letter. Keys for non-access stratum signaling and user data security, then the network side notifies the user equipment to derive the same key and distributes it by the network side to the entity performing the corresponding security operation; in the second mode The network side pushes a key for protecting access layer signaling, non-access stratum signaling, and user data security. Then, the network side distributes the key to the user equipment and the entity that performs the corresponding security operation.
  • This embodiment describes that the HSS and the user equipment respectively derive keys for securing access layer signaling, non-access stratum signaling, and user data security according to the shared key, and are distributed by the MME to the network entity performing the security operation.
  • FIG. 2 it is a schematic diagram of a key distribution process according to Embodiment 1 of the present invention.
  • the derivation function KGA of the key for deciding the key of the access layer signaling, the non-access stratum signaling and the user data is deprecated in advance on the HSS and the user equipment, and the specific steps of key generation and distribution include :
  • Step 1 The user equipment and the HSS share one or more keys in advance.
  • the way to share a key between the user equipment and the HSS can be achieved by setting the same key on the user equipment and the HSS.
  • the user equipment and the HSS may share one or more keys, a public-private key pair, or a certificate in advance.
  • the user equipment and the HSS share a key K in advance as an example for description.
  • Step 2 The HSS derives a key for protecting access layer signaling, non-access stratum signaling, and user data security.
  • the HSS Based on the pre-shared key K, the HSS derives the keys C as and IKas for protecting the access layer signaling, the keys Cl nas and IKnas for protecting the non-access stratum signaling, and the security of protecting the user data.
  • Keys CCu and Iku where CK is the key that provides confidentiality protection, IK is the key that provides integrity protection, the same below).
  • the key derivation process may also require the participation of some parameters, such as the authentication challenge random number generated by the HSS RANDo
  • the keys can be the same when the entities that perform the security operations are the same.
  • the key for protecting the access layer signaling and protecting the user plane may be the same when the user-secured entity and the access layer security-operating entity are the same. After the entity performing the security operation obtains the key distributed to it, it can be further deduced to be used to protect the access layer signaling, the non-access stratum signaling, and the user plane key.
  • a key that protects the user's face is deduced, and then sent to the entity that performs the user's face security, and the entity that performs the user's face security action can be further derived.
  • the key that is really used to protect the security of the user's face is deduced, and then sent to the entity that performs the user's face security, and the entity that performs the user's face security action.
  • Fig. 3 shows the key derivation mode of the present embodiment, that is, the derivation function KGA and the shared key K and the random number RAN are used to derive the key.
  • KGA1-6 is the derivation function of the key CKas, Ikas, Cknas, Iknas, Cku and Iku, respectively, and the same random number is used for each key derivation process.
  • the derivation can be varied and is not limited to the method shown in FIG.
  • the HSS can generate three sets of keys according to the same random number, or generate three sets of keys according to different random numbers.
  • the HSS can also generate a key for protecting the non-access stratum signaling according to the random number, and use a simple splitting, merging, etc. method to generate a key for protecting the access layer and user data security.
  • the timing at which the HSS derives these keys can be triggered by the request of the MME. For example, after the MME sends the authentication vector request message, the HSS performs key derivation.
  • Step 3 The HSS sends the derived key and the RAND parameter generated by the HSS to the MME. This information can be carried in the authentication vector response message and sent to the MME.
  • Step 4 The MME sends the RAND parameter to the user equipment.
  • This information can be carried in the authentication challenge message and sent to the user equipment.
  • Step 5 The user equipment derives a key for protecting access layer signaling, non-access stratum signaling, and user data security.
  • the user equipment derives the keys CKas and IKas for protecting the access layer signaling, the keys CKnas and IKnas for protecting the non-access stratum signaling, and the protection by the derivation function KGA based on the pre-shared key K and the RAND parameters generated by the HSS.
  • User data security keys CKu and IKu Since the derivation function, shared key, and parameters used in the key derivation process are the same, the key derived by the user equipment is the same as the key derived by the HSS.
  • Figure 3 shows a derivation.
  • the user equipment can be divided into two parts: a smart card and a terminal.
  • the process of deriving the key can be performed in the card, or in the terminal, or can be operated by the terminal and the card.
  • Step 6 The user equipment sends an acknowledgement message to the MME.
  • This confirmation message can be an authentication response message.
  • Step 7 The MME distributes the key it receives from the HSS to the corresponding entity that performs security operations. For example, the keys CKas and IKas that protect the access layer signaling are distributed to the evolved access network, and the keys CKu and IKu that protect the user data are distributed to the user plane entity UPE.
  • the MME may distribute the key received from the HSS to the corresponding entity performing the security operation before sending the RAND to the user equipment.
  • This embodiment describes that the root key is jointly derived by the HSS and the user equipment, and the MME and the user equipment respectively derive the keys for protecting the access layer signaling, the non-access stratum signaling, and the user data according to the root key, by the MME. Distributed to network entities that perform security operations.
  • FIG. 4 is a schematic diagram of a key distribution process according to Embodiment 2 of the present invention.
  • the derivation function HA of the same root key is set in advance on the HSS and the user equipment, and the same protection access layer signaling, non-access stratum signaling, and user data security secret are pre-configured on the MME and the user equipment.
  • the key derivation function MA, the specific steps of its key generation and distribution include:
  • Step 1 The user equipment and the HSS share one or more keys in advance.
  • the way to share a key between the user equipment and the HSS can be achieved by setting the same key on the user equipment and the HSS.
  • the user equipment and the HSS may share one or more keys, a public-private key pair, or a certificate in advance.
  • the user equipment and the HSS share a key K in advance as an example for description.
  • Step 2 The HSS derives the root key.
  • the HSS derives one or more root keys using the root key derivation function HA based on the key K pre-shared with the user equipment.
  • the root key derivation function can be one or more, and the derived root key can be one or more.
  • the root key derivation process may also require the participation of some parameters, such as the RAND generated by the HSS.
  • the root key derivation function HA1 is used to derive the confidential root key CKm, and the HA2 is used to derive the integrity root key Ikm.
  • the derivation mode is as shown in FIG. 5.
  • the derivation of the root key can be in various ways, and is not limited to the method shown in FIG.
  • the timing at which the HSS derives the root key can be triggered by the request of the MME. For example, after the MME sends the authentication vector request message, the HSS performs key derivation.
  • Step 3 The HSS sends the derived root keys CKm and IKm, and the generated RAND to the MME. This information can be carried in the authentication vector response message and sent to the MME.
  • Step 4 The MME derives a key for protecting access layer signaling, non-access stratum signaling, and user data security.
  • the MME Based on the received root keys CKm and IKm, the MME derives the keys CKas and IKas for protecting the access layer signaling, the keys CKnas and IKnas for protecting the non-access stratum signaling, and the protection user by using the derivation function ⁇ 1-6. Data security keys CKu and Iku. Some parameters may be involved in the derivation process, such as the random number RANDmme generated by the MME.
  • Figure 6 and Figure 7 show the derivation of the key, respectively. The difference is that in the mode shown in Figure 6, the derivation process of each key requires the participation of the root key CKm and Ikm; The derivation process of the confidentiality key is derived from the root key CKm, and the derivation process of the integrity key is derived from the root key Ikm.
  • the process by which the MME derives the keys for protecting the access layer signaling, the non-access stratum signaling, and the user data security may be independent or related.
  • the MME may generate three sets of keys according to the same random number, or may generate three sets of keys according to different random numbers.
  • the MME may also generate a key for protecting the non-access stratum signaling according to the random number, and use a simple splitting, merging, etc. method to generate a key for protecting the access layer and user data security.
  • the MME can also directly use the root key as a key to protect non-access stratum signaling or user data security.
  • Step 5 The MME sends the parameter RANDmme and the parameter RAND received from the HSS to the user equipment.
  • This information can be carried in the authentication challenge message and sent to the user equipment.
  • Step 6 The user equipment derives a key for protecting access layer signaling, non-access stratum signaling, and user data security.
  • the user equipment first derives the root key using the root key derivation function HA based on the key K and RAND parameters shared by the user and the HSS. Since the derivation function, shared key and parameters used in the user device root key deduction process are the same as those used by the HSS derivation root key, the root key derived by the user equipment is the same as the root key derived by the HSS. , the deduction can be as shown in Figure 5. The way shown.
  • the user equipment derives the keys CKas and IKas for protecting the access layer signaling by using the derivation function MA1-6 according to the RANDmme parameter, the root key CKm and Ikm generated by the MME, and protects the non-access layer signal.
  • the keys CKnas and IKnas which protect the user data security keys CKu and IKu. Since the derivation function, the shared key, and the parameters used in the key derivation process are the same as those used by the MME derivation key, the key derived by the user equipment is the same as the key derived by the MME, and the derivation manner may be The manner shown in Figures 6 and 7.
  • the user equipment can be divided into two parts: a smart card and a terminal.
  • the process of deriving the root key CKm and Ikm can be performed in the card or in the terminal.
  • the process of deriving CKas, Ikas, Cknas, Iknas, Cku, IKu can be done in the card or in the terminal.
  • Step 7 The user equipment sends an acknowledgement message to the MME.
  • This confirmation information may be an authentication response message.
  • Step 8 The MME distributes the generated key to the corresponding entity that performs security operations, for example, distributes the keys CKas and IKas that protect the access layer signaling to the evolved access network, and protects the key CKu of the user data security.
  • IKu is distributed to the user plane entity UPE.
  • the MME may send the generated key to the corresponding entity performing the security operation before sending the RAND and RANDmme to the user equipment.
  • the user equipment will simultaneously derive the root key and the key for securing the access layer security, non-access stratum security, and user plane security, and the user equipment may also separate the derivation process. That is, the MME first sends the parameter of the root key to the user equipment, and the user equipment derives the root key, and then the MME sends the key of the protection access layer security, the non-access layer security, and the user plane security to the user equipment. The user equipment then derives a key for securing the access layer, non-access layer security, and user plane security based on the root key.
  • FIG. 8 is a schematic diagram of a key distribution process according to Embodiment 3 of the present invention.
  • the derivation root key derivation function HA has been set in advance on the HSS and the user equipment.
  • the specific steps of the key generation and distribution are as follows: Step ⁇ _4, Step 1-4 in the same process as the second embodiment.
  • Step 5 The MME encrypts the key of the protection access layer signaling, the non-access stratum signaling, and the user data security, and sends the encrypted key to the user equipment.
  • the process of deriving the above-mentioned key by the MME is the same as that of the second embodiment, and can also be obtained by any other key derivation.
  • This information can be carried in the authentication challenge message and sent to the user equipment.
  • Step 6 The user equipment derives the root key and parses the received key with the root key.
  • Step 7 The user equipment sends an acknowledgement message to the MME.
  • This confirmation information may be an authentication response message.
  • Step 8 The MME distributes the key to the corresponding entity that performs the security operation.
  • the keys CKas and IKas for protecting the access layer signaling are distributed to the evolved access network, and the keys CKu and IKu for protecting the user data are distributed to the user plane entity UPE.
  • the key distributed by the MME is a key that has not been encrypted by the root key.
  • the MME may send a key to the corresponding entity performing the security operation before sending the encrypted key to the user equipment.
  • the root key is jointly derived by the HSS and the user equipment, and the MME and the user equipment respectively derive the keys for protecting the access layer signaling, the non-access stratum signaling, and the user data according to the root key, by the MME.
  • the network entity performing the security operation further derives a key for protecting the access layer signaling, the non-access stratum signaling, and the user data according to the received key.
  • the entity that performs the access layer security protection and the user plane data security is the same, so the keys for protecting the access layer signaling and the user data are the same.
  • the derivation function of the same root key is set in advance on the HSS and the user equipment.
  • the same protection access layer signaling, non-access stratum signaling, and user data security key are pre-configured on the MME and the user equipment.
  • the derivation function MA, the specific steps of its key generation and distribution include:
  • Step 1 The user equipment and the HSS share one or more keys in advance.
  • the user equipment and the HSS share a key K in advance as an example for description.
  • Step 2 The HSS derives the root key.
  • the HSS derives a root key Km based on the key K pre-shared with the user.
  • Step 3 The HSS sends the derived root key Km and the parameters required by the user equipment to derive Km to the MMEo.
  • Step 4 The MME sends the parameters required for deriving Km to the user equipment.
  • Step 5 The user equipment derives the root key Km.
  • Step 6 The MME derives a key for protecting the access layer signaling, the non-access stratum signaling, and the user data security according to the root key received from the HSS.
  • the MME Based on the received root key Km, the MME derives the keys CKnas and IKnas that protect the non-access stratum signaling, and protects the access layer security and the user data security key Kran. Some parameters may be involved in the derivation process, such as the random number RANDmme generated by the MME.
  • Step 7 The user equipment receives the parameters of the derivation protection access layer signaling, the non-access stratum signaling, and the user data security, and uses the root key Km derived by itself to derive the protection non-access layer signaling security. Keys CKnas and IKnas, the key Kran that protects access layer security and user data security.
  • Step 8 The MME distributes the derived key to an entity that performs non-access stratum signaling security protection, and an entity that performs access layer signaling security protection and user data security protection.
  • the access layer is implemented.
  • the entities for signaling security protection and user data security protection are the same entity). Entities such as user equipment, access layer security, and user data security protection are based on Kran's derivation of keys that are used to secure access layer security and user data, such as CKas, IKas, and CKup.
  • the parameters when the participation of the parameters is required in the process of deriving the key, and the required parameters are provided on the user equipment, the parameters are not required to be sent to the user equipment in the foregoing process, and the foregoing Embodiments 1 to 4 are performed.
  • the securely operated entity obtains the key, it may directly protect the user equipment and the communication between it by using the received key, or may further derive the derived key according to the key, and use the derived key to protect the user equipment and between it. Communication.
  • the received key can be just one key, such as a root key, and not necessarily two keys.
  • the keys that protect non-access stratum signaling and user data security may be the same.
  • CKnas and CKu may be the same. That is, the derivation function of CKnas and CKu is the same between the HSS and the user equipment, and the number of derivation functions that need to be implemented on the user equipment and the HSS can be reduced.
  • the entity performing the security protection of the access layer signaling and the entity performing the user data security protection are one entity, the keys protecting the security of the access layer signaling and the user data may be the same.
  • the keys described in the embodiments may not be required. For example, if access layer signaling does not need to provide confidentiality protection, then the key that protects the access layer signaling security only contains the integrity key IKas. As another example, if the user data does not need to provide integrity protection, then the key protecting the user data contains only the encryption key CKu.
  • the embodiment of the present invention provides a key distribution system in an evolved network, which is described below.
  • FIG. 9 is a schematic structural diagram of a key distribution system in an evolved mobile communication network according to an embodiment of the present invention.
  • the system includes: a network side and a user side, where the user side includes a user equipment, and the network side includes a key derivation module that protects access layer signaling, non-access stratum signaling, and user data security keys, and a key distribution module. Also includes network entities that perform security operations.
  • the key derivation module transmits a key that promotes access layer signaling, non-access stratum signaling, and user data security to the key distribution module.
  • the key distribution module distributes the key it receives to the corresponding network entity that performs the security operation, or further distributes it to the user equipment.
  • the user equipment can also derive keys that protect access layer signaling, non-access stratum signaling, and user data security.
  • Embodiments of the present invention provide three key distribution system structures.
  • FIG. 10 it is a schematic structural diagram of a first key distribution system according to an embodiment of the present invention.
  • the mechanism of the first type of key distribution system corresponds to the key derivation and distribution process described in the first embodiment.
  • the key distribution module is located on the MME.
  • the system includes two identical key derivation modules, which are respectively located on the network side of the HSS and the user equipment, and the key derivation module located on the HSS is connected with the key distribution module located on the MME.
  • the same key derivation algorithm and phase are pre-set in the key derivation module on the HSS and user equipment.
  • the same one or more public or private key pairs or certificates used to derive the key The key derivation module on the HSS and the key derivation module on the user equipment respectively derive the same key for protecting access layer signaling, non-access stratum signaling, and user data security.
  • the key derivation module on the HSS sends its derivation key to the key distribution module on the MME, and distributes the key separately to the network entity performing the corresponding security operation.
  • FIG. 11 is a schematic structural diagram of a second key distribution system according to an embodiment of the present invention.
  • the mechanism of the second key distribution system corresponds to the key derivation and distribution process described in the second embodiment.
  • the key distribution module is located on the MME.
  • Two identical key derivation modules in the system are located at the MME and the user equipment on the network side, and the key derivation module on the MME is connected to the key distribution module on the MME.
  • the system also includes two identical root key derivation modules, which are respectively located on the network side of the HSS and the user equipment, and the root key derivation module on the HSS is connected with the key derivation module on the MME.
  • the same key derivation algorithm and the same public key pair or certificate for deriving the key are set in the key derivation module on the MME and the user equipment; the root key derivation module on the HSS and the user equipment is pre- Set the same key deduction algorithm and the same one or more public or private key pairs or certificates used to derive the root key.
  • the root key derivation module on the HSS and the root key derivation module on the user equipment derive the same root key.
  • the root key derivation module on the HSS sends the derived root key to the key derivation module on the MME.
  • the key derivation module on the MME and the key derivation module on the user equipment derive keys for protecting access layer signaling, non-access stratum signaling, and user data security according to the same root key.
  • the key derivation module on the MME sends the derived key to the key distribution module on the MME, which distributes it separately to the network entity performing the corresponding security operation.
  • FIG. 12 it is a schematic structural diagram of a third key distribution system according to an embodiment of the present invention.
  • the mechanism of the third key distribution system corresponds to the key derivation and distribution process described in the third embodiment.
  • the key distribution module is located on the MME, and the key derivation module is also located on the MME.
  • the system further includes two root key derivation modules, which are respectively located in the HSS and the user equipment, and the root key derivation module on the HSS is connected with the key derivation module on the MME.
  • User equipment in the system also includes a key a decryption module (which may also be a key receiving module), respectively, with a root key derivation module on the user equipment and
  • the key distribution module on the MME is connected.
  • the same key derivation algorithm and the same one or more public-private key pairs or certificates used to derive the root key are pre-set in the root key derivation module on the HSS and the user equipment.
  • the root key derivation module on the HSS and the root key derivation module on the user device derive the same root key.
  • the root key derivation module on the HSS sends the derived root key to the key derivation module on the MME.
  • the key derivation module on the MME derives a key for protecting access layer signaling, non-access stratum signaling, and user data security, and sends the key to the MME.
  • the MME uses the received root key pair.
  • the derived key is encrypted and sent to the key distribution module on the MME, and the distribution module separately distributes the encrypted key to the user equipment, and distributes the unencrypted key to the network entity performing the corresponding security operation. .
  • the key decryption module on the user equipment After receiving the encrypted key by the MME, the key decryption module on the user equipment obtains the root key of the user from the root key derivation module of the user equipment, and decrypts the protection access layer by using the root key. Key to signaling, non-access stratum signaling, and user data security.
  • the key distribution method provided by the embodiment of the present invention implements a key for deriving protection access layer signaling, non-access stratum signaling, and user data security in a wireless evolved network, and distributes the key to the user.
  • the embodiment of the present invention provides a plurality of key derivation and distribution methods, including the HSS and the user equipment on the network side respectively deducing the key, and the MME distributes the network entity to perform the corresponding security operation; or the HSS and the MME on the network side cooperate with each other.
  • the performance key is distributed by the MME to the network entity performing the corresponding security operation, and the user equipment independently pushes the key; or the HSS of the network side cooperates with the MME to derive the key, and the MME distributes the key to the user equipment and the network performing the corresponding security operation. entity.
  • Embodiments of the present invention provide a variety of options that increase the flexibility of the system.

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Description

一种无线通信网络中的密钥分发方法和系统 技术领域
本发明涉及无线通信领域， 尤其涉及一种无线通信网络中的密钥分发方 法和系统。 背景技术
随着基于 IP业务和流量的急剧增长， 3GPP这种接入技术渐渐地不能适 应这种变化。与之对应地，无线局域网（ Wireless Local Area Network, LAN)、 微波存取全球互通 ( Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave Access, WiMAX ) 等接入技术开始兴起， 对 3GPP网络造成了直接的威胁。 为了保证在未来十年 以至更久的时间内 3GPP系统的竟争力， 一个接入技术演进的工作正在 3GPP 組织内部进行。 3GPP开始考虑对 3GPP网络接入技术的长期演进问题， 尤其 是对 3GPP系统内实现的分组交换技术进行增强， 以使得 3GPP接入系统在性 能和成本方面都处于领先地位。
当前无线演进网络架构如图 1 所示， 其核心网主要的实体是移动管理实 体 （Mobility Management Entity, MME ), 此实体负责控制面的移动性管理， 包括用户上下文和移动状态管理， 分配用户临时身份标识、 安全功能等； UPE ( User Plane Entity, 用户面实体） 负责空闲状态下为下行数据发起寻呼， 管 理保存 IP承载参数和网络内路由信息等； IASA ( Inter AS Anchor, 系统间锚 点）则充当不同接入系统间的用户面锚点。 UPE可能单独存在，也可能和 MME 合为一个实体。 UPE也有可能与 IASA合为一个实体， UPE也有可能下移到 接入网， 和接入网的 e B合成一个实体。 图中的各个接口的功能和是否存在 目前还没有最终确定。 用户信息存储于家乡用户服务器 （Home Subscriber Server, HSS )。
, 3GPP的网络的技术演进主要包括減少时延和反应时间、提高用户数据速 率、 增强系统容量和覆盖范围、 降低运营商成本等方面。 在安全方面， 要求 演进网络中的用户安全机制必须保证提供至少和目前 2G和 3G系统相同级别 的安全要求。
目前, 在 UMTS ( Universal Mobile Telecommunication System, 通用移动 通信系统） 系统中， 安全的终结点位于无线网络控制器 （ Radio Network Controller, R C )。 用户设备和 RNC执行加密 /解密和完整性保护操作， 为用 户数据提供机密性保护， 为用户设备和 R C之间交互的信令提供机密性保护 和完整性保护。 这种情况下， 用户设备和 RNC仅需要使用一个加密密钥 CK 和一个完整性保护密钥 IK即可， 其加密密钥和完整性密钥的分发方式如下：
1、 用户设备和网络执行认证过程， 认证结束后用户设备和核心网中的移 动业务交换中心 /访问位置寄存器（MSC/VLR )得到密钥 CK和 IK。
2、 核心网中的设备 MSC/VLR或者服务 GPRS支持节点（ Serving GPRS Support Node, SGSN )将密钥 CK和 IK发送给 RNC。
然而， 在无线演进网络中， 可能有三个不同的安全关联分别来保护接入 层信令、 非接入层信令和用户数据的安全， 即用户面的安全、 接入层信令面 的安全和非接入层信令面的安全。 用户面的安全被终结在核心网或接入网， 信令面的接入层信令和非接入层信令两个部分， 分别终结在接入网和核心网。 具体而言， 用户面的安全终结在核心网的 UPE上或接入网的基站上， 接入层 信令的安全终结在无线演进网络接入网的基站上， 非接入层信令的安全尚未 决定终结在核心网的哪个设备上， 可能终结在 MME上， 也可能终结在 IASA 上。 因此， 在无线演进网络中， 需要将上述三套涉及用户面安全和信令面安 全的密钥分发到网络中执行相应安全操作的实体和用户设备。
现有 UMTS系统中的密钥分发方法只能推演和分发一组密钥给一个网络 中执行安全操作的实体和用户设备。 因此， 针对演进网络， 需要制定一种无 线演进网络中的密钥推演和分发方法， 以保证网络的安全。 发明内容
. 本发明实施例提供了一种无线通信网络中的密钥分发方法， 以实现在演 进网络中推演和分发保护接入层信令、 非接入层信令和用户数据安全的密钥， 该方法包括如下步骤：
网络侧推演保护接入层信令、 非接入层信令和用户数据安全的密钥， 并 将推演出的密钥分发到网络中执行相应安全操作的实体上；
用户设备推演所述保护接入层信令、 非接入层信令和用户数据安全的密 钥， 或接收所述网络侧推演出的保护接入层信令、 非接入层信令和用户数据 安全的密钥。
本发明的另一个实施例提供了一种无线通信网络中的密钥分发系统， 包 括网絡侧和用户侧， 网络侧包括执行安全操作的网络实体， 网络侧还包括密 钥推演模块、 密钥分发模块， 用户侧包括用户设备；
所述密钥推演模块， 用于推演保护接入层信令、 非接入层信令和用户数 据安全的密钥；
所述密钥分发模块， 用于将所述密钥推演模块推演出的所迷密钥分别发 送到所述执行相应安全操作的网络实体；
所述用户设备， 用于推演所述保护接入层信令、 非接入层信令和用户数 据安全的密钥， 或接收所述密钥分发模块发送的所述保护接入层信令、 非接 入层信令和用户数据安全的密钥。
本发明的上述实施例， 通过由网络侧推演保护接入层信令、 非接入层信 令和用户数据安全的密钥， 并将推演出的密钥分发给网络中执行相应安全操 作的实体和用户设备， 用户设备也可以通过自身推演保护接入层信令、 非接 入层信令和用户数据安全的密钥， 从而实现了在通信网络中推演和分发保护 接入层信令、 非接入层信令和用户数据安全的密钥， 进而为网络通信安全提 供了保证。 附图说明
图 1为现有技术中的无线演进网络架构示意图；
图 2为本发明实施例一的密钥分发流程示意图； 图 3为本发明实施例一中 HSS或用户设备推演密钥的示意图；
图 4为本发明实施例二的密钥分发流程示意图；
图 5为本发明实施例二中 HSS或用户设备推演才艮密钥的示意图； 图 6为本发明实施例二中 MME或用户设备推演密钥的示意图之一； 图 7为本发明实施例二中 MME或用户设备推演密钥的示意图之二； 图 8为本发明实施例三的密钥分发流程示意图；
图 9为本发明实施例中演进移动通信网络的密钥分发系统的结构示意图； 图 10为本发明实施例中第一种密钥分发系统的结构示意图；
图 11为本发明实施例中第二种密钥分发系统的结构示意图；
图 12为本发明实施例中第三种密钥分发系统的结构示意图。 具体实施方式
本发明的实施例提供的移动通信网络中的密钥分发方法中 , 网络侧分別 推演出保护接入层信令、 非接入层信令和用户数据安全的密钥， 然后由网络 侧将其推演出的密钥分发到用户设备和网络中执行相应安全操作的实体上， 用户设备也可以独自推演保护接入层信令、 非接入层信令和用户数据安全的 密钥。
本发明实施例中， 保护接入层信令、 非接入层信令和用户数据安全的密 钥的推演及分发方式有两种： 第一种方式中， 网络侧推演出保护接入层信令、 非接入层信令和用户数据安全的密钥， 然后， 网络侧通知用户设备推演出相 同的密钥， 并由网络侧分发到执行相应安全操作的实体上； 在第二种方式中， 网絡侧推演出保护接入层信令、 非接入层信令和用户数据安全的密钥， 然后， 网络侧将密钥分别分发到用户设备和执行相应安全操作的实体上。
其中， 网络侧推演用于保护接入层信令、 非接入层信令和用户数据安全 的密钥有两种方法， 一种方法是网络侧的保存用户信息的服务器直接推演得 到保护接入层信令、 非接入层信令和用户数据安全的密钥； 另一种方法是网 络侧的保存用户信息的服务器和移动管理实体协同工作， 推演得到保护接入 层信令、 非接入层信令和用户数据安全的密钥。
下面结合附图对本发明实施例进行详细描述。
实施例一
本实施例描述由 HSS和用户设备根据共享密钥分别推演得到保护接入层 信令、非接入层信令和用户数据安全的密钥， 并由 MME分发给执行安全操作 的网络实体。
参见图 2, 为本发明实施例一的密钥分发流程示意图。 HSS和用户设备上 预先已设置有 ^据共享密钥推演保护接入层信令、 非接入层信令和用户数据 安全的密钥的推演函数 KGA, 其密钥生成和分发的具体步骤包括：
步骤 1、 用户设备和 HSS预先共享一个或多个密钥。
在用户设备和 HSS上共享密钥的方式可以通过在用户设备和 HSS上设置 相同的密钥实现。 用户设备和 HSS可预先共享一个或多个密钥、 公私钥对或 证书等， 本实施例中以用户设备和 HSS预先共享一个齊钥 K为例进行描述。
步骤 2、 HSS推演保护接入层信令、非接入层信令和用户数据安全的密钥。
HSS根据预先共享的密钥 K,利用推演函数 KGA推演得到保护接入层信 令的密钥 C as和 IKas、保护非接入层信令的密钥 Cl nas和 IKnas、保护用户 数据安全的密钥 CKu和 Iku (其中 CK为提供机密性保护的密钥， IK为提供 完整性保护的密钥， 以下同）。 密钥推导过程还可能需要一些参数的参与， 如 HSS生成的鉴权挑战随机数 RANDo
这里仅仅给出了一个保护接入层信令， 保护非接入层信令， 保护用户面 密钥的例子。 但是并没有列出全部的情况， 在某些情况下， 如用户面仅仅需 要机密性保护的情况下， 仅仅需要推演 CKu。 当执行安全搡作的实体相同时， 密钥也可以相同。 如用户面安全操作的实体和接入层安全操作的实体相同时， 保护接入层信令和保护用户面的密钥可以相同。 执行安全操作的实体得到分 发给它的密钥后， 可进一步推演得到真正用于保护接入层信令、 非接入层信 令、 用户面密钥。 如， 推演出一个保护用户面的密钥， 然后将其发送给执行 用户面安全搡作的实体上， 执行用户面安全搡作的实体可以进一步推演得到 真正用于保护用户面安全的密钥。
图 3给出了本实施例的密钥推演方式，即由推演函数 KGA以及共享密钥 K和随机数 RAN 推演密钥。 其中， KGA1-6分别是上迷密钥 CKas、 Ikas、 Cknas、 Iknas、 Cku和 Iku的推演函数， 每个密钥的推演过程都使用相同的随 机数。 推演方式可以多种多样， 不限于图 3所示的方式。 例如， HSS可以根 据同一个随机数来生成三组密钥， 也可以根据不同的随机数来生成三组密钥。 HSS还可以根据随机数来生成保护非接入层信令的密钥， 利用简单的拆分， 合并等方法来生成保护接入层和用户数据安全的密钥。
HSS推演这些密钥的时机可以由 MME的请求触发。 例如， MME发送认 证向量请求消息后， HSS进行密钥推演。
步骤 3、 HSS将推演得到的密钥和 HSS生成的 RAND参数发送给 MME。 这些信息可以携带在认证向量响应消息中发送给 MME。
步骤 4、 MME将 RAND参数发送给用户设备。
此信息可以携带在鉴权挑战消息中发给用户设备。
步骤 5、用户设备推演保护接入层信令、非接入层信令和用户数据安全的 密钥。
用户设备根据预先共享的密钥 K和 HSS生成的 RAND参数，利用推演函 数 KGA推演得到保护接入层信令的密钥 CKas和 IKas、保护非接入层信令的 密钥 CKnas和 IKnas、 保护用户数据安全的密钥 CKu和 IKu。 由于密钥推演 过程所采用的推演函数、 共享密钥和参数都相同， 因此， 用户设备推演出的 密钥与 HSS推演出的密钥相同。 如图 3给出了一种推演方式。
用户设备可以分为智能卡和终端两部分， 推演密钥的过程可以在卡内进 行， 也可以在终端内进行， 也可以由终端和卡协同操作。
步骤 6、 用户设备发送确认消息给 MME。
此确认消息可以是鉴权响应消息。
步骤 7、 MME将其从 HSS接收到的密钥分发给对应的执行安全搡作的实 体。 例如将保护接入层信令的密钥 CKas、 IKas分发给演进接入网， 将保护用 户数据安全的密钥 CKu、 IKu分发给用户面实体 UPE。
上述流程中， MME可以在发送 RAND给用户设备之前， 或同时， 将其 从 HSS接收到的密钥分发给对应的执行安全操作的实体。
实施例二
本实施例描述由 HSS和用户设备协同推演得到根密钥， 由 MME和用户 设备根据根密钥分别推演得到保护接入层信令、 非接入层信令和用户数据的 密钥， 由 MME分发给执行安全操作的网络实体。
参见图 4， 为本发明实施例二的密钥分发流程示意图。 HSS和用户设备上 预先已设置有相同的根密钥的推演函数 HA, 在 MME和用户设备上预先巳设 置有相同的保护接入层信令、 非接入层信令和用户数据安全的密钥的推演函 数 MA, 其密钥生成和分发的具体步骤包括：
步骤 1、 用户设备和 HSS预先共享一个或多个密钥。
在用户设备和 HSS上共享密钥的方式可以通过在用户设备和 HSS上设置 相同的密钥实现。 用户设备和 HSS可预先共享一个或多个密钥、 公私钥对或 证书等， 本实施例中以用户设备和 HSS预先共享一个密钥 K为例进行描述。
步骤 2、 HSS推演根密钥。
HSS根据与用户设备预先共享的密钥 K, 利用根密钥推演函数 HA推演 得到一个或多个根密钥。 根密钥推演函数可以为一个或多个， 推演出的根密 钥可以为一个或多个。 根密钥推导过程还可能需要一些参数的参与， 如 HSS 生成的 RAND。 本实施例中， 根密钥推演函数 HA1 用于推演机密性根密钥 CKm, HA2用于推演完整性根密钥 Ikm, 推演方式如图 5所示。 根密钥的推 演方式可以有多种方式， 不限于图 5所示的方式。
HSS推演根密钥的时机可以由 MME的请求触发。 例如， MME发送认证 向量请求消息后， HSS进行密钥推演。
步骤 3、 HSS将推演得到的根密钥 CKm和 IKm, 以及生成的 RAND发 送给 MME。 这些信息可以携带在认证向量响应消息中发送给 MME。
步骤 4、 MME推演保护接入层信令、 非接入层信令和用户数据安全的密 钥。
MME根据接收到的根密钥 CKm和 IKm, 利用推演函数 ΗΑ1-6， 推演得 到保护接入层信令的密钥 CKas和 IKas、 保护非接入层信令的密钥 CKnas和 IKnas、 保护用户数据安全的密钥 CKu和 Iku。 在推演过程中可能需要一些参 数的参与， 如 MME生成的随机数 RANDmme。
图 6和图 7分别给出了密钥的推演方式， 区别在于， 图 6所示的方式中， 每个密钥的推演过程都需要根密钥 CKm和 Ikm的参与； 图 7所示的方式中 , 机密性密钥的推演过程根据根密钥 CKm推演得到， 完整性密钥的推演过程才艮 据根密钥 Ikm推演得到。
推演方式可以有多种， 不限于图 6和图 7所示的方式。 MME推演保护接 入层信令、 非接入层信令、 用户数据安全的密钥的过程可以独立， 也可以相 关。 例如， MME可以根据同一个随机数来生成三组密钥， 也可以根据不同的 随机数来生成三组密钥。 MME还可以根据随机数来生成保护非接入层信令的 密钥， 利用简单的拆分， 合并等方法来生成保护接入层和用户数据安全的密 钥。 MME也可以直接利用根密钥作为保护非接入层信令或用户数据安全的密 钥。
步驟 5、 MME将参数 RANDmme、 从 HSS接收到的参数 RAND发送给 用户设备。
这些信息可以携带在鉴权挑战消息中发送给用户设备。
步骤 6、 用户设备推演保护接入层信令、 非接入层信令和用户数据安全的 密钥。
用户设备首先根据用户与 HSS预先共享的密钥 K和 RAND参数，利用根 密钥推演函数 HA推演得到根密钥。 由于用户设备根密钥推演过程所采用的 推演函数、 共享密钥和参数都与 HSS推演根密钥所采用的相同， 因此， 用户 设备推演出的根密钥与 HSS推演出的根密钥相同， 推演方式可以为如图 5所 示的方式。
推演出根密钥后， 用户设备根据 MME生成的 RANDmme参数、 根密钥 CKm和 Ikm, 利用推演函数 MA1-6推演得到保护接入层信令的密钥 CKas和 IKas, 保护非接入层信令的密钥 CKnas和 IKnas, 保护用户数据安全的密钥 CKu和 IKu。由于密钥推演过程所采用的推演函数、共享密钥和参数都与 MME 推演密钥所采用的相同， 因此，用户设备推演出的密钥与 MME推演出的密钥 相同， 推演方式可以为如图 6和图 7所示的方式。
用户设备可以分为智能卡和终端两部分,推演根密钥 CKm和 Ikm的过程 , 可以在卡内进行， 也可以在终端内进行。 推演 CKas、 Ikas、 Cknas、 Iknas、 Cku、 IKu的过程可以在卡内进行， 也可以在终端内进行。
步骤 7、 用户设备发送确认消息给 MME。
此确认信息可以是鉴权响应消息。
步骤 8、 MME将其生成的密钥分发给对应的执行安全操作的实体， 例如 将保护接入层信令的密钥 CKas、 IKas分发给演进接入网， 将保护用户数据安 全的密钥 CKu、 IKu分发给用户面实体 UPE。
上述流程中， MME可以在下发 RAND和 RANDmme给用户设备之前， 或同时， 发送其生成的密钥给对应的执行安全操作的实体。
本实施例中用户设备将同时推演根密钥和保护接入层安全、 非接入层安 全和用户面安全的密钥，用户设备也可以将推演过程分开。即 MME先将推演 根密钥的参数发给用户设备，用户设备推演得到根密钥，然后 MME再将推演 保护接入层安全、 非接入层安全和用户面安全的密钥发送给用户设备， 用户 设备再根据根密钥推演得到保护接入层安全、 非接入层安全和用户面安全的 密钥。
实施例三
本实施例描述由 HSS和 UPE协同推演得到根密钥， 由 MME推演出保护 接入层信令、 非接入层信令和用户数据的密钥， 并用根密钥进行加密后分发 给用户设备和执行安全操作的网络实体。 参见图 8， 为本发明实施例三的密钥分发流程示意图。 HSS和用户设备上 预先已设置有推演根密钥推演函数 HA, 其密钥生成和分发的具体步骤包括： 步骤 ι_4、 同实施例二流程中的步骤 1-4。
步骤 5、 MME利用根密钥对其推演出的保护接入层信令、 非接入层信令 和用户数据安全的密钥进行加密， 并将加密后的密钥发送给用户设备。 MME 推演上述密钥的过程同实施例二， 也可以通过其他任何密钥推演方式得到。
这些信息可以携带在鉴权挑战消息中发送给用户设备。
步骤 6、 用户设备推演出根密钥， 并用根密钥解析接收到的密钥。
步骤 7、 用户设备发送确认消息给 MME。
此确认信息可以是鉴权响应消息。
步骤 8、 MME将密钥分发给对应的执行安全操作的实体。
例如将保护接入层信令的密钥 CKas、 IKas分发给演进接入网， 将保护用 户数据安全的密钥 CKu、 IKu分发给用户面实体 UPE。 MME分发的密钥是没 有经过根密钥加密的密钥。
上述流程中， MME可以在发送加密后的密钥给用户设备之前， 或同时， 发送密钥给对应的执行安全操作的实体。
实施例四
本实施例描述由 HSS和用户设备协同推演得到根密钥， 由 MME和用户 设备根据根密钥分别推演得到保护接入层信令、 非接入层信令和用户数据的 密钥， 由 MME分发给执行安全操作的网络实体。执行安全操作的网络实体根 据接收到的密钥， 进一步推演得到保护接入层信令、 非接入层信令和用户数 据的密钥。 在本实施例中， 执行接入层安全保护和用户面数据安全的实体相 同， 因此保护接入层信令和用户数据的密钥相同。
HSS和用户设备上预先已设置有相同的根密钥的推演函数， 在 MME和 用户设备上预先已设置有相同的保护接入层信令、 非接入层信令和用户数据 安全的密钥的推演函数 MA, 其密钥生成和分发的具体步骤包括：
步骤 1、 用户设备和 HSS预先共享一个或多个密钥。 本实施例中以用户设备和 HSS预先共享一个密钥 K为例进行描述。
步骤 2、 HSS推演根密钥。
HSS根据与用户预先共享的密钥 K, 推演得到一个根密钥 Km。
步骤 3、 HSS将推演得到的根密钥 Km, 以及用户设备推演 Km所需的参 数发送给 MMEo
步骤 4、 MME将推演 Km所需的参数发送给用户设备。
步骤 5、 用户设备推演得到根密钥 Km。
步骤 6、 MME根据从 HSS接收到的根密钥推演保护接入层信令、非接入 层信令和用户数据安全的密钥。
MME根据接收到的根密钥 Km , 推演得到保护非接入层信令的密钥 CKnas和 IKnas,保护接入层安全和用户数据安全的密钥 Kran。在推演过程中 可能需要一些参数的参与， 如 MME生成的随机数 RANDmme。
步驟 7、用户设备接收到推演保护接入层信令、非接入层信令和用户数据 安全的参数， 并利用其自身推演出的根密钥 Km推演得到保护非接入层信令 安全的密钥 CKnas和 IKnas， 保护接入层安全和用户数据安全的密钥 Kran。
步骤 8、MME将推演出的密钥分发给执行非接入层信令安全保护的实体， 以及执行接入层信令安全保护和用户数据安全保护的实体（本实施例中， 执 行接入层信令安全保护和用户数据安全保护的实体为同一个实体）。 用户设 备、 执行接入层安全保护和用户数据安全保护的实体， 基于 Kran推演得到真 正用于保护接入层安全和用户数据安全的密钥 , 如 CKas、 IKas和 CKup。
上述实施例一至四中， 当推演密钥的过程中需要参数的参与， 并且用户 设备上具备了所需的参数， 则上述流程中不需要向用户设备发送这些参数 上述实施例一至四中， 执行安全操作的实体得到密钥后， 可能直接利用 接收到的密钥保护用户设备和它之间的通信， 也可能根据密钥进一步推演出 衍生密钥， 利用衍生密钥保护用户设备和它之间的通信。 这种情况下， 接收 到的密钥可以仅仅为一个密钥， 如一个根密钥， 而不需要为两个密钥。
如果执行非接入层信令的安全保护的实体和执行用户数据安全保护的实 体是同一个实体， 那么保护非接入层信令和用户数据安全的密钥可能相同。 例如，实施例一中， CKnas和 CKu可能相同。即 HSS和用户设备上推演 CKnas 和 CKu的推演函数相同，用户设备和 HSS上需要实现的推演函数数量可以减 少。 同样， 如果执行接入层信令的安全保护的实体和执行用户数据安全保护 的实体是一个实体， 那么保护接入层信令和用户数据安全的密钥可能相同。
由于并不是所有类型的信息都需要提供机密性保护和完整性保护， 因此 实施例中描述的有些密钥可能并不需要。 例如， 如果接入层信令不需要提供 机密性保护的话， 那么保护接入层信令安全的密钥就仅仅包含完整性密钥 IKas。 又例如， 如果用户数据不需要提供完整性保护的话， 那么保护用户数据 的密钥就仅仅包含加密密钥 CKu。
基于上述演进网络中密钥的推演和分发方法， 本发明实施例提供了一种 演进网络中密钥的分发系统， 下面进行评细描述。
参见图 9,为本发明实施例的演进移动通信网络中的密钥分发系统的结构 示意图。 系统包括： 网络侧和用户侧， 其中， 用户侧包括用户设备， 网络侧 包括保护接入层信令、 非接入层信令和用户数据安全的密钥的密钥推演模块、 密钥分发模块， 还包括执行安全操作的网络实体。 密钥推演模块将推演出保 护接入层信令、 非接入层信令和用户数据安全的密钥发送到密钥分发模块。 密钥分发模块将其接收到的密钥分发到相应的执行安全操作的网络实体， 或 进一步分发到用户设备。 用户设备也可由其自身推演出保护接入层信令、 非 接入层信令和用户数据安全的密钥。
本发明实施例提供三种密钥分发系统结构。
参见图 10, 为本发明实施的第一种密钥分发系统的结构示意图。 第一种 密钥分发系统的机构对应于实施例一所描述的密钥推演及分发流程。
该系统中， 密钥分发模块位于 MME上。 系统中包括两个相同的密钥推演 模块， 分别位于网络侧的 HSS和用户设备， 位于 HSS上的密钥推演模块与位 于 MME上的密钥分发模块连接。
HSS 和用户设备上的密钥推演模块中预先设置相同的密钥推演算法和相 同的用于推演密钥的一个或多个公私钥对或证书。 HSS 上的密钥推演模块和 用户设备上的密钥推演模块分别推演出相同的保护接入层信令、 非接入层信 令和用户数据安全的密钥。
HSS上的密钥推演模块将其推演出密钥发送到 MME上的密钥分发模块， 并通过该模块将密钥分别分发到执行相应安全操作的网络实体上。
参见图 11 , 为本发明实施例的第二种密钥分发系统的结构示意图。 第二 种密钥分发系统的机构对应于实施例二所描述的密钥推演及分发流程。
该系统中，密钥分发模块位于 MME上。系统中两个相同的密钥推演模块， 分别位于网络侧的 MME和用户设备， MME上的密钥推演模块与该 MME上 的密钥分发模块连接。 系统还包括两个相同的根密钥推演模块， 分別位于网 絡侧的 HSS和用户设备， HSS上的根密钥推演模块与 MME上的密钥推演模 块连接。
MME 和用户设备上的密钥推演模块中设置相同的密钥推演算法和相同 的用于推演密钥的一个或多个公私钥对或证书； HSS 和用户设备上的根密钥 推演模块中预先设置相同的密钥推演算法和相同的用于推演根密钥的一个或 多个公私钥对或证书。
HSS 上的根密钥推演模块和用户设备上的根密钥推演模块推演出相同的 根密钥。 HSS上的根密钥推演模块将推演出的根密钥发送到 MME上的密钥 推演模块。 MME上的密钥推演模块和用户设备上的密钥推演模块根据相同的 根密钥推演出保护接入层信令、 非接入层信令和用户数据安全的密钥。 MME 上的密钥推演模块将推演出的密钥发送到该 MME上的密钥分发模块，由其分 别分发到执行相应安全操作的网络实体。
参见图 12， 为本发明实施例的第三种密钥分发系统的结构示意图。 第三 种密钥分发系统的机构对应于实施例三所描述的密钥推演及分发流程。
该系统中， 密钥分发模块位于 MME上， 密钥推演模块也位于 MME上。 系统还包括两个根密钥推演模块， 分别位于 HSS和用户设备， HSS上的根密 钥推演模块与 MME上的密钥推演模块连接。系统中的用户设备还包括一密钥 解密模块（也可为密钥接收模块）， 分别与用户设备上的根密钥推演模块和
MME上的密钥分发模块连接。
HSS 和用户设备上的根密钥推演模块中预先设置相同的密钥推演算法和 相同的用于推演根密钥的一个或多个公私钥对或证书。 HSS 上的根密钥推演 模块和用户设备上的根密钥推演模块推演出相同的根密钥。 HSS上的根密钥 推演模块将推演出的根密钥发送到 MME上的密钥推演模块。 MME上的密钥 推演模块推演出保护接入层信令、 非接入层信令和用户数据安全的密钥， 发 送到该 MME上的密钥分发模块； MME利用接收到的根密钥对其推演出的密 钥进行加密，也发送到该 MME上的密钥分发模块， 由分发模块分别将加密的 密钥分发到用户设备， 将未加密的密钥分发到执行相应安全操作的网络实体。 用户设备上的密钥解密模块接收到 MME发送加密后的密钥后，从该用户设备 的根密钥推演模块获取其推演出的根密钥， 并利用该根密钥解密出保护接入 层信令、 非接入层信令和用户数据安全的密钥。
通过以上流程描述可知， 本发明实施例提供的密钥分发方法， 实现了在 无线演进网络中推演保护接入层信令、 非接入层信令和用户数据安全的密钥， 并分发到用户设备和执行相应安全操作的网络实体上。 本发明实施例提供了 多种密钥推演及分发方式， 包括网络侧的 HSS和用户设备分别推演出密钥， 由 MME分发到执行相应安全操作的网络实体； 或网络侧的 HSS与 MME协 同推演出密钥， 由 MME分发到执行相应安全操作的网络实体，用户设备独立 推演出密钥； 或网络侧的 HSS与 MME协同推演出密钥， 由 MME分发到用 户设备和执行相应安全操作的网络实体。 本发明实施例提供了多种选择， 提 高了系统的灵活性。
显然， 本领域的技术人员可以对本发明进行各种改动和变型而不脱离本 发明的精神和范围。 这样， 倘若本发明的这些修改和变型属于本发明权利要 求及其等同技术的范围之内， 则本发明也意图包含这些改动和变型在内。

Claims

权 利 要 求
1、 一种无线通信网络中的密钥分发方法， 其特征在于， 包括如下步歌： 网络侧推演保护接入层信令、 非接入层信令和用户数据安全的密钥， 并 将推演出的密钥分发到网絡中执行相应安全操作的实体上；
用户设备推演所述保护接入层信令、 非接入层信令和用户数据安全的密 钥， 或接收所述网络侧推演出的保护接入层信令、 非接入层信令和用户数据 安全的密钥。
2、 如权利要求 1所述的方法， 其特征在于， 网络侧的用户信息存储服务 器和所述用户设备分别推演所述密钥；
所迷用户信息存储服务器将推演出的所述密钥发送到移动管理实体， 所 迷移动管理实体将所述密钥分别发送到执行相应安全操作的实体上。
3、 如权利要求 2所述的方法， 其特征在于， 所述用户信息存储服务器和 所述用户设备推演所述密钥的过程包括：
在所述用户信息存储服务器和所述用户设备上预先设置相同的用于推演 所述密钥的推演算法， 并在两者间共享一个或多个密钥；
所述用户信息存储服务器和所述用户设备分别根据预设的密钥推演算法 和相同的共享密钥推演出所述保护接入层信令、 非接入层信令和用户数据安 全的密钥。
4、 如权利要求 3所述的方法， 其特征在于， 所述用户信息存储服务器和 所述用户设备根据相同的参数推演所述密钥。
5、 如权利要求 4所述的方法， 其特征在于， 当所述用户设备不具备所述 参数时， 所述用户信息存储服务器将所述参数发送到所述移动管理实体， 所 述移动管理实体将所述参数发送到所述用户设备。
6、 如权利要求 4所述的方法， 其特征在于， 所述参数为所述用户信息存 储服务器生成的随机数。
7、 如权利要求 1所述的方法， 其特征在于， 网络侧的移动管理实体和所 述用户设备分别推演出所述密钥；
所述移动管理实体将推演出的所述密钥分别发送到执行相庶安全操作的 实体上。
8、 如权利要求 7所述的方法， 其特征在于， 所述移动管理实体和所述用 户设备推演所述密钥的过程包括：
网络侧的用户信息存储服务器和所述用户设备分别推演出相同的根密 钥， 所述用户信息存储服务器将所述根密钥发送到所述移动管理实体；
所述移动管理实体根据所述根密钥推演所述保护接入层信令、 非接入层 信令和用户数据安全的密钥；
所述用户设备根据其自身推演出的根密钥推演出所述保护接入层信令、 非接入层信令和用户数据安全的密钥。
9、 如权利要求 8所述的方法， 其特征在于， 所述移动管理实体和所述用 户设备根据所述根密钥推演所述保护接入层信令、 非接入层信令和用户数据 安全的密钥的过程包括：
在所述移动管理实体和所述用户设备上预先设置相同的密钥推演算法； 所述移动管理实体和所述用户设备分别根据预设的推演算法和所述根密 钥， 推演出所述保护接入层信令、 非接入层信令和用户数据安全的密钥。
10、 如权利要求 9所述的方法， 其特征在于， 所述移动管理实体和所述 用户设备推演所述密钥时还根据相同的参数。
11、 如权利要求 10所述的方法， 其特征在于， 当所述用户设备不具备所 述参数时， 所述移动管理实体将该参数发送到用户设备。
12、 如权利要求 10所述的方法， 其特征在于， 所述参数为所述移动管理 实体生成的随机数。
13、 如权利要求 8所述的方法， 其特征在于， 所述移动管理实体和所述 用户设备将所述根密钥作为保护非接入层信令或 /和用户数据安全的密钥。
14、 如权利要求 1 所述的方法， 其特征在于， 网络侧的移动管理实体推 演出所述密钥， 并将推演出的所述密钥分别发送到所述用户设备和所述执行 相应安全操作的实体上。
15、 如权利要求 14所述的方法， 其特征在于， 所述移动管理实体将推演 出的所述密钥发送到所述用户设备的过程包括：
所述移动管理实体利用网络侧的用户信息存储服务器推演出的根密钥加 密所述保护接入层信令、 非接入层信令和用户数据安全的密钥， 并将加密后 的密钥发送到所述用户设备；
所述用户设备利用自身推演出的根密钥解密收到的密钥， 得到所述保护 接入层信令、 非接入层信令和用户数据安全的密钥。
16、 如权利要求 8或 15所述的方法， 其特征在于， 所述用户信息存储服 务器和所述用户设备推演所述根密钥的过程包括：
在所述用户信息存储服务器和所述用户设备上预先设置相同的用于推演 根密钥的推演算法， 并在两者间共享一个或多个密钥；
所迷用户信息存储服务器和所述用户设备分别根据预设的根密钥推演算 法和相同的共享密钥推演出所述根密钥。
17、 如权利要求 16所述的方法， 其特征在于， 所述用户信息存储服务器 和所述用户设备推演所述根密钥时还根据相同的参数。
1'8、 如权利要求 17所述的方法， 其特征在于， 当所述用户设备不具备所 述参数时， 所述用户信息存储服务器将所述参数发送到所述移动管理实体， 由所述移动管理实体发送到所述用户设备。
19、 如权利要求 1-15、 17-18任一权项所述的方法， 其特征在于， 所述执 行安全操作的实体和所述用户设备得到所述网络侧的移动管理实体发送的密 钥后进一步包括步骤：
根据接收到的部分或全部密钥推演出衍生密钥， 并将所述衍生密钥作为 保护接入层信令、 非接入层信令和用户数据安全的密钥。
20、 如权利要求 1-15、 17-18任一权项所述的方法， 其特征在于， 所述保 护接入层信令的密钥包括提供机密性保护的密钥或 /和提供完整性保护的密 钥； 所述保护非接入层信令的密钥包括提供机密性保护的密钥或 /和提供完整 性保护的密钥；
所述保护用户数据安全的密钥包括提供机密性保护的密钥或 /和提供完整 性保护的密钥。
21、 如权利要求 1-15、 17-18任一权项所述的方法， 其特征在于， 当执行 所述保护接入层信令、 非接入层信令和用户数据安全中的任何两种不同类型 信息安全保护的实体为同一实体时， 所述不同类型信息的安全保护的密钥相 同。
22、 如权利要求 1-15、 17-18任一权项所述的方法， 其特征在于， 所述用 户设备在其终端部分和 /或智能卡部分进行密钥推演。
23、 '一种无线通信网络中的密钥分发系统， 包括网络侧和用户侧， 网络 侧包括执行安全操作的网络实体， 其特征在于， 网络侧还包括密钥推演模块、 密钥分发模块， 用户侧包括用户设备；
所述密钥推演模块， 用于推演保护接入层信令、 非接入层信令和用户数 据安全的密钥；
所述密钥分发模块， 用于将所述密钥推演模块推演出的所述密钥分别发 送到所述执行相应安全操作的网络实体；
所述用户设备， 用于推演所述保护接入层信令、 非接入层信令和用户数 据安全的密钥， 或接收所述密钥分发模块发送的所述保护接入层信令、 非接 入层信令和用户数据安全的密钥。
―
24、 如权利要求 23所述的系统， 其特征在于， 所迷密钥推演模块集成于 网络侧的用户信息存储服务器， 所述密钥分发模块集成于网络侧的移动管理 实体；
所述用户信息存储服务器上的密钥推演模块将其推演出的所迷密钥发送 到所述移动管理实体上的密钥分发模块， 所述移动管理实体上的密钥分发模 块将所述密钥分别分发到执行相应安全操作的网络实体；
所迷用户设备包括用户侧密钥推演模块， 用于推演与所述用户信息存储 服务器上的密钥推演模块所推演出的密钥相同的密钥。
25、 如权利要求 23所述的系统， 其特征在于， 所述密钥推演模块和所述 密钥分发模块集成于网络侧的移动管理实体；
网络侧还包括根密钥推演模块， 集成于网络侧的用户信息存储服务器， 用于推演根密钥， 并将推演出的根密钥发送到所述移动管理实体上的密钥推 演模块；
所述移动管理实体上的密钥推演模块， 用于才艮据所述艮密钥推演所述保 护接入层信令、 非接入层信令和用户数据安全的密钥；
所述移动管理实体上的密钥分发模块， 用于将所迷密钥推演模块推演出 的密钥分别分发到执行相应安全操作的网络实体；
所述用户设备包括用户侧根密钥推演模块和用户侧密钥推演模块； 所述用户侧根密钥推演模块， 用于推演与所述用户信息存储服务器上的 根密钥推演模块所推演出的根密钥相同的才艮密钥；
所述用户侧密钥推演模块， 用于根据所述用户侧根密钥推演模块推演出 的根密钥 , 推演出与所述用户信息存储服务器上的密钥推演模块所推演出的 密钥相同的密钥。
26、 如权利要求 23所述的系统， 其特征在于， 所述密钥推演模块和密钥 分发模块集成于网络侧的移动管理实体；
网络侧还包括根密钥推演模块， 集成于集成于网絡侧的用户信息存储服 务器， 用于推演根密钥， 并将推演出的根密钥发送到所述移动管理实体上的 密钥分发模块；
所述移动管理实体上的密钥推演模块， 用于推演所述保护接入层信令、 非接入层信令和用户数据安全的密钥， 利用所述根密钥对推演出的密钥进行 加密；
所述移动管理实体上的密钥分发模块， 用于将所述密钥推演模块推演出 的所述密钥分别发送到执行相应安全操作的网络实体， 将加密后的密钥发送 到所述用户设备； 所述用户设备包括用户侧根密钥推演模块和密钥接收模块； 所述用户侧根密钥推演模块， 用于推演与所述用户信息存储服务器上的 根密钥推演模块所推演出的根密钥相同的根密钥；
所述密钥接收模块， 用于接收所述移动管理实体的密钥分发模块发送的 密钥， 并利用所述用户侧根密钥推演模块推演出的根密钥进行解密。
27、 如权利要求 24-26任一权项所述的系统， 其特征在于， 所迷用户侧密 钥推演模块或 /和用户侧根密钥推演模块， 集成于用户设备的终端部分， 或集 成于用户设备的智能卡部分。
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PT3252992T (pt) 2019-04-01
CN101094065A (zh) 2007-12-26
ES2717340T3 (es) 2019-06-20
EP2034658A4 (en) 2010-06-02
PT2775659T (pt) 2016-10-12
EP2034658A1 (en) 2009-03-11
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