WO2007107450A1 - Kryptographisches verfahren mit elliptischen kurven - Google Patents
Kryptographisches verfahren mit elliptischen kurven Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- WO2007107450A1 WO2007107450A1 PCT/EP2007/052075 EP2007052075W WO2007107450A1 WO 2007107450 A1 WO2007107450 A1 WO 2007107450A1 EP 2007052075 W EP2007052075 W EP 2007052075W WO 2007107450 A1 WO2007107450 A1 WO 2007107450A1
- Authority
- WO
- WIPO (PCT)
- Prior art keywords
- elliptic curve
- coordinate
- order
- twisted
- tested
- Prior art date
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Classifications
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F7/00—Methods or arrangements for processing data by operating upon the order or content of the data handled
- G06F7/60—Methods or arrangements for performing computations using a digital non-denominational number representation, i.e. number representation without radix; Computing devices using combinations of denominational and non-denominational quantity representations, e.g. using difunction pulse trains, STEELE computers, phase computers
- G06F7/72—Methods or arrangements for performing computations using a digital non-denominational number representation, i.e. number representation without radix; Computing devices using combinations of denominational and non-denominational quantity representations, e.g. using difunction pulse trains, STEELE computers, phase computers using residue arithmetic
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F7/00—Methods or arrangements for processing data by operating upon the order or content of the data handled
- G06F7/60—Methods or arrangements for performing computations using a digital non-denominational number representation, i.e. number representation without radix; Computing devices using combinations of denominational and non-denominational quantity representations, e.g. using difunction pulse trains, STEELE computers, phase computers
- G06F7/72—Methods or arrangements for performing computations using a digital non-denominational number representation, i.e. number representation without radix; Computing devices using combinations of denominational and non-denominational quantity representations, e.g. using difunction pulse trains, STEELE computers, phase computers using residue arithmetic
- G06F7/724—Finite field arithmetic
- G06F7/725—Finite field arithmetic over elliptic curves
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F3/00—Input arrangements for transferring data to be processed into a form capable of being handled by the computer; Output arrangements for transferring data from processing unit to output unit, e.g. interface arrangements
- G06F3/01—Input arrangements or combined input and output arrangements for interaction between user and computer
- G06F3/03—Arrangements for converting the position or the displacement of a member into a coded form
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F2207/00—Indexing scheme relating to methods or arrangements for processing data by operating upon the order or content of the data handled
- G06F2207/72—Indexing scheme relating to groups G06F7/72 - G06F7/729
- G06F2207/7219—Countermeasures against side channel or fault attacks
Definitions
- the present invention relates to a method for Ermit ⁇ stuffs of elliptic curves, which, in particular of elliptic curves are suitable for cryptographic data processing. Further, the present invention relates to a kryp ⁇ tographisches method and apparatus based on the to-elliptical front selected curves.
- Cryptographic techniques are used to encrypt messages, sign documents, and authenticate people or objects, among other things.
- asymmetric Locks ⁇ are particularly so selungsvon, as well as provide a public key for a user in both a private and secret keys.
- the sender When encrypting a message, the sender obtains the public key of the desired addressee and thus encrypts the message. Only the addressee is there ⁇ able to decrypt the message again with the private key known only to him.
- a Signing a document calculates a elekt ⁇ tronic signature with his private key. Other people can easily verify the signature using the undersigned's public key. However, only signatures can be verified with the public key, which are signed with the associated private key. This unambiguous assignment and the assumption that the private key is kept secret by the signer result in a clear assignment of the signature to the signer and the document.
- authenticating using a challenge-response (request-response) protocol transmits a testing a request to a person and ask it to this on ⁇ ask with the private key of the person to calculate an answer and be returned. A positive authentication occurs in the event that the verifier can verify the returned response with the public key of the person under review.
- the asymmetric cryptography methods are based on a private and a public key, as stated above.
- the public key is generated from the private key by means of a predetermined algorithm.
- Essential for the cryptographic methods is that a reversal, i. H. a determination of the private key from the public key in finite time with the available computing capacity is not manageable. The latter is granted if the key length of the private key reaches a minimum length. The minimum length of the key depends on the algorithms used for encryption and the determination of the public key.
- An elliptic curve E is generally defined by a Weierstrass equation which written as following cubic sliding ⁇ chung:
- the ai are a ⁇ a3 a selected elements of a
- Body K and the pairs (x, y) are hot points of the elliptic curve E and satisfy the Weierstrass equation.
- a finite field K is selected.
- the number of points of the elliptic curve E is finite and is hereinafter referred to as the order ord (E) of the curve E.
- a formal point is introduced at infinity.
- An abelian group structure G can be defined on the set of points of the elliptic curve.
- the operation of the abelian group structure is hereinafter referred to as addition and written additively.
- the addition of two arbitrary points of the elliptic curve clearly gives a third point of this elliptic curve.
- a scalar multiplication can be defined in DIE se, which is defined as multiple addition of a point to itself defi ⁇ .
- P is a point on the elliptic curve E
- s is an integer
- Q sP the s-fold of the point P.
- Q is flat ⁇ if a point of the elliptic curve.
- the determination of the scalar s at given points P and Q is called a discrete logarithm problem for elliptic curves.
- a suitable choice of the body K and the parameters of the elliptic curve E it is impossible with the computer equipment available today to solve the discrete logarithm problem within a reasonable time.
- the security of cryptographic methods using elliptic curves is based on this difficulty.
- a communication user selects a scalar s as his private key and keeps it secret. Furthermore, it generates the public key Q from a starting point P as the scalar multiple of the starting point. With respect to the start point P is agreement between the communication ⁇ participants.
- S is a determination of the private key from the public key Q due to the high computational effort of the discrete logarithm problem does not mög ⁇ Lich and thus granted the security of cryptographic methods with elliptic curves.
- Another requirement of the elliptic curves is that their order is a large prime or the product of a large prime with a small number.
- the parameters ai, a 2, a 3, a 4, a 6, the parameters of the el ⁇ liptica curves.
- the parameters v are all non-squares of the body K if the characteristic of the body K is odd or an element of the body K with trace 1.
- Al ⁇ le these twisted elliptic curves should also have an order according to DE 10161138 Al, the one large prime or the product of a large prime number with a small number.
- the object of the invention is to provide a method which selects elliptic curves which do not permit any conclusion on the private key in side channel attacks.
- this object is achieved by the method having the features of patent claim 1.
- a method for the cryptographic processing of data with the features of claim 4 and a device for Identticiansbes ⁇ actuation of a person or an object with the features of claim 6 also prevent a determination of the private key or a partial determination of the private key by side channel attacks.
- Method for determining an elliptic curve suitable for cryptographic methods comprising the following steps:
- test elliptic curve as the elliptic curve net cryptographic procedures geeig ⁇ when the order of the twisted elliptic curve is a strong prime number.
- the idea underlying the present invention is to provide an elliptic curve only for cryptographic
- a strong prime P is described by the following equation:
- r is a small number, typically in the range up to 255, and q is a large prime.
- the strong prime is a so-called Sophie Germain prime, i. r is 2.
- the elliptic curves and the associated twisted elliptic curves correspond to the definitions given above.
- the present invention prevents page channel attacks based on improperly transmitted x coordinates or malformed incorrectly transmitted x coordinates, these x coordinates not corresponding to any point on the selected elliptic curve.
- the method according to the invention is robust to the extent that even with such x-coordinates no spying or partial determination of the private key by an external device is possible.
- the order of the twisted elliptic curve is calculated by counting a number of points. true, which lie on the twisted elliptic curve.
- the order of the twisted elliptic curve may also be made based on a determination of the order of the elliptic curve and the characteristic of the body. For this purpose, clear mathematical relations between the different orders can be used. The counting of the dots is done by methods well known to those skilled in the art.
- the elliptic curve to be tested is selected for cryptographic methods only if the order of the elliptic curve to be tested is a strong prime.
- FIG. 1 shows a flow chart of an embodiment of the method according to the invention
- Fig. 2 is a block diagram of an embodiment of the device according to the invention.
- FIG. 3 is a flowchart of an embodiment of the method according to the invention, which is carried out by the devices of FIG. 2.
- FIG. 1 shows a flow chart for illustrating an embodiment of the method according to the invention.
- a pool with elliptic curves E is provided (S1).
- the elliptic curves E are defined over a finite field K.
- the curve E contains a finite number of points P.
- the elliptic curve is defined by the Weierstrass equation and the parameters ai, a 2 , a 3 , a 4 , a 6 .
- corre ⁇ sponding restrictions or changes in the parameterization individual parameters can be zero. The parameters are selected so that the elliptic curves are not singular.
- the order of the elliptic curve is determined (S2).
- the order of the elliptic curve is understood to mean the number of points over a body K that satisfy the Weerrstraß equation. In a geometric interpretation, these are all points P lying on the elliptic curve E.
- the order of the elliptic curve should be a prime number. If a review that this is not a prime number, a different curve E is out of the pool on the ⁇ selected (S8). If the order of the elliptic curve E is confirmed to be prime, a check is made as to whether the order of the elliptic curve is a strong prime (S3). The definition of a strong prime is given above.
- the elliptical curves E that are twisted into the elliptic curve E are checked (S4).
- the definition for the twisted curves E ' is already given above.
- the check is made for all twisted curves E ', i. for all possible parameters v, which are correspondingly not a square or an element with track 1.
- the order of the twisted curve E ' is determined
- the elliptic curve E is selected for a cryptographic method.
- the order of an elliptic curve can be determined by a known counting method. Alternatively it is possible the order about the relationship
- FIG. 2 shows a block diagram of a test object A and a test device B.
- the test object may be, for example, a smart card or an RFID chip.
- the testing device B is the corresponding reading device.
- the test object A has ei ⁇ ne memory device 1, in which a private key KP is held. This private key KP is kept secret and is in no way readable by an external device.
- the parameters required for the parameterization of an elliptic curve E are stored.
- a data processing device 3 performs an encryption algorithm based on the private key and an elliptic curve, which is determined by the parameters which cher worn in the SpeI ⁇ stored second
- the parameters or the elliptic curve are determined by means of the method according to the invention, for example by the exemplary embodiment shown in FIG.
- the test object has a receiving device 4, which can receive an x-coordinate of a point.
- This x coordinate is supplied to the data processing means 3 which carries out the predetermined process from ⁇ . What is special about this method is that it is only applied to the x-coordinate and only requires the x-coordinate of a point.
- the processed or encrypted x-coordinate is output by a transmitting device 5.
- the test object A does not check whether the transmitted x-coordinate can be a valid x-coordinate.
- the test object A does not check whether this x-coordinate is assigned to a point P of the elliptic curve.
- the selected rule ⁇ elliptic curves that are stored in the memory means 2 shall make sure that such an x- Coordinate no spying or partial spying of the private key is possible.
- the tester B has a random number generator 10 which selects an arbitrary point PO from the elliptic curve. This is transmitted by means of a transmitting device 11 to the test object A. Furthermore, the checking device B has a receiving device for receiving the processed x-coordinate Q (x). A data processing device 13 checks the processed x-coordinate on the basis of a public key of the test object A. The public key can either be stored in the test device B or obtained from an external source. If the decrypted value corresponds to the previously randomly generated x-coordinate, it is output at an interface 14 that the identity of the test object A is confirmed.
- a first step S generates a to ⁇ event generator a point PO on the elliptic curve E and transmits the x-coordinate as a request to the test ⁇ object A. This is calculated from the x-coordinate with its private key KP a response (Sil) , Subsequently, the test object transmits the answer Q (x) and possibly also its public key KO. The response is ge by the verifier B using the public key KO ⁇ checked (S12). Upon confirmation of the response, a signal is output that person A is authenticated or identified (S13, S14).
- a suitable elliptic curve is given by way of example.
- the corresponding parameters of the elliptic curve E are:
- the base point P (x, y) is defined by the coordinates
- each point of the elliptic curve E can be represented as a scalar multiple of the base point P.
- the orders of the curves E and the twisted curves E ' have the following value:
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- Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
- General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Computational Mathematics (AREA)
- Mathematical Analysis (AREA)
- Mathematical Optimization (AREA)
- Pure & Applied Mathematics (AREA)
- Mathematical Physics (AREA)
- Computing Systems (AREA)
- Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
- Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
- Software Systems (AREA)
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- Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)
Abstract
Description
Claims
Priority Applications (5)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
CN200780010399XA CN101410792B (zh) | 2006-03-23 | 2007-03-06 | 利用椭圆曲线的密码方法 |
US12/225,480 US8582761B2 (en) | 2006-03-23 | 2007-03-06 | Cryptographic method with elliptical curves |
JP2009501996A JP2009531726A (ja) | 2006-03-23 | 2007-03-06 | 楕円曲線による暗号化方法 |
EP07726643A EP1997000A1 (de) | 2006-03-23 | 2007-03-06 | Kryptographisches verfahren mit elliptischen kurven |
KR1020087025841A KR101391216B1 (ko) | 2006-03-23 | 2008-10-22 | 타원형 곡선들을 사용한 암호화 방법 |
Applications Claiming Priority (2)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
DE102006013515.6 | 2006-03-23 | ||
DE102006013515A DE102006013515A1 (de) | 2006-03-23 | 2006-03-23 | Kryptographisches Verfahren mit elliptischen Kurven |
Publications (1)
Publication Number | Publication Date |
---|---|
WO2007107450A1 true WO2007107450A1 (de) | 2007-09-27 |
Family
ID=38190860
Family Applications (1)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
---|---|---|---|
PCT/EP2007/052075 WO2007107450A1 (de) | 2006-03-23 | 2007-03-06 | Kryptographisches verfahren mit elliptischen kurven |
Country Status (7)
Country | Link |
---|---|
US (1) | US8582761B2 (de) |
EP (1) | EP1997000A1 (de) |
JP (2) | JP2009531726A (de) |
KR (1) | KR101391216B1 (de) |
CN (1) | CN101410792B (de) |
DE (1) | DE102006013515A1 (de) |
WO (1) | WO2007107450A1 (de) |
Cited By (4)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
WO2009118224A1 (de) * | 2008-03-25 | 2009-10-01 | Siemens Aktiengesellschaft | Verfahren zum rechnergestützten ermitteln einer elliptischen kurve für kryptographische anwendungen |
CN102231666A (zh) * | 2011-06-29 | 2011-11-02 | 电子科技大学 | 基于强素数的零知识身份认证方法 |
US8621212B2 (en) | 2009-12-22 | 2013-12-31 | Infineon Technologies Ag | Systems and methods for cryptographically enhanced automatic blacklist management and enforcement |
US8630411B2 (en) | 2011-02-17 | 2014-01-14 | Infineon Technologies Ag | Systems and methods for device and data authentication |
Families Citing this family (1)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
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US9590805B1 (en) * | 2014-12-23 | 2017-03-07 | EMC IP Holding Company LLC | Ladder-based cryptographic techniques using pre-computed points |
Citations (1)
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DE10161138A1 (de) * | 2001-12-12 | 2003-07-03 | Siemens Ag | Verfahren und Vorrichtung zum Ermitteln einer elliptischen Kurve, Verfahren und Vorrichtung zum Multiplizieren eines Punktes mit einem Skalar |
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US5272755A (en) * | 1991-06-28 | 1993-12-21 | Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. | Public key cryptosystem with an elliptic curve |
US5271061A (en) * | 1991-09-17 | 1993-12-14 | Next Computer, Inc. | Method and apparatus for public key exchange in a cryptographic system |
JP3835896B2 (ja) | 1997-07-30 | 2006-10-18 | 富士通株式会社 | 素数生成装置,B−smooth性判定装置及び記録媒体 |
JPH11234259A (ja) | 1998-02-13 | 1999-08-27 | Hitachi Ltd | 相手認証と鍵配送方法とそれを用いた装置、および、暗号通信方法と暗号通信システム |
CA2252078C (en) * | 1998-10-28 | 2009-02-17 | Certicom Corp. | Power signature attack resistant cryptographic system |
FR2791497B1 (fr) * | 1999-03-26 | 2001-05-18 | Gemplus Card Int | Procedes de contre-mesure dans un composant electronique mettant en oeuvre un algorithme de crytographie a cle publique de type courbe elliptique |
FR2791496B1 (fr) * | 1999-03-26 | 2001-10-19 | Gemplus Card Int | Procedes de contre-mesure dans un composant electronique mettant en oeuvre un algorithme de crytographie a cle publique de type courbe elliptique |
US6829356B1 (en) * | 1999-06-29 | 2004-12-07 | Verisign, Inc. | Server-assisted regeneration of a strong secret from a weak secret |
JP2002099211A (ja) * | 2000-09-21 | 2002-04-05 | Sony Corp | 公開鍵証明書発行要求処理システムおよび公開鍵証明書発行要求処理方法 |
DE10161137B4 (de) * | 2001-12-12 | 2008-02-14 | Siemens Ag | Verfahren und System zum kryptographischen Bearbeiten von Daten |
JP2003255831A (ja) | 2002-02-28 | 2003-09-10 | Hitachi Ltd | 楕円曲線スカラー倍計算方法及び装置 |
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2006
- 2006-03-23 DE DE102006013515A patent/DE102006013515A1/de not_active Withdrawn
-
2007
- 2007-03-06 WO PCT/EP2007/052075 patent/WO2007107450A1/de active Application Filing
- 2007-03-06 JP JP2009501996A patent/JP2009531726A/ja active Pending
- 2007-03-06 CN CN200780010399XA patent/CN101410792B/zh not_active Expired - Fee Related
- 2007-03-06 EP EP07726643A patent/EP1997000A1/de not_active Ceased
- 2007-03-06 US US12/225,480 patent/US8582761B2/en active Active
-
2008
- 2008-10-22 KR KR1020087025841A patent/KR101391216B1/ko active IP Right Grant
-
2012
- 2012-03-26 JP JP2012069762A patent/JP2012123426A/ja active Pending
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Cited By (6)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
WO2009118224A1 (de) * | 2008-03-25 | 2009-10-01 | Siemens Aktiengesellschaft | Verfahren zum rechnergestützten ermitteln einer elliptischen kurve für kryptographische anwendungen |
US8621212B2 (en) | 2009-12-22 | 2013-12-31 | Infineon Technologies Ag | Systems and methods for cryptographically enhanced automatic blacklist management and enforcement |
US8630411B2 (en) | 2011-02-17 | 2014-01-14 | Infineon Technologies Ag | Systems and methods for device and data authentication |
US9407618B2 (en) | 2011-02-17 | 2016-08-02 | Infineon Technologies Ag | Systems and methods for device and data authentication |
US9450933B2 (en) | 2011-02-17 | 2016-09-20 | Infineon Technologies Ag | Systems and methods for device and data authentication |
CN102231666A (zh) * | 2011-06-29 | 2011-11-02 | 电子科技大学 | 基于强素数的零知识身份认证方法 |
Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
---|---|
KR101391216B1 (ko) | 2014-05-02 |
JP2012123426A (ja) | 2012-06-28 |
EP1997000A1 (de) | 2008-12-03 |
CN101410792A (zh) | 2009-04-15 |
JP2009531726A (ja) | 2009-09-03 |
KR20080111089A (ko) | 2008-12-22 |
US20090285388A1 (en) | 2009-11-19 |
DE102006013515A1 (de) | 2007-10-04 |
US8582761B2 (en) | 2013-11-12 |
CN101410792B (zh) | 2013-03-06 |
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