WO2006136090A1 - Procede permettant d'empecher une attaque de repetition et procede permettant d'assurer la non repetition de numero de sequence de message - Google Patents

Procede permettant d'empecher une attaque de repetition et procede permettant d'assurer la non repetition de numero de sequence de message Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2006136090A1
WO2006136090A1 PCT/CN2006/001369 CN2006001369W WO2006136090A1 WO 2006136090 A1 WO2006136090 A1 WO 2006136090A1 CN 2006001369 W CN2006001369 W CN 2006001369W WO 2006136090 A1 WO2006136090 A1 WO 2006136090A1
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Prior art keywords
message
sequence number
message sequence
management message
management
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PCT/CN2006/001369
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English (en)
French (fr)
Inventor
Zhengfei Xiao
Yongmao Li
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Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.
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Publication of WO2006136090A1 publication Critical patent/WO2006136090A1/zh

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    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/08Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities

Definitions

  • the present invention relates to techniques for improving the security of wireless communication systems, and more particularly to a technique for preventing replay attacks. Background of the invention
  • security is an important indicator to evaluate the performance of a communication system.
  • the security of wireless communication systems is particularly important because of the openness and mobility of wireless communication systems.
  • the security of wireless communication systems can be improved by encrypting data transmitted over the air interface (referred to as air interface) of the wireless communication system.
  • the IEEE 802.16d/e series of protocols defines the protocol standard for the wireless broadband fixed and mobile access air interface portion.
  • the above series of protocols define a Privacy Sublayer for implementing authentication, key distribution and management, and subsequent data encryption and authentication for users of the wireless communication system.
  • the access method between the access mobile station (MS) and the base station (BS) can be implemented.
  • the Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) can also be used to authenticate access users.
  • the MS and the BS After the authentication is completed, the MS and the BS also need to generate, distribute, and manage the key for encrypting the air interface data through the Key Management Protocol (PKM).
  • PKM Key Management Protocol
  • the result of the above PKM process is to generate one for deriving another between the MS and the BS.
  • AK authentication key
  • the MS and the BS can derive a key used for encrypting data or authenticating signaling messages, thereby improving the security of air interface data transmission between the MS and the BS.
  • the AK of the MS stipulates that the AK generated by the negotiation between the MS and the BS is valid only for a period of time, called the life cycle of the AK. Therefore, before the end of an AK life cycle, the MS and BS corresponding to the AK need to undergo a re-authentication process to generate a new AK. In addition, when the MS roams to the new target BS, it also needs to perform the network re-entry process and generate new key resources or re-authenticate from the back-end network according to the corresponding security policy. Obtain an existing key resource.
  • the above method of encrypting the air interface data between the MS and the BS using the key derived from the AK can improve the security of the wireless communication system, but cannot prevent the replay attack.
  • the replay attack is a common network attack method.
  • the attacker first intercepts the data packet sent by one of the two parties in a certain interaction process, and receives the data packet at a suitable time later. The end resends the intercepted data. If the data packet does not contain enough information to enable the receiving end to determine whether the data packet is the first transmitted packet or the retransmitted data packet, the attacker can impersonate the communication partner.
  • One of the parties deceives the other party to achieve the purpose of attacking the wireless communication system. While general services are less sensitive to replay attacks, replay attacks can be fatal to the system for some important management messages.
  • IEEE 802.16e provides a method for preventing management of message replay attacks in PKM version 2, which implements anti-replay attacks through a protocol-defined encryption-based message authentication code (CMAC) digest (Digest).
  • CMAC protocol-defined encryption-based message authentication code
  • the CMAC Digest consists of a 32-bit message sequence number (CMAC_PN) and a CMAC value (CMAC Value).
  • CMAC_PN message sequence number
  • CMAC Value CMAC value
  • the message sequence number CMAC_PN is incremented on the sender (MS or BS). The changed sequence number is used to identify different management messages.
  • the message sequence number CMAC_PN may represent the uplink message sequence number CMAC PN U or the downlink message sequence number CMAC PN_D;
  • CMAC Value It is a summary of information obtained by encrypting the message sequence number CMAC-PN, management message body and other information with the key derived from AK.
  • the sender when sending a management message, the sender first increments the message sequence number CMAC_PN in the CMAC digest by a certain value, for example 1, and then increments the incremented message sequence number CMAC_PN and the encryption algorithm.
  • the CMAC Value is sent to the receiver as a CMAC Digest.
  • the receiver When receiving the management message, the receiver (BS or MS) first calculates the CMAC Value in the same way as the sender using the key saved by the receiver, and compares it with the CMAC Value carried in the message, thereby implementing the message. Authentication, and judge whether the message is a replay message according to the CMAC_PN.
  • CMAC_PN is a 32-bit unsigned integer whose value space is from 0X00000000 to 0XFFFFFF. If the increment value is 1, it is usually guaranteed that CMAC_PN will not be repeated for a long period of time. However, since CMAC_PN is not directly related to AK in the above method, it may appear in the context of an AK. CMAC_PN starts counting from a large value and counts from the initial value after counting the maximum value. In this case, there is no guarantee that the CMAC_PN always increments upward in the context of an AK, causing the receiver to be very complicated in determining whether the received message is a playback message based on the message sequence number CMAC JPN. Summary of the invention
  • the present invention provides a method for preventing a replay attack, which ensures that the message sequence number used in an AK context is never repeated, so that the receiving end can judge whether the received message is based on the message sequence number. Replay the message.
  • the present invention also provides a method for guaranteeing that the message sequence number used in an AK context is not repeated, avoiding the message sequence number starting from a large value in an AK context, and counting After counting to the maximum value and counting from the initial value
  • the resulting receiver handles complex problems.
  • the method for preventing replay attacks according to the present invention includes:
  • the sending end of the management message establishes a message sequence number parameter according to the message sequence number attribute in the generated AK context, and sets the established message sequence number parameter to an initial value.
  • the sending end of the management message sends a management message carrying a message sequence number parameter to the receiving end of the management message, and the receiving end determines to receive according to the received message sequence number parameter. Whether the management message is a replay message.
  • the authentication may be either an initial access authentication or a re-authentication.
  • Determining, according to the received message sequence number parameter, whether the received management message is a replay message comprises: receiving, by the receiving end, the received message sequence number parameter and the message sequence number of the received management message saved by itself, if If the message sequence number of the received management message saved by itself is the same, it is determined that the received management message is the replayed management message; otherwise, it is determined that it is not the replayed management message.
  • the method of the present invention further includes: in the process of using the AK context to perform a session, the sending end of the management message monitors the value of the message sequence number parameter in real time, and the predetermined time before the message sequence number reaches a predetermined value. Within, initiate the re-authentication process and re-set the message sequence number parameter to the initial value.
  • the sending end of the management message is a mobile station, the receiving end is a base station, the message sequence number is an uplink message sequence number, or the sending end of the management message is a base station, The receiving end is a mobile station, and the message sequence number is a downlink message sequence number.
  • the method for ensuring that a message sequence number is not repeated includes: adding a message sequence number attribute in a context of an AK;
  • the sender of the management message After the authentication between the two parties of the management message is completed, after the AK context is generated, the sender of the management message establishes a message sequence number parameter according to the message sequence number attribute in the generated AK context, and sets the established message sequence number parameter to Initial value.
  • the method further includes: in a process in which the management message interaction party uses the AK context to perform a session, the sending end of the management message monitors a value of the message sequence number parameter in real time, where the message sequence number reaches a predetermined value.
  • the re-authentication process is initiated within the predetermined time, and the message sequence number parameter is set to the initial value.
  • the method for preventing replay attacks adds an uplink message sequence number and a downlink message sequence number to the AK context as an attribute of the AK context, and ensures that after each authentication process is completed, a new one is generated.
  • the uplink and downlink message sequence numbers used by the MS and the BS are correspondingly reset to initial values, thereby ensuring that the uplink and downlink message sequence numbers are always non-repeating in an AK context.
  • the method for preventing a replay attack initiates a re-authentication process to reset the uplink and downlink message sequence numbers to ensure uplink and downlink before the uplink and downlink message sequence numbers reach a predetermined value.
  • the message sequence number is not repeated in an AK context.
  • FIG. 1 is a flowchart of an anti-replay attack method according to the present invention. Mode for carrying out the invention
  • the present invention provides a method for preventing a replay attack and a method for ensuring that a message sequence number of a sent management message is not repeated.
  • Add the uplink and downlink message sequence number attributes in the AK context attribute establish the relationship between the AK and the uplink and downlink message sequence numbers, so that the initial access authentication or re-authentication between the MS and the BS is completed, generating new AK, the uplink and downlink message sequence numbers are also reset to initial values, thereby ensuring that the CMAC-PN used in an AK context is not repeated, for example, it may always be incremented upward or downward, or other correspondences may exist. Wait.
  • the method for preventing replay attacks according to the present invention mainly includes:
  • the message sequence number includes: an uplink message sequence number CMAC_PN_U for identifying an uplink management message and a downlink message sequence number CMAC_PN_D for identifying a downlink management message.
  • the sender of the management message on the air interface including the MS or the BS, establishes a message sequence number parameter according to the AK context, and sets the established message sequence number parameter. Is the initial value.
  • the sender is the MS, and the MS establishes the uplink message sequence number CMAC_PN_U parameter in the AK context.
  • the parameter can be a 32-bit unsigned integer, and the value space is from 0X00000000 to 0XFFFFFFFF.
  • the initial value may be set to 0X00000000 or 0XFFFFFFFF;
  • the sender is the BS, and the BS establishes the downlink message sequence number CMAC_PN_D according to the AK context, and the parameter may also adopt a 32-bit unsigned.
  • An integer whose value space is from 0X00000000 to 0XFFFFFFFFFF.
  • the initial value can also be set to 0X00000000 or 0XFFFFFFFF.
  • an AK context will be generated for the session between the MS and the BS, where the authentication includes initial access authentication and re-authentication, the context Refers to the set of attributes of the session.
  • the AK context includes at least: the life cycle of the AK and AK used by the session, and the uplink message sequence number CMAC_PN_U maintained by the MS and the downlink message maintained by the BS. serial number CMAC - PN - D. Because the AK context has a certain scope and life cycle.
  • the AK context after the AK context is generated, it can only be used within a limited scope, for example, can only be used between the corresponding MS and the BS, and its various attributes are only valid during its lifetime, ie when the AK At the end of the life cycle, the attributes contained in the AK context are also invalidated.
  • the MS automatically resets the uplink message sequence number CMAC_PN_U to the initial value
  • the BS automatically resets the downlink message sequence number CMAC_PN_D to the initial value, thereby ensuring that
  • the uplink message sequence number CMAC_PN_U and the downlink message sequence number CMACJPN-D in an AK context are always not repeated, for example, may be incremented from the initial value or decreased downward. Therefore, the receiving end may judge the message of the received management message.
  • the sequence number matches the message sequence number of the received management message saved by itself to determine whether the received management message is a playback message, thereby greatly reducing the processing of the message sequence number by the receiving end.
  • the sending end of the management message first increments or decrements the message sequence number parameter by a predetermined value, for example 1, and then increments or decrements the message sequence number parameter with
  • the management message is sent to the receiving end together, and the receiving end determines whether the management message is a replay message according to the message sequence number parameter in the received management message, and if yes, discards the management message, otherwise, the management message is received.
  • a predetermined value for example 1
  • the MS and BS use the uplink message sequence number CMAC-PN-U and the downlink message sequence number CMAC-PN-D for the anti-replay attack during the lifetime of an AK context.
  • the MS uses the uplink message sequence number CMAC-PNJJ to identify the uplink management cancellation
  • the information includes: Before sending the uplink management message, the MS first increments or decrements the uplink message sequence number CMAC_PN_U by a certain value, for example 1, and then increments or decrements the CMAC_PN_U and calculates by using an encryption algorithm.
  • the obtained CMAC Value is sent to the BS as a CMAC Digest.
  • the BS After receiving the management message, the BS first calculates the CMAC Value by using the locally stored key and the MS-like method, and compares with the CMAC Value carried in the message. Thereby, the authentication of the message is realized, and at the same time, whether the message is a playback message is determined according to the uplink message sequence number CMAC_PN_U.
  • the method for the BS to use the downlink message sequence number CMAC_PN_D to identify the sent downlink management message is basically the same as the foregoing method, and the method includes: the BS first increments or decrements the downlink message sequence number CMAC_PN_D before sending the downlink management message. For a certain value, the CMAC_PN_D that is incremented or decremented is sent to the MS as a CMAC Digest together with the CMAC Value. After receiving the downlink management message, the MS first calculates the CMAC by using the locally saved key in the same manner as the BS. Value, and compared with the CMAC Value carried in the message, thus achieving the authentication of the message. At the same time, according to the downlink message sequence number CMAC_PN-D, it is judged whether the message is a replay message.
  • the MS and the BS determine whether the received management message is a playback management message according to the uplink message sequence number or the downlink message sequence number. For example, in a preferred embodiment of the present invention, since the sequence number of the message in the management message sent by the sender is incremented or decremented, the receiving end may receive the sequence number of the message in the management message and save it by itself.
  • the management message Receiving a message sequence number of the management message for comparison, if the message sequence number is incremented, when the message sequence number in the received management message is less than or equal to the message sequence number saved by itself, the management message is a playback If the message sequence number is decremented, when the message sequence number in the received management message is greater than or equal to the message sequence number saved by itself, the management message is determined to be a replayed management message. In this way, the receiving end can very easily recognize the replayed management message. It should be noted that the present invention does not matter.
  • the message sequence number may also be changed by other functional relationships, as long as the message sequence number in the received management message is matched with the sequence number of the saved management message, according to the message sequence number. Whether to repeat whether to judge whether the received management message is a playback message.
  • the present invention establishes an association relationship between the AK and the message sequence number by using the message sequence number as an attribute of the AK context, so that the MS and the BS generate a new AK after the authentication is completed, the MS and the MS.
  • the message sequence number maintained by the BS can also be reset to the initial value and incremented or decremented from the initial value during subsequent sessions, ensuring that the message sequence number is always incremented or decremented in an AK context.
  • the method of the present invention further includes:
  • the MS monitors the value of the uplink message sequence number CMAC_PN_U in real time, and initiates a re-authentication process in a predetermined time before the uplink message sequence number CMAC_PN_U reaches a predetermined value. After the re-authentication process is completed, according to the generated The new AK context, the uplink message sequence number CMAC_PN_U parameter maintained by the MS and the downlink message sequence number CMAC_PN_D parameter maintained by the BS will be reset to the initial value.
  • the BS detects the value of the downlink message sequence number CMAC_PN_D in real time, and sends an Authentication Invalid message to the MS within a predetermined time before the downlink message sequence number CMAC_PN_D reaches a predetermined value. Notifying the MS to initiate the re-authentication process, after the re-authentication process is completed, according to the generated, new AK context, the uplink message sequence number CMAC_PN_U parameter maintained by the MS and the downlink message sequence number CMAC_PN_D parameter maintained by the BS will be Reset to the initial value.
  • the predetermined time is the time required to complete the re-authentication process and enable the new AK context. In this way, through the above method, the message sequence in the uplink or downlink can be guaranteed.
  • the MS and the BS can enable the new AK context before the column number reaches the predetermined value, thereby effectively avoiding the repetition of the uplink or downlink message sequence number.
  • the MS immediately encrypts the subsequent session with the new AK.
  • the BS does not immediately use the new AK. It only receives the Key Update Request message sent by the MS, and detects that the CMAC Value in the CMAC Digest carried by the Key Request message is derived from the new AK. After the key is calculated, that is, when the current MS has successfully completed the re-authentication and obtained a new AK, the new AK is used to encrypt the subsequent session and calculate the message check code.

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Description

防止重放攻击的方法以及保证消息序列号不重复的方法 技术领域
本发明涉及到提高无线通信系统安全性的技术, 特别涉及到一种防 止重放攻击的技术。 发明背景
在通信系统中, 安全性是评价一个通信系统性能优劣的重要指标, 特别是在无线通信系统中, 由于无线通信系统具有开放性和移动性的特 点, 使得无线通信系统的安全性显得尤为重要。 随着密码学和密码分析 学的发展, 可以通过对在无线通信系统的空中接口 (简称空口)上传输 的数据进行加密的方式提高无线通信系统的安全性。
IEEE 802.16d/e 系列协议定义了无线宽带固定和移动接入空口部分 的协议标准。 为了保证空口数据传输的安全性, 上述系列协议定义了一 个安全子层 ( Privacy Sublayer ), 用于实现对无线通信系统用户的认证、 密钥的分发和管理以及后续的数据加密和认证等等。 根据协议规定, 在 认证方式上,除了可以使用基于数字证书的 RSA算法(由 Rivest、Shamir、 Adleman开发的公开密钥加密算法)实现对接入移动台( MS )和基站( BS ) 之间的双向认证之外, 还可以使用可扩展认证协议(EAP ) 实现对接入 用户的认证。在认证完成后, MS和 BS还需要通过密钥管理协议( PKM ) 生成、 分发并管理对空口数据进行加密的密钥, 上述 PKM过程的结果 就是在 MS和 BS之间生成一个用于派生其他密钥资源的基本密钥—— 鉴权密钥 (AK, Authorization Key )。 根据生成的 AK, MS和 BS可以 派生出对数据加密或对信令消息认证所使用的密钥,从而提高 MS和 BS 之间空口数据传输的安全性。 为了进一步增强无线通信系统的安全性, 防止网络攻击者恶意破解
MS的 AK, 协议规定 MS和 BS协商产生的 AK仅在一段时间内有效, 称为 AK的生命周期。 因此, 在某个 AK生命周期终止前, 该 AK对应 的 MS和 BS需要进行重认证过程, 以产生新的 AK。 除此之外, 当 MS 漫游到新的目标 BS时, 也需要进行网絡重入(Network Re-entry )过程, 并根据相应的安全策略, 通过重认证产生新的密钥资源或从后端网络获 得已有的密钥资源。
上述这种使用 AK派生出来的密钥对 MS和 BS之间空口数据进行 加密的方法虽然可以提高无线通信系统的安全性, 但是无法防止重放攻 击(Replay Attack )。 所述的重放攻击是一种常见的网络攻击方法, 攻击 者首先截获在通信双方在某次交互过程中由其中一方发送的数据包, 并 在以后某个合适的时机向该数据包的接收端重新发送截获的数据, 如果 在所述数据包中没有包含足够的信息使接收端能够判断出该数据包是 第一次发送的数据包还是重发的数据包, 攻击者就能够冒充通信双方中 的一方来欺骗另一方, 以达到攻击无线通信系统的目的。 虽然一般的业 务对重放攻击不太敏感, 但是, 对于一些重要的管理消息而言, 重放攻 击可能会对系统造成致命的破坏。
为此, IEEE 802.16e在 PKM版本 2中提供了一种防止管理消息重放 攻击的方法, 该方法通过协议定义的基于加密的消息认证码(CMAC ) 的摘要(Digest ) 实现防重放攻击, 同时实现对管理消息的认证。 在该 方法中, CMAC Digest由一个 32位的消息序列号(CMAC— PN )及一个 CMAC值(CMAC Value )组成, 通常情况下, 消息序列号 CMAC— PN 是在发送方( MS或 BS )递增变化的序列号,用于标识不同的管理消息, 在这里, 所述的消息序列号 CMAC— PN 既可以表示上行消息序列号 CMAC PN U,也可以表示下行消息序列号 CMAC PN_D; CMAC Value 是用 AK派生出来的密钥对消息序列号 CMAC— PN、 管理消息体以及其 他信息进行加密后得到的信息摘要。 在实际的应用中, 发送方在发送管 理消息时, 会首先将 CMAC摘要中的消息序列号 CMAC_PN递增某一 个数值, 例如 1 , 再将递增后的消息序列号 CMAC— PN与通过加密算法 计算得到的 CMAC Value—起作为 CMAC Digest发送给接收方。接收方 ( BS或 MS )在接收到该管理消息时, 首先使用接收端保存的密钥采用 和发送端一样的方法计算 CMAC Value,并与消息中携带的 CMAC Value 比较, 从而实现了对消息的认证, 同时根据 CMAC— PN判断消息是否为 重放消息。
在现有的方法中, CMAC_PN是 32位的无符号整数, 其取值空间从 0X00000000 到 0XFFFFFFFF , 如果每次递增值为 1, 通常可以保证 CMAC— PN 在很长的周期内不会重复。 但是, 由于在上述方法中 CMAC_PN与 AK没有直接关系, 可能会出现在一个 AK的上下文中, CMAC—PN从一个较大的数值开始计数, 并在计数到最大值后又从初始 值开始计数的情况,从而不能保证在一个 AK的上下文中 CMAC— PN始 终向上递增,导致接收方在根据消息序列号 CMAC JPN判断所接收消息 是否为重放消息时的处理非常复杂。 发明内容
为了解决上述技术问题, 本发明提供了一种防止重放攻击的方法, 保证在一个 AK上下文中使用的消息序列号始终不会重复, 从而使得接 收端可以根据消息序列号判断所接收消息是否为重放消息。
除此之外, 本发明还提供了一种保证在一个 AK上下文中所使用的 消息序列号不重复的方法, 避免在一个 AK上下文中消息序列号从一个 较大的数值开始计数, 并在计数到最大值后又从初始值开始计数的情况 所导致的接收端处理复杂的问题。
本发明所述的防止重放攻击的方法包括:
在 AK上下文中增加消息序列号属性;
在管理消息交互双方之间的认证完成, 生成 AK上下文后, 管理消 息的发送端根据所生成 AK上下文中的消息序列号属性建立消息序列号 参数, 并将建立的消息序列号参数设置为初始值;
在使用该 AK上下文进行会话的过程中, 所述管理消息的发送端发 送携带有消息序列号参数的管理消息到该管理消息的接收端 , 所述接收 端根据所接收的消息序列号参数判断接收的管理消息是否为重放消息。
如果是重放消息, 则需要丢弃该管理消息, 否则, 接收该管理消息。 其中, 所述认证既可以是初始接入认证又可以是重认证。
所述根据所接收的消息序列号参数判断接收的管理消息是否为重放 消息包括: 接收端将接收到的消息序列号参数与自身保存的已接收管理 消息的消息序列号进行匹配, 如果与所述自身保存的已接收管理消息的 消息序列号相同, 则确定接收的管理消息为重放的管理消息; 否则, 确 定为不是重放的管理消息。
本发明所述方法进一步包括: 在使用该 AK上下文进行会话的过程 中, 所述管理消息的发送端实时监测所述消息序列号参数的数值, 在所 述消息序列号达到预定值之前预定的时间内, 发起重认证过程, 重新将 消息序列号参数设置为初始值。
所述发送携带有消息序列号参数的管理消息到该管理消息的接收端 为: 通过基于加密的消息认证码摘要将所述递增或递减后的消息序列号 参数发送到所述接收端。
本发明所述管理消息的发送端为移动台, 所述接收端为基站, 所述 消息序列号为上行消息序列号; 或者所述管理消息的发送端为基站, 所 述接收端为移动台, 所述消息序列号为下行消息序列号。
根据本发明的另一方面,所述保证消息序列号不重复的方法, 包括: 在 AK的上下文中增加消息序列号属性;
在管理消息交互双方之间的认证完成, 生成 AK上下文后, 管理消 息的发送端^^据所生成 AK上下文中的消息序列号属性建立消息序列号 参数, 并将建立的消息序列号参数设置为初始值。
所述方法进一步包括: 在所述管理消息交互双方使用该 AK上下文 进行会话的过程中, 所述管理消息的发送端实时监测所述消息序列号参 数的数值, 在所述消息序列号达到预定值之前预定的时间内, 发起重认 证过程, 消息序列号参数设置为初始值。
由此可以看出, 本发明所述的防止重放攻击的方法通过将上行消息 序列号和下行消息序列号加入 AK上下文, 作为 AK上下文的属性, 保 证在每次认证过程完成后, 产生新的 AK时, MS和 BS所使用的上行、 下行消息序列号也相应的重置为初始值,从而保证在一个 AK上下文中, 上行、 下行消息序列号始终是不重复的。
另外, 本发明所述的防止重放攻击的方法, 通过在所述上行、 下行 消息序列号到达预定值之前, 发起重认证过程, 以重置所述上行、 下行 消息序列号,保证上行、下行消息序列号在一个 AK上下文中不会重复。 附图简要说明
图 1为本发明所述防重放攻击方法的流程图。 实施本发明的方式
为了解决现有技术中的问题, 本发明提供了一种防止重放攻击的方 法以及保证所发送管理消息的消息序列号不重复的方法, 该方法主要思 想是: 在 AK的上下文属性中增加上行、下行消息序列号属性,建立 AK 与上行、 下行消息序列号之间的关系, 使得 MS和 BS之间在初始接入 认证或重认证完成, 产生新的 AK时, 所述上行、 下行消息序列号也重 新设置为初始值,从而保证在一个 AK上下文中所使用的 CMAC—PN不 重复, 例如可以始终向上递增或向下递减或存在其它对应关系等等。
本发明所述的防止重放攻击的方法, 主要包括:
A、 在 AK的上下文属性中增加消息序列号属性。
其中, 所述消息序列号包括: 用于标识上行管理消息的上行消息序 列号 CMAC_PN— U 及用于标识下行管理消息的下行消息序列号 CMAC—PN— D。
B、 在 MS和 BS之间的认证完成, 生成 AK上下文后, 空中接口上 管理消息的发送端, 包括 MS或 BS,根据该 AK上下文建立消息序列号 参数, 并将建立的消息序列号参数设置为初始值。
对于上行管理消息来讲, 其发送端为 MS, MS 居该 AK上下文建 立上行消息序列号 CMAC—PN— U参数, 该参数可以采用 32位的无符号 整数, 其取值空间从 0X00000000到 0XFFFFFFFF, 例如可将初始值设 置为 0X00000000或 0XFFFFFFFF; 对下行管理消息来讲, 其发送端为 BS, BS根据该 AK上下文建立下行消息序列号 CMAC—PN— D, 该参数 也可以采用 32 位的无符号整数, 其取值空间从 0X00000000 到 0XFFFFFFFF, 也可将初始值设置为 0X00000000或 0XFFFFFFFF。
由于根据协议规定, 在 MS和 BS的认证过程完成后, 将为 MS和 BS之间的会话生成一个 AK的上下文,在这里,所述的认证包括初始接 入认证和重认证, 所述的上下文是指本次会话各个属性的集合, 该 AK 上下文至少包括: 本次会话使用的 AK、 AK的生命周期及由 MS所维护 的上行消息序列号 CMAC—PN—U及由 BS 所维护的下行消息序列号 CMAC— PN— D。 由于 AK上下文具有一定的作用域和生命周期。 因此, AK上下文在产生后, 仅能够在一个有限的作用域内使用, 例如仅能够 在对应的 MS和 BS之间使用 , 并且它所包含的各个属性仅在其生命周 期内有效, 即当该 AK生命周期结束时, 该 AK上下文中所包含的属性 也相应失效。
由此可以看出,通过将上行消息序列号 CMAC— PN— U和下行消息序 列号 CMAC_PN— D作为 AK上下文的属性,使得在每次认证过程完成后 (包括初始接入认证过程和重认证过程), 由于生成了新的 AK上下文, MS会自动将上行消息序列号 CMAC— PN— U重新设置为初始值, 而 BS 会自动将下行消息序列号 CMAC—PN_D重新设置为初始值,从而保证在 一个 AK上下文中上行消息序列号 CMAC—PN— U和下行消息序列号 CMACJPN— D始终不重复, 例如可以从初始值向上递增或者向下递减, 因此, 接收端可以通过判断所接收管理消息的消息序列号与自身保存的 已接收管理消息的消息序列号相匹配来判断所接收管理消息是否为重 放消息, 从而大大筒化接收端对消息序列号的处理。
C、 在 MS和 BS使用该 AK上下文进行会话的过程中, 管理消息的 发送端先将消息序列号参数递增或递减一个预定的数值, 例如 1 , 再将 递增或递减后的消息序列号参数与管理消息一起发送到接收端, 所述接 收端根据所接收管理消息中的消息序列号参数判断该管理消息是否为 重放消息, 如果是, 则丟弃该管理消息, 否则, 接收所述管理消息, 从 而实现防重放攻击的目的。
下面将具体说明在一个 AK上下文的生命周期内, MS和 BS利用上 行消息序列号 CMAC— PN— U及下行消息序列号 CMAC— PN— D进行防重 放攻击的过程。
MS使用上行消息序列号 CMAC— PNJJ标识所发送的上行管理消 息, 具体包括: MS 在发送上行管理消息之前, 首先将上行消息序号 CMAC— PN— U递增或递减某一个数值, 例如 1 , 再将递增或递减后的 CMAC— PN—U与通过加密算法计算得到的 CMAC Value—起作为 CMAC Digest发送给 BS; BS在接收到该管理消息后, 首先用本地保存的密钥 采用和 MS—样的方法计算 CMAC Value, 并与消息中携带的 CMAC Value 比较, 从而实现了对消息的认证, 同时根据上行消息序列号 CMAC— PN— U判断消息是否为重放消息。
BS使用下行消息序列号 CMAC—PN— D标识所发送的下行管理消息 的方法与上述方法基本相同, 包括: BS 在发送下行管理消息之前, 首 先将下行消息序号 CMAC— PN— D递增或递減某一个数值,再将递增或递 减后的 CMAC_PN— D与 CMAC Value一起作为 CMAC Digest发送给 MS; MS 在接收到该下行管理消息后, 首先用本地保存的密钥采用和 BS一样的方法计算 CMAC Value,并与消息中携带的 CMAC Value比较, 从而实现了对消息的认证。同时根据下行消息序列号 CMAC— PN— D判断 消息是否为重放消息。
MS和 BS根据所述上行消息序列号或下行消息序列号判断所接收 管理消息是否为重放管理消息的方法有很多种。 例如, 在本发明的一个 优选实施例中, 由于发送端所发送管理消息中的消息序列号是递增或递 减的, 因此, 接收端可以将接收到管理消息中的消息序列号与自身保存 的已接收管理消息的消息序列号进行比较, 如果所述消息序列号是递增 的, 则当接收的管理消息中的消息序列号小于或等于自身保存的消息序 列号时, 盘但该管理消息为重放的管理消息; 如果所述消息序列号是递 减的, 则当接收的管理消息中的消息序列号大于或等于自身保存的消息 序列号时, 判断该管理消息为重放的管理消息。 通过这种方法, 接收端 可以非常简单的识别出重放的管理消息。 需要说明的是, 本发明并不局 限于递增或递减的方式, 也可以通过其它的函数关系对消息序列号进行 变化, 只要通过将接收到的管理消息中的消息序列号与已经保存的管理 消息的序列号进行匹配, 根据消息序列号是否重复来判断所接收的管理 消息是否为重放消息。
在本发明提供的优选实施例中, 本发明通过将消息序列号作为 AK 上下文的属性, 建立 AK与消息序列号的关联关系, 使得 MS和 BS在 认证完成后,产生新的 AK时, MS和 BS所维护的消息序列号也能够随 之重新置为初始值, 并在随后的会话过程中从初始值递增或递减计数, 保证在一个 AK上下文中, 消息序列号始终递增或递减。
为了避免在某些特殊的情况下出现的由消息序列号的重复周期小于 AK生命周期所导致的在一个 AK上下文内出现消息序列号重复的情况, 本发明所述的方法进一步包括:
在上行方向, MS实时监测上行消息序列号 CMAC_PN_U的值, 在 上行消息序列号 CMAC— PN— U达到预定值之前预定的时间内 ,主动发起 重认证过程, 在重认证过程完成后, 根据所生成的、 新的 AK上下文, MS所维护的上行消息序列号 CMAC—PN—U参数及 BS所维护的下行消 息序列号 CMAC_PN—D参数将被重新设置为初始值。
在下行方向, BS实时检测下行消息序列号 CMAC—PN— D的值, 在 下行消息序列号 CMAC—PN— D达到预定值之前预定的时间内,发送鉴权 失效(Authentication Invalid ) 消息到 MS, 通知 MS发起重认证过程, 在重认证过程完成后, 根据所生成、 新的 AK上下文, MS所维护的上 行消息序列号 CMAC— PN—U 参数和 BS 所维护的下行消息序列号 CMAC_PN_D参数将被重新设置为初始值。
其中, 所述的预定时间为完成重认证过程并启用新的 AK上下文所 需的时间。 这样一来, 通过上述方法, 就可以保证在上行或下行消息序 列号在达到预定值之前 MS和 BS能够启用新的 AK上下文, 从而有效 的避免所述上行或下行消息序列号出现重复。
需要说明的是, 在重认证完成, 生成新的 AK之后, MS会立即使 用新的 AK对后续的会话进行加密。但 BS不会立即使用新的 AK, 它只 有在接收到 MS发送的密钥更新请求(Key Request )消息, 并且检测到 该 Key Request消息携带的 CMAC Digest中的 CMAC Value是由新的 AK 派生的密钥计算得到的之后, 即判断出当前 MS已经成功完成重认证并 获得了新的 AK时, 才使用新的 AK对后续的会话进行加密和计算消息 校验码。

Claims

权利要求书
1、 一种防止重放攻击的方法, 其特征在于, 所述方法包括: 在鉴权密钥的上下文中增加消息序列号属性;
在管理消息交互双方之间的认证完成, 生成鉴权密钥上下文后, 管 理消息的发送端根据鉴权密钥上下文中的消息序列号属性建立消息序 列号参数, 并将建立的消息序列号参数设置为初始值;
在使用该鉴权密钥上下文进行会话的过程中, 所述管理消息的发送 端发送携带有消息序列号参数的管理消息到该管理消息的接收端, 所述 接收端根据所接收的消息序列号参数判断接收的管理消息是否为重放 消息。
2、 根据权利要求 1所述的方法, 其特征在于, 所述认证为: 初始接 入认证或重认证。
3、根据权利要求 1所述的方法, 其特征在于, 所述管理消息的发送 端在发送所述管理消息之前, 进一步包括: 将所述消息序列号递增或递 减一个预定的数值。
4、根据权利要求 3所述的方法,其特征在于,所述预定的数值为 1。
5、根据权利要求 1所述的方法, 其特征在于, 所述根据所接收的消 息序列号参数判断接收的管理消息是否为重放消息包括: 接收端将接收 到的消息序列号参数与自身保存的已接收管理消息的消息序列号进行 匹配, 如果与所述自身保存的已接收管理消息的消息序列号相同, 则确 定接收的管理消息为重放的管理消息; 否则, 确定为不是重放的管理消 息。
6、根据权利要求 1或 5所述的方法, 其特征在于: 所述接收端在确 认接收到的管理消息为重放消息时, 丟弃该管理消息, 否则接收该管理 消息。
7、根据权利要求 1所述的方法,其特征在于,所述方法进一步包括: 在使用该鉴权密钥上下文进行会话的过程中, 所述管理消息的发送端实 时监测所述消息序列号参数的数值, 在所述消息序列号达到预定值之前 预定的时间内,发起重认证过程,重新将消息序列号参数设置为初始值。
8、根据权利要求 7所述的方法, 其特征在于, 所述预定时间为完成 重认证过程及启用鉴权密钥上下文所需的时间。
9、根据权利要求 1所述的方法, 其特征在于, 所述发送携带有消息 序列号参数的管理消息到该管理消息的接收端为: 通过基于加密的消息 认证码摘要将所述消息序列号参数发送到所述接收端。
10、 根据权利要求 1、 5或 7所述的方法, 其特征在于, 所述管理消 息的发送端为移动台; 所述接收端为基站; 所述消息序列号为上行消息 序列号。
11、 根据权利要求 1、 5或 7所述的方法, 其特征在于, 所述管理消 息的发送端为基站; 所述接收端为移动台; 所述消息序列号为下行消息 序列号。
12、 一种保证消息序列号不重复的方法, 其特征在于, 所述方法包 括:
在鉴权密钥的上下文中增加消息序列号属性;
在管理消息交互双方之间的认证完成, 生成鉴权密钥上下文后, 管 理消息的发送端根据所生成鉴权密钥上下文中的消息序列号属性建立 消息序列号参数, 并将建立的消息序列号参数设置为初始值。
13、根据权利要求 12所述的方法, 其特征在于, 所述方法进一步包 括: 在所述管理消息交互双方使用该鉴权密钥上下文进行会话的过程 中, 所述管理消息的发送端实时监测所述消息序列号参数的数值, 在所 述消息序列号达到预定值之前预定的时间内, 发起重认证过程, 消息序 列号参数设置为初始值。
14、根据权利要求 13所述的方法, 其特征在于, 所述预定时间为完 成重认证过程及启用鉴权密钥上下文所需的时间。
15、 根据权利要求 12、 13或 14所述的方法, 其特征在于, 所述管 理消息的发送端为移动台; 所述接收端为基站; 所述消息序列号为上行 消息序列号。
16、 根据权利要求 12、 13或 14所述的方法, 其特征在于, 所述管 理消息的发送端为基站; 所述接收端为移动台; 所述消息序列号为下行 消息序列号。
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CN1553600A (zh) * 2003-05-29 2004-12-08 华为技术有限公司 一种共享密钥更新的方法
KR20050005092A (ko) * 2003-07-01 2005-01-13 엘지전자 주식회사 미디어 재전송 장치 및 방법

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* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
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CN109450810A (zh) * 2018-12-30 2019-03-08 国网北京市电力公司 识别冗余消息的方法及装置
CN112396071A (zh) * 2019-08-13 2021-02-23 中兴通讯股份有限公司 一种信息监控方法及装置、终端及存储介质

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