WO2006098569A1 - Procede et appareil de copie de secours et de restauration d'information de domaine - Google Patents

Procede et appareil de copie de secours et de restauration d'information de domaine Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2006098569A1
WO2006098569A1 PCT/KR2006/000884 KR2006000884W WO2006098569A1 WO 2006098569 A1 WO2006098569 A1 WO 2006098569A1 KR 2006000884 W KR2006000884 W KR 2006000884W WO 2006098569 A1 WO2006098569 A1 WO 2006098569A1
Authority
WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
domain
user
domain information
information
encrypted
Prior art date
Application number
PCT/KR2006/000884
Other languages
English (en)
Inventor
Bong-Seon Kim
Myung-Sun Kim
Sung-Hyu Han
Young-Sun Yoon
Sun-Nam Lee
Jae-Heung Lee
Original Assignee
Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Priority claimed from KR1020050043759A external-priority patent/KR100644696B1/ko
Application filed by Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. filed Critical Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.
Priority to JP2008501808A priority Critical patent/JP2008533611A/ja
Publication of WO2006098569A1 publication Critical patent/WO2006098569A1/fr

Links

Classifications

    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/10—Protecting distributed programs or content, e.g. vending or licensing of copyrighted material ; Digital rights management [DRM]
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F11/00—Error detection; Error correction; Monitoring
    • G06F11/07—Responding to the occurrence of a fault, e.g. fault tolerance
    • G06F11/14—Error detection or correction of the data by redundancy in operation
    • G06F11/1402—Saving, restoring, recovering or retrying
    • G06F11/1446—Point-in-time backing up or restoration of persistent data
    • G06F11/1458—Management of the backup or restore process
    • G06F11/1464—Management of the backup or restore process for networked environments
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
    • H04L63/0428—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
    • H04L63/0442—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload wherein the sending and receiving network entities apply asymmetric encryption, i.e. different keys for encryption and decryption
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities

Definitions

  • the present invention broadly relates to protecting digital content.
  • DRM digital rights management
  • FIG. 1 is a diagram illustrating a conventional home domain 1 that includes a domain server 10 and first through fifth devices 11 through 15.
  • the domain server 10 manages the home domain 1 such that only an authorized user of the home domain 1 can receive various content services from the first through fifth devices 11 through 15 in the home domain 1. Disclosure of Invention
  • An aspect of the present invention is to provide an apparatus and a method capable of ensuring smooth management of a home domain even when a domain server malfunctions, thereby ensuring that the content services are normally provided in the home domain.
  • the present invention may provide a computer readable recording medium having embodied thereon a program for executing the method described-above in a computer.
  • [8] it is possible to securely back up domain information without the help of an external network by encrypting the domain information and storing the encrypted domain information in a secure storage device over a home domain.
  • a new domain server is capable of obtaining the domain information by decrypting the encrypted domain information obtained from the secure storage device, thereby enabling smooth management of the home domain.
  • the content service can be normally provided within the home domain regardless of whether the domain server malfunctions.
  • domain information is encrypted using user information and the encrypted domain information is decrypted by the user information, thereby allowing only an authorized user of the home domain to acquire the domain information. Accordingly, it is possible to prevent an unauthorized user from using content services without permission even when the domain server malfunctions.
  • FIG. 1 is a diagram illustrating a conventional home domain
  • FIG. 2 is a diagram illustrating a domain information backup environment of a home domain according to an exemplary, non-limiting embodiment of the present invention
  • FIG. 3 illustrates a domain information table according to an exemplary embodiment of the present invention
  • FIG. 4 is a diagram illustrating a domain information restoring environment of a home domain according to an exemplary embodiment of the present invention
  • FIG. 5 is a block diagram of a domain information backup apparatus according to an exemplary embodiment of the present invention.
  • FIG. 6 is a block diagram of a domain information restoring apparatus according to an exemplary embodiment of the present invention.
  • FIG. 7 is a flowchart of a method of backing up domain information according to an exemplary embodiment of the present invention.
  • FIG. 8 is a flowchart of a method of restoring domain information according to an exemplary embodiment of the present invention.
  • a method of backing up domain information regarding construction of a domain includes encrypting the domain information and storing the encrypted domain information in a predetermined storage device in the domain.
  • an apparatus for backing up domain information regarding construction of a domain includes an encryption unit encrypting the domain information and a storage unit storing the encrypted domain information in a predetermined storage device in the domain.
  • a computer readable recording medium having embodied thereon a program for executing a method of backing up domain information regarding the construction of a domain in a computer.
  • a method of restoring domain information regarding construction of a domain includes obtaining encrypted domain information from a predetermined storage device in the domain and decrypting the encrypted domain information.
  • an apparatus for restoring domain information regarding construction of a domain includes an obtaining unit obtaining encrypted domain information regarding the domain from a predetermined storage device in the domain and a decryption unit decrypting the encrypted domain information.
  • a computer readable recording medium having embodied thereon a program for executing a method of restoring of domain information regarding the construction of a domain in a computer.
  • FIG. 2 is a diagram illustrating a domain information backup environment of a home domain 2 according to an exemplary embodiment of the present invention.
  • the home domain 2 includes a domain server 20, first through fifth devices 21 through 25, and a secure storage device 30.
  • the domain server 20 manages the home domain 2 based on domain information regarding the construction of the home domain 2. That is, the domain server 20 allows only an authorized user of the home domain 2 to receive various content services from the first through fifth devices 21 through 25 over the home domain 2, based on the domain information.
  • the domain information specifies the first through fifth devices 21 through 25 connected to the home domain 2, and the authorized user of the home domain 2, for example, so that the domain server 20 can manage the domain server 20.
  • the domain information may, for example, be embodied as a domain information table 300 illustrated in FIG. 3.
  • FIG. 3 illustrates the construction of a domain information table 300 according to an exemplary embodiment of the present invention.
  • the domain information table 300 includes domain identification (ID) 31, a domain key 32, a device list 33, and a user list 34.
  • ID domain identification
  • the domain information table 300 includes domain identification (ID) 31, a domain key 32, a device list 33, and a user list 34.
  • the domain ID 31 is a value for identifying the home domain 2 of FIG. 2.
  • the domain key 32 is an encryption key assigned to the home domain 2.
  • the domain server 20 encrypts the content using the domain key 32 and provides the encrypted content to the first through fifth devices 21 through 25.
  • the device list 33 includes information regarding at least one device such as devices one through five, and the information includes a device ID, a device key, and a device description regarding the at least one device.
  • the device ID is a value for identifying the device.
  • the device key is a decryption key used to decrypt the content provided from the domain server 20.
  • the device description specifies general characteristics of the device.
  • the user list 34 includes information regarding at least one user, and the information includes a user ID, a user key, and a user description regarding the at least one user.
  • the user ID is a value for identifying the user.
  • the user key is a user password, but various other user authentication elements may be used such as a smart card, a certificate of authentication, and bio-recognition items.
  • the user key must be managed to ensure security thereof compared to the other user information.
  • the domain server 20 when the domain server 20 malfunctions, the domain server 20 cannot manage the home domain 2, thereby preventing content services from being normally provided within the home domain 2.
  • the domain information is encrypted using information regarding a user 40 over the home domain 2 and a backup of the encrypted domain information is stored in the secure storage device 30 so as to prevent the domain information from being disclosed even when the domain server 20 malfunctions and to allow only an authorized user of the home domain 2 to restore the domain information.
  • the secure storage device 30 according to the exemplary embodiment is not connected to any network outside the home domain 2 so that the secure storage device 30 can be protected from external attacks such as hacking.
  • FIG. 4 is a diagram illustrating a domain information restoring environment of a home domain 2 according to an exemplary embodiment of the present invention.
  • the home domain 2 includes a new domain server 50, first through fifth devices 21 through 25, and a secure storage device 30. Since the existing domain server 20 malfunctions, it is replaced with a new domain server 50. However, it would be apparent to those of ordinary skill in the art that the domain server 50 may be another device such as one of the first through fifth devices 21 through 25, or the existing domain server 20.
  • the new domain server 50 acquires domain information by obtaining encrypted domain information regarding the home domain 2 from the secure storage device 30 and decrypts the obtained encrypted domain information using information regarding a user 40 over the home domain 2.
  • FIG. 5 is a block diagram of an apparatus for backing up domain information according to an exemplary embodiment of the present invention.
  • the apparatus is installed in the domain server 20 of FIG. 2, and includes a domain change sensor 51, a domain information updating unit 52, a user authentication unit 53, an encryption key generation unit 54, an encryption unit 55, and a domain information storage unit 56.
  • the domain change sensor 51 senses a change in domain information regarding a home domain 2. For instance, when one of first through fifth devices 21 through 25 belonging to the home domain 2 leaves the home domain 2 or a new device joins the home domain 2, the domain change sensor 51 senses such a change in the domain information. Also, when a user 40 is deprived of a right of use of the home domain 2 or a person obtains the right, the domain change sensor 51 senses such a change in the domain information.
  • the domain information updating unit 52 updates the domain information regarding the home domain 2 based on the change in the domain information sensed by the domain change sensor 51. For instance, the domain information updating unit 52 deletes, from the domain information table 300, the device ID, the device key, and the device description of the device leaving the home domain 2, which is sensed by the domain change sensor 51. Also, the domain information updating unit 52 adds to the domain information table 300 the device ID, the device key, and the device description of the device newly joining the home domain 2, which is sensed by the domain change sensor 51.
  • the domain information updating unit 52 deletes from the domain information table 300 the user ID, the user key, and the user description of the user who is deprived of a right of use of the home domain 2, which is sensed by the domain change sensor 51. Also, the domain information updating unit 52 adds to the domain information table 300 the user ID, the user key, and the user description of the user who obtains a right of use of the home domain 2, which is sensed by the domain change sensor 51.
  • the user authentication unit 53 authenticates the user 40 over the home domain 2.
  • the user authentication unit 53 receives the user ID and the user password from the user 40 and determines whether the received user ID is identical to the user ID that the domain server 20 retains. If the two match, the user authentication unit 53 determines whether a user password value that the domain server 20 retains is identical to the received user password, in a manner secure from external attacks. If the value that the domain server 20 retains is identical to the received user password, the user authentication unit 53 authenticates that the user 40 over the home domain 2 has a right of use of the home domain 2.
  • the domain server 20 holds user information that includes the user ID and the user password, through user enrollment.
  • the domain server 50 may further have user information other than the user ID and the user password.
  • the encryption key generation unit 54 When the user authentication unit 53 authenticates that the user 40 over the home domain 2 is a legitimate user of the home domain 2, the encryption key generation unit 54 generates an encryption key Ke from information regarding the user 40. For instance, the encryption key generation unit 54 generates the encryption key Ke using the user password from among the information regarding the user 40 authenticated by the user authentication unit 53.
  • the user password is stored in a hashed form and known to only the user 40 over the home domain 2. Thus, the user password is preferably used to make the encryption key Ke.
  • the encryption key generation unit 54 generates the encryption key Ke according to a predetermined encryption algorithm. For instance, if the predetermined encryption algorithm uses a secret key cryptographic system, the encryption key generation unit 54 generates a secret key Ke using the user password. If the predetermined encryption algorithm uses a public key cryptographic system, the encryption key generation unit 54 generates a public key Ke using the user password.
  • the secret key Ke must be generated to be identical to a secret key Kd, which is to be used as a decryption key in the new domain server 50, according to the secret key cryptographic system.
  • the public key Ke generated by the encryption key generation unit 54 according to the public key cryptographic system must be provided to the new domain server 20.
  • the encryption unit 55 generates encrypted domain information E(Ke,
  • Domain_Info by encrypting the domain information updated by the domain information updating unit 52, using the encryption key Ke generated by the encryption key generation unit 54.
  • the encryption unit 55 generates encrypted domain information E(Ke, Domain_Info) by encrypting the domain information table 300 in which a device is added to or deleted from by the domain information updating unit 52.
  • the encryption unit 55 generates encrypted domain information E(Ke, Domain_Info) by encrypting the domain information table 32 to which a user is added to or deleted from by the domain information updating unit 52.
  • the domain information storage unit 56 stores the encrypted domain information
  • the secure storage unit 30 is not connected to any network outside the home domain 2 and thus is not affected by external attacks to the home domain 2.
  • the domain information storage unit 56 may periodically store the domain information in consideration of the storage reliability of a memory of the secure storage device 30.
  • FIG. 6 is a block diagram of an apparatus for restoring domain information according to an exemplary embodiment of the present invention.
  • the apparatus is installed in the new domain server 50, for example, the one depicted in FIG. 4, and includes a request receiving unit 61, a domain information obtaining unit 62, a user authentication unit 63, a decryption key generation unit 64, a decryption unit 65, and a domain manager 66.
  • the request receiving unit 61 receives a request for restoring the domain information when the domain server 20 backing up the encrypted domain information E(Ke, Domain_Info) and storing the backup in the secure storage device 30 malfunctions. More specifically, when the domain server 20 malfunctions and thus cannot normally manage the home domain 2, the request receiving unit 61 receives a request for restoring the domain information from the user 40 who recognizes the malfunction of the domain server 20. Alternatively, the request receiving unit 61 may receive a request for restoring the domain information from the domain server 20 at substantially the same time as the malfunction of the domain server 20.
  • the request receiving unit 61 receives the request for restoring the domain information from the user 40 since communications cannot be made between the domain server 20 and the new domain server 50.
  • the request receiving unit 61 receives the request for restoring the domain information from the domain server 20 since communications can be made between the domain server 20 and the new domain server 50.
  • the domain information obtaining unit 62 obtains encrypted domain information E(Ke, Domain_Info) regarding the home domain 2 from the secure storage device 30. That is, the domain information obtaining unit 62 reads an encrypted domain information table from the secure storage device 30 when the request receiving unit 61 receives the request.
  • the user authentication unit 63 authenticates the user 40 of the home domain 2. If a user key is used as a user password, the user authentication unit 63 receives the user ID and user password of the user 40 from the user 40, and determines whether the received user ID is identical to user ID that the domain server 50 retains. If so, the user authentication unit 63 determines whether a value that the domain server 50 retains is identical to the user password in a secure manner. If the value that the domain server 50 holds is identical to the user password, the user authentication unit
  • the domain server 50 holds user information that includes the user ID and the user password, through user enrollment. However, when different user information is used as a user key, the domain server 50 may further have user information other than the user ID and the user password.
  • the decryption key generation unit 63 When the user authentication unit 63 authenticates that the user 40 of the home domain 2 is a legitimate user of the home domain 2, the decryption key generation unit
  • the decryption key generation unit 64 generates a decryption key Kd from information regarding the user 40.
  • the decryption key generation unit 64 generates decryption key Kd using the user password from among the information of the user 40 authenticated by the user authentication unit 63.
  • the user password is stored in a hashed form and known to only the user 40 of the home domain 2.
  • the user password is preferably used to generate the decryption key Kd.
  • the decryption key generation unit 64 generates the decryption key Kd according to a predetermined encryption algorithm. For instance, when the predetermined encryption algorithm uses the secret key cryptographic system, the decryption key generation unit 64 generates a secret key Kd using the user password. When the predetermined encryption algorithm uses the public key cryptographic system, the decryption key generation unit 64 generates a private key Kd using the user password.
  • the secret key Kd must be generated to be identical to a secret key Ke, which is to be used in the domain server 20, according to the secret key cryptographic system.
  • the private key Kd must be generated to be coupled to a public key Ke provided from the domain server 20, according to the public key cryptographic system.
  • the decryption unit 65 obtains the domain information by decrypting the encrypted domain information E(Ke, Domain_Info) obtained by the domain information obtaining unit 62, using the decryption key Kd generated by the decryption key generation unit 64.
  • the domain manager 66 manages the home domain 2 based on the domain information decrypted by the decryption unit 65. For instance, the domain manager 66 provides content to devices listed in a device list of the domain information table 300 decrypted by the decryption unit 65 so that the content can be shared among devices connected to the home domain 2.
  • FIG. 7 is a flowchart illustrating a method of backing up domain information according to an exemplary embodiment of the present invention.
  • the method of FIG. 7 includes operations that may be performed by the apparatus illustrated in FIG. 5. Accordingly, even if not described here, the operations described with reference to FIG. 5 also apply to the method of FIG. 7.
  • the domain server 20 senses whether there is a change in domain information regarding the home domain 2.
  • the domain server 20 updates the domain information regarding the home domain 2 based on the change in the domain information.
  • the domain server 20 authenticates the user 40 of the home domain 2.
  • the domain server 20 generates domain information E(Ke,
  • Domain_Info by encrypting the domain information updated in operation 72, using the encryption key Ke generated in operation 74.
  • the domain server 20 stores the encrypted domain information
  • FIG. 8 is a flowchart illustrating a method of restoring domain information according to an exemplary embodiment of the present invention.
  • the method of FIG. 8 includes operations that may be performed by the apparatus illustrated in FIG. 6. Accordingly, even if not described here, the operations described with reference to FIG. 6 also apply to the method of FIG. 8.
  • the domain server 50 receives a request for restoring domain information when the domain server 20 backing up encrypted domain information E(Ke, Domain_Info) and storing the backup in the secure storage device 30 malfunctions.
  • the domain server 50 upon receiving the request for restoring the domain information in operation 81, the domain server 50 obtains the encrypted domain information E(Ke, Domain_Info) regarding the home domain 2 from the secure storage device 30.
  • the domain server 50 authenticates the user 40 of the home domain 2.
  • the domain server 50 obtains the domain information by decrypting the encrypted domain information E(Ke, Domain_Info) obtained in operation 82, using the decryption key Kd generated in operation 84.
  • the domain server 50 manages the home domain 2 based on the domain information decrypted in operation 85.
  • the present invention may be embodied as a program that can be executed in a computer, and performed in a general digital computer that runs the program using a computer readable medium. Also, data used in the above exemplary embodiments of the present invention may be recorded on a computer readable medium through various media.
  • the computer readable medium may be any recording apparatus capable of storing data that is read by a computer system, e.g., a magnetic recording medium (a read-only memory (ROM), a floppy disk, a hard disk, etc.), an optical recording medium (a compact disc (CD)-ROM, a digital versatile disc (DVD), etc.), and a carrier wave that transmits data via the Internet, for example.
  • a magnetic recording medium a read-only memory (ROM), a floppy disk, a hard disk, etc.
  • an optical recording medium a compact disc (CD)-ROM, a digital versatile disc (DVD), etc.
  • CD compact disc
  • DVD digital versatile disc

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Software Systems (AREA)
  • General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
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  • Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
  • Multimedia (AREA)
  • Technology Law (AREA)
  • Quality & Reliability (AREA)
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  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
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Abstract

La présente invention concerne un procédé de copie de secours d'information de domaine se rapportant à la construction d'un domaine. En l'occurrence, on crypte l'information de domaine et l'information de domaine cryptée est rangée dans un dispositif de mémoire prédéterminé dans le domaine, l'information de domaine étant cryptée pour le dispositif de mémoire prédéterminé, constituant ainsi une copie de secours sécurisée de l'information de domaine sans l'aide d'un réseau externe. De cette façon, même lorsque le serveur de domaine fonctionne mal, le nouveau serveur de domaine est capable d'obtenir l'information de domaine.
PCT/KR2006/000884 2005-03-14 2006-03-13 Procede et appareil de copie de secours et de restauration d'information de domaine WO2006098569A1 (fr)

Priority Applications (1)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
JP2008501808A JP2008533611A (ja) 2005-03-14 2006-03-13 ドメイン情報をバックアップ／復旧する方法及び装置

Applications Claiming Priority (4)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
US66103705P 2005-03-14 2005-03-14
US60/661,037 2005-03-14
KR10-2005-0043759 2005-05-24
KR1020050043759A KR100644696B1 (ko) 2005-03-14 2005-05-24 도메인 정보를 백업/복구하는 방법 및 장치

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WO2006098569A1 true WO2006098569A1 (fr) 2006-09-21

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Cited By (1)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US9596243B2 (en) 2009-09-11 2017-03-14 Koninklijke Philips N.V. Method and system for restoring domain management

Citations (4)

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Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
WO2003005247A2 (fr) * 2001-07-06 2003-01-16 Computer Associates Think, Inc. Systemes et procedes de sauvegarde d'informations
KR200307374Y1 (ko) * 2002-12-12 2003-03-15 스토리지원(주) 다목적 통합 네트워크 저장장치
KR20030083405A (ko) * 2002-04-22 2003-10-30 삼성전자주식회사 로컬 네트워크에서 도메인 네임 시스템 스푸핑 방법 및그를 이용한 로컬 네트워크 시스템
KR20040056743A (ko) * 2002-12-24 2004-07-01 엘지전자 주식회사 도메인 네임 서비스 서버 이용 방법

Patent Citations (4)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
WO2003005247A2 (fr) * 2001-07-06 2003-01-16 Computer Associates Think, Inc. Systemes et procedes de sauvegarde d'informations
KR20030083405A (ko) * 2002-04-22 2003-10-30 삼성전자주식회사 로컬 네트워크에서 도메인 네임 시스템 스푸핑 방법 및그를 이용한 로컬 네트워크 시스템
KR200307374Y1 (ko) * 2002-12-12 2003-03-15 스토리지원(주) 다목적 통합 네트워크 저장장치
KR20040056743A (ko) * 2002-12-24 2004-07-01 엘지전자 주식회사 도메인 네임 서비스 서버 이용 방법

Cited By (1)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US9596243B2 (en) 2009-09-11 2017-03-14 Koninklijke Philips N.V. Method and system for restoring domain management

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