WO2006058313A2 - Method to control access between network endpoints based on trust scores calculated from information system component analysis - Google Patents
Method to control access between network endpoints based on trust scores calculated from information system component analysis Download PDFInfo
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- WO2006058313A2 WO2006058313A2 PCT/US2005/043035 US2005043035W WO2006058313A2 WO 2006058313 A2 WO2006058313 A2 WO 2006058313A2 US 2005043035 W US2005043035 W US 2005043035W WO 2006058313 A2 WO2006058313 A2 WO 2006058313A2
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- WIPO (PCT)
- Prior art keywords
- signatures
- modules
- database
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Classifications
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F15/00—Digital computers in general; Data processing equipment in general
- G06F15/16—Combinations of two or more digital computers each having at least an arithmetic unit, a program unit and a register, e.g. for a simultaneous processing of several programs
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3247—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F11/00—Error detection; Error correction; Monitoring
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
Definitions
- This invention pertains to computer module validation, and more particularly to determining the integrity of a computer before granting the computer access to network resources.
- the invention includes methods and apparatuses for constructing a database of valid module signatures, for validating a module, and for validating a computer.
- an apparatus receives signatures generated for modules in the computer.
- the signatures can be assembled into an integrity log.
- the apparatus attempts to validate that each signature is correct by comparing the signatures with a database. After the signatures are validated or not, the apparatus generates a trust score based upon which signatures received from the computer were validated.
- FIG. 1 shows a system including an integrity validator to perform computer validation.
- FIG. 2 shows more details about the integrity validator of FIG. 1 used to perform computer validation.
- FIG. 3 shows more details about the database of FIG. 2.
- FIG. 4 shows a flowchart of the procedure used by the integrity validator of FIG. 1 to assemble the database of FIG. 2.
- FIGs. 5A-5B show a flowchart of the procedure used by the integrity validator of FIG. 1 to validate an individual module signature.
- FIG. 6 shows a flowchart of the procedure used by a computer system, such as the computer system of FIG. I 5 to assemble an integrity log to validate the computer system using the integrity validator of FIG. 1.
- FIGs. 7A- 7B show a flowchart of the procedure used by the integrity validator of FIG. 1 to validate a computer system.
- FIG. 8 shows a flowchart of the procedure used by the integrity validator of FIG. 1 to grant or deny a computer system, such as the computer system of FIG. 1, access to a network resource.
- FIG. 1 shows a system including an integrity validator to perform computer validation, m FIG. 1, computer system 105 is connected to external network 110.
- Computer system 105 is shown as including computer 115, monitor 120, keyboard 125, and mouse 130. But a person skilled in the art will recognize that other components can be included with computer system 105: for example, other input/output devices, such as a printer.
- FIG. 1 does not show some of the conventional internal components of computer system 105; for example, a central processing unit, memory, etc.
- computer system 105 could be replaced by other machines, such as a notebook computer, dedicated terminal, or Personal Digital Assistant (PDA), among other possibilities.
- External network 110 is a network that is external to the organization.
- internal network 135 is a network that is internal to the organization.
- Integrity validator 140 is interposed between external network 110 and internal network 135 to validate computers that are outside the organization but are requesting access to a resource internal to the organization, such as resource 145.
- Resource 145 could be any type of resource: for example, a network drive, directory, or file, or a web page, to name some examples.
- computer system 105 includes integrity log generator 150, which assembles the integrity log for the computer system. Integrity validator 140 can then use the integrity log to validate computer system 105.
- An integrity log is a set of signatures for various modules on computer system 105.
- these signatures are hashes of the various modules, and can be generated using hash function 155, such as MD5, SHA-I, or SHA-256.
- integrity log generator 150 can be a device driver that loads early in the system boot sequence (preferably, before any other drivers have been loaded). Integrity log generator 150 can then identify each module that is accessed or loaded during the system boot sequence, and generate a signature for these modules.
- integrity log generator 150 can be an executable that can scan the entire system for all potential modules. A person skilled in the art will recognize other ways in which integrity log generator 150 can operate.
- integrity log generator 150 generates signatures only for modules, such as device drivers and executable modules, that are actually loaded.
- integrity log generator 150 generates signatures for such modules and for all supporting modules: for example, dynamic link libraries (DLLs).
- DLLs dynamic link libraries
- modules for which integrity log generator 150 can generate signatures and other ways in which integrity log generator 150 can operate. From the above description, it might appear that integrity log generator 150 operates only on software modules. While software modules typically comprise the majority of modules for which integrity log generator 150 generates signatures, a person skilled in the art will recognize that integrity log generator 150 can generate signatures for hardware modules as well.
- integrity log generator 150 can generate signatures for firmware or hardware modules, such as that used in the Basic Input/Output System (BIOS) of the computer system, however stored (e.g., in flash memory, read-only memory (ROM), programmable read-only memory (PROM), erasable programmable read-only memory (EPROM), electrically-erasable programmable read-only memory (EEPROM), ferroelectric random access memory (FRAM), magnetoresistive random access memory (MRAM), etc.).
- BIOS Basic Input/Output System
- ROM read-only memory
- PROM programmable read-only memory
- EPROM erasable programmable read-only memory
- EEPROM electrically-erasable programmable read-only memory
- FRAM ferroelectric random access memory
- MRAM magnetoresistive random access memory
- the identifier can identify the product or component with which the module interacts.
- integrity validator 140 is used only to validate computer systems that are not directly connected to internal network 135.
- integrity validator 140 can be a publicly accessible integrity validator, rather than one dedicated to the organization. Such an integrity validator would be connected to external network 110, as integrity validator 160. Integrity validator 160 operates similarly to integrity validator 140, except that the integrity log is forwarded to integrity validator 160 via external network 110. As discussed above, in one embodiment, integrity validator 140 operates to validate network access to resources from within the organization. While it is possible for integrity validator 140 to store signatures for every potential module on a computer system, in another embodiment, integrity validator 140 only stores signatures for modules that are specific to the organization.
- integrity validator 140 forwards the signatures to integrity validator 160 (via external network 110) for validation. In this manner, integrity validator 140 does not need to be updated as new modules are introduced: validation of these modules can be handled by integrity validator 160.
- integrity validator 140 can operate whether resource 145 is requested in either an encrypted or unencrypted form, and whether resource 145 is requested using an encrypted or unencrypted channel.
- resource 145 might be a web page that is password- protected.
- resource 145 might be requested over a virtual private network (VPN) used to secure access to resources.
- VPN virtual private network
- FIG. 2 shows more features of the integrity validator of FIG. 1 used to perform computer validation.
- integrity validator 140 is shown in greater detail, but a person skilled in the art will recognize that the details shown can apply to any integrity validator: for example, integrity validator 160.
- FIG. 2 does not represent data flow through integrity validator 140.
- Integrity validator 140 includes database 205.
- Database 205 is shown in greater detail in FIG. 3.
- FIG. 3 shows database 205 represented as table 305, although a person skilled in the art will recognize other forms database 205 can take.
- Table 305 includes numerous entries, of which entries 310, 315, and 320 are shown. Each entry includes a module and a corresponding signature. For example, entry 320 shows a signature for the virtual memory manager DLL of the Windows® XP operating system.
- entries 310, 315, and 320 describe modules that are used with versions of the Windows operating system by Microsoft Corporation, a person skilled in the art will recognize that embodiments of the invention are equally applicable to other operating systems: for example, versions of the Linux® operating system.
- Microsoft and Windows are registered trademarks of Microsoft Corporation in the United States and other countries; Linux is a registered trademark of Linus Torvalds.
- the entries in table 305 include identifiers for the various modules. By including module identifiers in table 305, a signature provided for module validation can be compared to the signature expected for that module, to verify that the module is properly validated.
- Table 305 shows only one module identifier - the path and file name of the module - but a person skilled in the art will recognize that table 305 can use other module identifiers, or any combination of module identifiers.
- table 305 includes only valid signatures, without module identifiers. In that case, a signature provided for module validation is compared with all signatures in database 205 until a match is found. If a match is found anywhere in database 205, then the module is considered validated; otherwise, the module is not considered validated.
- the function chosen to compute the signatures that is, the hash function
- the risk of the signature of an unvali dated module matching a signature in the database is likely not significant.
- integrity validator 140 includes other elements.
- Receiver 210 is responsible for receiving information transmitted to integrity validator 140.
- receiver 210 can receive an integrity log from a computer system to be validated, a signature to be added to database 205 for a newly validated module, or a replacement signature to replace an older signature for an existing module in database 205.
- Transmitter 215 is responsible for transmitting information from integrity validator 140.
- transmitter 215 can transmit a trust score to a computer system, or can forward signatures to another integrity validator (if integrity validator 140 cannot validate the modules corresponding to those signatures).
- Validator 220 is responsible for validating signatures received by integrity log validator 140. Validator 220 takes one or more signatures, determines which signatures are valid, and returns an indication of which signatures are valid and which are not. Validator 220 can be as simple as a comparator to compare the received signature(s) with signatures in database 205 and indicate whether the signature(s) can be matched to signatures in database 205. Validator 220 can also implement a more complicated technique to validate signature, if desired.
- Trust score generator 225 is responsible for generating a trust score for a computer system.
- a trust score is an indication of whether a computer system is trustworthy. Trust scores can be generated in many different ways.
- the trust score is the ratio of the number of validated modules on the computer system to the total number of modules on the computer system (validated or not).
- the trust score can be scaled to a number between 0 and 1000, where 0 represents a completely untrustworthy computer system, and 1000 represents a completely trustworthy computer system.
- critical modules can be weighted more highly than other modules, so that a computer system with more validated critical modules can score more highly than a computer system with few validated critical modules, even if the second computer system has more total modules validated.
- critical is not intended to refer to modules that are absolutely necessary as much as modules that are identified as important to the organization. Thus, one organization might consider the files relating to the operating system to be “critical”, whereas another organization might consider modules that are custom developed internally (for whatever purpose) to be “critical”.)
- trust score generator 225 can calculate the trust score.
- trust score generator can factor in the position of the various validated modules within the integrity log: for example, modules that are listed earlier in the integrity log can be considered more important than modules that occur later in the integrity log.
- trust score generator 225 can factor in the module identifier in calculating the trust score. Modules manufactured by one manufacturer can be considered more important than modules manufactured by another manufacturer. For example, consider modules that work in conjunction with an application. Modules manufactured by the application manufacturer can be considered more important than modules manufactured by third-party manufacturers.
- the version and/or patch level of the module can be a factor in calculating the trust score. For example, given a module that has several versions, more recent versions can be considered more important than older versions. If the validated module is outdated, the resulting trust score can be lower than an otherwise-identical computer system with a more current version of the same module.
- Integrity validator 140 can also include policy 230.
- Policy 230 can indicate how and under what conditions a computer system can be permitted access to a resource, such as resource 145 of FIG. 1.
- policy 230 includes threshold score 235. To be granted access to the resource, the computer system should have a trust score at least as high as threshold score 235; if the trust score for the computer system does not meet or exceed threshold score 235, then the computer system is denied access to the resource.
- policy 230 can include multiple threshold scores. For example, in FIG. 2, policy 230 is shown as including two threshold scores 235 and 240. If the trust score for the computer system is at least as high as threshold score 235, then the computer system can be granted full access to the resource.
- the computer system can be granted partial access to the resource. And if the trust score for the computer system is smaller than threshold score 240, the computer system can be denied access to the resource (although the computer system can be redirected to a help resource to determine why the computer system has such a low trust score).
- policy 230 is described above in terms of one resource and up to two threshold scores, a person skilled in the art will recognize that policy 230 can be defined in other ways. For example, policy 230 can describe different policies for different resources on the same network. Or permission to access the resource can be determined in ways other than straight comparisons between the trust score of the computer system and one or more threshold scores.
- policy 230 is a policy for accessing resources for a particular organization, if integrity validator 140 is, in fact, used by multiple organizations (e.g., integrity validator 140 is connected to the external network as integrity validator 160), then integrity validator 140 can store policies for multiple organizations.
- FIG. 2 shows integrity validator 140 as including both the features used to generate a trust score and policy 230, a person skilled in the art will recognize that integrity validator 140 does not need to combine these features. For example, integrity validator 140 can be responsible for generating the trust score, and policy management (based on the generated trust score) can be handled elsewhere.
- FIG. 4 shows a flowchart of the procedure used by the integrity validator of FIG. 1 to assemble the database of FIG. 2.
- a module is identified.
- module identification is likely a manual process: for example, a module manufacturer can submit a module for signature generation and addition to the database. But a person skilled in the art will recognize that module identification can be automated.
- a signature is generated for the identified module.
- the signature is added to the database.
- an identifier for the module can be added to the database and associated with the signature, to aid in later module validation. As shown by arrow 425, step 420 is optional, and can be omitted.
- FIGs. 5A-5B show a flowchart of the procedure used by the integrity validator of FIG. 1 to validate an individual module signature.
- the integrity validator receives a signature, and potentially an identifier, for a module.
- the signature is compared with the database. If a module identifier is provided, then it can be used to reduce the search space of the database.
- the integrity validator determines whether the signature was found in the database. If so, then at step 520 the signature was validated.
- the integrity validator determines if there is another database (or integrity validator) that can validate the signatures. If not, then at step 530, the signature is rejected as invalid, and processing ends. Otherwise, then at step 535 the integrity validator forwards the signature to the other database (or integrity validator). At step 540, the integrity validator determines whether the signature was found in the other database. If so, then processing returns to step 520, and the signature is validated. Otherwise, processing returns to step 525 to determine if there is another database (or integrity validator) to which the signature can be forwarded.
- FIG. 6 shows a flowchart of the procedure used by a computer, such as the computer of FIG. 1, to assemble an integrity log to validate the computer using the integrity validator of FIG. 1.
- the integrity log generator identifies modules on the computer system.
- the integrity log generator generates signatures for the modules.
- the integrity log generator can optionally assemble the signatures into an integrity log.
- step 615 is optional: the signatures do not need to be assembled into an integrity log.
- the integrity log generator transmits the signatures, and optionally the module identifiers, to an integrity validator for validation.
- FIGs. 7A-7B show a flowchart of the procedure used by the integrity validator of FIG.
- the integrity validator receives signatures, and optionally, module identifiers, for validation.
- the integrity selects a signature for validation.
- the signature selected can be the next one in sequence, or can be selected according to some other criteria.
- the integrity validator attempts to validate the signature, as described above with reference to FIGs. 5A-5B.
- the integrity validator determines whether the signature was validated. If so, then at step 725 the integrity validator adds the signature to the set of signatures that are found in the database; otherwise, at step 730 the integrity validator adds the signature to the set of signatures that are not found in the database. Either way, at step 735, the integrity validator checks to see if there are any signatures remaining to validate. If so, then processing returns to step 710 on FIG. 7 A. Otherwise, at step 740, the integrity validator generates a trust score. As discussed above with reference to FIG. 2, the trust score can weight certain signatures more highly than others in generating the trust score. As discussed above, step 715 refers to FIGs.
- FIGs. 5A-5B in how to validate signatures for a computer system.
- FIGs. 5A-5B describes processing a single signature, and forwarding the signature to another integrity validator in case the first integrity validator cannot validate the signature. While this approach works well for individual signatures, with multiple signatures, such as in an integrity log, an alternative embodiment processes as many signatures as possible using the first integrity validator, and forwarding the unvalidated signatures to a second integrity validator as a group.
- FIG. 8 shows a flowchart of the procedure used by the integrity validator of FIG. 1 to grant or deny a computer, such as the computer of FIG. 1, access to a network resource.
- the integrity validator generates a trust score for a computer system, as discussed above with reference to FIGs. 7A-7B.
- the integrity validator accesses a policy for the desired resource.
- the integrity validator compares the trust score with the policy.
- the. integrity validator uses the policy to determine an appropriate level of access to the resource for the computer system.
- the machine includes a system bus to which is attached processors, memory, e.g., random access memory (RAM), read-only memory (ROM), or other state preserving medium, storage devices, a video interface, and input/output interface ports.
- the machine may be controlled, at least in part, by input from conventional input devices, such as keyboards, mice, etc., as well as by directives received from another machine, interaction with a virtual reality (VR) environment, biometric feedback, or other input signal.
- VR virtual reality
- the term “machine” is intended to broadly encompass a single machine, or a system of communicatively coupled machines or devices operating together. Exemplary machines include computing devices such as personal computers, workstations, servers, portable computers, handheld devices, telephones, tablets, etc., as well as transportation devices, such as private or public transportation, e.g., automobiles, trains, cabs, etc.
- the machine may include embedded controllers, such as programmable or non ⁇ programmable logic devices or arrays, Application Specific Integrated Circuits, embedded computers, smart cards, and the like.
- the machine may utilize one or more connections to one or more remote machines, such as through a network interface, modem, or other communicative coupling.
- Machines may be interconnected by way of a physical and/or logical network, such as an intranet, the Internet, local area networks, wide area networks, etc.
- network communication may utilize various wired and/or wireless short range or long range carriers and protocols, including radio frequency (RF), satellite, microwave, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) 545.11, Bluetooth, optical, infrared, cable, laser, etc.
- RF radio frequency
- IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
- Associated data may be stored in, for example, the volatile and/or non-volatile memory, e.g., RAM, ROM, etc., or in other storage devices and their associated storage media, including hard-drives, floppy-disks, optical storage, tapes, flash memory, memory sticks, digital video disks, biological storage, etc.
- Associated data may be delivered over transmission environments, including the physical and/or logical network, in the form of packets, serial data, parallel data, propagated signals, etc., and maybe used in a compressed or encrypted format.
- Associated data may be used in a distributed environment, and stored locally and/or remotely for machine access. Having described and illustrated the principles of the invention with reference to illustrated embodiments, it will be recognized that the illustrated embodiments may be modified in arrangement and detail without departing from such principles, and may be combined in any desired manner. And although the foregoing discussion has focused on particular embodiments, other configurations are contemplated, hi particular, even though expressions such as "according to an embodiment of the invention” or the like are used herein, these phrases are meant to generally reference embodiment possibilities, and are not intended to limit the invention to particular embodiment configurations. As used herein, these terms may reference the same or different embodiments that are combinable into other embodiments.
Abstract
Description
Claims
Priority Applications (3)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
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JP2007543583A JP4934860B2 (en) | 2004-11-29 | 2005-11-28 | Method for controlling access between multiple network endpoints based on trust score calculated from information system component analysis |
CA002588197A CA2588197A1 (en) | 2004-11-29 | 2005-11-28 | Method to control access between network endpoints based on trust scores calculated from information system component analysis |
EP05847593.0A EP1817862A4 (en) | 2004-11-29 | 2005-11-28 | Method to control access between network endpoints based on trust scores calculated from information system component analysis |
Applications Claiming Priority (6)
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US63145004P | 2004-11-29 | 2004-11-29 | |
US63144904P | 2004-11-29 | 2004-11-29 | |
US60/631,449 | 2004-11-29 | ||
US60/631,450 | 2004-11-29 | ||
US63706604P | 2004-12-17 | 2004-12-17 | |
US60/637,066 | 2004-12-17 |
Publications (2)
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WO2006058313A2 true WO2006058313A2 (en) | 2006-06-01 |
WO2006058313A3 WO2006058313A3 (en) | 2007-01-18 |
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Family Applications (1)
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PCT/US2005/043035 WO2006058313A2 (en) | 2004-11-29 | 2005-11-28 | Method to control access between network endpoints based on trust scores calculated from information system component analysis |
Country Status (5)
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EP (1) | EP1817862A4 (en) |
JP (1) | JP4934860B2 (en) |
KR (1) | KR20070098835A (en) |
CA (1) | CA2588197A1 (en) |
WO (1) | WO2006058313A2 (en) |
Cited By (7)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
US7272719B2 (en) * | 2004-11-29 | 2007-09-18 | Signacert, Inc. | Method to control access between network endpoints based on trust scores calculated from information system component analysis |
US20080163339A1 (en) * | 2006-01-17 | 2008-07-03 | Janani Janakiraman | Dynamic Security Access |
US7487358B2 (en) | 2004-11-29 | 2009-02-03 | Signacert, Inc. | Method to control access between network endpoints based on trust scores calculated from information system component analysis |
US7733804B2 (en) | 2004-11-29 | 2010-06-08 | Signacert, Inc. | Method and apparatus to establish routes based on the trust scores of routers within an IP routing domain |
US8266676B2 (en) | 2004-11-29 | 2012-09-11 | Harris Corporation | Method to verify the integrity of components on a trusted platform using integrity database services |
US8327131B1 (en) | 2004-11-29 | 2012-12-04 | Harris Corporation | Method and system to issue trust score certificates for networked devices using a trust scoring service |
US9450966B2 (en) | 2004-11-29 | 2016-09-20 | Kip Sign P1 Lp | Method and apparatus for lifecycle integrity verification of virtual machines |
Families Citing this family (4)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
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CN1703004B (en) * | 2005-02-28 | 2010-08-25 | 联想(北京)有限公司 | Method for implementing network access authentication |
CN100358303C (en) | 2005-02-28 | 2007-12-26 | 联想(北京)有限公司 | A method for monitoring apparatus being managed |
JP4822544B2 (en) * | 2006-04-26 | 2011-11-24 | 株式会社リコー | Image forming apparatus capable of managing a plurality of module configuration information |
WO2023112140A1 (en) * | 2021-12-14 | 2023-06-22 | 日本電気株式会社 | Access control device, access control method, and program |
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US7085925B2 (en) * | 2001-04-03 | 2006-08-01 | Sun Microsystems, Inc. | Trust ratings in group credentials |
US6944772B2 (en) * | 2001-12-26 | 2005-09-13 | D'mitri Dozortsev | System and method of enforcing executable code identity verification over the network |
AR043588A1 (en) * | 2003-03-12 | 2005-08-03 | Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co | METHOD FOR IMPLEMENTING A RISK ADMINISTRATION PROGRAM |
US20040107363A1 (en) * | 2003-08-22 | 2004-06-03 | Emergency 24, Inc. | System and method for anticipating the trustworthiness of an internet site |
US20050138417A1 (en) * | 2003-12-19 | 2005-06-23 | Mcnerney Shaun C. | Trusted network access control system and method |
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2005
- 2005-11-28 WO PCT/US2005/043035 patent/WO2006058313A2/en active Search and Examination
- 2005-11-28 JP JP2007543583A patent/JP4934860B2/en not_active Expired - Fee Related
- 2005-11-28 KR KR1020077014877A patent/KR20070098835A/en not_active Application Discontinuation
- 2005-11-28 EP EP05847593.0A patent/EP1817862A4/en not_active Withdrawn
- 2005-11-28 CA CA002588197A patent/CA2588197A1/en not_active Abandoned
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US6330670B1 (en) | 1998-10-26 | 2001-12-11 | Microsoft Corporation | Digital rights management operating system |
Cited By (10)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
US7272719B2 (en) * | 2004-11-29 | 2007-09-18 | Signacert, Inc. | Method to control access between network endpoints based on trust scores calculated from information system component analysis |
US7487358B2 (en) | 2004-11-29 | 2009-02-03 | Signacert, Inc. | Method to control access between network endpoints based on trust scores calculated from information system component analysis |
US7733804B2 (en) | 2004-11-29 | 2010-06-08 | Signacert, Inc. | Method and apparatus to establish routes based on the trust scores of routers within an IP routing domain |
US7904727B2 (en) | 2004-11-29 | 2011-03-08 | Signacert, Inc. | Method to control access between network endpoints based on trust scores calculated from information system component analysis |
US8139588B2 (en) | 2004-11-29 | 2012-03-20 | Harris Corporation | Method and apparatus to establish routes based on the trust scores of routers within an IP routing domain |
US8266676B2 (en) | 2004-11-29 | 2012-09-11 | Harris Corporation | Method to verify the integrity of components on a trusted platform using integrity database services |
US8327131B1 (en) | 2004-11-29 | 2012-12-04 | Harris Corporation | Method and system to issue trust score certificates for networked devices using a trust scoring service |
US8429412B2 (en) | 2004-11-29 | 2013-04-23 | Signacert, Inc. | Method to control access between network endpoints based on trust scores calculated from information system component analysis |
US9450966B2 (en) | 2004-11-29 | 2016-09-20 | Kip Sign P1 Lp | Method and apparatus for lifecycle integrity verification of virtual machines |
US20080163339A1 (en) * | 2006-01-17 | 2008-07-03 | Janani Janakiraman | Dynamic Security Access |
Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
---|---|
EP1817862A2 (en) | 2007-08-15 |
WO2006058313A3 (en) | 2007-01-18 |
JP2008522292A (en) | 2008-06-26 |
EP1817862A4 (en) | 2014-03-19 |
JP4934860B2 (en) | 2012-05-23 |
KR20070098835A (en) | 2007-10-05 |
CA2588197A1 (en) | 2006-06-01 |
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