WO2006053685A2 - Documents de valeur, production et verification de documents de valeur - Google Patents

Documents de valeur, production et verification de documents de valeur Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2006053685A2
WO2006053685A2 PCT/EP2005/012116 EP2005012116W WO2006053685A2 WO 2006053685 A2 WO2006053685 A2 WO 2006053685A2 EP 2005012116 W EP2005012116 W EP 2005012116W WO 2006053685 A2 WO2006053685 A2 WO 2006053685A2
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WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
value document
code
coding
value
test
Prior art date
Application number
PCT/EP2005/012116
Other languages
German (de)
English (en)
Other versions
WO2006053685A3 (fr
Inventor
Thomas Giering
Karlheinz Mayer
Reinhard Plaschka
Wolfram Seidemann
Dieter Stein
Harald Vater
Original Assignee
Giesecke & Devrient Gmbh
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Priority claimed from DE102004055761A external-priority patent/DE102004055761A1/de
Priority claimed from DE102005032704A external-priority patent/DE102005032704A1/de
Application filed by Giesecke & Devrient Gmbh filed Critical Giesecke & Devrient Gmbh
Priority to EP05806432A priority Critical patent/EP1815443A2/fr
Publication of WO2006053685A2 publication Critical patent/WO2006053685A2/fr
Publication of WO2006053685A3 publication Critical patent/WO2006053685A3/fr

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Classifications

    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07D—HANDLING OF COINS OR VALUABLE PAPERS, e.g. TESTING, SORTING BY DENOMINATIONS, COUNTING, DISPENSING, CHANGING OR DEPOSITING
    • G07D7/00—Testing specially adapted to determine the identity or genuineness of valuable papers or for segregating those which are unacceptable, e.g. banknotes that are alien to a currency
    • G07D7/004—Testing specially adapted to determine the identity or genuineness of valuable papers or for segregating those which are unacceptable, e.g. banknotes that are alien to a currency using digital security elements, e.g. information coded on a magnetic thread or strip
    • G07D7/0043—Testing specially adapted to determine the identity or genuineness of valuable papers or for segregating those which are unacceptable, e.g. banknotes that are alien to a currency using digital security elements, e.g. information coded on a magnetic thread or strip using barcodes
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07D—HANDLING OF COINS OR VALUABLE PAPERS, e.g. TESTING, SORTING BY DENOMINATIONS, COUNTING, DISPENSING, CHANGING OR DEPOSITING
    • G07D7/00—Testing specially adapted to determine the identity or genuineness of valuable papers or for segregating those which are unacceptable, e.g. banknotes that are alien to a currency
    • G07D7/06—Testing specially adapted to determine the identity or genuineness of valuable papers or for segregating those which are unacceptable, e.g. banknotes that are alien to a currency using wave or particle radiation
    • G07D7/12—Visible light, infrared or ultraviolet radiation
    • G07D7/1205—Testing spectral properties

Definitions

  • the invention relates to sheet-shaped value documents with a machine-readable security feature.
  • the invention also relates to methods and apparatus for producing or testing such value documents.
  • Sheet-shaped value documents such as banknotes, stocks, bonds, Ur ⁇ customers, vouchers, checks, lottery tickets, high-quality tickets, but also other forgery-prone papers, such as passports or other identity documents are usually provided with various security features to increase the Hurl ⁇ security .
  • security feature for example, security threads or strips, diffraction structures or luminescent, magnetic or electrically conductive elements can be provided.
  • DE 2237911 A1 describes from the serial number and a random number a coded information to win and print on a banknote.
  • a coding is applied to a banknote by means of a fluorescent ink, wherein measured values of production tolerances which normally occur during the production of the banknote are printed in coded form on the banknote for the purpose of coding.
  • These manufacturing tolerances may e.g. the distance of the printed image from the edge of the banknote, Textilabmessun ⁇ gen or thicknesses of the paint apply.
  • EP 1140521 B1 describes an asymmetrical encryption method in which an optically readable banknote marking, for example a diffraction structure or a barcode produced from fluorescent colors or magnetic color, is coded with the serial number and the result is applied to the banknote as an individual banknote signature. If such value documents are to be checked for authenticity, for example, then the coding result applied to the value document (serial number,%) Is checked. In this case, the checking may consist, for example, in that the properties of the banknote, which was also applied coded as a reference code to the banknote, are measured again and coded in the same way, so that after the property has been recoded, a property obtained therefrom is obtained Comparison code can be compared with the reference code on the value document. Different codes are then most likely a value document which does not meet the requirements. However, the decryption or the comparison of the codes is very time-consuming, in particular in the case of algorithmic encryption, owing to the associated computational effort.
  • the object of the present invention is to provide alternative systems for encoding sheet-shaped value documents and alternative systems for producing and testing such sheet-shaped value documents.
  • a first basic idea, from which the invention proceeds, is thus that a sheet-shaped value document is provided with a code which can be detected in the non-visible spectral range, in particular a bar code, the code being a
  • Coding is at least one measurable property of the respective value document.
  • the code can thus be used as a banknote-individual signature if the encrypted properties differ for different banknotes or banknote groups.
  • a sheet-shaped value document comprises a first machine-readable code, which is a coding result of a coding of one or more properties of the value document which can be measured and / or derived from measured values.
  • the value document according to the invention comprises at least one first test element, which is generated from the code derived from the properties and / or from the measured values and / or the properties derivable from the measured values.
  • the test element can be arranged as a reference test element separately on the value document or the code can be extended with the reference test element.
  • the coding is the coder result of an algorithmic encryption, in particular an asymmetric encryption
  • the test element can be generated by means of an algorithm which is less complex than that of the algorithmic encryption.
  • the applied code is again detected and a first comparison test element derived from the code.
  • the comparison test element is then compared with the reference test element, which is generated from the same code and has already been applied to the value document during production or at least prior to the output of the value document, in order to check the value document.
  • the test element can be very simple and thus only serve the plausibility check, as it - as described above - is used for example in the quality assurance.
  • the test element does not have to be suitable as an authenticity feature for the value document. This results in the advantage that the deriving of the comparison test element from the detected code can be carried out quickly and the test element can thus be tested in machines for quality control of new value documents, even if these machines are included high speed work. As a result, it is possible to carry out faster test specimens than if, for example, an encryption result had first to be calculated for each value document and compared with the reference values of the value document. However, more complex methods for forming the test element are also conceivable.
  • the test element is constructed so that it includes all measured values or bits of coding.
  • the test element can be ensured Din ⁇ that the coding itself is error-free readable, although this can not be reproduced in real time.
  • the value document further comprises a serial number and a second test element generated from the serial number.
  • This second test element can then be checked in the same way as the at least one first test element in the quality control of the value document.
  • test elements are applied to the document of value during production, for example a test element which is derived from a further machine-readable code applied to the document of value, which likewise has a coding result of coding one or more properties of the data measurable and / or derivable from measured values Is a value document, and if these further inspection elements are included in the quality check of the value document, the reliability of the quality inspection can be further increased in comparison with the inspection of only one inspection element. Limits in the number of test elements to be tested are set essentially only by the time available for the test, which is dependent on the processing speed of the machine used for quality testing.
  • Value documents which provide errors in the quality inspection by means of the test elements and thus do not meet the requirements can for example be destroyed directly, so that they do not get into circulation. Thus, it is ensured that only documents which have been read properly are put into circulation and at the same time deliver a correct result when checking the test elements.
  • the coding or the test elements are read with higher accuracy (e.g., in terms of resolution, contrast) than provided later in the tester. From the resulting data, it can then not only be ascertained that the code or the test element can be read. It can also be a measure of the quality of the coding or the test element are formed and this used for sorting to ensure a minimum quality. Thus, e.g. also a deterioration in legibility, as expected in circulation, can be simulated, e.g. by artificial deterioration of the signal-to-noise ratio. Et al From this data, a quantity can be derived which indicates the (decreasing) production quality and allows timely intervention in the application process.
  • higher accuracy e.g., in terms of resolution, contrast
  • the test elements may be in different forms depending on the property of the value document on the basis of which they are generated. If the first machine-readable code of the value document is, for example, a barcode, then the test element derived therefrom can be applied to the value document in the form of additional barcode bars. With a code in the form of a two-dimensional barcode, a few lines can also be added. On the other hand, if the test element is generated from the serial number of the value document, the test element may be e.g. in the form of a serial number supplementing or separate check digit be applied to the document of value. Further codes that are used to generate further test elements can also be present, for example, in the form of a barcode or as a number or number sequence. In this case, the respective test element produced therefrom can be applied separately during the production of the value document or the corresponding code can be extended with the test element.
  • the first machine-readable code of the value document is, for example, a barcode
  • the test element derived therefrom can be applied to the
  • the measurable properties of the value document on which the first code and the further code are based preferably relate to different physical properties.
  • the first code is an encoding of an optically measurable baren property and the other code is a coding of a non-optically measurable ren, for example, magnetic property.
  • both codes can also be based on optically measurable properties of the value document. These optically measurable properties then differ, in particular, in that they can only be read out at mutually different wavelengths.
  • the first code and the further code may also be based on the same properties, but be different encoding results.
  • the first code is a code which can be detected in the non-visible spectral range. This provides a particularly good protection against counterfeiting, for example in the form of color copies.
  • the actual code of the value document for example a banknote, is then sent e.g. checked only at a point of sale (POS) to verify the authenticity of the bill. Often it is sufficient to check only one of the numerous authenticity features. At the POS, the corresponding means are provided for this in order to be able to record and evaluate the authenticity feature.
  • POS point of sale
  • the corresponding machine for checking the quality is then made considerably more complex than a POS such as this, since it must be equipped with appropriate sensors for checking all the test elements applied to the value document.
  • the quality control can be carried out at high speed since complex features, such as e.g. an arithmetically encrypted code, only to be checked for plausibility, by only the associated test element is checked time-saving, without necessarily to determine the basic code from the Wert ⁇ document properties.
  • the value document is preferably equipped with a higher-order inspection element, this higher-level inspection element being produced from at least two inspection elements applied to the value document.
  • the higher-level test element can be, for example, as an extension of the first code on the value document.
  • the quality of the value documents can be checked in a particularly simple manner.
  • the higher-level test element can be the result of a simple algorithm and represent, for example, the checksum of the test elements from which the higher-order test element is generated. Then the corresponding inspection elements are recorded during quality inspection, added up and the checksum is formed. If the calculated checksum and the higher-order test element agree, a sufficient quality of the value document is ensured.
  • the quality control itself can be carried out either online on the printing press or on the machine on which the coding or the test element is applied or introduced onto the value document, or offline or in a downstream process. If the application of the coding or of the test element is checked online for its quality on the machine, the complete coding can be transferred to the components or evaluation electronics used for the test. In this case, a 1: 1 comparison of the actual printed or introduced pattern or signal with the default is possible. However, it is particularly preferred that only the information describing the test element be transferred, since in this way the data rate can be kept significantly lower. If the test element is formed from all areas of the coding, one still obtains the desired information about the readability or quality of the entire code and the test element.
  • the method described is used particularly advantageously in the quality control of the value document. Moreover, it can also be used later in authenticity checking and sorting on high-speed banknote processing machines on which the coding result can not be calculated in real time or can only be calculated with great effort. Although the coding result itself has a higher security against its counterfeiting than the security associated with the inspection element, the latter can be used to determine whether the protection used at the point of sale was falsified or forged. Particularly advantageously, these checks can be carried out if the test element is not tested at the point of sale, but only on the high-speed machines.
  • a sheet-shaped value document is dynamically adapted to changing safety requirements during manufacture in order to make the authenticity check of documents of value more reliable.
  • several machine-readable codes are provided on a value document, each of which is a coding result of an encoding of one or more measurable and / or measured-value-derived properties of the value document.
  • the examination of only one code or a selection of the available codes can be carried out.
  • those codes are not used for checking the value document which does not meet (more or not yet) certain requirements for the authenticity check of the value document. If a code is no longer valid for authentication, another code or code selection will be checked instead.
  • a corresponding device for checking value documents is at least suitable for checking individual codes.
  • the device is set up so that initially only a predetermined or a predetermined selection of the individual codes is checked, i.a. if one or more of the codes initially tested no longer meet certain authentication requirements.
  • the number of methods to be stored in a test device for checking the coding can increase sharply. This can cause an unacceptable increase in the time required for the check at the point of sale, eg if the codes after be checked each other.
  • the device described may be, for example, a POS which normally checks a first subset of the codes.
  • a method for the production of value documents in which different codes are applied to the value documents, whereby according to the invention a new code is applied to new value documents to be produced which are not yet part of the quantity available on the previous value documents Codes was when one of these previous codes can no longer be used as authentication information for the value documents. Preferably, then the code that can no longer be used for authenticity testing, no longer applied to the newly produced value documents.
  • FIG. 1 shows a schematic view of an example of a value document according to a first aspect of the invention.
  • FIG. 2 shows a schematic view on a sheet with a plurality of individual grooves, which are subsequently printed further and separated into individual bills in each case corresponding to a banknote;
  • FIG. 3 is a schematic view of a banknote to illustrate a preferred manufacturing method
  • FIG. 4 shows a schematic cross-sectional view of a test device according to a first exemplary embodiment
  • Figure 5 is a schematic cross-sectional view of a tester according to a second embodiment
  • Figure 6 is a schematic view of the illumination tracks of a tester according to another embodiment
  • FIG. 7 shows a schematic top view of a goods scanner with test apparatus according to a further exemplary embodiment
  • Figure 8 is a schematic perspective view of a tester according to yet another embodiment.
  • FIG. 9 shows a schematic view of an example of a value document according to a second aspect of the invention.
  • FIG 1 shows a schematic view of a banknote BN according to a first embodiment.
  • banknote not only finished banknotes BN but also intermediate products in the production process are to be understood as the security paper still to be printed During production, the paper to be cut later into the individual bills corresponding to the individual banknotes may also be in the form of an endless roll both in sheet form and in roll form.
  • the banknote BN is provided with a barcode 2 which can be detected in the non-visible spectral range, the bar Code 2 is an encoding of at least one measurable property of the respective banknote BN.
  • barcode encompasses any machine-readable code, in particular also any one- or two-dimensional pattern of black bars and / or points and white bars and / or points (gaps) or areas with intensity or intensity
  • the bar / space sequence represents a binary sequence of numbers like the code 2/5, the code 2/5 interleaved, the code 128, or the code 39, but also special formats, such as the commercially available codecs UPC 5 EAN-8 or EAN-13, which are also two-dimensional Barcodes, also called matrix codes, which offer a particularly highly condensed recording, can be advantageously used within the scope of the invention, such as PDF 417, Data Matrix, Dot Code, Aztec Mesas, Snoflake Codes.
  • the code 2/5 Interleaved is described, which is used for purely numerical codes.
  • five elements (bars or gaps) per Nutzsch verwen ⁇ det Two of these five are wide elements, the remaining three elements are narrow.
  • Straight line symbols are represented by a gap and an odd position by a bar.
  • gray levels or bars / gaps which can assume more than 2 possible values, correspondingly higher codings are possible.
  • Code 39 which uses a bar code representation of 9 elements (5 bars and 4 spaces), three of which are wide and six narrow, both numbers and letters can be represented.
  • the national currency (EUR, USD, etc.) and nominal value or other data, such as the issue date or the production location of the banknote BN can thus also be coded on a banknote BN.
  • proprietary code that is to say specially developed for this application, in order to avoid reading with standard devices and thus further reduce the risk of decryption.
  • Standard printing methods such as gravure and gravure, offset printing, screen printing, thermal, laser, ink jet and dot matrix printing can be used.
  • the banknotes BN in particular for applying the barcode 2
  • exposure methods with the aid of masks.
  • This can e.g. be known lithographic processes in which by means of an exposure mask, a photosensitive layer 60 of a banknote BN can be illuminated, as illustrated in Figure 3.
  • the mask may have translucent subregions in the form of or complementary to the shape of the individual lines 61 of the barcode 2.
  • the bar code is then embossed into the photo-sensitive layer 60.
  • conventional post-processing steps can be provided.
  • the photo-sensitive layer 60 e.g. also a layer used in films for still cameras.
  • detectable barcodes 2 are suitable for displaying the coding, especially in the infraro ⁇ th spectral range. This makes it possible to further increase the falsification security of such encodings. UV barcodes are also suitable.
  • IR barcodes 2 with a feature substance which has a significant absorption in the range from 1000 to 2500 nm and no significant absorption in the visible spectral range and at 800 nm.
  • feature substances are described in WO 03/032243 by the Applicant, to which reference is hereby expressly made.
  • barcodes with feature substances according to EP 0 340 898 A2, to which reference is expressly made, the feature substances appear colorless or only slightly colored in the visible spectral range and in the near infrared, in particular at a wavelength between 750 nm and 1000 im, have a significant absorption.
  • the luminescent marker substance emits in the infra-red spectral range, preferably at a wavelength ⁇ above about 1100 nm, more preferably above about 1100 nm.
  • the luminescence is then not limited to conventional and readily available Infrarotdetekto ⁇ ren, which are sensitive mainly in the wavelength range of 780 to 800 nm, can be detected. Due to the silicon band gap of 1.12 eV, conventional silicon photodiodes do not permit the detection of infrared radiation with wavelengths above about 1100 nm. Detectors for long-wave infrared radiation are considerably more complicated and are not available to everyone.
  • the luminescent marking substance emits in the absorption region of the infrared-absorbing marking substance.
  • the excitation of the luminescent marking substance is advantageously also in the infrared spectral range, preferably in the spectral range from about 800 nm to about 1000 nm.
  • the infrared-absorbing marking substance in the visible spectral range is essentially colorless or has only a weak intrinsic color. He is then invisible under ordinary lighting conditions or appears only slightly conspicuous.
  • the infrared-absorbing marking substance can be transparent in the visible. Even at a wavelength of about 800 nm, the infrared-absorbing marking substance advantageously still has no significant absorption in order to escape the detection by commercially available infrared detectors.
  • a significant absorption of the infrared-absorbing marker be ⁇ preferably only in the spectral range between about 1200 nm and about 2500 nm, preferably in the spectral range between about 1500 nm and about 2000 nm. The infrared absorption of the authenticity mark is then not detectable at the wavelengths of conventional infrared detectors, but occurs only in the longer-wavelength and more difficult-to-access spectral range above 1200 nm, or above 1500 nm.
  • the luminescent marker can be formed on the basis of a host lattice doped with a rare earth metal. Examples of such luminescent markers are contained, for example, in the publication WO 99/38701, the disclosure of which is incorporated in the present application in this respect.
  • both the coding i.
  • the barcode 2 as well as the coded properties are measured and compared with each other.
  • two or more than two different machine-measurable properties of the banknote BN are correlated with one another and the banknote is provided with the correlation result as a further measurable banknote property.
  • the encoding, i. the correlation result preferably applied to the banknote paper 1 in the form of a non-visible barcode 2.
  • the coded properties and / or the coding result e.g. in the case of sun light, visible properties for the human eye, such as a printed image 4 or the serial number 3.
  • visible properties for the human eye such as a printed image 4 or the serial number 3.
  • a visible bar code could be used to increase the number of bits for encoding.
  • properties which are not or largely invisible such as, for example, UV or IR radiation which is emitted in the non-visible spectral range, may also be present.
  • Substances, magnetic elements, magneto-optical elements or electrically conductive elements may be used.
  • the banknote paper 1 of the banknote BN of FIG. 1 contains fibers 5.
  • these fibers 5 may be invisible to the human eye, even in sunlight, and fluoresce visibly to the human eye only when stimulated by UV light.
  • inconspicuous features can be used for the human eye in sunlight, which are visible in themselves, but not readily visible to the human eye at the usual viewing distance of the banknote BN of 15 to 30 cm.
  • This property can e.g. the number, shape, angular position and / or distribution of larger numbers (more than 5 or 10) on the banknote existing graphical structures such as lines 7, circles or stars or the like, which are e.g. integrated into the print image. 6, an associated region of the printed image is identified by the reference numeral 6, which is shown enlarged in the area connected to the dashed line.
  • the printed image has lines 7 lying close to each other, which the human eye can not resolve without aids.
  • coded properties can also be data about hidden holographic information, so-called "hidden images”.
  • measurable properties which, in the case of different banknotes or different groups of banknotes of the same denomination, specifically and / or randomly vary in the production of the banknotes.
  • the measurable properties that are the same for all or several banknotes, or in particular the measurable properties that vary with several or all banknotes, can relate, for example, to differences in the distribution, position, shape, phase and / or intensity of, for example,
  • elements 10 of the printed image b) printing inks, color gradients or the proportions of the printed image in different colors, e.g. c) fibers 5 of the banknote paper 1, d) the outline of the banknote paper 1, e) with different processes such as background, offset printing, steel gravure, screen printed elements 7, 10 of the printed image, f) Security threads or strips 8, g) microperforations or other holes or see-through areas, h) diffraction structures such as holograms, i) elements with optically variable effect, such as elements with color change effect, j) watermarks, both classical, ie substrate-bound watermarks as well as digital watermarks, in which substrate properties or properties of one or more printing processes are changed in such a way that information is stored, k) planchettes,
  • thermochromonal elements 1) magnetic and / or magneto-optical elements, m) thermochromonal elements n) luminescence features, in particular visible-emitting features, o) features with resonance effects, p) metallizations, demetallizations, q) electronic chips or resonant circuits.
  • phase of elements As an example of a variation of the phase of elements, mention may be made, for example, of the holograms and / or security threads 8 which run in the production of the banknote BN along the paper sheets in endless strips and which have periodic structures 9. After cutting the sheets into banknotes, for example, the phase how large is the distance of the next of these structures 9 from the banknote edge or any other coordinate associated with the banknote.
  • measurable properties e.g. Distances or angles between several elements of Banknotenpa ⁇ piers 1 and / or the printed image are used.
  • the distance between predetermined circles 10 from a larger quantity of imprinted circles 10 can be used as such measurable property.
  • banknotes BN with laser marking which have a laser modification area at least partially overlapping the printed image, which is adjacent to the laser marking and in whose overlapping area with the printed image the visual appearance of the printed image is modified by the action of a laser beam. Passer fluctuations between the printed image and the laser marking are permitted in order to modify the visual appearance of the printed image in a part positioned in the register for laser marking in such a way that register fluctuations between the printed image and the laser marking are obscured by the observer and, instead, the (perfect) register between the laser marking and the modification area dominates the visual appearance of the security element.
  • the area ablated by a laser e.g. a patch metallization can be used, with the help of which a tailor-made reference for later laser (for example, a numbering) is made.
  • This range is a measure of the offset between the laser and the pre-printed patch, which is subject to the usual register variations. Is particularly advantageous if, in particular in the region of the patch, for example on the underside of the patch or in an adhesive layer or primer layer, a luminescent or magnetic feature substance is still present
  • a visible, e.g. Banknote ⁇ individual 2D code on the banknote for. be applied by laser or ink jet.
  • the code can also be constructed from banknote-individual areas that are combined with batch-specific, series-individual, nominal value-specific areas.
  • the measurable properties are coded and the bill is also provided with the coding result.
  • the measurable properties are coded with one another. For example, from the serial number 3 and from data about the number and / or the distribution of the lines 7 by means of a cryptographic algorithm an encryption number can be calculated, which is printed as encoding in the form of the IR barcode 2 on the banknote BN.
  • measurable properties of elements of the banknote which originate from different production steps will be included in the coding.
  • properties relating to printing elements applied with offset printing, printing elements applied by screen printing, as well as properties of an applied transfer element, such as a holographic patch can be included in the encryption.
  • each different production process results in a resulting measurable intrinsic banknote into the encryption.
  • the encryption result contains information about all production processes, which makes the forgery considerably more difficult.
  • An advantage of symmetric encryptions is that the signature, i. the coding result will be shorter, i. may be a small amount of data. Due to the smaller amount of data, a one-dimensional barcode 2 can already be used for this purpose. However, for asymmetric encryption methods that yield larger signatures, two-dimensional barcodes 30 are particularly advantageous.
  • the banknote BN can comprise, for example, a detectable barcode 2, which is a coding result of a coding of one or more measurable and / or derivable properties of the banknote.
  • the barcode may be a result of a complex, e.g. cryptography, encryption.
  • the banknote BN comprises a checking element 50 which is generated from the barcode 2 by means of a comparatively simple algorithm.
  • the test element 50 extends the barcode 2.
  • the quality or plausibility check within the scope of the final check in the production of banknotes is then carried out on the basis of the test element 50 by detecting the barcode 2 and deriving a comparison test element from this Comparison test element is compared with the applied on the banknote BN reference inspection element 50.
  • the test element 50 does not have to expand the barcode 2 as shown, but can also be arranged separately on the banknote.
  • the test element 50 can not only from the barcode 2 itself, but also by means of other measured values and / or other properties 3, 4, 5, 7 derivable from the measured values.
  • the banknote BN can comprise additional checking elements 51, 52 which are each produced by means of a comparatively simple algorithm.
  • the test element 51 extends the serial number 3 and the test element 52 the other code 11.
  • the described quality or plausibility check in the final check in bank note production can then be done additionally on the basis of the test elements 51, 52, thereby testing to improve, wherein the test is carried out analogously to the described test with respect to the test element 50.
  • the test elements 51, 52 do not have to expand the serial number 3 or the code 11, as shown, but can also be arranged separately on the banknote.
  • the banknote BN according to FIG. 1 comprises a higher-level inspection element 53, which is produced from at least two of the inspection elements 50, 51, 52. Die ⁇ ses superior inspection element 53 is used in particular to perform a particularly simple and thus time-saving test.
  • the calculation of the higher-order test element 53 can be based on a simple algorithm, e.g. represent the checksum of the test elements 50, 51, 52. Then the test elements 50, 51, 52 are detected in the banknote examination, added and forms the checksum therefrom. The higher-order test element 53 is also detected and compared with the calculated checksum. To get a positive test result, the two checksums must match.
  • an encoding for example an encryption, of one or more measurable properties of the banknote BN takes place, it can be provided that all or part of the properties to be encrypted of each banknote are read in the production machine online and all the banknotes are determined after the encryption result has been determined Banknotes are then provided with the respective encryption result, such as the barcode 2.
  • all or part of the properties to be encrypted in the production machine online can be read only by a part of all banknote BN and then all banknotes BN to be provided with the encryption result after the encryption result has been determined.
  • the individual sheets 12 have an associated sheet information, such as an arc number as a barcode 15 and read only this sheet information and from this at least one same or different measurable property of all individual benefits 13 of the sheet 12 can be determined and for or a later encryption is usable. It is then sufficient to record this sheet information only once per sheet 12 and not separately for each individual piece 13.
  • the bar code 15 in which predetermined and defined manner, the number, shape, distribution or Ab ⁇ states of the circular structures 14 of the individual benefits 13 differ.
  • banknote checking devices can be used which are integrated into banknote sorting, banknote counting devices, ATMs or also in cash registers or used as a handheld test device.
  • the test equipment can firstly be used to test the authenticity of banknotes BN, in particular special of already in circulation banknotes BN, as well as for quality assurance in the production of banknotes BN are used.
  • Fig. 4 shows schematically a relatively complex embodiment of a tester 26 for measuring different physical properties used for checking the coding of banknotes BN, e.g. Banknote BN of Figure 1 can be measured.
  • the device can be installed in all of the mentioned processing facilities. It is also conceivable, in particular, to use it as a test device at cash registers.
  • the tester 26 uses a plurality of different radiation sources B 1, B 2 and a plurality of different detectors D 1 to D 3 for checking banknote BN, which is guided by means of conventional transport devices in a sheet material plane.
  • the user may manually insert banknotes into an input slot of the tester 26 by hand, which is then transported for examination in the sheet material plane.
  • the various physical properties of the banknote BN are measured in a range which is defined by a measuring window 102, which is predetermined here by an opening in the (upper) housing of the tester 26.
  • the banknote BN is pressed against the underside of the upper housing 101 by means of brushes 103, which are only indicated in FIG.
  • the banknote BN is held at a defined distance from sensor elements arranged in or behind the measuring window 102, which is of importance in particular for a magneto-optical measurement which will be discussed in more detail below.
  • a transparent pane arranged in the measuring window 102 can be slightly set back relative to the surrounding housing wall 101, so that the banknote BN is guided past the pane at a distance and can not scratch it.
  • FIG. 4 shows the overall device from the side in cross section. This means on the one hand that the measuring window 102, which in the
  • the radiation sources Bl, B 2 and detectors DL-D 3 can preferably be formed line by line, that is to say for example as LED rows and Si detector rows which extend perpendicular to the plane of the page.
  • cylindrical lenses L for example Fresnel lenses
  • Selfoc lenses S in the outgoing beam path between the measuring window 102 and the detectors D1 and D3.
  • optical fibers can also be used, in particular to ensure a uniform distribution of the radiation emitted by the LED rows.
  • the light guides can, for example, contain scattering elements and / or be designed as fluorescent plates.
  • the bank note BN illustrated in the exemplary embodiment according to FIG. 4 contains magnetizable material as a security feature of the coding which is exemplarily magnetized by means of four magnets 104 arranged on both sides of the sheet material plane and on both sides of the measuring window 102.
  • a multilayer magneto-optical converter 105 is provided whose optical behavior is influenced by the magnetic leakage flux of the magnetized areas of the banknote BN.
  • the magneto-optical converter 105 comprises, for example, three layers, namely a transparent substrate layer 105a as a carrier material for a magneto-optical layer 105b, which is coated on its other side with a reflector layer 105c.
  • the radiation of the radiation source Bl is directed onto the measuring window 102 and passes through the transparent substrate layer 105a and the magnetic tooptic layer 105b.
  • the polarizer P1 the falling radiation is polarized, and the reflected at the reflector layer 105c radiation is detected after passing through a second polarizer P2 with the detector Dl. Due to the changed optical behavior of the transducer 105 caused by the magnetized banknote BN, the polarization direction of the radiation passing through the magneto-optical converter 105 changes in a characteristic manner and accordingly the intensity of the radiation detected by the detector D 1. In this way, magnetic properties of the banknote BN can thus be detected optically.
  • the reflector layer 105c is formed as a dichroic mirror layer, which is transparent at least for parts of the radiation of the radiation sources B2.
  • the same layer is transparent to light from the blue (including UV) and infrared spectral regions, partially reflecting in the region between blue and IR.
  • the radiation source B2 lying on the side of the magneto-optical converter 105 can also be set up to emit radiation in the spectral range green, blue, IR, UV or also white light as a whole.
  • laser diodes or other radiation sources are integrated therein in order to excite so-called feature substances of the bank note for luminescence, usually in a narrowband spectral range.
  • the opposite radiation source B2 can emit the same ray curtain or spectral sections of this radiation.
  • the detector D1 is embodied in the exemplary embodiment illustrated in FIG. 4 as a silicon detector line which is sensitive to different spectral ranges, for example UV radiation and radiation in the visible spectral range.
  • the detector D 1 is therefore used both for detecting the red polarization radiation of the radiation source Bl reflected by the magneto-optical converter 105 and for detecting the radiation of the radiation source B2 remitted by the banknote BN in the UV and visible range. If the radiation source B2 emits light itself in the red spectral range, this component can be filtered out by suitable filters, or the radiation sources B1, B2 can be operated differently, so that the silicon detector successively receives the corresponding measurements fürkelt.
  • the radiation to be detected may also be provided with spectral means, e.g. a 60 ° prism, are decomposed into individual spectral components on mutually parallel detector lines, as proposed for example in DE 101 59 234 A1.
  • spectral means e.g. a 60 ° prism
  • a data read-out can be carried out with the aid of a multiplex method in order to read out the different signals of the different spectral ranges detected by the same detector one after the other.
  • the above-described variants for the differentiation between the individual spectral components is suitable individually or in combination in a corresponding manner also in connection with the embodiments explained below.
  • the detector D1 can also be used to measure the radiation transmitted by the lower radiation source B2 and transmitted by the bank signal BN. Since the detector D1 is located in the dark field with respect to the lower radiation source B2, it is a dark field measurement. D. h., It is detected with the detector Dl, the diffusely transmitted radiation of the lower radiation source B2.
  • the transmission and re- Mission measurements by means of the detector D 1 can serve, for example, for detecting a printed image printed on the banknote BN. With this detection, however, the red portions of the print image are disregarded, since the reflector layer 105c is opaque to this radiation.
  • the opposite detector D3 is, for example, an InGaAs detector line for detecting IR radiation above 11 OOnm, for which the silicon detector line of the detector Dl is insensitive. That is, the detector D3 measures e.g. the IR transmission radiation of the upper radiation source B2 in the dark field and the IR reflectance radiation of the lower radiation source B2.
  • the further detector D2 is used to detect luminescent feature substances, which are excited by means of the aforementioned laser diodes or LEDs for radiation, for example in the UV range. Again, this measurement takes place in transmission since the excitation radiation source B2 and the luminescence detector D2 lie on opposite sides of the plane of the sheet. Alternatively, a measurement in remission is possible, in which case the detector D2 and the excitation source, e.g. an LED on the same side of the banknote, whereby the Sig ⁇ nalhe can be increased.
  • the printed image of the banknote BN in the visible for. the position and distribution of the circles 10 and the serial number 3 of the banknote BN of FIG. 1 can be determined.
  • the detector D2 in addition, e.g. the barcode 2 measurable in the infrared, which in the case of a genuine banknote BN, the encryption result of an encryption of data, e.g. indicates the location and distribution of circles 10 and serial number 3.
  • FIG. 5 schematically shows a further exemplary embodiment of a
  • a glass surface 22 is instal lated on the Banknote BN to be tested, inside the hous are one or more light sources 28 installed, the banknote BN vor ⁇ preferably in multiplex mode with Irradiate light of different wavelengths, in particular with visible, UV and IR light over a large area.
  • one or more image cameras 27 are installed, which can take a two-dimensional image of an illuminated area of the banknote BN.
  • the image cameras 27 should preferably be sensitive at least in the visible and infrared spectral range, in order to be able to detect at least fluorescent properties 3, visible properties such as the print image 4, 7, 10 and infrared properties such as the IR barcode 2 and thereby be able to check the coding.
  • the testers 26 are preferably in one for the
  • the testing device 26 will preferably have two different output interfaces. An interface leads at least to an indication of three different test results: "genuine banknote”, “false banknote”, “measurement not possible”, which are displayed to the cashier, for example, as signal lamps in different colors. According to another independent idea of the present invention, the tester 26 thus has its own display. Not only information about the result of the check, eg the authenticity of the bill, but also the degree of security with which the bill was determined to be genuine can be displayed on it. It is also possible to display information about the value of the banknotes as well as about the sum of the values of all banknotes which have been valued as genuine in the course of a payment transaction.
  • Another interface may preferably be connected directly to the cash register, e.g. to transmit the denomination of the banknotes which have been authenticated as genuine to a processor in order to calculate and display the change required in the current transaction (difference between the banknote value minus the value of the goods).
  • the testing device 26 is thus able to transfer this information to the cash register located at this "point of sale". This is particularly advantageous if the information transmitted by the tester is already used for calculations inside the cash register, e.g. to calculate the bill of exchange, can be used.
  • the check may e.g. This can also take place by the evaluation algorithm, such as in particular the encryption algorithm, being present in an evaluation unit 25 installed in the test apparatus 26 or in an evaluation unit connected to the data line and including the measured properties to be encrypted (eg the circuits 10 and the serial number 3) Cipher result is calculated and compared with the actually existing on the banknote BN encryption result (eg the barcode 2). If the comparison shows a match, the bill BN is classified as genuine.
  • the evaluation algorithm such as in particular the encryption algorithm
  • the evaluation or a part of the evaluation in a security module 23 of the test apparatus 26, in particular in a chip card 23 he follows.
  • the security module 23 will preferably carry out cryptographically encrypted calculations, so that, for example, the encryption algorithm or at least the key for calculating the encryption result from the measured properties itself is stored encrypted in the chip of the chip card 23. This is particularly advantageous for symmetric encryption algorithms in which the secret key of the encryption algorithm must be securely stored.
  • the security module 23 of the test apparatus 26, in particular the chip card 23, will be exchangeable in order to be able to easily update the data required for encryption, such as the key and / or the encryption or evaluation algorithm.
  • a central supervisory authority such as a central bank responsible for making banknotes, to authorize printers, banks and / or other institutions to create and / or verify secret coding by providing the central bank with secure access to the institutions Smart cards 23 provides, the secret data that are necessary for the coding or coding verification, such as the one or more keys and / or at least parts of the encryption algorithms, with the aid of which the encryption result is calculated from the various measurable properties of the banknote BN.
  • the data is then either transmitted from the chip card 23 to an external unit, for example, or supplied to the data to be encrypted from an external unit of the chip card.
  • the external unit may be, for example, the tester 26 or one in banknote production be used machine, such as a laser or ink jet tracker.
  • the encryption result can then be forwarded to the machines used in banknote production, which then print this encryption result, for example in the form of an IR barcode 2, onto the banknote.
  • the housing of the test apparatus 26 or at least the evaluation processor 25 and / or the security module 23 in which the key is stored is protected against access from the outside. If the housing is opened or broken without authorization, e.g. also the key stored in a volatile memory is actively deleted.
  • the device itself is checked by the chip card, in particular that the chip card can determine whether manipulations have been made to the sensors.
  • evaluation algorithm is carried out in an integrated digital signal processor and / or in a specially manufactured ASIC processor ("application specific integrated circuit").
  • the processor security processor, e.g. also has the smart card, via public (or published) or a specific circle of persons brought to the knowledge interfaces to the various Meß ⁇ systems, e.g. Cameras, magnetic heads, etc. can be connected.
  • the security processor becomes much more flexible and it is conceivable to operate various detection devices that can detect different parameters of the banknote.
  • an update of parts of the encryption algorithms, in particular of the key can take place via a remote data transmission line, such as an Internet and / or mobile radio connection.
  • a remote data transmission line such as an Internet and / or mobile radio connection.
  • a plurality of encrypted information is stored on the banknote. These can either be applied to the banknote without being related to one another or else combined to form a code. It is of particular advantage if the different encrypted information is encrypted with different encryption algorithms, or also with different keys with the same encryption algorithm. For the bank note check, it can then be provided to check all, a subset or even only one of the encryptions for authenticity. The selection of the subset of encryptions that are actually checked during the proof can, in particular, also be random, ie vary from checking to checking the banknote.
  • a two-stage evaluation is carried out.
  • a preliminary evaluation is first carried out, for example, determines the determined by an optical sensor, such as an OCR (optical character recognition) reader from camera 27 or scanner line Dl serial number 3 of the banknote BN as one of the encrypted properties.
  • Dl is based on the measurement of the optical sensor 27 determines only a portion of the Banknotenfikiee and the banknote surface thereof the data only within this range, or of a derived portion or another sensor Dl 5 D2, D3 ge Measure and / or evaluate to measure or determine other of the encrypted properties. This can save computing time and speed up the evaluation.
  • the data on this subarea are transmitted to the evaluation unit 25 and / or the security module 23, which subsequently determines or evaluates other encrypted properties of the banknotes BN only for this area.
  • a first step it is first determined whether the measured values satisfy predetermined conditions, in the special case, for example. the distance between two elements 7 and 10 of the printed image can be determined at all.
  • error correction methods can also be used to increase reading reliability. For example, it may be provided that a check is made as to whether a given minimum quantity of the measured values can be evaluated, ie, for example, the measured values lie within predefined tolerance ranges, and then only this evaluable portion is then used for further evaluation. If, for example, the serial number 3, the distribution of the lines 7 and the barcode 2 are read or measured during the test, then the predetermined relationship between these measured properties is checked. It can thus be checked whether the coding, ie the encryption result (barcode 2) matches the underlying encrypted quantities (serial number 3, lines 7). If the calculated and the measured coding do not match, the bank note BN is rejected by the tester 26 as being unauthentic.
  • a check is made as to whether a given minimum quantity of the measured values can be evaluated, ie, for example, the measured values lie within predefined tolerance ranges, and then only this evaluable portion is then used for further evaluation. If, for example, the serial number 3, the distribution of the lines 7 and the barcode
  • a secret key can be stored in the testing devices 26, preferably in the security module 23.
  • the checksum calculated in this way must be available for the banknote check, therefore it must also be applied in a suitable manner to the banknote BN. It can be printed separately on the banknote BN or can also be accommodated as message recovery in the encryption result.
  • the banknote properties in question are measured and the associated checksum is read or recovered from the encryption result (in the case of message recovery). Subsequently, any measurement errors are corrected with a corresponding decoding algorithm. The encryption result is then checked with the measured values corrected in this way.
  • the sensors in the banknote checking devices 26 output reliability information, that is to say information about the quality of the measurements, these can be included in the decoding algorithm for improving the error correction (soft-decision decoding). Thus, unreliably obtained measured values are corrected rather than measured values that were rated as reliable by the tester 26.
  • the checksum is already determined during the production of banknotes and applied to the banknote as a checking element. Then, in the quality check of the banknote, before it goes into circulation, the inspection element can be used to check the quality of the banknote. If the test element is based, for example, on the serial number of the banknote, The serial number can be recorded, from which a check digit is determined, and this check digit is compared with the corresponding check digit on the banknote. If a comparison of the two check digits is positive, the serial number was correctly recorded, which indicates a good quality of the banknote.
  • the testing device checks only a part of all codes and / or checks an alternating quantity from all available or testable codes, the varying quantity being e.g. for different measurements can vary or even be chosen randomly.
  • the tester can be set up so that it does not check encodings that no longer meet certain safety requirements. This is the case in particular if these codes were cracked and used on counterfeits. Furthermore, these codes can then not be applied during production to the newly produced banknotes and possibly be replaced by other codes.
  • the readability of the multiple codings is checked in a banknote, which affects, for example, for heavily worn banknotes. can be pregnant, and the selection of the codings to be checked for this bank note is dependent on the readability, ie the verifiability of the codings.
  • the authenticity check can only be performed by checking the coding, it is also possible to make use of other measurements of the authenticity check, e.g. also check uncoded characteristics of the banknote.
  • the serial number 3 and properties of the printed image 4 are encrypted and the encryption result is applied as bar code 2, so that not only the coding, but also e.g. also the presence of the fibers 5 must be verified.
  • the faster but less accurate first device is preferably used first for checking the banknotes BN, and only if that first device can not clearly verify or exclude the authenticity of the checked banknotes BN, the second device will be used for verification.
  • banknotes BN are not posi ⁇ tioned or transported in the tester 26 in a defined ebner position, because the banknotes BN eg in a used in Einzel ⁇ trade test device 26 individually by the cashier on a tray 22, 101 of the test device 26th can be stored, or are kept free in a measuring arrangement, the problem may arise that can not win a sharp image of the entire banknote BN with conventional imaging systems. According to a further idea, it can therefore also be provided that, in such an optical measurement, a banknote BN to be tested is measured in several different focal planes.
  • the focal plane of the imaging optics of an image camera 27, D1 can be varied during the measurement of an uneven banknote BN in order to sharply map different areas of the banknote BN and an image of the banknote BN from the several measurements at different focal planes to be able to determine larger areas.
  • test device 26 can furthermore also be integrated in the scanner cash register for acquiring the goods to be paid.
  • a laser beam for reading the IR barcode 2 of the banknote BN can be coupled onto the same polygon mirror as a red laser beam for the visible barcode of the goods and / or the banknotes BN.
  • the laser beam is preferably directed onto the scanner glass plate in an angled strip pattern via different deflection mirrors, so that a omnidirectional reading is made possible.
  • FIG. 6 shows an example of a reading field with angled strips of the projected laser beam 38.
  • multiple detectors can also be used for respectively different measurements, and the light emanating from the bank notes BN to be tested can be distributed to the respective detectors by means of a beam splitter.
  • FIG. 7 shows a schematic top view of another checking device 26 for bank notes BN integrated in a goods scanner cash register 40.
  • the goods are drawn to scan the price tags in the transport direction Tl via a glass plate 46 of a per se known bar code scanner 41, which is integrated in a surface 45.
  • a test apparatus 26 which, for example, both performs an image measurement by means of the barcode scanner 41 and can also have a magnetic sensor 43. If the banknote BN is now moved past this checking device 26 in the direction T2 (perpendicular to the direction T1), optical measurements and magnet measurements of banknote characteristics can be carried out in order to be able to measure and check the coding and the coded properties.
  • the integration of the magnetic sensor 43 in the edge of the surface 45 makes it easier for the operator to touch the bank note touching the magnetic sensor 43, which may be necessary in particular for the very distance-dependent magnetic measurements.
  • funnel-shaped guide elements 42 in the surface 45 vorgese ⁇ be hen to the banknote BN nen in a well-defined position nen to NEN. This arrangement is particularly advantageous for integrating magnetically coded information, which can be read in the withdrawal direction of the banknote, into the checking of the authenticity of the banknote BN.
  • test device which is specially designed for detecting optically variable elements which, when viewed from different sides, have a different color impression.
  • line scan cameras with two different circularly polarizing filters additional information can be obtained from the differential image if corresponding properties of security elements on a liquid-crystalline basis are measured to test the coding, as described in detail in WO 2004/011273 A2 of the Applicant are described.
  • an image camera 27 for example with a two-dimensional CCD array
  • a line scan camera for taking two-dimensional images of the banknotes BN
  • such a line sensor may be oriented, for example, parallel to the magnetic sensor 43, ie, perpendicular to the withdrawal direction of the bank notes BN, instead of the bar code scanner 41.
  • the tester 26 can independently determine whether a banknote BN is located in the measuring range of the tester 26, such as e.g. on a Ablagelage 22, 45, 101 of the tester is then to perform the appropriate measurements gene.
  • This can e.g. be done by means of infrared lighting, which does not disturb the operator of the tester and preferably also for the measurement of IR light, for example, the IR barcode 2, can serve. Only when a banknote BN is thus recognized in the measuring window are then further illumination and / or measuring channels activated for checking the banknote BN, and e.g. only then a visible or ultraviolet lighting turned on.
  • FIG. 8 schematically shows a part of a test apparatus 26 which can be used for this purpose for measuring a barcode, in particular also a two-dimensional barcode 30 of a banknote BN.
  • the test apparatus 26 according to FIG. 8 has a glass plate 31 for supporting a banknote BN to be tested.
  • a light source 33 serves to illuminate a micromirror 34 which can be rotated in two perpendicular directions. By rotating the micromirror 34 in the two directions, it is possible to divert the laser beam emanating from the light source 33 line by line over the entire scanning region 32 of the glass plate 31.
  • mirror 34 is particularly useful in manual testing, since it does not depend on extremely high scanning speeds and therefore sufficient time remains, by adjusting the mirror 34 to scan the banknote BN area , As a result, in particular, the two-dimensional barcode 30 can also be used.
  • radiation is detected by an imaging device 35 by a detector 36.
  • special light emitting diodes or laser diodes can be used as the radiation sources Bl, B2, 28, the monochromatic light, d. H.
  • light-emitting diodes which emit wavelengths from the near-infrared range or the far-infrared range are preferably used.
  • FIG. 9 shows a schematic view of a banknote BN according to a second aspect of the invention.
  • the conventionally provided on banknotes objects, as shown in part in Figure 1, are not shown in Figure 9 for the sake of clarity.
  • three further barcodes 55, 56, 57 are applied to the banknote BN, the total of four barcodes representing a set M of barcodes.
  • Each of the barcodes is a result of an encoding of one or more measurable and / or derivable from measured values egg characteristics of the value document.
  • the coded properties of the banknote and / or the coding result of the different barcodes can be different.
  • the serial number 3 and properties of the printed image 4 can be coded in the first barcode.
  • properties of the fibers 5 and the serial number 3 can be encoded in the second barcode, for example.
  • the third and fourth barcodes 56, 57 correspondingly different properties of the banknote BN can be coded, whereby the coded properties of the different barcodes can also overlap.
  • the test device only checks a barcode or only one selection of all barcodes and / or checks an alternating subset of all available or testable barcodes, the changing subset being e.g. can vary for different measurements or can also be selected at random. It is provided according to the invention that only the barcodes or only a subset of the quantity M of the barcodes are checked with respect to the authenticity of the banknotes which correspond to corresponding security requirements. Barcodes which have been decrypted unauthorized are no longer used in the authenticity check and preferably no longer printed on newly produced banknotes. In particular, these cracked barcodes are replaced by new barcodes that were not yet included in the set M of the signatures 2, 55, 56, 57.

Abstract

L'invention concerne des documents de valeur de type feuilles qui comportent une caractéristique de sécurité lisible par machine. L'invention concerne également des procédés et des dispositifs servant à produire ou à vérifier de tels documents de valeur. Selon l'invention, un document de valeur de type feuille est muni d'un code détectable dans le domaine spectral non visible, notamment d'un code à barres, le code à barres constituant un codage d'au moins une propriété mesurable du document de valeur correspondant. Le code à barres peut ainsi être utilisé comme signature propre au billet de banque lorsque les propriétés chiffrées se distinguent pour des billets ou des groupes de billets différents. L'utilisation notamment de codes à barres détectables uniquement dans le domaine spectral non visible permet également une protection particulièrement efficace contre les faux, sous la forme de photocopies en couleur par exemple.
PCT/EP2005/012116 2004-11-18 2005-11-11 Documents de valeur, production et verification de documents de valeur WO2006053685A2 (fr)

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EP05806432A EP1815443A2 (fr) 2004-11-18 2005-11-11 Documents de valeur, production et verification de documents de valeur

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DE102004055761A DE102004055761A1 (de) 2004-11-18 2004-11-18 Wertdokumente, Herstellung und Prüfung von Wertdokumenten
DE102004055761.6 2004-11-18
DE102005032704.4 2005-07-13
DE102005032704A DE102005032704A1 (de) 2005-07-13 2005-07-13 Wertdokumente, Herrstellung und Prüfung von Wertdokumenten

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WO2010040987A1 (fr) 2008-10-06 2010-04-15 De La Rue International Limited Procédé de fabrication d’un document de sécurité et procédé d’authentification du document
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EP2590147A1 (fr) * 2010-06-29 2013-05-08 Glory Ltd. Dispositif, système et procédé de traitement de billets de banque
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US8792090B2 (en) 2008-11-14 2014-07-29 De La Rue International Limited Document of value, method of manufacture and method of detecting soil or wear
WO2015043761A3 (fr) * 2013-09-27 2015-06-25 Giesecke & Devrient Gmbh Document de valeur et procédé pour en vérifier l'existence
WO2015043760A3 (fr) * 2013-09-27 2015-06-25 Giesecke & Devrient Gmbh Document de valeur et procédé pour en vérifier l'existence
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