WO2005064973A1 - Authentication in a communication network - Google Patents

Authentication in a communication network Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2005064973A1
WO2005064973A1 PCT/EP2003/051101 EP0351101W WO2005064973A1 WO 2005064973 A1 WO2005064973 A1 WO 2005064973A1 EP 0351101 W EP0351101 W EP 0351101W WO 2005064973 A1 WO2005064973 A1 WO 2005064973A1
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WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
value
node
mobile node
access
chain
Prior art date
Application number
PCT/EP2003/051101
Other languages
French (fr)
Inventor
Jari Arkko
Pekka Nikander
Mats NÄSLUND
Original Assignee
Telefonaktiebolaget Lm Ericsson (Publ)
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Telefonaktiebolaget Lm Ericsson (Publ) filed Critical Telefonaktiebolaget Lm Ericsson (Publ)
Priority to AU2003304666A priority Critical patent/AU2003304666A1/en
Priority to EP03819186A priority patent/EP1698197B1/en
Priority to CN2003801109162A priority patent/CN1887019B/en
Priority to PCT/EP2003/051101 priority patent/WO2005064973A1/en
Priority to DE60320322T priority patent/DE60320322T2/en
Priority to AT03819186T priority patent/ATE392107T1/en
Priority to US10/584,293 priority patent/US7551914B2/en
Publication of WO2005064973A1 publication Critical patent/WO2005064973A1/en
Priority to US12/370,781 priority patent/US7813718B2/en

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Classifications

    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3236Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using cryptographic hash functions
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/06Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network
    • H04L63/061Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network for key exchange, e.g. in peer-to-peer networks
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/50Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols using hash chains, e.g. blockchains or hash trees
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04WWIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/04Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
    • H04W12/041Key generation or derivation
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04WWIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/04Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
    • H04W12/043Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA] using a trusted network node as an anchor
    • H04W12/0433Key management protocols
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04WWIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/06Authentication
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04WWIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/10Integrity
    • H04W12/108Source integrity
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L2209/00Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
    • H04L2209/80Wireless
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/08Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities

Definitions

  • the present invention relates to authentication in a communication network and more particularly, though not necessarily, to the authentication of wireless terminals roaming in a visited communication network.
  • FIG. 1 illustrates diagrammatically the architecture of a cellular communications network for mobile wireless terminals.
  • the network comprises a set of access nodes 4, 6 interconnected by an IP network 12.
  • a subscriber owns user equipment (UE) 1 and has a subscription with a "home'' network 3.
  • the home network has a Home Location Register (HLR) 10 which comprises a database that stores subscriber information such as billing information, service allowance and subscriber location.
  • HLR Home Location Register
  • the subscriber may take the UE and roam to a visited foreign wireless network 2, where he wishes to access certain communication services via a first access node 4, for example voice calls (routed through a circuit switched network), Internet access, peer-to-peer data connections with other UEs, or other data services.
  • HLR Home Location Register
  • the visited network Before the subscriber is allowed to access such services via the UE, the visited network requires that the subscriber be authenticated, and this is typically achieved by the visited network 2 contacting the home network 3. The visited network may perfonn some initial check to verify that the UE is making a valid request.
  • the visited network 2 will not grant the subscriber access to any services until it knows that such access will be paid for, and the visited network therefore sends an authentication request 5 to the home network to dete ⁇ nine whether the subscriber is a registered subscriber of the home network, and is therefore trusted. Only after the home network 3 has confirmed, in message 5', that the subscriber is registered with the home network will the visited network provide access to the available services.
  • the authentication process may require more than one pair of messages 5, 5' to be exchanged between the visited network and the home network.
  • the full authentication procedure may be a lengthy process, both in terms of the time it takes and the communication overheads enforced on the communication network. Protocols for use in authenticating roaming subscribers include MAP, RADIUS and DIAMETER.
  • the access node that the UE uses to connect to the visited network can depend on a variety of factors, including amongst others physical proximity, bandwidth capacity and existing operational load. This may be the case, for example, in a wireless LAN, where cell sizes are small and movement of the UE between access nodes may be frequent.
  • the access node Each time the UE wishes to attach to a new access node, the access node must repeat the authentication process carried out by the previous access nodes by sending a request 7 to the home network 3, and awaiting a response 7' from the home network.
  • This second authentication process takes a similar length of time and consumes a similar amount of network resources to the initial authentication process. It is undesirable for excessive amounts of signalling data to be transferred over the network; the network operators are provided with fixed bandwidth allocations, and can only charge subscribers for service- related data. Signalling data represents unchargeable bandwidth usage, and network operators wish to minimise its use.
  • the second authentication process will likely result in an interruption of the services provided to the subscriber.
  • a concept known as "fast handoff has been developed for use in networks in which UEs switch between different access nodes on a frequent basis, the concept providing a faster means for switching between alternative access nodes.
  • a full authentication is provided, but bypassing the home network. This may be achieved using either a preemptive control from the home network, e.g. authenticating a UE to use a new access node prior to switching over from the current access node, or via some context transfer between the two access nodes, avoiding the home network altogether.
  • the first of these fast handoff mechanisms still suffers from undesirable large signalling overheads, requiring further signalling between the home and visited networks each time the UE switches access nodes.
  • a number of different fast handoff implementations have been proposed and these avoid excess communication with the home network 3 by using some type of session key or re-authentication key distributed to the access nodes.
  • the keys are agreed upon by both the home network and the visited network during initial authentication, and the keys are distributed among the access nodes of the visited network. This enables fast re-attachment of a UE when switching between access nodes but exposes the system to unnecessary security vulnerabilities, the main one being that a single compromised access node has access to all such session and re-authentication keys.
  • a single compromised access node can therefore provide information to a malicious third party which would enable that party to imitate the UE and access services from the visited network without having to provide payment.
  • a method of authenticating a mobile node to a communication system comprising a plurality of access nodes, the method comprising (a) generating a numerical chain comprising a series of values using a one-way coding function such that a given value within the chain is easily obtainable from a subsequent value, but the subsequent value is not easily obtainable from that given value; (b) sending a value from the first numerical chain from the mobile node to an access node to which the mobile node wishes to attach; and (c) using the sent value at the access node to authenticate the mobile node.
  • a method of deriving a secure authentication key when a mobile node authenticates itself to an access node in accordance with any preceding claim comprising providing a first authentication key Kso for use by the mobile node and a first access node; sending a hash of the first authentication key hash Ks ⁇ ) to a second access node and the mobile node; and generating a new authentication key K ⁇ i in accordance with the hash hash(Kso).
  • a mobile wireless terminal comprising means for generating and storing a first numerical chain comprising a series of n values using a one-way coding function such that a given value within the chain is easily obtainable from a subsequent value, but the subsequent value is not easily obtainable from that given value; and means for disclosing values from the numerical chain to an access node in order to allow the access node to authenticate the mobile wireless terminal.
  • an access node of a communication system having means for receiving from a mobile node a value of a first numerical chain comprising a series of n values using a one-way coding function such that a given value within the chain is easily obtainable from a subsequent value, but the subsequent value is not easily obtainable from that given value; and means for authenticating the mobile node on the basis of that value.
  • a control node of a communication system having means for receiving from a mobile node or an access node a value of a first numerical chain comprising a series of n values using a one-way coding function such that a given value within the chain is easily obtainable from a subsequent value, but the subsequent value is not easily obtainable from that given value; and means for authenticating the mobile node on the basis of that value.
  • Figure 1 illustrates diagrammatically the architecture of a communications network
  • FIG. 2 illustrates diagrammatically the architecture of a communications network in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention.
  • Figure 3 is a flow diagram illustrating the method of certain embodiments of the present invention.
  • FIG. 2 illustrates diagrammatically the architecture of a cellular communications network for mobile wireless terminals in accordance with a first embodiment of the present invention, with like numerals representing like elements to those shown in Figure 1.
  • Access nodes 4, 6 are interconnected by a network.
  • the network may be a cellular telecommunications network, e.g. a 3G network, WLAN, a combination of 3G and WLAN networks, or any other type of cellular network.
  • a subscriber to a home network 3 owns a mobile wireless terminal 1 and seeks to access services such as voice calls, Internet access, or other data services from a visited (foreign) wireless network 2. Prior to granting the subscriber access to the services, the visited network requires authorisation from the subscriber's home network.
  • the visited network In order for the subscriber to be authenticated, the visited network sends an authentication request to the home network, which checks the subscriber details in the HLR 10. This authentication process is defined in the MAP, RADIUS and DIAMETER (RFC 3588) protocols and, for wireless networks in particular, in the 802.1x, 802.1 li and EAP (RFC 2298) protocols.
  • the visited network Upon successful authentication, stores the subscriber's details in its Visitor Location Register (VLR) 11.
  • VLR Visitor Location Register
  • the UE may then access the service available from the visited network via a first access node 4.
  • An authentication key, or session key may be derived using some existing exchange protocol, and is used to encrypt traffic between the UE and a given access node after initial authentication.
  • a numerical chain is determined that will be used to re-authenticate the mobile node if it switches access nodes at a later stage.
  • the numerical chain may be known only to the UE.
  • the numerical chain is known to both the UE and the home network.
  • the chain is a sequence of n numbers having values Hi, H 2 ... H, let such that a given value within the chain is easily obtainable from a subsequent value, but the subsequent value is not easily obtainable from the given value.
  • a one-way coding function for example a hash function
  • H i has (H,).
  • the function hash() is defined in such a way that it is very difficult to reverse the operation, i.e. obtain the value that the function has operated upon.
  • the one-way hash function used may be, for example, MD5 or SHA-1.
  • the function hash() can be public knowledge; its one-way functionality means that it does not need to be secret. Any cryptographically secure one-way function is appropriate.
  • the numerical chain is generated from a seed value that is the last value in the chain, H Computer. Successive applications of the one-way hash() function return the preceding values in the chain, back down to the first number in the sequence Hi.
  • the seed value is agreed between the UE and the home network, being sent between the two parties in some encrypted form.
  • the seed value may be generated by a pseudo-random number generator.
  • the seed value may alternatively be based on some value known only to or only derivable by the UE and the home network, e.g. the EAP MSK or EMSK values, in which case existing authentication protocols would not need to be adapted to implement the protocol of this embodiment.
  • the UE generates the seed value by itself, the home network having no knowledge of it, and being unable to obtain it. Having generated the seed value, both the UE and the home network are capable of generating the remainder of the sequence by successive applications of the one-way coding function to obtain Hi.
  • the value Hi is distributed to the access nodes within the access network by a first one of the access nodes to which the UE is attached, along with the authentication encryption key K R .
  • the access nodes receive the value of Hi from a control node. The control node is provided with Hi by either the UE or the home network, and the control node subsequently updates the access nodes.
  • the UE presents to a second access node 6 the authentication key K R , and confirms its identity by presenting the value H 2 from the numerical chain.
  • the second access node compares the value of Hi distributed to the access nodes previously with the value of Hi obtained by "hashing" the value H supplied by the UE. Since the only two devices with knowledge of any subsequent values in the numerical chain are the UE and the home network, if the two values of Hi are equal, the UE is deemed to have been authenticated.
  • the second access node 6 sends an update notification message 8 to the other access nodes of the access network, so that they are aware that the UE has switched access nodes.
  • the update notification message may comprise the most recent H value provided by the UE, or alternatively it may simply comprise an indication that the UE has switched access nodes, in which case the other access nodes in the access network increment a counter by one.
  • the UE When the UE wishes to switch to a further access node and requires another re- authentication, the UE supplies that further access node with the next H value in the numerical chain.
  • the further access node then operates on the disclosed H value with the hash() function and compares it to the most recently distributed H value or, in the case where only a counter has been incremented, it applies the hash() function an appropriate successive number of times and compares the result to the stored //'value. It is required that each time it requests re-authentication the UE use a higher H value in the sequence than those already used to ensure that a compromised access node cannot use its knowledge of K R at an access node where the UE has not visited.
  • the update notification may be sent through a local multicast mechanism to all of the access nodes of the access network. This process, and the initial distribution of Hi and K R , must be secure. In a further embodiment, the distribution of information relating to multiple users is sent in batches, e.g. all user information is updated every 10 seconds.
  • the UE is authenticated to a new AN, via a control node.
  • the control node stores the new H value.
  • the further access node queries the control node with the new H value provided by the UE.
  • the control node applies the one-way function to the new H value for comparison with the stored H value. If the two values match, the control node authenticates the UE to the further access node.
  • the access nodes do not need to be able to store or apply the one-way coding function to supplied H values. It is also potentially more secure to have a trusted single location performing the authentication, rather than distributing values throughout the communication system.
  • the numerical chain of n values is generated by n- ⁇ successive iterations of the hash function on the initial seed value.
  • n- ⁇ applications of the one-way coding function the system allows only for a finite number of handovers between access nodes. After the maximum number of allowed handovers between access nodes has been reached, it is necessary to restart the process by generating a new numerical chain at the UE and the home network.
  • the system will only permit this third party to switch access nodes a finite number of times before the system's security is restored. Therefore, in order to set a higher level of security by demanding more frequent checks with the home network, the value of n is set lower.
  • values of the numerical chain may be used to generate at least part, if not all, of a new IP address for the UE.
  • the UE attaches to a new access node it must disclose the next value of the numerical chain. It could also use that value to generate the interface identifier part of an IP address in accordance with the methods of British Patent No. 2367986, the contents of which are incorporated herein by reference.
  • each time the UE wishes to attach itself to a new access node each time the UE wishes to attach itself to a new access node, it discloses an H value further along in the sequence than the next one, e.g. if the UE disclosed H3 to the last access node it attached itself to, then it may disclose H5 (or any higher / value, up to Hvisor) rather than H 4 .
  • the new access node must apply the hash() function to the disclosed value more than once in order to compare its output to the most recently distributed public H value.
  • Any further access node may only have been supplied with H; and an indication from earlier update notifications that the UE has switched access nodes a given number m of times.
  • the further access node knows that it must apply the one-way coding function at least m+1 times, up to a maximum of n- ⁇ times, to the H value supplied by the UE seeking authentication. If none of the hashed values corresponds to that provided by the UE, the access node must assume that the re- authentication request is not permissible. 1
  • multiple numerical chains are generated by the UE and the home network so that the UE may use them in parallel on multiple interfaces.
  • the multiple chains are generated using different seed values and the same one-way coding function.
  • the multiple chains may implement a different one-way coding function, subsequent communications bearing an indication of which coding function has been implemented on a given chain. This creates a fast "multi-homing" mechanism where only a single initial authentication is required even on a node with multiple interfaces. A different numerical chain must be used for each interface in order to avoid a replay attack.
  • a method for deriving a secure authentication key for use when a UE switches access nodes as described above It is initially assumed that the UE and the first access node share a common authentication key Kso- Methods for achieving this are well-known.
  • the first access node upon switching from a first access node to a new access node, the first access node sends a message containing the value h&sh.(Kso) to the new access node, which sends these values to the UE.
  • the UE can then confirm, by hashing Kso itself, that this message did indeed originate at the first access node.
  • the new access node cannot determine the original authentication key Kso since it cannot reverse the one-way coding function hash Kso) to obtain Kso-
  • the present invention provides a method of authenticating a mobile node to an access node of an access network. It will be appreciated by the skilled person that various modifications may be made to

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  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
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Abstract

A method of authenticating a mobile node to a communication system is provided, the communication system comprising a plurality of access nodes, the method comprising the steps of (a) generating a numerical chain comprising a series of values using a oneway coding function such that a given value within the chain is easily obtainable from a subsequent value, but the subsequent value is not easily obtainable from that given value; (b) sending a value from the first numerical chain from the mobile node to an access node to which the mobile node wishes to attach; and (c) using the sent value at the access node to authenticate the mobile node.

Description

Authentication In A Communication Network
Field of the Invention
The present invention relates to authentication in a communication network and more particularly, though not necessarily, to the authentication of wireless terminals roaming in a visited communication network.
Background to the Invention
Figure 1 illustrates diagrammatically the architecture of a cellular communications network for mobile wireless terminals. The network comprises a set of access nodes 4, 6 interconnected by an IP network 12. A subscriber owns user equipment (UE) 1 and has a subscription with a "home'' network 3. The home network has a Home Location Register (HLR) 10 which comprises a database that stores subscriber information such as billing information, service allowance and subscriber location. The subscriber may take the UE and roam to a visited foreign wireless network 2, where he wishes to access certain communication services via a first access node 4, for example voice calls (routed through a circuit switched network), Internet access, peer-to-peer data connections with other UEs, or other data services. Before the subscriber is allowed to access such services via the UE, the visited network requires that the subscriber be authenticated, and this is typically achieved by the visited network 2 contacting the home network 3. The visited network may perfonn some initial check to verify that the UE is making a valid request.
The visited network 2 will not grant the subscriber access to any services until it knows that such access will be paid for, and the visited network therefore sends an authentication request 5 to the home network to deteπnine whether the subscriber is a registered subscriber of the home network, and is therefore trusted. Only after the home network 3 has confirmed, in message 5', that the subscriber is registered with the home network will the visited network provide access to the available services. The authentication process may require more than one pair of messages 5, 5' to be exchanged between the visited network and the home network. The full authentication procedure may be a lengthy process, both in terms of the time it takes and the communication overheads enforced on the communication network. Protocols for use in authenticating roaming subscribers include MAP, RADIUS and DIAMETER.
After successful authentication, circumstances may change such that the UE has to access the visited network via an alternative access node 6. The access node that the UE uses to connect to the visited network can depend on a variety of factors, including amongst others physical proximity, bandwidth capacity and existing operational load. This may be the case, for example, in a wireless LAN, where cell sizes are small and movement of the UE between access nodes may be frequent.
Each time the UE wishes to attach to a new access node, the access node must repeat the authentication process carried out by the previous access nodes by sending a request 7 to the home network 3, and awaiting a response 7' from the home network. This second authentication process takes a similar length of time and consumes a similar amount of network resources to the initial authentication process. It is undesirable for excessive amounts of signalling data to be transferred over the network; the network operators are provided with fixed bandwidth allocations, and can only charge subscribers for service- related data. Signalling data represents unchargeable bandwidth usage, and network operators wish to minimise its use. The second authentication process will likely result in an interruption of the services provided to the subscriber. This may not be a significant problem if, for example, the subscriber is accessing a website, where a small delay in the data being supplied does not adversely affect the quality of the service provided. However, for services such as voice calls or streaming multimedia broadcasts, an interruption to the service is undesirable.
It is therefore desirable to provide a secure authentication mechanism in which the authentication time when switching access nodes is reduced. It is also desirable to provide a secure authentication mechanism that bypasses the need to query the home network to confirm the identity of the UE, reducing the signalling overheads on the home network. A concept known as "fast handoff has been developed for use in networks in which UEs switch between different access nodes on a frequent basis, the concept providing a faster means for switching between alternative access nodes. A full authentication is provided, but bypassing the home network. This may be achieved using either a preemptive control from the home network, e.g. authenticating a UE to use a new access node prior to switching over from the current access node, or via some context transfer between the two access nodes, avoiding the home network altogether.
The first of these fast handoff mechanisms still suffers from undesirable large signalling overheads, requiring further signalling between the home and visited networks each time the UE switches access nodes.- Considering further the second of these "fast handoff mechanisms, a number of different fast handoff implementations have been proposed and these avoid excess communication with the home network 3 by using some type of session key or re-authentication key distributed to the access nodes. The keys are agreed upon by both the home network and the visited network during initial authentication, and the keys are distributed among the access nodes of the visited network. This enables fast re-attachment of a UE when switching between access nodes but exposes the system to unnecessary security vulnerabilities, the main one being that a single compromised access node has access to all such session and re-authentication keys. A single compromised access node can therefore provide information to a malicious third party which would enable that party to imitate the UE and access services from the visited network without having to provide payment.
It is therefore desirable to provide a fast handoff mechanism for fast switching of mobile nodes between access nodes in an access network and which avoids the risk that a single access node can be compromised to allow a third party to access other access nodes.
Summary of the Present Invention
In accordance with a first aspect of the present invention there is provided a method of authenticating a mobile node to a communication system, the communication system comprising a plurality of access nodes, the method comprising (a) generating a numerical chain comprising a series of values using a one-way coding function such that a given value within the chain is easily obtainable from a subsequent value, but the subsequent value is not easily obtainable from that given value; (b) sending a value from the first numerical chain from the mobile node to an access node to which the mobile node wishes to attach; and (c) using the sent value at the access node to authenticate the mobile node.
In accordance with a second aspect of the present invention there is provided a method of deriving a secure authentication key when a mobile node authenticates itself to an access node in accordance with any preceding claim, the method comprising providing a first authentication key Kso for use by the mobile node and a first access node; sending a hash of the first authentication key hash Ksø) to a second access node and the mobile node; and generating a new authentication key Ki in accordance with the hash hash(Kso).
In accordance with a further aspect of the present invention there is provided a mobile wireless terminal, the terminal comprising means for generating and storing a first numerical chain comprising a series of n values using a one-way coding function such that a given value within the chain is easily obtainable from a subsequent value, but the subsequent value is not easily obtainable from that given value; and means for disclosing values from the numerical chain to an access node in order to allow the access node to authenticate the mobile wireless terminal.
In accordance with a further aspect of the present invention there is provided an access node of a communication system having means for receiving from a mobile node a value of a first numerical chain comprising a series of n values using a one-way coding function such that a given value within the chain is easily obtainable from a subsequent value, but the subsequent value is not easily obtainable from that given value; and means for authenticating the mobile node on the basis of that value.
In accordance with a further aspect of the present invention there is provided a control node of a communication system having means for receiving from a mobile node or an access node a value of a first numerical chain comprising a series of n values using a one-way coding function such that a given value within the chain is easily obtainable from a subsequent value, but the subsequent value is not easily obtainable from that given value; and means for authenticating the mobile node on the basis of that value.
Brief Description of the Drawings
Figure 1 illustrates diagrammatically the architecture of a communications network;
Figure 2 illustrates diagrammatically the architecture of a communications network in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention; and
Figure 3 is a flow diagram illustrating the method of certain embodiments of the present invention.
Detailed Description of Certain Embodiments
Figure 2 illustrates diagrammatically the architecture of a cellular communications network for mobile wireless terminals in accordance with a first embodiment of the present invention, with like numerals representing like elements to those shown in Figure 1. Access nodes 4, 6 are interconnected by a network. The network may be a cellular telecommunications network, e.g. a 3G network, WLAN, a combination of 3G and WLAN networks, or any other type of cellular network. A subscriber to a home network 3 owns a mobile wireless terminal 1 and seeks to access services such as voice calls, Internet access, or other data services from a visited (foreign) wireless network 2. Prior to granting the subscriber access to the services, the visited network requires authorisation from the subscriber's home network. In order for the subscriber to be authenticated, the visited network sends an authentication request to the home network, which checks the subscriber details in the HLR 10. This authentication process is defined in the MAP, RADIUS and DIAMETER (RFC 3588) protocols and, for wireless networks in particular, in the 802.1x, 802.1 li and EAP (RFC 2298) protocols. Upon successful authentication, the visited network stores the subscriber's details in its Visitor Location Register (VLR) 11. The UE may then access the service available from the visited network via a first access node 4. An authentication key, or session key, may be derived using some existing exchange protocol, and is used to encrypt traffic between the UE and a given access node after initial authentication.
During the initial authentication process (e.g. exchange of messages 5, 5'), a numerical chain is determined that will be used to re-authenticate the mobile node if it switches access nodes at a later stage. In certain of the embodiments the numerical chain may be known only to the UE. In other embodiments (which may be more suitable for application to existing protocols such as RADIUS and DIAMETER) the numerical chain is known to both the UE and the home network. The chain is a sequence of n numbers having values Hi, H2 ... H,„ such that a given value within the chain is easily obtainable from a subsequent value, but the subsequent value is not easily obtainable from the given value. This may be achieved using a one-way coding function, for example a hash function, to achieve a chain in which H i = has (H,). The function hash() is defined in such a way that it is very difficult to reverse the operation, i.e. obtain the value that the function has operated upon. The one-way hash function used may be, for example, MD5 or SHA-1. The function hash() can be public knowledge; its one-way functionality means that it does not need to be secret. Any cryptographically secure one-way function is appropriate.
The numerical chain is generated from a seed value that is the last value in the chain, H„. Successive applications of the one-way hash() function return the preceding values in the chain, back down to the first number in the sequence Hi. The seed value is agreed between the UE and the home network, being sent between the two parties in some encrypted form. The seed value may be generated by a pseudo-random number generator. The seed value may alternatively be based on some value known only to or only derivable by the UE and the home network, e.g. the EAP MSK or EMSK values, in which case existing authentication protocols would not need to be adapted to implement the protocol of this embodiment. According to an alternative embodiment, the UE generates the seed value by itself, the home network having no knowledge of it, and being unable to obtain it. Having generated the seed value, both the UE and the home network are capable of generating the remainder of the sequence by successive applications of the one-way coding function to obtain Hi. Following initial authentication of the subscriber to the visited network, the value Hi is distributed to the access nodes within the access network by a first one of the access nodes to which the UE is attached, along with the authentication encryption key KR. Alternatively, the access nodes receive the value of Hi from a control node. The control node is provided with Hi by either the UE or the home network, and the control node subsequently updates the access nodes.
Considering the scenario in which the UE moves to a new access node, the UE presents to a second access node 6 the authentication key KR, and confirms its identity by presenting the value H2 from the numerical chain. The second access node 6 knows the one-way coding function, and applies the function to the value H2, thereby obtaining the value Hi, since hash(/ 2) = Hi. The second access node compares the value of Hi distributed to the access nodes previously with the value of Hi obtained by "hashing" the value H supplied by the UE. Since the only two devices with knowledge of any subsequent values in the numerical chain are the UE and the home network, if the two values of Hi are equal, the UE is deemed to have been authenticated. If the two compared values do not match, the request to access services may be denied. Upon successful authentication, the second access node 6 sends an update notification message 8 to the other access nodes of the access network, so that they are aware that the UE has switched access nodes. The update notification message may comprise the most recent H value provided by the UE, or alternatively it may simply comprise an indication that the UE has switched access nodes, in which case the other access nodes in the access network increment a counter by one.
When the UE wishes to switch to a further access node and requires another re- authentication, the UE supplies that further access node with the next H value in the numerical chain. The further access node then operates on the disclosed H value with the hash() function and compares it to the most recently distributed H value or, in the case where only a counter has been incremented, it applies the hash() function an appropriate successive number of times and compares the result to the stored //'value. It is required that each time it requests re-authentication the UE use a higher H value in the sequence than those already used to ensure that a compromised access node cannot use its knowledge of KR at an access node where the UE has not visited.
The update notification may be sent through a local multicast mechanism to all of the access nodes of the access network. This process, and the initial distribution of Hi and KR, must be secure. In a further embodiment, the distribution of information relating to multiple users is sent in batches, e.g. all user information is updated every 10 seconds.
In an alternative embodiment, the UE is authenticated to a new AN, via a control node. Instead of broadcasting an update notification to the access nodes, the control node stores the new H value. When the UE requests authentication at a further access node, the further access node queries the control node with the new H value provided by the UE. The control node applies the one-way function to the new H value for comparison with the stored H value. If the two values match, the control node authenticates the UE to the further access node. In this embodiment, the access nodes do not need to be able to store or apply the one-way coding function to supplied H values. It is also potentially more secure to have a trusted single location performing the authentication, rather than distributing values throughout the communication system.
The numerical chain of n values is generated by n-\ successive iterations of the hash function on the initial seed value. By allowing for a maximum of n-\ applications of the one-way coding function the system allows only for a finite number of handovers between access nodes. After the maximum number of allowed handovers between access nodes has been reached, it is necessary to restart the process by generating a new numerical chain at the UE and the home network. Thus, in the event that the system is compromised by a third party, the system will only permit this third party to switch access nodes a finite number of times before the system's security is restored. Therefore, in order to set a higher level of security by demanding more frequent checks with the home network, the value of n is set lower.
The steps of the methods of the embodiment described above in which the value of n increments by one at each successive authorisation attempt are illustrated in the flow diagram of Figure 3. In a further embodiment, values of the numerical chain may be used to generate at least part, if not all, of a new IP address for the UE. When the UE attaches to a new access node it must disclose the next value of the numerical chain. It could also use that value to generate the interface identifier part of an IP address in accordance with the methods of British Patent No. 2367986, the contents of which are incorporated herein by reference.
According to a further embodiment of the present invention, each time the UE wishes to attach itself to a new access node, it discloses an H value further along in the sequence than the next one, e.g. if the UE disclosed H3 to the last access node it attached itself to, then it may disclose H5 (or any higher / value, up to H„) rather than H4. In this case the new access node must apply the hash() function to the disclosed value more than once in order to compare its output to the most recently distributed public H value.
Any further access node may only have been supplied with H; and an indication from earlier update notifications that the UE has switched access nodes a given number m of times. On the basis of this information alone, the further access node knows that it must apply the one-way coding function at least m+1 times, up to a maximum of n-\ times, to the H value supplied by the UE seeking authentication. If none of the hashed values corresponds to that provided by the UE, the access node must assume that the re- authentication request is not permissible. 1
In accordance with a further embodiment of the present invention multiple numerical chains are generated by the UE and the home network so that the UE may use them in parallel on multiple interfaces. The multiple chains are generated using different seed values and the same one-way coding function. Alternatively, the multiple chains may implement a different one-way coding function, subsequent communications bearing an indication of which coding function has been implemented on a given chain. This creates a fast "multi-homing" mechanism where only a single initial authentication is required even on a node with multiple interfaces. A different numerical chain must be used for each interface in order to avoid a replay attack. In accordance with a further embodiment of the present invention, the numerical chains are bound to a specific MAC address on an access node interface by modifying the oneway coding function such that / ,.; = hash( ;, MAC address), rendering it impossible for a third party to claim that a given numerical chain is valid for another MAC address. Even if a third party obtains the UE's MAC address, any attempt to imitate the UE will necessarily be stamped with the third party's own MAC address, and the access nodes will be able to reject this service request as being fraudulent.
In accordance with further embodiments of the present invention, there is provided a method for deriving a secure authentication key for use when a UE switches access nodes as described above. It is initially assumed that the UE and the first access node share a common authentication key Kso- Methods for achieving this are well-known. In a further embodiment, upon switching from a first access node to a new access node, the first access node sends a message containing the value h&sh.(Kso) to the new access node, which sends these values to the UE. The UE can then confirm, by hashing Kso itself, that this message did indeed originate at the first access node. The UE and the new access node can then derive a new authentication key using the equation Ksi = hash(hash(iζ β)). The new access node cannot determine the original authentication key Kso since it cannot reverse the one-way coding function hash Kso) to obtain Kso- The message sent by the first node may also include a nonce Npo, in which case the new authentication key is generated using the equation Ksi = hash(hash(/ζso), Npo).
In a further embodiment the first access node sends a hash of the authentication key, hash(iζso), to the new access node, and the mobile node and the new access node exchange nonces Nci and NAI, a new authentication key being derived using the equation Ksi = hash(hash( ζsø), Nci, NAI), such that the first access node cannot learn the new authentication key unless it intercepts the nonce exchange, and the new access node cannot learn the earlier authentication key since it cannot reverse the one-way coding function to obtain Kso- In a still further embodiment, the first access node may also send a nonce NPO along with the value of hash(KSO), in which case the new authentication key is generated using the equation Ksi = hash(hash(/ζso), Npo, Nci, NAI). The present invention provides a method of authenticating a mobile node to an access node of an access network. It will be appreciated by the skilled person that various modifications may be made to the above embodiments without departing from the scope of the present invention.

Claims

CLAIMS:
1. A method of authenticating a mobile node to a communication system, the communication system comprising a plurality of access nodes, the method comprising: (a) generating a numerical chain comprising a series of values using a oneway coding function such that a given value within the chain is easily obtainable from a subsequent value, but the subsequent value is not easily obtainable from that given value; (b) sending a value from the first numerical chain from the mobile node to an access node to which the mobile node wishes to attach; and (c) using the sent value at the access node to authenticate the mobile node.
2. A method according to claim 1 , wherein an authenticating node is provided with values of the first numerical chain earlier in the sequence than the sent value, the authenticating node authenticating the mobile node on the basis of a comparison of the output of the one-way coding function when applied to the sent value, and an earlier value of the first numerical chain.
3. A method according to claim 2, wherein the comparison of the sent value and an earlier value of the first numerical chain comprises comparing the output of the one-way coding function applied at least once to the sent value to an earlier value of the first numerical chain.
4. A method according to any preceding claim, wherein the earlier value of the first numerical chain is the value immediately preceding the sent value.
5. A method according to any one of claims 2 to 4, wherein the authenticating node is the access node to which the mobile node wishes to attach.
6. A method according to claim 5, wherein the authenticating node sends a notification update to the remainder of the plurality of access nodes upon successful authentication of the mobile node.
7. A method according to claim 6, wherein the update notification is issued through a secure local multicast mechanism.
8. A method according to any one of claims 2 to 4, wherein the authenticating node is a control node which communicates with the plurality of access nodes.
9. A method according to claim 8, wherein the authenticating node stores an update notification upon successful authentication of the mobile node.
10. A method according to claim 6 or 9, wherein the notification update comprises the sent value provided by the mobile node.
11. A method according to any preceding claim, wherein a value H,.ι of the first numerical chain may be obtained from a value H, of the first numerical chain using the one-way coding function defined such that ,./ = hash(/ ,).
12. A method according to any preceding claim, wherein the first numerical chain is generated by providing a seed value H„ of the numerical chain, all preceding values being obtainable through successive application of the one-way coding function.
13. A method according to claim 12, wherein the seed value H„ is based upon a value known only to the mobile node and a home network.
14. A method according to claim 12, wherein the seed value H„ is based upon a value known only to the mobile node.
15. A method according to any one of claims 12 to 14, wherein the seed value H„ is based upon the EAP MSK or EMSK value.
16. A method according to any one of claims 12 to 14, wherein the seed value H„ is based upon a randomly generated value.
17. A method according to any one of claims 12 to 16, wherein the seed value is encrypted so that the access nodes cannot determine the seed value.
18. A method according to any one of claims 2 to 17, wherein the first value of the numerical chain, obtained from successive applications of the one-way coding function to a seed value, is provided to the authenticating node by either the mobile node or a home network to which the mobile node is subscribed.
19. A method of authenticating a mobile node to a communication system, the communication system comprising a plurality of access nodes and a plurality of interfaces, the method comprising generating a plurality of numerical chains, each of the plurality of numerical chains corresponding to one of the plurality of interfaces, and authenticating the mobile node on a plurality of the interfaces in accordance with the method of claim 1.
20. A method according to claim 19, wherein the mobile node authenticates itself to the plurality of interfaces in parallel.
21. A method according to any preceding claim, wherein a value of the numerical chain is used to generate at least part of an IP address for the mobile node.
22. A method according to any preceding claim, wherein each numerical chain is bound to a specific MAC address corresponding to a specific access node.
23. A method according to any preceding claim, wherein the communication system comprises a wireless access network, and the mobile node is a wireless terminal.
24. A method of authenticating a mobile node when roaming within a communication system, the method comprising: following handover of the mobile node from a first access node of the communication system to a second access node, authenticating the mobile node to the second access node using the method of any one of the preceding claims.
25. A method according to claim 25, wherein the mobile node has been previously authenticated to the said communication system by a home network of the mobile node.
26. A method of deriving a secure authentication key when a mobile node authenticates itself to an access node in accordance with any preceding claim, the method comprising: providing a first authentication key Kso for use by the mobile node and a first access node; sending a hash of the first authentication key ash(Kso) to a second access node and the mobile node; and generating a new authentication key Ksi in accordance with the hash hash(^-_?o).
27. A method according to claim 26, wherein the new authentication key is generated by taking a hash of the hash hash(Kso), in accordance with the function Ksi = hash(has (iζyfl)).
28. A method according to claim 26, further comprising the steps of: exchanging a first nonce Nci provided by the mobile node and a second nonce
NAI provided by the second access node between the mobile node and the second access node; and wherein the new authentication key Ksi is generated in accordance with the hash of the first session key Kso, the first nonce Nci and the second nonce NAI in accordance with the function Ksi = hash(hash(tζsø), Nci, NAI).
29. A mobile wireless terminal, the terminal comprising means for generating and storing a first numerical chain comprising a series of n values using a one-way coding function such that a given value within the chain is easily obtainable from a subsequent value, but the subsequent value is not easily obtainable from that given value; and means for disclosing values from the numerical chain to an access node in order to allow the access node to authenticate the mobile wireless terminal.
30. An access node of a communication system having means for receiving from a mobile node a value of a first numerical chain comprising a series of n values using a one-way coding function such that a given value within the chain is easily obtainable from a subsequent value, but the subsequent value is not easily obtainable from that given value; and means for authenticating the mobile node on the basis of that value.
31. A control node of a communication system having means for receiving from a mobile node or an access node a value of a first numerical chain comprising a series of n values using a one-way coding function such that a given value within the chain is easily obtainable from a subsequent value, but the subsequent value is not easily obtainable from that given value; and means for authenticating the mobile node on the basis of that value.
PCT/EP2003/051101 2003-12-24 2003-12-24 Authentication in a communication network WO2005064973A1 (en)

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CN2003801109162A CN1887019B (en) 2003-12-24 2003-12-24 Authentication in a communication network
PCT/EP2003/051101 WO2005064973A1 (en) 2003-12-24 2003-12-24 Authentication in a communication network
DE60320322T DE60320322T2 (en) 2003-12-24 2003-12-24 AUTHENTICATION IN A COMMUNICATION NETWORK
AT03819186T ATE392107T1 (en) 2003-12-24 2003-12-24 AUTHENTICATION IN A COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK
US10/584,293 US7551914B2 (en) 2003-12-24 2003-12-24 Authentication in a communication network
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