WO2005026976A1 - Boitier de sous-reseau - Google Patents

Boitier de sous-reseau Download PDF

Info

Publication number
WO2005026976A1
WO2005026976A1 PCT/US2004/029110 US2004029110W WO2005026976A1 WO 2005026976 A1 WO2005026976 A1 WO 2005026976A1 US 2004029110 W US2004029110 W US 2004029110W WO 2005026976 A1 WO2005026976 A1 WO 2005026976A1
Authority
WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
access point
client
data packet
koolspan
network
Prior art date
Application number
PCT/US2004/029110
Other languages
English (en)
Inventor
Anthony C. Fascenda
Original Assignee
Koolspan, Inc.
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Koolspan, Inc. filed Critical Koolspan, Inc.
Publication of WO2005026976A1 publication Critical patent/WO2005026976A1/fr

Links

Classifications

    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
    • H04L63/0428—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
    • H04L63/0853—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities using an additional device, e.g. smartcard, SIM or a different communication terminal
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/12—Applying verification of the received information
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/06—Authentication
    • H04W12/068—Authentication using credential vaults, e.g. password manager applications or one time password [OTP] applications
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/06—Authentication
    • H04W12/069—Authentication using certificates or pre-shared keys
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/08—Access security
    • H04W12/084—Access security using delegated authorisation, e.g. open authorisation [OAuth] protocol
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/10—Integrity
    • H04W12/106—Packet or message integrity
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
    • H04L63/0876—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities based on the identity of the terminal or configuration, e.g. MAC address, hardware or software configuration or device fingerprint
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W84/00—Network topologies
    • H04W84/02—Hierarchically pre-organised networks, e.g. paging networks, cellular networks, WLAN [Wireless Local Area Network] or WLL [Wireless Local Loop]
    • H04W84/10—Small scale networks; Flat hierarchical networks
    • H04W84/12—WLAN [Wireless Local Area Networks]

Definitions

  • the present invention relates to wireless networking, and more particularly, to an authentication and secure communication technique for Wi-Fi (IEEE 802.11) networks.
  • a Wireless Local Area Network is generally implemented to provide local connectivity between a wired network and a mobile computing device.
  • RF radio frequency
  • WLANs are based on the Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE) 802.11 standard, which designates a wireless-Ethernet specification using a variety of modulation techniques at frequencies generally in the 2.4 gigahertz (GHz) and 5 GHz license-free frequency bands.
  • IEEE 802.11 standard (“Wi-Fi”) enables wireless communications with throughput rates up to 54 Mbps.
  • Wi-Fi for "wireless fidelity" is essentially a seal of approval certifying that a manufacturer's product is compliant with IEEE 802.11. For example, equipment carrying the "Wi-Fi" logo is certified to be interoperable with other Wi-Fi certified equipment.
  • Wi-Fi compatible PC cards that operate in peer-to-peer mode, but Wi-Fi usually incorporates at least one access point, or edge device. Most access points have an integrated Ethernet controller to connect to an existing wired-Ethernet network.
  • a Wi-Fi wireless transceiver connects users via the access point to the rest of the LAN.
  • Wi-Fi wireless transceivers are in Personal Computer Memory Card International Association (PCMCIA) card form, particularly for laptop, palmtop, and other portable computers, however Wi-Fi transceivers can be implemented through an Industry Standard Architecture (ISA) slot or Peripheral Component Interconnect (PCI) slot in a desktop computer, a Universal Serial Bus (USB), or can be fully integrated within a handheld device.
  • PCMCIA Personal Computer Memory Card International Association
  • ISA Industry Standard Architecture
  • PCI Peripheral Component Interconnect
  • USB Universal Serial Bus
  • network packets When network packets are formed, they typically result from a process known as encapsulation.
  • Fig. 4 shows the "layered" sequence of packet formation well known as the "protocol suite.” See Richard Stevens, TCP/IP Illustrated, Vol. 1 (Addison-Wesley ISBN 0-201-63346-9).
  • Ethernet Header 150
  • 802.11 wireless functionality adds yet another layer below the link layer and is known as the 802.11 layer and this layer adds an additional 802.11 header (410).
  • the Client Network Interface Card (NIC) (110) adds the 802.11 header (410) to the Ethernet packet and is used to transport the Ethernet packet across the wireless medium [0005]
  • the Access Point (140) will remove the 802.11 header (410) and place the remaining packet on the Ethernet cable (150).
  • the Ethernet packet stripped of its 802.11 header is placed on the LAN as if the Client PC were directly connected on the LAN instead of being bridged by the combination of Client NIC (110) and Access Point (140).
  • This process of stripping headers is known as "demultiplexing".
  • the 802.11 network (WLAN, 130) comprises at least one Access Point (140) attached via Ethernet cable (150) to the wired network (LAN, 190).
  • the Access Point (140) provides a wireless bridge for connecting clients PCs (120) to the LAN, 190.
  • the process of connection when security is not invoked is for the client NIC (110) to perform an Open Authentication to the Access Point (140). As the authentication is "open", any Client will be automatically authenticated.
  • the Access Point (140) grants permission to the Client NIC (110) to "associate” to the Access Point (140).
  • the Client NIC (110) then "associates” to the Access Point (140) and the Client's PC (120) is now “bridged” to the LAN (190).
  • the process of bridging involves the Access Point (140) to manage the wireless traffic and remove the 802.11 header (410) placing the packet on the Ethernet cable as if the Client PC (110) were "hard-wired” to the network.
  • Wired Equivalent Privacy Wired Equivalent Privacy
  • the process is identical except that the 802.11 authentication type is changed from “open" to "WEP' and the predefined WEP parameters are used by the NIC (110) to encrypt communications from the Client PC (120) to the Access Point (140).
  • the Access Point (140) decrypts all packets coming from the Client PC (120) using the pre-defined WEP parameters.
  • Turning on WEP encryption prevents and Client NIC (110) not using the exact WEP parameters from connecting to the Access Point (140) and gaining access to the network (190).
  • the WEP parameters thus are employed both for authentication and encryption purposes.
  • the Access Point (140) maintains the relationship between itself and the Client NIC (110) by means of the Client's MAC address (105).
  • the Client's MAC address is the mechanism by which a Client's connection is managed by the Access Point (140).
  • the Access Point (140) typically employs WEP security, a software algorithm that is used both for authentication purposes and to provide wireless link security. If WEP is turned on in the Access Point (140), no other users can connect to the Access Point without WEP turned on in their Client NIC (110) and the proper WEP parameters matching those in the Access Point turned on as well. This issue makes it impossible to support both people who desire security and those who do not at the same time.
  • WPA Wireless Protected Access
  • WPA2 Wired Protected Access 2
  • WPA2 Wired Protected Access 2
  • Client NIC MAC Address (105), its wireless adapter hardware address.
  • a hardware address is an address assigned to the network adapter during its manufacture and is used to identify the source and destination address of wireless frames.
  • Shared key authentication verifies that the wireless client joining the wireless network has knowledge of a secret key. During the authentication process, the wireless client proves it has knowledge of the secret key without actually sending the secret key. For infrastructure mode, all the wireless clients and the wireless AP use the same shared key. For ad hoc mode, all the wireless clients of the ad hoc wireless network use the same shared key.
  • IEEE 802. IX enforces authentication of a network node before it can begin to exchange data with the network. Exchanging frames with the network is denied if the authentication process fails. Although this standard was designed for wired Ethernet networks, it has been adapted for use by 802.1 lb. IEEE 802. IX uses the Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) and specific authentication methods known as EAP types to authenticate the network node.
  • EAP Extensible Authentication Protocol
  • IEEE 802.1X provides much stronger authentication than open system or shared key and the recommended solution for Windows XP wireless authentication is the use of EAP-Transport Level Security (TLS) and digital certificates for authentication.
  • EAP Extensible Authentication Protocol
  • TLS EAP-Transport Level Security
  • EAP-TLS authentication For wireless connections, you must create an authentication infrastructure comprising of an Active Directory domain, Remote Authentication Dial-In User Service (RADIUS) servers, and certification authorities (CAs) to issue certificates to your RADIUS servers and wireless clients.
  • This authentication infrastructure is appropriate for large businesses and enterprise organizations, but is not practical for the home or small business office.
  • Hot Spots typically provide no wireless link security. This is due to the fact that there is no mechanism for managing "keys" for transient users.
  • the existing technology is vulnerable to hackers and the newer technology will not allow AES encryption to be run in the same Access Point as WEP-enabled customers. Hot Spots are faced with a situation wherein they cannot deploy the newer security technology as it means they will lose existing customers unless their customers also upgrade to the newer technology.
  • “Koolspan” functionality provides for mutual authentication of both the Client and the Network Edge device, typically an Access Point based on secure, tamper-resistant tokens on both sides of the wireless link.
  • the modifier “Koolspan” refers to the authentication and secure communication technique(s) disclosed in U.S. Patent Application Nos. 10/679,371; 10/679,268; and 10/679,472, the disclosures of which are incorporated by reference in their entirety.
  • a "Session Key” is independently generated on both sides of the link that is used to secure communications across the link for the duration of the session.
  • the Access Point software is modified to provide for Koolspan authentication and to read an attached Koolspan token. Since this functionality requires modification of the Access Point software and an available port into which the token can be attached, not every Access Point can directly support Koolspan functionality.
  • Existing wireless networks implement WEP security, the original security standard for 802.11 networks. This security mechanism is not safe and can be easily cracked. Newer technologies such as WPA and WPA2 are more secure, but will require new Access Points to be deployed and or new Network Interface Cards (NIC) for the user to install. It is highly desirable, therefore, that a means be provided that would allow the network to achieve Koolspan functionality without requiring the Access Points to be modified or replaced.
  • the present invention provides an external in-line device ("Subnet
  • the Subnet Box placed between the network and the access point to achieve Koolspan functionality without modifying the Access Point.
  • the Subnet Box' contains an embedded Koolspan token and will authenticate users based on pre-stored access rights.
  • a method of facilitating authentication and security at an edge of a network comprising the steps of: receiving a data packet; determining whether a source identifier exists in said data packet; and if the source identifier exists, retrieving a cryptographic key from local storage associated with the source identifier, and decrypting a portion of the data packet using the identified cryptographic key, and directing the data packet toward its recipient.
  • the step of retrieving comprises the steps of: identifying a match to the source identifier, e.g., MAC address, within a pre-stored list of source identifiers; and loading a cryptographic key associated with a matching source identifier from the pre-stored list of source identifiers.
  • the method comprises identifying whether the data packet is a pass- through data packet, and then either directing the data packet toward its recipient if the data packet is identified as a pass-through data packet, or dropping the data packet if the data packet is not identified as a pass-through data packet.
  • an apparatus comprising: a first communications port for intercepting data packets communicated to and from a wired communications network; a second communications port for intercepting data packets communicated to and from a wireless access point, wherein the wireless access point is an edge device of the wired communications network; a database comprising a number of serial numbers each associated with a client token and a secret cryptographic key; and a processor for determining whether a computing device having a client token can access the wired communications network via the wireless access point.
  • the processor establishes a secure tunnel between the computing device and the first communications port.
  • An advantage of the invention is that it provides an external solution that enables a totally secure tunnel across the wireless link, thereby allowing secure transmissions between the Subnet Box and the connected Client regardless of the intervening Access Point.
  • Another advantage of the present invention is that it allows existing customers without a Koolspan token to "pass-through' the Subnet Box without security as before.
  • Another advantage of the invention is that it implement an authentication and wireless security technique at the edge of the network without requiring modification of the Access Point software/hardware.
  • the invention works with all flavors of 802.11: “a”, “b”, “g” etc. and provides automatic security without needing to distribute keys across a wired or wireless network.
  • Fig.1 illustrates a conventional Wi-Fi network
  • FIG. 2 illustrates a Wi-Fi network implementing a Subnet Box according to an embodiment of the invention
  • Fig. 3 illustrates Subnet Box functionality according to an embodiment of the invention
  • Fig.4 illustrates a conventional encapsulation protocol stack
  • Fig. 5 illustrates packet types according to an embodiment of the invention
  • FIG. 6 illustrates a client driver according to an embodiment of the invention
  • Fig. 7 illustrates "Koolspan" client packets according to an embodiment of the invention
  • FIGs. 8a-c illustrate processes implemented by the Subnet Box according to an embodiment of the invention
  • Fig. 9 illustrates a process implemented by the Subnet Box according to an embodiment of the invention.
  • FIG. 10 illustrates an authentication process according to an embodiment of the invention.
  • Fig. 11 illustrates a Subnet Box according to an embodiment of the invention.
  • the objects of the present invention are as follows: first, to implement Koolspan functionality across the wireless link (User ⁇ — (AP)- a Subnet Box) using any 802.11 -compliant Access Point without modification and second, to provide a facility that provides wireless link encryption for Koolspan-enabled clients and at the same time allowing non-Koolspan clients to pass through to the network across the wireless link.
  • the Koolspan technique is an improved method of authentication and security that provides a secure Wi-Fi communications method and system employing a combination of physical keys, or tokens, that attach to existing computing devices and wireless access points. These keys are typically connected via a USB port, although other types of connections, e.g., Ethernet, PC-Card, serial, parallel, and the like may be employed.
  • each component of the Wi-Fi network employs a physical key.
  • a client key is used to enable wireless connections on a user's computing device.
  • An access point key (“AP key”) is used to activate at the access point the secure Wi-Fi functions described herein.
  • a master key is provided to enable and administer secure authentication and communications on the network.
  • Each key comprises a serial number, which is forever unique, and must be unlocked using a personal identification number (PLN) known only to the owner, i.e., user, of the key. This PLN can be changed by the owner at any time.
  • PPN personal identification number
  • Each physical key comprises a common network send (“NKS”) and a common network receive (“NKR”) cryptographic key used only during the authentication phase by all components on the LAN.
  • Each physical key further includes a unique secret cryptographic key used in the second step of the authentication process. There is no mathematical relationship between key serial numbers and either the network send or network receive cryptographic keys, and the unique secret cryptographic key.
  • the authentication process results in two random numbers that are known by both sides of the wireless channel and are uniquely generated per communications session.
  • a transposed cryptographic key is used to encrypt all communications across the wireless channel between client and access point on behalf of the user.
  • the transposed cryptographic key is preferably a 32-byte (256- bit) key generated using the random numbers generated during authentication and the client's secret cryptographic key.
  • the access point uses the serial number of the client's physical key to the access point knows the client's secret cryptographic key.
  • both sides of the wireless channel know the secret key without it ever being transmitted between the two.
  • the Koolspan authentication and security technique is implemented in an in-line device (160) called a "Subnet Box" that is inserted in between the Access Point (140) and the network (190). This technique does not require an authentication server, certificate server or any other network support.
  • the Subnet Box comprises several hardware components as seen in Fig. 11. These components include an field programmable gate array (FPGA) (1200) (e.g., an Altera FPGA), a Smart Card (1210), (2) Ethernet transceiver integrated circuits (1240/1260), two Ethernet ports (1250/1270), flash memory (1220) and synchronous SRAM memory (1230) integrated circuits. Additional interface components are also added to the design.
  • the Subnet Box can be powered over Ethernet (POE) according to standard, well-known techniques (1260) or powered by an external AC adaptor (1230).
  • POE power over Ethernet
  • the block diagram of the Subnet Box there are two Ethernet Ports. The wireless Access Point is connected to the first Ethernet Port (1270) and the Subnet Box is connected to the Network through the second Ethernet Port (1250). All packets sent from clients destined for the network must pass through the Subnet Box.
  • the FPGA (1200) acts as a control element of the Subnet Box.
  • Altera FPGA is a field-programmable gate array comprising approximately 6,000 logical elements.
  • the internal configuration of the Altera Chip is programmed according to the desired hardware functionality.
  • the Altera FPGA (1200) internal sub-sections are configured to include the NIOS 32-bit processor (1201), AES Crypto Engine (1203), a memory bus interface (1204), a Smart Card interface (1202) and a PCI-bus interface (1205).
  • the NIOS processor (1201) executes firmware instructions contained within the Flash Memory (1220) as interfaced through the Memory Bus Interface (1204). External data storage is provided in the Sync SRAM IC (1230).
  • the NIOS processor (1201) reads the Smart Card data through the SLM J/F interface (1202) and processes Ethernet packets coming to/from the wireless Access Point through Ethernet Port (1270) via the Ethernet Transceiver IC (1260).
  • the hardware interface to the Ethernet Transceiver IC (1260) is via the Altera FPGA (1200) PCI Interface (1205). Ethernet packets to/from the wired network are interfaced similarly via the Ethernet Transceiver IC (1240) and physical jack (1250).
  • the Access Point (140) is configured without WEP security and is left in "open” mode; that is, any 802.11 Client NIC (110) can authenticate and associate to the Access Point (140). All Client PCs (120) will be authenticated and bridged onto the Ethernet cable (150). Any Ethernet packet that is sent from the Client NIC will be 'bridged' onto the Ethernet cable (150) attached to the Access Point (140).
  • the function of the Subnet Box is to permit Koolspan Client NICs (110) to establish a secure "tunnel" between the Client's PC (120) and the Subnet Box (160) providing security across the wireless 802.11 network.
  • All traffic to/from the Client's PC is encrypted using secure keys.
  • the secure keys are stored in a secure, tamper-resistant Smart Card (128) inside a Koolspan Token (125).
  • the token is attached to the Client PC via one of many interfaces (USB port, Parallel port, Serial Port etc.)
  • the secure keys are never exchanged or transmitted and are thus impervious to sniffing across the wireless network.
  • the Subnet Box comprises two Ethernet ports.
  • the first Ethernet port (305) is attached to the Ethernet cable (150) that is connected to the Access Point (140) in Fig. 2.
  • the Ethernet port is identified by its MAC Address (300), a 48-bit hardware address whose function is well understood by one of ordinary skill in the art.
  • a second Ethernet port (315) is found on the Subnet Box that is attached to the Wired Ethernet Network (LAN, 190) in Fig. 2. Packets input on the Ethernet port (305) must be processed internally within the Subnet Box (160) before appearing on port (315) and then going onto the network (190).
  • the Subnet Box further contains a KEY DATABASE (340) that is uploaded securely by a Key Management Program.
  • the KEY DATABASE contains, by example, all of the SERIAL NUMBERS of authorized Client Tokens (125) and their encrypted Secret Key (NK JTDs). Additional parameters may be stored in the Key Database (340) such as STATUS, PRIORITY etc.
  • the Subnet Box further maintains a table (330) containing a list of all active Client sessions. Entries in this table are made from time to time as individual Clients are authenticated in the Subnet Box. This table (330) contains the Client NICs MAC Address(105), Client Token (125) Serial Number and AES Session Key among other parameters. Koolspan Protocol
  • the Koolspan Protocol Header (720) contains various parameters (740) such as KOOLSPAN_TYPE. The setting of
  • KEP AES Encrypted IP data KMP Koolspan Management Protocol
  • Type KAP Koolspan Authentication Protocol.
  • NDIS Intermediate Driver (630) is placed in the driver stack of the operating system, e.g., Microsoft Windows Operating System.
  • the purpose of this NDIS Intermediate Driver (630) is to intercept packets to/from the network at the appropriate level.
  • the NDIS Intermediate Driver (620) operates in pass-through mode (640) whereby all packet between the LAN Protocols component (660) and the NDIS Device Driver (620) are untouched.
  • the NDIS Device Driver (620) for the wireless NIC (110) will perform an "open authentication” followed by an "association” with the Access Point as previously described.
  • the NDIS Device Driver (620) will trigger an event message that is passed up the stack to signify that association is complete and the Client's PC is now on the network.
  • the NDIS Intermediate Driver (630) is now intercepting all packets between the LAN Protocols (660) and the NDIS Device Driver (620).
  • the NDIS Intermediate Driver (630) will now attempt to perform a Koolspan Authentication wherein a Koolspan Authentication Packet is formed by the NDIS Intermediate Driver (630).
  • the Access Point (140) is acting now in bridge mode, all packets received are simply passed onto the Ethernet Cable (150) where they are received first by the Subnet Box (160).
  • all Ethernet packets comprise a
  • the MAC addresses are 48-bit fields that identify a unique hardware address of a node on the network.
  • the TYPE field is used to determine how to process the data portion (540).
  • Well known packet types are as follows:
  • Koolspan Type to be subsequently provided by the Internet Authority Naming Association (IAN A).
  • IAN A Internet Authority Naming Association
  • the Ethernet Header Type (530) is set to Koolspan and the DESTLNATION_MAC_ADDRESS (510) is set to "FF:FF:FF:FF:FF”. This initial setting will ensure that the Access Point "broadcasts" this first authentication packet to all locally connected nodes attached to the Access Point.
  • the Subnet Box will be the only device locally attached to the Access Point that will respond to a Koolspan First Authentication Packet and will respond as shown in the flow chart, Fig. 8.
  • the Subnet Box When responding to the authenticating Client NIC (110), the Subnet Box will set its SOURCE_MAC_ADDRESS to that of its Access Point Ethernet Port (300) (hardware address)
  • the Subnet Box software is designed to intercept all packets of the
  • Ethernet Type "Koolspan” including “Authentication Packets”. There are several other types of Koolspan packets including “Management” and “Discovery” packets as well as “Koolspan Encryption” packets (the most common packet type for sending AES encrypted data during a session).
  • Subnet Box Packet Processing wireless side processing
  • Subnet Box has two Ethernet Ports, one attached to the
  • the Subnet Box further has an embedded Smart Card (165) that is provisioned with three keys: • NKS - Network Send Key • NKR - Network Receive Key • NKJJIDs - Secret Key
  • the NKS key is the mirror of the Client's NKR key and the NKR key is the mirror of the Client's NKS key.
  • data encrypted by the Client with his "SEND" key (NKS) can be decrypted with the Subnet Box's RECEIVE key
  • the Subnet Box processes packets of data according to the series of flowcharts seen first in Figure
  • the Subnet Box On receipt of any wireless packet step 800, the Subnet Box will know from the Ethernet Header (150), the SOURCEJVIAC_ADDRESS (520) of the Client NIC (110). This address will be saved temporarily. The Ethernet Header (150) will be examined further to determine the packet TYPE (530) in step 810. If the packet type is non-Koolspan (ARP ( S O), RARP (560) or IP (570)), the Subnet Box will check its current configuration to see if unencrypted packets are allowed to pass through, step 812. If not, the packet will be dropped step 814. If "pass- through” is permitted, the packet will be sent, step 816, to the LAN via the LAN- PORT (165) of the Subnet Box.
  • ARP S O
  • RARP RARP
  • IP IP
  • Ethernet Header TYPE field (530) is set to Koolspan
  • KP Koolspan Protocol Header
  • a "KOOLSPAN TYPE' field that can have one of several values: 1. Authentication; 2. Management; and 3. Encryption.
  • the KOOLSPANJTYPE field is discovered in step 825.
  • the Subnet Box (165) will examine the data portion of the Ethernet packet (730) as an "authentication packet” (700).
  • the First Authentication Packet is generated by the Client NDIS Intermediate Driver (630) and is formed as shown in Fig. 7.
  • the data portion of the Ethernet packet comprises a Koolspan Protocol Header (720) whose internal structure is shown in the diagram (740).
  • the Koolspan Protocol Header (KP) (720) is followed by a Koolspan Authentication Packet Header (KAP) (710)
  • the KAP (710) includes several fields shown by example (700) including the authentication version, KOOLSPANJTYPE etc.
  • the Subnet Box (160) will process the data portion of the packet that contains the appropriate encrypted Koolspan authentication data formed by the Client NDIS Intermediate Driver (630).
  • the Subnet Box will begin processing the First Authentication Packet step 827, by decrypting the authData (shown in 700) with the Subnet Box's NKR (Receive Key), step 860, contained within the Subnet Box Smart Card.
  • the structure of an Authentication Packet is shown by example in step 855.
  • Various checks are made to determine if the packet has been altered.
  • the Serial Number of the Client's token (125) is used to retrieve the Client's Secret Key (NKJJIDs) from the Subnet Box Database (340) of previously stored Serial Numbers and matching encrypted Secret Keys (NK_UIDs). If the serial number does not exist in the Subnet Box Database (340) an error message, step xxx, is returned to the Client.
  • the Client's NK-UISs is retrieved from the Subnet Box Database (340) and the hash is computed on the received data, step 868, and compared, step 869, against the received signature, step 862. If the signatures do not match, an error message is returned to the Client, step 870 and further processing stops. [0066] If the signature match, a new entry is made in the Subnet Box Client
  • the Subnet Box will continue processing the AuthData recovering the Random Number (Rl) by decrypting the internal packet data with the Client's NKJITID recovered from the Subnet Box Database (340) using the Client Key (125) Serial Number step 882.
  • a second random number (R2) is computed, step 884, and concatenated with Rl and then encrypted with the Client's secret key (NKJJIDs), step 886.
  • the ciphertext is then encrypted this time with the Subnet Box's SEND Key (NKS) and the ciphertext is placed into the "authData" field of the Koolspan Authentication Packet (700) and the appropriate parameters are set in the Koolspan Authentication Header to indicate this is the Second Authentication Packet and the entire packet is returned to the Access Point for transmission to the Client via the Client's MAC Address, step 892.
  • NSS Subnet Box's SEND Key
  • Second Authentication Packet to the Client step 1105.
  • the construction of the packet data is shown, by example, in step 1100, Fig. 10.
  • the authData of the Authentication Packet (700) is decrypted by the NDIS Intermediate Driver (630) step 1110 yielding the encrypted RI:R2 numbers and the signature.
  • the encrypted Rl :R2 numbers are then decrypted with the Client Token's (125) RECEIVE KEY (NKR), step 1130, yielding the unencrypted R1:R2 combination.
  • a signature is computed from these two numbers, step 1140, and compared against the received signature, step 1150. If a match is not found, the error is reported to the user, step 1160, and processing terminates leaving the client blocked from sending further packets through the Subnet Box.
  • the NDIS Intermediate Driver will conclude that the Koolspan Authentication process has been successful and will compute the AES Session Key from the two random numbers Rl, R2, step 1180 and save the AES Session Key for further use during the session. All further communications between the Client and the Subnet Box will subsequently be encrypted with the AES Session Key. Additionally, the Client NDIS Intermediate Driver (630) will note the SOURCE MAC ADDRESS (520) of the Subnet Box that is returned in the Ethernet Header (150) of the Second Koolspan Authentication Packet. All further Koolspan- enabled communications between the Client NDIS Intermediate Driver will be specifically addressed to the MAC Address of Subnet Box Access Point port (300). Encryption
  • the Client NDIS Intermediate Driver (630) will encapsulate all of the fields of a normal Ethernet packet (IP header, TCP header, Application Data, Ethernet trailer with the exception of the Ethernet Header) as shown in Figure 4, encrypting this data with the Client's AES Session Key.
  • KEP Koolspan Encrypted Protocol
  • the Ethernet Packet Header will reveal the SOURCE MAC ADDRESS of the Client (105).
  • the SOURCE MAC ADDRESS will (520) will be used to see if there is an entry in the Subnet Box NETWORK TABLE (330). If there is no entry for that SOURCE MAC ADDRESS (520), step 900, an error message will be returned to the Client NIC (110), step 910, and the packet will be dropped, step 912. If the SOURCE MAC ADDRESS (520) is found in the Network Table (330), it will then be used to retrieve the AES Session Key from the Network Table (330).
  • the AES Session Key is then used to decrypt the Koolspan Data field resulting in a normal Ethernet Data Packet (non-Koolspan type). This packet is then directed appropriately to either the normal LAN port (310) or the Access Point port if the routing indicates the recipient also resides on the wireless side of the Subnet Box.
  • the plain-text packet, step 906, must now be encrypted with the recipient's AES Session Key for transmission to the recipient. If the recipient is not Koolspan-enabled and "pass- through" mode is enabled, the packet is simply sent normally without encryption. If "pass-through” mode is not enabled, the packet is dropped. Routing
  • the Subnet Box (160) can be configured to allow both non
  • Koolspan-enabled Clients to communicate as well as Koolspan-enabled Clients. This method of allowing non Koolspan-enabled Clients to communicate is known as "pass through" mode.
  • the Ethernet Packet Header Type field (530) indicates a non-Koolspan TYPE. On determination that "pass through” mode is enabled, the packet is allowed to pass through. It's final destination, however, determines how the packet is transmitted in the outbound direction. [0077] If the packet was received on the Access Point side of the Subnet
  • the packet will simply be let through the Subnet Box (165) without further processing. If however, the destination is on the same Access Point side (300) i.e., another wireless Client connected to the same Access Point, further processing is required. If the destination Client is non-Koolspan enabled and "pass through" mode is enabled, the Subnet Box will simply pass the packet through to the Access Point via the Access Point Ethernet Port (300). If the destination Client is Koolspan-enabled, the packet must be encrypted using the destination Client's AES Session Key with an appropriate Koolspan KEP header and Koolspan KP header pre-pended to the packet.
  • Koolspan-enabled Clients are provided automatic AES security across the wireless link whereas non-Koolspan-enabled Clients may be either denied access entirely (pass-through mode disabled) or provided non-secure access (pass-through mode enabled).
  • the network is wireless, but in other embodiments the end-to-end link (client -to-subnet box) might not involve any wireless components.
  • the present invention provides a technique for automatically detecting both non-Koolspan clients and Koolspan-enabled clients and thus providing both protected communications for Koolspan-enabled clients and normal (non secure) communications for non Koolspan-enabled users simultaneously.
  • Wireless link security can be provided in a public hotspot by the simple addition of an inline Koolspan Subnet Box providing automatic wireless link security without affecting existing non-Koolspan-enabled users.

Landscapes

  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
  • Computing Systems (AREA)
  • General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Small-Scale Networks (AREA)
  • Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)

Abstract

Selon cette invention, un dispositif en ligne externe (appelé 'boîtier de sous-réseau') est placé entre un réseau et un point d'accès afin que des communications Wi-Fi sécurisées soient obtenues sans qu'il soit nécessaire de modifier le point d'accès. Le boîtier de sous-réseau comprend un jeton intégré et peut authentifier des utilisateurs sur la base de droits d'accès préalablement stockés. Dans au moins un mode de réalisation de cette invention, le boîtier de sous-réseau comprend: un premier port de communication permettant d'intercepter des paquets de données envoyés à un réseau de communication câblé ou depuis celui-ci; un deuxième port de communication permettant d'intercepter des paquets de données envoyés à un point d'accès sans fil ou depuis celui-ci, lequel point d'accès sans fil est un dispositif périphérique du réseau de communication câblé; une base de données comprenant un certain nombre de numéros de série qui sont chacun associés à un jeton client et à une clé cryptographique secrète; et un processeur permettant de déterminer si un dispositif de calcul comprenant un jeton client peut accéder au réseau de communication câblé par le biais du point d'accès sans fil. Le processeur établit un tunnel sécurisé entre le dispositif de calcul et le premier port de communication.
PCT/US2004/029110 2003-09-08 2004-09-08 Boitier de sous-reseau WO2005026976A1 (fr)

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
US50065103P 2003-09-08 2003-09-08
US60/500,651 2003-09-08

Publications (1)

Publication Number Publication Date
WO2005026976A1 true WO2005026976A1 (fr) 2005-03-24

Family

ID=34312209

Family Applications (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
PCT/US2004/029110 WO2005026976A1 (fr) 2003-09-08 2004-09-08 Boitier de sous-reseau

Country Status (1)

Country Link
WO (1) WO2005026976A1 (fr)

Citations (2)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US20040203590A1 (en) * 2002-09-11 2004-10-14 Koninklijke Philips Electronics N.V. Set-up of wireless consumer electronics device using a learning remote control
US20050010680A1 (en) * 2003-06-18 2005-01-13 Zick Donald A. Enhanced shared secret provisioning protocol

Patent Citations (2)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US20040203590A1 (en) * 2002-09-11 2004-10-14 Koninklijke Philips Electronics N.V. Set-up of wireless consumer electronics device using a learning remote control
US20050010680A1 (en) * 2003-06-18 2005-01-13 Zick Donald A. Enhanced shared secret provisioning protocol

Similar Documents

Publication Publication Date Title
US8316142B2 (en) Subnet box
US7725933B2 (en) Automatic hardware-enabled virtual private network system
US7607015B2 (en) Shared network access using different access keys
US7028186B1 (en) Key management methods for wireless LANs
US7673146B2 (en) Methods and systems of remote authentication for computer networks
US7984496B2 (en) Systems and methods for secure communication over a wireless network
US8555344B1 (en) Methods and systems for fallback modes of operation within wireless computer networks
US9294915B2 (en) Localized network authentication and security using tamper-resistant keys
US7325134B2 (en) Localized network authentication and security using tamper-resistant keys
US7827409B2 (en) Remote secure authorization
US20120272310A1 (en) Systems and methods for secure communication over a wireless network
JP2003500923A (ja) セキュア通信をイニシャライズし、装置を排他的にペアリングする方法、コンピュータ・プログラムおよび装置
US20080141360A1 (en) Wireless Linked Computer Communications
JP2006109449A (ja) 認証された無線局に暗号化キーを無線で提供するアクセスポイント
KR100707805B1 (ko) 사용자 및 인증자별로 제어할 수 있는 인증 시스템
US20150249639A1 (en) Method and devices for registering a client to a server
WO2005057341A2 (fr) Systeme de reseau prive virtuel active par du materiel automatique
WO2005026976A1 (fr) Boitier de sous-reseau
WO2005091159A1 (fr) Systeme d'authentification capable de controler l'autorite connaissant l'utilisateur et l'authentificateur
Ozturk Evaluation of secure 802.1 X port-based network access authentication over 802.11 wireless local area networks
Weippl et al. Securing Mobile Communication: RADIUS in a Windows Environment
Leira Recommended Security System for wireless networks

Legal Events

Date Code Title Description
AK Designated states

Kind code of ref document: A1

Designated state(s): AE AG AL AM AT AU AZ BA BB BG BW BY BZ CA CH CN CO CR CU CZ DK DM DZ EC EE EG ES FI GB GD GE GM HR HU ID IL IN IS JP KE KG KP KZ LC LK LR LS LT LU LV MA MD MK MN MW MX MZ NA NI NO NZ PG PH PL PT RO RU SC SD SE SG SK SY TJ TM TN TR TT TZ UA UG US UZ VN YU ZA ZM

AL Designated countries for regional patents

Kind code of ref document: A1

Designated state(s): GM KE LS MW MZ NA SD SZ TZ UG ZM ZW AM AZ BY KG MD RU TJ TM AT BE BG CH CY DE DK EE ES FI FR GB GR HU IE IT MC NL PL PT RO SE SI SK TR BF CF CG CI CM GA GN GQ GW ML MR SN TD TG

121 Ep: the epo has been informed by wipo that ep was designated in this application
122 Ep: pct application non-entry in european phase