WO2005025173A1 - System for increasing the availability of a submarine by means of remote control using encoded communication connections - Google Patents
System for increasing the availability of a submarine by means of remote control using encoded communication connections Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- WO2005025173A1 WO2005025173A1 PCT/EP2004/009659 EP2004009659W WO2005025173A1 WO 2005025173 A1 WO2005025173 A1 WO 2005025173A1 EP 2004009659 W EP2004009659 W EP 2004009659W WO 2005025173 A1 WO2005025173 A1 WO 2005025173A1
- Authority
- WO
- WIPO (PCT)
- Prior art keywords
- submarine
- communication network
- data
- encryption device
- automation
- Prior art date
Links
Classifications
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/10—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for controlling access to devices or network resources
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L65/00—Network arrangements, protocols or services for supporting real-time applications in data packet communication
- H04L65/40—Support for services or applications
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L67/00—Network arrangements or protocols for supporting network services or applications
- H04L67/01—Protocols
- H04L67/12—Protocols specially adapted for proprietary or special-purpose networking environments, e.g. medical networks, sensor networks, networks in vehicles or remote metering networks
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/02—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for separating internal from external traffic, e.g. firewalls
- H04L63/0272—Virtual private networks
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
- H04L63/0428—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L69/00—Network arrangements, protocols or services independent of the application payload and not provided for in the other groups of this subclass
- H04L69/30—Definitions, standards or architectural aspects of layered protocol stacks
- H04L69/32—Architecture of open systems interconnection [OSI] 7-layer type protocol stacks, e.g. the interfaces between the data link level and the physical level
- H04L69/322—Intralayer communication protocols among peer entities or protocol data unit [PDU] definitions
- H04L69/329—Intralayer communication protocols among peer entities or protocol data unit [PDU] definitions in the application layer [OSI layer 7]
Definitions
- the invention relates to a system for increasing the operational readiness of a submarine.
- a submarine automation system is e.g. from the publication "Electrical Systems for Submarines", Siemens AG, June 2001, No. E10001-A93-A51-V3-7600
- the submarine and the pier monitoring system are located in the normally closed and particularly secured area of the pier and the data transmission to the pier monitoring system takes place via a separate cable connection, reading and manipulation of the data by unauthorized third parties is not necessary possible.
- the data transmission can thus be described as secure. Due to the spatial connection to the area of the pier, the monitoring options of such a pier monitoring system are limited.
- a non-secure communication network is understood here to mean a communication network in which unauthorized third parties have the option of reading and / or manipulating the transmitted data.
- this is a public communication network such as the ISDN network or the Internet.
- the encryption device is a cryptographic device and serves both the encryption and the decryption of the data with the help of cryptographic keys.
- Various cryptography techniques known per se can be used for this.
- non-secure communication network can also extend over several networks, for example both over a wired communication network, such as an ISDN network, and over a wireless communication network, such as a GSM or UMTS network. Network or WiFi.
- the operational readiness of the submarine can be further improved if the first encryption device is additionally set up to receive encrypted data from the non-secure communication network via the second communication connection, to decrypt it and to send it to the automation system via the first communication connection.
- This also enables secure data transmission to the automation system of the submarine.
- the automation system and the devices controlled and monitored by it on board the submarine can thus not only be monitored, but also put into operation and controlled from outside the submarine.
- the system preferably has a computer system which is arranged outside the submarine and is connected to the non-secure communication network. Data from the submarine automation system can thus be transferred directly to a computer system and further processed there without loss of time.
- the computer system is preferably connected to the communication network via a second encryption device.
- the first and the second encryption devices can be implemented in hardware and / or in software.
- the first encryption device can be located in the submarine or on land, in particular in the area of a pier. If the submarine is in the area of the pier, the first communication connection can be realized, for example, by a separate cable connection to the submarine.
- Particularly extensive data transmission options are available if the non-secure communication network is a public communication network such as the Internet.
- a broadband network such as an (A) DSL network, is suitable for the transmission of high data rates. Communication is preferably carried out continuously using the TCP / IP protocol.
- a device for user identification and authentication is connected between the computer system and the first encryption device.
- VPN Virtual Private Network
- the computer system is a development and / or simulation system for the automation system.
- the submarine automation system ⁇ can thus be communicatively connected via the non-secure communication network directly to a development and / or simulation system for the automation system and thus, for example, automation software from the development and / or simulation system can be imported into the automation system of the submarine.
- the development and / or simulation system preferably has means for commissioning and / or diagnosing the automation system. Remote commissioning and / or remote diagnosis of the automation system and the devices monitored by it is thus possible and thus an increase in the operational readiness of the submarine is possible. A change to the software of the automation system therefore only has to be carried out in the development and / or simulation system.
- the submarine automation system does not have to be commissioned directly on site in the submarine, but can be done remotely. In this way, the operational readiness of the submarine can be established in a short time and at the same time time and money can be saved for commissioning personnel to travel.
- the development and / or simulation system preferably u includes a database, in particular a so-called “engineering database”, which contains the data characterizing the submarine.
- the data are thus stored at a central location and only need to be maintained there. Updates or corrections can thus be carried out with little effort and in a short time and it is guaranteed that all facilities that need this data work with the same data.
- the operational readiness of the submarine can be increased by the fact that the database is a central database for all submarines in a class. Changes to the software of all submarines in a class can thus be implemented and tested at a central point and then transferred to all submarines. This simplifies data storage and software maintenance and reduces the likelihood of errors.
- IG 1 a configuration of a submarine automation system known from the prior art
- IG 2 a first embodiment of a system according to the invention with data transmission via a wired communication network
- IG 3 a second embodiment of a system according to the invention with data transmission via a wireless communication network .
- FIG. 6 shows a third embodiment of a system according to the invention with an additional transmission of video and voice data from the submarine
- a submarine automation system 3 shown in FIG. 1 and known from the prior art has a central control console 4, which is connected via a redundant data bus 6 to decentralized, local processing units (LPU) 7, each with local control panels communicated.
- the local processing units 7 are located on intelligent terminals 8 with a wide variety of different types, not shown Devices and systems of the submarine for their control and monitoring in connection.
- FIG. 2 shows a submarine 2, which is located on the sea surface 12 near a pier 11.
- the submarine 2 has an automation system 3, as shown for example in FIG. 1.
- a system 1 for increasing the operational readiness of the submarine 2 has a first encryption device 10, which is connected via a first device 41 for user identification and authentication and a first communication connection 13 to the automation system 3 of the submarine 2 and via a second communication link
- Data D1 of the submarine automation system 3 are received by the encryption device 10 via a communication interface of the automation system 3 and the first communication connection 13, not shown, and encrypted and as encrypted data D1 'via the second communication connection 14 and the public communication network 15 to a computer system 17 sent.
- a public communication network e.g. an ISDN network, a broadband network, such as (A) DSL, or the Internet.
- Data D1 of the submarine automation system 3 are received by the encryption device 10 via a communication interface of the automation system 3 and the first communication connection 13, not shown, and encrypted and as encrypted data D1 'via the second communication connection 14 and the public communication network 15 to a computer system 17 sent.
- the computer system 17 is connected to the public communication network via a second encryption device 16
- the encryption device 16 is connected to the public communication network 15 via a third communication connection 18 and to the computer system 17 via the downstream device 42 for user identification and authentication and a fourth communication connection 19.
- Encrypted data D1 'received from the public communication network via the third communication connection 18 are decrypted in the second encryption device 16 and the decrypted data D1 is transferred to the computer system 17 via the fourth communication connection 19.
- data D2 of the computer system 17 for the submarine automation system 3 are encrypted in the second encryption device 16 and sent as encrypted data D2 'via the public communication network 15 and the encryption device 10 to the submarine automation system 3.
- the encrypted data D2 ′ obtained via the public communication network 15 are decrypted and the unencrypted data D2 are then transferred to the automation system 3 via the first communication connection 13.
- Secure data transmission between the automation system 3 and the computer system 17 is thus possible in both directions via the public communication network 15, which is not secure per se.
- the bidirectional data transmission also enables remote commissioning and even remote control of the automation system and the devices controlled and monitored by it.
- the data transmission on the first or fourth communication link 13 or 19 can take place by means of a separate cable within a secure area or an intranet which is not accessible to a third party.
- the data transmission on the first and fourth communication links 13 and 19 is therefore preferably also secure. This can be ensured in that the encryption device 10 and the submarine 2 or the encryption device 19 and the computer system 17 are each together in a secure zone, ie an area protected from access by third parties, for example a locked pier or a military restricted area.
- the data transmission preferably takes place via the public communication network 15 using the TCP / IP protocol.
- the upstream devices for user identification and authentication are used for access control and can be used to generate the cryptographic keys required for encryption and decryption. Furthermore, user-specific information can be present in these means in a Personal Security Environment (PSE), which in turn is protected by a PIN.
- PSE Personal Security Environment
- a user on the computer system 17 side can only authenticate himself by entering a correct PSE and PIN in the system. Identification can also be done using a smart card
- the computer system 17 and the submarine automation system 3 can be designed as a client-server architecture.
- a computer of the automation system 3 can then function as a server and a computer of the computer system 17 as a client, which exchange data via the TCP / IP protocol.
- VPN Virtual Private Network
- the encryption devices 10 and 16 can be implemented in hardware (for example in the form of commercially available “crypto boxes”) and / or in software.
- the encryption devices and the devices for user identification and authentication assigned to them are preferably combined in one integrated device.
- integrated devices are already commercially available Software solutions that can run on a computer (eg security platform TransOn from the applicant) or hardware solutions (eg SINA from the manufacturer Secunet) are available.
- the computer system 17 can be a central monitoring station, e.g. a pier monitoring system for one or more submarines, a development and simulation system from the manufacturer of the automation system 3 or a training system for the automation system 3.
- a central monitoring station e.g. a pier monitoring system for one or more submarines
- a development and simulation system from the manufacturer of the automation system 3 or a training system for the automation system 3.
- the encryption device 10 is arranged on board the submarine 2 and the second communication connection 14 is connected to a wireless, non-secure communication network 15 ⁇ , such as the GSM or UMTS network or connected to a WLAN. It is thus possible to transmit data securely from the automation system 3 to the computer system 17 even when the submarine 1 is at sea and thus at a great spatial distance from the pier 11.
- the second encryption device 16 and the computer system 17 can also be located spatially far away on land or on board a ship within reception range of the wireless communication network.
- Devices for user identification and authentication are also preferably present, but are omitted to simplify the illustration.
- FIG. 4 shows a communication of four submarines 2 parked on a pier with a pier monitoring system 33 installed on land.
- the communication between the pier monitoring system 33 and the automation systems 3 of the submarines 2 takes place via a non-secure communication network 15
- Communication of two submarines 2 takes place via a pier communication cabinet 32 installed on the pier 11 and an associated encryption device 10 also installed in the area of the pier.
- the pier monitoring system 33 must be aware of the possible data transmission a public communication network 15 is not located in the immediate vicinity of the pier, but can also be arranged spatially distant from the pier.
- Important data, messages and alarms from the automation systems 3 as well as additional voice and video data can be transmitted to the pier monitoring system 33 via the communication network 15.
- the operational readiness of unmanned submarines parked at the pier can thus be monitored centrally and alarm messages can be output in the pier monitoring system 33 in the event of faults.
- the malfunctions in the submarines 2 can then be eliminated immediately and the operational readiness of the submarines 2 can be maintained.
- FIG. 5 shows a communication of automation systems 3, 3a, 3b of three submarines 2, 2a, 2b with a development and simulation system 21 in an expert center of a manufacturer of the automation system.
- HMI Human Machine Interface
- PLC Programmable Logic Controller
- the development of a submarine automation system is usually carried out on land in special expert centers with the help of such a development and simulation system 21.
- the automation system equipment to be installed later on board the submarine is partially reproduced in the form of "shadow systems" and the automation system and functionalities of various submarine facilities are simulated. This enables the software for the control of the automation system as well as for operating and monitoring devices to be adapted to the special functional requirements of the submarine and verified.
- the development and simulation system 21 accesses data from a central engineering database 24.
- This database represents a central database for all submarines in a class and contains this characterizing data (e.g. setting values for the automation software).
- the development and / or simulation system 21 has means (not shown) (for example operating and display interfaces, software routines) for starting up and / or diagnosing the automation systems 3 of the submarines 2, 2a, 2b.
- a first encryption device 10 is installed, for example, in the area of the pier where the submarines are in contact, and via the first communication connections 13 with the automation system 3 of the submarine 2 and via further first communication connections 13a, 13b with the automation systems 3a and 3b connected further submarines 2a and 2b.
- the first encryption device 10 is set up to receive and encrypt data from the submarine automation systems 3, 3a, 3b via the first and the further first communication connections 13, 13a, 13b and via the second communication connection 14 and the like to send public communication network 15.
- the first encryption device 10 is set up to receive, decrypt, and decrypt data for the automation systems 3, 3a, 3b of the submarines 2, 2a, 2b via the public communication network 15 and the second communication connection 14 and to the automation systems 3 , 3a, 3b via their respectively assigned first communication connections 13 or 13a or 13b.
- the development and simulation system 21 can simultaneously send data to all submarines or only to individual submarines.
- each of the submarines 2, 2a, 2b is assigned and stored in the development and simulation system 21 in each case a separate network address A, Aa, Ab.
- the first encryption device 10 is connected to the first communication connections 13, 13a, 13b via a switching device 40.
- Each of the network addresses A, Aa, Ab is assigned one of the first communication connections 13, 13a, 13b in the switching device 40.
- data D intended for submarine 2 are sent by computer system 21 to network address A assigned to submarine 2.
- the data D are encrypted in the encryption device 16 and the encrypted data D 'together with the network address as data AD' and sent to the encryption device 10 via the communication network 15.
- the switching device 40 There they are decrypted and the decrypted data D together with the network address A is then passed on to the switching device 40 as data AD.
- the received data D are forwarded to the respective automation system on the basis of the network address A via the first communication connections assigned to the network address A.
- the address management and assignment on the part of the submarine automation systems is carried out by the switching devices 40.
- the switching device 40 is preferably a router.
- FIG. 6 shows a third embodiment of a system according to the invention for increasing the operational readiness of a submarine 2.
- the submarine 2 is located in a port area 50, in which a commissioning base 51 and a pier monitoring center 52 are also located.
- the commissioning base 51 has an encryption device 56, which is connected to a public communication network 55, such as the Internet.
- Data from the automation system 3 of the submarine 2 can be transmitted via the public communication network 55 to the computer system 67 of a fault analysis and engineering device 54, for example from a manufacturer of the automation system 3 or from the fault analysis and engineering device 54 to the automation system 3 become.
- the fault analysis and engineering device 54 and the commissioning base 51 each have a DSL component 60 for communication via the Internet.
- the data communication between the commissioning base 51 and the automation system 3 of the submarine 2 takes place, for example, via a non-secure wireless local area network 68, such as a WLAN according to the IEEE 802.11 standard.
- the data transmission between the commissioning base 51 and the submarine 2 can be encrypted.
- the submarine 2 has an encryption device 58 for encrypting data which is sent via the local network 68 and for decrypting data which is received via the local network 68.
- the data communication between a monitoring system 66 of the pier monitoring center 52 and the submarine 2 also takes place via the wireless local network 68.
- the data transmission is encrypted to increase security, for which purpose an encryption device 59 is also connected upstream of the monitoring system 66.
- the data transmission preferably takes place via the local network 68 and via the public communication network 55 using the TCP / IP protocol. Continuous data transmission and thus a direct coupling of the automation system 3 to the pier monitoring system 66 and the fault analysis and engineering system 67 can thus be made possible.
- video surveillance data can also be transmitted via IP stream from the submarine 2 and between all connected stations a voice connection using the Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) can be established.
- VoIP Voice over Internet Protocol
- the submarine 2 has one or more video cameras 63 with a downstream streamer 64 and / or an IP telephone system 61, which also has the encryption device 58 are connected so that the video and audio data can also be sent in encrypted form via the local network 68 or encrypted video and audio data received via the local network 68 can be decrypted.
- the video data can, for example, be transmitted to the monitoring system 66 and output there on a monitor 69. This makes it possible to monitor the submarine using images from inside the submarine.
- the fault analysis and engineering device 54, the commissioning base 51 and the pier monitoring center 52 each have IP telephones 62.
- COTS Communication-Off-The-Shelf
- the wired communication link 13 for data transmission between the encryption device 10 and the automation system 3 - as shown in FIGS. 7 and 8 - a (transmission) channel 13.1 for data transmission from the automation system 3 to the encryption device 10 and a (reception) channel 13.2 for data transmission from the encryption device 10 to the automation system 3.
- a data transmission to the automation system 3 and thus an unwanted influencing of the automation system 3 can then be avoided in a simple manner by interrupting the (receive) channel 13.2.
- the channels 13.1 and 13.2 are each implemented by an optical fiber, an interruption of the data transmission via the channel 13.2 can be achieved, for example, by the optical fiber of the (receiving) channel 13.2 not being plugged into the automation system 3.
- a data transfer protocol is used which does not require a (receive) channel 13.2 when establishing the connection.
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- Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
- Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
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Abstract
Description
Claims
Priority Applications (1)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
EP04764625A EP1661361A1 (en) | 2003-09-01 | 2004-08-30 | System for increasing the availability of a submarine by means of remote control using encoded communication connections |
Applications Claiming Priority (4)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
DE10340548 | 2003-09-01 | ||
DE10340548.8 | 2003-09-01 | ||
DE102004029785.1 | 2004-06-21 | ||
DE102004029785 | 2004-06-21 |
Publications (1)
Publication Number | Publication Date |
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WO2005025173A1 true WO2005025173A1 (en) | 2005-03-17 |
Family
ID=34276533
Family Applications (1)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
---|---|---|---|
PCT/EP2004/009659 WO2005025173A1 (en) | 2003-09-01 | 2004-08-30 | System for increasing the availability of a submarine by means of remote control using encoded communication connections |
Country Status (3)
Country | Link |
---|---|
EP (1) | EP1661361A1 (en) |
KR (1) | KR20060119906A (en) |
WO (1) | WO2005025173A1 (en) |
Citations (3)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
WO2002008057A1 (en) * | 2000-07-20 | 2002-01-31 | Kapadia Viraf S | System and method for transportation vehicle monitoring, feedback and control |
WO2002095506A2 (en) * | 2001-05-21 | 2002-11-28 | Siemens Aktiengesellschaft | Process automation system and processing appliance for one such process automation system |
WO2003048998A2 (en) * | 2001-12-04 | 2003-06-12 | Kimberly-Clark Worldwide, Inc. | Healthcare networks with biosensors |
-
2004
- 2004-08-30 EP EP04764625A patent/EP1661361A1/en not_active Withdrawn
- 2004-08-30 KR KR1020067004229A patent/KR20060119906A/en not_active Application Discontinuation
- 2004-08-30 WO PCT/EP2004/009659 patent/WO2005025173A1/en active Search and Examination
Patent Citations (3)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
WO2002008057A1 (en) * | 2000-07-20 | 2002-01-31 | Kapadia Viraf S | System and method for transportation vehicle monitoring, feedback and control |
WO2002095506A2 (en) * | 2001-05-21 | 2002-11-28 | Siemens Aktiengesellschaft | Process automation system and processing appliance for one such process automation system |
WO2003048998A2 (en) * | 2001-12-04 | 2003-06-12 | Kimberly-Clark Worldwide, Inc. | Healthcare networks with biosensors |
Non-Patent Citations (1)
Title |
---|
LOMBARDO J S: "A Demonstration of Undersea Warfare Technologies in a High Fidelity Simulation on the Defense Simulation Internet", PROCEEDINGS OF THE WINTER SIMULATION CONFERENCE. LOS ANGELES, DEC. 12, 12 December 1993 (1993-12-12), pages 1030 - 1035, XP010306220, ISBN: 0-7803-1381-X * |
Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
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EP1661361A1 (en) | 2006-05-31 |
KR20060119906A (en) | 2006-11-24 |
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