WO2005003869A1 - Dispositif et procede pour commander de maniere automatisee le deroulement d'une operation dans une installation technique - Google Patents

Dispositif et procede pour commander de maniere automatisee le deroulement d'une operation dans une installation technique Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2005003869A1
WO2005003869A1 PCT/EP2004/006909 EP2004006909W WO2005003869A1 WO 2005003869 A1 WO2005003869 A1 WO 2005003869A1 EP 2004006909 W EP2004006909 W EP 2004006909W WO 2005003869 A1 WO2005003869 A1 WO 2005003869A1
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WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
unit
control
control unit
actuator
fail
Prior art date
Application number
PCT/EP2004/006909
Other languages
German (de)
English (en)
Inventor
Hans Schwenkel
Alexander Wiegert
Original Assignee
Pilz Gmbh & Co. Kg
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
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Application filed by Pilz Gmbh & Co. Kg filed Critical Pilz Gmbh & Co. Kg
Priority to EP04763026.4A priority Critical patent/EP1642179B2/fr
Publication of WO2005003869A1 publication Critical patent/WO2005003869A1/fr

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Classifications

    • G—PHYSICS
    • G05—CONTROLLING; REGULATING
    • G05B—CONTROL OR REGULATING SYSTEMS IN GENERAL; FUNCTIONAL ELEMENTS OF SUCH SYSTEMS; MONITORING OR TESTING ARRANGEMENTS FOR SUCH SYSTEMS OR ELEMENTS
    • G05B19/00—Programme-control systems
    • G05B19/02—Programme-control systems electric
    • G05B19/04—Programme control other than numerical control, i.e. in sequence controllers or logic controllers
    • G05B19/042—Programme control other than numerical control, i.e. in sequence controllers or logic controllers using digital processors
    • G05B19/0428—Safety, monitoring
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G05—CONTROLLING; REGULATING
    • G05B—CONTROL OR REGULATING SYSTEMS IN GENERAL; FUNCTIONAL ELEMENTS OF SUCH SYSTEMS; MONITORING OR TESTING ARRANGEMENTS FOR SUCH SYSTEMS OR ELEMENTS
    • G05B19/00—Programme-control systems
    • G05B19/02—Programme-control systems electric
    • G05B19/04—Programme control other than numerical control, i.e. in sequence controllers or logic controllers
    • G05B19/05—Programmable logic controllers, e.g. simulating logic interconnections of signals according to ladder diagrams or function charts
    • G05B19/058—Safety, monitoring
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G05—CONTROLLING; REGULATING
    • G05B—CONTROL OR REGULATING SYSTEMS IN GENERAL; FUNCTIONAL ELEMENTS OF SUCH SYSTEMS; MONITORING OR TESTING ARRANGEMENTS FOR SUCH SYSTEMS OR ELEMENTS
    • G05B2219/00—Program-control systems
    • G05B2219/20—Pc systems
    • G05B2219/24—Pc safety
    • G05B2219/24024—Safety, surveillance
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G05—CONTROLLING; REGULATING
    • G05B—CONTROL OR REGULATING SYSTEMS IN GENERAL; FUNCTIONAL ELEMENTS OF SUCH SYSTEMS; MONITORING OR TESTING ARRANGEMENTS FOR SUCH SYSTEMS OR ELEMENTS
    • G05B2219/00—Program-control systems
    • G05B2219/20—Pc systems
    • G05B2219/24—Pc safety
    • G05B2219/24191—Redundant processors are different in structure

Definitions

  • the present invention relates to a device for the automated control of an operating sequence in a technical system, with a first control unit for generating first control commands which are designed to effect the operating sequence, a second, preferably fail-safe control unit for generating second control commands for this are designed to perform safety functions, at least one actuator to be controlled, and an I / O unit remote from the first and the second control unit that drives the actuator, the I / O unit being connected to the first control unit via a first interface ,
  • the invention further relates to a method for the automated control of an operating sequence in a technical system, comprising the steps: Generating first control commands which are designed to effect the operating sequence,
  • the fieldbus is a communication medium that networks various components involved in the control of the system.
  • a control unit and spatially separated I / O units can communicate via the fieldbus.
  • the control unit usually a PLC (programmable logic controller) or an industrial computer, processes a user program that generates control commands depending on the status signals of the technical system.
  • the control commands are converted into control signals with the help of the I / O units, which in turn then drive various actuators in the system.
  • Actuators are electrical, for example Drives or electromagnetically controlled valves.
  • the status signals of the system are recorded via sensors, for example speed sensors, and are also reported to the control unit via the I / O units.
  • the operating control circuit and the safety circuit must be linked in some way in order to be able to reliably switch off the system in the event of a dangerous situation.
  • a first approach is to use the safety circuit to switch off the power supply to the I / O unit addressed by the operational control if a dangerous situation occurs. This inevitably shuts off all output signals from the I / O unit. As a result, the I / O unit can no longer drive the connected actuators.
  • the disadvantage of this method is that the higher-level operating control receives error messages due to the "elimination" of the I / O unit when the system is switched off. These error messages can delay the restart of the system. Furthermore, this type of coupling requires a certain amount of cabling.
  • An alternative concept is to arrange a further switching element (usually contactors) in the output-side connection between the I / O unit and the driven actuator.
  • the further switching element is then actuated by the safety circuit and can switch off the actuator without removing the power supply from the I / O unit.
  • this type of connection also requires a certain additional wiring effort.
  • the third possibility for coupling the operating circuit and the safety circuit is to consider the control commands of the operating circuit by the control unit of the safety circuit smuggle.
  • the control unit of the safety circuit thus has the possibility of interrupting the communication between the operating control and the I / O unit or of overriding control commands from the operating control if a dangerous situation occurs.
  • this approach has the disadvantage that the communication between the operational control and the I / O unit is delayed due to the interposed safety control. The responsiveness of the operational control is reduced.
  • this object is achieved by a device of the type mentioned at the outset, in which the I / O unit has a second interface for connection to the second control unit and in which the I / O unit is designed for the purpose of To drive the actuator depending on the first and the second control commands.
  • an I / O unit for use in a generic device having a first interface for receiving first control commands from a first control unit and a second interface for receiving second control commands from a second control unit. Furthermore, the I / O unit has at least one output for connecting an actuator to be driven, and it is designed to drive the actuator depending on the first and the second control commands.
  • the new concept is based on the idea of providing a special I / O unit that is able to process control commands from a first control unit (operation control unit) and additionally and simultaneously under the control of an internal logic or processing logic second control unit to perform security functions.
  • the new I / O unit is for the first time a component that is addressed both by an operational control system and by a safety control system.
  • the new I / O unit is a module that belongs to both the operating control circuit and the safety circuit, so that the separation of the operating circuit and the safety circuit that has been practiced up to now has been abandoned at this point. Since the I / O unit in a classic operating control circuit, however, only is an executive element, the task of the separation principle is possible here contrary to the custom.
  • the new I / O unit performs an AND operation in such a way that an actuator can only be in operation and taken out if there is no stop command from either of the two control units.
  • the control commands of the safety controller are a type of release signal, which is superimposed on the control commands of the operating control (first control unit).
  • the new I / O unit has internal processing logic that is able to link the operating control command and the enable signal. This gives it an intelligence that is not required and does not exist in previously known I / O units.
  • the new concept has the advantage that the wiring effort is significantly reduced compared to the concepts described above. Furthermore, additional external safety switching elements can be omitted, which also reduces component costs. Since the link between operational control and safety functions is done "in the field", i.e. in the decentralized I / O unit, the operational control of the system is delayed at most slightly.
  • the second control unit is designed to be fail-safe (in the sense of category 3 or higher of EN 954-1 or in the sense of a comparable security level, that is to say at least one-fail-safe).
  • the first control unit is preferably a standard control unit, which therefore does not ensure sufficient error security for controlling safety-critical processes.
  • the I / O unit is designed as a fail-safe module.
  • it has multi-channel redundant output switching elements for driving the actuator.
  • the I / O unit is a module that already fulfills the criteria required in the area of safety technology.
  • "Fail-safe” here means in particular that the I / O unit meets at least Category 3, preferably even Category 4, of the European standard EN 954-1 or a comparable safety standard.
  • This configuration has the advantage that the cabling effort and the communication between the I / O unit and the second control unit (safety control) can be reduced or simplified, since the second control unit can then rely on the intrinsic failure safety of the I / O unit.
  • the I / O unit has at least one output switching element for driving the actuator and a feedback circuit, with the aid of which an operating state of the output switching element can be determined.
  • This configuration can alternatively or preferably be implemented in addition or as part of the aforementioned configuration. It makes it possible to regularly or even continuously monitor the respective switching state of the output switching element and, in connection therewith, the operating state of the driven actuator. With redundant output switching elements in particular, it is thus possible to prevent the monitored system from being switched on again if a switch-off process was successful due to one output switching element, but another switching element is defective.
  • the integration of the feedback loop in the new I / O unit helps to further reduce the installation effort. This makes installation even easier and cheaper.
  • only the I / O unit can be used to prevent the system from being switched on again without the second (fail-safe) control unit having to be involved. This is particularly advantageous if a switch-off process is triggered by the first (operating) control, since such a switch-off process does not then have to be “communicated” to the second control unit.
  • the I / O unit has a head part with the first and second interfaces and an I / O part with a plurality of I / O modules, the head part being designed to have a plurality of I / O modules to be controlled jointly as a function of the first and second control commands.
  • the common control preferably takes place via a Logical addressing that is generated by the header and that is independent of the spatial position of the individual module slots insofar as I / O modules that are not spatially adjacent to one another can be switched on or off together without intervening I / O A modules are inevitably also controlled.
  • the I / O unit and the second control unit are connected to one another via a fail-safe communication link.
  • a fail-safe communication connection in this sense is, for example, the fieldbus marketed by the applicant under the name SaftetyBUS p®, which was specially developed for networking safety-critical components.
  • the new I / O unit is fully integrated in the safety circuit of the system.
  • Known and accepted procedures can therefore be used when installing the I / O unit and also during certification by the relevant supervisory authorities, which contributes to a further reduction in costs.
  • the I / O unit and the first control unit are connected to one another via a non-fail-safe communication link.
  • This embodiment shows, in combination with the previous embodiment, the "dual nature" of the new I / O unit.
  • the connection of this new I / O unit to the first control unit via a non-fail-safe, ie conventional, communication connection simplifies integration into known ones and - existing operational control circuits, which also simplifies the retrofitting of existing systems.
  • first and the second interface are implemented in the form of two physically separate connection options.
  • This configuration has the advantage that the new I / O unit is easier to integrate into existing systems. This is especially true when separate transmission media are used for communication between the first and second control units and the I / O unit.
  • the fail-safe communication link and the non-fail-safe communication link are implemented using a common transmission medium. It is preferred if the first and second interfaces are implemented as logically separate interfaces with common hardware.
  • the two control units can be connected to the I / O unit, for example, via a common Ethernet or Profibus connection. It is then the task of the logically separated interfaces to separate the telegrams received via the common transmission medium and to assign them to the correct sub-units, especially the correct memories, within the I / O unit.
  • the advantage of this configuration is the even simpler and more cost-effective implementation of new systems, since the material expenditure is lower with a physically combined interface.
  • the I / O unit has at least one output connection for connecting the actuator, the output connection being addressable in parallel both by the first control unit and by the second control unit.
  • addressable means that both the first and the second control unit can address the corresponding output connection.
  • the corresponding output connection is contained in the process image of the outputs for both control units. This means that each of the two control units is capable of deactivating the connected actuator so that the operational control itself can run independently of the safety function, which further simplifies the integration of the new I / O unit into the operational control circuit.
  • the I / O unit has at least one input connection for connecting a signaling device, the input connection being addressable in parallel both by the first control unit and by the second control unit.
  • the I / O unit has at least one further input connection for connecting a further signaling device, the further input connection being addressable only by the first control unit or only by the second control unit.
  • This configuration provides dedicated inputs via which information can be transmitted in a very targeted manner to only one of the control units.
  • the advantage is that a "secret” or isolated communication between the authorized control unit and the I / O unit can be implemented in a simple manner. As a result, the proven separation of the safety circuit and the standard circuit can be maintained more reliably.
  • FIG. 1 is a simplified block diagram of a new device for the automated control of a technical system
  • Fig. 2 is a simplified block diagram of a new I / O unit in the device of Fig. 1, and 3 shows a modular I / O unit according to an embodiment of the invention.
  • Fig. 1 an embodiment of the new device is designated in its entirety with the reference number 10.
  • the device 10 has a first control unit 12, a second control unit 14 and two I / O units 16 and 18 shown as examples.
  • the first control unit 12 is connected to the two I / O units 16, 18 via a first fieldbus 20.
  • the second control unit 14 is connected to the two I / O units 16, 18 via a second field bus 22.
  • the control units 12, 14 can exchange messages with the I / O units 16, 18 via the field buses 20, 22 in the form of so-called bus telegrams, which are indicated in FIG. 1 by the reference numbers 24, 26.
  • the bus telegrams 24, 26 transport control commands from the control units 12, 14 to the I / O units 16, 18 and, in the reverse direction, data and status messages from the I / O units 16, 18 to the control units 12, 14. These Bidirectional communication is shown in FIG. 1 using the arrows 28, 30.
  • the two field buses 20, 22 are bus technologies known per se.
  • the fieldbus 20 is a standard CAN bus or a Profibus or Interbus.
  • the field bus 22 is in the preferred embodiment, in contrast, 'a fieldbus especially for safety-critical applications, such as in particular the p® known under the name Safety-BUS bus, the assignee of the present invention.
  • the invention is not restricted to these special communication media, ie the I / O units 16, 18 can in principle also be connected to the control units 12 and 14 in another way, for example via a common Ethernet connection or a common Profibus.
  • the second control unit 14 here is a fail-safe control unit in the sense of category 4 of the European standard EN 954-1. It is accordingly shown with a multi-channel redundant structure, which is symbolized here as representative of the other components with two separate processors 34, 36. In a preferred exemplary embodiment, it is a fail-safe PLC as it is offered by the applicant of the present invention under the name PSS®.
  • the first control unit 12 here is a standard control unit, specifically a standard PLC. This is symbolized in FIG. 1 as a representative of the other components with the help of a single processor 38.
  • the I / O units 16, 18 have a first interface 40 and a second interface 42 (here for the sake of simplicity only for the I / O Unit 16 shown).
  • the two interfaces 40, 42 are implemented in the form of physically separate connection options, specifically here as a standard interface for connection to the commercially available fieldbus 20 and as an interface for connection to the SafetyBUS p® 22 from the applicant.
  • Reference number 44 denotes a processing and output circuit of the I / O unit 16, which is explained in more detail below with reference to FIG. 2.
  • each of the drives 46, 48 includes a speed sensor 52, which is also connected to the I / O unit 16.
  • the drives 46, 48, the valve 50 and the sensors 52 are part of a technical system, which is designated here in its entirety by the reference number 54. For example, it is an automated robot, a transport or conveyor system, a press line or another automated technical system.
  • the intended operating sequence of the system 54 is then completely implemented with the aid of the control unit 12, which addresses the actuators 46-50 via the I / O unit 16 and conversely reads in process variables with the aid of the sensors 52. Since such an automated system generally poses a danger, safety measures have been installed in the area of danger points. Typical examples include securing the system with the help of protective grilles and protective doors 56, arranging emergency stop switches 58 on neuralgic see points as well as the use of light barriers, light grids or laser scanners 60. These safety transmitters 56-60 are likewise connected to the I / O unit 16 here.
  • the second control unit 14 reads in the signals delivered by the safety transmitters 56-60, evaluates them and generates control commands as a function thereof, with which the actuators 46-50 may be actuated so that the system 54 is brought into a safe state. Deviating from previous concepts, it is no longer necessary here to provide separate contactors for switching off the actuators 46-50 due to the new I / O unit 16, since the second control unit 14 connects directly to the actuators via the new I / O unit 16 46-50 of the system 54 can access. It is advantageous here that the second control unit 14 can also read in and evaluate the signals from the sensors 52, for example in order to operate individual drives 46, 48 at a reduced speed during maintenance or setup work. Operation at a reduced speed can be made dependent on the actuation of an enabling switch (not shown here), which would also represent a safety-critical signaling device.
  • the I / O unit 16 has a number of output circuits 68, each having an output terminal 70.
  • the actuators 46, 48, 50 are connected to the output connections 70.
  • the output circuits 68 of the I / O unit 16 can also be implemented in semiconductor technology, feedback circuits then being implemented, for example, with the aid of optocouplers.
  • the actuators 46-50 are actuated here via fail-safe output circuits 68, which are implemented directly in the new I / O unit 16.
  • the reference numerals 80, 82, 84 denote three input circuits of the I / O unit 16 shown by way of example.
  • the input circuits 80-84 each have a connection 86 for connecting sensors 52 and / or safety transmitters 56-60.
  • the input circle 80 designed such that it can only be addressed by the first control unit 12. Accordingly, a sensor connected to the input circuit 80 can only be read from the first control unit 12.
  • the input circuit 82 can be addressed by both the first control unit 12 and the second control unit 14, so that a sensor connected to it can be read by both control units.
  • the input circuit 84 can only be read by the second control unit 14. It goes without saying that any combination of the input circuits 80, 82, 84 is possible, the input circuit 82, which can be addressed by both control units, being preferred in principle.
  • Reference number 88 denotes further output circuits, which in particular deliver different clock signals at corresponding connections 90.
  • Such clock signals are used in the field of security technology, for example, to realize cross-circuit detection between two lines.
  • the two interfaces 40, 42 each have an input memory 92, 94 and an output memory 96, 98.
  • the input memories and output memories contain, as is customary for PLC-based control systems, a process image of all inputs (signal states at the input connections 86) or one Process image of all outputs (signal states at the output connections 70, 90).
  • the first control unit 12 can read in and influence the process images of the inputs and outputs from the memories 92, 96 via the interface 40, while the second control unit 14 can read in or influence the process images in the memories 94, 98.
  • Reference number 100 denotes a logic part, which is shown here with a large number of AND logic elements 102.
  • the logic part 100 can be implemented with the aid of (signal) processors, microcontrollers or as an FPGA or ASIC.
  • the logic part 100 is constructed here with multiple channels and redundancy in order to enable fail-safe signal processing in the sense of category 4 of EN 954-1.
  • the outputs of the individual AND logic elements 102 are each fed to an output circuit 68.
  • the AND logic elements 102 are connected on the one hand to the output memory 96 and on the other hand to the output memory 98.
  • the control commands of the first and second control units 12 and 14 are thus linked and passed on to the individual output circuits 68 in the form of a linked control signal.
  • the second control unit 14 assumes the function of a release or enabling element, which, by providing a corresponding data value in the output memory 98, enables the first control unit 12 to control the connected actuators via the output circuits 68.
  • the safety-relevant sensor signals are evaluated exclusively in the second control unit. If the second control unit 14 detects a dangerous state, for example due to the actuation of one of the safety transmitters 56-60 or due to a self-test, it blocks the access of the first control unit 12 to the output circuits 68 via a corresponding data value in the output memory 98.
  • the output switching elements 72, 74 in the output circuits 68 are thus opened.
  • the actuators 46-50 are switched off.
  • the second control unit 14 can deviate from In this typical case, trigger other measures to achieve a safe system condition.
  • the drives 46, 48 can only be switched off with a certain time delay in order to first move moving loads into a safe parking position.
  • the second control unit 14 can inform the first control unit 12 that the drives must be switched off. Only after a defined period of time has elapsed does the second controller 14 switch off the power supply to the drives 46, 48 with the aid of the I / O unit 16.
  • the two interfaces 40, 42 of the new I / O unit are implemented with common hardware as only logically separate interfaces. This is indicated symbolically in FIG. 2 by box 104. Specifically, this is, for example, an interface hardware for an Ethernet connection.
  • An assignment group which is preferably implemented in the form of a suitable address evaluation software 106, assigns the telegrams 24, 26 received and to be sent in each case to the desired control unit or the associated memory 92, 96 or 94, 98.
  • the new I / O unit can then be connected to the two control units 12, 14 via a common Ethernet cable (or another wired or wireless transmission medium).
  • the I / O unit 110 has a head part 112 with the interfaces 40, 42 and the processing part 44.
  • the processing part 44 here also contains an address conversion 114 for the logic part 100, which can also be part of the logic part 100.
  • Module slots are lined up at the head part, in which I / O modules 116, 118, 120 can be used optionally.
  • the I / O modules contain the input circuits and output circuits 68, 80, 82, 84, 88 according to the functional description from FIG. 2. They can be constructed differently, that is to say, for example, pure input modules or pure output modules, or also contain all of the functions described above ,
  • all I / O modules 116, 118, 120 are designed to be fail-safe. Nevertheless, the I / O module 120 is provided here for connecting standard components which are integrated in the operating control circuit, such as the actuators 46, 48, 50 and the sensors 52 from FIG. 2, and which, according to the conventional concept, only have one - Fail-safe standard module would be connected.
  • the I / O module 116 is a fail-safe module and, as a special feature, it also has an infeed for an operating voltage for the I / O modules 116-120. Alternatively, however, the operating voltage infeed could also come from the head part 112 or any I / O A module have an operating voltage supply.
  • the I / O module 118 is a fail-safe I / O module that is also supplied via the operating voltage supply of the module 116.
  • the I / O modules 116, 118 for the safety circuit are contrasted in color to the module 120 for the standard circuit.
  • the address conversion 114 is designed to selectively address the individual I / O modules 116, 118, 120 in order to forward the control commands coming from the control units 12, 14.
  • the logical link between the standard part and the safety part for example in the form of the explained AND link, is taken into account.
  • This address conversion in the header 112 can be used to easily achieve a block shutdown from a decentralized location, ie several I / O modules can be shut down in a fail-safe manner at the same time.

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  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Automation & Control Theory (AREA)
  • Safety Devices In Control Systems (AREA)
  • Programmable Controllers (AREA)

Abstract

L'invention concerne un dispositif et un procédé pour commander de manière automatisée le déroulement d'une opération dans une installation technique (54). Ce dispositif présente une première unité de commande (12) servant à générer des premières instructions de commande (24) qui sont conçues pour provoquer le déroulement de l'opération. Une deuxième unité de commande (14), de préférence insensible aux défaillances, sert à générer des deuxièmes instructions de commande (26) qui sont conçues pour exécuter des fonctions de sécurité. Ce dispositif présente en outre au moins un actionneur (46, 48, 50) à commander, ainsi qu'une unité E/S (16) ne faisant partie ni de la première (12) ni de la deuxième unité (14). Cette unité E/S (16) entraîne l'actionneur (46, 48, 50) et est raccordée à la première unité de commande (12) par l'intermédiaire d'une première interface (40). Selon un aspect de l'invention, l'unité E/S (16) présente en outre une deuxième interface (42) servant au raccordement à la deuxième unité de commande (14) et conçue pour entraîner l'actionneur (46, 48, 50) en fonction des premières et des deuxièmes instructions de commande (24, 26).
PCT/EP2004/006909 2003-07-04 2004-06-25 Dispositif et procede pour commander de maniere automatisee le deroulement d'une operation dans une installation technique WO2005003869A1 (fr)

Priority Applications (1)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
EP04763026.4A EP1642179B2 (fr) 2003-07-04 2004-06-25 Dispositif pour commander de maniere automatisee le deroulement d'une operation dans une installation technique

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

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DE10330916.0 2003-07-04
DE10330916A DE10330916A1 (de) 2003-07-04 2003-07-04 Vorrichtung und Verfahren zum automatisierten Steuern eines Betriebsablaufs bei einer technischen Anlage

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EP1703346A2 (fr) * 2005-03-18 2006-09-20 Rockwell Automation Technologies, Inc. Module E/S de sécurité universel
WO2007088075A2 (fr) * 2006-02-01 2007-08-09 Robert Bosch Gmbh Procédé de commande et système de processeur associé
EP2026147A1 (fr) * 2007-08-13 2009-02-18 Siemens Aktiengesellschaft Procédé destiné à la transmission de télégrammes entre un dispositif de commande et un périphérique via un appareil intermédiaire
DE102011110182A1 (de) 2011-08-09 2013-02-14 Pilz Gmbh & Co. Kg Modulare Steuerungsvorrichtung
WO2013020818A1 (fr) 2011-08-09 2013-02-14 Pilz Gmbh & Co. Kg Dispositif modulaire de commande
WO2013020817A1 (fr) 2011-08-09 2013-02-14 Pilz Gmbh & Co. Kg Dispositif modulaire de commande
EP2574340A2 (fr) 2006-04-07 2013-04-03 Novartis AG Combinaison comprenant un composé pyrimidylaminobenzamide et un inhibiteur de kinase THR315LLE
EP2600705A2 (fr) 2011-12-01 2013-06-05 Pilz GmbH & Co. KG Élément accessoire séparé pour un dispositif de commande
WO2014072162A1 (fr) 2012-11-08 2014-05-15 Pilz Gmbh & Co. Kg Dispositif de commande et/ou réglage d'une installation technique
WO2014111439A1 (fr) * 2013-01-16 2014-07-24 Pilz Gmbh & Co. Kg Commutateur de sécurité
JP2016534422A (ja) * 2013-10-09 2016-11-04 ピルツ ゲーエムベーハー アンド コー．カーゲー 負荷モニタリングを有するモジュール式制御装置
EP3647892A1 (fr) * 2018-10-30 2020-05-06 Siemens Aktiengesellschaft Système de commande et procédé de commande d'une machine-outil
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DE10330916A1 (de) 2005-02-03
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EP1642179B1 (fr) 2013-05-22

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