WO2004107649A1 - Procede d'authentification pour utilisateurs de systeme d'acces multiple par repartition de code se deplaçant vers un systeme gsm - Google Patents
Procede d'authentification pour utilisateurs de systeme d'acces multiple par repartition de code se deplaçant vers un systeme gsm Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- WO2004107649A1 WO2004107649A1 PCT/CN2004/000526 CN2004000526W WO2004107649A1 WO 2004107649 A1 WO2004107649 A1 WO 2004107649A1 CN 2004000526 W CN2004000526 W CN 2004000526W WO 2004107649 A1 WO2004107649 A1 WO 2004107649A1
- Authority
- WO
- WIPO (PCT)
- Prior art keywords
- authentication
- cdma
- rand
- sres
- gsm
- Prior art date
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Classifications
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/06—Authentication
- H04W12/062—Pre-authentication
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04B—TRANSMISSION
- H04B1/00—Details of transmission systems, not covered by a single one of groups H04B3/00 - H04B13/00; Details of transmission systems not characterised by the medium used for transmission
- H04B1/69—Spread spectrum techniques
- H04B1/707—Spread spectrum techniques using direct sequence modulation
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W60/00—Affiliation to network, e.g. registration; Terminating affiliation with the network, e.g. de-registration
Definitions
- the present invention relates to an authentication technology for a mobile communication system, and in particular, to a code division multiple access
- CDMA Global System for Mobile Communications
- a mobile station In a mobile communication system, a mobile station needs to be authenticated before it can access the system. Only legitimate users who pass the authentication can access the network.
- the method for authenticating a CDMA user by a CDMA network includes a universal user authentication and voice encryption algorithm (CAVE) and a unique parameter authentication key (AKey) for the mobile station (MS) and the network; when the R-UIM When the card is generated, an AKey is generated and written in the card; when opening an account for a CDMA user in HLR / AC, the same AKey as that stored in the R-UIM card needs to be saved; through the shared encrypted data (SSD) update process, the AKey and An authentication random number (RANDSSD) generates an SSD, and the SSD is one of the most important parameters of CDMA authentication and can only be dynamically generated. AKey and SSD cannot be transmitted through the air interface.
- CAVE universal user authentication and voice encryption algorithm
- AKey unique parameter authentication key
- the SSD When the user accesses the system for the first time, the SSD must be updated first to ensure that the HLR / AC and the SSD in the R-UIM card are consistent; otherwise, authentication will not be successful; after the SSD update is successful, the user accesses again During the system, the network needs to authenticate the user. Since the authentication parameters in the HLR / AC and the R-UIM card are completely the same, the same result should be calculated through the same algorithm; otherwise, it indicates that the user is an illegal user.
- the process of authenticating the MS is: 1.
- the network side periodically broadcasts RAND to all MSs in the cell through the control / paging channel.
- the MS uses the RAND calculation authentication result (AUTHR) on the current control / paging channel, and sends it to the network side in the initial access message.
- RAND calculation authentication result (AUTHR)
- the network side calculates the AUTHR according to the RAND and compares it with the AUTHR sent by the MS. If the same, the MS is a legal user, otherwise it is illegal.
- AUTHR CAVE (RAND, SSD—A, ESN, AUTHDATA); where AUTHR is 18 bits, RAND is 32 bits, SSD— A is the first 64 bits of the SSD, ESN is the electronic serial number, AUTHDATA is the authentication data, and the data used is different when the access type is different. For example, it is calculated based on the mobile identification number (MIN) and the called number when calling. It is calculated based on MIN only during location registration or paging response.
- MIN mobile identification number
- the other is a unique query authentication method.
- the MS authentication process using this method is:
- the network side generates a unique query random number (RANDU), and uses the RANDU to calculate the user's authentication result (AUTHU); and will send a unique query random number (RANDU) to the MS.
- RANDU unique query random number
- the MS After receiving the RANDU, the MS also calculates AUTHU based on the RANDU and returns it to the network side.
- the network side compares the AUTHU calculated by itself with the AUTHU sent by the MS. If the same, the MS is a legal user, otherwise it is illegal.
- This authentication mode can be initiated by the MSC on a control channel or a traffic channel; its algorithm is as follows:
- AUTHU CAVE (RANDU, SSD-A, ESN, MIN); where AUTHU is 18 bits, RANDU is 32 bits, SSD-A is the first 64 bits of the SSD, ESN Is the electronic serial number, and MIN is the mobile identification number.
- the GSM network's authentication of GSM users includes the common authentication algorithms A3 / A8 and the unique parameter identity key (Ki) for the MS and the network; when the SIM card is generated, Ki will be generated and written in the card; When opening an account for a GSM user in HLR / AuC, the same Ki as that stored in the SIM card needs to be saved; Ki cannot be transmitted through the air interface.
- the network side authenticates the MS through the following steps:
- HLR / AuC will generate a random number RAND, and calculate the symbol response (SRES) and key C (Kc) according to Ki and RAND through the A3 / A8 algorithm;
- the network side sends the random number RAND to the MS through an authentication request message
- the MS After receiving the RAND, the MS also calculates SRES and Kc according to the RAND and Ki through the A3 / A8 algorithm and returns the SRES to the network side. Kc does not need to be transmitted over the air interface;
- SRES is 32 bits
- Kc is 64 bits
- RAND is 128 bits
- Ki is 32 bits.
- the network side After receiving the SRES sent by the MS, the network side compares it with the SRES calculated by itself. If the SRES are the same, the MS is a legal user, otherwise it is illegal.
- an interworking and interoperation function entity is added on the network side to support GSM registered users to use services in the CDMA network and CDMA registered users to use services in the GSM network.
- IIF mainly completes the interworking between the GSM network and the CDMA network. And interoperability functions; see Figure 1, which is a schematic diagram of the connection structure of the IIF with the GSM network and the CDMA network.
- a CDMA authentication center (AC) 111 is connected to a home location register (HLR) 113 through an H interface, and a short message center (MC) 112 passes N interface and HLR Are connected, MC112, HLR113, visit location register (VLR) 114, mobile switching center (MSC) 115 are connected to IIF through Q interface, D interface, D interface, and E interface, respectively.
- HLR home location register
- MC short message center
- MC112 HLR113
- VLR visit location register
- MSC mobile switching center
- the IIF 120 is located between the GSM MAP core network and the ANSI-41 core network, and performs conversion between ANSI-41 signaling and GSM MAP signaling.
- the GSM registered user When a GSM registered user roams to a CDMA network using a dual-mode terminal, the GSM registered user is said to be in a CDMA foreign mode.
- the IIF can be regarded as the CDMA HLR of the GSM registered user; and for the GSM network, the IIF can be regarded as GSM VLR serving this GSM registered user.
- GSM users in CDMA foreign mode need to be authenticated by the CDMA network. Only after successful authentication can GSM users be allowed to access the CDMA network and obtain the right to use network resources. For services that allow GSM users to use CDMA network resources, authentication is one of the most critical designs.
- the above CDMA network authentication method and GSM network authentication method cannot authenticate CDMA users roaming to the GSM network when the GSM network is connected to the CDMA network through the IIF. Therefore, there is an authentication method 5 for CDMA users roaming to a GSM network.
- the method is:
- FIG. 2 is a schematic flowchart of a prior art CDMA user roaming to a GSM network for authentication.
- the basic process includes the following steps:
- Step 201 A CDMA mobile terminal (MS) initiates an access system.
- Step 202 the MSC / VLR in the GSM network determines whether an authentication triplet of the MS exists, and if so, executes step 209; otherwise, sends an authentication request to the IIF, where the authentication triplet refers to the authentication random number RAND , SRES and Kc.
- Step 203 The IIF determines whether the GSM authentication data Ki of the MS exists in the AuC of the GSM network. If it exists, execute steps 205, 206, 207, and 208; otherwise, the IIF generates an authentication triplet and executes step 204.
- step 204 the IIF returns the authentication triplet to the MSC / VLR, and proceeds to step 209.
- Step 205 The IIF forwards the authentication request to the AuC in the GSM network.
- Step 206 The AuC in the GSM network generates an authentication triplet.
- Step 207 In the GSM network, the AuC returns an authentication triplet to the IIF.
- Step 208 The IIF forwards the authentication triplet to the MSC / VLR.
- Step 209 The MSC / VLR sends an authentication request to the MS, which includes an authentication random number RAND.
- Step 210 The MS calculates the SRES according to the authentication random numbers RAND and Ki.
- Step 211 The MS returns SRES to the MSC / VLR.
- Step 212 The MSC / VLR compares and judges the SRES received from the MS with the SRES returned by the IIF. If they are the same, the MS is a legal user, otherwise the MS is an illegal user.
- a new user identification module needs to be issued on the CDMA terminal.
- a standard GSM SIM card is inserted into the CDMA terminal, or a new terminal capable of storing both Ki and A-Key is used in the terminal.
- Type dual-mode card to achieve. Therefore, the operator needs to issue a user identification module again to a CDMA user who has applied for roaming to the GSM network function.
- This service distribution method that enables users to enjoy new services is more complicated and requires user cooperation, which is not conducive to the promotion of services. Summary of the invention
- an object of the present invention is to provide an authentication method for a user of a code division multiple access (CDMA) system roaming to the Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM), and to avoid operation when carrying out a new service of CDMA users roaming to a GSM network.
- CDMA code division multiple access
- GSM Global System for Mobile Communications
- Vendors issue new subscriber identification modules to CDMA users to enhance service operability.
- the mobile switching center (MSC) / visit location register (VLR) of the GSM system requests the GSM authentication parameter from the interworking and interoperation function entity (IIF) for the mobile station (MS) of the CDMA system that needs authentication;
- IIF interworking and interoperation function entity
- the IIF sends an authentication request to the Home Location Register (HLR) / CDMA Authentication Center (AC) of the CDMA system according to the request described in step 1);
- HLR Home Location Register
- AC CDMA Authentication Center
- the HLR / AC of the CDMA system generates a CDMA authentication parameter according to the request described in step 2), and returns the CDMA authentication parameter to the IIF;
- the IIF converts the CDMA authentication parameter into a GSM authentication parameter including a GSM authentication random number (RAND), SRES, and Kc, and returns it to the MSC VLR of the GSM system;
- the MSC / VLR of the GSM system stores the received RAND, SRES, and Kc's GSM authentication parameters, and sends an authentication request containing RAND to the MS;
- the MS restores the CDMA authentication parameters according to the RAND, and uses the same method in step 4) to convert the CDMA authentication parameters into SRES and Kc, and sends the SRES to the MSC / VLR of the GSM system;
- the MSC / VLR of the GSM system compares the SRES received from the MS with the SRES stored in step 5) to complete the authentication.
- the CDMA authentication parameters described in step 2) may include: a CDMA authentication random number (RANDU) and a CDMA authentication result (AUTHU) calculated by using the RANDU.
- RANDU CDMA authentication random number
- AUTHU CDMA authentication result
- the conversion method described in step 4) may be: IIF converts RANDU to RAND, and AUTHU to SRES and Kc.
- Step 6) The reduction method may be: MS restores RAND to RANDU and calculates AUTHU according to the RANDU; the method for converting SRES may be: converting AUTHU to SRES and Kc.
- the method of converting RANDU to RAND described in step 4) and the method of restoring RAND to RANDU described in step 6) may use a reciprocal algorithm.
- Step 4) The method for converting RANDU to RAND may be: filling RAND after performing RANDU calculation; or filling in RANDU and International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) or / and electronic serial number (ESN) after calculation RAND.
- IMSI International Mobile Subscriber Identity
- ESN electronic serial number
- the method for restoring RAND to RANDU in step 6) may be as follows: RAND is obtained by performing a reciprocal algorithm with step 4) to obtain RANDIL.
- Step 4) The method for converting RANDU to RAND may be: filling RANDU into a fixed position of RAND, filling the remaining position of RAND with a predetermined number or / and an International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI); or filling the remaining part of RAND The position is filled with a predetermined number or / and an electronic serial number (ESN);
- IMSI International Mobile Subscriber Identity
- ESN electronic serial number
- Step 6) The method for restoring RAND to RANDU may be: Take out RANDU in a fixed position.
- the method for converting RANDU to RAND described in step 4) can be: fill RANDU in the first 32 digits of RAND, and fill in the last 96 digits of RAND as all ones;
- the method for restoring the RAND to the RANDU described in step 6) may be: taking out the first 32 bits in the RAND as the RA DU.
- the method for converting AUTHU to SRES as described in step 4) and step 6) may be: filling the SRES after calculating AUTHU; or adding AUTHU and International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) or / and electronic serial number (ESN) Fill in SRES after calculation.
- IMSI International Mobile Subscriber Identity
- ESN electronic serial number
- the method for converting AUTHU to SRES as described in step 4) and step 6) may be: Fill AUTHU into the fixed position of SRES, and fill the remaining position of SRES with a predetermined number or / and International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) ; Or fill the remaining positions of the SRES with a predetermined number or / and an electronic serial number (ESN).
- IMSI International Mobile Subscriber Identity
- ESN electronic serial number
- the method for converting AUTHU to SRES as described in step 4) and step 6) can be: Fill AUTHU into the first 18 digits of SRES, and fill the last 14 of SRES as all ones.
- the method for converting AUTHU to Kc as described in step 4) and step 6) may be as follows: AUTHU is calculated and filled into Kc; or AUTHU and International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) or / and Electronic Serial Number (ESN) Fill in Kc after performing the calculation.
- IMSI International Mobile Subscriber Identity
- ESN Electronic Serial Number
- the method for converting AUTHU to Kc as described in step 4) and step 6) may be: filling AUTHU into a fixed position of Kc, filling the remaining position of Kc with a predetermined number or / and an International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) ; Or fill the remaining position of Kc with a predetermined number or / and an electronic serial number (ESN).
- IMSI International Mobile Subscriber Identity
- ESN electronic serial number
- the method for converting AUTHU to Kc described in step 4) and step 6) can be: Fill AUTHU into the first 18 digits of Kc, and fill the last 14 of Kc as all ones.
- the method for calculating AUTHU by using RANDU may be: RANDU, encrypted user data (SSD), electronic serial number (ESN), and mobile identification number (MIN)
- SSD encrypted user data
- ESN electronic serial number
- MIN mobile identification number
- CAVE user authentication and voice encryption
- the method may further include: when the IIF receives the authentication request response message of the HLR / AC of the CDMA system, reporting an authentication status report to the HLR / AC of the CDMA system indicating that the SSD update failed, and reporting to the GSM
- the system's MSC / VLR returns an authentication triad failure message.
- the authentication method for users of the code division multiple access (CDMA) system of the present invention roaming to the Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM) uses the CDMA user when carrying out a new service of CDMA user roaming to the GSM network.
- the original UIM card is used for authentication, which prevents the operator from issuing a new user identification module to CDMA users. At the same time, it does not need to modify the existing CDMA network equipment and GSM network equipment.
- FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram of a connection structure between an IIF and a GSM network and a CDMA network
- FIG. 2 is a schematic diagram of a prior art CDMA user roaming to a GSM network for authentication
- FIG. 3 is a schematic diagram of a location registration process for a CDMA user roaming to a GSM network according to a preferred embodiment of the present invention
- FIG. 4 is a schematic diagram of IIF converting C-RAND and C-AUTH in the embodiment shown in FIG. 3;
- FIG. 4 is a schematic diagram of IIF converting C-RAND and C-AUTH in the embodiment shown in FIG. 3;
- FIG. 5 is a schematic diagram of MS-to-G-RAND conversion in the embodiment shown in FIG. 3.
- the present invention is based on the comparison of GSM network authentication parameters with CDMA network authentication parameters, adapts through a certain algorithm, converts CDMA authentication parameters and GSM authentication parameters to each other, and uses the GSM authentication process to carry the CDMA authentication. Weight parameter for authentication.
- Table 1 shows the ratio of GSM network authentication parameters to CDMA network authentication parameters.
- the GSM authentication process if the GSM authentication process is used, the CDMA authentication parameters can be fully carried. Therefore, the adaptation is performed through a certain algorithm, for example: the 32-bit RAND or RANDU of CDMA, hereinafter referred to as C-RAND, is converted to 128-bitRAND, hereinafter referred to as G-RAND by algorithm Fa; and the 18-bit AUTHU of CDMA is calculated by algorithm Fb,
- the following tube is called C-AUTH, which is converted to GSM 32bitSRES; Kc does not need to be transmitted on the air interface, but if needed, the 18bit C-AUTH of CDMA can be converted to 32bitKc of GSM through the algorithm Fc; the corresponding relationship is shown as follows:
- the algorithms Fa, Fb, and Fc can take user information as parameters, such as International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) or ESN or other parameters.
- IMSI International Mobile Subscriber Identity
- ESN ESN
- G-RAND Fa (C-RAND, IMSI, ESN)
- the algorithm Fa can calculate the C-RAND, IMSI, ESN parameters, such as addition, subtraction, multiplication, division and negation, as long as Fa 'can pass
- C -RAND Fa '(G-RAND, IMSI, ESN) Calculate C-RAND in reverse; the same is true for Fb and Fc.
- the most convenient method of the algorithms Fa, Fb, and Fc is that the CDMA authentication parameters can be put into a fixed position of the corresponding GSM authentication parameters, and the others are filled with predetermined numbers.
- Fb fill C-AUTH in the first 18 digits of SRES, other digits of SRES can be filled in as all 1s;
- Fc Enter C-AUTH into the first 18 bits of Kc, and other bits of Kc may be required to be filled with all ones; the following takes the location registration process of a CDMA user roaming to a GSM network as an example to explain.
- the authentication process in this implementation is not different from the ordinary GSM authentication process, but the CDMA authentication algorithm is used in the authentication algorithm, and four functions Fa, Fa, Fb, and Fc are added.
- FIG. 3 is a schematic diagram of a location registration process for a CDMA user roaming to a GSM network according to a preferred embodiment of the present invention.
- the process includes the following steps:
- Step 301 The CDMA MS sends a location update request to the GSM MSC / VLR, hereinafter referred to as G-MSC / VLR.
- Step 302 the G-MSC / VLR finds that no authentication triplet is available, and then sends GSM to the IIF.
- the authentication information (MAP_SEND_AUTHENTICATION_INFO) requests an authentication triplet.
- Step 303 After receiving the authentication triplet request, the IIF sends an authentication request (AUTHREQ) to the CDMA HLR / AC, hereinafter referred to as C-HLR / AC, which indicates that the system has no broadcast authentication capability and no authentication parameters. .
- AUTHREQ authentication request
- Step 304 After receiving the authentication request, the C-HLR / AC finds no authentication parameters, generates a random number C-RA D according to the configuration, and calculates the authentication result C-AUTHo using the CAVE algorithm according to C-RAND.
- Step 305 The C-HLR / AC returns an authentication request response (authreq) including C-RAND and C-AUTH to the IIF.
- Step 306 After receiving the authentication request response, the IIF converts the C-RAND and C-AUTH therein into an authentication triplet.
- Step 307 The IIF reports the authentication success to the C-HLR / AC through an authentication status report (ASREPORT).
- Step 308 The C-HLR / AC returns an authentication report response to the IIF.
- Step 309 the IIF returns the GSM authentication response (map_send_authentication_info) including the authentication triplet to the G-MSC / VLR;
- Step 310 After receiving the authentication response, the G-MSC / VLR sends a unique query authentication request (Authentication Request) to the MS, which includes G-RAND;
- Authentication Request a unique query authentication request
- Step 311 After receiving the unique query authentication request, the MS converts SRES according to G-RAND.
- Step 312 The MS sends a unique query authentication request response (Authentication Response) including SRES to the G-MSC / VLR.
- Authentication Response a unique query authentication request response
- Step 313 After receiving the unique query authentication request response, the G-MSC / VLR obtains the SRES, and compares it with the saved SRES to determine whether the results are consistent. If they are consistent, the MS is legal. User, otherwise the MS is an illegal user.
- Step 314 The G-MSC / VLR returns a location update response to the MS.
- FIG. 4 is a schematic diagram of the conversion of C-RAND and C-AUTH by the IIF in the embodiment shown in FIG. It contains three algorithms: the 32-bit C-RA D is converted to the 128-bit G-RAND by the algorithm Fa, the 18-bit C-AUTH is converted to the 32-bit SRES by the algorithm Fb, and the 18-bit C-AUTH is converted to 32-bit Kc.
- FIG. 5 is a schematic diagram of the MS converting the G-RAND in the embodiment shown in FIG. 3. It contains four algorithms: First, the mobile device (ME) in MS converts 128-bit G-RAND to 32-bit C-RAND through algorithm Fa, and then uses the C-RAND, SSD, MIN, and ESN to pass UIM The CAVE algorithm in the card calculates the 18-bit C-AUTH, and then converts the C-AUTH into a 32-bit SRES through the algorithm Fb, and converts the C-AUTH into a 32-bit Kc through the algorithm Fc.
- ME mobile device
- steps 302-313 are authentication processes, and the authentication process is applicable to both the initiation call and the end call authentication process.
- CDMA users roaming to the GSM network there is no GSM message bearer, and SSD update cannot be performed. If the IIF receives a C-HLR / AC authentication request response message indicating SSD update, it should report the authentication to the C-HLR / AC. The weight status report indicates that the SSD update failed, and returned the authentication triplet to the G-MSC / VLR failed. In this case, CDMA users roaming to the GSM network need to switch back to the CDMA network first, and after the SSD update, they can roam to the GSM network before authentication.
- the authentication method for a user of the code division multiple access (CDMA) system of the present invention roaming to the Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM) uses the original CDMA user's original service when developing new services for CDMA users roaming to the GSM network.
- Some UIM cards are used for authentication, which prevents operators from issuing new subscriber identification modules to CDMA users.
- CDMA network equipment and GSM network equipment realize the convenience, and enhance the operability of the service
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CN031363547A CN1553610B (zh) | 2003-05-30 | 2003-05-30 | 码分多址系统用户漫游到全球移动通信系统的鉴权方法 |
CN03136354.7 | 2003-05-30 |
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CN100563159C (zh) * | 2006-02-23 | 2009-11-25 | 华为技术有限公司 | 通用鉴权系统及访问该系统中网络业务应用的方法 |
CN101060712B (zh) * | 2006-04-20 | 2011-08-24 | 华为技术有限公司 | 无线连接建立方法 |
CN100562167C (zh) * | 2006-04-24 | 2009-11-18 | 中兴通讯股份有限公司 | 一种对cdma用户漫游到gsm网络进行鉴权的方法 |
CN101137222B (zh) * | 2007-01-18 | 2013-06-05 | 中兴通讯股份有限公司 | 一种接入鉴权处理方法和系统及装置 |
CN102026174B (zh) * | 2009-09-17 | 2014-03-12 | 中兴通讯股份有限公司 | 一种寻呼过程中用户标识的保密方法及装置 |
CN102256229B (zh) * | 2010-05-19 | 2014-07-16 | 中兴通讯股份有限公司 | Cdma主叫短号显示的方法和系统 |
Citations (3)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
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CN1115026A (zh) * | 1994-07-11 | 1996-01-17 | 华东工业大学 | 传动链空回检测方法和装置 |
JP2002152190A (ja) * | 2000-09-15 | 2002-05-24 | Lucent Technol Inc | オーバレイデータネットワークで暗号化キーを配布する方法 |
WO2003050995A1 (en) * | 2001-12-07 | 2003-06-19 | Qualcomm Incorporated | Authentication in a hybrid communications network |
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US6584310B1 (en) * | 1998-05-07 | 2003-06-24 | Lucent Technologies Inc. | Method and apparatus for performing authentication in communication systems |
KR100300629B1 (ko) * | 1998-11-07 | 2001-09-07 | 윤종용 | 코드분할다중접속방식 서비스지역에서 심카드를 사용하기 위한시스템 및 방법 |
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Patent Citations (3)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
CN1115026A (zh) * | 1994-07-11 | 1996-01-17 | 华东工业大学 | 传动链空回检测方法和装置 |
JP2002152190A (ja) * | 2000-09-15 | 2002-05-24 | Lucent Technol Inc | オーバレイデータネットワークで暗号化キーを配布する方法 |
WO2003050995A1 (en) * | 2001-12-07 | 2003-06-19 | Qualcomm Incorporated | Authentication in a hybrid communications network |
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CN1553610B (zh) | 2010-04-28 |
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