WO2004017269A1 - Procede et systeme de securisation de transmission d'informations sur des reseaux de telecommunication - Google Patents
Procede et systeme de securisation de transmission d'informations sur des reseaux de telecommunication Download PDFInfo
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- WO2004017269A1 WO2004017269A1 PCT/FR2003/002536 FR0302536W WO2004017269A1 WO 2004017269 A1 WO2004017269 A1 WO 2004017269A1 FR 0302536 W FR0302536 W FR 0302536W WO 2004017269 A1 WO2004017269 A1 WO 2004017269A1
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- user
- network
- neutral intermediary
- confidential information
- intermediary
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
- G06Q20/02—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols involving a neutral party, e.g. certification authority, notary or trusted third party [TTP]
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
- G06Q20/02—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols involving a neutral party, e.g. certification authority, notary or trusted third party [TTP]
- G06Q20/023—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols involving a neutral party, e.g. certification authority, notary or trusted third party [TTP] the neutral party being a clearing house
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
- G06Q20/04—Payment circuits
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
- G06Q20/38—Payment protocols; Details thereof
- G06Q20/42—Confirmation, e.g. check or permission by the legal debtor of payment
- G06Q20/425—Confirmation, e.g. check or permission by the legal debtor of payment using two different networks, one for transaction and one for security confirmation
Definitions
- the invention relates to an automated method for the secure transmission of confidential information, possibly comprising identification codes, over two disjointed telecommunication networks, and possibly insecure, in particular the Internet and the telephone network.
- the invention relates to a method avoiding the transit, storage and reconstitution of confidential information, in its entirety, even transiently, by one or more intermediaries between a sender and a recipient of said confidential information.
- the method also allows a neutral intermediary to build a trace of the history of use of confidential information, anonymously and without being able to reconstruct it in its entirety.
- the invention is particularly suitable for the transmission of a payment card or authentication code in the context of securing payments, and in the context of remote access of a confidential nature in particular, by transmission of a word password or equivalent. STATE OF THE ART.
- the fear of pirating confidential information on the server of an intermediary for example a service provider, a merchant or a trusted third party, or simply the dishonesty of said intermediary .
- the fears of suppliers of online products or services include:
- the first encryption solutions do not respond to users' fears since only the transmission is secure and their confidential information always circulates in a piece (even if for example the internet protocol cuts information into packets, the latter are reconstituted and reconstitutable) and are stored in one piece.
- the SSL secure transmission protocol allows good protection of data transmission, but on the one hand, it is not impossible to decrypt, and on the other hand, it leaves the problem intact on transmission and receipt of data.
- users do not necessarily perceive the security of the system because it has been shown, particularly on the Internet, that such systems, based on all-wheel drive and by one or more channels of the same technologies, were a source of fraud.
- the second pre-registration solutions are not suitable for the user because they are not universal and require registration efforts.
- the second solutions are also not suitable for suppliers of products or services who seek solutions without disruption of flow, that is to say where the transaction is fluid, especially for the user.
- solutions of the third type require a mass enrollment effect, in particular for consumers, and moreover they very often require a financial or time investment on the part of the user to master the installation or use thereof. . Finally, these solutions have also often proved very costly for the service provider, the merchant or the authentication body.
- the invention proposes to overcome the drawbacks mentioned above.
- An object of the invention is to ensure the transmission of confidential information which does not affect the fluidity of the transaction and which is very user-friendly.
- Another object of the invention is to propose a technique making it possible to guide the user in the various stages of the transmission of information.
- Another object of the invention is to provide a method which does not require prior registration with the neutral intermediary ensuring the anonymous transfer of at least part of the confidential information. It therefore partially opposes the concept well known to those skilled in the art of a 'trusted third party' in the sense that the trusted third party is very often the custodian of personal information which may also be confidential.
- Another object of the invention is to provide a method which does not in itself require any particular installations on the part of the user other than software, hardware and means making it possible to communicate over networks implemented during the transaction. Thus, securing the transaction does not take place at the expense of the fluidity of the transaction.
- Another object of the invention is to allow better identification of the user during the transmission of confidential information while retaining simplicity of use and ensuring the anonymity of the user.
- security is ensured by the separation of the information into two complementary parts which are not signifying separately, conveyed on two disjointed networks via a neutral intermediary and requiring neither registration of the user with this neutral intermediary, nor installation by the user of software and hardware other than those necessary for connection on the two telecommunications networks.
- the invention provides a method for the secure transmission of confidential information, in particular an identification code, to an authentication body or any other final recipient, known as an “authentication body”, authorized to receive this information during a transaction with a user.
- This process is characterized in that the user separates the confidential information that he wants to transmit to the authentication body into two complementary parts which have no value taken separately.
- a disjointed security technique is thus used, allowing two complementary parts of confidential information to be transmitted simultaneously and entirely automated on two different networks.
- This technique is a very safe means of transmitting confidential information if the parts conveyed are worthless taken separately and if it is impossible for a third party to re-stick the pieces which allows the process implemented by the invention.
- the method implemented by the invention sets up an intermediary, called “neutral intermediary”, which makes it possible to transmit anonymously and without storing information capable of being reconstituted, a part which cannot be used alone of confidential information. , in particular an identification code, via a network called “the second network” technologically distinct from the network called “the first network” which is used to transmit the other complementary part of this confidential information directly or indirectly to the organization authenticator.
- the data stored by the neutral intermediary is stored according to non-reversible encryption techniques known as “digital fingerprints” well known to those skilled in the art, such as for example the MD5 algorithm (“Message Digest 5” according to the terminology Anglo-Saxon and referenced RFC1321) or SHA1 ("US Secure Hash Algorithm 1" according to Anglo-Saxon terminology and referenced RFC3174) or any other one-way encryption algorithm.
- digital fingerprints well known to those skilled in the art
- MD5 algorithm Message Digest 5” according to the terminology Anglo-Saxon and referenced RFC1321
- SHA1 US Secure Hash Algorithm 1
- the method makes it possible to build an anonymous history of transactions by storing, for example, the digital fingerprint of a combination of the coordinates of the user on the second network with the complementary part of the confidential information received by the user. neutral intermediary also on the second network.
- This digital fingerprint can be associated with statistical data of all kinds for classification, analysis and determination of scores.
- the user transmits a first part of the confidential information either directly to the authentication body, or via an intermediary, for example a supplier of products or services on a first network, for example the Internet.
- the neutral intermediary At the request of the neutral intermediary, himself solicited directly or indirectly by the authentication body, the user then transmits the second complementary part of the confidential code to the neutral intermediary on a second network separate from the first and using for example different communication technologies or protocols, the neutral intermediary then transmitting to the authentication body the part of the code that it has received.
- the exchanges with the authentication body and possibly with the suppliers of products or services involved in the transaction with the user are secured point to point by coding and mutual recognition techniques well known to those skilled in the art, such as exchanging certificates or keys, transmitting SSL, TLS, etc.
- This secure network between two points is called "third network".
- the first and second networks are networks linked to the user while the third is a network between the neutral intermediary, the authentication body and possibly suppliers of products or services involved in the transaction.
- the two networks have separate data entry means which can be, for example and without limitation a computer keyboard, the keys of a telephone, a voice recognition system, a card reader, etc. This avoids hacking or listening to data entered by a single terminal and in particular a computer keyboard.
- the user transmits the first part of the confidential information to a supplier of products or services on the first network;
- the supplier then transmits the first part to the organization on a third network;
- - at least one session identifier shared between at least two of the players in the transaction, allows the authentication body to automatically reconstruct the confidential information that the user transmits to it;
- each session identifier is generated by at least one of the players in the transaction
- the neutral intermediary automatically contacts the user on the second network to recover the second complementary part of the confidential information
- - contact details of the user on the second network are sent to the neutral intermediary by the supplier of products or services on the third network;
- - contact details of the user on the second network are transmitted to the neutral intermediary by the user on the first network;
- the third network is a point-to-point secure network
- the user is automatically guided by the neutral intermediary in the various stages of the transmission process of the second part of the confidential information on the first and / or second networks respectively, in a coordinated and possibly synchronized manner.
- the neutral intermediary issues a notice linked to the user's transaction history on the network; - the neutral intermediary requests the user to provide, in addition to confidential information to be transmitted to the organization, a personal code which is used during subsequent transactions and which makes it possible to identify the user;
- the personal code is transmitted, by a point-to-point secure type network, to a second authentication body with which the user is previously registered or known;
- the personal code is a digital and / or voice code entered on a terminal in connection with the second network;
- the neutral intermediary stores in clear or in reversibly encrypted contact details of the user on the network;
- the neutral intermediary stores in clear or reversibly the second complementary part of the confidential information supplied by the user on the network
- the neutral intermediary recontacts the user after the latter has disconnected from the first network, said connection to the first network being re-established once the second part of the confidential information has been transmitted to the neutral intermediary.
- the invention also relates to a system for implementing the method according to the invention.
- FIG. 1 schematically shows the exchange of information between a user, a product or service supplier, for example a merchant, an authentication body, for example a bank, and the neutral intermediary;
- FIG. 2 schematically represents the different stages of a method for securing the exchange of information between a user, a supplier of products or services, for example a merchant, an authentication body, for example a bank, and the security intermediary; and
- FIG. 3 shows schematically a possible sequence of the different stages of a method for securing the exchange of information between a user, a supplier of goods and services, for example a merchant, an authentication body, for example a bank and the neutral intermediary.
- FIG. 1 schematically represents the exchange of information between a user 1, a supplier of products or services 2, an authentication body 3 and the neutral intermediary 4 during any online transaction on a telecommunications network.
- the transit of part of the confidential information via the supplier of products or services is not essential for the transmission of the information.
- This transmission can be done directly to the authentication body. Indeed, the security and anonymity of the transmission based on the exchanges between the user 1, the neutral intermediary 4 and the authentication body 3, the transmission channel of the other part of the confidential information is less important.
- FIG. 1 shows communication networks comprising two disjointed networks and using, for example, different communication technologies or protocols forming the parts 100 and 200, and a private or secure point-to-point network forming the part 300.
- the double arrows 102, 105 and 106 symbolize the exchange of information between the supplier of products or services 2 and the neutral intermediary 4, the neutral intermediary 4 and the authentication body 3, and the supplier of products or services 2 and the certification body 'authentication 3 respectively.
- the link 102 is optional because all the information necessary for activating the transmission on the second network can pass through the authenticating body 3.
- the first possible part 100 of the telecommunications network allows communication between the user 1 and the supplier of products or services 2 represented by the double arrow 101, as well as between the user 1 and the neutral intermediary 4 during exchanges. 103. It is preferably of the Internet type and possibly, but not necessarily, secure. The first part 100 can therefore support any type of character to be transmitted by the user 1.
- the first part 100 is necessarily separate from the part 200 and uses, for example, communication technologies or protocols different from the part 200.
- the Internet designates all computer networks 100 from computer terminal to computer terminal.
- the designation includes in particular all kinds of private or public networks, such as intranet or extranet for example.
- the second possible part 200 of the telecommunications network allows communication between the user 1 and the neutral intermediary 4 during exchange 104. It is preferably of the telephone network type.
- the second part 200 is necessarily separate from the part 100 and uses, for example, communication technologies or protocols different from the part 100.
- the telephone network is, in the current state of the art, essentially composed of telephone terminals with digital keys. So, the data transmitted by the terminals is digital in the current state of the art. The evolution of the state of the art may soon allow the transmission of all types of characters.
- the system for implementing the possible method according to the invention comprises on the one hand means 11 for connection to the network 100 and on the other hand means connection 12 to network 200.
- the means 11 communicate with means 21 located at the supplier of products or services 2 and means 41 located at the neutral intermediary 4, in order to allow exchanges 101 and 103 respectively.
- the means 12 communicate with means 42 located at the neutral intermediary 4, in order to allow exchanges 104 on the part 200 of the network.
- the means 11 comprise for example a computer terminal called
- Web terminal since the network 100 is preferably of the Internet type.
- the means 12 comprise for example means forming a fixed telephone connection or a mobile telephone since the network 200 is preferably of the fixed or mobile telephone network type.
- the telephone 12 is advantageously with keys and allows the sending of DTMF codes “Dual Tone Multi-Frequency” according to the English terminology generally used or any other protocol or method available on this means for transmitting the part of the confidential information.
- the method according to the invention can thus be transposed to already existing systems, since mobile telephones allow the sending of DTMF codes and the vast majority of fixed telephones are now with keys and voice frequency allowing the sending of DTMF codes.
- a variant of the method according to the invention uses voice recognition to acquire the second part of the confidential information.
- the system comprises means 21 forming a server on the network 100.
- the means 21 comprise for example a so-called "web server" server.
- the supplier of products or services 2 can thus exchange data 101 with the user 1.
- the third part 300 of the telecommunications network is preferably of the type capable of transmitting secure point-to-point data.
- it can be a VPN type network.
- MAC Message Authentication Code
- DES Data Encryption Standard
- the system at the supplier of products or services 2 may include means 23 capable of managing point-to-point transactions 102, 106.
- the method according to the invention can be transposed to the systems of the prior art, since most suppliers of products or services, particularly on the Internet, are equipped with such servers. They often already use point-to-point secure data transfer protocols.
- the product or service supplier 2 does not have the means 23 suitable for managing such transactions, it entrusts the provision thereof to a third party approved by the authentication body 3. Said third party set up in advance with the authenticating body 3 the appropriate transfer protocols.
- the means 21 and 23 of the authentication body 2 are managed by means 22.
- the systems at the ends of the network 300 located at the authentication body 3 and the neutral intermediary 4 comprise means 33 and 43 respectively allowing the processing of information flows in point-to-point secure transfer.
- the authentication organization 3 has means 31 forming an authentication server, as well as means 32 allowing the management of all of the means 31 and 33.
- the neutral intermediary 4 is connected to the means 12 on the network 200 by means 42 of the server.
- the means 42 comprise for example a telephone server such as IVR (Interactive Voice Response) means or the like well known to those skilled in the art.
- the means 42 are suitable, for example, for making telephone calls 104, making deferred calls, filtering DTMF codes, broadcasting messages and recording calls as well as all the possibilities offered by computer systems coupled to telephony for exchanging information with the user 1.
- the means 42 are known to those skilled in the art.
- the neutral intermediary 4 is connected to the means 11 on the network 100 by means of the means 41 forming the server.
- the means 41 comprise for example a web server.
- the neutral intermediary 4 is connected to the means 33 on the network 300 by means of means 43 forming a point-to-point server.
- the term “confidential information” designates all types of confidential alphanumeric, numeric or binary codes and / or information linked to a secret identification or transmission. This can be, for example, but not limited to, a payment card number or an authentication code specific to a security system.
- the part of the confidential information transmitted by the telephone network is digital in the current state of the art.
- the other part of confidential information is preferentially alphanumeric if the networks support it.
- beginning of confidential information and “end of confidential information” or more generally “part of confidential information” designate two separate parts of confidential information.
- the disjointed parts have no meaning when taken separately and cannot be reconstituted in a method according to the invention, since they transit by different paths, and are only reconstituted by the authenticating body 3.
- the size of the different parts is indifferent, as long as these two parts are strictly complementary and not significant in terms of identification or confidentiality when taken separately. They are therefore not necessarily the same size.
- two actors namely the supplier of products or services 2 and the neutral intermediary 4, are used for the transmission of confidential information between the user 1 and the organization. authentication 3.
- the supplier of products or services 2 and the neutral intermediary 4 are in communication with the user 1 according to two modes of communication using, for example, different communication technologies or protocols, respectively the Internet network 100 and the telephone network 200.
- each transmits to the authentication body 3, and through the network 300, one of the two parts of the confidential information.
- the information flows exchanged between the different actors are represented schematically by the double arrows 101, 102, 103, 104, 105 and 106.
- FIGS 1 and 3 show possible modes of implementation of the invention in which the different actors are different entities.
- the user transmission channel 1 to the authentication body 3 via the product or service provider 2 may be simplified if the transmission of confidential information takes place directly between user 1 and the authentication body 3.
- the means of actors 2 and 3 are grouped together in the authentication body 3.
- the various servers presented as useful for carrying out the process can operate on the same means or even be part of the same program.
- the modes of transfer between the different actors remain the same as those visible in Figures 1 and 3.
- the invention can be used for electronic commerce transactions, and more generally, for any authentication and data transfer process.
- the method comprises the steps according to which:
- - User 1 separates confidential information into two complementary and distinct parts, but unusable independently of one another; - The user 1 transmits each of the two parts of the code by separate means of communication, by the network 100 to the supplier of products or services 2, and by the network 200 to the neutral intermediary 4.
- the transmission part of the confidential information to the supplier of products or services 2 is carried out for example by an Internet network and the transmission of the other part of the confidential information to the neutral intermediary 4 is carried out for example by a network telephone.
- the information transmitted over the networks cannot be reconciled by a third party. This makes piracy and eavesdropping on communications worthless;
- the supplier of products or services 2 and the neutral intermediary 4 transmit to the authentication body 3 the part of code which has been transmitted to them by the user 1.
- the authentication body 3 retrieves all of the information. Neither the supplier of products or services 2 nor the neutral intermediary 4 have access to all of the information.
- the two parts of the information once gathered by the authentication body 3, only pass over private or secure networks deemed to be inaccessible.
- the invention also relates to the use which can be made via neutral 4 of digital fingerprints of couples formed by the coordinates of user 1 on the network 200, for example the telephone number, and a non-significant part. confidential information received through the neutral user 1.
- the neutral intermediary 4 can store these digital fingerprints in a database or equivalent, for example included in the means 44.
- the data is stored in the form of a digital fingerprint, for example using a mechanism of the MD5 or SHA1 type.
- the history thus created or the statistical data associated with this history could possibly be provided to the supplier of products or services 2 or to the authentication body 3 when a user transmits to the neutral intermediary 4 a pair consisting of a same piece of information and using the same coordinates on the network 200 and whose digital footprint is stored by the neutral intermediary 4.
- the intermediary 4 can indicate to the supplier of products or services 2 if they are associated with this couple of payment problems for example.
- the neutral intermediary 4 does not store the coordinates of user 1 in plain text on the network 200 except coordinates belonging to a list of prohibited numbers, such as for example the numbers of public telephone boxes or numbers used by potential fraudsters or deemed at risk. Potentially no information transmission will be possible from these coordinates.
- FIG. 2 shows an embodiment of a transaction on a first network of the Internet type and a second of the telephone type.
- FIG. 3 shows schematically, and with the same numerical references, the information flows exchanged between the different actors during the implementation of the method according to the steps of FIG. 2.
- step 201 of FIG. 2 after having for example selected articles from the catalog of a supplier of products or services 2, the user 1 decides to validate his basket of articles.
- step 202 during the order validation process, the supplier of products or services 2 requests the user 1 to send him the information necessary for sending and paying for the products of the order.
- the supplier of products or services 2 only requests for example the first eight digits of the payment card number of the user 1.
- the transaction is preferably carried out in secure mode such as SSL.
- step 203 the user 1 sends the requested information to the supplier of products or services 2.
- step 204 the supplier of products or services 2 generates a session identifier. It is an identifier specific to the transaction. It will allow the various players to exchange information relating to this transaction.
- This identifier can, according to a variant, be generated by the authentication body 3 in response to the request from the supplier of products or services 2, during steps 205 or 207 detailed below.
- the supplier of products or services 2 can store the information awaiting payment in a database, for example included in the means 22, with, for example, the session identifier as key.
- step 205 the supplier of products or services 2 sends to the authentication body 3 the first part of the payment card number accompanied by the session identifier if it is he who generated it, thus than the other data necessary to finalize the transaction with the authentication body 3.
- the other necessary information is, for example, the expiry date of the payment card, the amount of the transaction, etc.
- step 206 the authentication body 3 stores the data transmitted by the supplier of products or services. 2 while waiting for the additional information from the neutral intermediary 4, with for key, for example, the session identifier and the identifier of the supplier of products or services 2.
- step 207 the step 207 according to which the user 1 is then redirected, according to means well known to those skilled in the art, to the site of the neutral intermediary 2 by passing the session identifier as a parameter.
- the supplier of products or services 2 already has the telephone number of user 1 or if he wants to transmit to intermediary 4 other information on the transaction, such as for example the language to be used or the number of characters to retrieve, it can transmit them to it in parallel via a secure point-to-point link 102.
- step 208 if no telephone number has been transmitted to it, the neutral intermediary 4 requests from the user 1 a number to which the latter can be contacted immediately. It is then a landline or mobile phone number.
- the telephone number can be requested from user 1, if it has not been transmitted beforehand during step 202 and transmitted by user 1 in step 203.
- the number is transmitted to the transaction intermediary 4.
- the neutral intermediary 4 manages everything relating to the telephone call and this includes in particular the detection of the wrong format of the number or the fact that the number belongs to a list of numbers at risk. These may include telephone booth numbers on the public highway, for example, or numbers used during previous fraudulent attempts or considered to be risky.
- the neutral intermediary 4 also manages the detection of line occupation, the detection of nonexistent international numbers or codes, etc.
- Appropriate responses to each case are provided. For example, a correction of the telephone number by user 1 is requested. It is also possible to provide a delayed recall and / or in voice mode, or a cancellation of the transaction.
- the neutral intermediary 4 also checks whether user 1 uses this telephone as access to the Internet 100. In this case, user 1 is asked to terminate his Internet connection. It is then automatically recalled, for example five minutes later, and guided in steps 210 to 212 in voice mode for example.
- the voice guidance end step then ends by sending an email, with an address - or URL (Uniform Resource Locator) according to English terminology - included, which allows him to continue his transaction once that he is reconnected.
- this electronic message or email (email according to English terminology) can be sent at the end of steps 213 to 220 or be replaced by a link at step 209.
- the neutral intermediary 4 calls back user 1.
- step 210 the user 1 receives a telephone call from the neutral intermediary 4. he is guided to his telephone terminal and / or to his web terminal.
- the messages can be coordinated and synchronized between the two networks by means of the neutral intermediary 4.
- step 211 the user 1 enters on his terminal 12, in our example the telephone, the digits complementary to the digits entered on network 100, in our example the last eight digits of its payment card number.
- the neutral intermediary 4 verifies that it has received the correct number of digits, namely in our example eight, then the telephone connection to the network 200 is terminated. It possibly prompts user 1 to correct errors, for example entering a number.
- the digital fingerprint of the telephone number + last eight digits of the payment card number is stored and used to identify user 1 anonymously during subsequent uses. Alternatively, during the first transaction with the neutral intermediary
- user 1 enters an additional code known as a personal code, either by using a code which would be provided to him elsewhere, or by dialing a code of his choice during the first transaction.
- an additional code known as a personal code
- the digital fingerprint of the telephone number + personal code pair is stored and used to identify user 1 anonymously during subsequent uses.
- the personal code is replaced by a voice signature.
- User 1 at the end of the transaction is required to pronounce his name.
- This voice signature is stored and can be used in the event of a dispute.
- the personal code is replaced by a voice print at the user's choice or predefined.
- the neutral intermediary 4 transmits to the authentication body 3 the last eight digits received and the session identifier in point-to-point secure mode.
- the authentication body 3 receives the data. Thanks to the session identifier, the authentication body 3 finds the first eight digits of the payment card number previously stored during step 206.
- step 215 the complete payment card number is reconstituted by the authentication organization 3.
- the authentication organization 3 validates or does not validate the transaction and generates a response.
- the response is transmitted in parallel by a point-to-point secure transmission 106 to the supplier of products or services 3 and possibly the neutral intermediary 4 via a point-to-point secure transmission 105.
- the neutral intermediary 4 optionally sends the telephone number used for the transaction to the supplier of products or services 2, via a secure point-to-point transmission 102. It is a valid telephone number and linked to user 1, which thus constitutes a trace of user 1. This number is not stored in plain text at the neutral intermediary 4 except in the event of fraud. It is stored in incomplete form, for example with two hidden figures in a trace file of the neutral intermediary 4 for billing purposes. It is also stored in the form of a digital fingerprint in means forming the database of the neutral intermediary 4.
- the neutral intermediary 4 ends the dialogue with the user 1.
- the user 1 is then redirected, according to means well known to those skilled in the art, to the site of the supplier of products or services 2 by passing l 'session identifier in parameter.
- the supplier of products or services 2 ends the transaction with the user 1, for example by confirming the transaction.
- the neutral intermediary 4 can store an imprint of the number of phone + the last eight digits of the payment card number, allowing him to build an anonymous transaction history and associate statistical data with it.
- the neutral intermediary 4 can also transmit in real time to the supplier of products or services 2 as well as to the authentication body 3 a score or various statistics concerning the history of transactions using this pair telephone number + last eight digits of the payment card number.
- the information thus transmitted can allow the supplier of products or services 2 to decide in real time to complete or not to complete the transaction. Fraud is thus limited for the supplier of products or services 2 but also for the authentication body 3.
- the method according to the invention has many advantages, including in particular the fact of using conventional and easily accessible transmission channels such as
- point-to-point transmissions between two certified sites which can transit, either via the Internet with data sealing processes, encryption and / or exchange of keys or certificates, or on other networks, in particular private , guaranteeing point-to-point confidentiality 300.
- These transmissions are private between recognized professionals (authentication organizations, in particular banks, their approved providers).
- the authentication body 3 has access to all of the confidential information.
- Intermediary 4 is neutral, knows nothing else about the user other than his telephone number and he does not even need to store this telephone number in clear or reversibly encrypted form.
- the neutral intermediary 4 can call users 1 worldwide.
- the size of the network 200 is transparent to each user 1. The network 200 thus adapts to the network 100 which is often on a global scale, for the Internet in particular.
- the user 1 remains in simultaneous contact on the Internet via the means 41 of the neutral intermediary 4, and the telephone link 200 with the means 42 of the neutral intermediary 4.
- the suspicious user can memorize the telephone number which called him back if he has a display of incoming calls, or obtain it by the service provided by the telephone operators in order to verify the identity of the calling server.
Abstract
Description
Claims
Priority Applications (5)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
AU2003274257A AU2003274257A1 (en) | 2002-08-16 | 2003-08-14 | Method and system for the secure transmission of a confidential code through a telecommunication network |
US10/524,772 US20060117173A1 (en) | 2002-08-16 | 2003-08-14 | Method and system for the secure transmission of a confidential code through a telecommunication network |
EP03758241A EP1535253A1 (fr) | 2002-08-16 | 2003-08-14 | Procede et systeme de securisation de transmission d'informations sur des reseaux de telecommunication |
CA002496076A CA2496076A1 (fr) | 2002-08-16 | 2003-08-14 | Procede et systeme de securisation de transmission d'informations sur des reseaux de telecommunication |
JP2004528614A JP2005535970A (ja) | 2002-08-16 | 2003-08-14 | 通信ネットワーク上での情報の送信を安全確保するための方法および装置 |
Applications Claiming Priority (2)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
FR02/10367 | 2002-08-16 | ||
FR0210367A FR2843664B1 (fr) | 2002-08-16 | 2002-08-16 | Procede et systeme de securisation de transmission d'informations sur des reseaux de telecommunication |
Publications (1)
Publication Number | Publication Date |
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WO2004017269A1 true WO2004017269A1 (fr) | 2004-02-26 |
Family
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Family Applications (1)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
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PCT/FR2003/002536 WO2004017269A1 (fr) | 2002-08-16 | 2003-08-14 | Procede et systeme de securisation de transmission d'informations sur des reseaux de telecommunication |
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Country | Link |
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US (1) | US20060117173A1 (fr) |
EP (1) | EP1535253A1 (fr) |
JP (1) | JP2005535970A (fr) |
AU (1) | AU2003274257A1 (fr) |
CA (1) | CA2496076A1 (fr) |
FR (1) | FR2843664B1 (fr) |
WO (1) | WO2004017269A1 (fr) |
Families Citing this family (6)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
US8166299B2 (en) * | 2004-07-06 | 2012-04-24 | Andrew Christopher Kemshall | Secure messaging |
CA2571666A1 (fr) * | 2006-12-12 | 2008-06-12 | Diversinet Corp. | Stockage et transfert de donnees d'identite et de renseignements personnels proteges |
US10169598B1 (en) | 2008-04-10 | 2019-01-01 | United Services Automobile Association | Systems and methods for sending and receiving encrypted submessages |
EP2128781A1 (fr) * | 2008-05-27 | 2009-12-02 | Benny Kalbratt | Procédé d'authentification |
US10354653B1 (en) * | 2016-01-19 | 2019-07-16 | United Services Automobile Association (Usaa) | Cooperative delegation for digital assistants |
US11353964B2 (en) | 2018-11-14 | 2022-06-07 | Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. | Wearable device for displaying con lent, and method thereof |
Citations (8)
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WO1996029667A1 (fr) * | 1995-03-20 | 1996-09-26 | Sandberg Diment Erik | Fourniture d'informations de verification relative a une transaction |
US5727163A (en) * | 1995-03-30 | 1998-03-10 | Amazon.Com, Inc. | Secure method for communicating credit card data when placing an order on a non-secure network |
GB2332833A (en) * | 1997-12-24 | 1999-06-30 | Interactive Magazines Limited | Secure credit card transactions over the internet |
US6012144A (en) * | 1996-10-08 | 2000-01-04 | Pickett; Thomas E. | Transaction security method and apparatus |
US6070154A (en) * | 1998-11-27 | 2000-05-30 | Activepoint Ltd. | Internet credit card security |
WO2001028154A1 (fr) * | 1999-10-13 | 2001-04-19 | Helsingin Puhelin Oyj | Transmission d'informations confidentielles |
FR2806229A1 (fr) * | 2000-03-13 | 2001-09-14 | Mathieu Schnee | Procede d'interaction ou de transaction entre un utilisateur et un fournisseur de produits ou de services et systeme pour la mise en oeuvre de ce procede |
FR2828966A1 (fr) * | 2001-08-23 | 2003-02-28 | Schlumberger Systems & Service | Procede pour communiquer de facon securisee des donnees d'identification d'une carte de paiement |
Family Cites Families (5)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
US5095772A (en) * | 1990-06-07 | 1992-03-17 | Tom Fortson | Bicycle pedal extension |
EA003230B1 (ru) * | 1999-01-28 | 2003-02-27 | Ютака Ясукура | Способ для обеспечения защиты электронной информации |
US6773022B2 (en) * | 2000-11-15 | 2004-08-10 | Dean R. Janssen | Step-cycle for exercise, recreation, and transport having telescopically movable pedals |
US7181017B1 (en) * | 2001-03-23 | 2007-02-20 | David Felsher | System and method for secure three-party communications |
US6688624B2 (en) * | 2001-05-01 | 2004-02-10 | Gcp, Llc | Foot pump scooter |
-
2002
- 2002-08-16 FR FR0210367A patent/FR2843664B1/fr not_active Expired - Fee Related
-
2003
- 2003-08-14 AU AU2003274257A patent/AU2003274257A1/en not_active Abandoned
- 2003-08-14 EP EP03758241A patent/EP1535253A1/fr not_active Withdrawn
- 2003-08-14 CA CA002496076A patent/CA2496076A1/fr not_active Abandoned
- 2003-08-14 JP JP2004528614A patent/JP2005535970A/ja active Pending
- 2003-08-14 WO PCT/FR2003/002536 patent/WO2004017269A1/fr active Application Filing
- 2003-08-14 US US10/524,772 patent/US20060117173A1/en not_active Abandoned
Patent Citations (8)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
WO1996029667A1 (fr) * | 1995-03-20 | 1996-09-26 | Sandberg Diment Erik | Fourniture d'informations de verification relative a une transaction |
US5727163A (en) * | 1995-03-30 | 1998-03-10 | Amazon.Com, Inc. | Secure method for communicating credit card data when placing an order on a non-secure network |
US6012144A (en) * | 1996-10-08 | 2000-01-04 | Pickett; Thomas E. | Transaction security method and apparatus |
GB2332833A (en) * | 1997-12-24 | 1999-06-30 | Interactive Magazines Limited | Secure credit card transactions over the internet |
US6070154A (en) * | 1998-11-27 | 2000-05-30 | Activepoint Ltd. | Internet credit card security |
WO2001028154A1 (fr) * | 1999-10-13 | 2001-04-19 | Helsingin Puhelin Oyj | Transmission d'informations confidentielles |
FR2806229A1 (fr) * | 2000-03-13 | 2001-09-14 | Mathieu Schnee | Procede d'interaction ou de transaction entre un utilisateur et un fournisseur de produits ou de services et systeme pour la mise en oeuvre de ce procede |
FR2828966A1 (fr) * | 2001-08-23 | 2003-02-28 | Schlumberger Systems & Service | Procede pour communiquer de facon securisee des donnees d'identification d'une carte de paiement |
Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
---|---|
US20060117173A1 (en) | 2006-06-01 |
FR2843664A1 (fr) | 2004-02-20 |
EP1535253A1 (fr) | 2005-06-01 |
JP2005535970A (ja) | 2005-11-24 |
FR2843664B1 (fr) | 2004-11-26 |
CA2496076A1 (fr) | 2004-02-26 |
AU2003274257A1 (en) | 2004-03-03 |
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