WO2003009606A2 - Cles de cryptage pour differents reseaux de communication cellulaires - Google Patents

Cles de cryptage pour differents reseaux de communication cellulaires Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2003009606A2
WO2003009606A2 PCT/EP2002/007274 EP0207274W WO03009606A2 WO 2003009606 A2 WO2003009606 A2 WO 2003009606A2 EP 0207274 W EP0207274 W EP 0207274W WO 03009606 A2 WO03009606 A2 WO 03009606A2
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WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
network
ciphering key
handover
communication
encryption
Prior art date
Application number
PCT/EP2002/007274
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English (en)
Other versions
WO2003009606A3 (fr
Inventor
Stephen John Barrett
John Gibbs
Gerry Foster
Original Assignee
Motorola Inc
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Motorola Inc filed Critical Motorola Inc
Priority to AU2002325858A priority Critical patent/AU2002325858A1/en
Publication of WO2003009606A2 publication Critical patent/WO2003009606A2/fr
Publication of WO2003009606A3 publication Critical patent/WO2003009606A3/fr

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Classifications

    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/04—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/06—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network
    • H04L63/061—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network for key exchange, e.g. in peer-to-peer networks
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/03—Protecting confidentiality, e.g. by encryption
    • H04W12/037—Protecting confidentiality, e.g. by encryption of the control plane, e.g. signalling traffic
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
    • H04L63/0428—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
    • H04L63/0457—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload wherein the sending and receiving network entities apply dynamic encryption, e.g. stream encryption
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W36/00—Hand-off or reselection arrangements
    • H04W36/0005—Control or signalling for completing the hand-off
    • H04W36/0011—Control or signalling for completing the hand-off for data sessions of end-to-end connection
    • H04W36/0033—Control or signalling for completing the hand-off for data sessions of end-to-end connection with transfer of context information
    • H04W36/0038—Control or signalling for completing the hand-off for data sessions of end-to-end connection with transfer of context information of security context information
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W80/00—Wireless network protocols or protocol adaptations to wireless operation
    • H04W80/02—Data link layer protocols

Definitions

  • This invention relates to encryption in the context of handover between different types of cellular communication networks.
  • GSM Global System for Mobile Communications
  • a downlink communication means communication in the direction from the base station to the mobile station (i.e. encryption is performed by the base station and decryption is performed by the mobile station) .
  • An uplink communication is in the direction from the mobile station to the base station (i.e. encryption is performed by the mobile station and decryption is performed by the base station) .
  • the base station requires to know a ciphering key particular to the mobile station.
  • the ciphering key is already known by the network and is therefore provided by the network to the new base station as part of the handover process.
  • the encryption runs between a higher network node than the base station (in the case of UMTS, the higher node is the Radio Network Controller (RNC) ) and the mobile station (again, "between" meaning in both the downlink and uplink directions) .
  • RNC Radio Network Controller
  • system and network are often interposed.
  • system will be used for any overall arrangement that contains components technically linked therein, and can thus include a number of networks
  • network will be used for any finite part of the overall system that is organisationally separate from other parts.
  • different networks may be made up of separate hardware such as switching centres, base stations, radio transceivers and so on. Also, they may be separate in a commercial sense.
  • the different networks could share some or all of their hardware, but constitute different networks by virtue of being used by different commercial entities on a time division basis or with respect to different radio channels and so on.
  • the networks may themselves be hiring such airtime or channels from different commercial entities using the relevant hardware .
  • a mobile station may require to be handed over from a network operating according to one technical specification, e.g. GSM, to a network operating according to another technical specification, e.g. UMTS (i.e. 2G to 3G handover, or vice versa) .
  • GSM Global System for Mobile communications
  • UMTS Universal Mobile Subscriber Identity
  • a 128 -bit ciphering key is used for UMTS and a 64 -bit ciphering key is used for GSM.
  • handover is implemented between different networks without the network being handed over to having to retrieve the new ciphering key before communication service is provided.
  • the present invention provides a handover method for a cellular communication system, as claimed in claim 1.
  • the present invention provides a handover method for a cellular communication system, as claimed in claim 2.
  • the present invention provides a cellular communication system, as claimed in claim 11.
  • the present invention provides a cellular communication system, as claimed in claim 12.
  • the present invention provides a communication unit, as claimed in claim 21.
  • the present invention provides a ciphering key module for a network entity, as claimed in claim 22.
  • the present invention provides a network entity, as claimed in claim 23.
  • the present invention provides a storage medium storing processor-implementable instructions, as claimed in claim 24.
  • FIG. 1 schematically illustrates a cellular communication system comprising a GSM network and a UMTS network
  • FIG. 2 is a schematic illustration of an encryption arrangement .
  • the invention is applied to a cellular communication system comprising a GSM network and a UMTS network, where these two networks have a degree of association with each other, particularly in that they each share direct access to a common home location register.
  • a cellular communication system comprising a GSM network and a UMTS network, where these two networks have a degree of association with each other, particularly in that they each share direct access to a common home location register.
  • the invention can be applied to arrangement of networks in an overall system, the networks for example being less or more associated than the following embodiments.
  • FIG. 1 shows the above-mentioned cellular communication system 1 comprising a GSM network 2 and a UMTS network 4.
  • the GSM network 2 comprises the following network entities: a base station 6, called a base transceiver station (BTS) in GSM terminology, a base station controller (BSC) 8 coupled to the BTS 6, and a mobile services switching centre (MSC) 10 coupled to the BSC 8. These network entities operate in conventional fashion as defined in the GSM specification.
  • the GSM network 1 comprises other BTSs, BSCs, and MSCs, but for clarity these are not shown.
  • the MSC 10 is coupled to a backbone entity or an arrangement serving, at least temporarily, as a backbone 11.
  • the backbone 11 is a common network node which bearer paths are forced to go through for the mobile station 22 when served by both the GSM network 2 and the UMTS network 4.
  • the common network node is a Gateway GPRS Switching Node (GGSN) .
  • GMSC Gateway Mobile Switching Centre
  • PSTN public switched telephone network
  • the UMTS network 4 comprises the following network entities: a base station 14, called a Node-B in UMTS terminology, a radio network controller (RNC) 16 coupled to the Node-B 14, and a mobile services switching centre (MSC) 18 coupled to the RNC 16. These network entities operate in conventional fashion as defined in the UMTS specification.
  • the UMTS network 4 comprises other Node- Bs, RNCs, and MSCs, and also other network entities, such as Serving GPRS Support Nodes (SGSNs) which are used instead of MSCs for connecting to General Packet Radio Switching (GPRS) networks, but for clarity these are not shown.
  • the MSC 18 is coupled to the backbone entity or arrangement 11.
  • the GSM network 2 and the UMTS network 4 share a common home location register (HLR) 20 which is coupled inter alia to the MSC 10 and the MSC 18.
  • the HLR 20 contains information of the current location of communication units, referred to as mobile stations (MSs) in GSM, allocated to it, subscriber information therefore, and ciphering keys, in this example for use in each of the two networks, for the MSs.
  • MSs mobile stations
  • MS 22 In practise a large number of communication units will be receiving service from the GSM network via BTS 6 , and likewise a large number will be receiving service from the UMTS network 4 via the Node-B 14. However, for clarity, only one MS, namely MS 22 is shown in FIG. 1.
  • the MS 22 is currently receiving service from the GSM network 2 via the BTS 6 over a radio link 24 between the BTS 6 and the MS 22.
  • Communication between the BTS 6 and the MS 22 over the radio link 24 i.e. in both the uplink and downlink directions) is encrypted.
  • the BTS 6 encrypts data before sending it to the MS 22.
  • the MS 22 encrypts data before sending it to the BTS 6.
  • This encryption is performed as specified in the GSM specification (and as will be described in more detail below) using the ciphering key for the particular MS 22 it has received in conventional fashion along with other data relating to the MS 22 when initially forming the radio link 24.
  • the MS 22 will be handed over from the BTS 6 to the Node- B 14, i.e. from the GSM network 2 to the UMTS network 4, such that the MS 22 will receive service from the Node-B 14 over a new radio link 26.
  • This may be for any one or more of a number of reasons.
  • the MS 22 may be leaving the extremities of the geographical area served by the GSM network.
  • Another possibility is that according to user input to the MS 22 the MS 22 is to require provision of Internet services, which are available from the UMTS network 4 but not from the GSM network 2.
  • Another possibility is that an overall operator of the two networks may wish to handover the call because of capacity considerations or other operational reasons. It is noted that the following account applies in corresponding fashion to handover in the other direction, i.e. from the UMTS network 4 to the GSM network 2.
  • the BSC 8 and the RNC 16 have been adapted, by provision in each of a ciphering key module, to offer, and provide for, adaptation of ciphering key procedures in the context of handover from one of the networks to the other, as will be described in more detail below.
  • this adaptation may be implemented in any suitable manner.
  • the module may consist of a single discrete entity added to a conventional BSC/RNC, or may alternatively be formed by adapting existing parts of a conventional BSC/RNC, for example by reprogramming of a one or more processors therein.
  • the required adaptation may be implemented in the form of processor- implementable instructions stored on a storage medium, such as a floppy disk, hard disk, PROM, RAM or any combination of these or other storage media.
  • the module may be implemented in the form of hardware, firmware, software, or any combination of these.
  • adaptation of transmission characteristics may alternatively be controlled, implemented in full or implemented in part by a module added to or formed by adaptation of any other suitable network entities within the communication system 1.
  • implementation may be at any appropriate switching node such as any other appropriate type of base station, base station controller etc.
  • various steps involved in determining and carrying out such adaptation can be carried out by various components distributed at different locations or entities within the system.
  • the embodiments do not incur a delay as it waits for ciphering to resume due to a need to retrieve information related to the second ciphering key, as will be described.
  • a common 3rd encryption algorithm that runs independently of the two networks is introduced, along with a corresponding third ciphering key for the MS 22.
  • This algorithm could either only be used during the handover stage, i.e. up until the point where the necessary information has been obtained from the Node-B of the new system, where upon the encryption for the new system can be applied. Alternatively, it could be run continuously 'on top of' other encryption algorithms (as described further below) .
  • Any suitable encryption algorithm and ciphering key may be used for this common 3rd encryption algorithm and ciphering key.
  • the same basic type as that already used in the UMTS system 4 is used. This is as specified fully in 3GPP technical Specification 25.301 Version 3.3.0 (December 1999), and which will now be described here in overview with reference to FIG. 2.
  • FIG. 2 is a schematic illustration of the encryption arrangement.
  • the specified ciphering algorithm 40 receives as input a number of parameter specification inputs, more particularly count 42, bearer 44, direction 46 and length 48. Also received as input is the ciphering key 50 for the MS 22.
  • the ciphering algorithm effectively operates as a shift register with feedback to provide as an output a pseudo random sequence that is used as a mask 52. Unencrypted data 54 and the mask 52 is input to an XOR logic function 56, whose resulting output constitutes the encrypted data 58 to be transmitted over the radio link.
  • Count 42 Effectively a clock which forces progression through the pseudo-random sequence.
  • Bearer 44 Bearer ID (so different ciphering can be applied to different logical channels) .
  • Direction 46 Indicates whether uplink or downlink, so enabling different ciphering to be applied on uplink / downlink.
  • Length 48 This is the length of the key streaming block.
  • the downlink encryption is performed by the BTS 6 using the GSM equivalent to the above, and corresponding decryption (comprising a reverse of the above process) is carried out by the MS 22, in both cases using the conventional GSM ciphering key for the MS 22 as stored at the HLR 20.
  • the downlink encryption is performed by the RNC 16 using the above process.
  • the corresponding decryption (comprising a reverse of the above process) is carried out by the MS 22, in both cases using the conventional UMTS ciphering key for the MS 22 as stored at the HLR 20.
  • the further/alternative downlink encryption may be terminated outside of the Radio Access Network (RAN), e.g. by running between (or in) the end terminals, i.e. mobile station 22 and the other caller, or else running between a common core network node (such as a GGSN or GMSC, e.g. serving as the backbone 11) and the mobile station 22.
  • RAN Radio Access Network
  • synchronisation (count) of this 3rd encryption algorithm may be achieved by making use of an open systems interconnection OSI Layer 3 or OSI Layer 4 sequence number, e.g. (on the Internet) that provided by transmission control protocol (TCP) or real time protocol (RTP) (which is typically terminated in the end-terminals) .
  • TCP transmission control protocol
  • RTP real time protocol
  • the common 3 rd encryption may be run continuously. Then in general the data will be encrypted twice, once with the IP based encryption and then once with the RAN based encryption. During handover, only the IP based encryption would be running.
  • a Layer 3 sequence number is used, since not all Layer 4 protocols have any form of sequence number (consider UDP which is run over an Internet protocol (IP) ) .
  • one candidate layer 3 protocol i.e. IP
  • IP IP
  • handover is very fast, e.g. can be achieved within the time taken to transmit one packet, then it would be acceptable to encrypt that one packet using the IP encryption key and the synchronising counter would never need to be incremented. This would avoid a problem in encryption arising from the fact that IP does not have a sequence number such that the packets could be placed in the correct order prior to decryption.
  • This 3rd encryption algorithm may be run in the end terminals, i.e. MS 22 and the communication unit with which it is ultimately communicating, or between the end terminal and some anchor point in the network through which the traffic will always be routed (before and after the inter-system handover) , such as the backbone entity 11.
  • the ciphering key for the new network i.e. the UMTS network in the present case, is transferred to the new network as part of the handover message passed from the BTS 6 to the Node-B 14.
  • the ciphering keys for all candidate handover networks are transferred to the initiating BSC/RNC (i.e. that BSC/RNC through which the bearer is set up on call establishment) - in this example BSC 8.
  • the ciphering key is then passed across to the new BSC/RNC (in this example RNC 16) in the handover message (obviating the need to interrogate the MSC 18) .
  • Embodiment 3 In this embodiment, encryption is performed before handover and after handover, but not during handover.
  • the MS 22 is a mobile telephone, but the communication unit may include or consist of any other appropriate form of radio receiving apparatus, for example a personal computer with a radio modem, an electronic organiser, a video and/or audio player, etc.
  • the encryption/ciphering algorithms and keys are appropriate to the systems described. It will be appreciated that the present invention may be applied to other encryption algorithms involving ciphering keys or equivalent data.
  • the present invention finds particular application in cellular communication systems such as UMTS and GSM. However, the inventive concepts contained herein are equally applicable to alternative cellular communication systems .

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
  • Computing Systems (AREA)
  • General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)

Abstract

L'invention concerne un transfert entre différents réseaux de communication cellulaires (2, 4), sans que le réseau auquel le transfert est effectué ne doive récupérer une nouvelle clé de cryptage avant le service de communication, chaque réseau (2, 4) pouvant avoir un algorithme de cryptage (40) et une clé de cryptage (50) indépendants. Dans un mode de réalisation, le message de transfert peut comporter une clé de cryptage pour le nouveau réseau. Dans un autre mode de réalisation, le cryptage a lieu avant et après mais pas pendant le processus de transfert. Ces processus présentent un avantage en ce qu'ils réduisent le délai de transfert, pouvant aussi potentiellement diminuer le nombre d'appels interrompus et améliorer ainsi la qualité du service.
PCT/EP2002/007274 2001-07-14 2002-07-01 Cles de cryptage pour differents reseaux de communication cellulaires WO2003009606A2 (fr)

Priority Applications (1)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
AU2002325858A AU2002325858A1 (en) 2001-07-14 2002-07-01 Ciphering keys for different cellular communication networks

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
GB0117248A GB2377589B (en) 2001-07-14 2001-07-14 Ciphering keys for different cellular communication networks
GB0117248.5 2001-07-14

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Publication Number Publication Date
WO2003009606A2 true WO2003009606A2 (fr) 2003-01-30
WO2003009606A3 WO2003009606A3 (fr) 2003-11-27

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GB (1) GB2377589B (fr)
WO (1) WO2003009606A2 (fr)

Cited By (2)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
WO2007019774A1 (fr) * 2005-08-19 2007-02-22 Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. Méthode de transfert inter-système
KR100816560B1 (ko) 2006-12-05 2008-03-25 한국정보보호진흥원 모바일 멀티캐스트 방송 보안을 위한 대리인증 방법

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GB0207129D0 (en) * 2002-03-26 2002-05-08 Nokia Corp Positioning-triggered handover
CN100388849C (zh) * 2003-12-18 2008-05-14 中国电子科技集团公司第三十研究所 数字蜂窝移动通信系统用户切换时密钥的管理分配传递方法
EP1562340A1 (fr) * 2004-02-05 2005-08-10 Siemens Aktiengesellschaft Méthode et dispositif pour établir une connexion sécurisée temporaire entre un noeud mobile et un noeud d'un réseau d'accès pendant un transfert de données
US20050176431A1 (en) * 2004-02-11 2005-08-11 Telefonaktiebolaget L M Ericsson (Publ) Method for handling key sets during handover
FI20050393A0 (fi) 2005-04-15 2005-04-15 Nokia Corp Avainmateriaalin vaihto
FI20070095A0 (fi) * 2007-02-02 2007-02-02 Nokia Corp Turva-avainten luominen langatonta viestintää varten
CN101304600B (zh) 2007-05-08 2011-12-07 华为技术有限公司 安全能力协商的方法及系统
US8578153B2 (en) * 2008-10-28 2013-11-05 Telefonaktiebolaget L M Ericsson (Publ) Method and arrangement for provisioning and managing a device

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Cited By (2)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
WO2007019774A1 (fr) * 2005-08-19 2007-02-22 Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. Méthode de transfert inter-système
KR100816560B1 (ko) 2006-12-05 2008-03-25 한국정보보호진흥원 모바일 멀티캐스트 방송 보안을 위한 대리인증 방법

Also Published As

Publication number Publication date
AU2002325858A1 (en) 2003-03-03
GB2377589B (en) 2005-06-01
GB2377589A (en) 2003-01-15
WO2003009606A3 (fr) 2003-11-27
GB0117248D0 (en) 2001-09-05

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