WO2002093868A1 - Procede pour produire des cles pour des cartes de signature - Google Patents

Procede pour produire des cles pour des cartes de signature Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2002093868A1
WO2002093868A1 PCT/EP2002/005174 EP0205174W WO02093868A1 WO 2002093868 A1 WO2002093868 A1 WO 2002093868A1 EP 0205174 W EP0205174 W EP 0205174W WO 02093868 A1 WO02093868 A1 WO 02093868A1
Authority
WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
key
signature
key generation
card
generation unit
Prior art date
Application number
PCT/EP2002/005174
Other languages
German (de)
English (en)
Inventor
Ralph Krysiak
Original Assignee
Giesecke & Devrient Gmbh
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Giesecke & Devrient Gmbh filed Critical Giesecke & Devrient Gmbh
Priority to EP02742989A priority Critical patent/EP1393526A1/fr
Publication of WO2002093868A1 publication Critical patent/WO2002093868A1/fr

Links

Classifications

    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/08Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
    • H04L63/0823Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities using certificates
    • GPHYSICS
    • G06COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06QINFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/02Payment architectures, schemes or protocols involving a neutral party, e.g. certification authority, notary or trusted third party [TTP]
    • GPHYSICS
    • G06COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06QINFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/30Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks
    • G06Q20/34Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks using cards, e.g. integrated circuit [IC] cards or magnetic cards
    • G06Q20/341Active cards, i.e. cards including their own processing means, e.g. including an IC or chip
    • GPHYSICS
    • G06COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06QINFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/38Payment protocols; Details thereof
    • G06Q20/382Payment protocols; Details thereof insuring higher security of transaction
    • G06Q20/3825Use of electronic signatures
    • GPHYSICS
    • G06COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06QINFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/38Payment protocols; Details thereof
    • G06Q20/382Payment protocols; Details thereof insuring higher security of transaction
    • G06Q20/3829Payment protocols; Details thereof insuring higher security of transaction involving key management
    • GPHYSICS
    • G07CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07FCOIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
    • G07F7/00Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus
    • G07F7/08Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means
    • G07F7/0806Details of the card
    • G07F7/0813Specific details related to card security
    • G07F7/082Features insuring the integrity of the data on or in the card
    • GPHYSICS
    • G07CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07FCOIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
    • G07F7/00Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus
    • G07F7/08Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means
    • G07F7/10Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means together with a coded signal, e.g. in the form of personal identification information, like personal identification number [PIN] or biometric data
    • G07F7/1008Active credit-cards provided with means to personalise their use, e.g. with PIN-introduction/comparison system
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/12Applying verification of the received information
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3247Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L2463/00Additional details relating to network architectures or network communication protocols for network security covered by H04L63/00
    • H04L2463/062Additional details relating to network architectures or network communication protocols for network security covered by H04L63/00 applying encryption of the keys

Definitions

  • the invention relates to a method for generating keys for signature cards according to the preamble of claim 1.
  • the signature card has, among other things, the task of storing the secret signature key.
  • This secret signature key must be generated in a secure environment, the key being generated either in the card itself or outside the card.
  • card personalizers for larger quantities of cards, personalization is carried out by card personalizers (example: ec cards, credit cards). Analog transfer of the external key generation to card personalizers is not easily possible due to the high security requirements for signature cards. For this reason, in the case of known concepts, the keys are generated in a high-security environment in a trust center. keys stored in a file and safely brought to the personalizer. This method is also very complex, so that there is no sensible use for the generation of signature keys.
  • On-card key generation is simpler, with the key never leaving the signature card, which means that there are no special requirements for the security of the personalization environment. Due to the limited computing speeds that are available in a chip card, i.e. However, the ⁇ C of a chip card is very long, so that this process is also unsuitable for the use of large quantities of cards to be personalized.
  • the key generation unit Before or after the generation of the secret key, a session key can be agreed between the key generation unit and the signature card for the later data exchange. Finally, the key for the signature card generated in the key generation unit is transmitted using the session key. Contrary to the prior art, in which the key generation is carried out in a security box and the encrypted key is personalized in the signature card, the personalization taking place in the immediate vicinity of the security box, it is not necessary in a method according to the invention that the key generation units are arranged in a trust center in which the personalization is also carried out.
  • the agreement of the session key is advantageously carried out together with an authentication of the key generation unit with respect to the signature card. In this way it can be achieved that the signature card can first check whether the key is actually received by the key generation unit.
  • the transmitted secret key can be signed by the key generation unit, so that the authenticity of the key can be determined in the signature card, which also results in an increase in security.
  • the key generated is transmitted via an online data line.
  • the online data line is preferred, i.e. the transmission path is secured. It is preferably secured by encryption.
  • the personalization device with which the secret key is inserted into the signature card generally has a higher throughput than the key generation units, which is partly due to the higher re processing speed of the personalization device is reached, but on the other hand also in that several cards are processed in parallel in the personalization device, it has proven to be advantageous that several key generation units are operated in parallel.
  • the coordination between the key generation units and the personalization device is managed by a control computer.
  • a personalization device 1 which can personalize several cards 11 sequentially or in parallel.
  • the personalization device 1 is connected via a bidirectional data line, which is preferably secured, to a control computer 3, which in turn is connected to a key generation device 2 via a bidirectional data line.
  • the control computer can optionally also be part of the key generation device.
  • the key generation device contains at least one key generation unit 21, in which the secret key for the signature card or for the signature cards to be processed are generated.
  • the key generation device 2 or the key generation units 21 themselves can each be implemented by a signature card.
  • the number of key generation units 21 depends on the number of cards to be processed simultaneously or sequentially by the personalization device within a time unit. However, the higher the number of key generation units 21, the smaller the influence of the statistical variation of individual key generation times. In particular when using signature cards as key generation This is important because the generation time for a key with a signature card is in the range from 10 to 40 seconds with 1024-bit encryption and from 100 to 400 seconds with 2048-bit encryption.

Landscapes

  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Business, Economics & Management (AREA)
  • General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Accounting & Taxation (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Strategic Management (AREA)
  • General Business, Economics & Management (AREA)
  • Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
  • Computing Systems (AREA)
  • General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Finance (AREA)
  • Microelectronics & Electronic Packaging (AREA)
  • Storage Device Security (AREA)

Abstract

La présente invention concerne un procédé pour produire une clé de signature pour une carte de signature. Selon ce procédé, une clé secrète est d'abord produite dans une unité de production de clés, une clé de session est produite par cette unité de production de clés et par la carte de signature, puis la clé secrète produite est transmise de manière codée sur la carte de signature.
PCT/EP2002/005174 2001-05-14 2002-05-10 Procede pour produire des cles pour des cartes de signature WO2002093868A1 (fr)

Priority Applications (1)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
EP02742989A EP1393526A1 (fr) 2001-05-14 2002-05-10 Procede pour produire des cles pour des cartes de signature

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
DE10123664.6 2001-05-14
DE2001123664 DE10123664A1 (de) 2001-05-15 2001-05-15 Verfahren zur Schlüsselgenerierung für Signaturkarten

Publications (1)

Publication Number Publication Date
WO2002093868A1 true WO2002093868A1 (fr) 2002-11-21

Family

ID=7684896

Family Applications (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
PCT/EP2002/005174 WO2002093868A1 (fr) 2001-05-14 2002-05-10 Procede pour produire des cles pour des cartes de signature

Country Status (3)

Country Link
EP (1) EP1393526A1 (fr)
DE (1) DE10123664A1 (fr)
WO (1) WO2002093868A1 (fr)

Cited By (1)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
EP2706736A1 (fr) * 2007-11-27 2014-03-12 Giesecke & Devrient GmbH Système d'inscription sur un support de données portable

Families Citing this family (2)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
DE102004058020A1 (de) 2004-12-01 2006-06-08 Siemens Ag Verfahren zur Personalisierung von Chipkarten
EP1755092A1 (fr) * 2005-08-01 2007-02-21 Axalto SA Machine de fabrication et procédé pour programmer des appareils portables

Citations (4)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US5534857A (en) * 1991-11-12 1996-07-09 Security Domain Pty. Ltd. Method and system for secure, decentralized personalization of smart cards
DE19720431A1 (de) * 1997-05-15 1998-11-19 Beta Research Ges Fuer Entwick Vorrichtung und Verfahren zur Personalisierung von Chipkarten
WO1999019846A2 (fr) * 1997-10-14 1999-04-22 Visa International Service Association Personnalisation de cartes a puce
US6014748A (en) * 1996-04-15 2000-01-11 Ubiq Incorporated System and apparatus for smart card personalization

Family Cites Families (4)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
SE468068C (sv) * 1991-09-30 1994-01-13 Comvik Gsm Ab Förfarande för personifiering av ett aktivt kort, för användning i ett mobiltelefonsystem
EP0723251A3 (fr) * 1995-01-20 1998-12-30 Tandem Computers Incorporated Procédé et appareil pour un utilisateur et dispositif de sécurité d'authentification
FR2786292B1 (fr) * 1998-11-24 2000-12-29 St Microelectronics Sa Systeme de test et de personnalisation de circuits integres
DE19947986A1 (de) * 1999-10-05 2001-04-12 Ibm System und Verfahren zum Herunterladen von Anwendungsteilen auf eine Chipkarte

Patent Citations (4)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US5534857A (en) * 1991-11-12 1996-07-09 Security Domain Pty. Ltd. Method and system for secure, decentralized personalization of smart cards
US6014748A (en) * 1996-04-15 2000-01-11 Ubiq Incorporated System and apparatus for smart card personalization
DE19720431A1 (de) * 1997-05-15 1998-11-19 Beta Research Ges Fuer Entwick Vorrichtung und Verfahren zur Personalisierung von Chipkarten
WO1999019846A2 (fr) * 1997-10-14 1999-04-22 Visa International Service Association Personnalisation de cartes a puce

Non-Patent Citations (1)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Title
See also references of EP1393526A1 *

Cited By (1)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
EP2706736A1 (fr) * 2007-11-27 2014-03-12 Giesecke & Devrient GmbH Système d'inscription sur un support de données portable

Also Published As

Publication number Publication date
DE10123664A1 (de) 2002-11-21
EP1393526A1 (fr) 2004-03-03

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