WO2002082388A1 - Dispositif securise d'echange de donnees - Google Patents
Dispositif securise d'echange de donnees Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- WO2002082388A1 WO2002082388A1 PCT/FR2002/001078 FR0201078W WO02082388A1 WO 2002082388 A1 WO2002082388 A1 WO 2002082388A1 FR 0201078 W FR0201078 W FR 0201078W WO 02082388 A1 WO02082388 A1 WO 02082388A1
- Authority
- WO
- WIPO (PCT)
- Prior art keywords
- data
- secure
- terminal
- network server
- validated
- Prior art date
Links
Classifications
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
- G06Q20/30—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks
- G06Q20/32—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks using wireless devices
- G06Q20/327—Short range or proximity payments by means of M-devices
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
- G06Q20/04—Payment circuits
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
- G06Q20/30—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks
- G06Q20/32—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks using wireless devices
- G06Q20/322—Aspects of commerce using mobile devices [M-devices]
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
- G06Q20/30—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks
- G06Q20/34—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks using cards, e.g. integrated circuit [IC] cards or magnetic cards
- G06Q20/341—Active cards, i.e. cards including their own processing means, e.g. including an IC or chip
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
- G07F7/00—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus
- G07F7/08—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means
- G07F7/0873—Details of the card reader
- G07F7/088—Details of the card reader the card reader being part of the point of sale [POS] terminal or electronic cash register [ECR] itself
- G07F7/0886—Details of the card reader the card reader being part of the point of sale [POS] terminal or electronic cash register [ECR] itself the card reader being portable for interacting with a POS or ECR in realizing a payment transaction
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
- G07F7/00—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus
- G07F7/08—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means
- G07F7/10—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means together with a coded signal, e.g. in the form of personal identification information, like personal identification number [PIN] or biometric data
- G07F7/1008—Active credit-cards provided with means to personalise their use, e.g. with PIN-introduction/comparison system
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
- G07F7/00—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus
- G07F7/08—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means
- G07F7/10—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means together with a coded signal, e.g. in the form of personal identification information, like personal identification number [PIN] or biometric data
- G07F7/1016—Devices or methods for securing the PIN and other transaction-data, e.g. by encryption
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04M—TELEPHONIC COMMUNICATION
- H04M1/00—Substation equipment, e.g. for use by subscribers
- H04M1/66—Substation equipment, e.g. for use by subscribers with means for preventing unauthorised or fraudulent calling
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04M—TELEPHONIC COMMUNICATION
- H04M1/00—Substation equipment, e.g. for use by subscribers
- H04M1/72—Mobile telephones; Cordless telephones, i.e. devices for establishing wireless links to base stations without route selection
- H04M1/724—User interfaces specially adapted for cordless or mobile telephones
- H04M1/72403—User interfaces specially adapted for cordless or mobile telephones with means for local support of applications that increase the functionality
- H04M1/72409—User interfaces specially adapted for cordless or mobile telephones with means for local support of applications that increase the functionality by interfacing with external accessories
- H04M1/72412—User interfaces specially adapted for cordless or mobile telephones with means for local support of applications that increase the functionality by interfacing with external accessories using two-way short-range wireless interfaces
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04M—TELEPHONIC COMMUNICATION
- H04M2250/00—Details of telephonic subscriber devices
- H04M2250/02—Details of telephonic subscriber devices including a Bluetooth interface
Definitions
- the present invention is in the field of data exchange between an information provider and a user.
- the invention provides a secure device for processing such data exchanges.
- the invention is particularly suitable for transactions between a network (purchasing) server and a client terminal.
- the invention therefore relates to a secure device and the implementation of such a device.
- the invention also relates to a secure system comprising a purchase server, a customer telecommunications terminal and a secure terminal, as well as a secure data exchange method.
- a client receives data from a network server concerning a potential transaction and the client accepts or not to validate the transaction based on this data.
- the devices or terminals used for these remote exchanges can be personal computers (possibly portable), mobile equipment (cellular or portable telephones), Personal Digital Assistants (PDA), interactive digital televisions, payment devices at a merchant , or others.
- These terminals are generally not secure, i.e. they can be modified for fraudulent purposes, for example by downloading software such as viruses, or be physically modified in order to recover confidential information (for example a PIN or data stored in the terminal) or for the purpose of transmitting false information.
- Another objective of the invention is to guarantee that the customer's return message (his validation) will not be modified.
- Another objective of the invention is to guarantee the network server the identity of the client and therefore to avoid the repudiation of an order.
- the invention proposes the use of an additional terminal particularly suitable for operations requiring to be secured and subsequently designated as a portable and personal secure terminal (TSPP).
- TSPP portable and personal secure terminal
- This terminal is essentially composed of a specific keyboard, a screen and a security component making it possible to store secret data in a secure manner; the whole constituting a homogeneous secure module.
- the invention relates to a portable secure remote communication terminal comprising at least one screen, a keyboard, a data processing and peripheral management unit and a communication interface with other terminals, mainly characterized in that it further includes a security component comprising an authentication code and means for verifying said code, and in that the secure component is capable of generating an electronic signature associated with data exchanged with the other terminals.
- the security component is a smart card with microprocessor.
- the security component is a software module integrated into a memory of the processing unit, or a processor or an electronic module integrated into the processing unit.
- the communication interface comprises a radio link or a wired link.
- the portable communication terminal according to the invention communicates with another fixed or mobile terminal.
- the invention also relates to a remote data exchange system between a network server and a client terminal, characterized in that said system comprises a secure portable terminal capable of generating an electronic signature associated with the data exchanged between the network server and the client terminal.
- the invention further relates to a method for secure remote data exchange between a network server and a client terminal, characterized in that it comprises the following steps: request for validation of data transmitted by the network server at the client terminal; transmission of data to be validated by the client terminal to a secure terminal; validation of said data by said secure terminal and generation of an electronic signature associated with the validated data; transmission of validated data and the associated signature to the network server;
- the method further comprises a step of verifying the electronic signature associated with the data validated by the network server.
- the secure terminal has a function of authenticating the remote server according to a principle known to those skilled in the art.
- FIG. 1 schematically illustrates the TSPP according to the associated invention to another terminal.
- FIG. 2 is a diagram of the data exchanges between the TSPP according to the invention and the other terminals and servers.
- the invention relates to a secure portable and personal terminal, called TSPP, comprising a keyboard. specific, a screen and a security component making it possible to store secret data in a secure manner; the whole constituting a homogeneous secure and trusted module.
- the security component can be a microprocessor smart card (a SIM, USIM, UIM card equipped with a cryptographic module, etc.), a secure processor, a secure software module or a secure electronic module for example.
- the TSPP is therefore secured against attempts at physical intrusion, by the use of known means such as, for example, anti-intrusion switches, electric anti-intrusion grids, plastic molds around electronic components, or the like.
- the TSPP is also secure against attacks by software because it is impossible to download new software applications to it.
- the TSPP contains a means of generating an electronic signature and is capable of transmitting a return message containing this signature.
- the user is sure of the data he has received and validated and sure that his validation order will be received correctly and in full by the network server.
- the network server is sure of the data that has been accepted and sure of the identity of the user.
- the TSPP is intended to be connected to another non-secure terminal by various means such as a wired connection, an infrared connection, a radio connection (Bluetooth), PCMCIA port, USB bus, or other.
- TSPP can have many types of forms.
- the TSPP 10 is connected to a client terminal
- the TSPP 10 comprises a secure keyboard 12, a secure screen 14 and a reader 11 associated with a security component 18 (a smart card in the example considered) capable of generating a signature (for example with the RSA-1024 algorithm) and a hashing algorithm (for example SHA-1) at the request of the user.
- the TSPP 10 also includes a data processing unit comprising at least one memory (ROM type) and a processor, as well as a peripheral management interface (screen, keyboard, smart card, etc.) and a data interface. communication with the outside (wired connection, bluetooth or other).
- the TSPP 10 can exchange data to be validated D with the cellular telephone 20 via its communication interface according to a specific protocol which is more or less complex and depends on the type of connection used.
- An example of implementation may relate to the transmission of a stock purchase order in a secure manner, that is to say by providing the functions of non-repudiation, integrity and authentication of the client.
- the user wishes to make a purchase of shares from his cell phone 20 equipped with a WIM (Wireless Identity Module) card. It connects to an online shopping server via the network according to the WAP protocol for example, and transmits its order (in a non-secure manner).
- the purchasing server on the network will request confirmation of the order by transmitting essential data to validate D which will be displayed on the screen of the cellular telephone 20.
- the order or the data to be validated D are then transmitted to the TSPP 10 according to the invention according to a simple communication protocol of the TLV (Tag Length Value) or SMS (Short Message Services) type for example.
- the order and / or the data D to be validated are thus displayed on the screen 14 of the TSPP 10 and the user can confirm them as validated data D 'by an action on the keyboard 12 of said reader 11.
- the user identifies himself, for example by entering his authentication code or PIN (Personal Identification Number) code using the secure keyboard 12.
- the security component 18 (the card) will then generate an electronic signature S associated with the validated data D 'by the user, the electronic signature S is generated using cryptographic keys according to encryption methods known per se.
- the validated data D 'associated with a digital signature S are then transmitted to the cell phone 20 to be sent back to the online shopping server 30 which will possibly verify the signature electronics S associated with validated data D '.
- the purchasing server on the network has the cryptographic key making it possible to recognize the signature S associated with the validated data D '.
- the user may have the possibility of modifying the data or the order to be validated D before validation D '.
- the online shopping server is then capable of verifying these modified data D 'as soon as they are associated with a valid electronic signature S.
- Figure 2 illustrates the exchange of information between the TSPP 10, the client terminal 20 (his cell phone in the present example) and the network server 30.
- the user initiates an order
- the message 0 is therefore transmitted according to a conventional, non-secure protocol (HTTP or WAP depending on the transaction terminal 20 used).
- HTTP HyperText Transfer Protocol
- WAP Wired Equivalent Privacy
- the network server 30 will request confirmation of this order by a message 1 in which it can request the validation of certain data D (the price and the quantity for example).
- This message 1 is transmitted by the network according to the same protocol as message 0.
- the network server 30 directly makes an offer to a user (a purchase offer for example) and will directly propose data D to be validated by the user.
- data exchanges between the terminal client 20 and the network server 30 start directly with the message 1 of a request for validation of data D by the server 30 to the user.
- the transaction terminal 20 will receive the data to be validated D. Not being secure, it will transmit said data D to a secure terminal, the TSPP 10 according to the invention, in a message 2 comprising a request for validation of the data D
- This message 2 is transmitted according to any known protocol depending on the type of connection between the TSPP 10 and the transaction terminal 20. The message 2 is not secure.
- the TSPP terminal 10 will then display the data D on its secure screen 14.
- the user will validate this data D by asking the TSPP to generate an electronic signature S associated with the validated data D '. For this, the user produces an action on the secure keyboard 12 and enters his authentication code (PIN) on said secure keyboard 12.
- the processing unit of the TSPP will then produce the signature S and the communication interface can retransmit validated data D 'in a secure mode to the processing terminal 20 in a message 3 transmitted according to the same protocol as the message 2.
- the processing terminal 20 then sends the validated data D' and the signature S, in a message 4, and the network server 30 executes the order.
- the network server 30 can systematically authenticate the validated data D 'using the associated electronic signature S in a step 5 or this authentication is only carried out in the event of a dispute to verify the validity of data confirmed by the user.
- Scenario (1) let X be the amount of a purchase order sent by an online shopping server 30 to cell phone 20.
- Cell 20 contains a virus
- the cellular telephone 20 transmits the data to be validated to the TSPP 10 (in this case the price X transformed into Y).
- the TSPP 10 will then display the price Y on the screen 14 while the screen of the cell phone 20 displays the price X. The user will immediately realize that the two prices are different and will cancel the transaction.
- Scenario (2) either D of the data displayed on the TSPP 10 that the user validates in data D 'and transmits to the terminal 20 with an associated signature S.
- the cell phone 20 contains a virus which will modify the data already validated D 'into data D' '.
- the server 30 checks the correlation between the electronic signature S and the data received D '' and will detect an anomaly and cancel the transaction.
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- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Business, Economics & Management (AREA)
- General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
- Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
- Accounting & Taxation (AREA)
- Strategic Management (AREA)
- General Business, Economics & Management (AREA)
- Signal Processing (AREA)
- Microelectronics & Electronic Packaging (AREA)
- Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
- Human Computer Interaction (AREA)
- Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)
Abstract
Description
Claims
Applications Claiming Priority (2)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
FR01/04749 | 2001-04-06 | ||
FR0104749A FR2823400B1 (fr) | 2001-04-06 | 2001-04-06 | Dispositif securise d'echange de donnees |
Publications (1)
Publication Number | Publication Date |
---|---|
WO2002082388A1 true WO2002082388A1 (fr) | 2002-10-17 |
Family
ID=8862064
Family Applications (1)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
---|---|---|---|
PCT/FR2002/001078 WO2002082388A1 (fr) | 2001-04-06 | 2002-03-28 | Dispositif securise d'echange de donnees |
Country Status (2)
Country | Link |
---|---|
FR (1) | FR2823400B1 (fr) |
WO (1) | WO2002082388A1 (fr) |
Cited By (28)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
US10621590B2 (en) | 2017-02-22 | 2020-04-14 | Square, Inc. | Line-based chip card tamper detection |
US10635820B1 (en) | 2017-09-29 | 2020-04-28 | Square, Inc. | Update policy-based anti-rollback techniques |
US10643200B2 (en) | 2010-10-13 | 2020-05-05 | Square, Inc. | Point of sale system |
US10684848B1 (en) | 2016-03-30 | 2020-06-16 | Square, Inc. | Blocking and non-blocking firmware update |
US10733588B1 (en) | 2014-06-11 | 2020-08-04 | Square, Inc. | User interface presentation on system with multiple terminals |
US10733589B2 (en) | 2017-04-28 | 2020-08-04 | Square, Inc. | Point of sale device power management and under voltage protection |
US10753982B2 (en) | 2014-12-09 | 2020-08-25 | Square, Inc. | Monitoring battery health of a battery used in a device |
US10762196B2 (en) | 2018-12-21 | 2020-09-01 | Square, Inc. | Point of sale (POS) systems and methods with dynamic kernel selection |
US10810570B1 (en) | 2019-09-30 | 2020-10-20 | Square, Inc. | Point of sale device with cradle for mobile computing device |
US10817869B2 (en) | 2016-06-29 | 2020-10-27 | Square, Inc. | Preliminary enablement of transaction processing circuitry |
US10937019B2 (en) | 2016-06-08 | 2021-03-02 | Square, Inc. | Wireless communication system with auxiliary antenna |
US10949189B2 (en) | 2017-06-28 | 2021-03-16 | Square, Inc. | Securely updating software on connected electronic devices |
US10970698B1 (en) | 2017-12-08 | 2021-04-06 | Square, Inc. | Reader detection signal bypassing secure processor |
US10970708B2 (en) | 2016-12-31 | 2021-04-06 | Square, Inc. | Predictive data object acquisition and processing |
US10990969B2 (en) | 2018-12-21 | 2021-04-27 | Square, Inc. | Point of sale (POS) systems and methods for dynamically processing payment data based on payment reader capability |
US11010765B2 (en) | 2016-06-29 | 2021-05-18 | Square, Inc. | Preliminary acquisition of payment information |
US11049095B2 (en) | 2018-12-21 | 2021-06-29 | Square, Inc. | Point of sale (POS) systems and methods with dynamic kernel selection |
US11080675B1 (en) | 2015-09-08 | 2021-08-03 | Square, Inc. | Point-of-sale system having a secure touch mode |
US11080674B1 (en) | 2014-09-19 | 2021-08-03 | Square, Inc. | Point of sale system |
US11087315B2 (en) | 2015-09-24 | 2021-08-10 | Square, Inc. | Server-assisted pairing for wireless communications |
US11087301B1 (en) | 2017-12-19 | 2021-08-10 | Square, Inc. | Tamper resistant device |
US11100298B1 (en) | 2017-12-08 | 2021-08-24 | Square, Inc. | Transaction object reader with analog and digital signal interface |
US11257058B1 (en) | 2017-10-30 | 2022-02-22 | Square, Inc. | Sharing output device between unsecured processor and secured processor |
US11328134B1 (en) | 2014-06-23 | 2022-05-10 | Block, Inc. | Displaceable reader circuitry |
US11481750B2 (en) | 2015-06-30 | 2022-10-25 | Block, Inc. | Pairing a payment object reader with a point-of-sale terminal |
US11665817B2 (en) | 2019-09-30 | 2023-05-30 | Block, Inc. | Tamper detection based on flexible member connecting circuitry elements |
US11663368B2 (en) | 2019-09-30 | 2023-05-30 | Block, Inc. | Tamper detection based on removal of fastener from recess |
US11871237B1 (en) | 2016-06-30 | 2024-01-09 | Block, Inc. | Pairing a payment object reader with a point-of-sale terminal |
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EP0625839A1 (fr) * | 1993-05-21 | 1994-11-23 | AT&T Corp. | Adjonction téléphonique de carte à circuit intégré |
WO1995020195A1 (fr) * | 1994-01-25 | 1995-07-27 | Dynamic Data Systems Pty. Ltd. | Dispositif de transaction de fonds |
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EP0940783A2 (fr) * | 1998-03-05 | 1999-09-08 | Keycorp Limited | Terminal mobile pour paiement électronique |
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WO2001003086A1 (fr) * | 1999-06-30 | 2001-01-11 | Ncr International, Inc. | Terminal portable |
-
2001
- 2001-04-06 FR FR0104749A patent/FR2823400B1/fr not_active Expired - Fee Related
-
2002
- 2002-03-28 WO PCT/FR2002/001078 patent/WO2002082388A1/fr not_active Application Discontinuation
Patent Citations (6)
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EP0625839A1 (fr) * | 1993-05-21 | 1994-11-23 | AT&T Corp. | Adjonction téléphonique de carte à circuit intégré |
WO1995020195A1 (fr) * | 1994-01-25 | 1995-07-27 | Dynamic Data Systems Pty. Ltd. | Dispositif de transaction de fonds |
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EP0940783A2 (fr) * | 1998-03-05 | 1999-09-08 | Keycorp Limited | Terminal mobile pour paiement électronique |
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Cited By (43)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
US10643200B2 (en) | 2010-10-13 | 2020-05-05 | Square, Inc. | Point of sale system |
US10733588B1 (en) | 2014-06-11 | 2020-08-04 | Square, Inc. | User interface presentation on system with multiple terminals |
US11328134B1 (en) | 2014-06-23 | 2022-05-10 | Block, Inc. | Displaceable reader circuitry |
US11836566B2 (en) | 2014-09-19 | 2023-12-05 | Block, Inc | Point of sale system |
US11537803B2 (en) | 2014-09-19 | 2022-12-27 | Block, Inc. | Point of sale system |
US11954549B2 (en) | 2014-09-19 | 2024-04-09 | Block, Inc. | Point of sale system |
US11966805B2 (en) | 2014-09-19 | 2024-04-23 | Block, Inc. | Point of sale system |
US11080674B1 (en) | 2014-09-19 | 2021-08-03 | Square, Inc. | Point of sale system |
US10753982B2 (en) | 2014-12-09 | 2020-08-25 | Square, Inc. | Monitoring battery health of a battery used in a device |
US11481750B2 (en) | 2015-06-30 | 2022-10-25 | Block, Inc. | Pairing a payment object reader with a point-of-sale terminal |
US11080675B1 (en) | 2015-09-08 | 2021-08-03 | Square, Inc. | Point-of-sale system having a secure touch mode |
US11087315B2 (en) | 2015-09-24 | 2021-08-10 | Square, Inc. | Server-assisted pairing for wireless communications |
US10684848B1 (en) | 2016-03-30 | 2020-06-16 | Square, Inc. | Blocking and non-blocking firmware update |
US11748739B2 (en) | 2016-06-08 | 2023-09-05 | Block, Inc. | Wireless communication system with auxiliary antenna |
US10937019B2 (en) | 2016-06-08 | 2021-03-02 | Square, Inc. | Wireless communication system with auxiliary antenna |
US11010765B2 (en) | 2016-06-29 | 2021-05-18 | Square, Inc. | Preliminary acquisition of payment information |
US10817869B2 (en) | 2016-06-29 | 2020-10-27 | Square, Inc. | Preliminary enablement of transaction processing circuitry |
US11871237B1 (en) | 2016-06-30 | 2024-01-09 | Block, Inc. | Pairing a payment object reader with a point-of-sale terminal |
US10970708B2 (en) | 2016-12-31 | 2021-04-06 | Square, Inc. | Predictive data object acquisition and processing |
US11669842B2 (en) | 2017-02-22 | 2023-06-06 | Block, Inc. | Transaction chip incorporating a contact interface |
US10621590B2 (en) | 2017-02-22 | 2020-04-14 | Square, Inc. | Line-based chip card tamper detection |
US11113698B2 (en) | 2017-02-22 | 2021-09-07 | Square, Inc. | Line-based chip card tamper detection |
US10733589B2 (en) | 2017-04-28 | 2020-08-04 | Square, Inc. | Point of sale device power management and under voltage protection |
US11899515B2 (en) | 2017-04-28 | 2024-02-13 | Block, Inc. | Point of sale device power management and undervoltage protection |
US11561593B2 (en) | 2017-04-28 | 2023-01-24 | Block, Inc. | Point of sale device power management and undervoltage protection |
US11762646B2 (en) | 2017-06-28 | 2023-09-19 | Block, Inc. | Securely updating software on connected electronic devices |
US10949189B2 (en) | 2017-06-28 | 2021-03-16 | Square, Inc. | Securely updating software on connected electronic devices |
US10635820B1 (en) | 2017-09-29 | 2020-04-28 | Square, Inc. | Update policy-based anti-rollback techniques |
US11983688B2 (en) | 2017-10-30 | 2024-05-14 | Block, Inc. | Controlling access to output device between two processors |
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Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
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FR2823400B1 (fr) | 2005-01-21 |
FR2823400A1 (fr) | 2002-10-11 |
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