New! View global litigation for patent families

WO2002071192A2 - Remote computer forensic evidence collection system and process - Google Patents

Remote computer forensic evidence collection system and process

Info

Publication number
WO2002071192A2
WO2002071192A2 PCT/US2002/006622 US0206622W WO2002071192A2 WO 2002071192 A2 WO2002071192 A2 WO 2002071192A2 US 0206622 W US0206622 W US 0206622W WO 2002071192 A2 WO2002071192 A2 WO 2002071192A2
Authority
WO
Grant status
Application
Patent type
Prior art keywords
machine
victim
server
disk
evidence
Prior art date
Application number
PCT/US2002/006622
Other languages
French (fr)
Other versions
WO2002071192A3 (en )
Inventor
La Garza Joel De
Original Assignee
Securify, Inc.
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date

Links

Classifications

    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/14Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for detecting or protecting against malicious traffic
    • H04L63/1433Vulnerability analysis
    • GPHYSICS
    • G06COMPUTING; CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06QDATA PROCESSING SYSTEMS OR METHODS, SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL, SUPERVISORY OR FORECASTING PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL, SUPERVISORY OR FORECASTING PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q10/00Administration; Management
    • G06Q10/10Office automation, e.g. computer aided management of electronic mail or groupware; Time management, e.g. calendars, reminders, meetings or time accounting
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L41/00Arrangements for maintenance or administration or management of packet switching networks
    • H04L41/08Configuration management of network or network elements
    • H04L41/0893Assignment of logical groupings to network elements; Policy based network management or configuration
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/02Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for separating internal from external traffic, e.g. firewalls
    • H04L63/0227Filtering policies
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/04Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
    • H04L63/0428Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/08Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting authentication of entities communicating through a packet data network
    • H04L63/083Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting authentication of entities communicating through a packet data network using passwords
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/10Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for controlling access to network resources
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/12Applying verification of the received information
    • H04L63/123Applying verification of the received information received data contents, e.g. message integrity
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/14Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for detecting or protecting against malicious traffic
    • H04L63/1408Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for detecting or protecting against malicious traffic by monitoring network traffic
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/30Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting lawful interception, monitoring or retaining of communications or communication related information
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L69/00Application independent communication protocol aspects or techniques in packet data networks
    • H04L69/22Header parsing or analysis

Abstract

The incident response team enters relevant data into a CGI template, i.e. a script. The script then generates an appropriate kernel image for the client machine (10) along with a client folder on the evidence aggregation server. This is where the data is stored, the data about the victim machine. A partition on the evidence aggregation server is also created. The client is also provided orally with a one-time password. The client then connects to the signing authority web site with the one-time password and downloades the kernel boot image onto a storage medium, such as a floppy disk. The disk image is encrypted using an encryption application such as open PGP, and the encrypted image is sent to the client (12). The client inserts the floppy disk that contains the bootable image into the victim machine, and reboots the machine from the floppy disk (14). Data are retrieved from the victim machine, streamed to the evidence aggregation server (18) via an SSL connection, stored at the evidence aggregation server (18) to a hard drive of the victim machine, and processed (16). A message digest is written across the secure connection to a disk on the secure server (24). Hashes are sent to trusted party via the ssl (26 and 28) and compared to the original hash from the compromised machine. Timestamps are also taken and written to the disk on the secure server (18). The disk on the secure server (18) is removed and a chain of custody is created (22). The evidence is stored in a secure location (20).

Description

Remote Computer Forensic Evidence Collection

System and Process

BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION

TECHNICAL FIELD

The invention relates to computer security. More particularly, the invention relates to a remote computer forensic evidence collection system and process.

DESCRIPTION OF THE PRIOR ART

Incident response as a business has one key barrier to entry. For a security incident to be investigated thoroughly, and to have the evidence collected in such a manner that it can be admissible in court, incident response professionals are forced to visit the scene of the incident so that they can perform a collection of data. The data are rarely processed on site however. The data are usually stored on a disk and transported, by the incident response professional, back to a clean environment where it can be examined and documented.

It would be desirable to provide a remote computer forensic evidence collection system that would allow incident response professionals to collect client data remotely while adhering to strict evidentiary standards by automatically verifying the content received with the data from the victim machine.

Unfortunately, it is not currently known to provide such approach to forensic evidence collection because the size of the files in which the data of interest are contained is on the order of 20+ gigabytes. Until recently, the bandwidth to move 20+ gigabytes of data did not exist.

More importantly, no one has thought about solving this problem because most incident response teams are in-house and do not have a need to travel to a client site. Thus, incident Reponses and forensic evidence collection is currently an immature market, i.e. computer security as a market is still in it's infancy, incident response as a part of that market is even less mature.

SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION

A remote computer forensic evidence collection system is provided that allows incident response professionals to collect client data remotely while adhering to strict evidentiary standards by automatically verifying the content received with the data from the victim machine. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

Fig. 1 is a flow diagram of a remote computer forensic collection system and process according to the invention.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE INVENTION

The invention provides a remote computer forensic evidence collection system that allows incident response professionals to collect client data remotely while adhering to strict evidentiary standards by automatically verifying the content received with the data from the victim machine.

Fig. 1 is a flow diagram of a remote computer forensic collection system and process according to the invention.

System Components

The system comprises a secure server containing the forensic evidence aggregator 18, an image generation system, and a bootable image containing the forensic evidence collection suite 14.

The image generation system is preferably a set of scripts that gather the following information from the victim machine:

Network configuration; ■ System architecture, e.g.x86, ALPHA, SPARC, PPC; and

■ Media device configuration, e.g. how many hard drives.

The scripts are preferably CGI (common gateway interface) scripts. CGI is a standard for running external programs from a World-Wide Web HTTP server. CGI specifies how to pass arguments to the executing program as part of the HTTP request. It also defines a set of environment variables. Commonly, the program generates some HTML which is passed back to a browser, but it can also request URL redirection. CGI allows the returned HTML (or other document type) to depend in any arbitrary way on the request. The CGI program can, for example, access information in a database and format the results as HTML. A CGI program can be any program which can accept command line arguments. Perl is a common choice for writing CGI scripts. Some HTTP servers require CGI programs to reside in a special directory, often "/cgi-bin" but other servers provide ways to distinguish CGI programs so they can be kept in the same directories as the HTML files to which they are related. Whenever the server receives a CGI execution request it creates a new process to run the external program. If the process fails to terminate for some reason, or if requests are received faster than the server can respond to them, the server may become swamped with processes.

In the invention, the CGI scripts take the information concerning the victim machine and generate a bootable image from the appropriate machine kernel.

The scripts also generate a one-use certificate for authentication and authorization that allows a single connection to the evidence aggregation server.

The forensic evidence aggregator is a custom implementation of an SSL server that restricts connections based upon verification of a certificate by a trusted third party authority, such as Verisign and the system also uses the tcp handshake for authentication (Tcp handshake=syn-ack-syn). Only 1 IP address is allowed to connect at a time. This is commonly referred to as wrapping a service. The forensic evidence aggregator provides multiple disk support, such that each host has it's own physical disk that is stored separately, where each such disk has it's own chain of custody.

Process Overview

In operation, an incident response team is contacted by a client that suspects a security incident has occurred.

The client provides the following information to the incident response team:

System architecture for the victim machine/s;

Network configuration of the victim machine/s, as well as access control devices on the network, e.g. firewall configurations; and

Why an incident is suspected. The incident response team enters relevant data into a CGI template, i.e. a script as discussed above. The script then generates an appropriate kernel image for the client machine 10 along with a client folder on the Evidence aggregation server. This is where the data are stored, where the data are information about the victim machine. A partition on the evidence aggregation server is also created. The client is also provided orally with a one-time password.

The client then connects to the signing authority Web site with the one-time password and downloads the kernel boot image onto a storage medium, such as a floppy disk. The disk image is encrypted using an encryption application, such as open PGP, and the encrypted image is sent to the client 12.

The client inserts the floppy disk that contains the bootable image into the victim machine, and reboots the machine from the floppy disk 14. The victim machine is now running from the trusted kernel contained on the floppy disk and not from any possibly victim machine resources, e.g. a hacked internal drive. The boot disk mounts all media in read only mode. The kernel and tools are all loaded into the machine's RAM memory from the boot disk. The machine can then establish network connectivity. Read only mode also means that residual information in swap space can be found. This is something that very few investigators do.

Cryptographic hashes are taken of all of the essential partitions on the victim machine. The hashes are sent to the evidence aggregation server and, optionally, to a trusted third party, such as Verisign, as well as to a time stamping authority, such as Suriety.

Data are retrieved from the victim machine, streamed to the evidence aggregation server via an SSL connection, stored at the evidence aggregation server as though the server were a hard drive of the victim machine, and processed 16.

Once the image of the drive is completed, another cryptographic hash is taken of the data on the evidence aggregation server and compared with the original hashes. If they match, a secured email is sent by the evidence aggregation server to notify the incident response team that the process has completed successfully. They derive on the evidence aggregation server can then be removed and remitted to a chain of custody. This is all hosted in a heavily secured facility

Thus, the invention secures the victim machine by running the machine from a boot disk, such that the state of all machine resources remains unchanged from the time the incident was first reported. The boot disk operates the victim machine to produce a hash of all relevant machine resources which is sent to a trusted authority, and then streams the contents of these resources to a remote location where they are securely stored. Once this information is captured at the remote location, a second hash is performed and the second and first hashes are compared to determine whether or not the captured information is a true representation of the information on the victim machine. If a match is determined, then the remote copy of the information is passed through a chain of custody that securely retains its authenticity.

The forensic disk image contains the following:

1. A bootable kernel that is selected for the victim machine from multiple machine architectures. The requirements for the kernel are that it provide support for TCP/IP networking and multiple hard drive configurations. Support for RAID arrays and other system components may also be provided.

2. The disk is protected so that it mounts in a read only mode, e.g. by permanently removing the write enable tab or other known mechanisms.

3. A message digest, such as an MD5 (MD5 is the message digest function defined in RFC 1321) checksum, is performed by software on the disk to volumes on the victim machine to be copied therefrom for remote forensic analysis. The message digest creates a unique and non-reputable identifier for the data to be copied for a third party signing authority, such as Verisign.

4. NNTP (Network News Transport Protocol, see RFC 977) synchronizes the system clock of the victim machine so that time stamps are accurate. 5. A one time use SSL certificate is signed by a trusted authority 24, 28, e.g. Verisign. The certificate limits the connection available from the victim machine to a single session with the evidence aggregation server. If the connection fails during the disk image process, a new disk image must be generated. Then the process starts again. Note:

SSL refers to Secure Socket Layer: A protocol designed by Netscape Communications Corporation to provide encrypted communications on the Internet. SSL is layered beneath application protocols such as HTTP, SMTP, Telnet, FTP, Gopher, and NNTP and is layered above the connection protocol TCP/IP. It is used by the HTTPS access method.

6. The contents of the victim machine are copied over a secure channel that is good for one use only 16 using disk imaging software, such as dd (Note: dd is a Unix copy command with special options suitable for block-oriented devices).

the forensic disk image works:

1. The image boots and loads into RAM only. The swap space/pagefile is not touched so that residual evidence in memory is preserved.

2. Media devices are detected in a read only mode.

3. Network support is brought up. No services are turned on, so the machine is secure. 4. NNTP synchronizes system time to an NNTP server on a server machine. The server is synchronized via a remote NNTP server.

5. An SSL connection is established to a secure server in an exodus vault.

6. A message digest, e.g. MD5 checksum, is written across the secure connection to a disk on the secure server 24. Timestamps are also taken and written to the disk on the secure server.

7. A dd starts running and takes a bit by bit image of the victim machine 16. Rather than writing to a local media, the dd sends it's output over the SSL connection to the disk on the secure server 18.

8. Once the dd has completed, the disk ejects itself and powers off the victim machine.

9. The disk on the secure server is removed and a chain of custody is created 22.

10. The evidence is stored in a secure location 20.

the server is set up: 1. The server is locked down. A stripped version of the operating system, e.g. BSD Unix, is used that has nothing other than network and disk support enabled. This allows for the removal of suid (Set User ID = If Setuid = Root then the file/program can be run by any user with roots privileges) binaries that could be exploited or used to overwrite data.

2. The SSL connections are wrapped using three authentication mechanisms:

■ Firewall access controls;

■ Host TCP wrappers; and

One time SSL certificates - mod_ssl implementation.

3. Multiple disk support is enabled so that each client can have a partition

(/home/client for example) that maps to a removable physical device

18.

4. The Web server has a CGI front end that is used over SSL. The CGI front end ties into a script that generates the appropriate disk image, and does an MD5 hash on it. The script also creates a home directory for the client machine that maps to it's own disk. For example, /home/client maps to /dev/hda8, which is for example a detachable SCSI disk. 5. The server has two interfaces. One interface has a publicly available IP address that listens for connections from the forensic evidence aggregator. The other interface is a private link used for such purposes as administration.

Although the invention is described herein with reference to the preferred embodiment, one skilled in the art will readily appreciate that other applications may be substituted for those set forth herein without departing from the spirit and scope of the present invention. Accordingly, the invention should only be limited by the Claims included below.

Claims

1. A remote computer forensic evidence collection apparatus, comprising: a mechanism for remotely collecting client data while adhering to strict evidentiary standards; and a mechanism for automatically verifying content received from a victim machine with data from said victim machine.
2. The apparatus of Claim 1 , said system comprising: a forensic evidence aggregator; an image generation system; and a bootable image containing a forensic evidence collection suite.
3. The apparatus of Claim 2, wherein said image generation system comprises: a set of scripts that gather any of the following information from said victim machine: network configuration; system architecture; and media device configuration.
4. The apparatus of Claim 2, wherein said image generation system comprises: a set of scripts that take information concerning said victim machine and generate a bootable image for said victim machine from an appropriate machine kernel.
5. The apparatus of Claim 2, wherein said image generation system comprises: a set of scripts that generate a one-use certificate for authentication and authorization that allows a single connection to said evidence aggregation server from said victim machine.
6. The apparatus of Claim 2, wherein said forensic evidence aggregator comprises: an SSL server that restricts connections based upon verification of a certificate by a trusted third party authority.
7. The apparatus of Claim 2, wherein said forensic evidence aggregator comprises: a server that provides multiple disk support, such that each host has it's own physical disk that is stored separately, where each such disk has it's own chain of custody.
8. A remote computer forensic evidence collection method, comprising the steps of: a client contacting an incident response team when a security incident is suspected to have occurred, wherein said incident response team is provided with any of the following information: system architecture for a victim machine; network configuration of said victim machine; access control devices on a network to which the victim machine is connected; and why an incident is suspected; said incident response team entering relevant data into a script to generate a kernel boot image for said victim machine; said incident response team providing said client with a one-time password; said client accessing an on-line signing authority with said one-time password and downloading said kernel boot image onto a storage medium, wherein said kernel boot image is encrypted using an encryption application and an encrypted version of said kernel boot image is sent to said client; said client rebooting said victim machine using said kernel boot image on said storage medium, wherein all media associated with said victim machine are mounted in read only mode and wherein said victim machine can establish network connectivity; taking a first cryptographic hash of all of essential partitions on said victim machine; sending said cryptographic hashes to an evidence aggregation server and, optionally, to any of a trusted third party and a time stamping authority; retrieving data from said victim machine and streaming said data to said evidence aggregation server via a secure connection; storing said data at said evidence aggregation server on a partitioned, separable storage medium; once streaming of an image of said victim machine data to said evidence aggregation server is completed, taking a cryptographic hash of said data on said evidence aggregation server and comparing said cryptographic hash with said first cryptographic hash; wherein if said cryptographic hashes match, a secured email is sent by said evidence aggregation server indicating that an image of said victim machine has been captured has captured successfully; and removing said separable storage medium from said evidence aggregation server and remitting said separable storage medium to a chain of custody.
9. A method for securing a victim machine, comprising the steps of: running said victim machine from a secure boot disk, such that a state of all machine resources remains unchanged from a time an incident is first reported; said secure boot disk operating said victim machine to produce a first hash of said victim machine contents, wherein said hash is sent to a trusted authority; said victim machine streaming said victim machine contents to a remote location where they are securely stored; once said victim machine contents are captured at said remote location, performing a second hash of said victim machine contents as received at said remote location and comparing said second and said first hashes to determine whether or not said captured victim machine contents provide a true representation of said victim machine contents; wherein if a match is determined, then passing said victim machine contents captured at said remote location through a chain of custody that securely retains its authenticity.
10. A forensic disk image, comprising: a bootable kernel that is selected for a victim machine from multiple machine architectures to provide support for networking and multiple drive configurations, wherein said disk image is protected so that it mounts in a read only mode; a message digest function to be performed by software on said disk image to volumes on said victim machine to be copied therefrom for remote forensic analysis, wherein message digest creates a unique and non- reputable identifier for data to be copied for a third party signing authority; an optional mechanism for synchronizing a system clock of said victim machine so that time stamps are accurate; a one time use certificate signed by a trusted authority for limiting a connection available from said victim machine to a single session with an evidence aggregation server; and a mechanism for copying contents of said victim machine over a secure channel to said evidence aggregation server.
11. A method for operating a forensic disk image, comprising the steps of: booting and loading said disk image only into RAM of a victim machine; detecting media devices in a read only mode; bringing up network support , wherein no services are turned on, so said victim machine is secure; optionally synchronizing victim machine system time to an NNTP server; establishing a secure connection to a secure server; writing a message digest across said secure connection to a partitioned, separable storage medium on a secure server; optionally taking timestamps and writing said timestamps to said separable storage medium on said secure server; taking an image of said victim machine and sending said image over said secure connection to said separable storage medium on said secure server.
12. The method of Claim 11, wherein a medium containing said disk image is ejected from said victim machine and said victim machines is powered off, once sending of said victim machine image to said secure server is completed.
13. The method of Claim 11, wherein said separable storage medium on said secure server is removed from said secure server and a chain of custody is created, once sending of said victim machine image to said secure server is completed.
PCT/US2002/006622 2000-06-16 2002-03-05 Remote computer forensic evidence collection system and process WO2002071192A3 (en)

Priority Applications (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
US09800378 US20030208689A1 (en) 2000-06-16 2001-03-05 Remote computer forensic evidence collection system and process
US09/800,378 2001-03-05

Publications (2)

Publication Number Publication Date
WO2002071192A2 true true WO2002071192A2 (en) 2002-09-12
WO2002071192A3 true WO2002071192A3 (en) 2003-02-20

Family

ID=25178236

Family Applications (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
PCT/US2002/006622 WO2002071192A3 (en) 2000-06-16 2002-03-05 Remote computer forensic evidence collection system and process

Country Status (2)

Country Link
US (1) US20030208689A1 (en)
WO (1) WO2002071192A3 (en)

Cited By (22)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US7496959B2 (en) 2003-06-23 2009-02-24 Architecture Technology Corporation Remote collection of computer forensic evidence
WO2009151757A2 (en) * 2008-04-07 2009-12-17 Transnetyx, Inc. Method and apparatus for forensic screening
US7748040B2 (en) 2004-07-12 2010-06-29 Architecture Technology Corporation Attack correlation using marked information
US7917647B2 (en) 2000-06-16 2011-03-29 Mcafee, Inc. Method and apparatus for rate limiting
WO2011110847A1 (en) 2010-03-09 2011-09-15 Roke Manor Research Limited Data capture tool and method
US8200635B2 (en) 2009-03-27 2012-06-12 Bank Of America Corporation Labeling electronic data in an electronic discovery enterprise system
US8224924B2 (en) 2009-03-27 2012-07-17 Bank Of America Corporation Active email collector
US8250037B2 (en) 2009-03-27 2012-08-21 Bank Of America Corporation Shared drive data collection tool for an electronic discovery system
US8364681B2 (en) 2009-03-27 2013-01-29 Bank Of America Corporation Electronic discovery system
US8417716B2 (en) 2009-03-27 2013-04-09 Bank Of America Corporation Profile scanner
US8458805B2 (en) 2003-06-23 2013-06-04 Architecture Technology Corporation Digital forensic analysis using empirical privilege profiling (EPP) for filtering collected data
US8549327B2 (en) 2008-10-27 2013-10-01 Bank Of America Corporation Background service process for local collection of data in an electronic discovery system
US8572227B2 (en) 2009-03-27 2013-10-29 Bank Of America Corporation Methods and apparatuses for communicating preservation notices and surveys
US8572376B2 (en) 2009-03-27 2013-10-29 Bank Of America Corporation Decryption of electronic communication in an electronic discovery enterprise system
US8806358B2 (en) 2009-03-27 2014-08-12 Bank Of America Corporation Positive identification and bulk addition of custodians to a case within an electronic discovery system
US9053454B2 (en) 2009-11-30 2015-06-09 Bank Of America Corporation Automated straight-through processing in an electronic discovery system
US9330374B2 (en) 2009-03-27 2016-05-03 Bank Of America Corporation Source-to-processing file conversion in an electronic discovery enterprise system
US9384677B2 (en) 2008-02-19 2016-07-05 Architecture Technology Corporation Automated execution and evaluation of network-based training exercises
US9485276B2 (en) 2012-09-28 2016-11-01 Juniper Networks, Inc. Dynamic service handling using a honeypot
US9721227B2 (en) 2009-03-27 2017-08-01 Bank Of America Corporation Custodian management system
US9729410B2 (en) 2013-10-24 2017-08-08 Jeffrey T Eschbach Method and system for capturing web content from a web server
US9934487B2 (en) 2012-08-03 2018-04-03 Bank Of America Corporation Custodian management system

Families Citing this family (49)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US20030041281A1 (en) * 2001-07-18 2003-02-27 Nestor Brian Patrick Data analysis system
US7711728B2 (en) * 2002-06-20 2010-05-04 Guidance Software, Inc. System and method for searching for static data in a computer investigation system
US6792545B2 (en) 2002-06-20 2004-09-14 Guidance Software, Inc. Enterprise computer investigation system
US8272053B2 (en) * 2003-12-18 2012-09-18 Honeywell International Inc. Physical security management system
US20070011450A1 (en) * 2004-09-14 2007-01-11 Mccreight Shawn System and method for concurrent discovery and survey of networked devices
WO2006101554A3 (en) * 2005-03-16 2008-09-25 Guidance Software Inc Computer system for searching static data
US7779032B1 (en) * 2005-07-13 2010-08-17 Basis Technology Corporation Forensic feature extraction and cross drive analysis
US7809686B2 (en) * 2005-10-06 2010-10-05 Guidance Software, Inc. Electronic discovery system and method
WO2007045051A1 (en) 2005-10-21 2007-04-26 Honeywell Limited An authorisation system and a method of authorisation
US20070272744A1 (en) * 2006-05-24 2007-11-29 Honeywell International Inc. Detection and visualization of patterns and associations in access card data
US20070283158A1 (en) * 2006-06-02 2007-12-06 Microsoft Corporation Microsoft Patent Group System and method for generating a forensic file
US7555480B2 (en) * 2006-07-11 2009-06-30 Microsoft Corporation Comparatively crawling web page data records relative to a template
US8892735B2 (en) * 2006-09-28 2014-11-18 Guidance Software, Inc. Phone home servlet in a computer investigation system
US8959568B2 (en) * 2007-03-14 2015-02-17 Microsoft Corporation Enterprise security assessment sharing
US8413247B2 (en) * 2007-03-14 2013-04-02 Microsoft Corporation Adaptive data collection for root-cause analysis and intrusion detection
US8955105B2 (en) * 2007-03-14 2015-02-10 Microsoft Corporation Endpoint enabled for enterprise security assessment sharing
US20080229419A1 (en) * 2007-03-16 2008-09-18 Microsoft Corporation Automated identification of firewall malware scanner deficiencies
US7899882B2 (en) * 2007-03-29 2011-03-01 Agile Risk Management Llc System and method for providing remote forensics capability
US7882542B2 (en) * 2007-04-02 2011-02-01 Microsoft Corporation Detecting compromised computers by correlating reputation data with web access logs
US8010502B2 (en) * 2007-04-13 2011-08-30 Harris Corporation Methods and systems for data recovery
EP2150901B1 (en) 2007-05-28 2015-09-16 Honeywell International Inc. Systems and methods for configuring access control devices
CN101765995B (en) 2007-05-28 2012-11-14 霍尼韦尔国际公司 Systems and methods for commissioning access control devices
CN101340281B (en) * 2007-07-02 2010-12-22 联想(北京)有限公司 Method and system for safe login input on network
US7856573B2 (en) * 2007-08-31 2010-12-21 International Business Machines Corporation WPAR halted attack introspection stack execution detection
US8572043B2 (en) * 2007-12-20 2013-10-29 International Business Machines Corporation Method and system for storage of unstructured data for electronic discovery in external data stores
US8024576B2 (en) * 2008-03-31 2011-09-20 International Business Machines Corporation Method and system for authenticating users with a one time password using an image reader
US20090286219A1 (en) * 2008-05-15 2009-11-19 Kisin Roman Conducting a virtual interview in the context of a legal matter
US9830563B2 (en) 2008-06-27 2017-11-28 International Business Machines Corporation System and method for managing legal obligations for data
US8484069B2 (en) 2008-06-30 2013-07-09 International Business Machines Corporation Forecasting discovery costs based on complex and incomplete facts
US8515924B2 (en) * 2008-06-30 2013-08-20 International Business Machines Corporation Method and apparatus for handling edge-cases of event-driven disposition
US20100017239A1 (en) * 2008-06-30 2010-01-21 Eric Saltzman Forecasting Discovery Costs Using Historic Data
US8489439B2 (en) * 2008-06-30 2013-07-16 International Business Machines Corporation Forecasting discovery costs based on complex and incomplete facts
US9704313B2 (en) 2008-09-30 2017-07-11 Honeywell International Inc. Systems and methods for interacting with access control devices
US20100205014A1 (en) * 2009-02-06 2010-08-12 Cary Sholer Method and system for providing response services
WO2010099575A1 (en) 2009-03-04 2010-09-10 Honeywell International Inc. Systems and methods for managing video data
EP2408984A4 (en) 2009-03-19 2016-11-30 Honeywell Int Inc Systems and methods for managing access control devices
US20100299430A1 (en) * 2009-05-22 2010-11-25 Architecture Technology Corporation Automated acquisition of volatile forensic evidence from network devices
US9280365B2 (en) 2009-12-17 2016-03-08 Honeywell International Inc. Systems and methods for managing configuration data at disconnected remote devices
US8655856B2 (en) * 2009-12-22 2014-02-18 International Business Machines Corporation Method and apparatus for policy distribution
US8707414B2 (en) 2010-01-07 2014-04-22 Honeywell International Inc. Systems and methods for location aware access control management
US8566903B2 (en) 2010-06-29 2013-10-22 International Business Machines Corporation Enterprise evidence repository providing access control to collected artifacts
US8832148B2 (en) 2010-06-29 2014-09-09 International Business Machines Corporation Enterprise evidence repository
US8787725B2 (en) 2010-11-11 2014-07-22 Honeywell International Inc. Systems and methods for managing video data
US9106645B1 (en) * 2011-01-26 2015-08-11 Symantec Corporation Automatic reset for time-based credentials on a mobile device
US9894261B2 (en) 2011-06-24 2018-02-13 Honeywell International Inc. Systems and methods for presenting digital video management system information via a user-customizable hierarchical tree interface
US9344684B2 (en) 2011-08-05 2016-05-17 Honeywell International Inc. Systems and methods configured to enable content sharing between client terminals of a digital video management system
US9037630B2 (en) 2012-02-21 2015-05-19 Matthew Martin Shannon Systems and methods for provisioning digital forensics services remotely over public and private networks
US9148418B2 (en) 2013-05-10 2015-09-29 Matthew Martin Shannon Systems and methods for remote access to computer data over public and private networks via a software switch
US9680844B2 (en) 2015-07-06 2017-06-13 Bank Of America Corporation Automation of collection of forensic evidence

Citations (4)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US5781629A (en) * 1994-10-28 1998-07-14 Surety Technologies, Inc. Digital document authentication system
US5960460A (en) * 1997-01-02 1999-09-28 Exabyte Corporation Non-intrusive replication of hard disk
US6091835A (en) * 1994-08-31 2000-07-18 Penop Limited Method and system for transcribing electronic affirmations
US6263349B1 (en) * 1998-07-20 2001-07-17 New Technologies Armor, Inc. Method and apparatus for identifying names in ambient computer data

Family Cites Families (16)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US5262956A (en) * 1991-06-26 1993-11-16 Inovec, Inc. Statistically compensated optimization system
US5819226A (en) * 1992-09-08 1998-10-06 Hnc Software Inc. Fraud detection using predictive modeling
US5679938A (en) * 1994-12-02 1997-10-21 Telecheck International, Inc. Methods and systems for interactive check authorizations
US5701400A (en) * 1995-03-08 1997-12-23 Amado; Carlos Armando Method and apparatus for applying if-then-else rules to data sets in a relational data base and generating from the results of application of said rules a database of diagnostics linked to said data sets to aid executive analysis of financial data
US6069563A (en) * 1996-03-05 2000-05-30 Kadner; Steven P. Seal system
US6026397A (en) * 1996-05-22 2000-02-15 Electronic Data Systems Corporation Data analysis system and method
US6064810A (en) * 1996-09-27 2000-05-16 Southern Methodist University System and method for predicting the behavior of a component
US5982896A (en) * 1996-12-23 1999-11-09 Pitney Bowes Inc. System and method of verifying cryptographic postage evidencing using a fixed key set
US6119103A (en) * 1997-05-27 2000-09-12 Visa International Service Association Financial risk prediction systems and methods therefor
US6065119A (en) * 1997-05-30 2000-05-16 The Regents Of The University Of California Data validation
US5978475A (en) * 1997-07-18 1999-11-02 Counterpane Internet Security, Inc. Event auditing system
US6049621A (en) * 1997-08-22 2000-04-11 International Business Machines Corporation Determining a point correspondence between two points in two respective (fingerprint) images
US6134532A (en) * 1997-11-14 2000-10-17 Aptex Software, Inc. System and method for optimal adaptive matching of users to most relevant entity and information in real-time
US6157707A (en) * 1998-04-03 2000-12-05 Lucent Technologies Inc. Automated and selective intervention in transaction-based networks
US6636873B1 (en) * 2000-04-17 2003-10-21 Oracle International Corporation Methods and systems for synchronization of mobile devices with a remote database
US6711699B1 (en) * 2000-05-04 2004-03-23 International Business Machines Corporation Real time backup system for information based on a user's actions and gestures for computer users

Patent Citations (4)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US6091835A (en) * 1994-08-31 2000-07-18 Penop Limited Method and system for transcribing electronic affirmations
US5781629A (en) * 1994-10-28 1998-07-14 Surety Technologies, Inc. Digital document authentication system
US5960460A (en) * 1997-01-02 1999-09-28 Exabyte Corporation Non-intrusive replication of hard disk
US6263349B1 (en) * 1998-07-20 2001-07-17 New Technologies Armor, Inc. Method and apparatus for identifying names in ambient computer data

Cited By (34)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US7917647B2 (en) 2000-06-16 2011-03-29 Mcafee, Inc. Method and apparatus for rate limiting
US8176557B2 (en) 2003-06-23 2012-05-08 Architecture Technology Corporation Remote collection of computer forensic evidence
US7496959B2 (en) 2003-06-23 2009-02-24 Architecture Technology Corporation Remote collection of computer forensic evidence
US8474047B2 (en) 2003-06-23 2013-06-25 Architecture Technology Corporation Remote collection of computer forensic evidence
US8458805B2 (en) 2003-06-23 2013-06-04 Architecture Technology Corporation Digital forensic analysis using empirical privilege profiling (EPP) for filtering collected data
US7748040B2 (en) 2004-07-12 2010-06-29 Architecture Technology Corporation Attack correlation using marked information
US8286249B2 (en) 2004-07-12 2012-10-09 Architecture Technology Corporation Attack correlation using marked information
US9384677B2 (en) 2008-02-19 2016-07-05 Architecture Technology Corporation Automated execution and evaluation of network-based training exercises
WO2009151757A3 (en) * 2008-04-07 2010-03-25 Transnetyx, Inc. Method and apparatus for forensic screening
WO2009151757A2 (en) * 2008-04-07 2009-12-17 Transnetyx, Inc. Method and apparatus for forensic screening
US8549327B2 (en) 2008-10-27 2013-10-01 Bank Of America Corporation Background service process for local collection of data in an electronic discovery system
US8224924B2 (en) 2009-03-27 2012-07-17 Bank Of America Corporation Active email collector
US8417716B2 (en) 2009-03-27 2013-04-09 Bank Of America Corporation Profile scanner
US9721227B2 (en) 2009-03-27 2017-08-01 Bank Of America Corporation Custodian management system
US8364681B2 (en) 2009-03-27 2013-01-29 Bank Of America Corporation Electronic discovery system
US8200635B2 (en) 2009-03-27 2012-06-12 Bank Of America Corporation Labeling electronic data in an electronic discovery enterprise system
US8572227B2 (en) 2009-03-27 2013-10-29 Bank Of America Corporation Methods and apparatuses for communicating preservation notices and surveys
US8250037B2 (en) 2009-03-27 2012-08-21 Bank Of America Corporation Shared drive data collection tool for an electronic discovery system
US8688648B2 (en) 2009-03-27 2014-04-01 Bank Of America Corporation Electronic communication data validation in an electronic discovery enterprise system
US8805832B2 (en) 2009-03-27 2014-08-12 Bank Of America Corporation Search term management in an electronic discovery system
US8806358B2 (en) 2009-03-27 2014-08-12 Bank Of America Corporation Positive identification and bulk addition of custodians to a case within an electronic discovery system
US8868561B2 (en) 2009-03-27 2014-10-21 Bank Of America Corporation Electronic discovery system
US8903826B2 (en) 2009-03-27 2014-12-02 Bank Of America Corporation Electronic discovery system
US9547660B2 (en) 2009-03-27 2017-01-17 Bank Of America Corporation Source-to-processing file conversion in an electronic discovery enterprise system
US9171310B2 (en) 2009-03-27 2015-10-27 Bank Of America Corporation Search term hit counts in an electronic discovery system
US9330374B2 (en) 2009-03-27 2016-05-03 Bank Of America Corporation Source-to-processing file conversion in an electronic discovery enterprise system
US8572376B2 (en) 2009-03-27 2013-10-29 Bank Of America Corporation Decryption of electronic communication in an electronic discovery enterprise system
US9542410B2 (en) 2009-03-27 2017-01-10 Bank Of America Corporation Source-to-processing file conversion in an electronic discovery enterprise system
US9053454B2 (en) 2009-11-30 2015-06-09 Bank Of America Corporation Automated straight-through processing in an electronic discovery system
WO2011110847A1 (en) 2010-03-09 2011-09-15 Roke Manor Research Limited Data capture tool and method
US9934487B2 (en) 2012-08-03 2018-04-03 Bank Of America Corporation Custodian management system
US9485276B2 (en) 2012-09-28 2016-11-01 Juniper Networks, Inc. Dynamic service handling using a honeypot
US9838427B2 (en) 2012-09-28 2017-12-05 Juniper Networks, Inc. Dynamic service handling using a honeypot
US9729410B2 (en) 2013-10-24 2017-08-08 Jeffrey T Eschbach Method and system for capturing web content from a web server

Also Published As

Publication number Publication date Type
US20030208689A1 (en) 2003-11-06 application
WO2002071192A3 (en) 2003-02-20 application

Similar Documents

Publication Publication Date Title
Cattaneo et al. The Design and Implementation of a Transparent Cryptographic File System for UNIX.
Mazieres et al. Separating key management from file system security
US8332464B2 (en) System and method for remote network access
US5923756A (en) Method for providing secure remote command execution over an insecure computer network
US6874084B1 (en) Method and apparatus for establishing a secure communication connection between a java application and secure server
US20090092252A1 (en) Method and System for Identifying and Managing Keys
US6978364B1 (en) VPN enrollment protocol gateway
US20060143700A1 (en) Security System Providing Methodology for Cooperative Enforcement of Security Policies During SSL Sessions
US20040003247A1 (en) Non-centralized secure communication services
US6732277B1 (en) Method and apparatus for dynamically accessing security credentials and related information
US6374402B1 (en) Method and apparatus for installation abstraction in a secure content delivery system
US6738909B1 (en) Method and apparatus for automatic configuration for internet protocol security tunnels in a distributed data processing system
US20030110229A1 (en) System and method for controlling transmission of data packets over an information network
US20060291664A1 (en) Automated key management system
US20090119504A1 (en) Intercepting and split-terminating authenticated communication connections
US9106617B2 (en) Methods, systems and computer program products for authenticating computer processing devices and transferring both encrypted and unencrypted data therebetween
US7127477B2 (en) Method and system for access to automatically synchronized remote files
US20040015725A1 (en) Client-side inspection and processing of secure content
US20080022122A1 (en) Methods and systems for entropy collection for server-side key generation
US7017188B1 (en) Method and apparatus for secure content delivery over broadband access networks
US20070174362A1 (en) System and methods for secure digital data archiving and access auditing
US20070011450A1 (en) System and method for concurrent discovery and survey of networked devices
US6763370B1 (en) Method and apparatus for content protection in a secure content delivery system
US20120089710A1 (en) Synchronizing Configuration Information Among Multiple Clients
US7334124B2 (en) Logical access block processing protocol for transparent secure file storage

Legal Events

Date Code Title Description
AL Designated countries for regional patents

Kind code of ref document: A2

Designated state(s): GH GM KE LS MW MZ SD SL SZ TZ UG ZM ZW AM AZ BY KG KZ MD RU TJ TM AT BE CH CY DE DK ES FI FR GB GR IE IT LU MC NL PT SE TR BF BJ CF CG CI CM GA GN GQ GW ML MR NE SN TD TG

AK Designated states

Kind code of ref document: A2

Designated state(s): AE AL AM AT AU AZ BA BB BG BR BY CA CH CN CR CU CZ DE DK DM EE ES FI GB GD GE GH GM HR HU ID IL IN IS JP KE KG KP KR KZ LC LK LR LS LT LU LV MA MD MG MK MN MW MX NO NZ PL PT RO RU SD SE SG SI SK SL TJ TM TR TT TZ UA UG UZ VN YU ZA ZW

121 Ep: the epo has been informed by wipo that ep was designated in this application
AL Designated countries for regional patents

Kind code of ref document: A3

Designated state(s): GH GM KE LS MW MZ SD SL SZ TZ UG ZM ZW AM AZ BY KG KZ MD RU TJ TM AT BE CH CY DE DK ES FI FR GB GR IE IT LU MC NL PT SE TR BF BJ CF CG CI CM GA GN GQ GW ML MR NE SN TD TG

AK Designated states

Kind code of ref document: A3

Designated state(s): AE AL AM AT AU AZ BA BB BG BR BY CA CH CN CR CU CZ DE DK DM EE ES FI GB GD GE GH GM HR HU ID IL IN IS JP KE KG KP KR KZ LC LK LR LS LT LU LV MA MD MG MK MN MW MX NO NZ PL PT RO RU SD SE SG SI SK SL TJ TM TR TT TZ UA UG UZ VN YU ZA ZW

REG Reference to national code

Ref country code: DE

Ref legal event code: 8642

122 Ep: pct application non-entry in european phase
NENP Non-entry into the national phase in:

Ref country code: JP

WWW Wipo information: withdrawn in national office

Country of ref document: JP