WO2001056249A1 - Codage de charge utile sur des liens ip a bande etroite - Google Patents
Codage de charge utile sur des liens ip a bande etroite Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- WO2001056249A1 WO2001056249A1 PCT/SE2001/000104 SE0100104W WO0156249A1 WO 2001056249 A1 WO2001056249 A1 WO 2001056249A1 SE 0100104 W SE0100104 W SE 0100104W WO 0156249 A1 WO0156249 A1 WO 0156249A1
- Authority
- WO
- WIPO (PCT)
- Prior art keywords
- sequence number
- data packet
- encryption
- encrypted data
- internet protocol
- Prior art date
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Classifications
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
- H04L63/0428—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L69/00—Network arrangements, protocols or services independent of the application payload and not provided for in the other groups of this subclass
- H04L69/30—Definitions, standards or architectural aspects of layered protocol stacks
- H04L69/32—Architecture of open systems interconnection [OSI] 7-layer type protocol stacks, e.g. the interfaces between the data link level and the physical level
- H04L69/322—Intralayer communication protocols among peer entities or protocol data unit [PDU] definitions
- H04L69/329—Intralayer communication protocols among peer entities or protocol data unit [PDU] definitions in the application layer [OSI layer 7]
Definitions
- the invention is related to IP networks and, more particularly, to the encryption of voice and speech data on narrow-band IP links.
- IP Internet Protocol
- the objective is, of course, to be able to use the Internet as an extension of such mobile radio access networks to transport real-time voice and speech data.
- Speech data has been transported across the Internet using IP -based transport layer protocols such as the User Datagram Protocol (UDP) and the Real-time Transport Protocol (RTP).
- UDP User Datagram Protocol
- RTP Real-time Transport Protocol
- FIGURE 1 illustrates a pertinent portion of an exemplary IP network 10.
- the IP network 10 includes a mobile station 11 providing speech data over a radio link 12 to a radio base station 13 , which is connected via land lines 14 to a radio access network 15.
- the radio link 12 may be any air interface between the mobile station 11 and the radio base station 13, such as a cellular link.
- the radio access network 15 may include a layer of communications protocol such as the Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM), or the like, that can be used to transfer the speech data to and from the mobile station 11
- GSM Global System for Mobile Communications
- a network connection 16 connects the radio access network 15 to an IP backbone network such as the Internet 17
- Speech data is presently transferred to and from the radio access network 15 using circuit-switched protocols It is expected that in future applications, the speech data will be transferred over the radio access network 15 using IP -based protocols in order to take advantage of the increasingly widespread use of IP Speech data transferred in this manner is transmitted in burst of packets, each packet having a header portion and a payload portion
- IP network 10 Transporting speech data over the IP network 10, however, raises a number of issues
- the IP network 10 is relatively unsecured, rendering the speech data traffic vulnerable to access by a third party
- the speech data may subsequently be tampered with or otherwise modified and then forwarded on, thereby compromising the integrity of the speech data
- Any data protection scheme contemplated for the IP network 10 must be bandwidth efficient in order to be feasible because the radio access network 15 is often bandwidth limited
- the cost associated with bandwidth is significantly higher in the radio access network 15 than in the IP backbone network 17
- IP Security IP Security
- the encryption algorithm used for speech data transfer is preferably a stream encryption algorithm
- Stream encryption algorithms encrypt data in small units (e g , a bit, a byte, a packet) and are generally much faster for encrypting a continuous stream of data than block encryption algorithms that encrypt data in large blocks
- stream encryption algorithms have better error resiliency than block encryption algorithms For example, a single-bit error in a stream encryption algorithm would yield only one error upon decryption, whereas a single-bit error in a block encryption algorithm would generate multiple errors upon decryption This error resiliency may be important in the radio access network 15, as the bit-error rates therein
- the present invention is directed to a method and an apparatus for synchronizing the transmitting side and the receiving side in an IP network that uses a stream encryption algorithm
- a sequence number is introduced into the payload of each packet at the transmitting side and transmitted with the packets
- the sequence number is extracted from the payload and used to synchronize the receiving side to the transmitting side
- An error detection mechanism is used to detect when the synchronization is lost and a recovery procedure is initiated
- the length of the sequence number is made sufficiently long to cope with any jitter variations in the IP network This sequence number length is dynamically adjustable based on the amount of jitter detected in the network
- the invention is related to a method of synchronizing encrypted data in an Internet Protocol based network
- the method comprises the steps of encrypting a data packet to be transmitted, generating a sequence number associated with the encrypted data packet, and transmitting the encrypted data packet together with the sequence number via an Internet Protocol based link
- the invention is related to an apparatus for synchronizing encrypted data in an Internet Protocol based network
- the apparatus comprises an encryption/decryption module configured to encrypt a data packet to be transmitted, a sequence number processor in the encryption/decryption module configured to generate a sequence number associated with the encrypted data packet, and a transceiver module connected to the encryption/ decryption module configured to transmit the encrypted data packet together with the sequence number via an Internet Protocol based link
- the invention is related to an apparatus for synchronizing encrypted data in an Internet Protocol based network
- the apparatus comprises an encryption/decryption module configured to encrypt a data packet to be transmitted, a sequence number processor in the encryption/decryption module configured to generate a sequence number associated with the encrypted data packet, and a transceiver module connected to the encryption/ decryption module configured to transmit the encrypted data packet together with the sequence number via an Internet Protocol based link
- the sequence number processor is further configured to extract a sequence number from a received encrypted data packet, and the encryption/ decryption module is further configured to decrypt the encrypted data packet based on a value of the extracted sequence number
- An error detection module is configured to check the decrypted data packet for errors and to cause an error message to be sent if errors are detected in a predetermined number of data packets
- the error detection module is further configured to initiate a data recovery procedure upon detecting that errors have occurred in the predetermined number of data packets
- the sequence number processor is further configured to reset the sequence number to
- FIGURE 1 is a high level illustration of a prior art communications network
- FIGURE 2 is a functional block diagram of a transmitter and a receiver according to one embodiment of the present invention
- FIGURE 3 is an illustration of a data packet according to one embodiment of the present invention.
- FIGURE 4 it is a flowchart of an encryption method according to one embodiment of the present invention.
- FIGURE 5 is a flowchart of a decryption method according to one embodiment of the present invention.
- FIGURE 6 is a flowchart of a method of adjusting the sequence number length according to one embodiment of the present invention
- a sequence number may be used to synchronize the transmitting side and the receiving side
- the sequence number can serve as an indicator of the order or position of a particular data packet in a burst of packets for encryption/ decryption purposes
- the sequence number may be appended to the encrypted payload of a speech data packet and then transmitted along with the packet.
- the payload is encoded or compressed prior to encryption in order to minimize the size of the data packet.
- the sequence number may be extracted from the payload and used to synchronize the two sides.
- the encrypted packet is subsequently decrypted into its compressed form and then decoded or decompressed into its original form.
- the sequence number itself is neither encrypted nor encoded and, therefore, does not need to be decrypted or decoded
- the length of the sequence number may be adjusted as needed based on a number of known statistical quality factors in the network.
- the updated sequence number length may be communicated to the network using in-band or out-band signaling.
- FIGURE 2 is a functional block diagram of a typical transmitter unit 20 and receiver unit 21 in the IP network 10
- the transmitter unit 20 may be located, for example, in the radio access network 15 at one end (e.g., the radio base station end) and the receiver unit 21 may be located in the radio access network 15 at the other end (e.g., the IP backbone network end), or vice versa.
- the transmitter unit 20 may be part of the mobile station 11 and the receiver unit 21 may be part of the radio access network 15, or vice versa
- the labels "transmitter” and “receiver” are used herein for purposes of convenient reference only, and that each of the transmitter unit 20 and the receiver unit 21 is fully capable of both transmitting and receiving signals in the IP network 10.
- transmitter unit 20 and receiving unit 21 and their constituent components may be implemented as software, hardware, or a combination of both software and hardware.
- An IP link 22 connects the transmitter unit 20 to the receiver unit 21.
- the IP link 22 may include a radio interface such as a cellular link or a microwave link, a wired connection such as an El or Tl connection, or any other type of connection that is capable of carrying IP -based speech data packets between the transmitter unit 20 and receiver unit 21.
- the transmitter unit 20 has a number of functional components, including a transceiver module 23, an encryption decryption module 24, and an error detection module 25.
- the receiver unit 21 likewise has a number of functional components, including a transceiver module 26, an encryption/decryption module 27, and an error detection module 28.
- Each of the encryption decryption modules 24 and 28 has a number of functional components including sequence number processors 29 and 30, respectively.
- the components of the transmitter unit 20 perform the same function as their counterparts in the receiver unit 21. Therefore, only the functions of the components of the transmitter unit 20 will now be described.
- the transceiver module 23 of the transmitter unit 20 is primarily responsible for sending and receiving signals between the transmitter unit 20 and the receiver unit 21.
- the tasks performed by the transceiver module 23 include all link level and physical level (e.g., Layer 1 and Layer 2) related tasks.
- the encryption/decryption module 24 is primarily responsible for encrypting the outgoing speech data packets and decrypting the incoming speech data packets.
- a stream encryption algorithm is used by the encryption/decryption module 24 to encrypt and decrypt the data packets. Note, however, that the specific type of stream encryption algorithm used is not important to the invention, and that any known or yet to be developed stream encryption may be used without departing from the scope of the invention.
- the tasks performed by the encryption/decryption module 24 include such things as performing certain mathematical/ logical operations on the data (depending on the type of encryption used), padding the data where applicable, and other tasks related to the encryption decryption process.
- Generating and extracting the sequence number is the primary responsibility of the sequence number generator 29.
- the sequence number processor 29 has the primary responsibility for generating a different sequence number for each data packet to be encrypted.
- the generated sequence number is then associated with that particular data packet and is transmitted with that packet in the payload thereof
- the sequence numbers are increased numerically by one's, but they may certainly be increased by two's, three's, four's, or some other increment without departing from the scope of the invention.
- the sequence number processor 29 has the primary responsibility for extracting the sequence number from the payload of the data packet to be decrypted.
- the sequence number may thereafter serve as an indicator of the specific order or position of the packet in the burst of packets so that an appropriate iteration of the encryption/ decryption process may be applied to the encrypted data.
- the encryption/decryption module 27 of the receiver unit 21 can use the sequence numbers of the packets to correctly reorder the packets.
- the sequence numbers may also be used to determine if any data packets were lost during transmission, as indicated by missing sequence numbers. Such an arrangement can help ensure that the transmitter unit 20 and the receiver unit 21 stay synchronized with each other in a loose sort of way.
- the length of the sequence number should be as short as possible for bandwidth efficiency purposes, but sufficiently long to compensate for any jitter variation or other quality factors in the network connections.
- the length of the sequence number can be determined statistically from the operation and maintenance of the network, i.e., if the network experiences a large amount of jitter on average, then the length of the sequence number can be made longer. For example, if the average jitter variation is 50 ms and the data packet has a 20-ms payload, then the sequence number should be made at least three bits long.
- the length of the sequence number may be dynamically adjusted. For instance, if the quality conditions in the IP network change so that a shorter length sequence number is permitted or a longer length sequence number is required, then the network operator can reconfigure the IP network to use a longer or shorter sequence number. Conditions that can cause a change in the length of the sequence number include, for example, a change in the amount of jitter, signal-to-noise ratio, received signal strength indicator (RSSI), and other known network quality factors.
- RSSI received signal strength indicator
- the new length of the sequence number can be updated to the various transmitter/receiver units in the IP network using in-band or out-band signaling. These updates can occur at the same time that the encryption keys are distributed. In general, the encryption keys need to be updated every so often for security purposes and then distributed to the various transmitter/receiver units in the network.
- One mechanism that can be used to distribute the keys is the Internet Key Exchange (IKE).
- IKE Internet Key Exchange
- the length of the sequence number to be used may be determined without employing any signaling.
- the speech coding algorithm that is used in the network relies on a plurality of known parameters. One of these parameters is the length of the encoded payload. If the sequence number is appended or otherwise attached to the encoded payload, then the length of the sequence number is simply the difference between the actual length of the received payload and the expected length of the received payload.
- the error detection module 25 performs a variety of tasks such as verifying, for example, the parity bits, the checksums, or the cyclic redundancy codes of the decoded data to make sure that the data was decoded properly and that no error occurred during transmission. Furthermore, if a predetermined number of packets (e.g., three consecutive packets) are found to be corrupted or otherwise defective, the error detection module 25 may conclude that the problem lies in the encryption/decryption process. In that case, the error detection module 25 may cause a predetermined error message to be sent via in- band or out-band signaling. On the other hand, if the error detection unit 25 were to receive such an error message, it may thereafter initiate a data recovery procedure to recover the data.
- a predetermined number of packets e.g., three consecutive packets
- the error detection module 25 may conclude that the problem lies in the encryption/decryption process. In that case, the error detection module 25 may cause a predetermined error message to be sent via in- band or out-
- sequence number processor 29 resets the sequence number back to its initial value
- the sequence number processor 29 may then cause a sequence number reset message to be transmitted indicating that the sequence number will restart beginning with, e g , a certain data packet or the next burst of packets
- the exemplary data packet 32 includes a header section 34 and a payload section 36
- the header section contains standard header information such as the origination and destination addresses of the packet, the type of formatting used, the particular transport layer protocol used, etc
- the payload section 36 contains the data to be transported such as encoded speech data
- the payload section 36 also includes a sequence number 38
- the sequence number 38 may be appended, attached, inserted into, or otherwise made a part of the payload section 36
- the sequence number 38 is not In this way, the sequence number 38 can be easily extracted from the payload section 36 and used to synchronize the transmitter unit and the receiver unit
- FIGURE 4 illustrates a method, according to one embodiment of the present invention, that can be used to transmit speech data in an IP network
- the data packet that is to be encrypted is obtained in the transmitter unit
- a sequence number is generated for the data packet at step 41 If the packet that is to be encrypted is the very first packet of the burst, then it is understood that the sequence number that is generated will be the initial sequence number
- the sequence number is associated or otherwise assigned to the data packet to be encrypted
- the data packet is then encrypted at step 43
- the encrypted data packet is transmitted along with the associated sequence number
- a determination is made to see whether an error message has been received from the receiver unit If yes, then some known data recovery procedure can be initiated at step 46
- the sequence number is reset to its initial value
- the transmitter unit informs the receiver unit at step 48 (via in-band or out-band signaling) that the sequence number will be restarted beginning with a certain data packet or with the next burst of data packets
- the method then begins again at step 40 If no, then the method
- step 50 an encrypted data packet to be decrypted is obtained in the receiver unit
- the sequence number is extracted from the payload of the data packet at step 51
- the data packet is then ordered or otherwise arranged at step 52, based on the extracted sequence number The ordering here should be identical to the ordering at the transmitter unit by virtue of the use of the sequence number
- step 53 the data packet is decrypted
- step 54 the decrypted data packet is checked for errors that may have occurred during decryption and/or decoding
- a determination is made at step 55 to see whether an error was detected in a predetermined number of data packets If yes, then an error message is sent at step 56 from the receiving unit to the transmitting unit
- a known data recovery procedure is initiated at step 57 to try and recover any lost data, and the method begins again at step 50 If no, then the method simply continues at step 50
- FIGURE 6 illustrates in more detail one aspect of the sequence number generating step, step 41, of the method shown in FIGURE 4
- a determination is made as to the quality of the IP links This determination may be made statistically using factors such as the average amount of jitter in the network, signal -to- noise ratios, RS SI measurements, etc
- the length of the sequence number is thereafter adjusted as needed at step 61
- the new sequence number length is then signaled to the various transmitter/ receiver units in the network at step 62
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- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
- Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
- Signal Processing (AREA)
- Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
- Computing Systems (AREA)
- General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Data Exchanges In Wide-Area Networks (AREA)
Abstract
Priority Applications (1)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
AU29000/01A AU2900001A (en) | 2000-01-25 | 2001-01-19 | Encryption of payload on narrow-band ip links |
Applications Claiming Priority (3)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
US17782500P | 2000-01-25 | 2000-01-25 | |
US60/177,825 | 2000-01-25 | ||
US09/751,156 | 2000-12-27 |
Publications (1)
Publication Number | Publication Date |
---|---|
WO2001056249A1 true WO2001056249A1 (fr) | 2001-08-02 |
Family
ID=22650113
Family Applications (1)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
---|---|---|---|
PCT/SE2001/000104 WO2001056249A1 (fr) | 2000-01-25 | 2001-01-19 | Codage de charge utile sur des liens ip a bande etroite |
Country Status (2)
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AU (1) | AU2900001A (fr) |
WO (1) | WO2001056249A1 (fr) |
Cited By (13)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
WO2003061192A2 (fr) * | 2002-01-14 | 2003-07-24 | Qualcomm, Incorporated | Conception de cryptosync pour un systeme de communication sans fil |
WO2003101073A1 (fr) | 2002-05-21 | 2003-12-04 | General Instrument Corporation | Association de parametres de securite pour ensemble de protocoles de flux connexes |
WO2003105368A1 (fr) * | 2002-06-05 | 2003-12-18 | Telefonaktiebolaget Lm Ericsson (Publ) | Procede et appareil de synchronisation utilisant l'erreur de detection de numeros de sequence de façon a eviter une defaillance de synchronisation |
AU782757B2 (en) * | 2000-11-22 | 2005-08-25 | International Business Machines Corporation | Distributed process for synchronizing the delivery of data from multiple web servers |
DE102004043480B3 (de) * | 2004-09-08 | 2005-12-29 | Infineon Technologies Ag | Vorrichtung und Verfahren zum Erkennen einer Störung einer kryptographischen Einheit vorzugsweise des AES-Algorithmus |
US7237108B2 (en) | 2001-09-26 | 2007-06-26 | General Instrument Corporation | Encryption of streaming control protocols and their headers |
US7243366B2 (en) | 2001-11-15 | 2007-07-10 | General Instrument Corporation | Key management protocol and authentication system for secure internet protocol rights management architecture |
US7251328B2 (en) | 2003-01-14 | 2007-07-31 | General Instrument Corporation | System for secure decryption of streaming media using selective decryption of header information and decryption of reassembled content |
EP2073478A1 (fr) * | 2007-12-20 | 2009-06-24 | Electronics And Telecommunications Research Institute | Appareil et procédé de cryptage de communications avec contrôle de la période de transfert d'informations de resynchronisation de clé |
EP2076072A3 (fr) * | 2007-12-28 | 2009-09-16 | Fujitsu Limited | Système et dispositif de communication sans fil |
WO2010017728A1 (fr) * | 2008-08-14 | 2010-02-18 | 中兴通讯股份有限公司 | Procédé et appareil de processus de reprise de transmission synchrone des données de service |
US8255989B2 (en) | 2001-09-26 | 2012-08-28 | General Instrument Corporation | Access control and key management system for streaming media |
US8364951B2 (en) | 2002-12-30 | 2013-01-29 | General Instrument Corporation | System for digital rights management using distributed provisioning and authentication |
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- 2001-01-19 AU AU29000/01A patent/AU2900001A/en not_active Abandoned
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Cited By (23)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
AU782757B2 (en) * | 2000-11-22 | 2005-08-25 | International Business Machines Corporation | Distributed process for synchronizing the delivery of data from multiple web servers |
US8255989B2 (en) | 2001-09-26 | 2012-08-28 | General Instrument Corporation | Access control and key management system for streaming media |
US7237108B2 (en) | 2001-09-26 | 2007-06-26 | General Instrument Corporation | Encryption of streaming control protocols and their headers |
US7243366B2 (en) | 2001-11-15 | 2007-07-10 | General Instrument Corporation | Key management protocol and authentication system for secure internet protocol rights management architecture |
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WO2003061192A2 (fr) * | 2002-01-14 | 2003-07-24 | Qualcomm, Incorporated | Conception de cryptosync pour un systeme de communication sans fil |
KR101038408B1 (ko) | 2002-01-14 | 2011-06-01 | 퀄컴 인코포레이티드 | 무선 통신 시스템의 크립토싱크 설계 |
WO2003101073A1 (fr) | 2002-05-21 | 2003-12-04 | General Instrument Corporation | Association de parametres de securite pour ensemble de protocoles de flux connexes |
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WO2003105368A1 (fr) * | 2002-06-05 | 2003-12-18 | Telefonaktiebolaget Lm Ericsson (Publ) | Procede et appareil de synchronisation utilisant l'erreur de detection de numeros de sequence de façon a eviter une defaillance de synchronisation |
US8364951B2 (en) | 2002-12-30 | 2013-01-29 | General Instrument Corporation | System for digital rights management using distributed provisioning and authentication |
US7251328B2 (en) | 2003-01-14 | 2007-07-31 | General Instrument Corporation | System for secure decryption of streaming media using selective decryption of header information and decryption of reassembled content |
US8781114B2 (en) | 2004-09-08 | 2014-07-15 | Infineon Technologies Ag | Apparatus and method for recognizing a failure of a cryptographic unit |
DE102004043480B3 (de) * | 2004-09-08 | 2005-12-29 | Infineon Technologies Ag | Vorrichtung und Verfahren zum Erkennen einer Störung einer kryptographischen Einheit vorzugsweise des AES-Algorithmus |
EP2073478A1 (fr) * | 2007-12-20 | 2009-06-24 | Electronics And Telecommunications Research Institute | Appareil et procédé de cryptage de communications avec contrôle de la période de transfert d'informations de resynchronisation de clé |
US8817987B2 (en) | 2007-12-20 | 2014-08-26 | Electronics And Telecommunications Research Institute | Encryption communication apparatus and method for controlling transfer period of key resynchronization information |
EP2076072A3 (fr) * | 2007-12-28 | 2009-09-16 | Fujitsu Limited | Système et dispositif de communication sans fil |
WO2010017728A1 (fr) * | 2008-08-14 | 2010-02-18 | 中兴通讯股份有限公司 | Procédé et appareil de processus de reprise de transmission synchrone des données de service |
US8462687B2 (en) | 2008-08-14 | 2013-06-11 | Zte Corporation | Method and apparatus for recovery processing of synchronously transmitted service data |
CN101651510B (zh) * | 2008-08-14 | 2013-01-16 | 中兴通讯股份有限公司 | 业务数据同步发送的恢复处理方法和装置 |
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Publication number | Publication date |
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