WO2001011817A2 - Network user authentication protocol - Google Patents
Network user authentication protocol Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- WO2001011817A2 WO2001011817A2 PCT/US2000/021414 US0021414W WO0111817A2 WO 2001011817 A2 WO2001011817 A2 WO 2001011817A2 US 0021414 W US0021414 W US 0021414W WO 0111817 A2 WO0111817 A2 WO 0111817A2
- Authority
- WO
- WIPO (PCT)
- Prior art keywords
- user
- authentication
- terminal
- encrypted
- message
- Prior art date
Links
Classifications
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
- H04L63/0428—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
- H04L63/0435—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload wherein the sending and receiving network entities apply symmetric encryption, i.e. same key used for encryption and decryption
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
- H04L63/083—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities using passwords
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3226—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using a predetermined code, e.g. password, passphrase or PIN
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
- H04L2209/80—Wireless
Definitions
- the present invention relates to computer networks and, in particular, to systems and methods for authentication of users seeking access to the network.
- Computer networks are widely used. These include private networks such as local-area networks (“LANs”), wide-area networks (“WANs”), and the Internet.
- the network consists of a variety of nodes, interconnected by transmission media. Some nodes may be terminals and/or personal computers ("PCs") by which a user gains access to the network. Other network nodes are functional units such as routers, servers, and the like.
- Various communications media are used to interconnect the nodes of a network, such as fiber-optic cables, Integrated Services Digital Network (“ISDN”), wireless links, and the like.
- ISDN Integrated Services Digital Network
- various nodes of a networked computer system may be connected through a variety of communication media.
- a given private network is typically maintained and operated by a specific company, where access to the networkis limited to authorized users.
- networks are often configured to "authenticate" a user attempting to access the network, to ensure that the user is an authorized user.
- the authentication procedure is thus designed to ensure that only authorized (authenticated) users are allowed to access the network.
- the simplest form of authentication requires a username or user ID, and password to gain access to a particular account.
- Authentication protocols can also be based on secret-key encryption or on public-key systems using digital signatures.
- users are required to be periodically re-authenticated to retain network access.
- the authentication process authenticates an authorized user.
- the outcome of the authentication can be said to be successful if the user is successfully authenticated, i.e. authorized to access the networl.
- the authentication fails if the user is not granted authorization to access the network.
- authentication procedures may be subject to infiltration by unauthorized users, or other forms of "attack".
- the attack may permit substitute or false information to be inserted into the network, or delivered from the network, or it may otherwise permit the unauthorized user to gain access to the network, further allowing them to perform a range of hostile acts.
- authentication information resides in the memory of a network terminal, whether mobile, wireless, or fixed, it may be possible for an unauthorized user to attack the memory to acquire the authentication information, and thus access to the system.
- a user terminal of the network receives a password from a user, and translates the password into an authentication encryption key for the user.
- the terminal generates a first random number, encrypts the first random number with the authentication encryption key to provide a first encrypted message, and transmits the first encrypted message to the user authentication site.
- the user authentication site decrypts the encrypted first message to provide the first random number, and generates a second random number, which is transmitted to the user terminal.
- the user terminal combines and encrypts the first and second random numbers, with the authentication encryption key, to provide a second encrypted message.
- the user terminal transmits the second encrypted message to the user authentication site, which decrypts the encrypted second message to provide the combined first and second random numbers.
- the user authentication site verifies that the first and second random numbers are correct, and authenticates the user in accordance with this verification.
- Fig. 1 is a block diagram of a computer network in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention
- Fig. 2 is a flow chart illustrating the authentication protocol of the network of Fig. 1, in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention. DESCRIPTION OF THE REFE ED EMBODIMENT
- the present invention provides an authentication protocol designed to prevent unauthorized entities from gaining access to the network either by obtaining authentication information through communications attack or by gaining access to a network terminal.
- an authentication protocol designed to prevent unauthorized entities from gaining access to the network either by obtaining authentication information through communications attack or by gaining access to a network terminal.
- only information personally retained by an authorized user may be used for authentication. No authentication information resides in any user's terminal, thereby minimizing the risk of an unauthorized user gaining access through a terminal, such as a mobile terminal.
- the authentication protocol of the present invention is not susceptible to a man-in- the-middle attack.
- Network 100 includes a user terminal 110, and a user authentication site 120, interconnected by a communications or transmission channel 125, which may be a LAN, fiber optic, wireless, or other digital communications means.
- User terminal 110 maybe a PC at a fixed location, a remote PC connected to authentication site 120 by a telephone or other link, or a mobile unit connected by a wireless link.
- Terminal 110 contains a processor (CPU 111) and memory 112.
- User authentication site 120 may be a server or other dedicated piece of hardware, a PC, or even a site manned by human operators. There may be more than one authentication site in network 100.
- Each authorized user of network 100 is assigned a unique password, and an authentication encryption and decryption key pair.
- a given user's authentication encryption key is the outcome of applying a specified encryption-key generation algorithm to the user's password.
- the user's authentication decryption key is the key that can decrypt messages encrypted using the user's authentication encryption key. These keys are used only for authentication and no other purpose, such as data encryption/decryption.
- Only the user authentication site(s) 120 stores the user's authentication encryption and decryption keys, password, and other information about the user, such as the user's security clearance, authority to access the network (access authority).
- No user terminal stores the user's encryption or decryption keys, or the user's password (except for temporarily storing the user's password and authentication encryption key during the authentication process).
- each user may also have a Smart Card with personal information pre-encrypted with the user's individual authentication encryption key.
- Each user may also have health sensors mounted on his body, for additional security.
- Each user terminal such as user terminal 110, has a means of translating the user's password to the user's individual encryption key.
- user terminal 110 contains processor 111 and the above-mentioned encryption-key generation algorithm.
- User terminal 110 also has the ability to generate random numbers, and to encrypta given message with the user's individual authentication encryption key.
- terminal 110 can run the encryption-key generation algorithm using the password as input, to generate the user's authentication encryption key. It can then generate a random number and use the authentication encryption key to encrypt the random number, to provide an encrypted random number (which is also a random number).
- the password, random number, authentication encryption key, encrypted messages, and received messages can be stored by terminal 110 temporarily in memory 112.
- a terminal 110 can be equipped with sensors to read and transmit the user's Smart Card information, health sensors, and/or an iris recognition device, for additional security.
- Fig. 2 there is shown a flow chart illustrating the network user authentication protocol method 200 of network 100, in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention.
- a user initiates access of a user terminal 110 (step 201).
- authentication site 120 notifies user terminal 110 to re-authenticate the user (step 203).
- Terminal 110 then notifies the user to enter a user ID and password, for example within a given time period (step 205).
- step 205 may involve issuing an Authentication Warning to the user, which may be in the form of a visual, auditory, or skin sensation message.
- the terminal 110 may still have user ID stored, in which case it need only prompt the user for the password. The user presumably will only have a password if he is an authorized user. In this case, the authorized user enters his user ID and password (step 207), within a specified timeout period if this is required in step 205.
- Terminal 110 then generates the user's authentication encryption key by translating the password into this key with the encryption-key generation algorithm (209). Thus, the user need not ever possess or even know his authentication encryption key, but only his password (and ID).
- Terminal 110 also generates a first random number (step 211), and then encrypts this random number using the user's authentication encryption key (step 213).
- the user terminal then notifies the user authentication site 120 of the user's identity and transmits the encrypted random number to user authentication site 120 (step 215).
- the authentication site is notified of the user's identity by transmitting the user ID to the authentication site.
- the user ID is preferably first encrypted with the user's authentication encryption key and then the encrypted ID is transmitted to authentication site 120.
- Authentication site 120 can then exhaustively decrypt the received encrypted message, with every possible authentication decryption key, until there is produced a user ID which matches a valid user ID of the network (and which also matches the user ID of the decryption key used to successfully decrypt the message). Thus, once authentication site 120 has successfully decrypted the user ID message, it knows the user ID and thus which authentication decryption key to use to decrypt subsequent encrypted messages transmitted during the authentication process.
- the user terminal 10 ID is also encrypted and transmitted to authentication site 120 along with the user ID.
- the encrypting and sending of the user ID can be skipped; or, for convenience and simplicity, it can still be transmitted, but the authentication site 120 can in this case simply use the already- determined decryption key to decrypt the encrypted user ID, rather than perform an exhaustive decryption.
- authentication site 120 After decrypting the encrypted user ID message, authentication site 120 receives the encrypted first random number. User authentication site 120 decrypts this message with the particular user's authentication decryption key, to provide the original first random number (step 217). User authentication site 120 then generates a second random number, and transmits it to user terminal 110 (step 219). In an alternative embodiment, an encrypted version of the second random number is transmitted to user terminal 110, in which a second encryption/decryption key pair is utilized.
- user authentication site 120 knows the identity of the user and/or his password, that user's authentication encryption/decryption keys (or at least the decryption key), and the first and second random numbers.
- the user terminal 110 only temporarily, during the authentication process, stores the user's password and authentication encryption key.
- the user's terminal 110 After receiving the second random number from authentication site 120, the user's terminal 110 combines and encrypts both random numbers with the user's authentication encryption key and transmits this message to the user authentication site (step 221).
- the two random numbers may be combined in a variety of specified ways, e.g. adding, subtracting, multiplying, concatenating strings, and so forth, so long as the technique used by user terminal 110 is known to user authentication site 120.
- the combining technique used is preferably set apriori and specified as part of the authentication protocol of the present invention.
- the user authentication site 120 thus receives an encrypted message, which is an encrypted version of the combined two random numbers, and decrypts this message using the user's authentication decryption key. Authentication site 120 then verifies that both random numbers are correct. If so, there has been no man-in-the-middle attack. At this point, authentication site 120 knows the identify of the user attempting to gain access. If the user's identify and access authority permit network access, authentication site 120 authenticates the user by transmittingthe appropriate authentication message to terminal 110 and allowing network resources to be used by the user from user terminal 110, in accordance with the user's level of access authority (step 223). If the user is a new user, he is authenticated, or denied access if the authentication fails. In the case of re- authentication, the user is re-authenticated, or authentication is withdrawn if the authentication fails.
- user authentication site 120 may also query user terminal 110 for Smart Card information, the status of the user's health, and/or iris recognition information. This information may be used for additional security by authentication site 120, in step 223, in verifying the user's identity and ability to conduct a terminal session. Whether authentication fails or is successful, the user terminal 110 in both cases erases the user's password and authentication encryption key from its memory 112 immediately after the authentication process is completed (step 225).
- the term"user” as used herein refers to a person either attempting to gain access, or already having access, to the network 100 via a user terminal 110.
- a prospective user as well as one already authorized by an authentication process is a user.
- health sensors are also provided. If at any time during a session user terminal 110 detects that the user is unable to conduct a terminal session, based on status from the health sensors, this information is transmitted to the user authentication site 120 and the latter withdraws authentication.
- the authentication protocol of the present invention is not vulnerable to a man-in-the-middle attack. Further, authentication data security is attained by not permitting individual authentication information to reside on any user terminal 110. Limiting user authentication information to the user authentication site 120 attains user security. Further, having user authentication site 120 control access to user terminal 110 attains terminal access and security.
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- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
- Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
- Signal Processing (AREA)
- Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
- Computing Systems (AREA)
- General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Data Exchanges In Wide-Area Networks (AREA)
- Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)
- Computer And Data Communications (AREA)
Abstract
Description
Claims
Priority Applications (1)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
AU65222/00A AU6522200A (en) | 1999-08-06 | 2000-08-07 | Network user authentication protocol |
Applications Claiming Priority (6)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
US14794499P | 1999-08-06 | 1999-08-06 | |
US60/147,944 | 1999-08-06 | ||
US14862499P | 1999-08-12 | 1999-08-12 | |
US60/148,624 | 1999-08-12 | ||
US63271700A | 2000-08-04 | 2000-08-04 | |
US09/632,716 | 2000-08-04 |
Publications (2)
Publication Number | Publication Date |
---|---|
WO2001011817A2 true WO2001011817A2 (en) | 2001-02-15 |
WO2001011817A3 WO2001011817A3 (en) | 2001-12-06 |
Family
ID=28794923
Family Applications (1)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
---|---|---|---|
PCT/US2000/021414 WO2001011817A2 (en) | 1999-08-06 | 2000-08-07 | Network user authentication protocol |
Country Status (2)
Country | Link |
---|---|
AU (1) | AU6522200A (en) |
WO (1) | WO2001011817A2 (en) |
Cited By (9)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
WO2007017288A2 (en) * | 2005-08-11 | 2007-02-15 | Giesecke & Devrient Gmbh | Method for protecting the authentication of a portable data carrier relative to a reading device via an unsecure communications path |
US7373507B2 (en) | 2000-08-10 | 2008-05-13 | Plethora Technology, Inc. | System and method for establishing secure communication |
US8386786B2 (en) | 2006-07-04 | 2013-02-26 | David Irvine | File system authentication |
CN103428221A (en) * | 2013-08-26 | 2013-12-04 | 百度在线网络技术(北京)有限公司 | Safety logging method, system and device of mobile application |
EP2738705A1 (en) * | 2012-11-30 | 2014-06-04 | Certicom Corp. | Challenge-Response Authentication Using a Masked Response Value |
US9369290B2 (en) | 2012-11-30 | 2016-06-14 | Certicom Corp. | Challenge-response authentication using a masked response value |
US9560046B2 (en) | 2014-11-07 | 2017-01-31 | Kaiser Foundation Hospitals | Device notarization |
US9560030B2 (en) | 2014-11-07 | 2017-01-31 | Kaiser Foundation Hospitals | Nodal random authentication |
US9727720B2 (en) | 2012-11-30 | 2017-08-08 | Certicom Corp. | Challenge-response authentication using a masked response value |
-
2000
- 2000-08-07 WO PCT/US2000/021414 patent/WO2001011817A2/en active Application Filing
- 2000-08-07 AU AU65222/00A patent/AU6522200A/en not_active Abandoned
Non-Patent Citations (2)
Title |
---|
BHARGHAVAN V: "Secure Wireless LANs" 2ND ACM CONFERENCE ON COMPUTER AND COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY, 2 November 1994 (1994-11-02), XP002155490 * |
KWON T ET AL: "AUTHENTICATED KEY EXCHANGE PROTOCOLS RESISTANT TO PASSWORD GUESSING ATTACKS" IEE PROCEEDINGS: COMMUNICATIONS,INSTITUTION OF ELECTRICAL ENGINEERS,GB, vol. 145, no. 5, October 1998 (1998-10), pages 304-308, XP000793271 ISSN: 1350-2425 * |
Cited By (10)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
US7373507B2 (en) | 2000-08-10 | 2008-05-13 | Plethora Technology, Inc. | System and method for establishing secure communication |
WO2007017288A2 (en) * | 2005-08-11 | 2007-02-15 | Giesecke & Devrient Gmbh | Method for protecting the authentication of a portable data carrier relative to a reading device via an unsecure communications path |
WO2007017288A3 (en) * | 2005-08-11 | 2007-05-18 | Giesecke & Devrient Gmbh | Method for protecting the authentication of a portable data carrier relative to a reading device via an unsecure communications path |
US8386786B2 (en) | 2006-07-04 | 2013-02-26 | David Irvine | File system authentication |
EP2738705A1 (en) * | 2012-11-30 | 2014-06-04 | Certicom Corp. | Challenge-Response Authentication Using a Masked Response Value |
US9369290B2 (en) | 2012-11-30 | 2016-06-14 | Certicom Corp. | Challenge-response authentication using a masked response value |
US9727720B2 (en) | 2012-11-30 | 2017-08-08 | Certicom Corp. | Challenge-response authentication using a masked response value |
CN103428221A (en) * | 2013-08-26 | 2013-12-04 | 百度在线网络技术(北京)有限公司 | Safety logging method, system and device of mobile application |
US9560046B2 (en) | 2014-11-07 | 2017-01-31 | Kaiser Foundation Hospitals | Device notarization |
US9560030B2 (en) | 2014-11-07 | 2017-01-31 | Kaiser Foundation Hospitals | Nodal random authentication |
Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
---|---|
AU6522200A (en) | 2001-03-05 |
WO2001011817A3 (en) | 2001-12-06 |
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