WO2001001629A1 - Systeme de stockage et de gestion proteges dans un serveur tdc - Google Patents

Systeme de stockage et de gestion proteges dans un serveur tdc Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2001001629A1
WO2001001629A1 PCT/EP2000/005642 EP0005642W WO0101629A1 WO 2001001629 A1 WO2001001629 A1 WO 2001001629A1 EP 0005642 W EP0005642 W EP 0005642W WO 0101629 A1 WO0101629 A1 WO 0101629A1
Authority
WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
key
user
enciphered
seskey
pubkeya
Prior art date
Application number
PCT/EP2000/005642
Other languages
English (en)
Inventor
Marten De Boer
Geert Kleinhuis
Original Assignee
Koninklijke Kpn N.V.
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Koninklijke Kpn N.V. filed Critical Koninklijke Kpn N.V.
Priority to EP00942100A priority Critical patent/EP1197034A1/fr
Priority to AU56838/00A priority patent/AU5683800A/en
Publication of WO2001001629A1 publication Critical patent/WO2001001629A1/fr

Links

Classifications

    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3297—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving time stamps, e.g. generation of time stamps
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
    • H04L9/0819—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s)
    • H04L9/083—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s) involving central third party, e.g. key distribution center [KDC] or trusted third party [TTP]
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0894—Escrow, recovery or storing of secret information, e.g. secret key escrow or cryptographic key storage
    • H04L9/0897—Escrow, recovery or storing of secret information, e.g. secret key escrow or cryptographic key storage involving additional devices, e.g. trusted platform module [TPM], smartcard or USB
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/30—Public key, i.e. encryption algorithm being computationally infeasible to invert or user's encryption keys not requiring secrecy
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/321—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving a third party or a trusted authority
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3247—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures

Definitions

  • TTP Trusted Third Party
  • the invention relates to, in other words, a timeless key and storage system for the benefit of the long-term storage of electronically exchanged (digitally protected) information and protectedly making available (secure retrieving) the stored data.
  • the object of the invention is to overcome said drawbacks.
  • the invention provides for a system having means for carrying out the functionalities: "Secure Archiving”, “Re-encryption” and “Secure Retrieval”, which will be discussed below.
  • the optional items “Digital Sign” and “Time Stamp” will be discussed separately.
  • a file is transmitted from a first user to a second user in a safe way
  • the file is enciphered with a symmetrical session key, which in its turn is enciphered with the public key of the second user.
  • Said second user may decipher the session key with his private key and decipher the file itself with the session key deciphered in this manner .
  • the session key is also enciphered by the first user with the public key of an "in-line" TTP server (i.e., included in the transmission channel between the first and second users) , which TTP server deciphers the session key received with his private key.
  • the TTP server enciphers the deciphered session key with a "public" storage key.
  • the session key enciphered with said public storage key and the file enciphered with the session key are subsequently stored in a storage medium of the TTP.
  • public and private keys constitute an asymmetric pair of keys. If a file or a code is enciphered with the public key of an asymmetric pair of keys, said file or code may be deciphered only with the help of the associated private key and vice versa.
  • the public keys are available to "the public", e.g., by way of a publicly accessible data base, such as www.pgp.com.
  • the users and the TTP each dispose of a pair of keys, each consisting of a public and a private key, and in particular intented for protecting the mutual data exchange of the files and codes.
  • the TTP disposes of a pair of keys which is used within the TTP only; the "public” and private keys serve as protected storage or recovery ("secure retrieval"), as the case may be, of files and codes.
  • the public storage key is not, as is normally the case for public keys, put at the disposal of the public.
  • the TTP server may at regular points in time store the file once again in the storage medium.
  • the session key with which the file was enciphered is first recovered by deciphering - with the private storage key - the stored (enciphered) session key. Subsequently, the enciphered file stored in the storage medium is deciphered with the recovered session key.
  • the TTP server then generates a new asymmetric pair of storage keys, consisting of a new public storage key (which is not made available outside the TTP) and a new private storage key, and a new version of the symmetrical session key, whereafter the TTP enciphers the deciphered file with the new session key and stores it in the storage medium.
  • the TTP also enciphers the new session key with the new public storage key and stores said enciphered session key in the storage medium.
  • the symmetrical session key is recovered from the storage medium by deciphering, with the private storage key, the stored enciphered session key.
  • the recovered session key is subsequently enciphered with the current public key of the first or second user, as the case may be, and transmitted to said user by way of the transmission channel, together with a copy of the file stored in the storage medium, enciphered with the session key.
  • the user may recover the session key therefrom by deciphering with his private key. Subsequently, the user may decipher the file enciphered with the session key using the recovered session key.
  • the public key of the first user may - as is well-known - be used to verify a digital signature of the file.
  • a problem arises if - which frequently occurs - the first user at a certain point in time, after the file has been stored in the TTP server, generates a new pair of keys (comprising a public and a private key) and discontinues the old one. For this reason, it is of importance to store the (original) public key of the first user in the TTP server, since only said original key may be used for verifying the digital signature of the stored, later retrievable file.
  • the TTP server after having received the enciphered file, also enciphers the - at that point in time publicly available - public key of the first user, with the public storage key, and stores said enciphered public key in the storage medium.
  • the public key of the first user may — upon retrieving the stored file — be recovered from the storage medium by deciphering, with the private storage key, said stored key.
  • the public key of the first user recovered in this manner is subsequently enciphered with the — at that point in time publicly available — public key of the retrieving first or second user, and transmitted by way of the transmission channel.
  • the user may recover the original public key of the first user by deciphering his current private key; subsequently, the digital signature of the recovered file may be verified using the recovered original public key of the first user.
  • the TTP server may generate a time stamp and store it, linked to the stored file and enciphered with the public storage key, in the storage medium.
  • the time stamp is deciphered and subsequently enciphered with the public key valid for said user and transmitted to the user.
  • the user may decipher the enciphered time stamp with his current private key.
  • Figures 1, 2 and 3 illustrate the functions "Secure Archiving", “Re-encryption” and "Secure
  • FIG. l "Secure Archiving" A file Txt is transmitted from a first user A to a second user B after having been enciphered with a symmetical session key SesKey. Said session key is enciphered with the public key FubKeyB of the second user. The latter may decipher the session key with his private key SecKeyB and the file itself with the deciphered session key. b
  • the session key is also enciphered by the first user with the public key of the TTP server PubKeyTTP, which, after having received it, deciphers said session key with his private key SecKeyTTP . Thereafter the TTP server enciphers the deciphered session key with a "public" storage key PubStorKey of the TTP.
  • the (transmission) keys of the users A and B each form an asymmetrical pair of keys, KeyPairA and KeyPairB, respectively, consisting of PubKeyA and SecKeyA, and PubKeyB and SecKeyB, respectively.
  • the TTP uses the pair of keys KeyPairTTP, consisting of PubKeyTTP and SecKeyTTP.
  • the public key PubKeyA of the first user A may be used to verify a digital signature DigSign of the file Txt.
  • the TTP server after having received the enciphered file (Txt) SesKey, also enciphers the - at that point in time publicly available - public key PubKeyA from the first user A, with the public storage key PubStorKey, and stores said enciphered public key (PubKeyA) PubStorKey in the storage medium DB.
  • the TTP server may generate a time stamp TSta p and store it, after enciphering with the public storage key PubStorKey and linked to the stored file, in the storage medium DB as (TStamp) PubStorKey.
  • FIG. 2 "Re-encryption"
  • the TTP server deciphers the enciphered file (Txt) SesKey stored in the storage medium with the session key SesKey, which for that purpose is recovered by deciphering the stored session key (SesKey) PubStorKey with the private storage key SecStorKey.
  • the TTP server subsequently generates a fresh pair of storage keys StorKeyPair, comprising a new "public” storage key PubStorKey' and a new private storage key SecStorKey' , as well as a new version of the symmetrical session key SesKey' .
  • the TTP subsequently enciphers the deciphered file Txt with the new session key SesKey' and stores the file (Txt) SesKey' enciphered in this manner in the storage medium DB.
  • the TTP also enciphers the new session key with the new public storage key PubStorKey' and stores the session key
  • the TTP server also deciphers the enciphered public key (PubKeyA) PubStorKey stored in the storage medium of the first user with the private storage key SecStorKey, and subsequently enciphers the deciphered public key PubKeyA with the newly generated public storage key PubStorKey' and stores the public key (PubKeyA) PubStorKey ' enciphered in this manner in the storage medium.
  • PubKeyA public key
  • PubStorKey PubStorKey
  • the TTP server also deciphers the enciphered time stamp (TStamp) PubStorKey stored in the storage medium with the private storage key SecStorKey, and subsequently enciphers the deciphered time stamp with the newly generated public storage key PubStorKey' and stores the time stamp (TStamp) PubStorKey' enciphered in this manner in the storage medium.
  • TTP stamp time stamp
  • PubStorKey stored in the storage medium with the private storage key SecStorKey
  • FIG. 3 "Secure Retrieval"
  • the symmetrical session key SesKey is recovered from the storage medium by deciphering, with the private storage key SecStorKey, the stored enciphered session key (SesKey) PubStorKe .
  • the recovered session key SesKey is subsequently enciphered with the then current public key PubKeyA * or PubKeyB", as the case may be, from the querying first or second user A or B, as the case may be, and transmitted to said user by way of the transmission channel, together with a copy of the file stored in the storage medium, with the user, after having received the enciphered session key (SesKey) PubKeyA *" or (SesKey) PubKeyB * " , being capable of recovering the session key therefrom by deciphering, with his private key SecKeyA" or SecKeyB", as the case may be, and subsequently being capable of deciphering the file (Txt) SesKey using the recovered session key.
  • the original public key PubKeyA of the first user may be recovered from the storage medium by deciphering, with the private storage key SecStorKey, the stored public key (PubKeyA) PubStorKey of the first user enciphered with the public storage key.
  • the deciphered public key PubKeyA of the first user recovered in this manner is subsequently enciphered with the current public key PubKeyA' or PubKeyB " ", as the case may be, of the retrieving first or second user A or B, as the case may be, and transmitted to the user by way of the transmission channel .
  • the time stamp is first retrieved by deciphering (TStamp) PubStorKey with the private storage key SecStorKey.
  • the recovered time stamp is subsequently enciphered with the user's current public key PubKeyA' or PubKeyB' , as the case may be, and transmitted to said user.
  • the user may decipher the enciphered time stamp (TStamp) PubKeyA' or (TStamp) PubKeyB" , as the case may be, with his current private key SecKeyA' or SecKeyB ' , as the case may be .

Landscapes

  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Computing Systems (AREA)
  • Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
  • Storage Device Security (AREA)

Abstract

L'invention concerne un système de stockage protégé dans un serveur TDC. Un fichier (Txt) est transmis d'un premier utilisateur (A) à un second utilisateur (B) après avoir été chiffré au moyen d'une clé de session (SesKey) chiffrée au moyen de la clé publique (PubKeyB) du second utilisateur. La clé de session (SesKey) est également chiffrée par le premier utilisateur au moyen de la clé publique (PubKeyTTP) du serveur TDC qui, après l'avoir reçue, déchiffre ladite clé de session au moyen de sa clé privée (SecKeyTTP). Le serveur TDC chiffre ensuite la clé de session (SesKey) et la clé publique (d'origine) (PubKeyA) du premier utilisateur (A) au moyen d'une clé de stockage « publique » (PubStorKey). La clé de session chiffrée [(SesKey)PubStorKey] et la clé publique [(PubKeyA)PubStorKey] du premier utilisateur sont stockées, avec le fichier chiffré [(Txt)SesKey], dans une mémoire (DB). Les clés peuvent être récupérées par déchiffrement par le serveur TDC au moyen de la clé de stockage privée (SecStorKey), et peuvent être transmises après avoir été chiffrées au moyen des clés publiques actuelles (PubKeyA' ou PubKeyB' selon le cas) des utilisateurs.
PCT/EP2000/005642 1999-06-25 2000-06-19 Systeme de stockage et de gestion proteges dans un serveur tdc WO2001001629A1 (fr)

Priority Applications (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
EP00942100A EP1197034A1 (fr) 1999-06-25 2000-06-19 Systeme de stockage et de gestion proteges dans un serveur tdc
AU56838/00A AU5683800A (en) 1999-06-25 2000-06-19 System for protected storage and management in a ttp server

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
NL1012435 1999-06-25
NL1012435A NL1012435C2 (nl) 1999-06-25 1999-06-25 Systeem voor beveiligde opslag en beheer in een TTP server.

Publications (1)

Publication Number Publication Date
WO2001001629A1 true WO2001001629A1 (fr) 2001-01-04

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PCT/EP2000/005642 WO2001001629A1 (fr) 1999-06-25 2000-06-19 Systeme de stockage et de gestion proteges dans un serveur tdc

Country Status (4)

Country Link
EP (1) EP1197034A1 (fr)
AU (1) AU5683800A (fr)
NL (1) NL1012435C2 (fr)
WO (1) WO2001001629A1 (fr)

Cited By (5)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
EP1241826A2 (fr) * 2001-03-14 2002-09-18 Hitachi, Ltd. Procédé d'administration de clés cryptographiques
US7246379B2 (en) 2002-07-10 2007-07-17 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. Method and system for validating software code
US8984636B2 (en) 2005-07-29 2015-03-17 Bit9, Inc. Content extractor and analysis system
WO2019165707A1 (fr) * 2018-02-28 2019-09-06 深圳市达仁基因科技有限公司 Procédé de partage de fichiers, dispositif informatique et support d'informations
US20220058269A1 (en) * 2018-12-19 2022-02-24 Telit Communications S.P.A. Systems and methods for managing a trusted application in a computer chip module

Citations (2)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
EP0422757A2 (fr) * 1989-10-13 1991-04-17 Addison M. Fischer Installation de certification notarielle de la date et de l'heure utilisant une clé publique
EP0892521A2 (fr) * 1997-07-15 1999-01-20 Hewlett-Packard Company Procedé et dispositif de vérification a long terme de signatures numériques

Patent Citations (2)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
EP0422757A2 (fr) * 1989-10-13 1991-04-17 Addison M. Fischer Installation de certification notarielle de la date et de l'heure utilisant une clé publique
EP0892521A2 (fr) * 1997-07-15 1999-01-20 Hewlett-Packard Company Procedé et dispositif de vérification a long terme de signatures numériques

Non-Patent Citations (1)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Title
DENNING D E ET AL: "A taxonomy for key escrow encryption systems", COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ACM, MARCH 1996, ACM, USA, vol. 39, no. 3, pages 34 - 40, XP000676295, ISSN: 0001-0782 *

Cited By (6)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
EP1241826A2 (fr) * 2001-03-14 2002-09-18 Hitachi, Ltd. Procédé d'administration de clés cryptographiques
EP1241826A3 (fr) * 2001-03-14 2003-02-26 Hitachi, Ltd. Procédé d'administration de clés cryptographiques
US7246379B2 (en) 2002-07-10 2007-07-17 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. Method and system for validating software code
US8984636B2 (en) 2005-07-29 2015-03-17 Bit9, Inc. Content extractor and analysis system
WO2019165707A1 (fr) * 2018-02-28 2019-09-06 深圳市达仁基因科技有限公司 Procédé de partage de fichiers, dispositif informatique et support d'informations
US20220058269A1 (en) * 2018-12-19 2022-02-24 Telit Communications S.P.A. Systems and methods for managing a trusted application in a computer chip module

Also Published As

Publication number Publication date
AU5683800A (en) 2001-01-31
NL1012435C2 (nl) 2000-12-28
EP1197034A1 (fr) 2002-04-17

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