WO2000079457A1 - Systeme et procede permettant une authentification dans un reseau public - Google Patents

Systeme et procede permettant une authentification dans un reseau public Download PDF

Info

Publication number
WO2000079457A1
WO2000079457A1 PCT/US2000/016938 US0016938W WO0079457A1 WO 2000079457 A1 WO2000079457 A1 WO 2000079457A1 US 0016938 W US0016938 W US 0016938W WO 0079457 A1 WO0079457 A1 WO 0079457A1
Authority
WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
otp
electronic
customer
electronic system
segment
Prior art date
Application number
PCT/US2000/016938
Other languages
English (en)
Inventor
David Scott Benson
Quiche' John Carpenter
Peter Jakl
Diane Trout
Chong Ahn
Original Assignee
Internet Revenue Network, Inc.
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Internet Revenue Network, Inc. filed Critical Internet Revenue Network, Inc.
Priority to AU56262/00A priority Critical patent/AU5626200A/en
Publication of WO2000079457A1 publication Critical patent/WO2000079457A1/fr

Links

Classifications

    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
    • H04L63/0428—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/30—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks
    • G06Q20/34—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks using cards, e.g. integrated circuit [IC] cards or magnetic cards
    • G06Q20/341—Active cards, i.e. cards including their own processing means, e.g. including an IC or chip
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/38—Payment protocols; Details thereof
    • G06Q20/382—Payment protocols; Details thereof insuring higher security of transaction
    • G06Q20/3827—Use of message hashing
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/38—Payment protocols; Details thereof
    • G06Q20/40—Authorisation, e.g. identification of payer or payee, verification of customer or shop credentials; Review and approval of payers, e.g. check credit lines or negative lists
    • G06Q20/409—Device specific authentication in transaction processing
    • G06Q20/4097—Device specific authentication in transaction processing using mutual authentication between devices and transaction partners
    • G06Q20/40975—Device specific authentication in transaction processing using mutual authentication between devices and transaction partners using encryption therefor
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q30/00—Commerce
    • G06Q30/06—Buying, selling or leasing transactions
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
    • G07F7/00—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus
    • G07F7/08—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means
    • G07F7/10—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means together with a coded signal, e.g. in the form of personal identification information, like personal identification number [PIN] or biometric data
    • G07F7/1008—Active credit-cards provided with means to personalise their use, e.g. with PIN-introduction/comparison system
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
    • G07F7/00—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus
    • G07F7/08—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means
    • G07F7/10—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means together with a coded signal, e.g. in the form of personal identification information, like personal identification number [PIN] or biometric data
    • G07F7/1016—Devices or methods for securing the PIN and other transaction-data, e.g. by encryption
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
    • H04L63/083—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities using passwords
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/12—Applying verification of the received information
    • H04L63/126—Applying verification of the received information the source of the received data
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L2463/00—Additional details relating to network architectures or network communication protocols for network security covered by H04L63/00
    • H04L2463/102—Additional details relating to network architectures or network communication protocols for network security covered by H04L63/00 applying security measure for e-commerce

Definitions

  • the present invention relates to the field of data security.
  • this invention relates to a system and method for securing electronic commerce over a public network.
  • Internet an enormous compilation of publicly accessible networks situated throughout the world. Due to its growing acceptance, the Internet is quickly becoming a worldwide marketplace for products and services. For electronic commerce (e- commercc) to fully evolve, customers need access to information about the products or services being sold by a particular merchant. Also > it is important to the public at large that e-commerce implements a secure, on-line credit card payment system to avoid the perpetuation of fraud.
  • An "electronic wallet” is a file stored on a hard drive of the owner of the wallet.
  • the contents of an electronic wallet typically include sensitive information about the owner such as, for example, his or her social security number, drivers license number, credit card information (e.g., credit card number, expiration date, what financial institution issued the credit card, etc.) and the like.
  • sensitive information e.g., credit card number, expiration date, what financial institution issued the credit card, etc.
  • the sensitive information is provided to a merchant. Thereafter, the merchant submits the credit card number and payment sum for authorization.
  • the card verification procedure requires the merchants to perform the following tasks: (i) verifying the identity of a credit card holder by comparing the signature on the back of the credit card with the signed charge receipt, and (ii) obtaining authorization from a payment processing system to indicate that the customer has sufficient credit before releasing the goods to the customer.
  • a merchant cannot verify the identity of the credit card holder because physical examination of the customer's credit card is not feasible.
  • the present invention relates to a method for increasing security of electronic commerce transactions over a public network between a first electronic system controlled by a customer and a second electronic system.
  • a challenge message is provided from the second electronic system to the first electronic system.
  • the challenge message includes at least (i) a sequence number, (ii) a one-time pad (OTP) seed value, and (iii) a hash value based on the sequence number, the OTP seed value, an OTP key and a shared secret.
  • the first electronic system Upon receiving the challenge message, the first electronic system computes an OTP key and a shared secret.
  • the OTP key based on the sequence number, the OTP seed value and a first segment of the electronic password entered by the customer.
  • the shared secret is based on a second segment of the cntcrod electronic password and a segment of an electronic personal identification generated by the second electronic system and associated with the customer.
  • the first electronic system also computes a hash value based on (i) the sequence number, (ii) the OTP seed value, (iii) the computed OTP key and (iv) the computed shared secret. This hash value is used to authenticate the second electronic system by determining that the hash value matches the hash value of the challenge message.
  • Figure I is a block diagram of an illustrative embodiment of a secure e- commerce network is shown.
  • FIG. 2 is a flowchart of an illustrative embodiment of the registration scheme to support the authentication protocol of the network of Figure 1.
  • Figure 3 is a flowchart of an illustrative embodiment of a registration window displayable at the customer.
  • Figure 4 is a block diagram of an illustrative embodiment of the operations of the OTP function during registration.
  • FIG. 5 is a block diagram of an illustrative embodiment of the operations of the OTP functions at registration.
  • Figure 6 is a block diagram of an illustrative embodiment of the authentication protocol during a transaction.
  • FIGS. 7A and 7B are flowcharts of an illustrative embodiment of the authentication protocol.
  • Figure 8 is a block diagram of an illustrative embodiment of a purchase verification window at the customer during authentication.
  • DRTATT.F.n r>P.srRTPTT N Certain embodiments of the invention are described to provide a system and method for increasing security of electronic commerce (e-commerce) transactions over a public network.
  • the term "secure” indicates that it is virtually infeasible for an unauthorized individual to successfully perpetuate fraud by tampering with transmitted information without detection.
  • examples of system architecture and protocols for registration and authentication of a customer and service provider are described. These examples should be broadly construed as illustrative in nature in order to represent the spirit of the invention.
  • an "electronic system” is broadly defined as hardware capable of processing information and accessing a public network.
  • Each electronic system includes, but is not limited or restricted to a computer (e.g., a laptop, desktop, hand-held, server, mainframe, etc.), imaging equipment (e.g., printer, facsimile machine, etc.), a set-top box, network routing equipment and the like.
  • the electronic systems are coupled together by a public network (e.g., a wide area network "WAN”, a local area network "LAN”, etc.) which has one or more communication links through which information can be routed.
  • POTS Plain Old Telephone System
  • ''information includes one or more bits of data, address, control signals or any combination thereof.
  • Charge card information includes one or more of the following: credit card numbers, debit card numbers, expiration date, name of the issuing financial institution, billing information concerning the credit card holder, etc.
  • a "transaction” includes the purchase or rental of a product based on credit or an outstanding monetary balance on an account. Another examples of transactions include access requests to information stored at a web site accessible only to pre-paid members.
  • An “entity” includes a business, individual, partnership or other group of individuals.
  • a “merchant” includes an entity (or hardware or software of an electronic system acting on behalf of the entity) in the business of selling goods and/or services.
  • a “customer” includes an entity (or hardware or software of an electronic system acting on behalf of the entity) concerned with an on-line purchase from a merchant.
  • a “service provider” includes an entity (or hardware or software of an electronic system acting on behalf of the entity) responsible for authorizing a transaction by a customer.
  • Network 100 comprises a plurality of electronic systems logically coupled together through a public network 110 such as the Internet for example. As shown, these electronic systems include a first electronic system (customer) 120, a second electronic system (merchant) 130 and a third electronic system (service provider) 140.
  • customer 120 establishes a logical connection with merchant 130 over public network 110, Normally, the logical connection is established through an Internet Service Provider (ISP) as shown by dashed lines, Customer 120 may directly access a web page produced by merchant 130 and retrieve digital advertisements therefrom. These advertisements include pictures and/or descriptions of products or services offered for sale or lease. Also, in lieu of directly accessing web pages of merchant 130, customer 120 may directly access one or more Uniform Resource Locators (URLs) associated with sponsored merchants that are displayed on a web page produced by service provider 140.
  • ISP Internet Service Provider
  • URLs Uniform Resource Locators
  • first electronic system associated with customer 120 includes a One-Time Pad (OTP) function stored in memory.
  • OTP One-Time Pad
  • the OTP function performs logical operations (e.g., exclusive OR "XOR" operations) on input information loaded into the OTP function.
  • the input information is bitwise XOR'ed with a predetermined reference, namely a sequence of bits referred to as a "OTP seed".
  • OTP seed a sequence of bits
  • the third electronic system associated with service provider 140 includes memory loaded with communication software (e.g., a browser), encryption/decryption software, and the OTP function. Also, service provider 140 is in communication with a remote, independent payment processing system 150 through dedicated communication links (e.g., secure leased lines) 160.
  • Payment processing system 150 includes a database controlled by a financial institution or an agent for the financial institution responsible for authorizing debits or credits against a charge card. It is contemplated, however, that the credit/debit authorization may be performed by service provider 140 instead of being performed by a separate payment processing system 150. For example, this can be accomplished by caching invalid credit card numbers and periodically accessing payment processing system 150 for an updated listing of invalid credit card numbers,
  • the above-identified architecture supports a web-based, authentication protocol designed to facilitate secure on-line transactions.
  • This authentication protocol is a combination of "shared secret” authentication and a unique electronic transaction tag using an OTP function to validate a customer transaction.
  • service provider 140 confirms (and perhaps determines) the approval or denial of the transaction.
  • service provider 140 is capable of authenticating customers and verifying transactions in order to reduce the number of "charge backs" that are common to mail order/telephone order transactions.
  • FIG. 2 a flowchart of an illustrative embodiment of a registration scheme for the authentication protocol is shown. Upon completion of the registration scheme, one or more database records for the newly registered customer are created and stored by service provider 140 of Figure 1.
  • a customer establishes a secure logical connection (e.g., a Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol 'TCP/IP" connection) with the service provider of Figure 1 .
  • a secure logical connection e.g., a Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol 'TCP/IP" connection
  • the customer prompts the service provider to transfer an applet (block 210).
  • the customer selects an ActiveX-controlled object on a publicly accessible web page produced by the service provider.
  • ActiveX is a library provided by Microsoft Corporation of Redmond, Washington.
  • the applet Upon execution, the applet produces a sequence of events (block 220). For example, one event involves the display of a registration window 300 as shown in Figure 3.
  • Registration window 300 includes a plurality of fields of which the contents entered into these fields are provided to the service provider.
  • the plurality of fields includes a customer information field 310, a charge field 320 and a pass-phrase field 330.
  • customer information field 310 includes billing information such as a list of namc(s) and address(es) of the person or persons authorized to use the charge card(s) listed in charge field 320.
  • Charge field 320 includes charge card information such as, for example, at least one charge card account number, the type of charge card (e.g., VISA®, Mastercard®, Discover®, American Express®, debit card from a certain financial institution, etc), and/or the expiration date of the charge card. It is contemplated that charge field 320 may include an account routing number for a cash balance retained at a bank or by the authorization system.
  • Pass-phrase field 330 receives, a string of alphanumeric characters (referred to as "psygnature pass-phrase") as input, Referring back to Figure 2, a segment (e.g., a portion, rearrangement of the current content, etc.) of the psygnature pass-phrase is used for customer authentication as described in Figures 4-7.
  • the billing information, credit card information and the psygnature pass- phrase are encrypted in accordance with secure socket layer (SSL) encryption protocol before transmission to the service provider (block 230).
  • SSL secure socket layer
  • An account number (referred to as an electronic personal identification number “ePin”) is assigned to the customer and subsequently provided to the customer electronically or by mail (block 250).
  • a segment of the ePin referred to as an "OTP_ID,” operates as an index for the database entry assigned to the customer.
  • the psygnature pass-phrase is not stored anywhere in the database for enhanced security. Instead, as described below, a segment of the psygnature pass-phrase (referred to as a "OTP pass-phrase") and an OTP seed (possibly being some segment or version of the ePin) are loaded into an OTP function.
  • the OTP pass-phrase is a remainder of the psygnature pass-phrase after removal of the OTP_ID.
  • the OTP function undergoes N iterative operations, where intermediary results are reloaded in lieu of the OTP pass-phrase to produce an OTP key, where "N" is equal to a predetermined initial sequence number (block 260).
  • the OTP key is stored in the database entry of the service provider (block 270).
  • the OTP function at the service provider receives as input three sources of information, namely the OTP pass-phrase, an OTP seed and a sequence number (blocks 410 and 420). These input sources are computed from values provided by the customer (e.g., psygnature pass-phrase) or generated by the service provider (e.g., ePin).
  • the "OTP pass-phrase” is a predetermined segment of the psygnature pass-phrase that is provided by the customer during registration.
  • the "OTP seed” is a random series of alphanumeric characters.
  • a selected series of characters associated with the ePin may be used.
  • the series has a maximum length of 16 bits.
  • the "sequence number" is a number that is decremcnted each time there is a successful authentication,
  • the sequence number determines the number of iterations performed by the OTP function on the input sources OTP pass-phrase and OTP seed (blocks 430, 440 and 450).
  • the final result is equal to the OTP key (block 460). Therefore, the initial starting number should be high enough to support a "maximum" number of transactions prior to a changing the OTP pass-phrase, which resets the sequence number to its default (initial) value.
  • selected data is held in secret and known only by the service provider and the customer.
  • This "shared secret” is refrained from being transmitted over the network; instead, only computations based on its value are exchanged.
  • the shared secret is computed from predetermined segments of both the psygnature pass-phrase (provided by the customer during registration) and the ePin (generated by the service provider during registration).
  • the shared secret is also transparently added as part of the shopper's identity at the time of registration.
  • the shared secret is computed by removing the 4 ⁇ through 7 fe digits 510 of the generated 16-digit ePin (account number) 500 and the first 3 characters of every 12 characters entered by the customer for psygnature pass-phrase 520.
  • ePin 500 is produced as "1234567890123456”
  • OTP_ID the value "123890123456"
  • SS_Pin the value "4567”
  • psygnature pass- phrase 520 is selected by the customer to be "this is a very long password, really it is"
  • the resultant OTP pass-phrase 540 would be "s is a velong passd” and the string "thiry wor" (SS_Pass) 550 would be used for the shared secret.
  • SS_Pin 510 and SS_Pass 550 are removed and combined in accordance with a selected combination (e.g., concatenation, modulo addition, etc.) 560 to produce shared secret 570.
  • the remainder of ePin 500 and psygnature pass-phrase 520, namely OTP_ID 530 and OTP pass-phrase 540 are used for addressing and production of the OTP key, respectively.
  • the customer may be prompted to select an image from a list of images stored at the service provider. Upon selection of an image by the customer, during each transaction, the image is transferred to the customer for display on a purchase verification window. This prohibits Trojan horse attacks.
  • FIG. 6 a block diagram and flowcharts of an embodiment of the authentication protocol followed during a transaction are shown.
  • the authentication protocol is initially performed over a TCP/IP connection established between customer 120 and service provider 140. Prior to these operations, customer 120 has followed the registration scheme as described above. Also, customer 120 has selected different goods and/or services to purchase through the use of a well-known shopping cart application and has selected a payment object supplied by the merchant's web page. This establishes the TCP IP connection with service provider 140 (block 700).
  • customer 120 enters his or her ePin and the psygnature pass-phrase into an appropriate field of a purchasing window and selects an A-OK button (block 705).
  • both customer 120 and service provider 140 exchange sequences of random information 600 and 605 in order to reduce the threat of attack.
  • service provider 140 internally generates and transmits a first sequence of random data (Ra) 600 to customer 120 (block 710).
  • Customer 120 responds by sending OTP_ID 610 along with a second sequence of random data (Rb) 605 generated by customer 120 (block 715).
  • OTP_ID 610 operates as an index to access a database entry associated with customer 120.
  • service provider 140 begins authentication of customer 120 by first detecting if OPT_ID 610 is invalid (block 720). This can be accomplished by searching through a number of list of indices associated with a look-up table for example. If OTP_ID 610 is invalid, random data is returned to customer 120 so that additional resources are required of an attacker (block 725), If OTP_ID 610 is valid, service provider 140 transmits a challenge message 615 back to customer 120 as shown in Figure 6 (block 730).
  • "Challenge message" 615 contains a current sequence number (N) 620 stored in the database entry, an OTP seed value (OSV) 625 (perhaps a segment of the ePin used in the initial computation of the OTP key), customer specific data (UD) 630 such as an assigned image selected by the customer during registration, for example, and a hash value 635.
  • Hash value 635 is the result produced by a hash function on a combination of sequence number (N) 620, OTP seed value (OSV) 625, customer specific data (UD) 630, a current OTP key computed by service provider 140 (OK) 640, shared secret (SS) 645 and optionally first and second random data sequences (Ra and Rb) 600 and 605.
  • customer 120 Upon receiving challenge message 615, customer 120 computes a shared secret 650 based on a hash value of selected segments (SS_Pass, SS_Pin) of customer entered psygnature pass-phrase 655 and ePin 660 (block 735). Also, an OTP key 665 is computed based on contents (OTP pass-phrase) of the customer entered psygnature pass-phrase 655, sequence number 620 and OTP seed value 625 (block 740). Customer 120 combines the provided sequence number (N) 620, OTP seed value (OSV) 625, customer specific data (UD) 630 with computed OTP key 665 and shared secret 660 to produce a check result 670 (block 745).
  • N sequence number
  • OSV OTP seed value
  • UD customer specific data
  • Check result 670 undergoes a hash operation to compute a hash value 675, which is compared to hash value 635 (blocks 750 and 755). If hash values 635 and 675 do not match, the transaction ceases because the data has been modified and or service provider 140 is not authenticated (block 760).
  • the current sequence number 620 is decremented (N-l) as shown in block 765. Also, the following items are displayed on a purchase verification window as shown in Figure 8. For example, the total purchase amount is displayed in a first field 800 while an image is displayed in a second field 810, The customer can visually check that the image is represented in second field 810 matches the registered image, If the image is different, the customer knows not to proceed with the transaction.
  • the customer selects an A-OK button 820 (see Figure 8) as shown in blocks 770 and 775, Initially, this prompts the OTP function at customer 120 to produce a new OTP key (NOK) 680 based on N-l iterations of OTP pass-phrase 661 and OTP seed value 625 (block 780).
  • NOK OTP key
  • AMT purchase amount
  • a hash value 690 featuring new OTP key 680, AMT 685, shared secret 665 and optionally random data sequences 600 and 605 is produced to verify that the sequence number and OTP seed have not been tampered with and that service provider 140 knows the shared secret information (block 785).
  • the message is validated by applying one extra iteration of the OTP function on new OTP key 680 to produce result 695.
  • Result 695 is compared with the stored (current) OTP key 640 (block 790). If result 695 matches stored OTP key 640, the shopper can continue (block 791). Otherwise, service provider 140 ceases the transaction and sends a "Failure" message and customer 120 responds accordingly (block 792). If the newly computed OTP key 680 matches OTP key 640 stored in the database, the database is updated with this new OTP key 680 and decrements the sequence number for the next transaction. Customer 120 and service provider 140 will now receive different keys for the next authentication, The sequence number is decremented so hackers cannot compute sequences given historical data,
  • SSL secure socket

Landscapes

  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Business, Economics & Management (AREA)
  • Accounting & Taxation (AREA)
  • General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Strategic Management (AREA)
  • General Business, Economics & Management (AREA)
  • Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Finance (AREA)
  • Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
  • General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computing Systems (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Development Economics (AREA)
  • Economics (AREA)
  • Marketing (AREA)
  • Microelectronics & Electronic Packaging (AREA)
  • Financial Or Insurance-Related Operations Such As Payment And Settlement (AREA)

Abstract

L'invention concerne un système et un procédé permettant d'améliorer la sécurité des transactions de commerce électronique réalisées par l'intermédiaire d'un réseau public. Au lieu de recourir à une certification par tierce partie, ce procédé réalise une authentification à partir de valeurs (750) de hachage et d'une information résultante produites par des fonctions (745) de masque jetable (OTP).
PCT/US2000/016938 1999-06-17 2000-06-19 Systeme et procede permettant une authentification dans un reseau public WO2000079457A1 (fr)

Priority Applications (1)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
AU56262/00A AU5626200A (en) 1999-06-17 2000-06-19 System and method for authentication over a public network

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
US33522599A 1999-06-17 1999-06-17
US09/335,225 1999-06-17

Publications (1)

Publication Number Publication Date
WO2000079457A1 true WO2000079457A1 (fr) 2000-12-28

Family

ID=23310814

Family Applications (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
PCT/US2000/016938 WO2000079457A1 (fr) 1999-06-17 2000-06-19 Systeme et procede permettant une authentification dans un reseau public

Country Status (2)

Country Link
AU (1) AU5626200A (fr)
WO (1) WO2000079457A1 (fr)

Cited By (9)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
WO2001090987A1 (fr) * 2000-05-25 2001-11-29 Wilson How Kiap Gueh Systeme et procede de transactions
WO2002033616A1 (fr) * 2000-10-20 2002-04-25 Accenture Pte. Ltd. Procede et systeme destines a faciliter une transaction securisee en ligne entre des entreprises et des consommateurs en reseaux
WO2004091170A2 (fr) * 2003-03-31 2004-10-21 Visa U.S.A. Inc. Procede et systeme d'authentification securisee
CN1298194C (zh) * 2004-03-22 2007-01-31 西安电子科技大学 基于漫游密钥交换认证协议的无线局域网安全接入方法
WO2008022917A1 (fr) * 2006-08-22 2008-02-28 Nokia Siemens Networks Gmbh & Co. Kg Procédé d'authentification
GB2467975A (en) * 2009-02-24 2010-08-25 Hewlett Packard Development Co Authentication method and apparatus using one time pads
GB2482664A (en) * 2010-07-30 2012-02-15 Makalu Technologies Ltd Method for authorising a payment
CN101478386B (zh) * 2007-12-21 2013-05-08 英特尔公司 在计算机系统中配备主动管理技术(amt)
CN110942566A (zh) * 2019-11-27 2020-03-31 中国银行股份有限公司 一种身份认证方法及相关设备

Citations (8)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US5272754A (en) * 1991-03-28 1993-12-21 Secure Computing Corporation Secure computer interface
US5276735A (en) * 1992-04-17 1994-01-04 Secure Computing Corporation Data enclave and trusted path system
US5796834A (en) * 1994-01-03 1998-08-18 E-Stamp Corporation System and method for controlling the dispensing of an authenticating indicia
US5819092A (en) * 1994-11-08 1998-10-06 Vermeer Technologies, Inc. Online service development tool with fee setting capabilities
US5862260A (en) * 1993-11-18 1999-01-19 Digimarc Corporation Methods for surveying dissemination of proprietary empirical data
US5889863A (en) * 1996-06-17 1999-03-30 Verifone, Inc. System, method and article of manufacture for remote virtual point of sale processing utilizing a multichannel, extensible, flexible architecture
US5903882A (en) * 1996-12-13 1999-05-11 Certco, Llc Reliance server for electronic transaction system
US6088456A (en) * 1996-11-15 2000-07-11 Desktop Guardian Limited Data encryption technique

Patent Citations (10)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US5272754A (en) * 1991-03-28 1993-12-21 Secure Computing Corporation Secure computer interface
US5276735A (en) * 1992-04-17 1994-01-04 Secure Computing Corporation Data enclave and trusted path system
US5499297A (en) * 1992-04-17 1996-03-12 Secure Computing Corporation System and method for trusted path communications
US5502766A (en) * 1992-04-17 1996-03-26 Secure Computing Corporation Data enclave and trusted path system
US5862260A (en) * 1993-11-18 1999-01-19 Digimarc Corporation Methods for surveying dissemination of proprietary empirical data
US5796834A (en) * 1994-01-03 1998-08-18 E-Stamp Corporation System and method for controlling the dispensing of an authenticating indicia
US5819092A (en) * 1994-11-08 1998-10-06 Vermeer Technologies, Inc. Online service development tool with fee setting capabilities
US5889863A (en) * 1996-06-17 1999-03-30 Verifone, Inc. System, method and article of manufacture for remote virtual point of sale processing utilizing a multichannel, extensible, flexible architecture
US6088456A (en) * 1996-11-15 2000-07-11 Desktop Guardian Limited Data encryption technique
US5903882A (en) * 1996-12-13 1999-05-11 Certco, Llc Reliance server for electronic transaction system

Cited By (16)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
WO2001090987A1 (fr) * 2000-05-25 2001-11-29 Wilson How Kiap Gueh Systeme et procede de transactions
WO2002033616A1 (fr) * 2000-10-20 2002-04-25 Accenture Pte. Ltd. Procede et systeme destines a faciliter une transaction securisee en ligne entre des entreprises et des consommateurs en reseaux
WO2004091170A2 (fr) * 2003-03-31 2004-10-21 Visa U.S.A. Inc. Procede et systeme d'authentification securisee
WO2004091170A3 (fr) * 2003-03-31 2005-02-17 Visa Usa Inc Procede et systeme d'authentification securisee
US7702916B2 (en) 2003-03-31 2010-04-20 Visa U.S.A. Inc. Method and system for secure authentication
CN1298194C (zh) * 2004-03-22 2007-01-31 西安电子科技大学 基于漫游密钥交换认证协议的无线局域网安全接入方法
WO2008022917A1 (fr) * 2006-08-22 2008-02-28 Nokia Siemens Networks Gmbh & Co. Kg Procédé d'authentification
JP2010502068A (ja) * 2006-08-22 2010-01-21 ノキア シーメンス ネットワークス ゲゼルシャフト ミット ベシュレンクテル ハフツング ウント コンパニー コマンディトゲゼルシャフト 認証方法
CN101512961B (zh) * 2006-08-22 2011-12-14 诺基亚西门子通信有限责任两合公司 用于进行认证的方法
US9411952B2 (en) 2006-08-22 2016-08-09 Nokia Siemens Networks Gmbh & Co. Kg Method for authentication
CN101478386B (zh) * 2007-12-21 2013-05-08 英特尔公司 在计算机系统中配备主动管理技术(amt)
GB2467975A (en) * 2009-02-24 2010-08-25 Hewlett Packard Development Co Authentication method and apparatus using one time pads
GB2467975B (en) * 2009-02-24 2014-09-10 Hewlett Packard Development Co Authentication method and apparatus using one time pads
GB2482664A (en) * 2010-07-30 2012-02-15 Makalu Technologies Ltd Method for authorising a payment
CN110942566A (zh) * 2019-11-27 2020-03-31 中国银行股份有限公司 一种身份认证方法及相关设备
CN110942566B (zh) * 2019-11-27 2022-10-21 中国银行股份有限公司 一种身份认证方法及相关设备

Also Published As

Publication number Publication date
AU5626200A (en) 2001-01-09

Similar Documents

Publication Publication Date Title
EP1245008B1 (fr) Procede et systeme pour l'execution authentifiee de paiements securises sur un reseau informatique
US7200577B2 (en) Method and apparatus for secure online transactions
US7983987B2 (en) System and method for conducting secure payment transaction
US7024395B1 (en) Method and system for secure credit card transactions
JP5721086B2 (ja) 電子マネーの管理方法
JP5638046B2 (ja) コンピュータ・ネットワーク上において行われる購買を許可する方法およびシステム
US9112842B1 (en) Secure authentication and transaction system and method
US6748367B1 (en) Method and system for effecting financial transactions over a public network without submission of sensitive information
US20010056409A1 (en) Offline one time credit card numbers for secure e-commerce
US20010039535A1 (en) Methods and systems for making secure electronic payments
US20020123972A1 (en) Apparatus for and method of secure ATM debit card and credit card payment transactions via the internet
US20010042051A1 (en) Network transaction system for minimizing software requirements on client computers
US20120191615A1 (en) Secure Credit Transactions
US20040059952A1 (en) Authentication system
JP2003519420A (ja) セキュリティを確保した取り引きシステム
JP2004527861A (ja) 安全な現金を使用しない支払取引を行うための方法および現金を使用しない支払システム
US20120317018A1 (en) Systems and methods for protecting account identifiers in financial transactions
US20190333062A1 (en) Secure authentication and transaction system and method
AU781671B2 (en) An improved method and system for conducting secure payments over a computer network
WO2000079457A1 (fr) Systeme et procede permettant une authentification dans un reseau public
Islam et al. A PKI Enabled Authentication Protocol for Secure E-Payment Framework
Assora et al. Using WPKI for security of web transaction
Pfitzmann et al. Smartcard-Supported Internet Payments
WO2002103642A2 (fr) Procede et systeme permettant des transactions sures par carte de credit

Legal Events

Date Code Title Description
AK Designated states

Kind code of ref document: A1

Designated state(s): AE AG AL AM AT AU AZ BA BB BG BR BY BZ CA CH CN CR CU CZ DE DK DM DZ EE ES FI GB GD GE GH GM HR HU ID IL IN IS JP KE KG KP KR KZ LC LK LR LS LT LU LV MA MD MG MK MN MW MX MZ NO NZ PL PT RO RU SD SE SG SI SK SL TJ TM TR TT TZ UA UG UZ VN YU ZA ZW

AL Designated countries for regional patents

Kind code of ref document: A1

Designated state(s): GH GM KE LS MW MZ SD SL SZ TZ UG ZW AM AZ BY KG KZ MD RU TJ TM AT BE CH CY DE DK ES FI FR GB GR IE IT LU MC NL PT SE BF BJ CF CG CI CM GA GN GW ML MR NE SN TD TG

121 Ep: the epo has been informed by wipo that ep was designated in this application
REG Reference to national code

Ref country code: DE

Ref legal event code: 8642

122 Ep: pct application non-entry in european phase
NENP Non-entry into the national phase

Ref country code: JP