WO2000036785A1 - Counterfeit deterrence system - Google Patents
Counterfeit deterrence system Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- WO2000036785A1 WO2000036785A1 PCT/US1999/030217 US9930217W WO0036785A1 WO 2000036785 A1 WO2000036785 A1 WO 2000036785A1 US 9930217 W US9930217 W US 9930217W WO 0036785 A1 WO0036785 A1 WO 0036785A1
- Authority
- WO
- WIPO (PCT)
- Prior art keywords
- user
- computer
- data
- image
- security document
- Prior art date
Links
Classifications
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04N—PICTORIAL COMMUNICATION, e.g. TELEVISION
- H04N1/00—Scanning, transmission or reproduction of documents or the like, e.g. facsimile transmission; Details thereof
- H04N1/00838—Preventing unauthorised reproduction
- H04N1/00856—Preventive measures
- H04N1/00859—Issuing an alarm or the like
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F17/00—Digital computing or data processing equipment or methods, specially adapted for specific functions
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04N—PICTORIAL COMMUNICATION, e.g. TELEVISION
- H04N1/00—Scanning, transmission or reproduction of documents or the like, e.g. facsimile transmission; Details thereof
- H04N1/00838—Preventing unauthorised reproduction
- H04N1/0084—Determining the necessity for prevention
- H04N1/00843—Determining the necessity for prevention based on recognising a copy prohibited original, e.g. a banknote
Definitions
- the present subject matter more generally relates to digital watermarking as typified, e.g., by the assignee's issued patents: 5,721,788, 5,768,426, 5,636,292, 5,841,978, 5,832,119, 5,745,604, 5,822,436, 5,841,886, 5,809,160, and copending applications 08/746,613, filed 11/12/96, 09/452,023, filed 11/30/99, entitled Watermark Detection Using a Fourier Mellin Transform, and 09/452,022, filed 11/30/99, entitled Method and System for Determining Image Transformation.
- a counterfeit deterrence system provides an effective and rapidly deployable global solution to this growing digital counterfeiting problem.
- the system provides a network of security document detectors in the personal computer infrastructure. These detectors create multiple intervention points in personal computers and related peripherals. Positive detection of a security document at any of these points triggers a predetermined counterfeit deterrence action.
- Security document detection relies on a special digital watermark, termed an Anti-Counterfeiting System (ACS) mark, which is added to security document designs. Such marking does not distract from the aesthetics of the security document, yet is readily and reliably detected during typically operations on a personal computer system.
- the ACS marks can be added to existing security document designs without changing the artwork (e.g. by pre- or post-processing the note to provide texture- or ink- markings). New designs can incorporate the watermarks as an integral part of their artwork.
- the preferred counterfeit deterrence system is capable of several deterrence actions in response to detection of a security document. These range from issuing warnings, to preventing certain operations, to scarring security document images — all designed to substantially deter creation of passable counterfeits.
- the illustrative system ' s intervention strategy prevents the acquisition and printing of security document images, while providing artists with a central resource to obtain approved images for use in marketing, communications, and other legitimate uses.
- These approved images can be controlled and distributed without certain key security features, with additional special security features, and offered in a way that balances the use of security documents as a symbol of country and commerce, without increasing the risk of counterfeiting.
- the result is eventual removal of unauthorized security document images from the desktop computing environment (provided necessary assistance is provided by issuing entities and computer equipment vendors; the latter may be required by legislation).
- recognition of an image by reference to a watermark may trigger other actions, such as commerce opportunities.
- Detectors are deployed both in hardware and software.
- detectors are deployed in image editing applications to intervene in scanning, file open, and file save operations, and in various device drivers. These initial locations can be supplemented to include other processing points, such as internet browsers, operating system, multi-function desktop peripherals, etc., etc. Intervention is augmented by a covert tracing system, which can be an integral part of the counterfeit deterrence system. As detailed in application 09/185,380, covert tracing serves to record suspected counterfeiting operations in multiple locations on the offending personal computer in a way that is intentionally obscured from the user. Law enforcement can use special tools to recover the covert audit trail, providing a means to corroborate a suspected offense.
- a counterfeit deterrence system includes an embedder, one or more detectors, and (optionally) a covert tracing system.
- the embedder serves to embed an ACS Mark into a security document.
- the ACS mark can take various forms — both visible and imperceptible -- as detailed in the cited patents and applications.
- the ACS mark embedder is a set of software programs designed to assist the user in application of ACS marks to security documents designs in the pre-press stage of development, either through universal application to the design, or application to a single plate or portion of a plate.
- An illustrative embedder runs under the Windows NT operating system and performs various functions, including receiving high-resolution security document image data, rasterizing vector designs, creating masks for those images (i.e. defining the areas of a plate that are to receive an ACS mark, and at what respective intensities), embedding ACS marks in rasterized image data, and transferring files to and from the prepress system.
- the embedder is a stand-alone group of programs. In another, it is a suite of tools that integrates seamlessly with designer tools, such as the Barco Fortuna system (e.g. using that system's TIFIT file export function). In either case, the ACS marks can be designed-in as part of the original artwork, or can be added-in after the original artwork has been completed. The output is typically produced in either TIFF or PNG form.
- the ACS mark can be a single bit (i.e., "do not copy"), but more typically comprises a plural-bit payload (e.g., 2 - 128 bits).
- Data conveyed in the payload can include, for a banknote, the denomination and country of issuance.
- the payload can also include a reserved area that can be encoded differently, as particular needs arise.
- notes can be serialized.
- notes can be marked for special purposes (e.g. circulation control) or to facilitate statistical studies (e.g. geographic dispersal studies for groups of notes issued from different banks).
- the embedder can work on a per-plate/film basis.
- the image for an exemplary plate is 37,500 pixels by 75,000 pixels, and is printed at a resolution in excess of 2500 dpi (e.g. 10,000 dpi).
- the embedder desirably employs traditional user interface elements to facilitate the different operations.
- an illustrative user interface permits the operator (1) to select one or more areas of a plate for application of an ACS mark, (2) to select the intensity of the ACS mark, (3) to add ACS marked background tints to the design, to (4) to manage marking of designs in which there are common design elements between different notes, etc., etc.
- Background tinting is discussed in the related applications (e.g. 09/127,502, filed July 31, 1998) and refers to subtle, visible patterning that encodes watermark data. In one embodiment, the patterning is tiled (i.e. repetitive).
- the patterning is scrambled using one of various known image manipulation/encryption techniques so that the same data is conveyed, but the patterning no longer has a repetitive appearance.
- the preferred tinting took the form of a weave pattern of fine lines.
- tinting not based on weave patterning can be used — e.g. other patterning that results in the desired luminance/reflectance changes can be employed.
- Such tinting can be applied to clear areas of the document, such as over the top of traditional paper watermarks where printing is usually limited so as to allow viewing of the paper watermark.
- the embedder may have the capability of incorporating multiple grid patterns into a single design.
- the embedder may also have the capability to vary the ACS mark intensity from region to region within a single plate or film.
- ACS marks can be applied in regions of continuous tone in the security document artwork. If the area is devoid of ink (i.e. the note in that region shows just the unprinted substrate), fine droplets of ink (e.g. less than 100 microns in diameter) can be scattered through the region to define the necessary changes in luminance/reflectance, without detracting from the aesthetics of the design. If the area has a uniform region of ink, small points devoid of ink (again, typically less than 100 microns, e.g. 30-50 microns) can be incorporated in the design to effect the intended luminance/reflectance change. In both cases, droplets or points of non-uniform size can be used so as to minimize visibility.
- the detailed embedder performs the embedding in the pixel domain, the tool could also support application of the ACS marks directly to vector design files, without the need to first convert the design to raster files.
- a validation tool can be provided with the embedder to read and examine the payload and strength of an ACS mark in a digital image or in a scan of a marked document.
- the results of such a tool can be used in a design environment in which tradeoffs between visibility and robustness are iteratively balanced.
- An illustrative ACS mark detector is a software development kit (SDK) designed for integration into software applications and control software including image editing applications, TWAIN drivers, scanner device drivers, printer device drivers, and other intervention points.
- SDK software development kit
- the SDK is a C/C++ callable library that includes a programming interface to the detector for easy integration into various software products.
- the detector may support various different color formats (e.g. RGB, CMYK, etc.).
- the detector takes the form of hardware, e.g. an ASIC, PLA, etc.
- Audit trail functionality can be integrated into the detector, causing detection of an ACS mark to trigger writing of covert audit records, e.g. in the host computer.
- the detector may also be responsive to other watermarks (e.g., the commercial digital watermark that can be embedded using Adobe Photoshop or using other image editing software available from other vendors).
- the detector(s) can be deployed at various intervention points, including scanner hardware, scanner driver, operating system, image editing application, printer driver, printer hardware, internet browser, communications port, etc.
- the detector is fully integrated with the software of which it forms a part, to prevent trivial work-arounds, such as removal of plug-ins.
- a detector When a detector senses security document image data, it can intervene in various ways. In one embodiment, the detector intervenes with a dialog box advising the user:
- This application does not support unauthorized ⁇ scanning. editing, printing, etc., as applicable> of controlled security documents.
- To obtain images for legitimate use select 'Get Image ' below, or go to www. imagedistribution. com.
- This dialog box includes a "Get Image” button that launches/directs a web browser resident on the computer to a web site authorized by the document issuer, from which substitute legitimate security document images are available for downloading.
- the substitute images appear ⁇ on first inspection ⁇ to be authenticate security document images, and are sufficiently close to satisfy all legitimate uses for security document imagery (e.g. for use in advertising, etc.) but on closer inspection are evidently illegitimate (e.g. they may be low resolution, front-only, and have certain key security features removed).
- Slightly different substitute images can be provided to each user (e.g. each image can have different tracking information embedded as a digital watermark). Registration and pre-authorization may be required for users who request the substitute images, and different security/authentication techniques can be employed to assure that accurate registration data is obtained.
- the just-described web site additionally provides additional relevant information. For example, it can include warnings regarding counterfeiting and illegal reproduction of security documents, specific to that country. It can also provide guidelines for legitimate use of security document images (e.g. required size/color, required registration and pre-authorization, etc.)
- the dialog box further includes a "Cancel” button that simply aborts the operation ⁇ scanning. printing, file opening, etc> that triggered the detector response.
- Another detector intervention is for the detector to substitute its own substitute data for the security document data. Scanning of a security document can result, for example, in image data corresponding to play money. Likewise for printing.
- the intervention response can be visual scarring of the image with the words "Copy" clearly repeated across the printed image.
- ACS mark detection capability can be provided by updated device drivers. Updated device drivers are commonly installed when a new application employing the device is installed, or an updated operating system is installed. On-line updates are also available for many programs; ACS mark compliant drivers can be installed via such on-line mechanisms as well. By such approaches, ACS mark capability is extended even to equipment that was released before deployment of the counterfeit deterrent system.
- the detector functionality can be tailored to the environment in which it is used, and the computing resources available to it. For example, in the environment of a printer, the detector may not need to concern itself with security documents that are printed at 150% normal size; such notes would never be passable. In contrast, detectors in image editing equipment should be robust against all manner of scaling.
- ACS mark detectors can be used in various security document reading/authenticating applications, and their functional requirements can depend accordingly.
- the feed mechanism limits rotations of the security document, and user-instructions can require that the note be fed from a predetermined end.
- scale and rotation are effects that can almost be disregarded.
- banknote counting equipment and in quality assurance testing apparatuses used by security document printers.
- covert Tracing The covert tracing function (e.g. the writing of hidden audit trail data in response to detection of security document data) is fully detailed in application 09/185,380, so that disclosure is not repeated here. Suffice to say that any detection of security document image data can trigger storage of one or more records that may include any or all of: payload of the detected ACS mark, data/time the operation was performed, computer type, operating system and version number, user ID, printer type, printer driver version, scanner type, and scanner driver version.
- the covert tracing function is invoked not just when security document data is sensed, but also when an attempt is made to patch or attack the detector software or functionality.
- covert tracing function is invoked not just when security document data is sensed, but also when an attempt is made to patch or attack the detector software or functionality.
- Miscellaneous Patent 5,841,886 discloses a self-authenticating identification document in which an image on the document is steganographically encoded to correspond in a predetermined manner with human-perceptible information on the document.
- the name of the owner of the card is both steganographically encoded in an image of the owner on the card, and is also textually printed on the card.
- the steganographically-embedded data need not ⁇ itself
- the correspondence can be effected through, e.g., a remote database.
- the embedded data can be an index into a remote database.
- a record in the database identified by this index can contain information on the card owner, including the card- owner's name.
- the index is steganographically decoded from the image, and the database then checked to confirm that the owner name corresponding to that index matches the owner name printed on the card.
- Stock certificates and other security documents can be steganographically encoded in such manners as an aid to authentication.
- the steganographic encoding can be accomplished by any of the security document embedding techniques discussed in the cited applications (e.g. line width modulation, etc.).
- non-security applications e.g., recognizing images, video, or audio being processed on a user's computer as belonging to a certain class, and presenting the user with a web page relating to that class of object. Commerce opportunities may thereby be made available to the user.
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- Software Systems (AREA)
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- General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
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- Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
- Data Mining & Analysis (AREA)
- Databases & Information Systems (AREA)
- Mathematical Physics (AREA)
- Computer Vision & Pattern Recognition (AREA)
- Editing Of Facsimile Originals (AREA)
- Image Processing (AREA)
- Facsimile Image Signal Circuits (AREA)
Abstract
Description
Claims
Priority Applications (5)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
KR1020017007645A KR20020003357A (en) | 1998-12-18 | 1999-12-16 | Counterfeit deterrence system |
CA002355715A CA2355715A1 (en) | 1998-12-18 | 1999-12-16 | Counterfeit deterrence system |
JP2000588925A JP2002532812A (en) | 1998-12-18 | 1999-12-16 | Anti-counterfeiting system |
EP99967414A EP1142190A4 (en) | 1998-12-18 | 1999-12-16 | Counterfeit deterrence system |
AU23695/00A AU2369500A (en) | 1998-12-18 | 1999-12-16 | Counterfeit deterrence system |
Applications Claiming Priority (2)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
US11295598P | 1998-12-18 | 1998-12-18 | |
US60/112,955 | 1998-12-18 |
Publications (1)
Publication Number | Publication Date |
---|---|
WO2000036785A1 true WO2000036785A1 (en) | 2000-06-22 |
Family
ID=22346778
Family Applications (1)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
---|---|---|---|
PCT/US1999/030217 WO2000036785A1 (en) | 1998-12-18 | 1999-12-16 | Counterfeit deterrence system |
Country Status (6)
Country | Link |
---|---|
EP (1) | EP1142190A4 (en) |
JP (1) | JP2002532812A (en) |
KR (1) | KR20020003357A (en) |
AU (1) | AU2369500A (en) |
CA (1) | CA2355715A1 (en) |
WO (1) | WO2000036785A1 (en) |
Cited By (5)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
WO2002037489A2 (en) * | 2000-10-31 | 2002-05-10 | Inktomi Corporation | Method and apparatus for tracking digitally transmitted data |
KR100511630B1 (en) * | 2001-08-28 | 2005-08-31 | (주)마크텍 | Multimedia electronic money, and issuing/authenticating/transferring method and system of the multimedia electronic money |
US6952485B1 (en) | 2000-09-11 | 2005-10-04 | Digimarc Corporation | Watermark encoding and decoding in imaging devices and imaging device interfaces |
US9275053B2 (en) | 2000-03-24 | 2016-03-01 | Digimarc Corporation | Decoding a watermark and processing in response thereto |
US9630443B2 (en) | 1995-07-27 | 2017-04-25 | Digimarc Corporation | Printer driver separately applying watermark and information |
Families Citing this family (1)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
KR100822724B1 (en) * | 2006-06-16 | 2008-04-17 | 이정옥 | Digital security device and method thereof, and image certification device |
Citations (5)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
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US5453968A (en) * | 1989-09-21 | 1995-09-26 | U.S. Philips Corporation | Methods of and information recording devices for recording and/or inhibiting recording of an information signal having copy bits with logic values which alternate in accordance with a pattern |
US5671277A (en) * | 1992-06-30 | 1997-09-23 | Minolta Camera Kabushiki Kaisha | Image forming apparatus and copy management system |
US5796824A (en) * | 1992-03-16 | 1998-08-18 | Fujitsu Limited | Storage medium for preventing an irregular use by a third party |
US5800600A (en) * | 1994-07-14 | 1998-09-01 | Tonejet Corporation Pty Ltd | Solid ink jet ink |
US5825892A (en) * | 1996-10-28 | 1998-10-20 | International Business Machines Corporation | Protecting images with an image watermark |
Family Cites Families (1)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
EP1137251B1 (en) * | 1995-05-08 | 2004-03-03 | Digimarc Corporation | Use of calibration data steganographically embedded in the transform domain to discern image distortion |
-
1999
- 1999-12-16 JP JP2000588925A patent/JP2002532812A/en active Pending
- 1999-12-16 CA CA002355715A patent/CA2355715A1/en not_active Abandoned
- 1999-12-16 KR KR1020017007645A patent/KR20020003357A/en not_active Application Discontinuation
- 1999-12-16 WO PCT/US1999/030217 patent/WO2000036785A1/en not_active Application Discontinuation
- 1999-12-16 AU AU23695/00A patent/AU2369500A/en not_active Abandoned
- 1999-12-16 EP EP99967414A patent/EP1142190A4/en not_active Withdrawn
Patent Citations (5)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
US5453968A (en) * | 1989-09-21 | 1995-09-26 | U.S. Philips Corporation | Methods of and information recording devices for recording and/or inhibiting recording of an information signal having copy bits with logic values which alternate in accordance with a pattern |
US5796824A (en) * | 1992-03-16 | 1998-08-18 | Fujitsu Limited | Storage medium for preventing an irregular use by a third party |
US5671277A (en) * | 1992-06-30 | 1997-09-23 | Minolta Camera Kabushiki Kaisha | Image forming apparatus and copy management system |
US5800600A (en) * | 1994-07-14 | 1998-09-01 | Tonejet Corporation Pty Ltd | Solid ink jet ink |
US5825892A (en) * | 1996-10-28 | 1998-10-20 | International Business Machines Corporation | Protecting images with an image watermark |
Non-Patent Citations (1)
Title |
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See also references of EP1142190A4 * |
Cited By (8)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
US9630443B2 (en) | 1995-07-27 | 2017-04-25 | Digimarc Corporation | Printer driver separately applying watermark and information |
US9275053B2 (en) | 2000-03-24 | 2016-03-01 | Digimarc Corporation | Decoding a watermark and processing in response thereto |
US10304152B2 (en) | 2000-03-24 | 2019-05-28 | Digimarc Corporation | Decoding a watermark and processing in response thereto |
US6952485B1 (en) | 2000-09-11 | 2005-10-04 | Digimarc Corporation | Watermark encoding and decoding in imaging devices and imaging device interfaces |
WO2002037489A2 (en) * | 2000-10-31 | 2002-05-10 | Inktomi Corporation | Method and apparatus for tracking digitally transmitted data |
WO2002037489A3 (en) * | 2000-10-31 | 2003-08-21 | Inktomi Corp | Method and apparatus for tracking digitally transmitted data |
EP1630641A1 (en) * | 2000-10-31 | 2006-03-01 | Inktomi Corporation | Approach for tracking data |
KR100511630B1 (en) * | 2001-08-28 | 2005-08-31 | (주)마크텍 | Multimedia electronic money, and issuing/authenticating/transferring method and system of the multimedia electronic money |
Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
---|---|
KR20020003357A (en) | 2002-01-12 |
EP1142190A4 (en) | 2005-05-25 |
JP2002532812A (en) | 2002-10-02 |
EP1142190A1 (en) | 2001-10-10 |
AU2369500A (en) | 2000-07-03 |
CA2355715A1 (en) | 2000-06-22 |
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