WO2000024139A1 - Support de chiffrement dans un reseau hybride gsm/amcr - Google Patents

Support de chiffrement dans un reseau hybride gsm/amcr Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2000024139A1
WO2000024139A1 PCT/US1999/024521 US9924521W WO0024139A1 WO 2000024139 A1 WO2000024139 A1 WO 2000024139A1 US 9924521 W US9924521 W US 9924521W WO 0024139 A1 WO0024139 A1 WO 0024139A1
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WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
gsm
data
long code
cdma
encrypting
Prior art date
Application number
PCT/US1999/024521
Other languages
English (en)
Inventor
Ron Nevo
Michael Vakulenko
Franklin Quick, Jr.
Sergio Kolor
Shlomo Nizri
Atai Levy
Original Assignee
Qualcomm Incorporated
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Qualcomm Incorporated filed Critical Qualcomm Incorporated
Priority to AU12132/00A priority Critical patent/AU1213200A/en
Publication of WO2000024139A1 publication Critical patent/WO2000024139A1/fr

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Classifications

    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04B—TRANSMISSION
    • H04B7/00—Radio transmission systems, i.e. using radiation field
    • H04B7/14—Relay systems
    • H04B7/15—Active relay systems
    • H04B7/204—Multiple access
    • H04B7/216—Code division or spread-spectrum multiple access [CDMA, SSMA]
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
    • H04L9/0838—Key agreement, i.e. key establishment technique in which a shared key is derived by parties as a function of information contributed by, or associated with, each of these
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3271—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using challenge-response
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
    • H04L2209/04—Masking or blinding
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
    • H04L2209/80—Wireless

Definitions

  • the present invention relates generally to wireless telecommunications, and specifically to advanced cellular telephone networks.
  • GSM Global System for Mobile
  • TDMA time-division multiple access
  • GSM offers a useful range of network services and standards, including encryption of user data and signaling to protect confidentiality of communications.
  • GSM encryption is powerful, i.e., relatively secure against cryptanalytic attack, but generally requires special- purpose hardware to cipher and decipher the data and signaling.
  • GSM network security features, including ciphering are defined by GSM standards 02.09 and 03.20, which are incorporated herein by reference.
  • the encryption itself uses proprietary algorithms defined by the GSM MoU Group of participant companies, such as the A5 algorithms for ciphering and the A8 algorithm for generation of an encryption key K c used in ciphering, as defined by GSM standards.
  • Code-division multiple access is an improved digital communications technology, which affords more efficient use of radio bandwidth than TDMA, as well as a more reliable, fade-free link between cellular telephone subscriber units (or mobile stations) and base stations.
  • the leading CDMA standard is IS-95, promulgated by the Telecommunications Industry Association (TIA) and incorporated herein by reference.
  • IS-95 specifies a public long code mask, based on an electronic serial number (ESN), which is used to spread the spectrum of user data and signaling before transmission over traffic channels.
  • ESN electronic serial number
  • the ESN itself is transmitted by the subscriber unit over an access channel, making it relatively difficult for an eavesdropper to capture the code and thereby decrypt the call.
  • Spreading using the long code provides only limited protection against cryptanalysis, however.
  • IS-95 also describes a method of spreading using a private long code, based on secret data, so as to afford greater protection against eavesdropping.
  • PCT patent application PCT/US96/20764 which is based upon U.S. patent application serial no. 08/575,413 entitled "Wireless Telecommunications System Utilizing CDMA Radio Frequency Signal Modulation in Conjunction with the GSM A-Interface Telecommunications Network Protocol," filed December 20, 1995, which are assigned to the assignee of the present patent application and both incorporated herein by reference, describe a wireless telecommunications system that uses a CDMA air interface (i.e., basic RF communications protocols) to implement GSM network services and protocols.
  • CDMA air interface i.e., basic RF communications protocols
  • CDMA BSSs TDMA base stations
  • MSCs GSM mobile switching centers
  • Hybrid cellular communications networks incorporating both GSM and CDMA elements, are also described in PCT patent publications WO 95/24771 and WO 96/21999, and in an article by Tscha, et al., entitled “A Subscriber Signaling Gateway between CDMA Mobile Station and GSM Mobile Switching Center,” in Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference on Universal Personal Communications, Ottawa (1993), pp. 181- 185, which are incorporated herein by reference. None of these publications deals with specific issues of encryption support. SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION
  • methods and apparatus are provided to enable GSM-compatible ciphering and deciphering capabilities over a CDMA air interface.
  • a mixed GSM/CDMA cellular communications system includes one or more CDMA base stations, controlled by a GSM mobile switching center (MSC).
  • MSC GSM mobile switching center
  • Systems of this type are further described in U.S. patent application serial no. 09/119,717 entitled “Base Station Handover in a Hybrid GSM/CDMA Network,” filed July 20, 1998, which is assigned to the assignee of the present patent application and is incorporated herein by reference.
  • Communications over a CDMA air interface between a subscriber unit in the system, also referred to herein as a mobile station (MS), and one of the CDMA base stations (BSS) are ciphered and deciphered using a GSM encryption key K c provided in accordance with GSM standards.
  • the MSC controls ciphering of user data and signaling substantially in accordance with GSM networking protocols.
  • the GSM-based communications system thus supports ciphering over the CDMA air interface with substantially no other modification required to the existing system.
  • communications between the MS and the CDMA BSS are ciphered and deciphered using the GSM key K c in a CDMA-compatible encryption algorithm.
  • the algorithm comprises a stream cipher, as is known in the art, which is implemented using a general-purpose microprocessor in the MS, without the need for dedicated encryption hardware.
  • the communications between the MS and the CDMA BSS are encrypted using a masked pseudorandom noise (PN) long code, in accordance with the IS-95 standard.
  • PN pseudorandom noise
  • Masking of the long code provides a shift in the phase, i.e., time shift, of the long code as output by the long code generator so as to produce a unique long code.
  • the masking of the long code is based upon a private long code mask that is generated based on the GSM K c .
  • the resulting private long code provides greater security against eavesdropping than can be afforded by open transmission of the usual masked long code.
  • the private long code is generated so as to be substantially unique, i.e., so that no two MSs in contact with a given BSS will have the same long code.
  • the MS is handed over between base stations in the course of a telephone call. Ciphering continues, as described hereinabove, during and after the handover, even when the MS is handed over between a CDMA BSS and a GSM/TDMA BSS.
  • a method for encrypting data for transmission over a CDMA air interface including: providing an encryption key in accordance with GSM ciphering protocols; and encrypting the data for transmission over the CDMA air interface using the key.
  • providing the encryption key comprises exchanging messages indicative of the key over the CDMA air interface substantially in accordance with GSM ciphering protocols.
  • encrypting the data includes encrypting user data and signaling.
  • encrypting the data includes generating a stream cipher, wherein generating the stream cipher includes generating a cipher using a general-purpose microprocessor.
  • encrypting the data includes generating a masked long code based on the encryption key and applying the masked long code to the data.
  • generating a long code generating a long code mask based on the encryption key, and applying the long code masked to the long code and applying the masked long code to the data.
  • the generating of the masked long code includes generating a mask which includes a group of bits based upon a hash function of the key.
  • generating the long code mask includes generating a mask which includes a group of bits that is different for calls conducted over the CDMA air interface having the same key.
  • encrypting the data includes continuing to encrypt data substantially without interruption during a handover between two base stations in the system.
  • encrypting the data includes encrypting using information stored in a subscriber identity module of a mobile station.
  • wireless communications apparatus for use in a GSM mobile telecommunications system, including: a base station, which receives a GSM encryption key from the system and transmits a message indicative of the key over a CDMA air interface; and a mobile station, which receives the message and responsive thereto derives the key to be used for encrypting data for transmission over the CDMA air interface.
  • the data encrypted by the mobile station include user data and signaling.
  • the base station receives the key and transmits the indication in accordance with GSM messaging protocols.
  • the mobile station includes a general- purpose microprocessor, which encrypts the data.
  • the mobile station includes a subscriber identity module and encrypts the data using information received by the mobile station from the module.
  • the mobile station includes a long code generator, which generates a masked long code mask based upon the key.
  • FIG. 1 is a schematic block diagram of a hybrid GSM/CDMA cellular communications system, in accordance with a preferred embodiment of the present invention
  • Figs. 2A and 2B are schematic block diagrams illustrating communications protocols between elements of the system of Fig. 1, in accordance with a preferred embodiment of the present invention
  • Fig. 3 is a schematic diagram illustrating message flow associated with encryption in the system of Fig. 1, in accordance with a preferred embodiment of the present invention
  • Fig. 4 is a schematic block diagram showing details of a mobile station in the system of Fig. 1, in accordance with a preferred embodiment of the present invention
  • Fig. 5 is a schematic block diagram showing details of a base station subsystem in the system of Fig. 1, in accordance with a preferred embodiment of the present invention
  • Fig. 6 is a schematic block diagram illustrating a data structure of a long code mask used in encryption, in accordance with a preferred embodiment of the present invention.
  • Fig. 1 is a schematic block diagram of a hybrid GSM/CDMA cellular communications system 20, in accordance with a preferred embodiment of the present invention.
  • System 20 is built around a public land mobile network (PLMN) 22, which is based on the GSM communications standard, as is known in the art and described briefly hereinabove.
  • PLMN public land mobile network
  • Infrastructure for such networks already exists and is in wide use in many countries, and the present invention has the advantage of enabling gradual introduction of CDMA service is conjunction with such a network without requiring major changes to the existing switching infrastructure.
  • PLMN 22 comprises at least one mobile-services switching center (MSC) 24, or possibly a number of such centers (although only one MSC is shown here for clarity of illustration), which controls network operations within a geographical area.
  • MSC 24 is responsible for location registration of subscriber units and handover of subscriber units between base stations, as well as linking PLMN 22 to a public switched telephone network (PSTN) and /or packet data network (PDN) 48.
  • PSTN public switched telephone network
  • PDN packet data network
  • the PLMN also comprises a network management center (NMC) 26 and a cell broadcast center (CBC) 28.
  • NMC network management center
  • CBC cell broadcast center
  • System 20 includes a plurality of MSs 40, which communicate with PLMN 22 via a plurality of base station subsystems (BSS) 30 and 32 over a wireless RF link at one or more of the accepted cellular communications frequencies.
  • MS 40 which is also known as a subscriber unit, is preferably capable of communicating with both GSM BSS 30, using a standard GSM TDMA radio communications protocol, and CDMA BSS 32, using CDMA- based communication methods described hereinbelow. Although for the sake of clarity, only one each of MS 40, GSM BSS 30 and CDMA BSS 32 is shown in Fig. 1, it will be understood that in actuality, system 20 typically comprises a plurality of each of these system elements.
  • GSM BSS 30 and CDMA BSS 32 communicate with and are controlled by MSC 24, substantially in accordance with GSM standards, i.e., via the GSM standard A-interface, as further described hereinbelow with reference to Figs. 2A and 2B.
  • BSS 32 also communicates with CBC 28, so as to receive messages to be broadcast over the air, and comprises a radio operation and maintenance center (OMC-R) 38, which communicates with NMC 26 over a GSM-standard Q3 interface.
  • OMC-R radio operation and maintenance center
  • BSS 32 may be linked to a general packet data service (GPRS), such as has been proposed by the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI).
  • GPRS general packet data service
  • CDMA BSS 32 Communications between CDMA BSS 32 and MS 40 are built on a CDMA radio "air interface," which is preferably based on the IS-95 standard for CDMA communications, and most preferably with the TIA/EIA-95-B version of the standard, with necessary modifications as described herein.
  • BSS 32 is built around a base station controller (BSC) 34, which controls and communicates with a number of base station transceivers (BTS) 36.
  • BTS base station transceivers
  • Each BTS transmits RF signals to and receives RF signals from MS 40 when the MS is within a geographical area, or cell, served by the particular BTS.
  • BSS 30 the MS preferably communicates with BSS 30 over a GSM/TDMA air interface.
  • MS 40 comprises mobile equipment (ME) 42, which preferably includes either two radio transceivers, one configured for TDMA operation and one for CDMA, or a single transceiver which can dynamically switch between TDMA and CDMA operational modes.
  • MS 40 includes as a part of ME 42 a mobile termination (MT), which supports terminal equipment (TE) 46 for voice and data input and output.
  • MT mobile termination
  • TE terminal equipment
  • MS 40 comprises a subscriber identity module (SIM) 44, in accordance with GSM standards, which is used in authenticating the identity of a user of MS 40 in a manner substantially transparent to and independent of the CDMA air interface.
  • SIM subscriber identity module
  • Fig. 2A is a block diagram that schematically illustrates protocol stacks used in signaling interfaces between MS 40, CDMA BSS 32 and GSM MSC 24, in accordance with a preferred embodiment of the present invention.
  • These interfaces enable MS 40 to communicate with GSM MSC 24 over a CDMA air interface. Operation of these interfaces, and particularly message flow through these interfaces, is described in greater detail in the above- mentioned PCT application PCT/US96/20764, as well as in the above- mentioned U.S. patent application entitled "Base Station Handover in a Hybrid GSM/CDMA Network.”
  • the protocol stacks are in accordance with GSM standards, substantially without modification.
  • MS 40 communicates with CDMA BSS 32 over a CDMA Um interface, based on a CDMA air interface which is modified for compatibility of signaling with the GSM standard.
  • the CDMA air interface between MS 40 and CDMA BSS 32 comprises CDMA Layer 1, which preferably operates on a standard IS-95 protocol, and GSM-CDMA Layer 2, in which IS-95 operation is adapted to accommodate the needs of GSM upper layer protocols.
  • Layer 2 supports transmission of frames between MS 40 and BSS 30 or 32.
  • GSM- CDMA Layer 2 includes functionality, such as message ordering, priority and fragmentation, and suspension and resumption of communications, which is normally supported by the standard GSM Layer 2, but not by CDMA IS-95.
  • GSM-CDMA Layer 2 also supports message sizes up to at least the maximum message size permitted by GSM Layer 2 (251 bytes), which is greater than the maximum IS-95 Layer 2 message payload.
  • Standard GSM protocols include three Radio Interface sub-layers (RIL3) above the physical and framing layers, Layer 1 and Layer 2: Radio Resource (RR) management, Mobile Management (MM) and Connection Management (CM).
  • RIL3 Radio Interface sub-layers
  • RR Radio Resource
  • MM Mobile Management
  • CM Connection Management
  • the CM sub-layer supports signaling for call processing, as well as GSM supplementary services and short message service (SMS).
  • SMS short message service
  • the MM sub-layer supports signaling required for locating MS 40, authentication and encryption key management, as described hereinbelow.
  • a GSM-CDMA RR layer is introduced in the MS 40 and BSS 32 protocol stacks.
  • the GSM-CDMA RR layer which manages radio resources and maintains radio links between MS 40 and BSSs 30 and 32, is "aware" of the existence of the dual GSM and CDMA lower layers (Layers 1 and 2) in the MS 40 protocol stack. It invokes the appropriate lower layers in the MS stack to communicate with either the standard RIL3-RR layer over the GSM Um interface or the GSM-CDMA RR layer of BSS 32 over the CDMA U m interface, depending on instructions it receives from the BSS with which it is in communication.
  • the RR layer in the MS stack also controls the handover between the corresponding air interfaces defined in Layers 1 and 2, under instructions from MSC 24, BSS 30 and BSS 32. Regardless of which of the air interfaces is in use, the GSM-CDMA R R layer supports the standard GSM RIL3-MM and CM layers above it. The MM and CM layers are not processed by BSS 32, but are rather relayed through between MS 40 and MSC 24 for processing in a manner substantially transparent to the CDMA air interface layers below. Further features of the RR layer are described in the above-mentioned U.S. patent application serial no. 09/119,717 entitled "Base Station Handover in a Hybrid GSM/CDMA Network.”
  • CDMA BSS 32 communicates with GSM MSC 24 over a standard, substantially unmodified GSM A-interface. This interface is based on the SS7 and BSS Application Part (BSSAP) protocols, as are known in the art, preferably in accordance with the GSM 08.06 and 08.08 standards. BSSAP supports procedures between MSC 24 and BSS 32 that require interpretation and processing of information related to single calls and resource management, as well as transfer of call control and mobility management messages between MSC 24 and MS 40. BSS 32 translates CDMA Layer 1, GSM-CDMA Layer 2 and GSM-CDMA RR protocols exchanged between the BSS and MS 40 into appropriate SS7 and BSSAP protocols for transmission to MSC 24, and vice versa.
  • BSSAP BSS Application Part
  • CDMA BSC 34 communicates with GSM MSC 24 using the standard A-interface, substantially no modifications are required in the core GSM MSC in order to enable the addition of CDMA BSS 32 to GSM system 20. Furthermore, MSC 24 need not be aware that there is any difference in identity between GSM/TDMA BSS 30 and CDMA BSS 32, since both communicate with the MSC in a substantially identical manner over the A- interface.
  • Fig. 2B is a block diagram that schematically illustrates protocol stacks involved in conveying voice data between MS 40 and MSC 24 via CDMA BSS 32, in accordance with a preferred embodiment of the present invention.
  • Voice data between MS 40 and BSS 32 are coded and decoded by a vocoder particularly suited for CDMA applications, which may comprise any of the standard IS-95 compatible vocoder protocols known in the art.
  • Encryption of the voice data takes place in CDMA Layer 1, along with encryption of signaling and any other user data transmitted between the MS and the BSS.
  • BSS 32 decrypts and translates CDMA Layer 1 into El TDMA signals, and converts the CDMA vocoded data into PCM A-law companded voice data, in accordance with the requirements of the A-interface standard.
  • MSC 24 thus transmits and receives voice data to and from MS 40 via BSS 32 substantially without regard to the fact that the data between the BSS and the MS are CDMA-encoded, as though MS 40 were operating in GSM/TDMA mode.
  • Fig. 3 is a schematic diagram showing message flow between MS 40 (MM and RR protocol layers and SIM 44, as described hereinabove), BSS 32 and MSC 24 associated with encryption of a call, in accordance with a preferred embodiment of the present invention.
  • the call starts with a channel request conveyed by the RR layer of MS 40.
  • BSS 32 responds by allocating a traffic channel to the MS and conveying a long code mask to be used for the call.
  • a link is then opened to MSC 24.
  • MSC 24 sends an Authentication Request via BSS 32 to MS 40, including a pseudorandom number (RAND), which is input to SIM 44 and used as an indicator in generating a GSM encryption key K c .
  • RAND pseudorandom number
  • the SIM inputs the pseudorandom number, together with a key K[ stored in the SIM, to the GSM A8 algorithm to generate K c , which is conveyed to the MS RR layer for subsequent use in ciphering.
  • SIM 44 returns an Authentication Response to MSC 24, including an indication of Kj, thus enabling the MSC to determine the same key K c as in MS 40 without transmitting the key over the air.
  • MSC 24 conveys a GSM Cipher Mode Command message to BSS 32, in accordance with GSM standard 08.08, which is incorporated herein by reference, instructing the BSS to begin encryption.
  • the message contains the GSM encryption key K c and indicates a ciphering algorithm to be used, typically one of the A5 algorithms, in accordance with GSM standards.
  • the BSS Upon receiving the command, the BSS sends a Ciphering Mode Command to MS 40, substantially in a form specified by GSM standard 04.08, which is incorporated herein by reference.
  • This command contains the indication of the ciphering algorithm received from MSC 24 and any required algorithm- specific information, preferably along with an Action Time, i.e., the CDMA system time at which to start encryption.
  • the BSS and MS preferably do not use GSM ciphering algorithms, but rather use the GSM algorithm indication to select an encryption algorithm compatible with the CDMA air interface.
  • GSM ciphering algorithms may include suitable stream ciphers and /or spreading using private long codes, as described further hereinbelow.
  • the RR layer of MS 40 receives and acknowledges the command from the BSS by sending a Ciphering Mode Complete message, preferably within a time equal to T56m (0.2 sec, as specified by the IS-95B standard).
  • GSM- CDMA Layer 2 of MS 40 generates a corresponding acknowledgment message.
  • the MS sends a Ciphering Mode Reject message if it cannot support the required encryption.
  • both BSS 32 and MS 40 switch to the specified encrypted communications mode.
  • the BSS sends a Cipher Mode Complete message to MSC 24, acknowledging successful encryption, and including an International Mobile Equipment Identity (IMEI), as specified by GSM standards, if the IMEI is received from the MS. If the ciphering operation failed, the BSS sends a Cipher Mode Failure Message to the MSC.
  • the RR layer of MS 40 informs the MM layer that the encryption has started, using the RrSyncInd primitive, as specified in GSM standard 04.07, which is incorporated herein by reference.
  • any suitable encryption algorithm known in the art may be used to encrypt and decrypt data and signaling between BSS 32 and MS 40.
  • the algorithm is of a type that generates a stream cipher, which is obtained by combining the data to be encrypted with a stream of pseudorandom numbers.
  • the stream of pseudorandom numbers is generated using the GSM key K c .
  • Decryption is performed at the BSS by generating the same pseudorandom number stream and removing it from the encrypted data.
  • the GSM A5/1 ciphering algorithm for example, works on this principle, but typically requires special-purpose hardware in MS 40 to encrypt and decrypt.
  • the stream ciphering encryption algorithm is most preferably of a type that requires only limited computational power to generate the stream cipher, as described, for example, in U.S. patent application serial nos. 08/934,582 and 08/957,571 both entitled "Method and Apparatus for Generating Encryption Stream Ciphers," respectively filed September 22, 1997 and October 24, 1997, which are assigned to the assignee of the present patent application and both incorporated herein by reference.
  • An exemplary cipher of this type is the SOBER cipher, which can be generated by suitable software running on a general-purpose processor of a type that is commonly used in cellular telephones.
  • Fig. 4 is a schematic block diagram showing elements of MS 40, including particularly the location therein of encryption operations, in accordance with a preferred embodiment of the present invention.
  • User data typically comprising voice signals, and signaling are input from TE 46 to a multiplexer 50 in ME 42.
  • An encryption block 52 reads the appropriate GSM encryption key K c from SIM 44 and ciphers the multiplexed data and signaling using the key, preferably as described hereinabove, in accordance with ciphering instructions from BSS 32.
  • Block 52 may be implemented in hardware and /or software.
  • the encrypted data and signals are then passed through a conventional framing and encoding sequence, as defined by the IS-95 standard and well-known in the art, including a CRC block 54; a frame quality erasure indicator and 8-bit encoder tail block 56; a convolutional encoder 58; a symbol repetition block 60; and an interleaver 62.
  • the interleaved data are input to a 64ary orthogonal modulator 64.
  • a long code generator 70 generates a long code PN spreading sequence code which is shifted as output thereof in accordance with a long code mask received from BSS 32.
  • the code output from long code generator 70 spreads the spectrum of the data, generally in accordance with the IS-95 CDMA standard, using a data burst randomizer 68.
  • the data are finally input to an output stage 72, from which they are transmitted to BSS 32.
  • Fig. 5 is a schematic block diagram of BSS 32, illustrating elements of the BSS involved in decryption of the data received from MS 40, in accordance with a preferred embodiment of the present invention.
  • the data are received through an input stage 80 of BTS 36.
  • the long code PN spreading is removed using a long code generator 81, similar to long code generator 70 in MS 40.
  • the data are then demodulated, deinterleaved and decoded respectively by a demodulator 83, a deinterleaver 82 and a convolutional decoder 84, and are backhauled to BSC 34.
  • the decoded data are passed through a frame selection block 90 to a decryption block 92, which deciphers the data using the encryption key K c provided by MSC 24 and an algorithm which is the inverse of whatever ciphering algorithm was used in encryption block 52.
  • the deciphered data are demultiplexed by a demultiplexer 94 to separate out the signaling and voice/data channels that were originally input to ME 42. The separate channels are then suitably routed through GSM/CDMA system 20.
  • MS 40 and BSS 32 have been described hereinabove with reference to encryption and transmission of data by the MS and its reception and decryption by the BSS, it will be understood that the inverse process can similarly be performed to transmit encrypted data from the BSS to the MS.
  • Fig. 6 is a block diagram illustrating a data structure of a private long code mask 100, generated and used for encryption of transmissions between MS 40 and BSS 32 in accordance with another preferred embodiment of the present invention.
  • long code mask 100 is used by the long code generator, which spreads the data before transmission, to provide a shift in the generated code as output from the long code generator.
  • An example of a masked PN code generator is disclosed in U.S. patent no. 5,228,054 issued July 13, 1993 to the assignee of the present application and is incorporated by reference herein. It should be noted that the present invention is described with respect to a long code generator which produces a long code common to all MS.
  • a mask applied to the long code provides a shift in phase of the long code to produce a long code unique to the MS. It should be understood that the mask may also be used in the sense that the long code generator is responsive thereto for producing a long code sequence that does not have any common properties to the long code of any other MS.
  • the electronic serial number In CDMA systems known in the art, the electronic serial number
  • ESN public long code mask
  • hybrid GSM/CDMA information pertaining to the long code mask is preferably transmitted from the BSS to the MS over a paging channel (since GSM standards do not recognize the ESN, used in generating the long code mask in accordance with the IS-95 CDMA standard), making it relatively easy for an eavesdropper to capture and decode the call.
  • the long code mask is changed after MS 40 has been authenticated to private mask 100.
  • the private long code mask is generated by the MS using GSM encryption key K c and is not transmitted openly from BSS 32 to MS 40.
  • the key is output by SIM 44 responsive to the pseudorandom indicator number conveyed by MSC 24, as described hereinabove.
  • the private long code mask is by the long code generator in spreading the CDMA data in place of the public long code mask conveyed at the earlier stage of channel assignment.
  • Encryption by long code masking with private mask 100 is preferably used when additional encryption (typically based on SOBER or a GSM ciphering algorithm, as described hereinabove) is not used in encryption block 52.
  • Long code mask 100 comprises 42 bits, in accordance with the IS-95 standard.
  • the two MSB 102 are set to a constant value, and the next six bits 104 are assigned a value by BSS 32 which is varied so that no two MSs communicating with the BSS have the same long code, even if they by chance have the same K c .
  • the last thirty-four bits 106 are based on a suitable hash function of K c .
  • Mask 100 therefore, cannot readily be discovered by an eavesdropper. Bits 104 assigned by BSS 32 ensure that no two calls will have the same long code mask, hence different shifts in the spreading code, since otherwise both calls would be dropped.
  • MS 40 may move from a cell served by one CDMA BSS 32 to another, or between cells served respectively by CDMA BSS 32 and GSM BSS 30.
  • the ciphering algorithm is switched from the CDMA-compatible algorithms described above to an appropriate GSM algorithm, or vice versa, and ciphering continues substantially uninterrupted.

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  • Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)

Abstract

Dans un système GSM de télécommmunications mobile sans fil, un procédé de cryptage de données destinées à être transmises par une interface hertzienne AMCR consiste à mettre en oeuvre une clé de chiffrement GSM, puis à transmettre une indication de la clé par l'interface hertzienne AMCR. Les données sont cryptées en vue de leur transmission par l'interface hertzienne AMCR, au moyen de ladite clé.
PCT/US1999/024521 1998-10-21 1999-10-19 Support de chiffrement dans un reseau hybride gsm/amcr WO2000024139A1 (fr)

Priority Applications (1)

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AU12132/00A AU1213200A (en) 1998-10-21 1999-10-19 Encryption support in a hybrid gsm/cdma network

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

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US17665098A 1998-10-21 1998-10-21
US09/176,650 1998-10-21

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WO2000024139A1 true WO2000024139A1 (fr) 2000-04-27

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US8428038B1 (en) 2009-02-13 2013-04-23 U.S. Department Of Energy Communication devices for network-hopping communications and methods of network-hopping communications

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Cited By (14)

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Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US7876729B1 (en) 1998-07-20 2011-01-25 Qualcomm Incorporated Intersystem base station handover
US7590407B1 (en) 1999-11-26 2009-09-15 Nokia Corporation Method and device for carrying out security procedures involving mobile stations in hybrid cellular telecommunication systems
WO2001039536A1 (fr) * 1999-11-26 2001-05-31 Nokia Corporation Procede et dispositif permettant de mettre en oeuvre des procedures de securite comprenant des stations mobiles dans des systemes de telecommunication cellulaire hybrides
US7333614B2 (en) 2001-11-16 2008-02-19 Qualcomm Incorporated System and method for encypting spread spectrum carrier
WO2003045106A1 (fr) * 2001-11-16 2003-05-30 Qualcomm Incorporated Chiffrage d'une sequence de pseudo-bruit (pb) avant etalement d'un signal de communication
WO2003051072A1 (fr) 2001-12-07 2003-06-19 Qualcomm, Incorporated Appareil et procede d'utilisation d'une cle de chiffrement dans un reseau de telecommunication hybride
EP1451966A1 (fr) * 2001-12-07 2004-09-01 QUALCOMM Incorporated Authentification d'un reseau de communication hybride
EP1464190A1 (fr) * 2001-12-07 2004-10-06 Qualcomm, Incorporated Appareil et procede d'utilisation d'une cle de chiffrement dans un reseau de telecommunication hybride
EP1464190A4 (fr) * 2001-12-07 2009-12-30 Qualcomm Inc Appareil et procede d'utilisation d'une cle de chiffrement dans un reseau de telecommunication hybride
EP1451966A4 (fr) * 2001-12-07 2010-09-29 Qualcomm Inc Authentification d'un reseau de communication hybride
US7961687B2 (en) 2001-12-07 2011-06-14 Qualcomm Incorporated Method and apparatus for effecting handoff between different cellular communications systems
CN101340644B (zh) * 2008-08-28 2011-05-11 中国电信股份有限公司 空口语音加密启动方法及系统
US8081624B2 (en) 2009-02-13 2011-12-20 The United States Of America As Represented By The United States Department Of Energy Communication devices for network-hopping communications and methods of network-hopping communications
US8428038B1 (en) 2009-02-13 2013-04-23 U.S. Department Of Energy Communication devices for network-hopping communications and methods of network-hopping communications

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