WO1999006933A1 - Systeme servant a contracter un engagement amenage - Google Patents

Systeme servant a contracter un engagement amenage Download PDF

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Publication number
WO1999006933A1
WO1999006933A1 PCT/US1998/015729 US9815729W WO9906933A1 WO 1999006933 A1 WO1999006933 A1 WO 1999006933A1 US 9815729 W US9815729 W US 9815729W WO 9906933 A1 WO9906933 A1 WO 9906933A1
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WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
contract
commitment
decommit
contracts
agents
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Application number
PCT/US1998/015729
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English (en)
Inventor
Thomas W. Sandholm
Victor R. Lesser
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Businessbots, Inc.
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
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Publication date
Application filed by Businessbots, Inc. filed Critical Businessbots, Inc.
Priority to AU86694/98A priority Critical patent/AU8669498A/en
Publication of WO1999006933A1 publication Critical patent/WO1999006933A1/fr

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    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06N—COMPUTING ARRANGEMENTS BASED ON SPECIFIC COMPUTATIONAL MODELS
    • G06N5/00—Computing arrangements using knowledge-based models
    • G06N5/04—Inference or reasoning models
    • G06N5/043—Distributed expert systems; Blackboards
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F17/00—Digital computing or data processing equipment or methods, specially adapted for specific functions
    • G06F17/10—Complex mathematical operations
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q99/00—Subject matter not provided for in other groups of this subclass

Definitions

  • This invention relates to the field of contracting protocols and, more particularly, to contracting protocols for automated negotiations that can be implemented in connection with computer networks.
  • Game theory has suggested utilizing the potential provided by probabilistically known future events via contingency contracts among self-interested agents. The contract obligations are made contingent on future events. There are games in which this method increases the expected payoff to both parties of the contract compared to any full commitment contract. Also, some deals are enabled by contingency contracts in the sense that there is no full commitment contract that both agents prefer over their fall-back positions, but there is a contingency contract that each agent prefers over its fall-back.
  • contingency contracts There are at least three problems regarding the use of contingency contracts in automated negotiation among self-interested agents.
  • all domain events e.g. new tasks arriving or resources breaking down
  • all negotiation events other contracts
  • these future events may not only affect the value of the original contract independently: the value may depend combinations of the future events.
  • the third problem is that of verifying the unraveling of the events. Sometimes an event is only observable by one of the agents.
  • This agent may have an incentive to lie to the other party of the contract about the event in case the event is associated with an unadvantageous contingency to the directly observing agent.
  • contingency contracts would require an event verification mechanism that is not manipulable and not prohibitively complicated.
  • the present invention involves a leveled commitment contracting system.
  • a contractor can decommit upon payment of a decommitment penalty.
  • FIG. 1 illustrates a "sequential decommitting" (“SEQD") game; the game tree of the figure representing two alternative protocols (i.e., two different games).
  • FIG. 2 illustrates decommitment penalties "a" and "b" that satisfy both agents'
  • FIG. 3 illustrates a "simultaneous decommit - both pay if both decommit game" ("SIMUDBP”) game.
  • FIG. 4 illustrates Nash equilibrium decommitment thresholds for an example of an SIMUDBP game for different values of decommitment penalties a and b.
  • FIG. 5 illustrates three different regions of contracts that are IR for both agents and allow and equilibrium in the SIMUDBP decommiting game.
  • FIG. 6 illustrates Nash equilibrium decommitment penalties for an example of an SIMUDBP game for different values of decommitment penalties a and b. Detailed Description of Preferred Embodiments)
  • leveled commitment contracting protocol that allows self-interested agents to efficiently accommodate future events by having the possibility of unilaterally decommitting from a contract based on local reasoning is described below.
  • a decommitment penalty is assigned to both agents in a contract: to be freed from the contract, an agent only pays this penalty to the other party. It is shown through formal analysis of several contracting settings that this leveled commitment feature in a contracting protocol increases Pareto efficiency of deals and can make contracts individually rational when no full commitment contract can. This advantage holds even if the agents decommit manipulatively. 1.
  • a mechanism is built into the contract that allows unilateral decommitting at any point in time. This is achieved by specifying in the contract decommitment penalties, one for each agent. If an agent wants to decommit— i.e. to be freed from the obligations of the contract— it can do so simply by paying the decommitment penalty to the other party.
  • the method requires no explicit conditioning on future events: each agent can do its own conditioning dynamically. Therefore no event verification mechanism is required either. This paper presents formal justifications for adding this decommitment feature into a contracting protocol.
  • the contracting setting consists of two games. First, the contracting game involves the agents choosing a contract— or no contract, i.e. the null deal— before any future events have unraveled.
  • the decommitting game involves the agents deciding on whether to decommit or to carry out the obligations of the contract— after the future events have unraveled.
  • the decommitment game is a subgame of the contracting game: the expected outcomes of the decommitting game affect the agents' preferences over contracts in the contracting game.
  • the decommitting game will be analyzed using the Nash equilibrium and the dominant strategy concepts.
  • the contracting game will be analyzed with respect to individual rationality(lR): is the contract better for an agent than the null deal?
  • the embodiments described herein are described in connection with FIGs. 1-6, which are described herein.
  • FIG. 1 shows a "sequential decommitting" ("SEQD") game.
  • FIG. 1 encompasses Contracting Game 20 and Decommitting Game 40.
  • the Game Tree 10 represents two alternative protocols: i.e., two different games. In the first, both agents have to pay decommitment penalties to each other if both decommit. In the second, neither agent has to pay if both decommit.
  • the payoffs in the latter protocol are in parentheses when they differ from the former.
  • the dotted lines represent information sets: the contractor does not know the contractee's outside offer and vice versa. The contractor's payoffs are usually negative because it has to pay for having the task handled.
  • FIG. 2 shows three graphs: left graph 110, middle graph 120, and right graph 130.
  • FIG. 2 shows decommitment penalties a and b that satisfy both agents' IR constraints in the example SEQD game described herein.
  • FIG. 2 shows, in graph 110, contractee's IR constraints 112, and contractor's IR constraints 114. It also illustrates, at 116, where IR costraints are satisfied, either agent might decommit.
  • Graph 120 shows contractor's IR constraints 122 and contractee's IR constraints 124, and the region 126 where IR constraints are satisfied, and contractee surely will not decommit.
  • Graph 130 shows contractor's IR constraints 132 and contractee's IR constraints 134, and the region 136 where IR constraints are satisfied, and contractor surely will not decommit.
  • FIG. 3 shows the "Simultaneous Decommit - Both Pay if Both Decommit" ("SIMUDBP") game.
  • FIG. 3 shows contracting game 202 and decommitting game 204. The dashed lines represent the agents' information sets. When decommitting, the contractor does not know the contractee's outside offer and vice versa.
  • the contractor has to decide on decommitting before it has observed the contractee's decommitting decision, and vice versa.
  • FIG. 4 illustrates Nash equilibrium decommitment thresholds of the example SIMUDBP game described herein for different values of decommitment penalties a and b.
  • the Graphs in FIG. 4 show, respectively, Nash equilibrium curves 308, 310 and 312, and the curves for truthful decommitting 314, 316 and 318.
  • FIG. 5 shows three different regions of contracts that are IR for both agents and allow an equilibrium of the SIMUDBP decommiting game.
  • either agent might decommit; but in the light gray areas 404 and 406, only one of the agent's might.
  • FIG. 6 shows graphs 502, 504 and 506, comprising, respectively, Nash equilibrium curves 508, 510 and 512, and curves for truthful decommiting 514, 516 and 518.
  • FIGs. 1-6 are further discussed and referenced in connection with the detailed examples described herein.
  • J o-a payoff from the contract is no less than the expected payoff from the outside offer:
  • the contractor's IR constraint states that the expected payoff from the contract is no less than that from the outside offer: ⁇ J bL*(p,a, M b) & r J -oo As)[-s+bdadb+
  • the contractor can want to decommit only if -a -a > -p, its decommitment penalty can be chosen so high that it will surely not decommit (assuming that a is bounded from below). In this case the contractee will decommit whenever p ⁇ b -b. If b is bounded from above, the contractee's decommitment penalty can be chosen so high that it will surely not decommit.
  • full commitment contracts are a subset of leveled commitment ones. This reasoning holds for contracts where both agents have to pay the penalties if both decommit, and for contracts where neither agent has to pay a penalty if both decommit.
  • full commitment contracts are a subset of leveled commitment contracts, the former can be no better in the sense of Pareto efficiency or social welfare than the latter. It follows that if there exists an IR full commitment contract, then there also exist IR leveled commitment contracts. However, leveled commitment contracts can enable deals that are impossible via full commitment contracts:
  • Theorem 2.1 Enabling in a SEQD game. There are SEQD games (defined by f d) and g(b)) where no full commitment contract satisfies the IR constraints but a leveled commitment contract does.
  • leveled commitment contracts can increase the efficiency of deals which are possible via full commitment contracts (the reverse cannot occur because the former can emulate the latter) if there is enough ex ante variance in the outside offers:
  • b is bounded from above, f is bounded, and jj fi ⁇ )dd > 0, or
  • a is bounded from below, g is bounded, and J g(b)db > 0, then that game has a leveled commitment contract that increases both agents ' expected payoffs over any full commitment contract. Therefore, the leveled commitment contract is Pareto superior and IR.
  • both agents have to declare decommitment simultaneously.
  • both agents have to pay the decommitment penalties to each other.
  • neither agent has to pay. The next two sections analyze them.
  • Condition 8 states the contractor's best response (defined by a*) to the contractee's strategy that is defined by b*.
  • Condition 9 states the contractee's best response b * to the contractor's strategy that is defined by a * .
  • Condition 8 uses the variable p which is defined by Equation 10. So together, Equations 8, 9, and 10 define the Nash equilibria of the decommitting game. Now the contractor's IR constraint becomes
  • the first row corresponds to the contractee decommitting, while the second corresponds to the contractee not decommitting.
  • the second integral in each row corresponds to the contractor decommitting, while the third integral corresponds to the contractor not decommitting.
  • the contractee's IR constraint becomes 00 »a , (p,ajb,b*) ⁇ 00
  • the contractor's decommitment penalty a can be chosen so high that the contractor's decommitment threshold a*(p,a,b,b*) becomes lower than any a . In that case the contractor will surely not decommit.
  • the contractee's decommitment penalty b can be chosen so high that the contractee's decommitment threshold b * ⁇ p,a,b,d*) is greater than any b. In that case the contractee will surely not decommit.
  • full commitment contracts are a subset of leveled commitment ones. Therefore, the former can be no better in the sense of Pareto efficiency or social welfare than the latter.
  • SIMUDBP games defined by f(a) and gib) where no full commitment contract satisfies the IR constraints but a leveled commitment contract does.
  • Each agent's IR constraint induces three curves (Fig. 5), two of which actually bound the IR region. The third is also a root, but at both sides of that curve, the IR constraint is satisfied.
  • the dark gray area of Figure 5 represents the values of the decommitment penalties a and b for which the validity constraints of the programmed model and the IR constraints are satisfied. In other words, for any such a and b, there exists decommitment thresholds a * and b * such that these form a Nash equilibrium, and there is a nonzero probability for either agent to decommit, and each agent has higher expected payoff with the contract than without it.
  • leveled commitment contracts can increase the efficiency of a deal even if a full commitment contract were possible (the reverse cannot occur):
  • Theorem 3.2 Pareto efficiency improvement.
  • Theorem 2.2 applies to SIMUDBP games.
  • SIMUDBP games are equivalent to SEQD games.
  • Simultaneous decommitting games where a protocol is used where neither agent has to pay a decommitting penalty if both agents decommit can be analyzed in the same way as SIMUDBP games, but the decommitting thresholds differ.
  • a is bounded from below, and b from above, a can be chosen so high that the contractor will surely not decommit, and b so high that the contractee will not. So, full commitment contracts are a subset of leveled commitment ones. Thus the former cannot enable a deal whenever the latter cannot. Also, leveled commitment can enable a deal that is impossible via full commitment:
  • Theorem 3.3 Enabling in a SIMUDNP game.
  • SIMUDNP games defined by f(d) and gib) where no full commitment contract satisfies the IR constraints but a leveled commitment contract does.
  • the proof is like that of Theorem 3.1 except that the formulas for decommitting differ.
  • the Nash equilibria of the SIMUDNP game are as shown in Figure 6.
  • the decommitment thresholds a * and b * differ from the truthful ones. They are closer to the truthful ones than what they were with a protocol where both agents pay if both 17/1 decommit, Figure 4.
  • the shapes of the curves using these two protocols also differ significantly.
  • Leveled commitment contracts can also increase the efficiency of a deal even if a full commitment contract were possible (the reverse cannot occur):
  • Theorem 2.2 applies to SIMUDNP games. Proof. When one agent is known not to decommit, SIMUDNP games are equivalent to SEQD games. 4 Prescriptions for system builders
  • the Nash equilibrium decommitting strategies were usually closer to truthful ones when a protocol was used where neither pays if both decommit than when a protocol was used where both pay if both decommit. Also, as an agent's opponent's decommitment penalty approaches zero, the agent becomes truthful in the former protocol, but starts to increasingly bias its decommitment decisions in the latter. This suggests using the former protocol in practical systems. It also minimizes the number of payment transfers because it does not require any such transfer if both decommit.
  • the initially low commitment to contracts can also be used as a mechanism to facilitate linking of deals. Often, there is no contract over a single item that is beneficial, but a combination of contracts among two agents would be. Even if explicit clustering of issues into contracts is not used, an agent can agree to an unbeneficial contract in anticipation of synergic future contracts from the other agent that will make the first contract beneficial. If no such contracts appear, the agent can decommit. Similarly, low commitment contracts can be used to facilitate deals among more than two agents. Even without explicit multiagent contract protocols, multiagent contracts can be implemented by one agent agreeing to an unbeneficial contract in anticipation of synergic future contracts from third parties that will make the first contract beneficial. If no such contracts appear, the agent can decommit.

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Abstract

Système servant à contracter un engagement aménagé et consistant en la possibilité pour des agents contractants de se désengager en fonction d'une pénalité prédéterminée de désengagement.
PCT/US1998/015729 1997-08-01 1998-07-29 Systeme servant a contracter un engagement amenage WO1999006933A1 (fr)

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AU86694/98A AU8669498A (en) 1997-08-01 1998-07-29 Leveled commitment contracting system

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US08/904,873 1997-08-01

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Cited By (2)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
GB2343770A (en) * 1998-09-04 2000-05-17 Ibm Service contract for managing service systems
US7373323B1 (en) * 2000-04-13 2008-05-13 I2 Technologies Us, Inc. Method and system for multi-enterprise optimization using flexible trade contracts

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Cited By (6)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
GB2343770A (en) * 1998-09-04 2000-05-17 Ibm Service contract for managing service systems
US6148290A (en) * 1998-09-04 2000-11-14 International Business Machines Corporation Service contract for managing service systems
US7373323B1 (en) * 2000-04-13 2008-05-13 I2 Technologies Us, Inc. Method and system for multi-enterprise optimization using flexible trade contracts
US7720747B2 (en) 2000-04-13 2010-05-18 I2 Technologies Us, Inc. Method and system for multi-enterprise optimization using flexible trade contracts
US7720748B2 (en) 2000-04-13 2010-05-18 I2 Technologies Us, Inc. Method and system for multi-enterprise optimization using flexible trade contracts
US7774265B2 (en) 2000-04-13 2010-08-10 I2 Technologies Us, Inc. Method and system for multi-enterprise optimization using flexible trade contracts

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