WO1991001067A2 - Methode pour l'identification et la protection des abonnes au telephone dans les systemes de telecommunication - Google Patents

Methode pour l'identification et la protection des abonnes au telephone dans les systemes de telecommunication Download PDF

Info

Publication number
WO1991001067A2
WO1991001067A2 PCT/US1990/003290 US9003290W WO9101067A2 WO 1991001067 A2 WO1991001067 A2 WO 1991001067A2 US 9003290 W US9003290 W US 9003290W WO 9101067 A2 WO9101067 A2 WO 9101067A2
Authority
WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
communication unit
modified
arbitrary value
subscriber
transmitted
Prior art date
Application number
PCT/US1990/003290
Other languages
English (en)
Other versions
WO1991001067A3 (fr
Inventor
Mary Beth Flanders
Larry C. Puhl
Original Assignee
Motorola, Inc.
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Motorola, Inc. filed Critical Motorola, Inc.
Publication of WO1991001067A2 publication Critical patent/WO1991001067A2/fr
Publication of WO1991001067A3 publication Critical patent/WO1991001067A3/fr

Links

Classifications

    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/06—Authentication
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/12—Detection or prevention of fraud
    • H04W12/126—Anti-theft arrangements, e.g. protection against subscriber identity module [SIM] cloning
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/60—Context-dependent security
    • H04W12/69—Identity-dependent
    • H04W12/72—Subscriber identity

Definitions

  • This invention relates generally to communication systems and more particularly to radio frequency (RF) cellular telecommunication systems.
  • RF radio frequency
  • Cellular radio telephone systems typically include subscriber units (such as mobile or portable units) which communicate with a fixed network communication unit via RF transmissions.
  • a typical fixed communication network includes at least a base station and a switching center.
  • One responsibility of the fixed network communication unit is to grant use of the communication system to the subscriber unit after the requesting subscriber unit meets the authentication requirements of the system.
  • each subscriber unit is assigned a telephone number (mobile identification number) (MIN) and an identification number (or serial number) (SN) which uniquely identifies the subscriber to any fixed network communication unit.
  • MIN mobile identification number
  • SN identification number
  • Each subscriber unit has a unique identification number that distinguishes it from other subscriber units.
  • the fixed network communication unit has access to these identification numbers through a database.
  • these numbers are used by the fixed network communication units to bill subscribers for the time the subscriber uses the system.
  • the subscriber calls another unit, he enters the phone number he wishes to call.
  • the dialed phone number becomes the data to be sent to the fixed network communication unit.
  • Data may also include other information regarding a third communication unit such as a unit's location.
  • Detection of a legitimate subscriber's identification number may be accomplished by RF eavesdropping or by purposeful or inadvertent divulgence of the MIN/SN combination by the radio telephone installer. Once the subscriber's telephone number and identification number is known (stolen), a thief may reprogram another subscriber unit with the stolen identification number causing two or more subscriber units to have the same MIN/SN combination.
  • Cellular radio telephone systems have authentication procedures to deny access to subscribers not having legitimate identification numbers, but do not have the capability to detect multiple users or effectively neutralize the effect of an installer leaking subscriber identification numbers. Therefore, the legitimate user is billed for both the thief's use and his own use.
  • EIA-553 section 2.3 specifies that each subscriber shall have a MIN and a factory set SN.
  • the telephone number which the subscriber is attempting to contact is the data that is transmitted by the subscriber to the fixed network communication unit. Authentication is granted by this system if the MIN and corresponding SN are found in the fixed network communication unit database.
  • EIA-553 does not require the encipherment of the MIN or SN before transmission to the fixed network communication unit thereby permitting direct RF detection of any MIN or SN.
  • this technique fails to provide protection against a thief that acquires a MIN/SN from an installer.
  • GSM Groupe Special Mobile
  • This method additionally requires the subscriber to ope y transmit a temporary mobile subscriber ID (TMSI) to the fixed network communication unit; the fixed network communication unit generates and sends a random number (RAND) to the subscriber.
  • TMSI temporary mobile subscriber ID
  • RAND random number
  • the enciphering technique requires the subscriber unit to autonomously retrieve at least three enciphering elements from its memory: a predetermined ciphering key, an SN (individual subscriber authentication key) and a MIN (international mobile subscriber identification number - IMSI).
  • the subscriber then enciphers its SN and MIN using the cipher to construct the RAND into a signed response (SRES).
  • the subscriber unit transmits this signed response back to the fixed network communication unit where the fixed network communication unit checks the SN, MIN, and ciphering key against its database using the subscriber's temporary ID (TMSI).
  • TMSI subscriber's temporary ID
  • the fixed network communication unit generates its response to the same random number using the information retrieved from the database and compares the subscriber signed response to the fixed network communication unit generated response. If the responses are substantially equivalent, authentication is confirmed.
  • the dialed telephone number is only allowed to be transmitted after authentication is granted. This system affords some protection against a thief that acquires the MIN/SN from an installer by enciphering the SN and reassigning a temporary TMSI each time the subscriber enters a different cell area.
  • the authentication method should restrict an illegitimate user's capacity to utilize the system in the case where access is inadvertently granted. Further, an adequate level of security resulting from encipherment should not require additional transmission processes or inject higher error levels during the authentication process.
  • This method describes an authentication technique for use between a first communication unit, such as a subscriber unit, and a second communication unit, such as a fixed network communication unit, wherein the first communication unit modifies an ID, known to both the first communication unit and the second communication unit (such as a serial number), using data as one enciphering key and a second ID (such as a Personal Identification Number - PIN) as the other enciphering key.
  • An historic non-arbitrary valu ⁇ of predetermined communication events such as a count of the number of telephone calls made by a subscriber, is maintained in both the first and second communication units. This value (count) is historic because it represents past telephone calls attributed to a communication unit, and it is non-arbitrary because this history of transactions (i.e., number of calls made) serves to identify an out-of-sync communication unit.
  • the first communication unit transmits (via RF signals) the modified ID and count to a second communication unit.
  • the second communication unit compares the count maintained by the first communication unit to the count maintained by the second unit.
  • a count discrepancy indicates a different number of calls on one unit indicating a multiple user whose count is out of sequence.
  • the second communication unit performs the same enciphering method on the known serial number using the data received and a known second ID.
  • the second communication unit compares the received modified serial number and the serial number generated by the fixed network communication unit to determine if the serial number is valid.
  • the invention is designed to substantially decrease unauthorized use of a first ID of a communication unit.
  • the authentication method does not require the second ID to ever be transmitted by RF.
  • This invention provides a means for detecting multiple subscribers using the same serial numbers and telephone numbers. Moreover, if a multiple user copies the information transmitted and uses the same information to access the system, the multiple user will be limited to only calling the telephone number that is in the authentication message; not a telephone number of his own choice.
  • This authentication invention also reduces authentication errors by making more efficient use of the data transmitted and a second ID, by using them as a part of the cipher; the enciphering means does not require an additional RAND stream to be sent by a fixed network communication unit to be used as the common enciphering base and thereby eliminates this additional transmission and therefore decreases the probability of errors.
  • FIG. 1 is a block diagram of a typical subscriber communication unit and fixed network communication unit.
  • FIG. 2 is a flow chart of the identification enciphering method used by a subscriber communication unit.
  • FIG. 3 is a flow chart of the authentication method used by a fixed network communication unit in accordance with the invention.
  • FIG. 1 generally depicts a subscriber communication unit (10) .such as a subscriber telephone and a fixed network communication unit (20) such as a cellular telephone basesite and switching center.
  • the subscriber communication unit (10) is comprised of a microprocessing stage (12), a non-volatile memory unit (11), a radio frequency (RF) stage (13), all as well understood in the art.
  • Additional elements include a data input- stage (14) such as a key entry pad on a telephone (to enter a telephone number - data), a subscriber call sequence counter (15), and an output from an enciphering stage referred to as the enciphered serial number (16).
  • the non-volatile memory unit (11 ) resides the serial number (18) (for the subscriber unit), the PIN (19), and the subscriber telephone number (17) (which can have, for example, characteristics of a Mobile Identification Number (MIN)).
  • the PIN is a second ID known only to the subscriber unit and the fixed network unit. For example, it should not be available to an installer of the subscriber unit, it should only be available to a legitimate user of a subscriber unit and a fixed network communication unit database. The subscriber need only enter the PIN one time to activate it. The PIN may be changed by the subscriber, but the change must also be made known to the fixed network unit.
  • These identifiers need not necessarily be numbers but may correspond to any attribute capable of being identified by the fixed network communications unit.
  • An alternative embodiment for example, in a cellular system, may include a stored look up table containing multiple sets of serial numbers, PIN's, and telephone numbers with each set of identifiers corresponding to a specific cellular area or fixed network communication u n it.
  • the fixed network communication unit (20) includes a switching center which is comprised of a microprocessing stage (22), a database (23), and a link to a basesite radio frequency stage (21 ), all as well understood in the art. Additional elements include a fixed network unit call sequence counter (24) and an enciphered serial number generated by the fixed network unit (25).
  • the database includes information regarding the subscriber unit's: serial number (28), PIN (27), and subscriber telephone number (26); the information includes a stored copy of the serial number (28), PIN (27), and the subscriber telephone number (26).
  • serial number (18), PIN (19), and telephone number (17) of the subscriber communication unit (10) correspond to the serial number (28), PIN (27), and telephone number (26) as stored in the fixed network communication unit (20).
  • Communication between the subscriber communication unit (10) and the fixed network communication unit (20) is accomplished via RF transmissions between the two units in accordance with well understood cellular system techniques.
  • FIG. 2 depicts the method used by a subscriber comrhunicaion unit to encipher its serial number before transmission to a fixed network communication unit during an authentication request (29).
  • This method requires use of two enciphering . keys. he subscriber unit obtains the called telephone number (data) (30) and obtains PIN (31 ) from memory and uses at least parts of these two components as the enciphering keys to encipher its serial number (32). If PIN and the called telephone number are comprised of bits, the parts of these keys to be used are the contents of the bits and the bit length of each key.
  • an enciphered serial number may have a different bit length than the unenciphered serial number, or unmodified first ID, depending on the contents of the PIN or the data. Varying the enciphered SN bit length may also be a function of another event known to both the subscriber and fixed network unit such as the time of day.
  • the algorithm to integrate the two enciphering keys may be varied to accommodate various levels of security depending upon the requirement of the system.
  • the subscriber identification enciphering method does not require authentication to be confirmed by the fixed network communication unit before data is transmitted. Combining PIN with data adds the ability of the system to encipher a serial number into, a complex code to an extent sufficient to substantially eliminate unauthorized detection by RF eavesdropping and unauthorized divulgence by installers.
  • the modified serial number (enciphered SN) becomes a component of the Authentication Request Message (ARM) (35) that is transmitted via RF (36) to the fixed network communication unit.
  • ARM Authentication Request Message
  • the assigned telephone number is obtained (33) from memory. This number is not enciphered as part of the authentication procedure.
  • This identifier is a component of the ARM (35) that informs the fixed network unit that the authentication request is coming from a valid subscriber unit.
  • the call sequence count is then obtained (34) and also used in the ARM (35).
  • the call sequence count is updated (incremented or decremented) each time a predetermined event occurs such as when the authentication procedure is initiated or a call is completed.
  • the count may be maintained by the subscriber and fixed network unit using a rollover type counter such as a ring counter. This count is used by the fixed network communication unit as a means to count the number of calls made by each subscriber. Because a record of the number of calls made by each subscriber is maintained by both the subscriber unit and the fixed network communication unit, another subscriber trying to use the same serial number will be detected because it will not have made the exact same number of calls as the legitimate subscriber.
  • the call sequence count information is communicated to the fixed network unit as one component of the Authentication Request Message.
  • the ARM can be communicated in any acceptable format or in any number of stages. Components of a typical ARM (35) include data, the enciphered serial number, the call sequence count, and the assigned telephone number.
  • An alternative embodiment would include modifying the call sequence count using the same enciphering method that is used to modify the SN. This would further enhance the protection because the count is also disguised using the PIN and data; each subscriber would generate a different value for the same count (number of calls made).
  • a fixed network communication unit receives a transmitted ARM and uses this information to determine whether authentication should be granted to the subscriber unit.
  • FIG. 3 depicts the authentication method performed by a fixed network unit.
  • the ARM is received (37) by the fixed network unit by means of the base RF unit (21 ).
  • the fixed network unit has access to assigned telephone number's, serial number's and PIN's of valid subscriber units through its database.
  • the fixed network unit determines if the assigned telephone number received in the ARM is valid (39) by obtaining from the fixed network unit database the same assigned telephone number (38). A comparison is made between the received telephone number from the subscriber unit and the valid number found in the database (39). If the assigned telephone number is not recognized by the fixed network unit, authentication is denied (or some other action taken) (40).
  • the fixed network unit retrieves from the database the serial number and PIN corresponding to that particular assigned telephone number.
  • the fixed network unit uses the PIN from the database and the data received in the ARM as enciphering keys as elements of its enciphering method (44), which is the same method used in the subscriber unit, and generates its own enciphered serial number.
  • the fixed network unit compares this enciphered serial number to the serial number enciphered by the subscriber unit(46). If they are not substantially the same, then the system denies access or takes some other predetermined course of action (47).
  • the received call sequence count is obtained (48) and compared (50) to the call count maintained by the fixed network communication unit (49). If the counts are substantially equal, authentication may be confirmed (52) which is the first predetermined course of action. At this point, the subscriber may be allowed to communicate with the third communication unit associated with the dialed number. This third unit may more generally be termed a requested communication resource. If the count is not within the acceptable tolerance, authentication may be denied or the authorities may be notified that a multiple user is attempting to access the system (51 ).
  • the fixed network unit call counter maintains the number of times authentication is granted to a subscriber. Each subscriber has its own call counter. Having a continuous call counting scheme between a subscriber and a fixed network communication unit prevents another subscriber from using some other subscriber's identification number because the thief would not have made the identical number of calls that the legitimate subscriber made. This discrepancy is flagged by the fixed network unit when it compares the two counts.
  • Protection against illegitimate users is further enhanced by the encipherment method's use of the enciphered dialed telephone number and the PIN (which is not transmitted). Without an illegitimate user knowing a subscriber's PIN and the exact algorithm that enciphers the serial number, a thief is limited to merely copying the authentication message of a subscriber and repeating this message. Each time a subscriber dials a different telephone number, a different authentication request message is generated because each subscriber has a different PIN; each subscriber generates a different authentication request message for the same telephone number.
  • a thief may detect the call sequence count (because it is not enciphered in the ARM) and update it, a correct count would only allow the thief to gain authentication for the enciphered dialed telephone number he intercepted. Therefore the illegitimate user can only communicate to the subscriber whose enciphered telephone number matches that copied from the ARM.
  • An alternative embodiment comprising the call sequence count may allow each subscriber to maintain more than one call counter where a separate call counter is required for each fixed network communication unit. This embodiment would find use in a cellular communication system which allowed a subscriber to use multiple fixed network communication units.
  • Another alternative embodiment to the flow in FIG. 3 may require the step of comparing the call sequence counts (50) to occur before the step involving the comparison of enciphered serial numbers (46).

Landscapes

  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)
  • Telephonic Communication Services (AREA)

Abstract

Les systèmes de télécommunications cellulaires fondés sur la radio fréquence nécessitent souvent que l'abonné au téléphone possède un numéro d'identification ou un numéro d'ordre qui est transmis à une unité de communication déterminée du réseau pour vérifier l'identité de l'abonné. La détection non autorisée des numéros d'identification est sensiblement réduite par cette invention. Cette invention décrit une méthode de chiffrage (32) et une méthode de séquence d'appel (34), qui lorsqu'elles sont combinées (35), offrent une bonne protection à l'abonné contre la détection non autorisée de leurs numéros d'identification.
PCT/US1990/003290 1989-07-12 1990-06-14 Methode pour l'identification et la protection des abonnes au telephone dans les systemes de telecommunication WO1991001067A2 (fr)

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
US37872189A 1989-07-12 1989-07-12
US378,721 1989-07-12

Publications (2)

Publication Number Publication Date
WO1991001067A2 true WO1991001067A2 (fr) 1991-01-24
WO1991001067A3 WO1991001067A3 (fr) 1992-11-26

Family

ID=23494291

Family Applications (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
PCT/US1990/003290 WO1991001067A2 (fr) 1989-07-12 1990-06-14 Methode pour l'identification et la protection des abonnes au telephone dans les systemes de telecommunication

Country Status (7)

Country Link
JP (1) JP2684118B2 (fr)
AU (1) AU6034790A (fr)
CA (1) CA2063447C (fr)
IL (1) IL94467A (fr)
MX (1) MX166091B (fr)
MY (1) MY107083A (fr)
WO (1) WO1991001067A2 (fr)

Cited By (17)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
FR2678459A1 (fr) * 1991-06-26 1992-12-31 Remery Patrick Procede d'authentification d'une personne appelante abonnee pour tarification telephonique.
EP0554093A2 (fr) * 1992-01-29 1993-08-04 Kabushiki Kaisha Toshiba Appareil de radio-télécommunications
EP0584725A1 (fr) * 1992-08-19 1994-03-02 Nippon Telegraph And Telephone Corporation Méthode d'authentification à sécurité améliorée pour conserver le secret d'une cléf d'authentification
EP0634852A2 (fr) * 1993-07-16 1995-01-18 GRUNDIG E.M.V. Elektro-Mechanische Versuchsanstalt Max Grundig GmbH & Co. KG Méthode pour l'intérrogation à distance d'une autorisation d'accès pour équipement d'abonné
EP0647079A1 (fr) * 1993-10-01 1995-04-05 Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. Méthode et appareil de protection de l'information d'authentification du numéro de compte d'un téléphone sans fil
DE4336995A1 (de) * 1993-10-29 1995-05-04 Sel Alcatel Ag Verfahren und Vorrichtung zur Bestimmung der Zuordnung eines Mobilfunkgerätes zu Geräte-Listen
WO1995015066A1 (fr) * 1993-11-24 1995-06-01 Telefonaktiebolaget Lm Ericsson Procede d'authentification pour systemes analogiques de communications
EP0663124A1 (fr) * 1993-06-29 1995-07-19 Motorola, Inc. Procede et appareil permettant une authentification et un codage en temps reel efficaces dans un systeme de communication
EP0717898A1 (fr) * 1994-07-05 1996-06-26 Motorola, Inc. Procede d'etablissement de messagerie dans un systeme de telecommunications
WO1996038994A1 (fr) * 1995-06-02 1996-12-05 Dsc Communications Corporation Procede et dispositif permettant d'authentifier un terminal d'abonne dans un systeme de telecommunications sans fil
WO1997037508A1 (fr) * 1996-03-29 1997-10-09 Ericsson Inc. Procede et dispositif de deduction de numero de reference aleatoire a partir de signaux de tele-appel et d'appelant
EP0774845A3 (fr) * 1995-11-16 1999-07-28 Siemens Aktiengesellschaft Procédé et dispositif pour l'authentification de l'utilisateur d'une ligne d'abonnée
EP0781063A3 (fr) * 1995-12-21 1999-08-11 Siemens Aktiengesellschaft Procédé et dispositif de génération de nombres aléatoires dans des appareils de télécommunication d'un système de communication sans fil
WO2000078078A1 (fr) * 1999-06-15 2000-12-21 Siemens Aktiengesellschaft Procede et systeme pour la verification de l'authenticite d'un premier partenaire de communication dans un reseau de communication
WO2001037586A2 (fr) * 1999-11-16 2001-05-25 Siemens Aktiengesellschaft Procede d'authentification d'un reseau de communication radio par rapport a une station mobile ainsi que reseau de communication radio et station mobile
US7613456B2 (en) 1996-07-15 2009-11-03 At&T Mobility Ii Llc System and method for automatic registration notification for over-the-air activation
CN112164220A (zh) * 2020-09-22 2021-01-01 江西锦路科技开发有限公司 一种高速公路服务区拥堵监测及自动导引系统

Citations (4)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US4023012A (en) * 1974-07-08 1977-05-10 Omron Tateisi Electronics Co. System for verifying the user of a card
US4315101A (en) * 1979-02-05 1982-02-09 Atalla Technovations Method and apparatus for securing data transmissions
US4535333A (en) * 1982-09-23 1985-08-13 Chamberlain Manufacturing Corporation Transmitter and receiver for controlling remote elements
US4814741A (en) * 1986-04-30 1989-03-21 Mitsubishi Denki K.K. Digital remote control device

Patent Citations (4)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US4023012A (en) * 1974-07-08 1977-05-10 Omron Tateisi Electronics Co. System for verifying the user of a card
US4315101A (en) * 1979-02-05 1982-02-09 Atalla Technovations Method and apparatus for securing data transmissions
US4535333A (en) * 1982-09-23 1985-08-13 Chamberlain Manufacturing Corporation Transmitter and receiver for controlling remote elements
US4814741A (en) * 1986-04-30 1989-03-21 Mitsubishi Denki K.K. Digital remote control device

Cited By (42)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
FR2678459A1 (fr) * 1991-06-26 1992-12-31 Remery Patrick Procede d'authentification d'une personne appelante abonnee pour tarification telephonique.
US5437053A (en) * 1992-01-29 1995-07-25 Kabushiki Kaisha Toshiba Radio telecommunication apparatus
EP0554093A2 (fr) * 1992-01-29 1993-08-04 Kabushiki Kaisha Toshiba Appareil de radio-télécommunications
EP0554093A3 (en) * 1992-01-29 1993-11-18 Toshiba Kk Radio telecommunication apparatus
EP0584725A1 (fr) * 1992-08-19 1994-03-02 Nippon Telegraph And Telephone Corporation Méthode d'authentification à sécurité améliorée pour conserver le secret d'une cléf d'authentification
EP0663124A1 (fr) * 1993-06-29 1995-07-19 Motorola, Inc. Procede et appareil permettant une authentification et un codage en temps reel efficaces dans un systeme de communication
EP0663124A4 (fr) * 1993-06-29 2000-04-05 Motorola Inc Procede et appareil permettant une authentification et un codage en temps reel efficaces dans un systeme de communication
EP0634852A2 (fr) * 1993-07-16 1995-01-18 GRUNDIG E.M.V. Elektro-Mechanische Versuchsanstalt Max Grundig GmbH & Co. KG Méthode pour l'intérrogation à distance d'une autorisation d'accès pour équipement d'abonné
EP0634852A3 (fr) * 1993-07-16 2000-01-19 GRUNDIG Aktiengesellschaft Méthode pour l'intérrogation à distance d'une autorisation d'accès pour équipement d'abonné
EP0647079A1 (fr) * 1993-10-01 1995-04-05 Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. Méthode et appareil de protection de l'information d'authentification du numéro de compte d'un téléphone sans fil
DE4336995A1 (de) * 1993-10-29 1995-05-04 Sel Alcatel Ag Verfahren und Vorrichtung zur Bestimmung der Zuordnung eines Mobilfunkgerätes zu Geräte-Listen
US5561853A (en) * 1993-10-29 1996-10-01 Alcatel Sel Aktiengesellschaft Method and apparatus for determining the assignment of a mobile station to equipment lists
WO1995015066A1 (fr) * 1993-11-24 1995-06-01 Telefonaktiebolaget Lm Ericsson Procede d'authentification pour systemes analogiques de communications
US5557676A (en) * 1993-11-24 1996-09-17 Telefonaktiebolaget Lm Ericsson Authentication for analog communication systems
AU677482B2 (en) * 1993-11-24 1997-04-24 Telefonaktiebolaget Lm Ericsson (Publ) Authentication for analog communication systems
EP0717898A1 (fr) * 1994-07-05 1996-06-26 Motorola, Inc. Procede d'etablissement de messagerie dans un systeme de telecommunications
EP0717898A4 (fr) * 1994-07-05 1999-09-01 Motorola Inc Procede d'etablissement de messagerie dans un systeme de telecommunications
WO1996038994A1 (fr) * 1995-06-02 1996-12-05 Dsc Communications Corporation Procede et dispositif permettant d'authentifier un terminal d'abonne dans un systeme de telecommunications sans fil
EP0774845A3 (fr) * 1995-11-16 1999-07-28 Siemens Aktiengesellschaft Procédé et dispositif pour l'authentification de l'utilisateur d'une ligne d'abonnée
EP0781063A3 (fr) * 1995-12-21 1999-08-11 Siemens Aktiengesellschaft Procédé et dispositif de génération de nombres aléatoires dans des appareils de télécommunication d'un système de communication sans fil
WO1997037508A1 (fr) * 1996-03-29 1997-10-09 Ericsson Inc. Procede et dispositif de deduction de numero de reference aleatoire a partir de signaux de tele-appel et d'appelant
US8301140B2 (en) 1996-07-15 2012-10-30 At&T Mobility Ii Llc System and method for automatic registration notification for over-the-air activation
US8515423B2 (en) 1996-07-15 2013-08-20 At&T Mobility Ii Llc System and method for automatic registration notification for over-the-air activation
US8874109B2 (en) 1996-07-15 2014-10-28 At&T Mobility Ii Llc System and method for automatic registration notification for over-the-air activation
US7613456B2 (en) 1996-07-15 2009-11-03 At&T Mobility Ii Llc System and method for automatic registration notification for over-the-air activation
EP1326470A2 (fr) * 1999-06-15 2003-07-09 Siemens Aktiengesellschaft Méthode et appareil pour l'authentification d'un souscripteur dans un réseau de communications
EP1326469A2 (fr) * 1999-06-15 2003-07-09 Siemens Aktiengesellschaft Méthode et appareil pour l'authentication des souscripteurs dans un réseau de communications
EP1326469A3 (fr) * 1999-06-15 2004-01-07 Siemens Aktiengesellschaft Méthode et appareil pour l'authentication des souscripteurs dans un réseau de communications
EP1326470A3 (fr) * 1999-06-15 2004-01-07 Siemens Aktiengesellschaft Méthode et appareil pour l'authentification d'un souscripteur dans un réseau de communications
US6980796B1 (en) 1999-06-15 2005-12-27 Siemens Aktiengesellschaft Method and system for verifying the authenticity of a first communication participants in a communications network
US7139550B2 (en) 1999-06-15 2006-11-21 Siemens Aktiengesellschaft Method and system for verifying the authenticity of a first communication participants in a communications network
CN1314277C (zh) * 1999-06-15 2007-05-02 西门子公司 在通信网中检验第一通信方的真实可靠性的方法和装置
CN1316834C (zh) * 1999-06-15 2007-05-16 西门子公司 在通信网中检验第二通信方的真实可靠性的方法和系统
USRE40791E1 (en) 1999-06-15 2009-06-23 Siemens Aktiengesellschaft Method and system for verifying the authenticity of a first communication participants in a communications network
US8565429B2 (en) 1999-06-15 2013-10-22 Siemens Aktiengesellschaft Method and system for veryfying the authenticity of a first communication participants in a communications network
AU760714B2 (en) * 1999-06-15 2003-05-22 Siemens Aktiengesellschaft Method and system for verifying the authenticity of a first communication participants in a communications network
WO2000078078A1 (fr) * 1999-06-15 2000-12-21 Siemens Aktiengesellschaft Procede et systeme pour la verification de l'authenticite d'un premier partenaire de communication dans un reseau de communication
WO2001037586A2 (fr) * 1999-11-16 2001-05-25 Siemens Aktiengesellschaft Procede d'authentification d'un reseau de communication radio par rapport a une station mobile ainsi que reseau de communication radio et station mobile
US7627122B1 (en) 1999-11-16 2009-12-01 Siemens Aktiengesellschaft Method for authentication of a radio communications network with a mobile station, and radio communications network and a mobile station
DE19955096B4 (de) * 1999-11-16 2009-10-01 Siemens Ag Verfahren zur Authentifikation eines Funk-Kommunikationsnetzes gegenüber einer Mobilstation sowie ein Funk-Kommunikationsnetz und eine Mobilstation
WO2001037586A3 (fr) * 1999-11-16 2002-02-28 Siemens Ag Procede d'authentification d'un reseau de communication radio par rapport a une station mobile ainsi que reseau de communication radio et station mobile
CN112164220A (zh) * 2020-09-22 2021-01-01 江西锦路科技开发有限公司 一种高速公路服务区拥堵监测及自动导引系统

Also Published As

Publication number Publication date
WO1991001067A3 (fr) 1992-11-26
IL94467A (en) 1995-12-31
IL94467A0 (en) 1991-03-10
MX166091B (es) 1992-12-17
MY107083A (en) 1995-09-30
AU6034790A (en) 1991-02-06
CA2063447C (fr) 1997-03-25
CA2063447A1 (fr) 1991-01-13
JPH05503816A (ja) 1993-06-17
JP2684118B2 (ja) 1997-12-03

Similar Documents

Publication Publication Date Title
US5572193A (en) Method for authentication and protection of subscribers in telecommunications systems
CA2141318C (fr) Methode et dispositif d'authentification et de chiffrement en temps reel pour systeme de communication
US5239294A (en) Method and apparatus for authenication and protection of subscribers in telecommunication systems
US5708710A (en) Method and apparatus for authentication in a communication system
US6427073B1 (en) Preventing misuse of a copied subscriber identity in a mobile communication system
US5457737A (en) Methods and apparatus to verify the identity of a cellular mobile phone
EP1562394B1 (fr) Dispositif et procédé pour definir la restriction d'usage d'un terminal mobile de communication
US5513245A (en) Automatic generation of private authentication key for wireless communication systems
EP1168870B1 (fr) Procédé amélioré pour l'authentification du module d'identité d'abonné d'un utilisateur
EP0872151B1 (fr) Gestion de clefs d'authentification dans un systeme mobile de communications
CA2063447C (fr) Methode d'identification et de protection des abonnes dans un systeme de telecommunication
EP1502467B1 (fr) Fonction couplee pour carte sim
US20030061488A1 (en) Cloning protection for electronic equipment
US6532290B1 (en) Authentication methods
US6665530B1 (en) System and method for preventing replay attacks in wireless communication
US6934531B1 (en) Method for improving the security of authentication procedures in digital mobile radio telephone systems
KR100320322B1 (ko) 셀룰라전화기
WO1999049688A1 (fr) Systeme et procede d'authentification d'une identite de station mobile et gestion des problemes d'authentification dans un reseau de radiotelecommunication
JPH11510019A (ja) 通信ネットワーク、通信システム及びそのようなシステム用のユニットに対するアクセス制限処理
EP1000520A1 (fr) Systeme et procede destines a eviter les attaques par reexecution en radiocommunication
JPH05336109A (ja) 無線通信システム
MXPA99010399A (en) Processing of emergency calls in wireless communications system with fraud protection

Legal Events

Date Code Title Description
AK Designated states

Kind code of ref document: A2

Designated state(s): AU CA JP KR

AL Designated countries for regional patents

Kind code of ref document: A2

Designated state(s): AT BE CH DE DK ES FR GB IT LU NL SE

WWE Wipo information: entry into national phase

Ref document number: 2063447

Country of ref document: CA

AK Designated states

Kind code of ref document: A3

Designated state(s): AU CA JP KR

AL Designated countries for regional patents

Kind code of ref document: A3

Designated state(s): AT BE CH DE DK ES FR GB IT LU NL SE

CFP Corrected version of a pamphlet front page

Free format text: REVISED ABSTRACT RECEIVED BY THE INTERNATIONAL BUREAU AFTER COMPLETION OF THE TECHNICAL PREPARATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL PUBLICATION