US9270672B2 - Performing a group authentication and key agreement procedure - Google Patents
Performing a group authentication and key agreement procedure Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- US9270672B2 US9270672B2 US14/119,665 US201114119665A US9270672B2 US 9270672 B2 US9270672 B2 US 9270672B2 US 201114119665 A US201114119665 A US 201114119665A US 9270672 B2 US9270672 B2 US 9270672B2
- Authority
- US
- United States
- Prior art keywords
- group
- key
- authentication
- devices
- shared
- Prior art date
- Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
- Active
Links
- 238000000034 method Methods 0.000 title claims abstract description 150
- 238000004590 computer program Methods 0.000 claims abstract description 16
- 230000000977 initiatory effect Effects 0.000 claims abstract description 9
- 230000004044 response Effects 0.000 claims description 19
- 230000011664 signaling Effects 0.000 abstract description 8
- 230000004048 modification Effects 0.000 abstract description 6
- 238000012986 modification Methods 0.000 abstract description 6
- 230000003247 decreasing effect Effects 0.000 abstract description 5
- 238000004891 communication Methods 0.000 description 13
- 238000010586 diagram Methods 0.000 description 5
- 238000004846 x-ray emission Methods 0.000 description 5
- 230000008901 benefit Effects 0.000 description 3
- CSRZQMIRAZTJOY-UHFFFAOYSA-N trimethylsilyl iodide Substances C[Si](C)(C)I CSRZQMIRAZTJOY-UHFFFAOYSA-N 0.000 description 3
- 230000006870 function Effects 0.000 description 2
- 230000007774 longterm Effects 0.000 description 1
- 230000003287 optical effect Effects 0.000 description 1
Images
Classifications
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
- H04L63/0869—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities for achieving mutual authentication
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/04—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
- H04W12/041—Key generation or derivation
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/04—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
- H04W12/043—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA] using a trusted network node as an anchor
- H04W12/0431—Key distribution or pre-distribution; Key agreement
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/04—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
- H04W12/043—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA] using a trusted network node as an anchor
- H04W12/0433—Key management protocols
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/06—Authentication
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/06—Authentication
- H04W12/069—Authentication using certificates or pre-shared keys
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/06—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network
- H04L63/065—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network for group communications
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/10—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for controlling access to devices or network resources
- H04L63/104—Grouping of entities
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/04—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
-
- H04W4/005—
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W4/00—Services specially adapted for wireless communication networks; Facilities therefor
- H04W4/70—Services for machine-to-machine communication [M2M] or machine type communication [MTC]
Definitions
- Embodiments of the present invention generally relate to wireless communication. More particularly, embodiments of the present invention relate to a method, an apparatus, and a computer program product for performing a group authentication and key agreement procedure on a group of communication devices, e.g., machine-type-communication devices.
- a group of communication devices e.g., machine-type-communication devices.
- An AKA procedure is a procedure that has been employed by many communication systems of today for the purpose of improving system security and robustness.
- One such an AKA procedure has been detailed in 3GPP Technical Specifications 33.102 and 33.401, which are incorporated herein by reference in their entirety.
- the AKA procedure which may involve a challenge-response authentication procedure as known in the art, will inevitably cause certain amount of signaling overhead.
- the number of devices to be authenticated in the AKA procedure is relatively low, it will merely cause small amount of overhead for the network.
- devices to be simultaneously authenticated are numerous, it will generate tremendous signaling overhead that may burden the bandwidth and processing capability of the network.
- a method, an apparatus, and a computer program product are therefore provided for performing a group AKA procedure on a group of devices.
- a method, an apparatus and a computer program product are provided where a master device in a group of devices, upon completion of its own authentication with the network (i.e., authentication entities), may authenticate other devices in the group on behalf of the network.
- the impact of the signaling overhead on the network may be decreased without substantive modification to the existing architecture of the network.
- One embodiment of the present invention provides a method.
- the method comprises initiating, by a master device in a group of devices, a group authentication and key agreement procedure towards an authentication entity, wherein a shared group key is defined for use in the group authentication and key agreement procedure.
- the method also comprises performing mutual authentication between the master device and the authentication entity based upon the shared group key. Additionally, the method comprises performing mutual authentication between the authenticated master device and other devices in the group based upon the shared group key for completion of the group authentication and key agreement procedure.
- the master device is selected by an owner of the group of devices, an owner of the master device or a network operator.
- a plurality of different shared group keys are defined for a plurality of different groups of devices such that the device has a plurality of the shared group keys based upon the groups to which it belongs.
- the performing mutual authentication is based upon a challenge-response authentication procedure.
- the method further comprises sending, from the master device, to the authentication entity a message regarding results of the group authentication and key agreement procedure.
- the method further comprises instructing, by the master device, one or more devices that have failed in the group authentication and key agreement procedure to initiate an authentication and key agreement procedure towards the authentication entity individually.
- the method further comprises generating, for one or more devices that have been successfully authenticated in the group authentication and key agreement procedure, a respective new shared key based upon one or more device specific parameters and an intermediate group key derived from the shared group key.
- the one or more device specific parameters are one or more of an existing specific key, an international mobile subscriber identity, a temporary mobile subscriber identity, and an international mobile equipment identity of the device.
- the existing specific key is a shared key derived from a shared root key between the device and an authentication center, and the respective new shared key is derived from the existing specific key and the intermediate group key.
- An additional embodiment of the present invention provides an apparatus.
- the apparatus comprises means for initiating, by a master device in a group of devices, a group authentication and key agreement procedure towards an authentication entity, wherein a shared group key is defined for use in the group authentication and key agreement procedure.
- the apparatus also comprises means for performing mutual authentication between the master device and the authentication entity based upon the shared group key.
- the apparatus comprises means for performing mutual authentication between the authenticated master device and other devices in the group based upon the shared group key for completion of the group authentication and key agreement procedure.
- the master device is selected by an owner of the group of devices, an owner of the master device or a network operator.
- a plurality of different shared group keys are defined for a plurality of different groups of devices such that the device has a plurality of the shared group keys based upon the groups to which it belongs.
- the performing mutual authentication is based upon a challenge-response authentication procedure.
- the apparatus further comprises means for sending, from the master device, to the authentication entity a message regarding results of the group authentication and key agreement procedure.
- the apparatus further comprises means for instructing, by the master device, one or more devices that have failed in the group authentication and key agreement procedure to initiate an authentication and key agreement procedure towards the authentication entity individually.
- the apparatus comprises means for generating, for one or more devices that have been successfully authenticated in the group authentication and key agreement procedure, a respective new shared key based upon one or more device specific parameters and an intermediate group key derived from the shared group key.
- the one or more device specific parameters are one or more of an existing specific key, an international mobile subscriber identity, a temporary mobile subscriber identity, and an international mobile equipment identity of the device.
- the existing specific key is a shared key derived from a shared root key between the device and an authentication center, and the respective new shared key is derived from the existing specific key and the intermediate group key.
- the apparatus comprises at least one processor and at least one memory including compute program code, the at least one memory and the computer program code configured to, with the at least one processor, cause the apparatus to at least perform: initiating, by a master device in a group of devices, a group authentication and key agreement procedure towards an authentication entity, wherein a shared group key is defined for use in the group authentication and key agreement procedure; performing mutual authentication between the master device and the authentication entity based upon the shared group key; and performing mutual authentication between the authenticated master device and other devices in the group based upon the shared group key for completion of the group authentication and key agreement procedure.
- the computer program product comprises at least one computer readable storage medium having a computer readable program code portion stored thereon.
- the computer readable program code portion comprises program code instructions for initiating, by a master device in a group of devices, a group authentication and key agreement procedure towards an authentication entity, wherein a shared group key is defined for use in the group authentication and key agreement procedure.
- the computer readable program code portion also comprises program code instructions for performing mutual authentication between the master device and the authentication entity based upon the shared group key.
- the computer readable program code portion further comprises program code instructions for performing mutual authentication between the authenticated master device and other devices in the group based upon the shared group key for completion of the group authentication and key agreement procedure.
- the signaling overhead caused by performance of too many AKA procedures on a group of device will be decreased. Additionally, with the shared group key, secure communications between the group of devices and the network may be improved.
- FIG. 1 exemplarily illustrates a simplified 3GPP network that provides an environment and structure for application of the principles of the present invention
- FIG. 2 exemplarily illustrates a flow chart of a method for performing a group AKA procedure on a group of devices according to an embodiment of the present invention
- FIG. 3 is a flow chart exemplarily illustrating a method for performing a group AKA procedure on a group of devices under a LTE network according to an embodiment of the present invention.
- FIG. 4 is a block diagram illustrating an apparatus for performing a group AKA procedure according to an embodiment of the present invention.
- a master device in a group of devices may initiate a group AKA procedure towards the network, e.g., an authentication entity.
- a shared group key is predefined so as to perform mutual authentication between master device and the network.
- the master device When the master device has been successfully authenticated, it will authenticate other devices in the group in place of the authentication entity.
- the master device if one or more devices in the group fail in the authentication, then each of them will initiate an individual AKA procedure with the authentication entity.
- the master device will send to the authentication entity a message regarding the results of the group AKA procedure.
- FIG. 1 exemplarily illustrates a simplified 3GPP network 100 that provides an environment and structure for application of the principles of the present invention.
- the network 100 as illustrated in FIG. 1 includes a MTC device 102 a , a MTC device 102 b , and a master MTC device 104 that are located at an access portion of the network 100 .
- the network 100 includes a MME (used in a LTE system) or SGSN (used in a 3G system) 106 and a HSS/AuC 108 that are located in the 3GPP bearer as illustrated by a circle, wherein the MME or SGSN 106 and HSS/AuC 108 belong to network-side (as compared to the access portion) entities and the MME or SGSN 106 may also be referred to as an authentication entity.
- MME used in a LTE system
- SGSN used in a 3G system
- HSS/AuC 108 that are located in the 3GPP bearer as illustrated by a circle, wherein the MME or SGSN 106 and HSS/AuC 108 belong to network-side (as compared to the access portion) entities and the MME or SGSN 106 may also be referred to as an authentication entity.
- the network 100 includes a MTC server 110 a and a MTC server 110 b that are connected to the 3GPP bearer and handle various transactions regarding a group of MTC devices, e.g., the group consisting of the MTC device 102 a , 102 b and 104 as illustrated in FIG. 1 .
- a group of MTC devices e.g., the group consisting of the MTC device 102 a , 102 b and 104 as illustrated in FIG. 1 .
- the network 100 is provided as an example of one embodiment and should not be construed to narrow the scope or spirit of the disclosure in any way.
- each device in a group of devices would have to initiate an AKA procedure towards the network individually.
- the MTC devices 102 a and 102 b each initiate a AKA procedure towards the MME or SGSN 106 through their respective shared root key K i which has been stored in the USIM.
- the MME or SGSN 106 may interact with the HSS/AuC 108 so as to perform respective challenge-response procedures for authenticating the MTC devices 102 a and 102 b .
- MTC devices including the master MTC device
- MTC devices there may be a group of hundreds of MTC devices in practice.
- MTC devices initiate AKA procedures separately and simultaneously, it is unquestionable that the generated signaling overhead cause tremendous impact on the MME or SGSN 106 and HSS/AuC 108 .
- a master MTC device 104 may be selected or designated in a group of MTC devices beforehand by a network operator, an owner of the master MTC device, or an owner of the group of MTC devices (e.g., a company, such as a power company). Then the master MTC device 104 may initiate a group AKA procedure towards the authentication entity through a predefined shared group key K group that is similar to the key K i .
- the master MTC device 104 may authenticate other MTC devices in the group on behalf of the network-side entities.
- other MTC devices in the group may perform individual AKA procedures no longer with network-side entities but with the master MTC device 104 .
- the signaling overhead at the network side would be significantly decreased because the AKA procedure has been performed only once at the network side.
- FIG. 2 exemplarily illustrates a flow chart of a method 200 according to an embodiment of the present invention.
- the method starts at step S 201 and proceeds to step S 202 at which the method 200 initiates, by a master device in a group of devices, a group AKA procedure towards an authentication entity, wherein a shared group key is defined for use in the group AKA procedure.
- the master device is selected by an owner of the group of devices, an owner of the master device or a network operator.
- any one of devices in the group may play a role as the master device to initiate the group AKA procedure as needed.
- a plurality of different shared group keys are defined for a plurality of different groups of devices such that the device has a plurality of the shared group keys based upon the groups to which it belongs.
- the method 200 Upon initiation of the group AKA procedure, the method 200 advances to step S 203 .
- the method 200 performs mutual authentication between the master device and the authentication entity based upon the shared group key.
- the mutual authentication may be performed based upon a challenge-response authentication procedure in which the shared group key is used instead of a conventional key.
- the challenge-response authentication procedure is successful only when the device has authenticated the network and the network has authenticated the device.
- step S 204 Upon authentication of the master device and the network, the method 200 proceeds to step S 204 at which the method 200 performs mutual authentication between the authenticated master device and other devices in the group based upon the shared group key for completion of the group AKA procedure.
- the mutual authentication herein also may involve a challenge-response authentication procedure.
- the method 200 may comprise additional steps in various embodiments.
- the method 200 may instruct, by the master device, one or more devices that have failed in the group AKA procedure to initiate new AKA procedures towards the authentication entity individually.
- the method 200 may send, from the master device, to the authentication entity a message regarding results of the group AKA procedure; thereby, the authentication entity can be aware of which devices in the group have passed through the group AKA procedure.
- the method 200 may generate, for one or more devices that have been successfully authenticated in the group AKA procedure, a respective new shared key based upon one or more device specific parameters and an intermediate group key derived from the shared group key, wherein the one or more device specific parameters are one or more of an existing specific key, an international mobile subscriber identity, a temporary mobile subscriber identity, and an international mobile equipment identity of the device.
- the existing specific key is a shared key derived from a shared root key between the device and an AuC
- the respective new shared key is derived from the existing specific key and the intermediate group key.
- step S 205 the method 200 ends at step S 205 .
- FIG. 3 illustrating a method 300 for performing a group AKA procedure on a group of devices (e.g., embodied as MTC devices) under the LTE system.
- a group of MTC devices has been registered to the network previously and each registered MTC device has a shared key K ASME with the network, though FIG. 3 only illustrates for brevity one MTC device and one master MTC device that are in a same group.
- a group key K group dedicated for the group AKA procedure has been defined and stored in each device in the group, e.g. on the USIM.
- Such a group key K group can be securely pushed to the device from the network based upon secure communication preestablished under the protection of the unique shared root key K i or a shared key derived from K i .
- the method 300 starts at step S 301 , wherein the master MTC device, which can be selected from the group by an owner of the group of devices, an owner of the master device, or a network operator, sends a group AKA procedure request to the MME.
- the MME Upon receipt of the group AKA procedure request, the MME, at step S 302 , requests an AV from the HSS/AuC. Due to the previous registration of the MTC devices to the network or an indicator indicative of the group AKA procedure in the request, the HSS/AuC determines that this request is in relation to a group AKA procedure.
- an AV that includes, for example, four components, i.e., a RAND, an AUTN, a XRES, and a K ASME-GROUP .
- the component K ASME-GROUP is a shared intermediate key derived from the key K group .
- the components RAND and AUTN each of them can be substituted by new components RAND group and AUTN group dedicated for a group AKA procedure, respectively.
- the HSS/AuC sends the AV including the above four components to the MME.
- the MME Upon receiving the AV from the HSS/AuC, the MME, at Step S 304 , forwards the components RAND and AUTN to the master MTC device.
- the master MTC device more particularly, its USIM, upon receipt of the RAND and AUTN, at step S 305 , first authenticates the MME by computing XMAC and comparing it with MAC included in AUTN. If XMAC equals MAC, then the master MTC device determines the MME is a trusted entity; otherwise, the master MTC device will abandon or abort the group AKA procedure this time and may attempt to reinitiate a group AKA procedure after a certain time interval.
- a new master device when number of attempts to reinitiate the group AKA procedure exceeds a predefined limit, a new master device should be selected or assigned to initiate the group AKA procedure.
- the master MTC device Upon successfully authenticating the MME, the master MTC device generates a response RES based upon the shared group key K group and RAND. Afterwards, the master MTC device sends the response RES back to the MME.
- the MME To authenticate the master MTC device, the MME simply verifies that the response RES received from the master MTC device equals the XRES received in the AV. Once the response RES equals the XRES, authentication of the master MTC device towards the wireless network has been successfully completed.
- the master MTC device may compute a new shared key K ASME ′ based upon the intermediate key K ASME-GROUP derived from K group and one or more device specific parameters.
- the one or more device specific parameters may be one or more of an existing specific key, e.g., K ASME , or other identifies, e.g., IMSI, TMSI or IMEI.
- the key K ASME ′ can be calculated, e.g., by an equation as below.
- K ASME ′ K ASME ⁇ K ASME-GROUP (1)
- the resulting K ASME ′ is used for further secure communication with the network.
- the K ASME ′ may be used to generate keys for other layers, such as the Non-Access Stratum, Access Stratus, and user plane. It should be noted that the above generation of the key K ASME ′ is not necessary when the old K ASME is still suitable for further secure communication.
- the master MTC device sends RAND and AUTN to others devices in the group so as to perform the mutual authentication between itself and each of other devices in the group. Similar to the step S 305 , each of other devices in the group performs authentication operations on the master MTC device to assure such a master MTC device is a trusted master device rather than a masquerader of the master device. Likewise, upon successfully authenticating the master MTC device, the MTC device in the group generates a respective response RES based upon the shared group key K group and RAND and then forwards the RES to the master MTC device. Similarly, the master MTC device determines whether the RES equals the XRES.
- the master MTC device informs the MTC device of failure in the authentication. Then, alternatively or additionally, the MTC device that fails in the authentication may initiate an individual AKA procedure towards the network at step S 308 .
- the MTC device may alternatively computes its own K ASME ′ based upon its own existing specific key, e.g., K ASME , which may be unusable now, or its own identifies, e.g., IMSI, TMSI or IMEI.
- the MTC device may apply the equation ( 1 ) as discussed above with respect to the master MTC device to compute its own K ASME ′ for further secure communication with the network.
- the master device may send to the MME a message regarding the results of the group AKA procedure so that the MME may know which devices in the group have passed through the group AKA procedure. Similar to the MTC device, the MME may also compute, at step S 311 , a respective new shared key K ASME ′ for further secure communication.
- the present invention should not be limited thereto.
- a person skilled in the art can understand that the above method 300 may also be implemented, for example, in a 3G system and other types of a group of devices by some modifications.
- the above keys K ASME and K ASME-GROUP in the LTE system may be replaced by keys IK and CK, and IK group and CK group , respectively.
- the SGSN in the 3G system will play the same role as the MME in the LTE system.
- FIG. 4 is a schematic diagram of an apparatus 400 according to another embodiment of the present invention, which implements relevant steps of methods 200 and 300 as illustrated in FIGS. 2 and 3 .
- the apparatus as illustrated in FIG. 4 is only an example of the electronic devices in which the present invention is implemented.
- the apparatus as illustrated in FIG. 4 may be a personal digital assistant (PDA), a mobile phone, an electronic card reader, a sensor device, etc.
- PDA personal digital assistant
- FIG. 4 may be a personal digital assistant (PDA), a mobile phone, an electronic card reader, a sensor device, etc.
- the apparatus 400 may comprise at least one processor 400 , a keyboard 401 , a codec circuitry 402 , a microphone 403 , an ear-piece 404 , a radio interface circuitry 405 , an antenna 406 , at least one memory 407 storing computer program code, an infrared port 408 , a display 409 , a smart card 410 (e.g., an USIM card according to embodiments of the present invention), and a card reader 411 .
- Individual circuits and elements are all of a type well known in the art and some of them are omitted herein so as not to obscuring embodiments of the present invention unnecessarily.
- the memory 407 and the computer program code as stored therein are configured to cause the processor 400 to perform relevant steps in methods 200 and 300 as described in connection with FIGS. 2 and 3 .
- a computer program product in one embodiment of the invention comprises at least one computer readable storage medium, on which the foregoing computer program instructions are stored.
- the computer readable storage medium can be, for example, an optical compact disk or an electronic memory device like a RAM (random access memory) or a ROM (read only memory).
Landscapes
- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
- Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
- Signal Processing (AREA)
- Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
- Computing Systems (AREA)
- General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)
Abstract
Description
-
- 3GPP Third Generation Partnership Project
- LTE Long Term Evolution
- BS Base Station
- MS Mobile Station
- MME Mobility Management Entity
- UE User Equipment
- IMSI International Mobile Subscriber Identity
- ASME Access Security Management Entity
- TMSI Temporary Mobile Subscriber Identity
- MTC Machine Type Communication
- HSS Home Subscriber Server
- IMEI International Mobile Equipment Identity
- AV Authentication Vector
- USIM Universal Subscriber Identity Module
- AUTN Authentication Token
- RAND Random Challenge
- GPRS General Packet Radio Service
- SGSN Serving GPRS Support Node
- XRES Expected Response
- CK Cipher Key
- IK Integrity Key
- AK Anonymity Key
- XMAC Expected Message Authentication Code
- MAC Message Authentication Code
- AuC Authentication Center
- AKA Authentication and Key Agreement
KASME′=KASME⊕KASME-GROUP (1)
Claims (18)
Applications Claiming Priority (1)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| PCT/CN2011/074693 WO2012159272A1 (en) | 2011-05-26 | 2011-05-26 | Performing a group authentication and key agreement procedure |
Publications (2)
| Publication Number | Publication Date |
|---|---|
| US20140075509A1 US20140075509A1 (en) | 2014-03-13 |
| US9270672B2 true US9270672B2 (en) | 2016-02-23 |
Family
ID=47216530
Family Applications (1)
| Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
|---|---|---|---|
| US14/119,665 Active US9270672B2 (en) | 2011-05-26 | 2011-05-26 | Performing a group authentication and key agreement procedure |
Country Status (4)
| Country | Link |
|---|---|
| US (1) | US9270672B2 (en) |
| EP (1) | EP2716093A4 (en) |
| CN (1) | CN103688563A (en) |
| WO (1) | WO2012159272A1 (en) |
Cited By (2)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| US20180115539A1 (en) * | 2016-10-26 | 2018-04-26 | Futurewei Technologies, Inc. | System and Method for Massive loT Group Authentication |
| NL2031140A (en) | 2021-03-02 | 2022-12-14 | Univ Istanbul Teknik | A method for creating a group key |
Families Citing this family (22)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| WO2013113162A1 (en) * | 2012-02-02 | 2013-08-08 | Nokia Siemens Networks Oy | Group based bootstrapping in machine type communication |
| EP2944107A2 (en) * | 2013-01-10 | 2015-11-18 | NEC Corporation | GROUP AUTHENTICATION IN BROADCASTING FOR MTC GROUP OF UEs |
| JP6165483B2 (en) * | 2013-03-27 | 2017-07-19 | 株式会社Nttドコモ | COMMUNICATION SYSTEM, RELAY DEVICE, AND COMMUNICATION METHOD |
| EP3576447A1 (en) * | 2013-06-28 | 2019-12-04 | NEC Corporation | Security for prose group communication |
| EP3025404B1 (en) * | 2013-07-23 | 2021-06-23 | Nokia Technologies Oy | Methods, apparatuses and computer program products of secure charging for device-to-device service |
| US11570161B2 (en) * | 2013-07-31 | 2023-01-31 | Nec Corporation | Devices and method for MTC group key management |
| CN104661171B (en) * | 2013-11-25 | 2020-02-28 | 中兴通讯股份有限公司 | Small data secure transmission method and system for MTC (machine type communication) equipment group |
| JP6254675B2 (en) * | 2014-02-18 | 2017-12-27 | パナソニック インテレクチュアル プロパティ コーポレーション オブ アメリカPanasonic Intellectual Property Corporation of America | Authentication method and authentication system |
| US10756804B2 (en) * | 2014-05-08 | 2020-08-25 | Apple Inc. | Lawful intercept reporting in wireless networks using public safety relays |
| US9992670B2 (en) * | 2014-08-12 | 2018-06-05 | Vodafone Ip Licensing Limited | Machine-to-machine cellular communication security |
| CN105792095A (en) * | 2014-12-23 | 2016-07-20 | 中兴通讯股份有限公司 | Secret key negotiation method and system for MTC (Machine Type Communication) packet communication and network entity |
| WO2016132718A1 (en) * | 2015-02-16 | 2016-08-25 | 日本電気株式会社 | Communication system, communication terminal, authentication method and non-transitory computer-readable medium storing program for same |
| CN106034027A (en) * | 2015-03-12 | 2016-10-19 | 中兴通讯股份有限公司 | Method and system for realizing packet authentication |
| KR101675088B1 (en) | 2015-04-30 | 2016-11-10 | 성균관대학교산학협력단 | Mutual authentication method and system with network in machine type communication |
| JPWO2016181586A1 (en) * | 2015-05-08 | 2018-02-22 | パナソニック インテレクチュアル プロパティ コーポレーション オブ アメリカPanasonic Intellectual Property Corporation of America | Authentication method and authentication system |
| CN106209802A (en) * | 2016-06-30 | 2016-12-07 | 全球能源互联网研究院 | A kind of electric power 4G network security certification based on group policy and cryptographic key negotiation method |
| CN107579826B (en) | 2016-07-04 | 2022-07-22 | 华为技术有限公司 | Network authentication method, transit node and related system |
| CN108616354B (en) * | 2018-04-27 | 2021-10-26 | 北京信息科技大学 | Key negotiation method and device in mobile communication |
| CN109873801B (en) | 2018-12-12 | 2020-07-24 | 阿里巴巴集团控股有限公司 | Method, device, storage medium and computing equipment for establishing trusted channel between user and trusted computing cluster |
| CN109861980B (en) | 2018-12-29 | 2020-08-04 | 阿里巴巴集团控股有限公司 | Method, device, storage medium and computing equipment for establishing trusted computing cluster |
| JP7124975B2 (en) * | 2019-04-08 | 2022-08-24 | 日本電気株式会社 | Procedures for providing integrity protection for UE parameters during UE configuration update procedures |
| RS66015B1 (en) * | 2022-05-25 | 2024-10-31 | Gurulogic Microsystems Oy | Methods and arrangements for enabling secure digital communications among a group |
Citations (7)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| US20050187966A1 (en) * | 2004-02-23 | 2005-08-25 | Sony Corporation | Data communicating apparatus, data communicating method, and program |
| CN101106449A (en) | 2006-07-13 | 2008-01-16 | 华为技术有限公司 | System and method for realizing multi-party communication security |
| JP2009027513A (en) | 2007-07-20 | 2009-02-05 | National Institute Of Information & Communication Technology | Authentication system, authentication method, and program |
| CN101399661A (en) | 2007-09-27 | 2009-04-01 | 华为技术有限公司 | Legal neighbor authentication method and device in group key management |
| WO2010117310A1 (en) | 2009-04-07 | 2010-10-14 | Telefonaktiebolaget L M Ericsson (Publ) | Attaching a sensor to a wsan |
| CN102143491A (en) | 2010-01-29 | 2011-08-03 | 华为技术有限公司 | MTC (machine type communication) equipment authentication method, MTC gateway and relevant equipment |
| CN102215474A (en) | 2010-04-12 | 2011-10-12 | 华为技术有限公司 | Method and device for carrying out authentication on communication equipment |
-
2011
- 2011-05-26 US US14/119,665 patent/US9270672B2/en active Active
- 2011-05-26 WO PCT/CN2011/074693 patent/WO2012159272A1/en active Application Filing
- 2011-05-26 EP EP11866256.8A patent/EP2716093A4/en not_active Withdrawn
- 2011-05-26 CN CN201180072384.2A patent/CN103688563A/en active Pending
Patent Citations (12)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| US20050187966A1 (en) * | 2004-02-23 | 2005-08-25 | Sony Corporation | Data communicating apparatus, data communicating method, and program |
| US7620824B2 (en) * | 2004-02-23 | 2009-11-17 | Sony Corporation | Data communicating apparatus, data communicating method, and program |
| CN101106449A (en) | 2006-07-13 | 2008-01-16 | 华为技术有限公司 | System and method for realizing multi-party communication security |
| US8209532B2 (en) * | 2006-07-13 | 2012-06-26 | Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd | System and method for implementing security of multi-party-communication |
| JP2009027513A (en) | 2007-07-20 | 2009-02-05 | National Institute Of Information & Communication Technology | Authentication system, authentication method, and program |
| CN101399661A (en) | 2007-09-27 | 2009-04-01 | 华为技术有限公司 | Legal neighbor authentication method and device in group key management |
| US20100185850A1 (en) * | 2007-09-27 | 2010-07-22 | Ya Liu | Method and device for authenticating legal neighbor in group key management |
| WO2010117310A1 (en) | 2009-04-07 | 2010-10-14 | Telefonaktiebolaget L M Ericsson (Publ) | Attaching a sensor to a wsan |
| US20120023564A1 (en) * | 2009-04-07 | 2012-01-26 | Telefonaktiebolaget L M Ericsson (Publ) | Attaching a sensor to a wsan |
| CN102143491A (en) | 2010-01-29 | 2011-08-03 | 华为技术有限公司 | MTC (machine type communication) equipment authentication method, MTC gateway and relevant equipment |
| EP2530963A1 (en) | 2010-01-29 | 2012-12-05 | Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. | Authentication method for machine type communication device, machine type communication gateway and related devices |
| CN102215474A (en) | 2010-04-12 | 2011-10-12 | 华为技术有限公司 | Method and device for carrying out authentication on communication equipment |
Non-Patent Citations (4)
| Title |
|---|
| "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; 3GPP System Architecture Evolution (SAE); Security architecture (Release 10)", 3GPP TS 33.401 V10.0.0, Mar. 2011, 113 pgs. |
| "MTC group based authentication, Huawei, 3GPP TSG-SA3(Security)", S3-101276, Nov. 2010, 2 pgs. |
| "Solution-MTC group based authentication, Huawei, 3GPP TSG-SA3(Security)", S3-110076, Jan. 2011, 2 pgs. |
| International Search Report received for corresponding Patent Cooperation Treaty Application No. PCT/CN2011/074693, dated Mar. 8, 2012, 3 pages. |
Cited By (3)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| US20180115539A1 (en) * | 2016-10-26 | 2018-04-26 | Futurewei Technologies, Inc. | System and Method for Massive loT Group Authentication |
| US10887295B2 (en) * | 2016-10-26 | 2021-01-05 | Futurewei Technologies, Inc. | System and method for massive IoT group authentication |
| NL2031140A (en) | 2021-03-02 | 2022-12-14 | Univ Istanbul Teknik | A method for creating a group key |
Also Published As
| Publication number | Publication date |
|---|---|
| WO2012159272A1 (en) | 2012-11-29 |
| EP2716093A4 (en) | 2015-04-08 |
| CN103688563A (en) | 2014-03-26 |
| US20140075509A1 (en) | 2014-03-13 |
| EP2716093A1 (en) | 2014-04-09 |
Similar Documents
| Publication | Publication Date | Title |
|---|---|---|
| US9270672B2 (en) | Performing a group authentication and key agreement procedure | |
| US11863982B2 (en) | Subscriber identity privacy protection against fake base stations | |
| US10849191B2 (en) | Unified authentication for heterogeneous networks | |
| CN101931955B (en) | Authentication method, device and system | |
| KR102112542B1 (en) | Method and system for generating session key using Diffie-Hellman procedure | |
| US9467431B2 (en) | Application specific master key selection in evolved networks | |
| US11343673B2 (en) | Enhanced aggregated re-authentication for wireless devices | |
| EP3340690A1 (en) | Access method, device and system for user equipment (ue) | |
| EP2854329B1 (en) | Method, system, and device for securely establishing wireless local area network | |
| US20110312301A1 (en) | Authenticity Verification of Authentication Messages | |
| El Idrissi et al. | Security analysis of 3GPP (LTE)—WLAN interworking and a new local authentication method based on EAP-AKA | |
| WO2012174959A1 (en) | Group authentication method, system and gateway in machine-to-machine communication | |
| CN101951590B (en) | Authentication method, device and system | |
| CN109788480B (en) | Communication method and device | |
| AU2017313215B2 (en) | Authentication server of a cellular telecommunication network and corresponding UICC | |
| US20210297400A1 (en) | Secured Authenticated Communication between an Initiator and a Responder | |
| US20170223531A1 (en) | Authentication in a wireless communications network | |
| US12231586B2 (en) | UE challenge to a network before authentication procedure | |
| KR101431214B1 (en) | Mutual authentication method and system with network in machine type communication, key distribution method and system, and uicc and device pair authentication method and system in machine type communication | |
| WO2025177147A1 (en) | Authentication between user equipment and network using a hybrid key exchange | |
| WO2007124657A1 (en) | A method, system and device for authenticating |
Legal Events
| Date | Code | Title | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| AS | Assignment |
Owner name: NOKIA CORPORATION, FINLAND Free format text: ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNORS INTEREST;ASSIGNORS:HOLTMANNS, SILKE;ZHANG, DAJIANG;SIGNING DATES FROM 20131121 TO 20131122;REEL/FRAME:031660/0559 |
|
| AS | Assignment |
Owner name: NOKIA TECHNOLOGIES OY, FINLAND Free format text: ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNORS INTEREST;ASSIGNOR:NOKIA CORPORATION;REEL/FRAME:035414/0601 Effective date: 20150116 |
|
| FEPP | Fee payment procedure |
Free format text: PAYOR NUMBER ASSIGNED (ORIGINAL EVENT CODE: ASPN); ENTITY STATUS OF PATENT OWNER: LARGE ENTITY |
|
| STCF | Information on status: patent grant |
Free format text: PATENTED CASE |
|
| AS | Assignment |
Owner name: OMEGA CREDIT OPPORTUNITIES MASTER FUND, LP, NEW YORK Free format text: SECURITY INTEREST;ASSIGNOR:WSOU INVESTMENTS, LLC;REEL/FRAME:043966/0574 Effective date: 20170822 Owner name: OMEGA CREDIT OPPORTUNITIES MASTER FUND, LP, NEW YO Free format text: SECURITY INTEREST;ASSIGNOR:WSOU INVESTMENTS, LLC;REEL/FRAME:043966/0574 Effective date: 20170822 |
|
| AS | Assignment |
Owner name: WSOU INVESTMENTS, LLC, CALIFORNIA Free format text: ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNORS INTEREST;ASSIGNOR:NOKIA TECHNOLOGIES OY;REEL/FRAME:043953/0822 Effective date: 20170722 |
|
| AS | Assignment |
Owner name: BP FUNDING TRUST, SERIES SPL-VI, NEW YORK Free format text: SECURITY INTEREST;ASSIGNOR:WSOU INVESTMENTS, LLC;REEL/FRAME:049235/0068 Effective date: 20190516 |
|
| AS | Assignment |
Owner name: WSOU INVESTMENTS, LLC, CALIFORNIA Free format text: RELEASE BY SECURED PARTY;ASSIGNOR:OCO OPPORTUNITIES MASTER FUND, L.P. (F/K/A OMEGA CREDIT OPPORTUNITIES MASTER FUND LP;REEL/FRAME:049246/0405 Effective date: 20190516 |
|
| MAFP | Maintenance fee payment |
Free format text: PAYMENT OF MAINTENANCE FEE, 4TH YEAR, LARGE ENTITY (ORIGINAL EVENT CODE: M1551); ENTITY STATUS OF PATENT OWNER: LARGE ENTITY Year of fee payment: 4 |
|
| AS | Assignment |
Owner name: OT WSOU TERRIER HOLDINGS, LLC, CALIFORNIA Free format text: SECURITY INTEREST;ASSIGNOR:WSOU INVESTMENTS, LLC;REEL/FRAME:056990/0081 Effective date: 20210528 |
|
| AS | Assignment |
Owner name: WSOU INVESTMENTS, LLC, CALIFORNIA Free format text: RELEASE BY SECURED PARTY;ASSIGNOR:TERRIER SSC, LLC;REEL/FRAME:056526/0093 Effective date: 20210528 |
|
| FEPP | Fee payment procedure |
Free format text: MAINTENANCE FEE REMINDER MAILED (ORIGINAL EVENT CODE: REM.); ENTITY STATUS OF PATENT OWNER: LARGE ENTITY |
|
| FEPP | Fee payment procedure |
Free format text: 7.5 YR SURCHARGE - LATE PMT W/IN 6 MO, LARGE ENTITY (ORIGINAL EVENT CODE: M1555); ENTITY STATUS OF PATENT OWNER: LARGE ENTITY |
|
| MAFP | Maintenance fee payment |
Free format text: PAYMENT OF MAINTENANCE FEE, 8TH YEAR, LARGE ENTITY (ORIGINAL EVENT CODE: M1552); ENTITY STATUS OF PATENT OWNER: LARGE ENTITY Year of fee payment: 8 |