US9210140B2 - Remote functionality selection - Google Patents

Remote functionality selection Download PDF

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Publication number
US9210140B2
US9210140B2 US12/858,345 US85834510A US9210140B2 US 9210140 B2 US9210140 B2 US 9210140B2 US 85834510 A US85834510 A US 85834510A US 9210140 B2 US9210140 B2 US 9210140B2
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network interface
interface device
network
configuration instructions
authentication key
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US20110202983A1 (en
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Steven L. Pope
David Riddoch
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Xilinx Inc
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Solarflare Communications Inc
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    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/06—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network
    • H04L63/061—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network for key exchange, e.g. in peer-to-peer networks
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/50—Monitoring users, programs or devices to maintain the integrity of platforms, e.g. of processors, firmware or operating systems
    • G06F21/57—Certifying or maintaining trusted computer platforms, e.g. secure boots or power-downs, version controls, system software checks, secure updates or assessing vulnerabilities
    • G06F21/572—Secure firmware programming, e.g. of basic input output system [BIOS]
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/60—Protecting data
    • G06F21/62—Protecting access to data via a platform, e.g. using keys or access control rules
    • G06F21/6218—Protecting access to data via a platform, e.g. using keys or access control rules to a system of files or objects, e.g. local or distributed file system or database
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L41/00—Arrangements for maintenance, administration or management of data switching networks, e.g. of packet switching networks
    • H04L41/08—Configuration management of networks or network elements
    • H04L41/0803—Configuration setting
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L41/00—Arrangements for maintenance, administration or management of data switching networks, e.g. of packet switching networks
    • H04L41/28—Restricting access to network management systems or functions, e.g. using authorisation function to access network configuration
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F2221/00—Indexing scheme relating to security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F2221/21—Indexing scheme relating to G06F21/00 and subgroups addressing additional information or applications relating to security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F2221/2149—Restricted operating environment
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/12—Applying verification of the received information

Definitions

  • This invention relates to network interface devices and methods for securely selecting the function set of an electronic device by means of a novel network interface device.
  • Chip functions may be enabled or disabled in hardware through the use of programmable registers defining the capabilities of the chip, through the use of external components connected to the chip so as to cripple certain functions, or by brute-force, such as removing external pins or destroying certain areas of the chip.
  • chip functions may be enabled or disabled through the use of different versions of firmware operating on or in combination with the chip.
  • firmware With respect to the use of firmware to enable or disable certain functions in hardware, it is well-known for firmware to be updateable by an end user through the use of software and hardware tools, or by replacing the chip carrying the firmware. However, these methods require the interaction of the end user (whose technical skill is unknown and could be very limited) and do not provide a secure channel through which updates to the product functionality can be applied. In some cases, it is also possible for programmable chip registers to be reset but this typically requires specialist hardware which is not available to the end user and requires the product to be returned to the vendor.
  • a network interface device providing a set of functions in hardware and being operable in first and second modes: in a first mode, the network interface device being configured to operate with a selected configuration of the set of functions; and in a second mode, the network interface device being operable to select a particular configuration of the set of functions in accordance with configuration instructions received at the network interface device; the network interface device being configured to, on receiving a network message having one or more predetermined characteristics and comprising an authentication key and one or more configuration instructions defining a particular configuration of the set of functions: verify the authentication key; and
  • the configuration instructions defining the particular configuration of the set of functions may comprise one or more of:
  • the network message comprises one or more data packets received in accordance with a predetermined messaging protocol.
  • the protocol may be the Intelligent Platform Management Interface protocol, or an extension thereof.
  • the network interface device is configured to enter the second mode on receiving the network message.
  • the network interface device can be configured to enter the second mode on successfully verifying the authentication key.
  • the configuration instructions are encrypted and the authentication key is the encrypted configuration instructions.
  • the network interface device can be configured to verify the authentication key by decrypting the encrypted configuration instructions, the authentication key being successfully verified if the encrypted configuration instructions are successfully decrypted.
  • the authentication key is one of a password, a cryptographically-signed certificate, a pseudorandom number or a hash of a set of predetermined data.
  • the network interface device is configured to verify the authentication key in accordance with the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol or Internet Protocol Security (IPsec) protocol.
  • TLS Transport Layer Security
  • IPsec Internet Protocol Security
  • the network message is received from a local network entity and the configuration instructions comprised in said network message originate at a remote network entity, the local network entity being a proxy for the remote network entity.
  • a cryptographic pair of keys and the authentication key is generated using a private cryptographic key of the pair.
  • a public cryptographic key of the pair is stored at the network interface device and the network interface device is configured to verify the authentication key using the public key.
  • the network interface device is configured to use the public key to establish an encrypted channel over which the network message is received.
  • the private key is stored at a network entity from which the configuration instructions originate, the said network entity being configured to generate the authentication key and transmit the authentication key and configuration instructions to the network interface device.
  • the network entity may be accessible to the network interface device over the internet.
  • the network interface device includes a Trusted Platform Module and the Trusted Platform Module holds the public key.
  • the endorsement key of the Trusted Platform Module may be used to establish the encrypted channel.
  • the encrypted channel is established in accordance with the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol or Internet Protocol Security (IPsec) protocol.
  • TLS Transport Layer Security
  • IPsec Internet Protocol Security
  • the network interface device is configured to verify the authentication key at a state machine or processor of the network interface device.
  • the network interface device is configured to message its device driver supported at a data processing system attached to the network interface device to indicate that the function set of the network interface device has changed.
  • the network interface device is configured to accept the network message in a low power state.
  • the network interface device further comprises a management controller operable to perform said verification of the configuration instructions and cause the selection of the particular configuration of the set of functions defined in the configuration instructions, the management controller being active in the low power state.
  • the network interface device is attached to a data processing system comprising a Baseboard Management Controller and the network interface device is configured to pass Intelligent Platform Management Interface messages received at the network interface device to the Baseboard Management Controller.
  • the network interface device may be configured to message the Baseboard Management Controller to indicate that the function set of the network interface device has changed.
  • the network interface device may further comprise a non-volatile memory and be configured to store the received configuration instructions in said memory and at a later time to perform the selection of the particular configuration of the set of functions defined in the configuration instructions of the network message at the instigation of a software entity supported at a data processing system attached to the network interface device.
  • the network interface device is coupled to one or more other devices each providing a set of functions in hardware and each being operable to select a particular configuration of their set of functions in accordance with configuration instructions received at the network interface device, the network interface device being configured to cause each of the one or more other devices to select a particular configuration of their set of functions in accordance with the configuration instructions defined in the network message.
  • the network interface device is operable to successfully verify at least two different authentication keys including a first authentication key and a second authentication key, the second authentication key having a lower privilege level than the first authentication key.
  • the first authentication key permits the network interface device to configure any of the set of functions of the network interface device and the second authentication key permits the network interface device to configure a subset of the set of functions of the network interface device.
  • the first authentication key on being successfully verified by the network interface device, allows the network interface device to enable one or more hardware functions; and the second authentication key, on being successfully verified by the network interface device, allows the network interface device to modify one or more parameters of the hardware functions but does not allow the network interface device to enable one or more hardware functions.
  • the first authentication key is generated at a first network entity holding a private key and the second authentication key is generated at a second network entity holding a cryptographic key generated using that private key.
  • the first network entity may be accessible to the network interface device over the internet.
  • the second network entity is operable to transmit a network message comprising configuration instructions and the second authentication key to the network interface device in accordance with the IPMI protocol.
  • the second network entity is on a network local to the network interface device.
  • the network interface device may be one of a network interface card, a switch or a router.
  • a method for selecting a configuration of a set of hardware functions of a network interface device comprising: receiving at a network interface device a network message having one or more predetermined characteristics, the network message comprising an authentication key and configuration instructions defining a particular configuration of a set of functions of the network interface device; in response to receiving the network message, verifying the authentication key at the network interface device; and if the authentication key is successfully verified, selecting the particular configuration of the set of functions defined in the configuration instructions of the network message.
  • a network interface device and a baseboard management controller providing a set of functions in hardware and being operable in first and second modes: in a first mode, the network interface device being configured to operate with a selected configuration of the set of functions; and in a second mode, the network interface device being operable to select a particular configuration of the set of functions in accordance with configuration instructions received at the network interface device; the network interface device being configured to, on receiving a network message having one or more predetermined characteristics and comprising an authentication key and one or more configuration instructions defining a particular configuration of the set of functions, pass the configuration instructions and authentication key to the baseboard management controller which: verifies the authentication key; and if the authentication key is successfully verified, causes the network interface device to select the particular configuration of the set of functions defined in the configuration instructions of the network message.
  • the network interface device is further configured to pass Intelligent Platform Management Interface messages received at the network interface device to the Baseboard Management Controller.
  • a system for selecting a configuration of hardware functions of an electronic device comprising:
  • an electronic device operable to select a configuration of its set of hardware functions
  • a network interface device coupled to the electronic device and operable to cause the selection of a particular configuration of the set of functions of the electronic device in accordance with configuration instructions received at the network interface device; wherein the network interface device is configured to, on receiving a network message having one or more predetermined characteristics and comprising an authentication key and configuration instructions defining a particular configuration of the set of functions: verify the authentication key; and if the authentication key is successfully verified, cause the selection at the electronic device of the particular configuration of the set of functions defined in the configuration instructions of the network message.
  • the electronic device and the network interface device are both supported at a data processing system.
  • the electronic device is a peripheral device of the data processing system, such as a display adaptor or I/O controller.
  • the electronic device is a component of a data processing system supporting the network interface device.
  • the network interface device is configured to cause the selection at the electronic device of the particular configuration of the set of functions defined in the configuration instructions of the network message by storing the configuration instructions at a non-volatile memory of the network interface device optionally along with data indicating that the network interface device has configuration instructions for the electronic device.
  • the selection at the electronic device of the set of functions defined in the configuration instructions of the network message is performed at the instigation of a software entity supported at the data processing system attached to the network interface device.
  • a method for selecting a configuration of hardware functions of an electronic device coupled to a network interface device comprising: receiving at a network interface device a network message having one or more predetermined characteristics, the network message comprising an authentication key and configuration instructions defining a particular configuration of a set of functions of an electronic device coupled to the network interface device; in response to receiving the network message, verifying the authentication key at the network interface device; and if the authentication key is successfully verified, causing the selection at the electronic device of the particular configuration of the set of functions defined in the configuration instructions of the network message.
  • a method for conducting a transaction between a vendor of a network interface device and a customer operating a data processing system supporting the network interface device, the network interface device having one or more functions which are disabled in hardware and comprising a cryptographic key comprising: the customer acquiring from the vendor access to one of the said functions and providing one or more identifiers of the network interface device to the vendor; the vendor transmitting to the customer a network message comprising an authentication key and configuration instructions operable to cause the network interface device to enable one or more of the disabled functions of the network interface device; the customer allowing the authentication key and configuration instructions to pass to the network interface device over a network to which the network interface device is attached; using the cryptographic key, verifying the authentication key at the network interface device; and if the authentication key is successfully verified, causing the network interface device to enable the one or more of the disabled functions of the network interface device specified in the configuration instructions; wherein the authentication key is selected by the vendor in dependence on the identifier of the network interface device
  • FIG. 1 is a schematic drawing of a data processing system supporting a network interface device configured in accordance with the present invention.
  • FIG. 2 is a schematic drawing of a network interface device configured in accordance with the present invention.
  • FIG. 3 is a schematic drawing of a network interface device and trusted network entity configured in accordance with the present invention.
  • FIG. 4 is a schematic drawing of a network interface device, trusted network entity and intervening proxy network entity configured in accordance with the present invention.
  • the present invention is directed to a network interface device which has the ability to modify the set of functions it, or another device to which the network interface is coupled, can perform in response to receiving configuration instructions over the network to which it is connected.
  • the present invention is directed to selectively enabling additional functions in devices (including network interface devices) which are capable of performing those additional functions but which have been shipped with those additional functions disabled.
  • the network interface device is configured to verify the configuration instructions it receives by means of an authentication key included in the instructions. This allows the network interface device to be sure that the instructions originate from a trusted entity (such as a device vendor or administration server).
  • FIG. 1 A schematic drawing of a system configured in accordance with the present invention is shown in FIG. 1 .
  • network interface card or device (NIC) 102 provides an interface between network 105 and data processing system 101 .
  • NIC 102 communicates with the data processing system over bus 110 (such as a PCI, PCI-X or PCI-E bus) and is connected to the network by data link 106 (such as an Ethernet connection).
  • the data processing system could support one or more peripheral devices 103 and 104 , typically also via communication buses 111 .
  • a data processing system will include a processor 107 , memory 108 and other devices 109 integral to the data processing system, such as onboard data controllers, graphics subsystems and audio subsystems.
  • network interface device 102 is operable to select the set of functions it provides in hardware in accordance with instructions received over the network.
  • a schematic diagram of network interface device 102 is shown in FIG. 2 .
  • NIC 102 includes a processor 205 , memory 208 and receive circuitry 206 , although these components need not be distinct and could be combined in a single integrated circuit.
  • the connections between the components shown in FIG. 2 are illustrative only; the components of NIC 102 may be connected in any suitable arrangement.
  • NIC 102 is connected over network 105 to trusted entity 301 .
  • Trusted instructing entity 301 is configured to send configuration instructions to NIC 102 in accordance with the method described below.
  • the NIC is only responsive to instructions received from trusted instructing entity 301 and will not process instructions received from untrusted entity 303 .
  • NIC 102 is configured to ignore any configuration instructions received from an untrusted entity, such as entity 303 , because untrusted entity 303 cannot provide the necessary authentication key to NIC 102 .
  • Trusted instructing entity 301 may be any kind of server, switch or embedded control processor (to name a few of the many possibilities). Specifically, the entity can be a program executing on such hardware. In certain situations (such as when the trusted instructing entity and target device are separated by a firewall), the trusted instructing entity may have a proxy entity accessible to the target device (e.g. behind the firewall) which mirrors the behaviour of the trusted instructing entity or relays messages from the trusted instructing entity onto the target device. This is discussed further below in relation to FIG. 4 .
  • configuration instructions are communicated to the NIC in accordance with a predetermined protocol defining the format of the data exchanged between the NIC and the trusted instructing entity, and other parameters of the communication, such as the steps of a handshake used to establish communications.
  • a protocol used is a challenge-response protocol employing cryptographic authentication, such as Transport Layer Security (TLS) or Internet Protocol Security (IPsec) protocol (with the communication being secured at the transport and internet layers, respectively).
  • TLS Transport Layer Security
  • IPsec Internet Protocol Security
  • less secure methods could be used, such as a simple secret password-based authentication method.
  • the configuration data is of a predetermined form and/or includes one or more identifiers.
  • the receive circuitry 206 of NIC 102 is configured to detect when configuration data is received from a network entity and to cause the NIC to process the configuration data in accordance with the methods described herein.
  • Configuration data may be identified by the receive circuitry on the basis of any suitable distinguishing characteristics, including one or more of:
  • NIC 102 is configured to receive internet protocol (IP) data packets and the configuration data comprises one or more IP data packets that include an identifier in their header to indicate to receive circuitry 206 that those data packets carry configuration data.
  • IP internet protocol
  • the packets can be Ethernet packets or an extension to a management protocol such as IPMI. This is discussed further below.
  • Configuration data comprises all of the data received from a trusted entity at a NIC which relates to the provision of configuration instructions to the NIC.
  • the configuration data therefore includes the messaging and preamble associated with establishing a connection between the NIC and trusted entity in accordance with the predetermined protocol and, if the connection is successfully established, the configuration instructions themselves.
  • the NIC 102 is configured to only carry out those configuration instructions which can be authenticated as being received from a trusted entity. It is greatly preferable if this is the only way in which the hardware function set of the NIC can be modified.
  • the configuration data therefore includes (at some point in the communications between the NIC and trusted entity) an authentication key from the entity sending the configuration instructions to indicate to the NIC that the entity is indeed trusted entity 301 .
  • the authentication key could be a password, a security certificate, a pseudorandom number (for which the NIC understands the generator sequence) or a hash of a set of predetermined data (such as a secret word known to the NIC, a timecode, an identifier of the trusted entity, etc.).
  • the authentication key can be the encrypted instructions themselves, with the authentication key being successfully verified if the instructions are successfully decrypted.
  • the instructions preferably include a verifiable checksum or hash so that the network interface device can determine whether the configuration instructions have been successfully decrypted.
  • communications between the NIC are established over a secure channel.
  • this has the advantage that man-in-the-middle attacks are much more difficult because the NIC can be sure that all of the packets came from the same entity.
  • Authentication, verification and decryption/encryption functions can be performed at a state machine or processor located at the network interface device.
  • the trusted entity holds a private key and the NIC holds a public key, the two keys together belonging to a cryptographic pair.
  • the keys can be used to establish a secure communication channel between the NIC and trusted entity and to encrypt data communicated over that channel. Suitable protocols are known in the art (e.g. TLS and IPsec).
  • TLS and IPsec Suitable protocols are known in the art (e.g. TLS and IPsec).
  • the preferred embodiment is based on the principle that the trusted entity keeps the private key secret and therefore any authentication keys generated by that key or any data encrypted using that key must have originated at the trusted entity.
  • the public key of the pair which is stored at the NIC can be used to verify an authentication key generated using the private key or decrypt data encrypted by the private key (or a derivative thereof).
  • the NIC can be sure that the configuration instructions originated at the trusted entity and the trusted entity can be sure that only the intended NIC with the correct public key can use the configuration instructions.
  • the private key could be stored at the NIC and the public key stored at the trusted entity but this is not preferred because a typical vendor will ship their NICs to customers all over the world, giving malicious parties the opportunity to examine a NIC and potentially (although unlikely) to extract its key.
  • having the public key at the NIC allows there to be fewer private keys (perhaps only one) than there are public keys, with each public key being able to decrypt data encrypted by the group of private keys or their derivatives.
  • the private key(s) must be physically secure. This architecture makes it very difficult for a party to modify the function set of a single NIC, and almost impossible to modify the function set of many NICs (as would be present in a corporate network).
  • the trusted entity On initiation of a secure channel between the NIC and the trusted entity, the trusted entity transmits a message to NIC 102 indicating that it wants to send configuration instructions to the NIC. It can be advantageous if the NIC can decline the request. This can be useful in cases in which the NIC is supporting other communication channels and would be required to drop those channels in order to process the configuration instructions, or the NIC could be configured to decline requests which are sent between predetermined hours or on predetermined days. If the NIC accepts the request, the NIC and trusted entity may optionally establish a secure encrypted connection between themselves (preferably secured using the private key held at the trusted entity and the public key held at the NIC).
  • the trusted entity can transmit the configuration instructions to a proxy entity local to the network interface device according to this scheme and the proxy can then appropriately schedule the application of the configuration update. It is advantageous if the proxy has its own cryptographic key with which it can verify configuration instructions received from the trusted entity/set up a secure connection between the trusted and proxy entities. This cryptographic key may be generated by the trusted entity in the manner described below.
  • the trusted entity transmits the configuration instructions to the NIC/proxy entity (as appropriate), preferably in encrypted form. If the proxy receives the configuration instructions and authentication key, it may store them for later application to the NIC as part of a scheduled update. Once the NIC receives the configuration instructions and authentication key (possibly via the proxy), the NIC verifies the authentication key and updates its function set in accordance with the configuration instructions. Following the updating of the NIC's function set, a message may be transmitted to the trusted entity to indicate that the configuration instructions were successfully applied.
  • the NIC may optionally include a Trusted Platform Module (TPM) 207 in accordance with the specification published by the Trusted Computing Group (TCG).
  • TPM Trusted Platform Module
  • TCG Trusted Computing Group
  • the TPM could be used to store the public key assigned to the NIC.
  • a TPM could be present in data processing system 101 , with the NIC being capable of querying the system TPM in order to use the stored public key.
  • the endorsement key of the TPM could be used to authenticate the identity of the NIC in accordance with the TCG specification and additional information could be stored in the TPM memory to allow the NIC to authenticate the identity of the trusted entity.
  • the information could include a hash derived from the cryptographic key held by the trusted entity, parameters for generating a pseudorandom number sequence used by the trusted entity, etc.
  • the trusted entity could provide a security certificate issued by a certificate authority to authenticate its identity, as is well known in the art.
  • the trusted entity transmits configuration instructions along with an authentication key to the NIC without first establishing a connection between the two.
  • the authentication key can be a cryptographic hash or digital certificate (or in any other form described in the embodiments above) which is generated using a private key held at the trusted entity, with the NIC having a public key which is used to validate the authentication key.
  • the configuration instructions could be encrypted at the trusted entity using its private key, with the public key at the NIC being used to decrypt (and therefore also validate) the configuration instructions.
  • the NIC indicates to the trusted entity whether it will accept the instructions and/or whether the instructions have been successfully applied. The same considerations apply with regard to the detection of configuration data at the receive circuitry of the NIC.
  • the NIC On receiving a set of valid configuration instructions from a trusted entity whose identity has been validated, the NIC performs the instructions of the set or writes the instructions to a memory (preferably to the non-volatile memory of the NIC 208 or a memory of the data processing system 108 ) for the instructions to be later applied by the NIC or a software, firmware or hardware entity of data processing system 101 .
  • the NIC stores the received configuration instructions in its non-volatile state memory 208 and then enters a configuration mode in which the NIC can safely apply the configuration instructions.
  • NIC 102 provides a set of functions defined in hardware and/or firmware (such as data throughput, half or full-duplex operation, Wake-on-LAN functionality, etc.), one or more of which can be enabled or disabled by the NIC.
  • the functions of the NIC can be enabled or disabled by one or more of: changing the state of one or more hardware switches, modifying entries in a hardware register or function table defining the functions the NIC can perform, and updating firmware stored at the NIC. In this manner the set of functions provided at the NIC can be modified.
  • one or more hardware switches could be used to switch on and off portions of circuitry which provide additional functions at the NIC: if the circuitry is switched on, the additional functions are enabled; if the circuitry is switched off, the functions are disabled. In a second example, one or more switches are used to select between different modes or clock speeds. In a third example, the values written to a hardware register determine the set of functions active at the NIC: on boot-up the hardware consults the entries in the register and operates with the function set indicated therein.
  • the present invention provides a secure method by which the function set of a network interface device can be remotely selected. This method addresses the problems identified in the prior art and has several useful applications.
  • the function set of the NIC can comprise any number of different functions, including:
  • the virtual network interfaces presented by the NIC in particular, the PCIe physical functions, IOV virtual functions and parameters such as the degree of Receive Side Scaling (RSS).
  • the function set of the NIC could include the parameters of any of these interfaces, allowing the configuration of the interfaces presented by the NIC to be configured in accordance with the mechanisms of the present invention.
  • QoS Quality of Service
  • the network parameters of the NIC such as IP address and maximum transmission unit (MTU) size, virtual LAN (VLAN) identifiers.
  • MTU maximum transmission unit
  • VLAN virtual LAN
  • Network state associations for example, it is advantageous if the NIC can store the state for the connections of a particular guest operating system in a virtualised system such that if the guest OS migrates between servers the state can be transferred to the NIC of that server.
  • trusted entity 301 is operated by the vendor of NIC 201 so as to allow remote unlocking of functions which are disabled in hardware at the NIC.
  • the public key is written to the NIC by the vendor during manufacture of the NIC, with the vendor holding the private key of the cryptographic pair.
  • the public key is written to “tamper-proof” write-once memory. If the vendor of the NIC is the trusted entity, the vendor can arrange that the NIC does not carry out configuration instructions unless they are verified as originating from the vendor (the carrier of the private key).
  • a NIC allows a public key to be written to it so as to allow the party writing the key to remotely manage the functions set accessible at the NIC.
  • a system administrator holding the private key of the pair could securely manage a group of computers having NICs configured in accordance with the present invention and loaded with a predetermined public key. This allows a system administrator to remotely control the set of functions provided in hardware at each NIC on the administrator's network.
  • a network interface device as described above can be further configured to set the function set of another device which is enabled to receive configuration instructions.
  • the other device may be any device local to NIC 102 , such as an onboard I/O controller 109 supported at data processing system 101 , the data processing system 101 itself, or a peripheral device 103 or 104 .
  • the NIC may be coupled to the device via a data bus of the data processing system or any kind of direct interconnect.
  • NIC 102 receives configuration instructions from a trusted entity according to the method described herein and is configured to cause those configuration instructions to be applied to another device operable to use them.
  • a NIC configured to apply configuration instructions to another device need not be operable to modify its own function set in accordance with received configuration instructions.
  • the NIC can use a public key stored at the target device to which the configuration instructions are directed to secure communications between the trusted entity and the NIC.
  • the NIC uses its public key to secure communications between it and the trusted entity, and the target device or a software entity at data processing system 101 then performs decryption or validation of the received configuration instructions before modifying the function set of the target device.
  • a NIC operable to cause the function set of another device to be updated must know to which device a set of received configuration instructions are targeted. This may be indicated to the NIC in the configuration data transmitted to it from a trusted entity. For example, on establishing a secure connection to the NIC, the trusted entity could signal to the NIC which device of the system the trusted entity wishes to update. This allows the NIC to optionally check for the presence of the device and query the device in order to determine whether the target device can receive the configuration instructions at that time. Alternatively, the configuration instructions themselves can indicate the device to which they are directed.
  • the NIC stores the identity of each of the devices in the local system which are operable to have their function set updated in accordance with the present invention. The device identities may be entered by the manufacturer or system administrator on installing the NIC in the local system.
  • the NIC can be configured to handle the instructions in one of two ways (the NIC may have the ability to perform only one of the two options or it may be able to use either option in dependence on whether or not the NIC can directly address the target device).
  • the NIC transmits the configuration instructions to the target device and the target device updates its function set accordingly.
  • the NIC stores the configuration instructions for the other device in its memory 208 or in a memory 108 of the data processing system to which it is attached.
  • NIC This allows the NIC to apply configuration instructions to devices which it cannot access without cooperation from data processing system 101 (for example, devices on other buses), or to devices which are not switched on or connected to the NIC/data processing system at the time the configuration instructions are received (such as wireless printers or external storage).
  • the NIC may receive the configuration instructions when the data processing system is in a low power state (e.g. switched off or in standby or hibernation mode) and therefore in some circumstances cannot communicate with the target device of the system.
  • a low power state e.g. switched off or in standby or hibernation mode
  • this problem can be solved by either allowing the NIC to wake the target device or an intervening data bus, or causing the configuration instructions to be processed the next time the system as a whole enters a higher power state when the target device is accessible.
  • the NIC can either (a) apply the configuration instructions to a target device itself, or (b) cause the data processing system or a software entity supported at the data processing system to apply the configuration instructions to a target device.
  • the NIC may be a peripheral device in the target system or the NIC could be supported at the mainboard of the system.
  • the application of configuration instructions to a device configured in accordance with the present invention comprises enabling or disabling hardware functionality and/or firmware functions by one or more of:
  • Configuration instructions stored at a memory of the NIC or data processing system could be applied to the target device in several ways.
  • An application, component of the operating system, or firmware stored at the data processing system (such as the BIOS) could pick up the stored configuration instructions and apply them to the target device (which could be the NIC) at a suitable time. For example, this could occur during boot-up of the data processing system or at the initiation of a system administrator (perhaps from a remote computer).
  • the NIC can indicate to the data processing system that configuration instructions have been received so as to alert the appropriate functionality of the operating system, an application or the BIOS that a set of configuration instructions are ready to be applied. This could be by means of a flag or other identifier set at the NIC, or the presence of the configuration instructions in memory could itself be sufficient.
  • the NIC or other target device may be required to enter a configuration mode in which the NIC or other target device can safely update its function set.
  • the NIC/other device may be unresponsive to all communications and stop performing its normal functions. This allows the NIC/device minimise the risk of rendering itself inoperable as a result of enabling or disabling functions in hardware, updating its firmware etc.
  • the network interface device 102 has been described above as an interface card for a data processing system 101 , such as a desktop, laptop computer or server.
  • network interface device 102 could be any kind of network interface configured in accordance with the present invention and could be a communication interface of, for example, a switch, a router, a printer, a handheld multimedia device or a portable telephone.
  • NIC 102 could be a wired or wireless network interface.
  • the data processing system and NIC In order to deal with the situation in which the data processing system supporting the target NIC is in a low power state, it is advantageous for the data processing system and NIC to support at least some of the operations of the present invention in the low power state.
  • the NIC is configured to be operable to receive configuration instructions in a low power state and this is the preferred mode in which configuration instructions are received and applied in a system configured in accordance with the present invention. This allows configuration changes to be effected when the target system is not being used, or at a time selected by the system administrator.
  • the trusted entity can transmit management or Wake-on-LAN packets to the target system so as to cause the target system to at least raise its power state (or that of a target device) such that the configuration instructions can be received and applied. This may be required in certain circumstances—for example, if configuration instructions are received for a device which is powered down.
  • a target system supporting a NIC in accordance with the present invention might include a low power management subsystem that is active in the low power state.
  • a system would include a Baseboard Management Controller (BMC) 112 , with the NIC being configured to filter incoming data packets and deliver those packets recognized as carrying instructions for the BMC to the BMC.
  • BMC Baseboard Management Controller
  • these will be packets of the Intelligent Platform Management Interface (IPMI) and the NIC will pass them to BMC 112 using the Network Controller Sideband Interface (NC-SI).
  • IPMI Intelligent Platform Management Interface
  • N-SI Network Controller Sideband Interface
  • the NIC is configured to support additional management packets to the set of packets of a management protocol (such as IPMI packets) supported by the system.
  • a management protocol such as IPMI packets
  • This is preferably implemented at the NIC by configuring an extended set of filters at receive circuitry 206 to trap the additional management packets (as well as the regular packets of the management protocol), even when the data processing system and network interface device are in a low power state.
  • the management packets are passed by the NIC to the management controller of the system (the BMC) and either the NIC or the BMC can be configured to handle the verification and configuration steps of the present invention.
  • the NIC is configured to handle packets carrying configuration instructions and the necessary authentication keys, this is preferably performed at its own internal management controller (MC) 209 .
  • MC internal management controller
  • the present invention can utilise a sideband management subsystem to allow configuration instructions to be transmitted to the target system when the target system is in a low power state.
  • the management circuitry (BMC) of the system is configured to perform the authentication and processing of the configuration instructions, with the command set recognised by the BMC being extended to include the commands carried in the additional management packets.
  • the authentication of received authentication keys may be performed with the support of a Trusted Platform Module of the data processing system, as discussed above.
  • the NIC need only perform the filtering (interception) of packets directed to the BMC (which includes packets carrying configuration instructions) and pass those packets (or their contents) onto the BMC which performs all other aspects of the present invention (such as verification etc.).
  • the BMC is configured to cause successfully verified configuration instructions to be applied to the network interface device—in other words, the network interface device is operable to receive configuration instructions from the BMC and configure itself in accordance with those instructions.
  • the BMC can store a cryptographic key for one or more devices of the system and the BMC is able to effect the modification of hardware functionality at one or more devices of the system.
  • the present invention could operate with a basic Wake on LAN (WoL) architecture, with the trusted entity transmitting a WoL “magic packet” to the NIC prior to sending configuration instructions. If the NIC is in a low power state, the magic packet triggers the NIC to wake the I/O bus and main processor of the target system 101 .
  • WiL Wake on LAN
  • the trusted entity prefferably configured to query the target system in order to determine whether it is in a low power state. If the target system is found to be in a low power state the trusted entity can message the BMC/send a magic packet (as appropriate) in order to move the target system to the required power state in which configuration instructions can be applied.
  • the administrator of the network that includes the target NIC may be required to configure a virtual private network (VPN) between the trusted entity and the target NIC so as to allow the management messages/magic packet to reach the NIC.
  • VPN virtual private network
  • Proxy trusted entity 402 is accessible to NIC 102 over local network 401 (which could be a corporate network). Proxy trusted entity 402 is also accessible to trusted entity 301 over non-local network 105 (which could be the internet).
  • the proxy entity is operable to receive configuration instructions for the target NIC 102 from trusted entity 301 in accordance with any of the authentication/encryption methods described above.
  • target NIC 102 is operable to receive those configuration instructions from the proxy. Since the proxy is local to NIC 102 , it can transmit management packets to the NIC, which allows (in accordance with the preferred embodiment) the configuration instructions to be transmitted to the NIC in one or more management packets.
  • the management packets are preferably defined in an extension of a known management protocol (such as IPMI) utilised at the target system.
  • Trusted entity 301 and proxy trusted entity 402 preferably include cryptographic keys 405 and 404 , respectively.
  • Cryptographic key 405 is used to authenticate configuration instructions sent proxy the trusted entity.
  • Cryptographic key 404 is used to authenticate the proxy to NIC 102 and can also be used to authenticate configuration instructions which originate at the proxy (for example, instructions which are used to configure the NIC but do not modify the hardware functions of the NIC).
  • the proxy is a trusted entity in its own right, although typically of a lower privilege level, and the proxy uses its cryptographic key to generate the authentication keys it provides with its configuration instructions.
  • cryptographic keys 404 and 405 are both generated from a private key held by the trusted entity, and NIC 102 may include one or more public keys which correspond to the authentication keys sent by the trusted/proxy entities.
  • NIC 102 may include one or more public keys which correspond to the authentication keys sent by the trusted/proxy entities.
  • various other arrangements are envisaged and will be apparent to a person of skill in the art.
  • trusted entity 301 can determine the privilege level of other network entities.
  • the trusted entity can be configured to generate an authentication or public key for another entity (such as a proxy entity or management server local to the target NIC) which gives the holder of that key configuration rights up to a particular privilege level.
  • another entity such as a proxy entity or management server local to the target NIC
  • configuration instructions sent along with that authentication key may only configure those predetermined functions over which that privilege level has control.
  • Functions which are only configurable by network entities having a higher privilege level cannot be modified by the network entities having a lower privilege level.
  • An authentication key may indicate to a target NIC that the originating network entity has a particular privilege level by one of several mechanisms, including:
  • the authentication key corresponds to a public key stored at the NIC having a predetermined privilege level
  • the authentication key includes a privilege level indicator signed by the trusted entity which indicates the privilege level of the holder of that authentication key.
  • a proxy server in order to mediate the transaction between the trusted entity and the target machine.
  • the use of a proxy allows configuration instructions to be delivered to the target machine asynchronously (i.e. the target machine does not require a live connection to the trusted entity).
  • the proxy can connect to the trusted entity in order to download the configuration instructions for one or more target devices on the network and then store those devices until a later time, such as during an update cycle or overnight when the target machines are in a low power state.
  • the proxy could allow the configuration instructions to be written to a bootable disc or portable drive, such as a USB memory stick, which can be used to supply the configuration instructions to the target machine.
  • the configuration instructions can be delivered to the proxy as a message having, very generally, the form:
  • NIC 102 is a gigabit Ethernet device capable of operating at 1 Gbps or 10 Gbps and which of these two functions the NIC is configured to perform may be selected in hardware.
  • a public cryptographic key is written to the NIC by the vendor during manufacture and the choice of either 1 Gbps or 10 Gbps functionality is selected. Only the vendor can set the functions of the NIC in hardware. The private key of the cryptographic pair is held by the vendor.
  • the customer wants to upgrade their NIC to support the 10 Gbps function.
  • Conventionally, such an upgrade would require the customer to purchase a new NIC, or return the NIC to the vendor to allow the 10 Gbps function to be selected in hardware.
  • the present invention allows the vendor to remotely select the function set offered by the NIC.
  • the customer contacts the vendor, pays an upgrade fee and provides sufficient information for the trusted entity provided by the vendor to address the NIC over the relevant networks (which may include the Internet).
  • the trusted entity of the vendor transmits the appropriate configuration instructions to the NIC so as to cause the NIC to enable the 10 Gbps function.
  • Display device 102 comprises a 3-D graphics processor having 64 texture units and supporting a maximum clock speed of 750 MHz.
  • these functions of the graphics processor can be configured at a hardware register of the display device, with the number of texture units being selectable between 16, 32 and 64, and the clock speed being selectable between 450, 650 and 750 MHz.
  • the firmware of the display device may be updated to reflect the enabled functions of the device.
  • the end-user of the data processing system supporting the display device purchased the system, they only paid for a display device having 32 texture units enabled and a 650 MHz clock speed. At some later date the end-user wishes to pay to enable the full functionality of the display device so as to allow the system to support the latest videogames. Because the data processing system includes a NIC configured in accordance with the present invention, the end-user can purchase the additional functionality from the appropriate vendor and have the new function set applied remotely to their display device by means of the NIC.
  • a network interface device 102 configured in accordance with the present invention is installed in the data processing system.
  • One or more of the other devices present in the data processing system are operable to have their function sets updated according to the method described above.
  • the data processing system comprises one or more devices (this may or may not include the NIC itself) whose function sets may be determined in hardware and/or firmware and a NIC 102 operable to configure those function sets by means of communication over a network with a trusted entity.
  • a data processing system is assembled from a selection of pre-configured hardware devices which match the specification ordered by the customer.
  • each of the hardware devices is pre-loaded with the appropriate firmware and the hardware functions provided by each device are either non-configurable or preset by the manufacturer of each device.
  • the manufacturer of the data processing system must therefore keep stocks of all of the devices in all of the configurations offered to their customers. This can be inefficient when different versions of the same product differ only in the set of functions which are enabled in hardware.
  • the manufacturer of the data processing system can enable or disable hardware functions and update the firmware of the devices of the system, conventional methods for performing these tasks require specialist tools and must be performed on a device-by-device basis.
  • the present invention provides a convenient method by which the manufacturer of a data processing system can quickly and easily enable or disable hardware functions and update the firmware of the devices of a newly-built system using the configuration functionality of NIC 102 .
  • the manufacturer can connect the NIC to a trusted entity (this could be by means of a simple Ethernet patch cable) and the configuration instructions for all of the devices of the system which are enabled to receive configuration instructions (and which require configuring) can be downloaded to the NIC.
  • the configuration instructions are then be applied to each of the respective devices in accordance with the teachings described herein. This allows the function sets of the devices in the system to be configured to match the specification ordered by the customer:
  • Each type (1 to 3) of public key may correspond to a different level of authority and hence a different set of device capabilities which can be modified. For instance, providing a pair to the key at the device manufacturer's level would allow access to all configurable functions of the device, whereas providing a pair to the key at the OEM level would allow access to a subset of those functions over which the OEM has been given control (perhaps by means of a licensing agreement between the device manufacturer and the OEM). Providing a pair to the key at the customer level would yield the least control over the functions of the device—this can provide a mechanism by which the device can be configured by the customer, or perhaps the customer is permitted to disable, but not enable, functions in hardware. Accordingly, the “trusted entity” referred to herein can be a machine of the device manufacturer, OEM or customer, as appropriate to the situation.
  • a NIC at a data processing system on a corporate network which also includes a trusted entity which may or may not be able to act as a proxy for a trusted entity operated by a device manufacturer/OEM external to the corporate network.
  • the trusted entity may not be local to the data processing system—for example, the corporate network could be split across several sites.
  • the NIC has stored a public key for the corporation which corresponds to a private key stored at the trusted entity.
  • the data processing system is virtualised with several guest operating systems running on the system atop a hypervisor.
  • the NIC supports a virtual NIC for each of the guest operating systems.
  • VNIC virtual NIC
  • the system administrator causes the trusted entity to transmit configuration instructions to the NIC of the target system which instruct the NIC to create the new VNIC.
  • the NIC can then transmit an event to its device driver so as to cause the hypervisor to pick up the new VNIC and map it into the new guest operating system (the hypervisor can be messaged by conventional means in order to configure the new guest operating system and instruct the hypervisor to correctly map the new VNIC).
  • the present invention can be used to securely and remotely configure a NIC at a low level.
  • the network interface device or other electronic device (such as a peripheral device for a computer system) is shipped by the manufacturer with some of the set of functions of the device disabled such that the disabled functions are not available for use at the device.
  • the device is capable of performing the disabled functions (i.e. it includes the necessary hardware and optionally the necessary firmware/software) but those functions are disabled by the vendor of the device such that the functions cannot be enabled unless a valid authentication key is received by the device.
  • a disabled function is a function that the hardware of the device is capable of performing but that is not available for use at the device whilst the function is disabled.
  • the information necessary to verify an authentication key received at the device is stored integral to the device during manufacture, or at least prior to sale of the device.
  • the information could be stored at a trusted platform module (TPM) of the device.
  • TPM trusted platform module
  • the cryptographic information required to verify configuration instructions received at the device is stored at the device in such a way that it cannot be edited or overwritten (e.g.
  • the cryptographic information is stored in a “write-once” memory), or the cryptographic information is stored in a tamper-proof memory such that any attempts to perform one or more of (a) editing, (b) over-writing or (c) directly reading the cryptographic information prevent the device from enabling any disabled functions (or alternatively, the device could render itself inoperable until “unlocked” by the vendor).
  • the vendor can ensure that only they can enable those functions of the device that are disabled when the product is sold, allowing the vendor to charge for enabling those additional functions.
  • a network interface device includes one or more functions disabled in hardware in a second mode, the network interface device being operable to enable disabled functions in accordance with configuration instructions received at the network interface device, and the network interface device being configured to, on receiving a network message comprising an authentication key and configuration instructions defining one or more hardware functions of the network interface device that are to be enabled, verify the authentication key as being valid by means of cryptographic information stored at the network interface device and, if the authentication key is successfully verified, enable the one or more functions defined in the configuration instructions of the network message.
  • the network message is received over a network to which the network interface device provides an interface.
  • the cryptographic information is preferably stored at the network interface device during manufacture and could be a cryptographic key or other data by means of which an authentication key can be verified as being valid—i.e. as being from a trusted source allowed to enable disabled functions of the network interface device.
  • a network interface device configured in accordance with the present invention could be operable to enable one or more of the following functions that are disabled during manufacture:
  • Such a device may be shipped in a default state in which the maximum link speed of the device is limited to a first speed (e.g. 10 Gbps) but the hardware of the device can in fact support a greater second link speed (e.g. 40 Gbps)—in other words, the greater second link speed is disabled at the device.
  • a first speed e.g. 10 Gbps
  • a greater second link speed e.g. 40 Gbps
  • the maximum link speed at which the device can operate increases up to the second link speed.
  • Such a device may be shipped in a default state in which the device supports only half-duplex communications over its physical ports. On enabling the device's full duplex function, the device supports full-duplex communications over its physical ports.
  • Such a device may be shipped in a default state in which the number of VNICs the device can support is limited at the device—in other words, some of the potential VNICs (or the physical resources associated with those VNICs) of the PCIe device are disabled.
  • Such a device may be shipped in a default state in which the number of PCIe physical and/or virtual functions of a PCIe NIC is limited at the device—in other words, some of the potential physical and/or virtual functions (or the physical resources associated with those functions) of the PCIe device are disabled. On enabling additional PCIe physical and/or virtual functions, the device makes additional PCIe physical and/or virtual functions available for use.
  • TCP Offload Engine A TCP Offload Engine (TOE).
  • TOE TCP Offload Engine
  • Such a device may be shipped in a default state in which the TCP Offload Engine is disabled such that the device does not support TCP offload processing at the device, although it includes the hardware necessary to perform such processing.
  • the device On enabling the TCP Offload Engine, the device supports TCP offload processing and is operable to perform such processing.
  • Such a device may be shipped in a default state in which only a subset of the total number of the physical ports of the device are enabled, with the remaining number being disabled. On enabling one or more of the disabled ports, the newly-enabled ports become available for use at the device so as to allow the device to communicate data over networks connected to the newly-enabled ports.
  • network interface device is a hardware controller operable to provide an interface between a data network and a data processing system.
  • the controller (or NIC) may be embodied as a peripheral card of a data processing system or could be an embedded component of a data processing system, such as a server, router or switch device.

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