US8966258B2 - Method for securely downloading from distributed download sources - Google Patents

Method for securely downloading from distributed download sources Download PDF

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Publication number
US8966258B2
US8966258B2 US13/521,874 US201013521874A US8966258B2 US 8966258 B2 US8966258 B2 US 8966258B2 US 201013521874 A US201013521874 A US 201013521874A US 8966258 B2 US8966258 B2 US 8966258B2
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secure
download
client
server
main server
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US20120290842A1 (en
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Jerry John Artishdad
Christian Hett
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Artec Computer GmbH
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Artec Computer GmbH
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    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
    • H04L63/0428—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/12—Applying verification of the received information
    • H04L63/123—Applying verification of the received information received data contents, e.g. message integrity
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L67/00—Network arrangements or protocols for supporting network services or applications
    • H04L67/01—Protocols
    • H04L67/06—Protocols specially adapted for file transfer, e.g. file transfer protocol [FTP]
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L67/00—Network arrangements or protocols for supporting network services or applications
    • H04L67/01—Protocols
    • H04L67/10—Protocols in which an application is distributed across nodes in the network
    • H04L67/104—Peer-to-peer [P2P] networks
    • H04L67/1074—Peer-to-peer [P2P] networks for supporting data block transmission mechanisms
    • H04L67/1078—Resource delivery mechanisms
    • H04L67/108—Resource delivery mechanisms characterised by resources being split in blocks or fragments

Definitions

  • the present invention relates to a method of securely downloading from distributed download sources.
  • the greatest possible download security with a simultaneously minimized server load is needed for this.
  • the method of this invention comprises as shown in the drawing at least the following steps:
  • a computer network that is characterized in that it contains at least one client computer, a secure main server and at least one non-secure download server, wherein a secure network connection is established between the client computer and the secure main server; in particular, a HTTPS or SSL connection;
  • Preferred use of the method according to the invention is applicable for updates of the client by the one and/or several servers.
  • the update therein includes only software updates as well as firmware updates or updates for the operating software for devices.
  • Each client is, first of all, rendered exactly identifiable by generating a unique identifier for the contacted server. These unique identifiers are then deposited on a secure database server in a database.
  • generating the unique identifiers for each client includes at least the steps of
  • the unique ID can be, for example, the serial number of the device.
  • the MAC address can serve as a further unique identifying feature and can also be included in the identifier, if necessary.
  • the files are assembled for downloading and compressed in an archive file.
  • This process can be done automatically by scripts that use the information from the database, as well as by an administrator or human user otherwise authorized.
  • a hash value is then generated for the archive file, and the archive is signed using it.
  • the signed archive file can either be used further in one piece or, which is highly preferred, divided into several parts. The parts therein must not necessarily all have the same size; their dimensions can be completely arbitrary.
  • the one or more parts of the signed archive file are, in addition, symmetrically encrypted, and the used key is added to the information regarding the parts that are to be loaded in the transmitted data packet. This allows for further enhancing the security of the data. Due to the additional encryption, it is no longer possible to recognize the parts from which information regarding their content could have been extracted, nor can their content be analyzed.
  • non-secure download is servers for downloading.
  • Any additional symmetrical encryption accommodates the different security levels ranging from the main server to the less secure download servers. This ensures that the non-secure download servers re-encrypt the symmetrically encrypted packets in predefined time intervals such as, for example, once per day. Any such symmetrical re-encryption is advantageous because it does not take up much computing time.
  • the key for re-encryption is to be provided with a cryptographically secure current-status feature. This can be achieved, for example, by calculating the key for the re-encryption action by a hash algorithm based on a key that is commonly known to the main server and the download server, as well as the date of the day and, if necessary the current time of the day such as, for example, by an HMAC algorithm.
  • the current packet and the packet from the previous day are always obtained and any older packets can be deleted after the expiration of a set time interval such as, for example, after one day to save storage space on the download servers.
  • the main server is able to calculate and give to the client, independently of the download servers, the above-referenced information regarding each part for the large data packet.
  • a secure main server handles the coordinating of the downloads.
  • the client contacts the main server for the purpose of requesting the downloads via a secure connection that is, in particular, a HTTPS or SSL connection.
  • the client therein identifies itself relative to the main server by its unique identifier.
  • To authenticate the client by querying the database, the main server checks if the transmitted identifier belongs to the authorized client.
  • the client In response to its download request, the client is receives from the main server a data packet that is generated by linking the total length of the signed archive file to the hash value of the signed archive file and information regarding the totality of the parts to be loaded. Contained in this information is for each part at least the offset of the part in the signed archive file, its length, its hash value and a download URL.
  • the main server specifically selects the download URL for each client. Before transmitting a data packet from the secure main server via the secure connection to the client, the data packet is encrypted and/or signed.
  • the information as to the last part must be correct if the hash values for the remaining parts as well as for the total file are correct. In principle, it would suffice in this instance as well, if only the hash value of the total file is transmitted; because if it is correct, it would thus also indicate that all parts must also have been transmitted correctly and without having been tampered with.
  • the hash values of the parts are known because, in the event of a faulty transmission of a part, it can be immediately downloaded again without having to wait for the completion of the total download.
  • the client then decrypts, if necessary, the received data packet and analyzes the information regarding the partial downloads. Subsequently, it establishes one or more non-secure connections to the transmitted URLs on the one or more download servers in order to download parts. Once the parts are complete, they are checked by their respective transmitted hash values in order to ensure an error-free transmission. The checked parts are then assembled into the archive file, and the archive file in turn is checked by its hash value.
  • One embodiment of the method according to the invention provides that the content of the archive file is identical for all clients.
  • all clients receive a uniform and complete record, and the functions that are available for the user are determined by the licensing information and the like. If the user acquires a license for further functions between two updates, it must only be approved by transmitted licensing information. It is not necessary, however, to download any program files after the fact. This way, the management task of the update packets on the part of the provider is also simplified.
  • the files for the download archive are assembled individually for each client.
  • the assembly preferably is done by the secure main server.
  • the main server itself does not handle this task but instead passes it on to one or more computers that are connected within the local network.
  • the secure main server is not an individual computer but a multiple-computer network or cluster. Any such configuration of the main server as comprising multiple networked individual computers is deemed within the scope of the present application.
  • the individual assembly of the files for the download archive is based on one or multiple features that are deposited in addition to the unique identifiers in the database. This way, it is possible to minimize downloading for each client, for example, by only transmitting files for licensed functions. It is, moreover, possible to take region-specific files into consideration such as, for example, character sets and voice files. Moreover, the provider has the option of providing one group or individual clients (for example, beta testers) specifically with one version of the software or, vice versa, to exclude them from it (for example, known incompatibilities, legal restrictions).
  • a preferred embodiment of the invention envisions that the data that are made available on the download servers do not correspond, in terms of their sizes, to the parts that are to be loaded and that information as to a corresponding download offset is added to the parts that are to the loaded in the transmitted data packet.
  • Two advantages can be realized using this technique.
  • a further security benefit is achieved in that the parts that are to be loaded are not stored as such on the download servers; instead, supplemented by random data before and/or after, they are stored as a file therein. Since the client knows, based on its received data packet, the exact length of the part as well as of the download offset, it is able to download only the part, while any attacker does not know what is junk data and what is a necessary data piece.
  • the download servers are also able to hold a completely prepared archive file instead of a multitude of part files at the ready.
  • the main server is then able to define completely flexibly the parts that are to be loaded without new part data having to be transmitted by it to the download servers. All that is necessary is the calculation of the matching hash values that are then transmitted together with the new offsets and part lengths to the clients.
  • a GZIP- or LZMA-compressed tar archive is greatly preferred for use in connection with the archive file.
  • Combining a tarball with the GZIP- or LZMA-compression algorithm it is possible to achieve very good compression rates; plus, the generated archive files have the advantage that the data can only be reconstructed when the archive file is complete.
  • connection between the clients and the servers is achieved by a WAN, in particular the internet.
  • the method is, naturally, also suited for an LAN such as, for example, a company network in which the computers of a large company are supplied with software updates via a central server.
  • the secure main server makes the selection of the one or more non-secure servers for the downloading action of the requesting client based on the shortest possible distance or the geographic region that is determined by the IP addresses, and/or that is deposited in the database for each client, and/or when achieving preset transmission volumes.
  • the main server can ensure a downloading action for the client that is a quick as possible and will, aside from balancing the loads of the download servers, take into consideration any free traffic on leased servers. If the free volume of the is running month has been reached on one server, the main server is able to simply exclude it for the remainder of the month from the URL transmission to the clients, thus keeping operating costs low.
  • the secure main server can function as a database server and/or download server at the same time. Any such task combination is interesting, first and foremost, in cases when the main server does not appear as an individual computer but, as described above, as a computer cluster. The possibility that the main server can also act as a download server is also useful with regard to securing availability.
  • the archive file can be extended before the hashing and signature by a manifest that contains information regarding the files that are contained in the archive file such as, in particular, version and compatibility information, and a version number and/or a description of the archive are also incorporated into the transmitted data packet.
  • a manifest that contains information regarding the files that are contained in the archive file such as, in particular, version and compatibility information, and a version number and/or a description of the archive are also incorporated into the transmitted data packet.
  • One preferred method of preventing such undesired conditions consists in detecting such problematic conditions by return messages from the download servers to the main server. Subsequently, the download server/client links are then sorted in the context of an availability table, and the problems are recorded individually. Any automated management strategy can consist in excluding problem-afflicted connections during further attempts or by skipping generally unavailable download servers altogether for all clients. Using expedient, known evaluation tools, administrators are able to use the availability table for error resolution tasks.
  • Certain error states of the download server may possibly only be reliably recognized from the client side; for example, let us imagine an instance in which, due to a defective configuration, the firewall of the download server allows administrative connections between the main server and download server via VPN, but no downloads from external clients.
  • the main server can thus also learn whether individual clients have individual problems; for example, due to a firewall, local routing issues or wrongly configured MTUs in the router. Moreover, the main server is able to maintain statistics if the client not only reports the success or failure of the update and/or of the download of each part or daily information and the like, but if the client also transmits speed and duration. On the basis of this information, the main server is able to detect and ascertain, for example, which non-secure download server is best suited for which client, which provider network or which region.
US13/521,874 2010-01-27 2010-11-25 Method for securely downloading from distributed download sources Active 2031-06-20 US8966258B2 (en)

Applications Claiming Priority (4)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
DE102010006008A DE102010006008B4 (de) 2010-01-27 2010-01-27 Verfahren zum gesicherten Download von verteilten Downloadsourcen
DE102010006008.9 2010-01-27
DE102010006008 2010-01-27
PCT/EP2010/068252 WO2011091887A1 (de) 2010-01-27 2010-11-25 Verfahren zum gesicherten download von verteilten downloadsourcen

Publications (2)

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US20120290842A1 US20120290842A1 (en) 2012-11-15
US8966258B2 true US8966258B2 (en) 2015-02-24

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US (1) US8966258B2 (de)
EP (1) EP2529529B1 (de)
KR (1) KR101453379B1 (de)
DE (1) DE102010006008B4 (de)
WO (1) WO2011091887A1 (de)

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US9286644B2 (en) * 2013-01-12 2016-03-15 Pro Softnet Corporation Method for sharing multiple data items using a single URL
US10250579B2 (en) * 2013-08-13 2019-04-02 Alcatel Lucent Secure file transfers within network-based storage
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KR101595897B1 (ko) * 2014-12-09 2016-02-19 숭실대학교산학협력단 디지털 도어록 및 그 제어방법, 이를 수행하기 위한 기록매체
US9948625B2 (en) 2015-01-07 2018-04-17 Cyph, Inc. Encrypted group communication method
US10103891B2 (en) 2015-01-07 2018-10-16 Cyph, Inc. Method of generating a deniable encrypted communications via password entry
CN104753925A (zh) * 2015-03-11 2015-07-01 华中科技大学 一种对文件进行加解密的网关系统和方法
KR101712726B1 (ko) * 2015-04-27 2017-03-14 갤럭시아커뮤니케이션즈 주식회사 해시 코드를 이용하는 콘텐츠의 무결성 및 유효성 검증 방법 및 시스템
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EP3360033B1 (de) * 2015-10-07 2023-03-15 Nec Corporation Verfahren zum speichern einer datendatei
US10528624B2 (en) * 2015-12-07 2020-01-07 Sap Se Optimal hash calculation of archive files and their file entries
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Also Published As

Publication number Publication date
EP2529529B1 (de) 2018-03-14
KR20120123483A (ko) 2012-11-08
WO2011091887A1 (de) 2011-08-04
DE102010006008B4 (de) 2012-10-31
EP2529529A1 (de) 2012-12-05
KR101453379B1 (ko) 2014-10-22
US20120290842A1 (en) 2012-11-15
DE102010006008A1 (de) 2011-07-28

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