US20210342445A1 - Systems and Methods for Identifying Malware Injected into a Memory of a Computing Device - Google Patents
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- US20210342445A1 US20210342445A1 US17/373,001 US202117373001A US2021342445A1 US 20210342445 A1 US20210342445 A1 US 20210342445A1 US 202117373001 A US202117373001 A US 202117373001A US 2021342445 A1 US2021342445 A1 US 2021342445A1
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- 238000000034 method Methods 0.000 title claims description 32
- 238000001514 detection method Methods 0.000 claims abstract description 48
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/50—Monitoring users, programs or devices to maintain the integrity of platforms, e.g. of processors, firmware or operating systems
- G06F21/55—Detecting local intrusion or implementing counter-measures
- G06F21/56—Computer malware detection or handling, e.g. anti-virus arrangements
- G06F21/562—Static detection
- G06F21/563—Static detection by source code analysis
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/50—Monitoring users, programs or devices to maintain the integrity of platforms, e.g. of processors, firmware or operating systems
- G06F21/55—Detecting local intrusion or implementing counter-measures
- G06F21/56—Computer malware detection or handling, e.g. anti-virus arrangements
- G06F21/566—Dynamic detection, i.e. detection performed at run-time, e.g. emulation, suspicious activities
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/50—Monitoring users, programs or devices to maintain the integrity of platforms, e.g. of processors, firmware or operating systems
- G06F21/57—Certifying or maintaining trusted computer platforms, e.g. secure boots or power-downs, version controls, system software checks, secure updates or assessing vulnerabilities
- G06F21/577—Assessing vulnerabilities and evaluating computer system security
Definitions
- the present disclosure relates to a system and method for detecting the execution of malicious instructions injected into the memory of a computing device.
- FIG. 1 depicts an exemplary prior art computing device 100 comprising processor 110 , memory 120 , and storage device 130 .
- memory 120 is volatile and can comprise DRAM, SRAM, SDRAM, or other known memory devices.
- Storage device 130 is non-volatile and can comprise a hard disk drive, solid state drive, flash memory, or other known storage devices.
- processor 110 can include a single processor core or multiple processor cores as well as numerous cache memories, as is known in the prior art.
- Processor 110 executes operating system 140 . Examples of operating system 140 include the operating systems known by the trademarks WINDOWS® by Microsoft and IOS@ by Apple, CHROME OS® and ANDROID® by Google, LINUX and others.
- data is stored in storage device 130 .
- data is stored as blocks 220 and can be accessed by logical block address (LBA) or similar addressing scheme.
- LBA logical block address
- data is stored as files 230 and can be accessed using a file system.
- scanning module 210 can be executed by processor 110 and can scan either blocks 220 or files 230 to look for malicious code. This often is referred to as virus scan software and is well-suited for identifying and nullifying known malicious programs that are stored in non-volatile devices such as in storage device 130 .
- What is needed is a mechanism for detecting malicious instructions that have been injected into processor 110 or memory 120 but not stored in storage device 130 and generating an alert upon such detection and/or suspending execution of the malicious instructions.
- a malicious code detection module identifies potentially malicious instructions in memory of a computing device.
- the malicious code detection module examines the call stack for each thread running within the operating system of the computing device. Within each call stack, the malicious code detection module identifies the originating module for each stack frame and determines whether the originating module is backed by an image on disk. If an originating module is not backed by an image on disk, the thread containing that originating module is flagged as potentially malicious, execution of the thread optionally is suspended, and an alert is generated for the user or administrator.
- FIG. 1 depicts a prior art computing device.
- FIG. 2 depicts prior art virus scan software.
- FIG. 3 depicts multiple threads running within a prior art operating system.
- FIG. 4 depicts attribute information for various programs running in a prior art computing device.
- FIG. 5 depicts a malicious code detection module for identifying potentially malicious instructions.
- FIG. 6 further depicts a malicious code detection module for identifying potentially malicious instructions.
- processor 110 executes operating system 140 .
- Operating system 140 can manage multiple threads of instructions that are executed concurrently.
- exemplary threads 301 and 302 are depicted, but it is to be understood that additional threads can be executed.
- Operating system 140 maintains a call stack for each thread.
- exemplary call stack 312 is depicted, which is the call stack for thread 302 . Threads can be related to one another. For example, in this example, thread 302 was initiated by thread 301 .
- call stack 312 comprises variables 331 , 332 , and 335 and parameter 333 , which were placed in call stack 312 by thread 302 .
- Return address 334 also was placed on call stack 312 by thread 302 .
- Return address 334 is the address corresponding to the instruction in thread 302 that placed stack frame 341 in call stack 312 .
- a stack frame is a collection of data placed in a call stack as part of a procedure.
- stack frame 341 comprises variables 331 and 332 , parameter 333 , and return address 334 .
- Operating system 140 further comprises application programming interface (API) module 320 , which is a mechanism by which threads can invoke APIs specific to operating system 140 .
- API application programming interface
- FIG. 4 depicts further aspects of the prior art.
- memory 120 contains various types of programs, user data, and unassigned portions. Each of these items is stored in a particular address range within memory 120 , and memory 120 includes attribute information 410 that indicates whether each item is backed by a file stored in storage device 130 (e.g., whether that item is “backed on disk”).
- attribute information 410 includes address ranges for operating system 140 , utility program 411 , application program 412 , program 413 , user data 414 , and an unassigned area 415 .
- Attribute information 410 further indicates whether each item is backed by a file in storage device 130 or not. Here, all items are in fact backed by a file except for program 413 .
- Attribute information 410 typically is established and managed by operating system 140 .
- Computing device 500 comprises processor 110 and operating system 140 as in the prior art.
- Computing device 500 further comprises malicious code detection module 510 , which comprises lines of code executed by processor 110 .
- Malicious code detection module 510 optionally can be part of the kernel of operating system 140 or can be code outside of operating system 140 that is given special privileges by operating system 140 , such as the ability to access attribute information 410 and/or to suspend execution of a thread.
- the embodiments detect malicious code based on three characteristics that typically are present in malicious code.
- malicious code usually owns a thread of execution.
- this thread of execution originates or operates from code that is not backed by a file on disk.
- the thread of execution must call the operating system API module_ 320 directly in order for the malicious code to affect appreciable activity on the system. That is, in order for the malicious code to inflict harm, it inevitably must call operating system API module_ 320 directly.
- these three features generally are not found in benign application or operating system 140 itself.
- Malicious code detection module 510 first enumerates the call stacks of each thread of execution. In one embodiment, malicious code detection module 510 assigns a unique identifier to each call stack. Once enumerated, each call stack is analyzed to determine if it is malicious in nature.
- malicious code detection module 510 starts at the top of call stack 312 and works down.
- the top of a call stack is almost always a system call originating from an operating system library. If not, the thread was likely performing a CPU intensive task and the thread is immediately deemed non-malicious.
- the top of the call stack 312 is system call 521 (which represents a call made to API module_ 320 ), and the analysis therefore continues.
- Malicious code detection module continues down call stack 312 and determines the originating module for each stack frame in the reverse order in which the stack frames were added to call stack 312 .
- stack frames 502 and 501 are shown.
- Malicious code detection module 510 determines the return address for stack frames 502 and 501 , which here are return addresses 512 and 511 , and determines the procedure within thread 302 associated with the return address.
- Malicious code detection module 510 then consults attribute information 410 to determine whether the code in which that procedure is contained is backed by a file in storage device 130 . If it is (as would be the case if the procedure is part of application program 412 ), then the procedure and the thread containing it are deemed non-malicious. If it is not (as would be the case if the procedure is part of program 413 ), then the procedure and the thread containing it are deemed potentially malicious.
- malicious code detection module 510 determines that a procedure and the thread containing it are potentially malicious, it optionally suspends the thread (if operating system 140 has given malicious code detection module 510 permission to perform such an action) and/or it generates alert 610 .
- thread 302 will not resume execution unless and until a user or administrator expressly instructs computing device 500 to proceed with execution of thread 302 .
- Alert 610 can take any variety of forms. Alert 610 can be a message displayed on a display operated by a user or administrator. Alert 610 also might be an email, SMS message, MMS message, or other message sent to a device operated by a user or administrator. Alert 610 also might be an audible sound generated by computing device 500 .
- malware code detection module 510 can stop this analysis when threshold/event 520 is reached.
- threshold/event 520 possibilities include: (1) Malicious code detection module 510 can analyze X stack frames and then stop; (2) Malicious code detection module 510 can analyze the stack frames that were added to call stack 312 within the last Y seconds; (3) Malicious code detection module 510 can analyze the stack frames that were added to call stack 312 since the last analysis performed by malicious code detection module 510 was performed on call stack 312 ; or (4) Malicious code detection module 510 can analyze the stack frames until it identifies a return address associated with a certain type of procedure. This type of limitation might be desirable because call stacks can become very large, and continuing the analysis indefinitely may slow down processor 110 in performing other tasks.
Abstract
In the embodiments described herein, a malicious code detection module identifies potentially malicious instructions in memory of a computing device. The malicious code detection module examines the call stack for each thread running within the operating system of the computing device. Within each call stack, the malicious code detection module identifies the originating module for each stack frame and determines whether the originating module is backed by an image on disk. If an originating module is not backed by an image on disk, the thread containing that originating module is flagged as potentially malicious, execution of the thread optionally is suspended, and an alert is generated for the user or administrator.
Description
- This patent application is a continuation of, and claims priority benefit of, U.S. patent application Ser. No. 15/648,972, filed Jul. 13, 2017, entitled “System and Method for Detecting Malware Injected Into Memory of a Computing Device,” which is hereby incorporated by reference herein in its entirety including all references and appendices cited therein.
- The present disclosure relates to a system and method for detecting the execution of malicious instructions injected into the memory of a computing device.
- As computing devices become increasingly complex, viruses and malware also are becoming increasingly complex and difficult to detect and prevent. While the prior art includes many approaches for scanning non-volatile storage such as a hard disk drive for such threats, the prior art includes few satisfactory solutions for detecting malicious code loaded into memory or the processor itself.
-
FIG. 1 depicts an exemplary priorart computing device 100 comprisingprocessor 110,memory 120, andstorage device 130. In this example,memory 120 is volatile and can comprise DRAM, SRAM, SDRAM, or other known memory devices.Storage device 130 is non-volatile and can comprise a hard disk drive, solid state drive, flash memory, or other known storage devices. One of ordinary skill in the art will understand thatprocessor 110 can include a single processor core or multiple processor cores as well as numerous cache memories, as is known in the prior art.Processor 110 executesoperating system 140. Examples ofoperating system 140 include the operating systems known by the trademarks WINDOWS® by Microsoft and IOS@ by Apple, CHROME OS® and ANDROID® by Google, LINUX and others. - In
FIG. 2 , data is stored instorage device 130. There are numerous mechanisms to store data instorage device 130, and two known mechanisms are shown for illustration purposes. In one mechanism, data is stored asblocks 220 and can be accessed by logical block address (LBA) or similar addressing scheme. In another mechanism, data is stored as files 230 and can be accessed using a file system. In the prior art,scanning module 210 can be executed byprocessor 110 and can scan eitherblocks 220 or files 230 to look for malicious code. This often is referred to as virus scan software and is well-suited for identifying and nullifying known malicious programs that are stored in non-volatile devices such as instorage device 130. - While prior art techniques are well-suited for detecting known malicious programs stored in
storage device 130, there is no satisfactory technique for detecting malicious instructions that have been injected intomemory 120 but not stored instorage device 130. - What is needed is a mechanism for detecting malicious instructions that have been injected into
processor 110 ormemory 120 but not stored instorage device 130 and generating an alert upon such detection and/or suspending execution of the malicious instructions. - In the embodiments described herein, a malicious code detection module identifies potentially malicious instructions in memory of a computing device. The malicious code detection module examines the call stack for each thread running within the operating system of the computing device. Within each call stack, the malicious code detection module identifies the originating module for each stack frame and determines whether the originating module is backed by an image on disk. If an originating module is not backed by an image on disk, the thread containing that originating module is flagged as potentially malicious, execution of the thread optionally is suspended, and an alert is generated for the user or administrator.
-
FIG. 1 depicts a prior art computing device. -
FIG. 2 depicts prior art virus scan software. -
FIG. 3 depicts multiple threads running within a prior art operating system. -
FIG. 4 depicts attribute information for various programs running in a prior art computing device. -
FIG. 5 depicts a malicious code detection module for identifying potentially malicious instructions. -
FIG. 6 further depicts a malicious code detection module for identifying potentially malicious instructions. - Additional aspects of prior art systems will now be described. In
FIG. 3 ,processor 110 executesoperating system 140.Operating system 140 can manage multiple threads of instructions that are executed concurrently. Here,exemplary threads Operating system 140 maintains a call stack for each thread. Here,exemplary call stack 312 is depicted, which is the call stack forthread 302. Threads can be related to one another. For example, in this example,thread 302 was initiated bythread 301. - In this simplified example,
call stack 312 comprisesvariables parameter 333, which were placed incall stack 312 bythread 302.Return address 334 also was placed oncall stack 312 bythread 302.Return address 334 is the address corresponding to the instruction inthread 302 that placedstack frame 341 incall stack 312. A stack frame is a collection of data placed in a call stack as part of a procedure. Here,stack frame 341 comprisesvariables parameter 333, andreturn address 334. -
Operating system 140 further comprises application programming interface (API)module 320, which is a mechanism by which threads can invoke APIs specific tooperating system 140. -
FIG. 4 depicts further aspects of the prior art. Here,memory 120 contains various types of programs, user data, and unassigned portions. Each of these items is stored in a particular address range withinmemory 120, andmemory 120 includesattribute information 410 that indicates whether each item is backed by a file stored in storage device 130 (e.g., whether that item is “backed on disk”). In this simple example,attribute information 410 includes address ranges foroperating system 140,utility program 411,application program 412,program 413, user data 414, and anunassigned area 415.Attribute information 410 further indicates whether each item is backed by a file instorage device 130 or not. Here, all items are in fact backed by a file except forprogram 413.Attribute information 410 typically is established and managed byoperating system 140. - With reference now to
FIG. 5 , an embodiment ofcomputing device 500 is depicted.Computing device 500 comprisesprocessor 110 andoperating system 140 as in the prior art.Computing device 500 further comprises maliciouscode detection module 510, which comprises lines of code executed byprocessor 110. Maliciouscode detection module 510 optionally can be part of the kernel ofoperating system 140 or can be code outside ofoperating system 140 that is given special privileges byoperating system 140, such as the ability to accessattribute information 410 and/or to suspend execution of a thread. - The embodiments detect malicious code based on three characteristics that typically are present in malicious code. First, malicious code usually owns a thread of execution. Second, this thread of execution originates or operates from code that is not backed by a file on disk. Third, the thread of execution must call the operating system API module_320 directly in order for the malicious code to affect appreciable activity on the system. That is, in order for the malicious code to inflict harm, it inevitably must call operating system API module_320 directly. Although there are some exceptions, these three features generally are not found in benign application or
operating system 140 itself. - Malicious
code detection module 510 first enumerates the call stacks of each thread of execution. In one embodiment, maliciouscode detection module 510 assigns a unique identifier to each call stack. Once enumerated, each call stack is analyzed to determine if it is malicious in nature. - In the simplified example of
FIG. 5 , maliciouscode detection module 510 starts at the top ofcall stack 312 and works down. The top of a call stack is almost always a system call originating from an operating system library. If not, the thread was likely performing a CPU intensive task and the thread is immediately deemed non-malicious. Here, the top of thecall stack 312 is system call 521 (which represents a call made to API module_320), and the analysis therefore continues. - Malicious code detection module continues down
call stack 312 and determines the originating module for each stack frame in the reverse order in which the stack frames were added to callstack 312. Here, stack frames 502 and 501 are shown. Maliciouscode detection module 510 determines the return address for stack frames 502 and 501, which here are return addresses 512 and 511, and determines the procedure withinthread 302 associated with the return address. Maliciouscode detection module 510 then consultsattribute information 410 to determine whether the code in which that procedure is contained is backed by a file instorage device 130. If it is (as would be the case if the procedure is part of application program 412), then the procedure and the thread containing it are deemed non-malicious. If it is not (as would be the case if the procedure is part of program 413), then the procedure and the thread containing it are deemed potentially malicious. - With reference to
FIG. 6 , when maliciouscode detection module 510 determines that a procedure and the thread containing it are potentially malicious, it optionally suspends the thread (ifoperating system 140 has given maliciouscode detection module 510 permission to perform such an action) and/or it generates alert 610. - If suspended,
thread 302 will not resume execution unless and until a user or administrator expressly instructscomputing device 500 to proceed with execution ofthread 302. -
Alert 610 can take any variety of forms.Alert 610 can be a message displayed on a display operated by a user or administrator.Alert 610 also might be an email, SMS message, MMS message, or other message sent to a device operated by a user or administrator.Alert 610 also might be an audible sound generated by computingdevice 500. - With reference again to
FIG. 5 , it is understood that each stack frame is analyzed in the reverse order in which the stack frame was added to thecall stack. Optionally, maliciouscode detection module 510 can stop this analysis when threshold/event 520 is reached. Examples of different threshold/event 520 possibilities include: (1) Maliciouscode detection module 510 can analyze X stack frames and then stop; (2) Maliciouscode detection module 510 can analyze the stack frames that were added to callstack 312 within the last Y seconds; (3) Maliciouscode detection module 510 can analyze the stack frames that were added to callstack 312 since the last analysis performed by maliciouscode detection module 510 was performed oncall stack 312; or (4) Maliciouscode detection module 510 can analyze the stack frames until it identifies a return address associated with a certain type of procedure. This type of limitation might be desirable because call stacks can become very large, and continuing the analysis indefinitely may slow downprocessor 110 in performing other tasks. - The foregoing merely illustrates the principles of the disclosure. Various modifications and alterations to the described embodiments will be apparent to those skilled in the art in view of the teachings herein. It will thus be appreciated that those skilled in the art will be able to devise numerous systems, arrangements, and procedures which, although not explicitly shown or described herein, embody the principles of the disclosure and can be thus within the spirit and scope of the disclosure. Various different exemplary embodiments can be used together with one another, as well as interchangeably therewith, as should be understood by those having ordinary skill in the art. In addition, certain terms used in the present disclosure, including the specification, drawings and claims thereof, can be used synonymously in certain instances, including, but not limited to, for example, data and information. It should be understood that, while these words, and/or other words that can be synonymous to one another, can be used synonymously herein, that there can be instances when such words can be intended to not be used synonymously. Further, to the extent that the prior art knowledge has not been explicitly incorporated by reference herein above, it is explicitly incorporated herein in its entirety. All publications referenced are incorporated herein by reference in their entireties.
Claims (21)
1. A method of identifying malware in a computing device comprising a processor executing an operating system and a malicious code detection module, memory, and a non-volatile storage device, the method comprising:
identifying, by the malicious code detection module, a call stack for a thread of execution within the operating system that includes an originating module and an attribute table;
determining, by the malicious code detection module, the originating module that initiated a stack frame in the call stack, wherein the determining step is performed for additional stack frames in the call stack until a threshold or event is reached; and
generating an alert, by the malicious code detection module, when the attribute table associated with the originating module indicates that the originating module is not backed by a file stored in the non-volatile storage device.
2. The method of claim 1 , wherein the malicious code detection module is part of a kernel of the operating system.
3. The method of claim 1 , wherein the malicious code detection module is not part of the operating system.
4. The method of claim 1 , further comprising assigning, by the malicious code detection module, a unique identifier to the call stack.
5. The method of claim 1 , further comprising suspending the thread until a user or an administrator expressly instructs the computing device to proceed with execution of the thread.
6. The method of claim 1 , wherein the malicious code detection module is outside of the operating system that is given a special privilege by the operating system.
7. The method of claim 6 , wherein the special privilege comprises an ability to access attribute information that indicates whether an item is backed by a file stored in the non-volatile storage device.
8. The method of claim 6 , wherein the special privilege comprises an ability to suspend execution of a thread.
9. The method of claim 1 , wherein the alert comprises at least one of a message displayed on a computing device of a user or administrator, an audible sound generated by the computing device, an email, a SMS message, a MMS message, and any type of message to be sent to a computing device of a user or administrator.
10. A method of identifying malicious code in a computing device comprising a processor executing an operating system and a malicious code detection module, memory, and a non-volatile storage device, the method comprising:
identifying, by the malicious code detection module, a call stack for a thread of execution within the operating system that includes an originating module and an attribute table;
determining, by the malicious code detection module, the originating module that initiated a stack frame in the call stack, wherein the determining step is performed for additional stack frames in the call stack until a threshold or event is reached; and
suspending, by the malicious code detection module, a thread of execution containing the originating module when the attribute table associated with the originating module indicates that the originating module is not backed by a file stored in the non-volatile storage device.
11. The method of claim 10 , wherein the malicious code detection module is part of a kernel of the operating system.
12. The method of claim 10 , wherein the malicious code detection module is not part of the operating system.
13. The method of claim 10 , further comprising assigning, by the malicious code detection module, a unique identifier to the call stack.
14. The method of claim 10 , wherein the malicious code detection module is outside of the operating system that is given a special privilege by the operating system.
15. The method of claim 14 , wherein the special privilege comprises an ability to access attribute information that indicates whether an item is backed by a file stored in the non-volatile storage device.
16. The method of claim 14 , wherein the special privilege comprises an ability to suspend execution of a thread.
17. A computing device comprising: a processor executing an operating system and a malicious code detection module, memory, and a non-volatile storage device, wherein the malicious code detection module comprises instructions for:
identifying a call stack for a thread of execution that includes an originating module and an attribute table within the operating system;
determining the originating module that initiated a stack frame in the call stack, wherein the malicious code detection module further comprises instructions for performing the determining step for additional stack frames in the call stack until a threshold or event is reached; and
generating an alert if the attribute table associated with the originating module indicates that the originating module is not backed by a file stored in the non-volatile storage device.
18. The device of claim 17 , wherein the malicious code detection module is part of a kernel of the operating system.
19. The device of claim 17 , wherein the malicious code detection module is not part of the operating system.
20. The device of claim 17 , wherein the malicious code detection module further comprises instructions for suspending a thread of execution containing the originating module if the originating module is not backed by a file stored in the non-volatile storage device.
21. The device of claim 17 , wherein the malicious code detection module further comprises instructions for enumerating the call stack and the additional call stacks.
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