US20210211869A1 - Vehicle, communication system and communication method using the same - Google Patents

Vehicle, communication system and communication method using the same Download PDF

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Publication number
US20210211869A1
US20210211869A1 US17/011,337 US202017011337A US2021211869A1 US 20210211869 A1 US20210211869 A1 US 20210211869A1 US 202017011337 A US202017011337 A US 202017011337A US 2021211869 A1 US2021211869 A1 US 2021211869A1
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Prior art keywords
vehicle
pseudonym
base station
service provider
public key
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US17/011,337
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English (en)
Inventor
Jun Ho Lee
Jang-won Lee
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Samsung Electronics Co Ltd
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Samsung Electronics Co Ltd
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Assigned to SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. reassignment SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNORS INTEREST (SEE DOCUMENT FOR DETAILS). Assignors: LEE, JANG-WON, LEE, JUN HO
Publication of US20210211869A1 publication Critical patent/US20210211869A1/en
Priority to US18/448,474 priority Critical patent/US20230396995A1/en
Abandoned legal-status Critical Current

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    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W4/00—Services specially adapted for wireless communication networks; Facilities therefor
    • H04W4/30—Services specially adapted for particular environments, situations or purposes
    • H04W4/40—Services specially adapted for particular environments, situations or purposes for vehicles, e.g. vehicle-to-pedestrians [V2P]
    • H04W4/44—Services specially adapted for particular environments, situations or purposes for vehicles, e.g. vehicle-to-pedestrians [V2P] for communication between vehicles and infrastructures, e.g. vehicle-to-cloud [V2C] or vehicle-to-home [V2H]
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
    • H04L9/0819—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s)
    • H04L9/0825—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s) using asymmetric-key encryption or public key infrastructure [PKI], e.g. key signature or public key certificates
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F16/00—Information retrieval; Database structures therefor; File system structures therefor
    • G06F16/20—Information retrieval; Database structures therefor; File system structures therefor of structured data, e.g. relational data
    • G06F16/23—Updating
    • G06F16/2379—Updates performed during online database operations; commit processing
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
    • H04L63/0407—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the identity of one or more communicating identities is hidden
    • H04L63/0421—Anonymous communication, i.e. the party's identifiers are hidden from the other party or parties, e.g. using an anonymizer
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0861—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0869—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords involving random numbers or seeds
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/30—Public key, i.e. encryption algorithm being computationally infeasible to invert or user's encryption keys not requiring secrecy
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/30—Public key, i.e. encryption algorithm being computationally infeasible to invert or user's encryption keys not requiring secrecy
    • H04L9/3066—Public key, i.e. encryption algorithm being computationally infeasible to invert or user's encryption keys not requiring secrecy involving algebraic varieties, e.g. elliptic or hyper-elliptic curves
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3236—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using cryptographic hash functions
    • H04L9/3239—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using cryptographic hash functions involving non-keyed hash functions, e.g. modification detection codes [MDCs], MD5, SHA or RIPEMD
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/50—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols using hash chains, e.g. blockchains or hash trees
    • H04W12/0013—
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/02—Protecting privacy or anonymity, e.g. protecting personally identifiable information [PII]
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/03—Protecting confidentiality, e.g. by encryption
    • H04W12/033—Protecting confidentiality, e.g. by encryption of the user plane, e.g. user's traffic
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/06—Authentication
    • H04W12/069—Authentication using certificates or pre-shared keys
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/60—Context-dependent security
    • H04W12/69—Identity-dependent
    • H04W12/75—Temporary identity
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
    • H04L2209/42—Anonymization, e.g. involving pseudonyms
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
    • H04L2209/80—Wireless
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
    • H04L2209/84—Vehicles

Definitions

  • the present disclosure relates to a vehicle, a communication system and a communication method using the same.
  • Mobile communication technology enables information to be shared between a wireless device and a land-based communication station.
  • Fifth generation (5G) networking is a technology standard for mobile communication networks. Information from smartphones, aircraft, and automobiles may be accessed through 5G networks.
  • Automobiles are an example of a system that can utilize 5G communications.
  • Automobile information may contain data such as traffic volume, road conditions, or vehicle motion data. This data may be collected and analyzed in by a service provider in real time to optimize traffic flow, provide emergency support, or provide vehicle location information (e.g., for navigation or law enforcement purposes).
  • aspects of the present disclosure provide a communication method capable of verifying an identity of a vehicle while ensuring privacy of the vehicle.
  • aspects of the present disclosure also provide a communication method capable of publicly managing vehicle data to prevent a service provider from denying a fact that a vehicle has provided the vehicle data to the service provider.
  • aspects of the present disclosure are not restricted to those set forth herein. The above and other aspects of the present disclosure will become more apparent to one of ordinary skill in the art to which the present disclosure pertains by referencing the detailed description of the present disclosure given below.
  • a communication method comprising registering a public key for a vehicle which receives a service from a service provider; generating a pseudonym ID corresponding to the public key; transmitting the pseudonym ID and vehicle data; verifying whether the vehicle is registered with the service provider based on the transmitted pseudonym ID; and storing a first transaction including the pseudonym ID and the vehicle data in a database of the service provider according to a result of the verification.
  • a communication system comprising a wireless communication module configured to receive a pseudonym ID and vehicle data from a vehicle; a network communication module configured to transmit the pseudonym ID and the vehicle data to a service provider providing a service, and to receive an initial secret value for the service; a base station arithmetic unit configured to verify whether the vehicle is registered for the service through the received initial secret value; and a first base station server configured to form a blockchain transaction including the pseudonym ID and the vehicle data according to a verification result of the base station arithmetic unit, and to store the blockchain transaction.
  • a vehicle comprising a sensor configured to acquire vehicle data; a security module configured to store a private key, the security module comprising a random number generator configured to generate a plurality of first random numbers that vary over time; a wireless communication module configured to receive a public key generated by an operation of the private key and to receive an initial secret value provided by a service provider; and a vehicle arithmetic unit configured to generate a pseudonym ID based on the public key, wherein the wireless communication module is further configured to transmit the pseudonym ID to verify that the pseudonym ID is generated based on the initial secret value.
  • a method of communication comprising receiving an initial secret value from a service provider; receiving a pseudonym ID and vehicle data from a vehicle; verifying that the vehicle is registered with the service provider based on the pseudonym ID and the initial secret value; and storing a transaction comprising the pseudonym ID and vehicle data based on the verification.
  • FIG. 1 is a diagram illustrating a structure of a communication system according to some embodiments
  • FIG. 2 is a block diagram illustrating the communication system according to some embodiments.
  • FIG. 3 is a flowchart illustrating a communication method of the communication system according to some embodiments.
  • FIGS. 4 and 5 are diagrams explaining step S 100 of FIG. 3 ;
  • FIG. 6 illustrates elliptic curve cryptography used in the communication method according to some embodiments
  • FIG. 7 is a diagram explaining steps S 200 and S 300 of FIG. 3 ;
  • FIG. 8 is a diagram explaining steps S 400 and S 500 of FIG. 3 ;
  • FIGS. 9 to 11 are diagrams explaining a data storage method used in the communication method according to some embodiments.
  • FIG. 12 is a diagram explaining steps S 600 and S 700 of FIG. 3 .
  • the present disclosure relates to mobile communications between an automobile and a communication network.
  • Embodiments of the present disclosure relate to a method for verifying the identity of a vehicle without comprising the privacy of a user.
  • a method of communication includes registering a public key for a vehicle, generating a pseudonym ID, transmitting the pseudonym ID, verifying whether the vehicle is registered, and storing a first transaction.
  • Registration of a public key for a vehicle may include comprises receiving a service from a service provider. Generation of the pseudonym ID may be based on the registered public key. The pseudonym ID and vehicle data may then be transmitted, and verification of whether the vehicle is registered with the service provider through the transmitted pseudonym ID may be performed.
  • a transaction, including the pseudonym ID and the vehicle data is stored in a database of the service provider according to a result of the verification.
  • Embodiments of the present disclosure provide data from a vehicle to a road side unit.
  • the road side unit may contain a server and may use blockchain technology to perform calculations on the data.
  • the calculations may be provided to a core network, which can be accessed by a service provider.
  • Data may then be provided back to the vehicle, where a user may decipher the data.
  • FIG. 1 is a diagram illustrating a structure of a communication system according to some embodiments.
  • FIG. 2 is a block diagram illustrating the communication system according to some embodiments.
  • the communication system may be a fifth generation (5G) communication system, or a pre-5G communication system such as a fourth generation (4G) communication system.
  • 5G fifth generation
  • 4G fourth generation
  • the 5G communication system may be implemented in an ultra-high frequency (millimeter wave) band (e.g., 60 GHz band).
  • Techniques such as beam-forming, multiple input multiple output (MIMO), full dimensional MIMO (FD-MIMO), array antenna techniques, analog beam-forming, and large scale antenna techniques may be applied in the communication system to reduce propagation loss of radio waves and increase the transmission distance thereof.
  • MIMO multiple input multiple output
  • FD-MIMO full dimensional MIMO
  • array antenna techniques analog beam-forming
  • large scale antenna techniques may be applied in the communication system to reduce propagation loss of radio waves and increase the transmission distance thereof.
  • the communication system may include a plurality of vehicles 100 .
  • the vehicles 100 may include first to fourth vehicles 100 _ 1 to 1004 , a plurality of roadside units 200 including first and second roadside units 200 _ 1 and 2002 , a core network 300 , a service provider 400 , and the Internet 500 .
  • the first roadside unit 200 _ 1 may communicate with the first and second vehicles 100 _ 1 and 100 _ 2 to transmit and receive data.
  • the second roadside unit 200 _ 2 may communicate with the third and fourth vehicles 1003 and 1004 to transmit and receive data.
  • the first and second roadside units 200 _ 1 and 200 _ 2 include first and second roadside unit servers 240 _ 1 and 2402 , respectively.
  • Each of the first and second roadside unit servers 240 _ 1 and 240 _ 2 may be components of a blockchain network. The formation of the blockchain network will be described later.
  • the first and second roadside units 200 _ 1 and 200 _ 2 may communicate with the core network 300 .
  • Communication with the core network 300 may be used to communicate with a service provider 400 .
  • the first through fourth vehicles 100 _ 1 to 100 _ 4 , the roadside units 200 _ 1 and 200 _ 2 , and the service provider 400 may be connected to, and communicate through, the Internet 500 .
  • the vehicle 100 may have a mobile communications capability.
  • the vehicle 100 may also represent or be referred to by a term such as a terminal, a user equipment (UE), a mobile station (MS), a user terminal (UT), a mobile subscriber station (MSS), a subscriber station (SS), an advanced mobile station (AMS), a wireless terminal (WT), a machine-type communication (MTC) device, a machine-to-machine (M2M) device and a device-to-device (D2D) device or the like.
  • UE user equipment
  • MS mobile station
  • UT user terminal
  • MSS mobile subscriber station
  • SS subscriber station
  • AMS advanced mobile station
  • WT wireless terminal
  • MTC machine-type communication
  • M2M machine-to-machine
  • D2D device-to-device
  • the vehicle 100 may include a security module 110 , a wireless communication module 120 , a sensor 130 , and an arithmetic unit 140 .
  • the vehicle 100 is used as an example of a transport device, but the present disclosure is not limited thereto.
  • the vehicle 100 may be another communication device or another transport device such as a train, a ship or the like.
  • the security module 110 may support a security-related library with, for example, an elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) public key or a Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) public key.
  • ECC elliptic curve cryptography
  • RSA Rivest-Shamir-Adleman
  • the security module 110 may store a private key (x i ), a public key (Q i ), and an initial secret value (s), which will be described later. Once stored, the private key (x i ), the public key (Q i ), and the initial secret value (s) are not exposed outside the security module 110 . The private key (x i ), the public key (Q i ), and the initial secret value (s) may be issued by a trusted third party. The security module 110 may further store another public key (Q i, s ).
  • the wireless communication module 120 may further include a plurality of transmission/reception paths.
  • the wireless communication module 120 may further include at least one antenna array configured with a plurality of antenna elements.
  • the wireless communication module 120 may be configured with a digital circuit and an analog circuit (e.g., a radio frequency integrated circuit (RFIC)). In some cases, the digital circuit and the analog circuit may be implemented in one package.
  • the wireless communication module 120 may further include a plurality of RF chains. Additionally or alternatively, the wireless communication module 120 may perform beam-forming.
  • the wireless communication module 120 may include different communication modules to process signals of different frequency bands. Furthermore, the wireless communication module 120 may include a plurality of communication modules to support different wireless access techniques.
  • the different wireless access techniques may include Bluetooth low energy (BLE), wireless fidelity (Wi-Fi), WiFi Gigabyte (WiGig), a cellular network (e.g., long term evolution (LTE)), and the like.
  • the different frequency bands may include a super-high frequency (SHF) (e.g., 2.5 GHz, 5 GHz, or the like) band and a millimeter-wave (e.g., 60 GHz) band.
  • SHF super-high frequency
  • the sensor 130 may be, e.g., a smartphone, a sensor for detecting internal information of the vehicle, a black box for imaging conditions of a road where the vehicle travels in real-time, or the like.
  • the sensor 130 may image the front and rear regions of the road where the vehicle travels in real-time to detect objects such as vehicles, road conditions, and the like from the captured image data by applying an object detection algorithm. Thereafter, the sensor 130 may provide at least one among type information, location information, and movement information of the detected object.
  • the arithmetic unit 140 may include various kinds of hardware (or processor) accelerators or software.
  • the arithmetic unit 140 may include a hardware accelerator such as a central processing unit (CPU), a graphics processing unit (GPU), or the like.
  • Operations such as add, multiplication, shift, XOR, AND, OR, NOR, and NAND may be performed in the hardware, as well as operations for processing RSA and ECC public keys, such as modular operations of modular addition, modular multiplication and the like.
  • the roadside unit 200 may be a terminal node of a network that directly communicates with the vehicle 100 .
  • operations described as performed by the roadside unit may be performed by an upper node of the roadside unit in some cases.
  • various operations performed for communications with a terminal may be performed by the roadside unit or other network nodes.
  • the roadside unit may be a fixed station, a base station (BS), a Node B, an evolved-NodeB (eNB), a base transceiver system (BTS), an access point (AP), a macro eNB (MeNB), a secondary eNB (SeNB), or the like.
  • the RSU 200 may include a wireless module 210 , a network communication module 220 , an RSU arithmetic unit 230 , and an RSU server 240 .
  • the wireless module 210 may have the same or similar functions and configurations as the wireless communication module 120 of the vehicle 100 .
  • the description for the wireless module 210 of the RSU 200 may also apply to the wireless communication module 120 of the vehicle 100 .
  • the network communication module 220 transmits data to the core network 300 , through wired or wireless communications, to transmit data to the service provider 400 .
  • the network communication module 220 is a unit in charge of connecting to the core network 300 in the RSU 200 .
  • the RSU arithmetic unit 230 may include various kinds of hardware (or processor) accelerators or software.
  • the RSU arithmetic unit 230 may include a hardware accelerator such as a central processing unit (CPU), a graphics processing unit (GPU), or the like.
  • Operations such as add, multiplication, shift, XOR, AND, OR, NOR, and NAND may be performed in the hardware.
  • operations for RSA and ECC public keys such as modular operations of modular addition, modular multiplication, and the like, may be performed in the hardware.
  • the RSU server 240 may process data using mobile edge computing techniques.
  • the mobile edge computing may be applied in a fourth generation (4G) or fifth generation (5G) environments, but the present disclosure is not limited thereto.
  • a service may be provided to the vehicle 100 by performing computing at the RSU 200 as one edge.
  • the RSU server 240 may store the initial secret value (s), a pseudonym ID (PID i ), and vehicle data (m), which will be described later.
  • the service provider 400 may include an arithmetic unit 410 and a database 420 .
  • the arithmetic unit 410 of the service provider 400 may include various kinds of hardware (or processor) accelerators or software.
  • the arithmetic unit 410 may include a hardware accelerator such as a central processing unit (CPU), a graphics processing unit (GPU) or the like.
  • Operations such as add, multiplication, shift, XOR, AND, OR, NOR, and NAND may be performed in the hardware, as well as operations for RSA and ECC public keys, such as modular operations of modular addition, modular multiplication and the like.
  • the database 420 may store the pseudonym ID (PID i ) and the vehicle data (m) transmitted from the vehicles 100 . Additionally or alternatively, the database 420 may share the pseudonym ID (PID i ) and the vehicle data (m) stored in the RSU server 240 .
  • a method of communication includes receiving an initial secret value from a service provider; receiving a pseudonym ID and vehicle data from a vehicle; verifying that the vehicle is registered with the service provider based on the pseudonym ID and the initial secret value; and storing a transaction comprising the pseudonym ID and vehicle data based on the verification.
  • the transaction is stored in a block of a blockchain.
  • the pseudonym ID is generated based on a random number generated and a public key, and wherein the public key is generated based on the initial secret value.
  • FIG. 3 is a flowchart illustrating a communication method of the communication system according to some embodiments.
  • the vehicle 100 registers a user specific public key (Q i,s ), which corresponds to the vehicle 100 , with the service provider 400 (step S 100 ).
  • a process between the service provider 400 and the RSU 200 and a process between the vehicle 100 and the service provider 400 may be performed through a secure channel such as a secure sockets layer (SSL) or a transport layer security (TLS), or performed offline.
  • the registration step may include steps described below.
  • FIGS. 4 and 5 are diagrams explaining the step S 100 of FIG. 3 .
  • the service provider 400 may provide the initial secret value (s) to the RSU 200 (step S 110 ).
  • the initial secret value (s) may be used to determine whether the vehicle 100 has or has not been registered with the service provider 400 for a service.
  • the vehicle 100 may share the public key (Q i ) and a user ID (ID i ) with the service provider 400 (step S 120 ).
  • the security module 110 generates the private key (x i ) of the vehicle 100 through the random number generator 111 .
  • Each private key (x i ) may correspond to a vehicle 100 .
  • the service provider may provide the public key (Q i ) with the vehicle 100 (S 130 ).
  • the security module 110 generates the public key (Q i ) through the arithmetic unit 140 using Eq. 1 below and the private key (x i ) may not be opened to other components during the operation of generating the public key (Q i ).
  • FIG. 6 illustrates elliptic curve cryptography used in the communication method according to some embodiments.
  • a and B are predetermined coefficients used in the elliptic curve equation.
  • E elliptic curve cryptography
  • the sum of the two points is the x-axis symmetry point of the point at which the straight line connecting the two points and the curve meet.
  • ⁇ P represents the x-axis symmetry point of P.
  • P+( ⁇ P) ⁇ (point at infinity) is established.
  • the point at infinity ⁇ the point is defined that a straight line passing through the point at infinity c is parallel to the y-axis.
  • the point R is defined as the point at infinity ⁇
  • the point at infinity ⁇ is the identity element
  • the point symmetric about the x-axis is the inverse element.
  • the arithmetic unit 410 may store the user ID (ID i ), the first random value (r i ), and the public key (Q i ) in the database 420 and provide y i and the public key (Q i ) to the security module 110 of the vehicle 100 .
  • FIG. 7 is a diagram explaining steps S 200 and S 300 of FIG. 3 .
  • the vehicle 100 _ 1 generates the pseudonym ID (PID i ) and a signature (sign i (m)) corresponding to the public key (Q i ) (step S 200 ).
  • the vehicle data (m) may be vehicle data (m) 10 acquired through the sensor 130 and may correspond to a message for the service provider 400 .
  • the security module 110 may calculate as represented in Eq. 5 below by using a second random value (r j ), y i and the public key (Q i, s ) through the arithmetic unit 140 to generate the pseudonym ID (PID i ).
  • Eqs. 4 to 7 are merely illustrative, and the present disclosure is not limited thereto.
  • the RSU arithmetic unit 230 of the RSU 200 may generate a modular inverse w of the signature (sign i (m)), a variable u1, and a variable u2 as represented in Eqs. 8 to 10, respectively, by using the pseudonym ID (PID i ), the vehicle data (m), the signature (sign i (m)), the variable v, and the time t received at the RSU at the transmission step S 300 .
  • PID i pseudonym ID
  • a point (x′, y′) may be generated by using the variable u1, the variable u2, the pseudonym ID (PID i ), the point G predetermined on the elliptic curve and the initial secret value (s) stored in the RSU server 240 , as represented in Eq. 11 below.
  • Eqs. 8 to 12 are merely illustrative, and the present disclosure is not limited thereto.
  • the RSU 200 transmits the pseudonym ID (PID i ) and the vehicle data (m) to the database 420 of the service provider 400 and the RSU server 240 (step S 500 ). If NO is determined in the verification step S 400 , the communication method, according to some embodiments, may be ended.
  • the data set 11 having passed the verification step S 400 may be configured as a record rcd of PID ⁇ m ⁇ sign (m) ⁇ t to be stored and transmitted to the service provider 400 .
  • a public key based authentication technique such as the ECDSA, the RSA, or the like, may be adopted for the signature of the RSU.
  • the plurality of RSU servers 240 _ 1 to 240 _ 6 as blockchain nodes may form a blockchain network.
  • the RSU servers 240 _ 1 to 240 _ 6 forming a blockchain-based system manage blocks in a chain-shaped data structure as shown in FIG. 10 . Additionally or alternatively, the data in the blockchain may be kept equally at each blockchain node without the control of a central system.
  • a hash value of the previous block is recorded in each block to refer to the previous block by using the hash value.
  • the header of each block may include a merkle root as shown in FIG. 10 , and the block body may store data forming a merkle tree.
  • the integrity and reliability of the data can be guaranteed even in a distributed environment.
  • the data stored in the blockchain is data maintained by the RSU servers 240 _ 1 to 240 _ 6 forming the blockchain network, and one or more blocks recording the data are formed in the chain-shaped data structure.
  • the blockchain data may be used as a distributed ledger.
  • the form of data recorded in each block may vary.
  • the formation of the blockchain network is an example of a method for storing data having passed the verification of the present disclosure, and the present disclosure is not limited thereto.
  • FIG. 12 is a diagram explaining steps S 600 and S 700 of FIG. 3 .
  • the vehicle 100 requests a reward for the message provided to the service provider 400 through the RSU 200 (step S 600 ).
  • the service provider 400 rewards the vehicle 100 based on the data stored in the database 420 (step S 700 ).
  • the service provider 400 retrieves a user ID (ID i ), which is the same as the received user ID (ID i ) and is stored at the registration step S 100 , to find ID i ⁇ r i ⁇ Q i stored in the database at the time of user registration.
  • ID i the public key
  • r i the first random value
  • the reward (R) is provided when the received vehicle data (m) matches vehicle data (m k ) in the record rcd of PID k ⁇ m k ⁇ sign (m k ) ⁇ t k stored in the database 420 , and the public key (Q) generated by using the received second random value (r j ), and the first random value (r j ) and the pseudonym ID (PID k ) stored in the database 420 matches the public key (Q) stored in the database 420 .
  • the present disclosure is not limited to the reward step described above.
  • the user ID (ID) may be transmitted without the vehicle data (m) of the vehicle 100 and the user may be rewarded based on the vehicle data (m) stored in the database 420 which corresponds to the user ID (ID).
  • the vehicle 100 is registered by using the public key obtained through the ECC operation without exposing the private key (x) of the security module 110 to the outside.
  • embodiments of the present disclosure verify whether the vehicle 100 has been registered for the service or not based on the pseudonym ID (PID i ) generated by using the first and second random values, so that the user's vehicle 100 can be identified while ensuring the anonymity thereof.
  • PID i pseudonym ID
  • the RSU server 240 when the RSU server 240 forms the blockchain network for storing the vehicle data (m), the RSU server 240 maintains the vehicle data (m) received from the vehicle 100 in the blockchain so that the service provider 400 cannot refuse a reward by denying the vehicle data (m). Therefore, the user can be rewarded according to the vehicle data (m) provided to the service provider 400 .

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