US20170142100A1 - Secure distribution of session credentials from client-side to server-side traffic management devices - Google Patents

Secure distribution of session credentials from client-side to server-side traffic management devices Download PDF

Info

Publication number
US20170142100A1
US20170142100A1 US15/356,471 US201615356471A US2017142100A1 US 20170142100 A1 US20170142100 A1 US 20170142100A1 US 201615356471 A US201615356471 A US 201615356471A US 2017142100 A1 US2017142100 A1 US 2017142100A1
Authority
US
United States
Prior art keywords
server
tmd
client
encrypted
session
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Abandoned
Application number
US15/356,471
Inventor
Benn Sapin Bollay
Jeffrey Michael Warren
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
F5 Networks Inc
Original Assignee
F5 Networks Inc
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Priority to US31585710P priority Critical
Priority to US12/967,006 priority patent/US9509663B2/en
Application filed by F5 Networks Inc filed Critical F5 Networks Inc
Priority to US15/356,471 priority patent/US20170142100A1/en
Assigned to F5 NETWORKS, INC. reassignment F5 NETWORKS, INC. ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNORS INTEREST (SEE DOCUMENT FOR DETAILS). Assignors: BOLLAY, BENN SAPIN, WARREN, JEFFREY MICHAEL
Publication of US20170142100A1 publication Critical patent/US20170142100A1/en
Abandoned legal-status Critical Current

Links

Images

Classifications

    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/04Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
    • H04L63/0428Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/02Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for separating internal from external traffic, e.g. firewalls
    • H04L63/0227Filtering policies
    • H04L63/0245Filtering by information in the payload
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/04Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
    • H04L63/0428Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
    • H04L63/0442Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload wherein the sending and receiving network entities apply asymmetric encryption, i.e. different keys for encryption and decryption
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/06Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network
    • H04L63/061Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network for key exchange, e.g. in peer-to-peer networks
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/08Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting authentication of entities communicating through a packet data network
    • H04L63/0853Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting authentication of entities communicating through a packet data network using an additional device, e.g. smartcard, SIM or a different communication terminal
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/08Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting authentication of entities communicating through a packet data network
    • H04L63/0884Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting authentication of entities communicating through a packet data network by delegation of authentication, e.g. a proxy authenticates an entity to be authenticated on behalf of this entity vis-à-vis an authentication entity
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/16Implementing security features at a particular protocol layer
    • H04L63/166Implementing security features at a particular protocol layer at the transport layer
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/30Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting lawful interception, monitoring or retaining of communications or communication related information
    • H04L63/306Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting lawful interception, monitoring or retaining of communications or communication related information intercepting packet switched data communications, e.g. Web, Internet or IMS communications
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L67/00Network-specific arrangements or communication protocols supporting networked applications
    • H04L67/14Network-specific arrangements or communication protocols supporting networked applications for session management
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication
    • H04L9/08Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0816Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
    • H04L9/0838Key agreement, i.e. key establishment technique in which a shared key is derived by parties as a function of information contributed by, or associated with, each of these
    • H04L9/0841Key agreement, i.e. key establishment technique in which a shared key is derived by parties as a function of information contributed by, or associated with, each of these involving Diffie-Hellman or related key agreement protocols
    • H04L9/0844Key agreement, i.e. key establishment technique in which a shared key is derived by parties as a function of information contributed by, or associated with, each of these involving Diffie-Hellman or related key agreement protocols with user authentication or key authentication, e.g. ElGamal, MTI, MQV-Menezes-Qu-Vanstone protocol or Diffie-Hellman protocols using implicitly-certified keys
    • GPHYSICS
    • G06COMPUTING; CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06FELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/60Protecting data
    • G06F21/604Tools and structures for managing or administering access control systems
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L67/00Network-specific arrangements or communication protocols supporting networked applications
    • H04L67/28Network-specific arrangements or communication protocols supporting networked applications for the provision of proxy services, e.g. intermediate processing or storage in the network

Abstract

A traffic management device (TMD), system, and processor-readable storage medium are directed to securely transferring session credentials from a client-side traffic management device (TMD) to a second server-side TMD that replaces a first server-side TMD. In one embodiment, a client-side TMD and the first server-side TMD have copies of secret data associated with an encrypted session between a client device and a server device, including a session key. For any of a variety of reasons, the first server-side TMD is replaced with the second server-side TMD, which may not have the secret data. In response to a request to create an encrypted connection associated with the encrypted session, the client-side TMD encrypts the secret data using the server device's public key and transmits the encrypted secret data to the second server-side TMD. If the second server-side TMD has a copy of the server device's private key, and is therefore considered to be an authentic and trusted TMD, the second sever-side TMD decrypts the secret data and participates in the encrypted connection.

Description

    CROSS REFERENCE TO RELATED APPLICATION
  • This application is a Continuation Application of U.S. patent application Ser. No. 12/967,006 filed on Dec. 13, 2010, now issued as U.S. Pat. No. 9,509,663 on Nov. 29, 2016, which is based on previously filed U.S. Provisional Patent Application, titled “Proxy SSL Handoff Via Mid-Stream Renegotiation,” Ser. No. 61/315,857 filed on Mar. 19, 2010, the benefit of the filing dates of which are hereby claimed under 35 U.S.C. §119(e) and §120 and the contents of which are incorporated in entirety by reference.
  • TECHNICAL FIELD
  • The present invention relates generally to managing network communications, and more particularly, but not exclusively, to securely transferring session credentials from a client-side traffic management device (TMD) to a second server-side TMD that replaces a first server-side TMD.
  • TECHNICAL BACKGROUND
  • An increasing number of applications within an enterprise are provided over Secure Sockets Layer (SSL), Transport Layer Security (TLS), or any number of protocols that network devices may use to communicate over an encrypted session. Maintaining security while increasing performance and reliability of such encrypted sessions is of practical benefit to end users, system administrators, infrastructure providers, and the like.
  • However, traditional methods of optimizing data transfer between two network devices are often rendered inoperable when two network devices, such as a client device and a server device, encrypt the data being transferred. For example, a pair of network accelerators, one operating in physical proximity to the client device and the other in physical proximity to the server device, are traditionally unable to perform certain types of compression on the encrypted data. Moreover, such pairs of network accelerators are also traditionally unable to insert content or otherwise modify the encrypted data, redirect data requests to particular servers, or the like. Thus, increasing the reliability and availability of proxy SSL/TSL sessions is an ongoing challenge.
  • One obstacle to reliability of such proxy SSL/TLS sessions is intermittent availability of network devices, including client-side and server-side network accelerators. Scheduled or unscheduled down-time of client-side and/or server-side network accelerators may result in a loss of data associated with an established proxy SSL/TLS session, often requiring the client device and server device negotiate a new SSL/TLS session.
  • BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
  • Non-limiting and non-exhaustive embodiments are described with reference to the following drawings. In the drawings, like reference numerals refer to like parts throughout the various figures unless otherwise specified.
  • For a better understanding of the described embodiments, reference will be made to the following Detailed Description, which is to be read in association with the accompanying drawings, wherein:
  • FIG. 1 illustrates a functional block diagram illustrating an environment for practicing various embodiments;
  • FIG. 2 illustrates one embodiment of a network device that may be included in a system implementing various embodiments;
  • FIG. 3 illustrates one embodiment of a server device that may be included in a system implementing various embodiments;
  • FIG. 4 illustrates a logical flow diagram generally showing one embodiment of an overview of a process for replacing an endpoint in an end-to-end encrypted connection;
  • FIG. 5 illustrates a logical flow diagram generally showing one embodiment of a process for generating a session key associated with an end-to-end encrypted session;
  • FIG. 6 illustrates a logical flow diagram generally showing one embodiment of a process for replacing an endpoint in an end-to-end encrypted connection with a second server device;
  • FIG. 7 illustrates a logical flow diagram generally showing one embodiment of a process for enhancing data transmitted between a client-side traffic management device (TMD) and a server-side TMD over the encrypted connection;
  • FIG. 8 illustrates one embodiment of a signal flow diagram generally usable with the process of FIG. 4;
  • FIG. 9 illustrates a logical flow diagram showing one embodiment of a process for securely distributing session credentials from a client-side TMD to a server-side TMD; and
  • FIG. 10 illustrates a logical flow diagram showing one embodiment of a process for securely distributing session credentials from a client-side TMD to a server-side TMD.
  • DETAILED DESCRIPTION
  • In the following detailed description of exemplary embodiments, reference is made to the accompanied drawings, which form a part hereof, and which show by way of illustration examples by which the described embodiments may be practiced. Sufficient detail is provided to enable those skilled in the art to practice the described embodiments, and it is to be understood that other embodiments may be utilized, and other changes may be made, without departing from the spirit or scope. Furthermore, references to “one embodiment” are not required to pertain to the same or singular embodiment, though they may. The following detailed description is, therefore, not to be taken in a limiting sense, and the scope of the described embodiments is defined only by the appended claims.
  • Throughout the specification and claims, the following terms take the meanings explicitly associated herein, unless the context clearly dictates otherwise. As used herein, the term “or” is an inclusive “or” operator, and is equivalent to the term “and/or,” unless the context clearly dictates otherwise. The term “based on” is not exclusive and allows for being based on additional factors not described, unless the context clearly dictates otherwise. In addition, throughout the specification, the meaning of “a,” “an,” and “the” include plural references. The meaning of “in” includes “in” and “on.”
  • As used herein, application layer refers to layer 7 of the seven-layer protocol stack as defined by the ISO-OSI (International Standards Organization-Open Systems Interconnection) framework.
  • As used herein, the term “network connection” refers to a collection of links and/or software elements that enable a computing device to communicate with another computing device over a network. One such network connection may be a Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) connection. TCP connections are virtual connections between two network nodes, and are typically established through a TCP handshake protocol. The TCP protocol is described in more detail in Request for Comments (RFC) 793, available from the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), and is hereby incorporated by reference in its entirety. A network connection “over” a particular path or link refers to a network connection that employs the specified path or link to establish and/or maintain a communication. The term “node” refers to a network element that typically interconnects one or more devices, or even networks.
  • As used herein, including the claims, the term “SSL” refers to SSL, TLS, Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) and all secure communications protocols derived therefrom. The SSL protocol is described in Netscape Communications Corp, Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) version 3 (November 1996), and the TLS protocol is derived from SSL, and is described in Dierks, T., and Allen, C., “The TLS Protocol Version 1.0,” RFC 2246 (January 1999), available from the IETF. The DTLS protocol is based on the TLS protocol, and is described in Rescorla, E., and Modadugu, N., “Datagram Transport Layer Security,” RFC 4347 (April 2006), available from the IETF. Each of these documents is incorporated herein by reference in their entirety. An SSL connection is a network connection that is secured by cryptographic information derived from an SSL protocol. The SSL protocol operates between an application layer (such as one or more of OSI layers 5-7) and a transport layer (such as OSI layer 4). The SSL protocol may provide security for application layer protocols such as HyperText Transfer Protocol (HTTP), Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP), Internet Messaging Access Protocol (IMAP), or the like. For example, HTTP over SSL (HTTPS) utilizes the SSL protocol to secure HTTP data. The SSL protocol may utilize Transport Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) on behalf of the application layer protocols to transport secure data. The SSL protocol may also employ a certificate. In one embodiment, the certificate is an X.509 certificate, such as those described in RFC 2459, available from the IETF, which is also incorporated herein by reference.
  • As used herein, an SSL session refers to a secure session over a network between two endpoints, wherein the session is secured using the SSL protocol. Although an SSL session is generally described herein as being established between a client device and a server device over a network, it should be understood that an SSL session may be established between virtually any types of network devices enabled to employ the SSL protocol. The SSL protocol uses a series of SSL handshakes (i.e. an SSL handshake protocol) to initiate an SSL session. An SSL session is associated with a master secret (also known as a session key) that results from the SSL handshakes. An SSL session is further associated with additional secret data that enables the SSL session (e.g. pre-master secret, random data, server's public and private keys and/or client's public and private keys). The SSL protocol also includes an SSL re-handshake procedure for renegotiating an SSL session. The renegotiated SSL session may be associated with the current SSL session or with another SSL session. An SSL session may employ one or more underlying network connections.
  • As used herein, the term SSL connection refers to a network connection employed by an SSL session to transmit encrypted data. An SSL connection is created at the request of a client device or a server device that are endpoints of an established SSL session. Regardless of which device requests the SSL connection, one or more keys used to encrypt/decrypt data transmitted over the SSL connection are independently derived by the client device and the server device based on the master secret of the associated SSL session.
  • Briefly, SSL supports at least four content types: application_data, alert, handshake, and change_cipher_spec. Alert, handshake, and change_cipher_spec content types are associated with messages for managing the SSL protocol. For example, an SSL alert is of the alert content type and is used for signaling, among other things, error conditions. SSL has provisions for other content types, but these capabilities are not commonly used.
  • The SSL handshake protocol includes the exchange and processing of a series of messages, which may be one of an alert, handshake, and/or change_cipher_spec content type. One or more SSL handshake messages are encapsulated within one or more network records of the handshake content type. The SSL handshake message also includes an associated SSL handshake type, and one or more data fields.
  • The SSL handshake protocol typically begins with the client device sending to the server device, among other things, randomly generated data within a CLIENT-HELLO message (e.g. an SSL handshake message with an associated SSL handshake type of “CLIENT-HELLO”). The server device responds to the CLIENT-HELLO message with, among other things, randomly generated data within a SERVER-HELLO message. Further, the server may provide a server certificate which the client may use to authenticate the server. Moreover, in some embodiments the server may request a client certificate which the server may authenticate in order to validate the client.
  • The client device, using the randomly generated data exchanged in the CLIENT-HELLO and SERVER-HELLO messages, generates a pre-master secret for an SSL session. In one embodiment, the client device may also include another random number in the pre-master secret, one that has typically not been transmitted over a public network in the clear. The client device then sends the pre-master secret to the server device in an SSL handshake message. In one embodiment, the pre-master secret may be encrypted using a public key associated with the server (obtained from the server's SERVER-HELLO message). Typically, the SSL handshake message that includes the pre-master secret is a CLIENT-KEY-EXCHANGE handshake message. Then, each of the client device and the server device, separately, perform a series of steps to generate a master secret using the pre-master secret. This master secret is associated with the SSL session, and is also known as a session key. Once an SSL session has been established, either the client device or the server device may requests that an SSL connection be created. Creation of an SSL session includes independently generating a key at both the client device and the server device based on the shared master secret. Connection keys may include, but are not limited to, cipher keys used to encrypt and decrypt communicated data over the SSL session, and/or authentication keys used verify messages received over the SSL session. The client device and the server device may then use their respective instances of the connection key(s) to generate and send messages containing encrypted payloads to each other.
  • As used herein, including the claims, the term “encrypted session” refers to a communications session between two endpoint devices over a network, encrypted in some way so as to secure the session. Example encrypted sessions may include SSL, TLS, and DTLS sessions. An encrypted session is associated with a master secret, also known as a session key. As used herein, the term “encrypted connection” refers to any network connection secured by cryptographic information, such as SSL, TLS, and DTLS connections, although other encrypted connections are similarly contemplated. An encrypted connection includes cipher keys used to encrypt and decrypt data communicated over the encrypted connection, as well as a reference to an underlying transport protocol interface, such as a TCP interface.
  • As used herein, the phrase “encrypted session/connection” refers an encrypted session and/or an encrypted connection.
  • As used herein, the phrase “end-to-end encrypted session/connection” refers to an encrypted session and/or connection between two endpoint devices. In some instances, each endpoint device may know the identity of the other endpoint device when establishing the encrypted session/connection.
  • As used herein, the phrase “terminating an encrypted session” refers to being one of the two endpoints of an encrypted session. Similarly, the phrase “terminating an encrypted connection” refers to being one of the two endpoints of an encrypted connection. The endpoints of an encrypted session or connection are devices, such as a client device and a server device, between which encrypted data may be transmitted. Examples of a client device and a server device are an SSL client device and an SSL server device.
  • As used herein, the phrase “establishing an encrypted session” refers to participating in an encrypted session handshake protocol. The phrase “establishing an encrypted connection” refers to generating an encrypted connection associated with an encrypted session by participating in an abridged handshake protocol. In one embodiment, two devices establish the encrypted session/connection, becoming the endpoints of the encrypted session/connection. Additional devices also may optionally participate in establishing the encrypted session/connection, either in conjunction with one or both of the endpoints, or without the knowledge of one or both endpoints. One example of an encrypted session handshake protocol is an SSL handshake protocol.
  • As used herein, the phrase “abridged handshake protocol” refers to a negotiation between a client device and a server device used to create a new encrypted connection that is associated with an established encrypted session. The request may be made by either the client device or the server device. The request may occur at any time after the encrypted session has been established. In one embodiment, both devices participating in the abridged handshake protocol independently generate a connection key based on the session key of the established encrypted session.
  • As used herein, the phrase “out-of-band” refers to sending data outside of a current encrypted session/connection, such as sending the data over a connection distinct from an end-to-end encrypted session/connection established between a client device and a server device.
  • As used herein, the phrase “secret data” refers to data that enables an encrypted session handshake between two devices. Secret data includes, for example, a master secret and a pre-master secret as described in RFC 2246, referenced above. Secret data may also include the random data employed to generate the pre-master secret, nonces, PKI private keys for server and/or client, and the like.
  • As used herein, the term “packet” refers to a group of binary digits which is switched and transmitted as a composite whole. A “network packet” is a packet that is switched and transmitted over a network from a source toward a destination. As used herein, the terms “packet header” and “header” refer to contiguous bits at the start of a packet that carry information about the payload data of the packet. For example, a header may include information regarding a format, protocol, source, destination, type, and/or sequence of payload data in a packet, and/or any other type of control information necessary for the sending, receiving and/or processing of the payload data in a packet. As used herein, “packet payload” and “payload” refer to data included within a packet, and distinct from a packet header of the packet. The payload may include data that is to be transferred from source toward a destination, and such data may be in a particular format described in the header.
  • Identification of header and payload within a packet may be context relevant, and related to a relevant layer of the OSI stack. For example, a packet may be analyzed by a lower-level process operating at a lower level of the OSI stack, such as the transport layer. Such a lower-level process may identify a transport-layer header and transport-layer payload within the packet, and may strip the transport-layer header from the packet in the course of receiving and analyzing the packet. The identified payload data from the packet may then be transferred to a higher-level process operating at a higher level of the OSI stack, such as at the application layer, which may identify an application layer header and application layer payload within the transferred data. Thus, both header and payload relevant to a higher level of processing (e.g. application layer) may be included in payload data relevant to a lower level of processing (e.g. transport layer).
  • Throughout this disclosure, when specific message types are listed, such as “CLIENT-HELLO”, it is understood that these are examples used to illustrate a type of message. These specific messages are but one embodiment, and other similar messages used to establish and/or maintain an encrypted session/connection are similarly contemplated.
  • In some embodiments, server-side TMD and client-side TMD may be distinguished by their relative positions within a system topology, and/or their physical locations. For example, as shown in FIG. 1, a client-side TMD may be closer to a client device physically (e.g. co-located within branch office 107 with client device(s)) and/or topologically (e.g. requiring relatively fewer network hops for traffic to reach a client device than a server device). Similarly, a server-side TMD may be closer to a server device physically (e.g. co-located within head office 120) or topologically.
  • Throughout this disclosure, including the claims, an untrusted TMD refers to a TMD that is not under the physical and/or administrative control of a head office. For example, a client-side TMD residing in a branch office will often be regarded as untrusted, as branch offices typically do not provide as high a level of physical or administrative security as does a head office.
  • Throughout this disclosure, including the claims, an “unknown TMD” refers to a TMD which may or may not be in possession of server secret data, such as a server device's private key, digital certificate, or the like.
  • The claimed invention may be practiced in an environment in which a client-side TMD and a first server-side TMD are interposed between a client device and a server device, such that one or both of the TMDs have access to the session key(s) and/or connection key(s) required to decrypt encrypted data sent between the client device and the server device. What follows is a brief, non-limiting, non-exemplary description of how the first server-side TMD and the client-side TMD may reach this state. As described, the first server-side TMD is interposed between the client device and the server device. During establishment of an end-to-end encrypted session between the client device and the server device, the interposed TMD accesses secret information about the encrypted session. Such secret information includes, for example, client device and server device random data, a pre-master secret usable to determine a session key, a server certificate, a client certificate, and the like. By accessing the secret information for the end-to-end encrypted session, the first server-side TMD is able to read, intercept, augment, delete, delay, prune, compress, enhance, accelerate, transpose, or otherwise modify data sent over encrypted connections associated with the encrypted connection.
  • In one embodiment, once the end-to-end encrypted session has been established and the first server-side TMD has access to the session key, the first server-side TMD may transmit the session key and other secret data (including the pre-master secret, client and server random data, server certificate, and the like) to the client-side TMD, thereby enabling the client-side TMD to also decrypt encrypted data transmitted over encrypted connections associated with the encrypted session. In one embodiment, once both the client-side TMD and the first server-side TMD have access to the session keys, the client-side TMD and the server-side TMD may be used in conjunction to enhance or otherwise modify data transmitted between the client device and the server device.
  • Briefly described is a mechanism for securely transferring session credentials from a client-side traffic management device (TMD) to a second server-side TMD that replaces a first server-side TMD. In one embodiment, a client-side TMD and the first server-side TMD have copies of secret data associated with an encrypted session between a client device and a server device, including a session key. For any of a variety of reasons, the first server-side TMD is replaced with the second server-side TMD, which does not have the secret data. In response to a request to create an encrypted connection associated with the encrypted session, the client-side TMD encrypts the secret data using the server device's public key and transmits the encrypted secret data to the second server-side TMD. If the second server-side TMD has a copy of the server device's private key, then the second sever-side TMD decrypts the secret data and participates in the encrypted connection.
  • Illustrative Operating Environment
  • FIG. 1 shows components of an illustrative environment 100 in which the described embodiments may be practiced. Not all the components may be required to practice the described embodiments, and variations in the arrangement and type of the components may be made without departing from the spirit or scope of the described embodiments. Environment 100 of FIG. 1 includes client devices 102-104, client-side TMD 106, branch office 107, network 108, server-side TMD 110, end-to-end encrypted session (A) and secure tunnel (B) through network 108, private keys 111(1) through 111(n), server devices 112 through 114, authentication server device 115, secret data 116, third party content provider 118, and head office 120. Server devices 112-114 (server device 113 not shown) and authentication server device 115 are collectively referred to herein as server devices 112-115.
  • Generally, client devices 102-104 may include virtually any computing device capable of connecting to another computing device and receiving information. Client devices 102-104 may be located within the branch office 107, but client devices 102-104 may alternatively be located outside of branch office 107. Such devices may include personal computers, multiprocessor systems, microprocessor-based or programmable consumer electronics, network devices, and the like. Client devices 102-104 may also include portable devices such as, cellular telephones, smart phones, display pagers, radio frequency (RF) devices, infrared (IR) devices, Personal Digital Assistants (PDAs), handheld computers, wearable computers, tablet computers, integrated devices combining one or more of the preceding devices, and the like. As such, client devices 102-104 may range widely in terms of capabilities and features.
  • Client devices 102-104 may further include one or more client applications that are configured to manage various actions. Moreover, client devices 102-104 may also include a web browser application that is configured to enable an end-user to interact with other devices and applications over network 108.
  • Network 108 is configured to couple network enabled devices, such as client devices 102-104, TMDs 106 and 110, server devices 112-114, authentication server device 115, and third party content provider 118, with other network enabled devices. In one embodiment, client device 102 may communicate with server device 112 through client-side TMD 106, network 108, and server-side TMD 110. Additionally or alternatively, client device 102, client-side TMD 106, server-side TMD 110, and server device 112 may all be connected directly to network 108. In one embodiment, network 108 may enable encrypted sessions, such as end-to-end encrypted session (A), between client devices 102-104 and server devices 112-115.
  • Network 108 is enabled to employ any form of computer readable media for communicating information from one electronic device to another. In one embodiment, network 108 may include the Internet, and may include local area networks (LANs), wide area networks (WANs), direct connections, such as through a universal serial bus (USB) port, other forms of computer-readable media, or any combination thereof. On an interconnected set of LANs, including those based on differing architectures and protocols, a router may act as a link between LANs, to enable messages to be sent from one to another. Also, communication links within LANs typically include fiber optics, twisted wire pair, or coaxial cable, while communication links between networks may utilize analog telephone lines, full or fractional dedicated digital lines including T1, T2, T3, and T4, Integrated Services Digital Networks (ISDNs), Digital Subscriber Lines (DSLs), wireless links including satellite links, or other communications links known to those skilled in the art.
  • Network 108 may further employ a plurality of wireless access technologies including, but not limited to, 2nd (2G), 3rd (3G), 4th (4G) generation radio access for cellular systems, Wireless-LAN, Wireless Router (WR) mesh, and the like. Access technologies such as 2G, 3G, 4G, and future access networks may enable wide area coverage for network devices, such as client devices 102-104, or the like, with various degrees of mobility. For example, network 108 may enable a radio connection through a radio network access such as Global System for Mobil communication (GSM), General Packet Radio Services (GPRS), Enhanced Data GSM Environment (EDGE), Wideband Code Division Multiple Access (WCDMA), and the like.
  • Furthermore, remote computers and other related electronic devices could be remotely connected to either LANs or WANs via a modem and temporary telephone link, a DSL modem, a cable modem, a fiber optic modem, an 802.11 (Wi-Fi) receiver, and the like. In essence, network 108 includes any communication method by which information may travel between one network device and another network device.
  • Secure tunnel (B) through network 108 includes any tunnel for communicating information between network devices. Typically, secure tunnel (B) is encrypted. As used herein, a “tunnel” or “tunneled connection” is a network mechanism that provides for the encapsulation of network packets or frames at a same or lower layer protocol of the Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) network stack. Tunneling may be employed to take packets or frames from one network system and place (e.g. encapsulate) them inside frames from another network system. Examples of tunneling protocols include, but are not limited to IP tunneling, Layer 2 Tunneling Protocol (L2TP), Layer 2 Forwarding (L2F), VPNs, IP SECurity (IPSec), Point-to-Point Tunneling Protocol (PPTP), GRE, MBone, and SSL/TLS. As shown, secure tunnel (B) is created for secure connections between client-side TMD 106 and server-side TMD 110 through network 108.
  • One embodiment of a network device that could be used as client-side TMD 106 or server-side TMD 110 is described in more detail below in conjunction with FIG. 2. Briefly, however, client-side TMD 106 and server-side TMD 110 each include virtually any network device that manages network traffic. Such devices include, for example, routers, proxies, firewalls, load balancers, cache devices, application accelerators, devices that perform network address translation, any combination of the preceding devices, or the like. Such devices may be implemented solely in hardware or in hardware and software. For example, such devices may include some application specific integrated circuits (ASICs) coupled to one or more microprocessors. The ASICs may be used to provide a high-speed switch fabric while the microprocessors may perform higher layer processing of packets.
  • In one embodiment, server-side TMD 110 is typically located within head office 120, and as such is considered to be physically secure and under the direct management of a central administrator. Accordingly, sever-side TMD 110 may also be known as a trusted TMD. Server-side TMD 110 may control, for example, the flow of data packets delivered to, or forwarded from, an array of server device devices, such as server devices 112-115. In one embodiment, messages sent between the server-side TMD 110 and the server devices 112-115 may be part of a secure channel, such end-to-end encrypted session (A) formed between one of client devices 102-104 and one of the server devices 112-115. In another embodiment, server-side TMD 110 may terminate an encrypted connection on behalf of a server device, and employ another type of encryption, such as IPSec, to deliver packets to or forward packets from the server device. Alternatively, when the server-side TMD 110 terminates the encrypted connection on behalf of a server device, delivering packets to or forwarding packets from the server device may be performed with no encryption (or “in the clear”).
  • In one embodiment, client-side TMD 106 typically resides in branch office 107, physically outside the control of central administrators, and therefore may be subject to physical tampering. Accordingly, client-side TMD 106 may be known as an untrusted TMD. In one embodiment, client-side TMD 106 may forward data from a source to a destination. For example, client-side TMD 106 may forward one or more encrypted session handshake messages between one of client devices 102-104 and one of server devices 112-115. Alternatively, a client-side TMD may reside in the head office 120. Alternatively, a client-side TMD may be included with a server-side TMD in a single device, enabling a single device to provide the services of both a client-side TMD and a server-side TMD, based on the types and locations of devices transmitting data through the TMD. Alternatively or additionally, a TMD may act as both a client-side TMD and a server-side TMD for a single connection. For example, a TMD may act as a client-side TMD by routing a request to a server-side TMD in another office. However, the server-side TMD may re-route the request to a server device located in geographic proximity to the “client-side” TMD. In this case, the “client-side” TMD may connect the client device to the local server device. When connecting the client device to a local server device, the TMD that began as a “client-side” TMD may perform the role of a “server-side” TMD.
  • As described in more detail below, client-side TMD 106 may receive secret data 116, typically from server-side TMD 110, that enables it to perform various additional actions on encrypted connection messages sent between one of client devices 102-104 and one of server devices 112-115. For example, client-side TMD 106 may be enabled to read, intercept, augment, delete, prune, compress, delay, enhance, transpose, or otherwise modify data within an encrypted connection message.
  • In one embodiment, server device private keys 111 may be centralized inside of the head office 120, a Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) boundary, or the like. Server-side TMD 110 may be enabled to access the private keys 111, or the like, through a variety of mechanisms.
  • Server devices 112-115 may include any computing device capable of communicating packets to another network device. Each packet may convey a piece of information. A packet may be sent for handshaking, e.g., to establish a connection or to acknowledge receipt of data. The packet may include information such as a request, a response, or the like. Generally, packets received by server devices 112-115 may be formatted according to TCP/IP, but they could also be formatted using another protocol, such as SCTP, X.25, NetBEUl, IPX/SPX, token ring, similar IPv4/6 protocols, and the like. Moreover, the packets may be communicated between server devices 112-115, server-side TMD 110, and one of client devices 102-104 employing HTTP, HTTPS, and the like.
  • In one embodiment, server devices 112-115 are configured to operate as a website server. However, server devices 112-115 are not limited to web server devices, and may also operate a messaging server, a File Transfer Protocol (FTP) server, a database server, content server, and the like. Additionally, each of server devices 112-115 may be configured to perform a different operation. Thus, for example, server device 112 may be configured as a messaging server, while server device 114 is configured as a database server. Moreover, while server devices 112-115 may operate as other than a website, they may still be enabled to receive an HTTP communication.
  • Devices that may operate as server devices 112-115 include personal computers, desktop computers, multiprocessor systems, microprocessor-based or programmable consumer electronics, network PCs, server devices, and the like.
  • As discussed above, secret data 116 typically includes a pre-master secret and/or a master secret. Secret data 116 may also include random numbers, e.g. nonces (number used once). In one embodiment, a client device and a server device may exchange nonces in their respective HELLO messages, for use in generating the session key (also known as the master key). Additionally or alternatively, secret data 116 may include another nonce (distinct from the nonce's contained in HELLO messages) generated by the client device and digitally encrypted by the client device using the public key of the server device. In one embodiment, secret data 116 is utilized by one or more of the client device, server-side TMD 110, and the server device to generate a session key.
  • Third party content provider 118 may optionally be used to provide content, for example advertisements, to be inserted by server-side TMD 110 or client-side TMD 106 into an encrypted connection. However, third party content is not so limited, and may additionally include content provided by an affiliated business partner, a corporate IT department, and the like.
  • It is further noted that terms such as client and server may refer to functions within a device. As such, virtually any device may be configured to operate as a client, a server, or even include both a client and a server function. Furthermore, where two or more peers are employed, any one of them may be designated as a client or as a server, and be configured to confirm to the teachings of the present invention.
  • Illustrative Network Device Environment
  • FIG. 2 shows one embodiment of a network device, according to one embodiment of the invention. Network device 200 may include many more or less components than those shown. The components shown, however, are sufficient to disclose an illustrative embodiment for practicing the invention. Network device 200 may represent, for example, server-side TMD 110 and/or client-side TMD 106 of FIG. 1.
  • Network device 200 includes processing unit 212, video display adapter 214, and a mass memory, all in communication with each other via bus 222. The mass memory generally includes RAM 216, ROM 232, and one or more permanent mass storage devices, such as hard disk drive 228, tape drive, CD-ROM/DVD-ROM drive 226, and/or floppy disk drive. The mass memory stores operating system 220 for controlling the operation of network device 200. Network device 200 also includes encrypted session manager 252, and other application 258.
  • As illustrated in FIG. 2, network device 200 also can communicate with the Internet, or some other communications network via network interface unit 210, which is constructed for use with various communication protocols including the TCP/IP protocol. Network interface unit 210 is sometimes known as a transceiver, transceiving device, or network interface card (NIC).
  • The mass memory as described above illustrates another type of computer-readable media, namely computer storage media. Computer storage media may include volatile, nonvolatile, removable, and non-removable media implemented in any method or technology for storage of information, such as computer readable instructions, data structures, program modules, or other data. Examples of computer storage media include RAM, ROM, EEPROM, flash memory or other memory technology, CD-ROM, digital versatile disks (DVD) or other optical storage, magnetic cassettes, magnetic tape, magnetic disk storage or other magnetic storage devices, or any other medium which can be used to store the desired information and which can be accessed by a computing device.
  • The mass memory also stores program code and data. One or more applications 258 are loaded into mass memory and run on operating system 220. Examples of application programs may include email programs, routing programs, schedulers, calendars, database programs, word processing programs, HTTP programs, traffic management programs, security programs, and so forth.
  • Network device 200 may further include applications that support virtually any secure connection, including TLS, TTLS, EAP, SSL, IPSec, and the like. Such applications may include, for example, and encrypted session manager 252.
  • In one embodiment, encrypted session manager 252 may perform encrypted session processing, including managing an encrypted session handshake, managing keys, certificates, authentication, authorization, or the like. Moreover, encrypted session manager 252 may in one embodiment establish encrypted sessions and/or connections, terminate encrypted sessions and/or connections, establish itself as a man-in-the-middle of an encrypted session and/or connection, or the like. Moreover, encrypted session manager 252 may in one securely transfer session credentials from to another TMD.
  • Additionally, network device 200 may include applications that support a variety of tunneling mechanisms, such as VPN, PPP, L2TP, and so forth.
  • Network device 200 may also include input/output interface 224 for communicating with external devices, such as a mouse, keyboard, scanner, or other input devices not shown in FIG. 2. Likewise, network device 200 may further include additional mass storage facilities such as CD-ROM/DVD-ROM drive 226 and hard disk drive 228. Hard disk drive 228 may be utilized to store, among other things, application programs, databases, certificates, public and private keys, secret data, and the like.
  • In one embodiment, the network device 200 includes at least one Application Specific Integrated Circuit (ASIC) chip (not shown) coupled to bus 222. The ASIC chip can include logic that performs some of the actions of network device 200. For example, in one embodiment, the ASIC chip can perform a number of packet processing functions for incoming and/or outgoing packets. In one embodiment, the ASIC chip can perform at least a portion of the logic to enable the operation of encrypted session manager 252.
  • In one embodiment, network device 200 can further include one or more field-programmable gate arrays (FPGA) (not shown), instead of, or in addition to, the ASIC chip. A number of functions of the network device can be performed by the ASIC chip, the FPGA, by CPU 212 with instructions stored in memory, or by any combination of the ASIC chip, FPGA, and CPU.
  • Illustrative Server Device Environment
  • FIG. 3 shows one embodiment of a server device, according to one embodiment of the invention. Server device 300 may include many more components than those shown. The components shown, however, are sufficient to disclose an illustrative embodiment for practicing the invention. Server device 300 may represent, for example, Servers 112-114 and Authentication Server 115 of FIG. 1.
  • Server device 300 includes processing unit 312, video display adapter 314, and a mass memory, all in communication with each other via bus 322. The mass memory generally includes
  • RAM 316, ROM 332, and one or more permanent mass storage devices, such as hard disk drive 328, tape drive, CD-ROM/DVD-ROM drive 326, and/or floppy disk drive. The mass memory stores operating system 320 for controlling the operation of server device 300. Any general-purpose operating system may be employed. Basic input/output system (“BIOS”) 318 is also provided for controlling the low-level operation of server device 300. As illustrated in FIG. 3, server device 300 also can communicate with the Internet, or some other communications network, via network interface unit 310, which is constructed for use with various communication protocols including the TCP/IP protocol. Network interface unit 310 is sometimes known as a transceiver, transceiving device, or network interface card (MC).
  • The mass memory as described above illustrates another type of computer-readable media, namely computer storage media. Computer-readable storage media may include volatile, nonvolatile, removable, and non-removable media implemented in any method or technology for storage of information, such as computer readable instructions, data structures, program modules, or other data. Examples of computer readable storage media include RAM, ROM, EEPROM, flash memory or other memory technology, CD-ROM, digital versatile disks (DVD) or other optical storage, magnetic cassettes, magnetic tape, magnetic disk storage or other magnetic storage devices, or any other physical medium which can be used to store the desired information and which can be accessed by a computing device.
  • One or more applications 350 may be loaded into mass memory and run on operating system 320. Examples of application programs may include transcoders, schedulers, calendars, database programs, word processing programs, HTTP programs, customizable user interface programs, IPSec applications, encryption programs, security programs, VPN programs, web servers, account management, and so forth. Applications 350 may include encrypted session module 360. Encrypted session module 360 may establish encrypted sessions and/or connections with other network devices, including any of the network devices discussed above. In one embodiment, encrypted session module 360 may work cooperatively with TMD 110 or TMD 106 of FIG. 1. Additionally or alternatively, encrypted session module 360 may communicate with other network devices independent of any TMD. In one embodiment, encrypted session module 360 may send a request to create a new encrypted connection that is associated with an established encrypted session.
  • Applications 350 may also include a variety of web services that are configured to provide content, including messages, over a network to another computing device. These web services include for example, a web server, messaging server, a File Transfer Protocol (FTP) server, a database server, a content server, or the like. These web services may provide the content including messages over the network using any of a variety of formats, including, but not limited to WAP, HDML, WML, SMGL, HTML, XML, cHTML, xHTML, or the like.
  • Generalized Operation
  • The operation of certain aspects will now be described with respect to FIGS. 4-8. FIGS. 4-7 provide logical flow diagrams illustrating certain aspects, while FIG. 8 provides a signal flow diagram. FIG. 4 illustrates a logical flow diagram generally showing one embodiment of a process for replacing an endpoint in an end-to-end encrypted connection. In one embodiment, process 400 may be implemented by server-side TMD 110.
  • Process 400 begins, after a start block, at block 402, by a server-side TMD interposed between a client device and a first server device. In one embodiment, the server-side TMD determines a session key associated with an end-to-end encrypted session between the client device and the first server device. The determination of the session key is described in more detail below in conjunction with FIG. 5.
  • At block 404, the server-side TMD detects a criterion upon which to replace the first server device as an endpoint in an end-to-end connection associated with the end-to-end encrypted session. In one embodiment this detection criteria may include detecting a type of data requested by the client device. Additionally or alternatively the criteria may include a periodic schedule, a system upgrade of the server device, a request by an administrator, or the like.
  • At block 406, the server-side TMD replaces the first server device with a second server device as an endpoint in the encrypted connection. In one embodiment, the server-side TMD utilizes a renegotiation of the encrypted connection to establish the second server device as an endpoint. The replacement of the server device with the second server device is described in more detail below in conjunction with FIG. 6.
  • At block 408, the server-side TMD may read, intercept, delay, augment, delete, prune, compress, enhance, accelerate, transpose, or otherwise modify data sent over the encrypted connection. In one embodiment, the server-side TMD may work in conjunction with a client-side TMD to further enhance data transmitted over the encrypted connection. The enhancement of data transmitted over the encrypted connection is described in more detail below in conjunction with FIG. 7. The process then terminates at a return block.
  • FIG. 5 illustrates a logical flow diagram generally showing one embodiment of a process for generating a session key associated with an end-to-end encrypted session. In one embodiment, process 500 may be implemented by server-side TMD 110.
  • Process 500 begins, after a start block, at block 502, by receiving a private key associated with the first server device. In one embodiment, the first server device may comprise one of server devices 112-115 illustrated in FIG. 1. In one embodiment, the private key of the first server device may be provided by a system administrator. Additionally or alternatively, the private key may be provided by a local domain controller, LDAP server, or the second network device itself.
  • At block 504, a first set of handshake messages associated with an encrypted session are intercepted. In one embodiment, the creation of the encrypted session may be initiated by a client device, such as one of client devices 102-104. In one embodiment, the first set of handshake messages includes a “CLIENT HELLO” message sent by the client device toward a first server device. After being intercepted and stored, the “CLIENT HELLO” message may be forwarded on to the first server. In one embodiment, by storing the intercepted handshake messages such as the “CLIENT HELLO” message, the server-side TMD is enabled to perform the actions described herein at any time throughout the lifetime of the corresponding encrypted session.
  • In response to the “CLIENT HELLO”, the first server device may send a “SERVER HELLO” message, a “SERVER CERTIFICATE” message enabling the client device to identify the first server device, a “SERVER KEY EXCHANGE” message including the first server device's public key, a “CERTIFICATE REQUEST” message requesting that the client send its certificate enabling the server device to identify the client device, and a “SERVER HELLO DONE” message, all of which may be intercepted and stored in a first set of handshake messages, and forwarded on to the client device.
  • In response to the “SERVER HELLO DONE” message, the client device may in one embodiment transmit a “CLIENT KEY EXCHANGE” message, including a random number (e.g. a nonce) generated by the client device and encrypted with the first server device's public key. In one embodiment, the “CLIENT KEY EXCHANGE” message may be intercepted, stored in the first set of handshake messages, and forwarded on to the first server device. Additionally or alternatively, the first set of handshake messages may include any additional messages exchanged between the client device and the first server device while establishing the encrypted session, for example a “CERTIFICATE” message containing the client device's certificate enabling the server device to identify the client device. In one embodiment, upon completion of this exchange of handshake messages, the client device and the first server device have established an end-to-end encrypted session.
  • Processing next continues to block 506, where secret data is extracted from the intercepted first set of handshake messages. In one embodiment, the received private key of the first server device may be used to extract secret data by decrypt the payload of the “CLIENT KEY EXCHANGE”, including a random number generated by the client device and encrypted with the public key of the first server device. Additionally or alternatively, the server-side TMD extracts the “pre-master secret.”
  • Processing next continues to block 508 where, in one embodiment, the decrypted random number is used in combination with one or more other random numbers exchanged between the client device and the first server device to generate a session key. In one embodiment, the session key may be a “master secret”. In one embodiment, the session key is combined with one or more other random numbers exchanged during the encrypted session handshake to generate connection keys. The connection keys may be used to encrypt and decrypt data transmitted over the encrypted connection.
  • In one embodiment, the client device and the first server device also independently calculate the session key based on the exchanged handshake messages. In one embodiment, the client device and the first server device also independently calculate the connection keys. In some embodiments, the server-side TMD may calculate the session key based on information in the intercepted handshake messages. Alternatively, instead of independently calculating the session key, the server-side TMD may receive the session key and/or connection key(s) from one of the first server, the client, another network device, or a system administrator.
  • Regardless of how the connection keys are generated or obtained, the connection keys enable encrypted data transmitted between the client device and the first server device to be decrypted. In one embodiment, the server-side TMD may decrypt the data using the connection keys, and then may augment, delete, enhance, or otherwise modify the decrypted data. In one embodiment, the server-side TMD may re-encrypt the modified data using the connection keys, and transmit the modified data to the other of the client device and the first server device. The process then terminates at a return block.
  • FIG. 6 illustrates a logical flow diagram generally showing one embodiment of a process for replacing an endpoint in an end-to-end encrypted connection with a second server device. In one embodiment, process 600 may be implemented by server-side TMD 110.
  • Process 600 begins, after a start block, at block 602, where in one embodiment server-side TMD transmits a renegotiation request to the client device over the end-to-end encrypted connection. In one embodiment, the server-side TMD transmits the renegotiation request message in response to extracting an HTTP header sent by either the client device or the first server device, and determining the HTTP header includes a request for content located on the second server device. Server-side TMD 110 may direct a request for a resource to a particular server device based on network traffic, network topology, capacity of a server device, content requested, and a host of other traffic distribution mechanisms. Also, sever-side TMD 110 may recognize packets that are part of the same communication, flow, and/or stream and may perform special processing on such packets, such as directing them to the same server device.
  • In one embodiment, the server-side TMD requests or otherwise initiates renegotiation by originating and transmitting an “SSL HELLO REQUEST” to the client device over the end-to-end encrypted connection. In one embodiment, the server-side TMD utilizes encrypted connection renegotiation to replace the first server device with one or more second server devices as an endpoint of the end-to-end encrypted connection. As discussed above, the client (or server) device may in one embodiment not know that a different server (or client) device has become the endpoint. In this way, the function of the server-side TMD may be transparent to the client (or server) device.
  • Processing next continues to block 604, where the server-side TMD intercepts a second set of handshake messages sent in response to the “SSL HELLO REQUEST”. In one embodiment, the second set of handshake messages are encrypted using connection key and transmitted by the client device over the end-to-end encrypted connection. In one embodiment the second set of handshake messages are addressed to the first server device.
  • Processing next continues to block 606, where the server-side TMD decrypts the second set of handshake message using the connection key.
  • Processing next continues to block 608, where the server-side TMD redirects the decrypted second set of handshake messages to the second server device, thereby enabling the second server device to become an endpoint in the end-to-end encrypted connection. In one embodiment, by directing the second set of handshake messages to the second server device, the requests made by the client device over the end-to-end encrypted connection may be re-distributed by the server-side TMD to more than one server device. In one embodiment, the existing connection that had been established between the server-side TMD and the first server device is gracefully terminated by the server-side TMD. Alternatively, the existing connection between the server-side TMD and the first server device may be cached, pooled, or otherwise maintained for future use.
  • Additionally or alternatively, instead of establishing the second server device as an endpoint, the server-side TMD may utilize encrypted connection renegotiation to make itself an endpoint of the encrypted connection. In this embodiment, the server-side TMD may act as an encrypted connection accelerator: receiving encrypted content from the client device, decrypting the received content, forwarding the decrypted content to a server device for processing, and encrypting the server device's response. In such instances, the TMD may communicate with the first server device in the clear or establish another connection with the first server device. In another embodiment, the server-side TMD may generate encrypted content itself, rather than forwarding content from another server, such as a cached data or generated data. In another embodiment, a client-side TMD may similarly utilize encrypted connection renegotiation to make itself an endpoint of the encrypted connection, act as an encrypted connection accelerator, generate content such as cached data, and the like. Additionally or alternatively, the server-side TMD may ignore the ensuing renegotiation between the client device and the first server device, such that the server-side TMD ceases to decrypt and modify content sent over the end-to-end encrypted connection. Instead, the server-side TMD may route data sent over the renegotiated encrypted connection to the first server device as it would any other network connection. In some embodiments, a client-side TMD may also utilize encrypted connection renegotiation to ignore an ensuing renegotiation, “stepping out” of the encrypted connection.
  • Additionally or alternatively, the server-side TMD may terminate an encrypted connection to a client device and another encrypted connection to a server device. The server-side TMD may convert this pair of encrypted connections into a single end-to-end encrypted connection between the client device and the server device. In one embodiment, the server-side TMD may perform such a conversion by utilizing encrypted connection renegotiation and handshake message forwarding between the client device and the server device. In such an embodiment, the TMD may then perform any of the operations described herein on data transmitted over the end-to-end encrypted connection.
  • Processing next continues to block 610, where the private key of the second server device is received by the server-side TMD. Additionally or alternatively, the server-side TMD may receive the private key of the second server device before transmitting the renegotiation request. In one embodiment, the server-side TMD receives the private key of the second server device in any of the manners discussed above with regard to receiving the private key of the first server device.
  • Processing next continues to block 612, where the private key of the second server device is used to extract secret data from the second set of handshake messages. In one embodiment, the server-side TMD extracts secret data from the second set of handshake messages in a manner similar to the extraction of secret data from the first set of handshake messages, as discussed above with respect to block 506.
  • Processing next continues to block 614, where the server-side TMD generates a second session key based at least on the secret data extracted from the second set of handshake messages. In one embodiment, the second session key is generated in a manner similar to the generation of the first session key, as discussed above with respect to block 508. In one embodiment, the generated second session key is utilized to create a second set of connection keys, defining an end-to-end encrypted connection between the client device and the second server device.
  • Processing next continues to block 616, where a message sent over the end-to-end encrypted connection of the re-negotiated end-to-end encrypted session is intercepted and processed by the server-side TMD. In one embodiment, the intercepted message is transmitted by the client device and is addressed to the first server device, as the client device may be unaware that the second network device is now the other endpoint of the renegotiated end-to-end encrypted session. Additionally or alternatively, the second server device may transmit a message that is intercepted and processed by server-side TMD. In either case, server-side TMD may perform additional processing, optionally in conjunction with a client-side TMD and/or third party content provider 118, to augment, delete, prune, enhance, delay, accelerate, or otherwise modify the intercepted message. For example, an advertisement or other content may be provided by third party content provider 118, which may then be embedded in data transmitted between the second server device and the client device.
  • Processing next continues to block 618, where in the embodiment in which the sever-side TMD intercepts a message transmitted by the client device and addressed to the first server device, the server-side TMD redirects the intercepted message to the second server device. The process then terminates at a return block
  • In one embodiment, the process illustrated in FIG. 6 enables an existing end-to-end encrypted connection to be handed off to a new server device, while from the perspective of the client device, the identity of the server is unchanged. In one embodiment, renegotiation happens within the existing encrypted session tunnel.
  • FIG. 7 illustrates a logical flow diagram generally showing one embodiment of a process for enhancing data transmitted between a client-side TMD and a server-side TMD over the encrypted connection. In one embodiment, process 700 may be implemented by server-side TMD 110.
  • Process 700 begins, after a start block, at block 702, where the server-side TMD 110 transmits the second set of connection keys to a client-side TMD 106. In one embodiment, the second set of connection keys may be transmitted over the end-to-end encrypted session. Alternatively, the second set of connection keys may be transmitted over a separate encrypted session/connection, such as secure tunnel (B).
  • Processing next continues to block 704, where the client-side TMD 106, in one embodiment, intercepts encrypted data sent from the client device over the end-to-end encrypted connection. In one embodiment, typically when the client device is unaware that the second server device is now the endpoint of the end-to-end encrypted connection, the encrypted data sent by the client device may be addressed to the first server device. Additionally or alternatively, when the client device is aware that the second server device 701 is now the endpoint of the end-to-end encrypted connection, the encrypted data sent by the client device may be addressed to the second server device 701.
  • Processing next continues to block 706, where the client-side TMD 106, in one embodiment, decrypts the intercepted data using the received second set of connection keys.
  • Processing next continues to block 708, where the client-side TMD 106, in one embodiment, processes the decrypted data. In one embodiment, the decrypted data may be augmented, deleted, compressed, accelerated, or otherwise modified.
  • Processing next continues to block 710, where the client-side TMD 106, in one embodiment, re-encrypts the processed data using the second set of connection keys, and transmits the re-encrypted processed data towards the second server device 701. In this embodiment, processing continues at block 712.
  • Additionally or alternatively, the client-side TMD 106 may explicitly be working in conjunction with server-side TMD 110 to transmit data between the client device and the second server device 701. In this case, the client-side TMD 106 may transmit the processed data to the server-side TMD 110 using a separate tunnel, such as secure tunnel (B) through network 108. In this embodiment, the secure tunnel (B) may utilize an encrypted connection separate and apart from the end-to-end encrypted connection. In other words, client-side TMD 106 may communicate with server-side TMD 110 using a separate set of connection keys to encrypt the processed data, or another type of encryption entirely. Upon receiving the data transmitted through secure tunnel (B), the server-side TMD 110 typically decrypts and performs further processing on the decrypted data. For example, if the client-side TMD 106 compressed the processed data to reduce transmission time, the server-side TMD 110 typically may decompress the data, and optionally perform additional processing as discussed in conjunction with block 712 and throughout this disclosure. Then, processing continues at block 714.
  • In one embodiment, the client-side TMD 106 and the server-side TMD 110 may utilize two levels of encryption—the encryption used for the end-to-end encrypted connection established between the client device and the second server device 701, and additionally the encryption used by secure tunnel (B). This embodiment provides two layers of security for data transmitted over public networks, such as the internet, enhancing security of the transmitted data.
  • Processing next continues to block 712, where the server-side TMD 110 intercepts the processed data sent by the client-side TMD 106. In one embodiment, the server-side TMD 110 decrypts the intercepted data using the second set of connection keys.
  • In one embodiment, server-side TMD 110 performs further processing on the intercepted and decrypted data. In one embodiment, server-side TMD 110 augments, deletes, decompresses, or otherwise modifies the intercepted and decrypted data.
  • Processing next continues to block 714, where the server-side TMD 110 encrypts the further processed data using the second set of connection keys, and transmits the re-encrypted data to the second server device 701. In one embodiment, regardless of whether data was intercepted, decrypted, modified, re-encrypted, forwarded, or the like, the end-to-end encrypted connection (e.g. a connection contained in secure session (A) as shown in FIG. 1) remains intact from the perspective of the client device and the second server device 701.
  • Processing next continues to block 716, where the second server device 701 receives, decrypts, and processes the data transmitted by the server-side TMD 110. The process then terminates at a return block
  • FIG. 8 illustrates a signal flow diagram generally showing one embodiment of the process of FIGS. 4-6.
  • Process 800 begins at 802 by the client device transmitting a “CLIENT HELLO” handshake message as discussed above with respect to block 504. Processing continues to 804, where the server-side TMD 110 intercepts and forwards handshake messages as also discussed above with respect to block 504. Processing continues to 806, where the first server receives the “CLIENT HELLO” handshake message, among others, as discussed above with respect to block 504.
  • Processing continues to 808 and 812, where other handshake messages are exchanged between the client device and the first server device, as discussed above with respect to block 504.
  • Processing continues to 810, where secret data, such as a random number generated by the client device and encrypted by the client device with the public key of the first server device, is extracted from the other handshake messages by the server-side TMD 110 using the private key of the first server device, as discussed above with respect to block 508.
  • Processing optionally continues to 813, where secret data, such as the secret data generated in 810, is received by client-side TMD 106. In one embodiment, this secret data may be used to generate a connection key. Additionally or alternatively, a connection key may be received by client-side TMD 106. In one embodiment, either the secret data or the connection key may be transmitted to client-side TMD 106 by server-side TMD 110. Once client-side TMD 106 has received or generated the connection key, client-side TMD 106 is enabled to intercept and enhance encrypted data as it is transmitted over the connection.
  • Processing continues to 814, where a renegotiation request is transmitted by the server-side TMD 110 to the client device, as discussed above with respect to block 602.
  • Processing continues to 816 and 820, where in response to receiving the renegotiation request, the client device begins to exchange a second set of handshake messages, as discussed above with respect to block 412.
  • Processing continues to 818, where the server-side TMD 110 intercepts, decrypts, and redirects the second set of handshake messages towards the second server, as discussed above with respect to blocks 804 and 806.
  • Processing continues to 822, where the server-side TMD 110 transmits the second set of connection keys to the client-side TMD 106, as discussed above with regard to FIG. 7.
  • Processing continues to 824 and 826, where the end-to-end connection initially established between the client device and the first server device has been altered as a result of the requested renegotiation, resulting in the encrypted connection being re-established between the client device and the second server device.
  • Securely Transferring Session Credentials from a Client-Side Traffic Management Device to a Server-Side TMD
  • FIG. 9 illustrates a logical flow diagram showing one embodiment of a process for securely distributing session credentials from a client-side TMD to a server-side TMD. In some embodiments, process 900 may be implemented as an application, program, software module or the like that executes within mass memory of the TMD, for example encrypted session manager 252 of FIG. 2.
  • Process 900 begins after a start block at decision block 902 where it is determined whether an end-to-end encrypted session has been established between a client device and a server device. In one embodiment, such an end-to-end encrypted session includes a client-side TMD and a first server-side TMD interposed between the client device and the server device, and which are enabled to intercept, decrypt, and modify encrypted data transmitted over encrypted connections associated with the encrypted session. In one embodiment, upon establishment of an end-to-end encrypted session, the first server-side TMD and the client-side TMD will have acquired secret data necessary to decrypt encrypted data transferred over encrypted connections associated with the encrypted session. Thus, in one embodiment, detecting if an end-to-end encrypted session has been established includes detecting if the client-side TMD has a copy of the secret data. How an end-to-end encrypted session is established is discussed in more detail above, particularly in conjunction with FIGS. 5 and 7. If an end-to-end encrypted session has been established, then the process 900 proceeds to block 904. However, if an end-to-end encrypted session has not been established, then the process 900 proceeds back the start block.
  • At block 904, in one embodiment, the first server-side TMD is replaced with a second server-side TMD. The first server-side TMD may be replaced with the second server-side TMD for any number of reasons, including planned scheduled maintenance, a software or hardware error resulting in a crash, a power failure, or the like. In one embodiment the second server-side TMD may be a designated backup TMD serving as a failover. Additionally or alternatively the second server-side TMD may be selected from a pool, or may be provided on demand. In one embodiment, the second server-side TMD may not have a copy of the secret data, particularly the session key, necessary to generate encrypted connection keys for decrypting data transmitted over encrypted connections associated with the encrypted session. In this way, the second server-side TMD may be unable to participate in the end-to-end encrypted session other than as a pass-through.
  • At block 906, in one embodiment, a request to initiate an encrypted connection associated with the end-to-end encrypted session is received from the client device at the client-side TMD. In another embodiment, a request to initiate an encrypted connection associated with the end-to-end encrypted session is received at the second server-side TMD from the server device. For the sake of simplifying the discussion, the embodiment in which the request to initiate the encrypted connection is received from the client device at the client-side TMD will be discussed, however the same techniques apply equally when the server device initiates the encrypted connection. In one embodiment, initiating an encrypted connection associated with the end-to-end encrypted session includes initiating an abridged handshake between the client device and the server device.
  • At block 908, in one embodiment, client-side TMD intercepts the abridged handshake. In one embodiment, upon intercepting the abridged handshake, the client-side TMD retrieves a network address associated with the first server-side TMD. In one embodiment the network address is an IP address, although a MAC address or any other type of network address is similarly contemplated. In one embodiment, the client-side TMD may retrieve the network address from memory. Additionally or alternatively, the client-side TMD may utilize a web service, a database, a configuration file, or the like to retrieve the network address. However, as the first server-side TMD has been replaced with the second server-side TMD, the network address associated with the first server-side TMD now points to the second server-side TMD. Thus, the client-side TMD is not aware of the true identity of the network device pointed to by the retrieved network address, or whether the network device has a copy of the session key.
  • At decision block 910, in one embodiment, the client-side TMD sends a message to the second server-side TMD to determine if the second server-side TMD has the session key associated with the end-to-end encrypted session. If the second server-side TMD responds affirmatively, then process 900 proceeds to block 916, where it is determined that the end-to-end encrypted session has been restored, before proceeding to a return block. However, if the second server-side TMD responds indicating it does not have the session key, then the process flows to block 912.
  • At block 912, in one embodiment, the client-side TMD transmits a hash of the server certificate to the second server-side TMD. Additionally or alternatively, the client-side TMD encrypts the cryptographic primitives used to establish the encrypted session using the server device's public key, and transmits them to the second server-side TMD. In one embodiment, the cryptographic primitives include the client and server random numbers (nonces), and the pre-master secret. In one embodiment, the cryptographic primitives enable the second server-side TMD to generate the session key, and thus any subsequent connection keys. Thus, if the second server-side TMD has a copy of the server device's private key, the second server-side TMD is enabled to decrypt the encrypted cryptographic credentials, generate the session key, and participate in the end-to-end encrypted session. By following this protocol, reliability of the encrypted session is enhanced, as the replacement of the first server-side TMD with the second server-side TMD can occur without requiring negotiation of a new encrypted session. Moreover, this distribution of session credentials from the client-side TMD to the server-side TMD is secure in that the private key used by the first server-side TMD generate the session key is the same private key that the second server-side TMD must have in order to access the encrypted cryptographic credentials received from the client-side TMD.
  • At decision block 914, in one embodiment, if the second server-side TMD has the private key of the server device, then the process 900 flows to block 916 where the second server-side TMD generates the session key necessary to restore the end-to-end encrypted session, upon which the process 900 flows to a return block. However, if the second server-side TMD does not have the necessary private key, then the process 900 proceeds to block 918 where the second server-side TMD may in one embodiment be used as a pass-through device, after which the process 900 flows to the return block.
  • FIG. 10 illustrates a logical flow diagram showing one embodiment of a process for securely distributing session credentials from a client-side TMD to a server-side TMD. In some embodiments, process 1000 may be implemented as an application, program, software module or the like that executes within mass memory of the TMD, for example encrypted session manager 252 of FIG. 2.
  • Process 1000 begins after a start block at block 1002 where in one embodiment a request to initiate an encrypted connection sent from a server device is intercepted by a second server-side TMD. In one embodiment the request to initiate the encrypted connection is associated with an encrypted session previously established between a client device and the server device, wherein a client-side TMD and a first server-side TMD were interposed between the client device and the server device, and wherein the client-side TMD and the first server-side TMD had access to a session key associated with the encrypted session. In one embodiment the first server-side TMD generated the session key as discussed above in conjunction with FIGS. 5 and 7. In one embodiment, the second server-side TMD does not have a copy of the session key associated with the established encrypted session.
  • At block 1004, in one embodiment, the second server-side TMD transmits a request to the client-side TMD for copies of cryptographic primitives associated with the established encrypted session. In one embodiment, the cryptographic primitives may include a client random number, a server random number, and a pre-master secret. In one embodiment, the cryptographic primitives enable the second server-side TMD to generate a copy of the session key associated with the established encrypted session.
  • At block 1006, in one embodiment, the second server-side TMD receives the requested set of cryptographic primitives from the client-side TMD. In one embodiment, the received set of cryptographic primitives are encrypted, however the received set of cryptographic primitives may alternatively be unencrypted. In one embodiment, the received set of cryptographic primitives are encrypted using the public key of the server device, although any other means of encryption known to the client-side TMD and the second server-side TMD may be used. Additionally or alternatively, the client-side TMD and the second server-side TMD may communicate over an encrypted session/connection distinct from form the established encrypted session, such as secure tunnel (B).
  • At block 1008, in one embodiment, the second server-side TMD decrypts the encrypted set of cryptographic primitives using the server device's private key. However, as other encryption methods are contemplated, the second server-side TMD may decrypt the encrypted cryptographic primitives using the corresponding decryption method. Once the second server-side TMD has access to the set of cryptographic primitives, the second server-side TMD may in one embodiment generate the session key associated with the established encrypted session. In one embodiment, the session key may be generated using the same techniques a network device party to the initiation of an encrypted session uses.
  • At block 1010, in one embodiment, the second server-side TMD generates a connection key based on the generated session key. In one embodiment the connection key is a symmetric key usable to decrypt and/or encrypt data transmitted over the encrypted connection, as discussed herein. However, the connection key also may include an asymmetric key pair such as a public/private key pair. In one embodiment, the generated connection key is associated with the encrypted connection requested by the server device. Process 1000 then flows to a return block.
  • It will be understood that figures, and combinations of steps in the flowchart-like illustrations, can be implemented by computer program instructions. These program instructions may be provided to a processor to produce a machine, such that the instructions, which execute on the processor, create means for implementing the actions specified in the flowchart block or blocks.
  • The computer program instructions may be executed by a processor to cause a series of operational steps to be performed by the processor to produce a computer implemented process such that the instructions, which execute on the processor to provide steps for implementing the actions specified in the flowchart block or blocks. These program instructions may be stored on a computer readable medium or machine readable medium, such as a computer readable storage medium.
  • Accordingly, the illustrations support combinations of means for performing the specified actions, combinations of steps for performing the specified actions and program instruction means for performing the specified actions. It will also be understood that each block of the flowchart illustration, and combinations of blocks in the flowchart illustration, can be implemented by modules such as special purpose hardware-based systems which perform the specified actions or steps, or combinations of special purpose hardware and computer instructions.
  • The above specification, examples, and data provide a complete description of the manufacture and use of the composition of the described embodiments. Since many embodiments can be made without departing from the spirit and scope of this description, the embodiments reside in the claims hereinafter appended.

Claims (1)

What is claimed as new and desired to be protected by Letters Patent of the United States is:
1. A traffic management device (TMD) for managing network traffic between a client device and a server device, comprising:
a transceiver to send and receive data over a network; and
a processor, in communication with the transceiver, that performs actions, including:
intercepting a request to initiate an encrypted connection associated with an established encrypted session, wherein the established encrypted session includes a client device and a first server-side TMD in communication with the TMD, and wherein the first server-side TMD is in communication with a server device;
encrypting a set of cryptographic primitives associated with the established encrypted session using a public key associated with the server device; and
transmitting the encrypted set of cryptographic primitives to a second server-side TMD, wherein the second server-side TMD replaces the first server-side TMD and the second server-side TMD is enabled to decrypt data associated with the encrypted session.
US15/356,471 2010-03-19 2016-11-18 Secure distribution of session credentials from client-side to server-side traffic management devices Abandoned US20170142100A1 (en)

Priority Applications (3)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
US31585710P true 2010-03-19 2010-03-19
US12/967,006 US9509663B2 (en) 2010-03-19 2010-12-13 Secure distribution of session credentials from client-side to server-side traffic management devices
US15/356,471 US20170142100A1 (en) 2010-03-19 2016-11-18 Secure distribution of session credentials from client-side to server-side traffic management devices

Applications Claiming Priority (1)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
US15/356,471 US20170142100A1 (en) 2010-03-19 2016-11-18 Secure distribution of session credentials from client-side to server-side traffic management devices

Related Parent Applications (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
US12/967,006 Continuation US9509663B2 (en) 2010-03-19 2010-12-13 Secure distribution of session credentials from client-side to server-side traffic management devices

Publications (1)

Publication Number Publication Date
US20170142100A1 true US20170142100A1 (en) 2017-05-18

Family

ID=44603286

Family Applications (10)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
US12/846,778 Active 2031-09-02 US8700892B2 (en) 2010-03-19 2010-07-29 Proxy SSL authentication in split SSL for client-side proxy agent resources with content insertion
US12/848,096 Expired - Fee Related US9210131B2 (en) 2010-03-19 2010-07-30 Aggressive rehandshakes on unknown session identifiers for split SSL
US12/967,006 Active US9509663B2 (en) 2010-03-19 2010-12-13 Secure distribution of session credentials from client-side to server-side traffic management devices
US13/052,005 Expired - Fee Related US9100370B2 (en) 2010-03-19 2011-03-18 Strong SSL proxy authentication with forced SSL renegotiation against a target server
US13/051,963 Expired - Fee Related US9166955B2 (en) 2010-03-19 2011-03-18 Proxy SSL handoff via mid-stream renegotiation
US13/051,994 Active 2031-08-25 US9172682B2 (en) 2010-03-19 2011-03-18 Local authentication in proxy SSL tunnels using a client-side proxy agent
US13/779,530 Active US9178706B1 (en) 2010-03-19 2013-02-27 Proxy SSL authentication in split SSL for client-side proxy agent resources with content insertion
US14/851,783 Active US9667601B2 (en) 2010-03-19 2015-09-11 Proxy SSL handoff via mid-stream renegotiation
US14/856,127 Active US9705852B2 (en) 2010-03-19 2015-09-16 Proxy SSL authentication in split SSL for client-side proxy agent resources with content insertion
US15/356,471 Abandoned US20170142100A1 (en) 2010-03-19 2016-11-18 Secure distribution of session credentials from client-side to server-side traffic management devices

Family Applications Before (9)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
US12/846,778 Active 2031-09-02 US8700892B2 (en) 2010-03-19 2010-07-29 Proxy SSL authentication in split SSL for client-side proxy agent resources with content insertion
US12/848,096 Expired - Fee Related US9210131B2 (en) 2010-03-19 2010-07-30 Aggressive rehandshakes on unknown session identifiers for split SSL
US12/967,006 Active US9509663B2 (en) 2010-03-19 2010-12-13 Secure distribution of session credentials from client-side to server-side traffic management devices
US13/052,005 Expired - Fee Related US9100370B2 (en) 2010-03-19 2011-03-18 Strong SSL proxy authentication with forced SSL renegotiation against a target server
US13/051,963 Expired - Fee Related US9166955B2 (en) 2010-03-19 2011-03-18 Proxy SSL handoff via mid-stream renegotiation
US13/051,994 Active 2031-08-25 US9172682B2 (en) 2010-03-19 2011-03-18 Local authentication in proxy SSL tunnels using a client-side proxy agent
US13/779,530 Active US9178706B1 (en) 2010-03-19 2013-02-27 Proxy SSL authentication in split SSL for client-side proxy agent resources with content insertion
US14/851,783 Active US9667601B2 (en) 2010-03-19 2015-09-11 Proxy SSL handoff via mid-stream renegotiation
US14/856,127 Active US9705852B2 (en) 2010-03-19 2015-09-16 Proxy SSL authentication in split SSL for client-side proxy agent resources with content insertion

Country Status (6)

Country Link
US (10) US8700892B2 (en)
EP (1) EP2548332A4 (en)
JP (1) JP5744172B2 (en)
CN (2) CN102195878B (en)
HK (1) HK1161787A1 (en)
WO (1) WO2011116342A2 (en)

Cited By (3)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US20140245359A1 (en) * 2011-06-01 2014-08-28 Interdigital Patent Holdings, Inc. Content Delivery Network Interconnection (CDNI) Mechanism
US10652224B2 (en) 2017-12-05 2020-05-12 International Business Machines Corporation Stateless session synchronization between secure communication interceptors
US10681085B2 (en) 2017-10-16 2020-06-09 International Business Machines Corporation Quick transport layer security/secure sockets layer connection for internet of things devices

Families Citing this family (158)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US8166547B2 (en) 2005-09-06 2012-04-24 Fortinet, Inc. Method, apparatus, signals, and medium for managing a transfer of data in a data network
US8782393B1 (en) 2006-03-23 2014-07-15 F5 Networks, Inc. Accessing SSL connection data by a third-party
US8510560B1 (en) 2008-08-20 2013-08-13 Marvell International Ltd. Efficient key establishment for wireless networks
CN102160035A (en) 2008-09-18 2011-08-17 马维尔国际贸易有限公司 Preloading applications onto memory at least partially during boot up
US8700892B2 (en) 2010-03-19 2014-04-15 F5 Networks, Inc. Proxy SSL authentication in split SSL for client-side proxy agent resources with content insertion
US20120030475A1 (en) * 2010-08-02 2012-02-02 Ma Felix Kuo-We Machine-machine authentication method and human-machine authentication method for cloud computing
FR2966669B1 (en) * 2010-10-21 2013-07-05 Ipanema Technologies Method of optimizing the transfer of secure data streams via an autonomous network
US9544770B2 (en) 2010-12-01 2017-01-10 Microsoft Technology Licensing, Llc User authentication in a mobile environment
US9998545B2 (en) * 2011-04-02 2018-06-12 Open Invention Network, Llc System and method for improved handshake protocol
US8743885B2 (en) 2011-05-03 2014-06-03 Cisco Technology, Inc. Mobile service routing in a network environment
US8694782B2 (en) * 2011-05-04 2014-04-08 Marvell World Trade Ltd. Wireless authentication using beacon messages
US9049025B1 (en) * 2011-06-20 2015-06-02 Cellco Partnership Method of decrypting encrypted information for unsecure phone
CN102868665B (en) * 2011-07-05 2016-07-27 华为软件技术有限公司 The method of data transmission and device
US8914635B2 (en) * 2011-07-25 2014-12-16 Grey Heron Technologies, Llc Method and system for establishing secure communications using composite key cryptography
US9015469B2 (en) 2011-07-28 2015-04-21 Cloudflare, Inc. Supporting secure sessions in a cloud-based proxy service
US10362019B2 (en) 2011-07-29 2019-07-23 Amazon Technologies, Inc. Managing security credentials
US8856910B1 (en) * 2011-08-31 2014-10-07 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Detecting encrypted tunneling traffic
US9264432B1 (en) 2011-09-22 2016-02-16 F5 Networks, Inc. Automatic proxy device configuration
US9294452B1 (en) * 2011-12-09 2016-03-22 Rightquestion, Llc Authentication translation
WO2013089728A1 (en) 2011-12-15 2013-06-20 Intel Corporation Method, device, and system for securely sharing media content from a source device
EP3518458A1 (en) * 2011-12-15 2019-07-31 INTEL Corporation Method and device for secure communications over a network using a hardware security engine
US9531691B2 (en) * 2011-12-16 2016-12-27 Akamai Technologies, Inc. Providing forward secrecy in a terminating TLS connection proxy
US9647835B2 (en) * 2011-12-16 2017-05-09 Akamai Technologies, Inc. Terminating SSL connections without locally-accessible private keys
WO2013103897A1 (en) * 2012-01-05 2013-07-11 Adept Cloud, Inc. System and method for decentralized online data transfer and synchronization
US8914629B2 (en) 2012-01-30 2014-12-16 The Nielsen Company (Us), Llc Intercepting encrypted network traffic for internet usage monitoring
US8863250B2 (en) 2012-02-01 2014-10-14 Amazon Technologies, Inc. Logout from multiple network sites
DE112013000649B4 (en) * 2012-02-21 2020-11-19 International Business Machines Corporation Network node with a stateless security offload device attached to the network
US9167006B1 (en) 2012-02-21 2015-10-20 F5 Networks, Inc. Connection bucketing in mirroring asymmetric clustered multiprocessor systems
US9059853B1 (en) * 2012-02-22 2015-06-16 Rockwell Collins, Inc. System and method for preventing a computing device from obtaining unauthorized access to a secure network or trusted computing environment
US9537899B2 (en) 2012-02-29 2017-01-03 Microsoft Technology Licensing, Llc Dynamic selection of security protocol
US8898314B2 (en) * 2012-03-21 2014-11-25 Verizon Patent And Licensing Inc. Direct communication between applications in a cloud computing environment
CN110012460A (en) * 2012-03-31 2019-07-12 英特尔公司 Use the secure communication of physical access
US9348927B2 (en) 2012-05-07 2016-05-24 Smart Security Systems Llc Systems and methods for detecting, identifying and categorizing intermediate nodes
JP5295408B1 (en) * 2012-05-13 2013-09-18 淳也 榎本 Secure communication method, operated device, and operation program
US8843738B2 (en) * 2012-05-14 2014-09-23 Sierra Wireless, Inc. TLS abbreviated session identifier protocol
US10778659B2 (en) 2012-05-24 2020-09-15 Smart Security Systems Llc System and method for protecting communications
US9325676B2 (en) 2012-05-24 2016-04-26 Ip Ghoster, Inc. Systems and methods for protecting communications between nodes
US9344405B1 (en) * 2012-06-15 2016-05-17 Massachusetts Institute Of Technology Optimized transport layer security
US8862882B2 (en) * 2012-06-29 2014-10-14 Intel Corporation Systems and methods for authenticating devices by adding secure features to Wi-Fi tags
WO2014040292A1 (en) * 2012-09-17 2014-03-20 华为技术有限公司 Protection method and device against attacks
EP3119059B1 (en) 2012-10-24 2019-05-01 CyberArk Software Ltd. A system and method for secure proxy-based authentication
US9712563B2 (en) 2014-07-07 2017-07-18 Cyber-Ark Software Ltd. Connection-specific communication management
US9680813B2 (en) * 2012-10-24 2017-06-13 Cyber-Ark Software Ltd. User provisioning
KR20140052703A (en) * 2012-10-25 2014-05-07 삼성전자주식회사 Method and apparatus for accelerating web service using a proxy server
US9277017B2 (en) 2012-10-30 2016-03-01 Netiq Corporation Techniques for device independent session migration
US9219762B2 (en) * 2012-10-30 2015-12-22 Netiq Corporation Techniques for desktop migration
WO2014071564A1 (en) * 2012-11-07 2014-05-15 Nokia Corporation Proxy connection method and apparatus
US8856515B2 (en) 2012-11-08 2014-10-07 Intel Corporation Implementation of robust and secure content protection in a system-on-a-chip apparatus
JP6172546B2 (en) 2012-12-28 2017-08-02 ▲ホア▼▲ウェイ▼技術有限公司Huawei Technologies Co.,Ltd. Traffic steering method, device, and system
US9575768B1 (en) 2013-01-08 2017-02-21 Marvell International Ltd. Loading boot code from multiple memories
US8874761B2 (en) 2013-01-25 2014-10-28 Seven Networks, Inc. Signaling optimization in a wireless network for traffic utilizing proprietary and non-proprietary protocols
US9026783B2 (en) * 2013-03-07 2015-05-05 Google Inc. Low latency server-side redirection of UDP-based transport protocols traversing a client-side NAT firewall
US8782774B1 (en) 2013-03-07 2014-07-15 Cloudflare, Inc. Secure session capability using public-key cryptography without access to the private key
US9516102B2 (en) * 2013-03-07 2016-12-06 F5 Networks, Inc. Server to client reverse persistence
US9043593B2 (en) * 2013-03-11 2015-05-26 International Business Machines Corporation Session attribute propagation through secure database server tiers
US9794379B2 (en) 2013-04-26 2017-10-17 Cisco Technology, Inc. High-efficiency service chaining with agentless service nodes
US9137218B2 (en) * 2013-05-03 2015-09-15 Akamai Technologies, Inc. Splicing into an active TLS session without a certificate or private key
US9736801B1 (en) 2013-05-20 2017-08-15 Marvell International Ltd. Methods and apparatus for synchronizing devices in a wireless data communication system
US9521635B1 (en) 2013-05-21 2016-12-13 Marvell International Ltd. Methods and apparatus for selecting a device to perform shared functionality in a deterministic and fair manner in a wireless data communication system
US9300629B1 (en) * 2013-05-31 2016-03-29 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Password constraint enforcement used in external site authentication
WO2014201186A1 (en) * 2013-06-11 2014-12-18 Seven Networks, Inc. Application and/or server stability in signaling optimization in a wireless network for traffic utilizing proprietary and non-proprietary protocols
US9602540B1 (en) 2013-06-13 2017-03-21 Amazon Technologies, Inc. Enforcing restrictions on third-party accounts
US9225704B1 (en) 2013-06-13 2015-12-29 Amazon Technologies, Inc. Unified management of third-party accounts
US9531704B2 (en) * 2013-06-25 2016-12-27 Google Inc. Efficient network layer for IPv6 protocol
WO2015013645A1 (en) * 2013-07-25 2015-01-29 Convida Wireless, Llc End-to-end m2m service layer sessions
US9836306B2 (en) 2013-07-31 2017-12-05 Marvell World Trade Ltd. Parallelizing boot operations
US9491157B1 (en) 2013-09-27 2016-11-08 F5 Networks, Inc. SSL secured NTLM acceleration
US9225516B1 (en) * 2013-10-03 2015-12-29 Whatsapp Inc. Combined authentication and encryption
CN105637802B (en) * 2013-10-16 2019-09-06 日本电信电话株式会社 Key device, key cloud system, decryption method and program
US10069811B2 (en) * 2013-10-17 2018-09-04 Arm Ip Limited Registry apparatus, agent device, application providing apparatus and corresponding methods
EP3058692B1 (en) * 2013-10-17 2019-08-21 Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson (publ) Authentication of wireless device entity
US20150120943A1 (en) * 2013-10-29 2015-04-30 Homersoft Sp. Zo.O. Secure mobile access to resources within a private network
US10475018B1 (en) 2013-11-29 2019-11-12 Amazon Technologies, Inc. Updating account data for multiple account providers
CN103618726A (en) * 2013-12-04 2014-03-05 北京中创信测科技股份有限公司 Method for recognizing mobile data service based on HTTPS
US10037514B2 (en) * 2013-12-19 2018-07-31 Centurylink Intellectual Property Llc Ubiquitous in-cloud microsite generator for high speed data customer intake and activation
WO2015116768A2 (en) 2014-01-29 2015-08-06 Sipn, Llc Systems and methods for protecting communications
US10116731B2 (en) * 2014-03-13 2018-10-30 Oncam Global, Inc. Method and systems for providing data to a remote site
US9344337B2 (en) 2014-03-13 2016-05-17 Cisco Technology, Inc. Service node originated service chains in a network environment
US9426176B2 (en) 2014-03-21 2016-08-23 Cisco Technology, Inc. Method, system, and logic for in-band exchange of meta-information
US9184911B2 (en) * 2014-04-08 2015-11-10 Cloudflare, Inc. Secure session capability using public-key cryptography without access to the private key
US8966267B1 (en) 2014-04-08 2015-02-24 Cloudflare, Inc. Secure session capability using public-key cryptography without access to the private key
US8996873B1 (en) 2014-04-08 2015-03-31 Cloudflare, Inc. Secure session capability using public-key cryptography without access to the private key
US9479443B2 (en) 2014-05-16 2016-10-25 Cisco Technology, Inc. System and method for transporting information to services in a network environment
US9379931B2 (en) 2014-05-16 2016-06-28 Cisco Technology, Inc. System and method for transporting information to services in a network environment
CN105207972B (en) * 2014-06-17 2018-03-30 腾讯科技(深圳)有限公司 The data processing method and device of channel
KR101670496B1 (en) * 2014-08-27 2016-10-28 주식회사 파수닷컴 Data management method, Computer program for the same, Recording medium storing computer program for the same, and User Client for the same
GB2530028A (en) 2014-09-08 2016-03-16 Advanced Risc Mach Ltd Registry apparatus, agent device, application providing apparatus and corresponding methods
CN104301333A (en) * 2014-11-05 2015-01-21 中国科学技术大学 Non-blocking type handshake implementation method and system
US10417025B2 (en) 2014-11-18 2019-09-17 Cisco Technology, Inc. System and method to chain distributed applications in a network environment
US9660909B2 (en) 2014-12-11 2017-05-23 Cisco Technology, Inc. Network service header metadata for load balancing
USRE48131E1 (en) 2014-12-11 2020-07-28 Cisco Technology, Inc. Metadata augmentation in a service function chain
CN104580190B (en) * 2014-12-30 2018-09-04 北京奇虎科技有限公司 The implementation method and secure browser device of secure browser
CN107113174B (en) * 2015-01-16 2020-04-21 株式会社自动网络技术研究所 Communication system and comparison method
US20160241667A1 (en) * 2015-02-18 2016-08-18 Actmobile Networks, Inc. Extended http object cache system and method
US9871772B1 (en) 2015-03-17 2018-01-16 The Charles Stark Draper Laboratory, Inc. Cryptographic system for secure command and control of remotely controlled devices
US9614816B2 (en) * 2015-03-23 2017-04-04 Oracle International Corporation Dynamic encryption for tunneled real-time communications
US9660969B2 (en) 2015-03-31 2017-05-23 Here Global B.V. Method and apparatus for providing key management for data encryption for cloud-based big data environments
US10834065B1 (en) * 2015-03-31 2020-11-10 F5 Networks, Inc. Methods for SSL protected NTLM re-authentication and devices thereof
CN107534554B (en) * 2015-04-30 2021-01-08 日本电信电话株式会社 Data transmitting and receiving method and system
US10205598B2 (en) * 2015-05-03 2019-02-12 Ronald Francis Sulpizio, JR. Temporal key generation and PKI gateway
US20170026414A1 (en) * 2015-05-07 2017-01-26 Saguna Networks Ltd. Methods Circuits Devices Systems and Functionally Associated Computer Executable Code for Managing a Data Access Network
US9774572B2 (en) * 2015-05-11 2017-09-26 Salesforce.Com, Inc. Obfuscation of references to network resources
US9762402B2 (en) 2015-05-20 2017-09-12 Cisco Technology, Inc. System and method to facilitate the assignment of service functions for service chains in a network environment
US9967236B1 (en) 2015-07-31 2018-05-08 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Credentials enforcement using a firewall
US10051001B1 (en) 2015-07-31 2018-08-14 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Efficient and secure user credential store for credentials enforcement using a firewall
US9450944B1 (en) * 2015-10-14 2016-09-20 FullArmor Corporation System and method for pass-through authentication
US9762563B2 (en) 2015-10-14 2017-09-12 FullArmor Corporation Resource access system and method
US9992238B2 (en) * 2015-11-11 2018-06-05 International Business Machines Corporation Proxy based data transfer utilizing direct memory access
US20170163607A1 (en) * 2015-12-03 2017-06-08 Microsoft Technology Licensing, Llc Establishing a Communication Event Using Secure Signalling
US10505984B2 (en) * 2015-12-08 2019-12-10 A10 Networks, Inc. Exchange of control information between secure socket layer gateways
US10469594B2 (en) * 2015-12-08 2019-11-05 A10 Networks, Inc. Implementation of secure socket layer intercept
US10305871B2 (en) 2015-12-09 2019-05-28 Cloudflare, Inc. Dynamically serving digital certificates based on secure session properties
US10187475B2 (en) * 2015-12-31 2019-01-22 Hughes Network Systems, Llc Method and system for automatically bypassing network proxies in the presence of interdependent traffic flows
US10277562B1 (en) * 2016-01-12 2019-04-30 Symantec Corporation Controlling encrypted traffic flows using out-of-path analysis devices
GB2546340A (en) * 2016-01-18 2017-07-19 Isis Innovation Improving security protocols
US10250637B2 (en) * 2016-01-29 2019-04-02 Citrix Systems, Inc. System and method of pre-establishing SSL session connections for faster SSL connection establishment
KR101847636B1 (en) * 2016-03-14 2018-04-10 주식회사 수산아이앤티 Method and apprapatus for watching encrypted traffic
US10187306B2 (en) 2016-03-24 2019-01-22 Cisco Technology, Inc. System and method for improved service chaining
US10931793B2 (en) 2016-04-26 2021-02-23 Cisco Technology, Inc. System and method for automated rendering of service chaining
US10264079B2 (en) 2016-05-18 2019-04-16 Cisco Technology, Inc. Fastpath web sessions with HTTP header modification by redirecting clients
US10116634B2 (en) * 2016-06-28 2018-10-30 A10 Networks, Inc. Intercepting secure session upon receipt of untrusted certificate
US10250596B2 (en) * 2016-06-29 2019-04-02 International Business Machines Corporation Monitoring encrypted communication sessions
US10419550B2 (en) 2016-07-06 2019-09-17 Cisco Technology, Inc. Automatic service function validation in a virtual network environment
US10291405B2 (en) * 2016-07-15 2019-05-14 International Business Machines Corporation Seamless abort and reinstatement of TLS sessions
US10320664B2 (en) 2016-07-21 2019-06-11 Cisco Technology, Inc. Cloud overlay for operations administration and management
US10218616B2 (en) 2016-07-21 2019-02-26 Cisco Technology, Inc. Link selection for communication with a service function cluster
US10225270B2 (en) 2016-08-02 2019-03-05 Cisco Technology, Inc. Steering of cloned traffic in a service function chain
US10218593B2 (en) 2016-08-23 2019-02-26 Cisco Technology, Inc. Identifying sources of packet drops in a service function chain environment
US10361969B2 (en) 2016-08-30 2019-07-23 Cisco Technology, Inc. System and method for managing chained services in a network environment
CN106302507A (en) * 2016-08-31 2017-01-04 北京盛世光明软件股份有限公司 A kind of method based on SSL network data analytic technique
CN106453259A (en) * 2016-09-13 2017-02-22 广州善融信息科技有限公司 Internet finance safety link realization method based on block chaining encryption technology
US10382562B2 (en) * 2016-11-04 2019-08-13 A10 Networks, Inc. Verification of server certificates using hash codes
US10225187B2 (en) 2017-03-22 2019-03-05 Cisco Technology, Inc. System and method for providing a bit indexed service chain
US10554684B2 (en) * 2017-03-29 2020-02-04 Juniper Networks, Inc. Content-based optimization and pre-fetching mechanism for security analysis on a network device
US10511629B2 (en) 2017-04-07 2019-12-17 Fujitsu Limited Encryption control in optical networks without data loss
US10469459B2 (en) 2017-04-07 2019-11-05 Fujitsu Limited Use of optical transport network overhead data for encryption
US10511582B2 (en) * 2017-04-07 2019-12-17 Fujitsu Limited Simplified encryption key generation in optical networks
US10257033B2 (en) 2017-04-12 2019-04-09 Cisco Technology, Inc. Virtualized network functions and service chaining in serverless computing infrastructure
US10884807B2 (en) 2017-04-12 2021-01-05 Cisco Technology, Inc. Serverless computing and task scheduling
US10333855B2 (en) 2017-04-19 2019-06-25 Cisco Technology, Inc. Latency reduction in service function paths
US10554689B2 (en) 2017-04-28 2020-02-04 Cisco Technology, Inc. Secure communication session resumption in a service function chain
US20180357432A1 (en) * 2017-06-07 2018-12-13 Combined Conditional Access Development & Support, LLC Determining a Session Key Using Session Data
US10735275B2 (en) 2017-06-16 2020-08-04 Cisco Technology, Inc. Releasing and retaining resources for use in a NFV environment
US10798187B2 (en) 2017-06-19 2020-10-06 Cisco Technology, Inc. Secure service chaining
US10645183B2 (en) * 2017-06-26 2020-05-05 Microsoft Technology Licensing, Llc Redirection of client requests to multiple endpoints
US10397271B2 (en) 2017-07-11 2019-08-27 Cisco Technology, Inc. Distributed denial of service mitigation for web conferencing
US10673698B2 (en) 2017-07-21 2020-06-02 Cisco Technology, Inc. Service function chain optimization using live testing
US10791065B2 (en) 2017-09-19 2020-09-29 Cisco Technology, Inc. Systems and methods for providing container attributes as part of OAM techniques
US10666430B2 (en) * 2017-09-29 2020-05-26 Intel Corporation System and techniques for encrypting chip-to-chip communication links
US10841096B2 (en) * 2017-10-03 2020-11-17 Salesforce.Com, Inc. Encrypted self-identification using a proxy server
US10541893B2 (en) 2017-10-25 2020-01-21 Cisco Technology, Inc. System and method for obtaining micro-service telemetry data
US20190335520A1 (en) * 2018-04-27 2019-10-31 Nokia Solutions And Networks Oy Traffic steering for stateless packets over multipath networks
US10666612B2 (en) 2018-06-06 2020-05-26 Cisco Technology, Inc. Service chains for inter-cloud traffic
US10887289B2 (en) 2018-08-21 2021-01-05 Fujitsu Limited Encryption in optical transport networks using multiple randomly selected keys
US20200236104A1 (en) * 2019-01-23 2020-07-23 Mcafee, Llc Methods and apparatus to verify encrypted handshakes
US20200287881A1 (en) * 2019-03-08 2020-09-10 Gigamon Inc. Correlating network flows through a proxy device
US10693872B1 (en) * 2019-05-17 2020-06-23 Q5ID, Inc. Identity verification system
US10903990B1 (en) 2020-03-11 2021-01-26 Cloudflare, Inc. Establishing a cryptographic tunnel between a first tunnel endpoint and a second tunnel endpoint where a private key used during the tunnel establishment is remotely located from the second tunnel endpoint

Family Cites Families (216)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US5412730A (en) 1989-10-06 1995-05-02 Telequip Corporation Encrypted data transmission system employing means for randomly altering the encryption keys
US5319638A (en) 1991-09-12 1994-06-07 Bell Communications Research, Inc. Link-by-link congestion control for packet transmission systems
JP2966198B2 (en) * 1992-06-04 1999-10-25 信越化学工業株式会社 Polymer scale adhesion inhibitor, polymerization vessel for preventing adhesion of polymer scale, and method for producing polymer using the same
US5267314A (en) 1992-11-17 1993-11-30 Leon Stambler Secure transaction system and method utilized therein
US5657390A (en) 1995-08-25 1997-08-12 Netscape Communications Corporation Secure socket layer application program apparatus and method
US6703757B2 (en) 1995-09-13 2004-03-09 Delta Electronics Inc. Motor structure having low profile
US6724893B1 (en) 1996-10-11 2004-04-20 The United States Of America As Represented By The National Security Agency Method of passing a cryptographic key that allows third party access to the key
US5991881A (en) 1996-11-08 1999-11-23 Harris Corporation Network surveillance system
US6104716A (en) 1997-03-28 2000-08-15 International Business Machines Corporation Method and apparatus for lightweight secure communication tunneling over the internet
US6212636B1 (en) 1997-05-01 2001-04-03 Itt Manufacturing Enterprises Method for establishing trust in a computer network via association
US6061454A (en) 1997-06-27 2000-05-09 International Business Machines Corp. System, method, and computer program for communicating a key recovery block to enable third party monitoring without modification to the intended receiver
US7117358B2 (en) 1997-07-24 2006-10-03 Tumbleweed Communications Corp. Method and system for filtering communication
US6094485A (en) 1997-09-18 2000-07-25 Netscape Communications Corporation SSL step-up
US5974143A (en) 1997-09-30 1999-10-26 Intel Corporation Virus-resistent mechanism for transaction verification to confirming user
US6052785A (en) 1997-11-21 2000-04-18 International Business Machines Corporation Multiple remote data access security mechanism for multitiered internet computer networks
US6134584A (en) 1997-11-21 2000-10-17 International Business Machines Corporation Method for accessing and retrieving information from a source maintained by a network server
US6084969A (en) 1997-12-31 2000-07-04 V-One Corporation Key encryption system and method, pager unit, and pager proxy for a two-way alphanumeric pager network
US7584505B2 (en) 2001-10-16 2009-09-01 Microsoft Corporation Inspected secure communication protocol
US6681327B1 (en) 1998-04-02 2004-01-20 Intel Corporation Method and system for managing secure client-server transactions
US6175869B1 (en) 1998-04-08 2001-01-16 Lucent Technologies Inc. Client-side techniques for web server allocation
US6105067A (en) 1998-06-05 2000-08-15 International Business Machines Corp. Connection pool management for backend servers using common interface
US6223287B1 (en) 1998-07-24 2001-04-24 International Business Machines Corporation Method for establishing a secured communication channel over the internet
CA2287813C (en) 1998-10-22 2005-03-29 At&T Corp. System and method for network load balancing
US6799270B1 (en) 1998-10-30 2004-09-28 Citrix Systems, Inc. System and method for secure distribution of digital information to a chain of computer system nodes in a network
US6367009B1 (en) 1998-12-17 2002-04-02 International Business Machines Corporation Extending SSL to a multi-tier environment using delegation of authentication and authority
US7430757B1 (en) 1999-01-08 2008-09-30 International Business Machines Corporation Oblivious proxying using a secure coprocessor
US7904951B1 (en) 1999-03-16 2011-03-08 Novell, Inc. Techniques for securely accelerating external domains locally
US7249377B1 (en) 1999-03-31 2007-07-24 International Business Machines Corporation Method for client delegation of security to a proxy
US6526131B1 (en) 1999-04-30 2003-02-25 Hewlett-Packard Company Initiation of communication between network service system and customer-premises equipment
US6718388B1 (en) 1999-05-18 2004-04-06 Jp Morgan Chase Bank Secured session sequencing proxy system and method therefor
TW425821B (en) 1999-05-31 2001-03-11 Ind Tech Res Inst Key management method
US7146505B1 (en) 1999-06-01 2006-12-05 America Online, Inc. Secure data exchange between date processing systems
US7142676B1 (en) * 1999-06-08 2006-11-28 Entrust Limited Method and apparatus for secure communications using third-party key provider
US6584567B1 (en) 1999-06-30 2003-06-24 International Business Machines Corporation Dynamic connection to multiple origin servers in a transcoding proxy
US6374300B2 (en) 1999-07-15 2002-04-16 F5 Networks, Inc. Method and system for storing load balancing information with an HTTP cookie
US6567857B1 (en) 1999-07-29 2003-05-20 Sun Microsystems, Inc. Method and apparatus for dynamic proxy insertion in network traffic flow
US6751677B1 (en) 1999-08-24 2004-06-15 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. Method and apparatus for allowing a secure and transparent communication between a user device and servers of a data access network system via a firewall and a gateway
US6772333B1 (en) 1999-09-01 2004-08-03 Dickens Coal Llc Atomic session-start operation combining clear-text and encrypted sessions to provide id visibility to middleware such as load-balancers
US6732269B1 (en) 1999-10-01 2004-05-04 International Business Machines Corporation Methods, systems and computer program products for enhanced security identity utilizing an SSL proxy
US6728884B1 (en) 1999-10-01 2004-04-27 Entrust, Inc. Integrating heterogeneous authentication and authorization mechanisms into an application access control system
US6643701B1 (en) 1999-11-17 2003-11-04 Sun Microsystems, Inc. Method and apparatus for providing secure communication with a relay in a network
US6704798B1 (en) 2000-02-08 2004-03-09 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. Explicit server control of transcoding representation conversion at a proxy or client location
US8291007B2 (en) 2000-02-22 2012-10-16 Flash Networks Ltd System and method to accelerate client/server interactions using predictive requests
US6918041B1 (en) 2000-02-23 2005-07-12 Microsoft Corporation System and method of network communication with client-forced authentication
US7343413B2 (en) 2000-03-21 2008-03-11 F5 Networks, Inc. Method and system for optimizing a network by independently scaling control segments and data flow
US6674717B1 (en) 2000-03-30 2004-01-06 Network Physics, Inc. Method for reducing packet loss and increasing internet flow by feedback control
US6742044B1 (en) 2000-05-10 2004-05-25 Cisco Technology, Inc. Distributed network traffic load balancing technique implemented without gateway router
JP3730480B2 (en) 2000-05-23 2006-01-05 株式会社東芝 Gateway device
US20020035681A1 (en) 2000-07-31 2002-03-21 Guillermo Maturana Strategy for handling long SSL messages
DE10037500A1 (en) 2000-08-01 2002-02-28 Deutsche Telekom Ag Method for key agreement for a cryptographically secured point-to-multipoint connection
US7228350B2 (en) 2000-08-04 2007-06-05 Avaya Technology Corp. Intelligent demand driven recognition of URL objects in connection oriented transactions
US7137143B2 (en) 2000-08-07 2006-11-14 Ingrian Systems Inc. Method and system for caching secure web content
US20040015725A1 (en) 2000-08-07 2004-01-22 Dan Boneh Client-side inspection and processing of secure content
US7266613B1 (en) 2000-08-09 2007-09-04 Microsoft Corporation Fast dynamic measurement of bandwidth in a TCP network environment
US7370015B2 (en) 2000-10-12 2008-05-06 Sap Portals Israel Ltd. User impersonation by a proxy server
US20020069241A1 (en) 2000-12-06 2002-06-06 Girija Narlikar Method and apparatus for client-side proxy selection
US7254237B1 (en) 2001-01-12 2007-08-07 Slt Logic, Llc System and method for establishing a secure connection
US7360075B2 (en) 2001-02-12 2008-04-15 Aventail Corporation, A Wholly Owned Subsidiary Of Sonicwall, Inc. Method and apparatus for providing secure streaming data transmission facilities using unreliable protocols
US7383329B2 (en) 2001-02-13 2008-06-03 Aventail, Llc Distributed cache for state transfer operations
US20020116732A1 (en) * 2001-02-13 2002-08-22 Leandro Christmann Microinjection assembly and methods for microinjecting and reimplanting avian eggs
US7370351B1 (en) 2001-03-22 2008-05-06 Novell, Inc. Cross domain authentication and security services using proxies for HTTP access
US7322040B1 (en) 2001-03-27 2008-01-22 Microsoft Corporation Authentication architecture
GB2374497B (en) 2001-04-03 2003-03-12 Ericsson Telefon Ab L M Facilitating legal interception of IP connections
US7017049B2 (en) 2001-04-12 2006-03-21 International Business Machines Corporation Method and system providing secure socket layer session sharing between network based servers and a client
US7200679B2 (en) 2001-04-13 2007-04-03 Telefonaktiebolaget Lm Ericsson (Publ) Creating distributed proxy configurations
US6996841B2 (en) 2001-04-19 2006-02-07 Microsoft Corporation Negotiating secure connections through a proxy server
US6839761B2 (en) 2001-04-19 2005-01-04 Microsoft Corporation Methods and systems for authentication through multiple proxy servers that require different authentication data
US6914886B2 (en) 2001-05-03 2005-07-05 Radware Ltd. Controlling traffic on links between autonomous systems
US7516485B1 (en) 2001-05-29 2009-04-07 Nortel Networks Limited Method and apparatus for securely transmitting encrypted data through a firewall and for monitoring user traffic
US20020199098A1 (en) 2001-06-08 2002-12-26 Davis John M. Non-invasive SSL payload processing for IP packet using streaming SSL parsing
US20050198379A1 (en) 2001-06-13 2005-09-08 Citrix Systems, Inc. Automatically reconnecting a client across reliable and persistent communication sessions
US7243370B2 (en) 2001-06-14 2007-07-10 Microsoft Corporation Method and system for integrating security mechanisms into session initiation protocol request messages for client-proxy authentication
US7853781B2 (en) 2001-07-06 2010-12-14 Juniper Networks, Inc. Load balancing secure sockets layer accelerator
US7149892B2 (en) 2001-07-06 2006-12-12 Juniper Networks, Inc. Secure sockets layer proxy architecture
US7073066B1 (en) 2001-08-28 2006-07-04 3Com Corporation Offloading cryptographic processing from an access point to an access point server using Otway-Rees key distribution
JP2003110576A (en) 2001-09-26 2003-04-11 Toshiba Corp Wireless network system, managing method for wireless network, and computer runnable managing program for wireless network
US7010608B2 (en) 2001-09-28 2006-03-07 Intel Corporation System and method for remotely accessing a home server while preserving end-to-end security
US8601566B2 (en) 2001-10-23 2013-12-03 Intel Corporation Mechanism supporting wired and wireless methods for client and server side authentication
US8020201B2 (en) 2001-10-23 2011-09-13 Intel Corporation Selecting a security format conversion for wired and wireless devices
US7769690B2 (en) 2001-11-06 2010-08-03 International Business Machines Corporation Method and system for the supply of data, transactions and electronic voting
US7574496B2 (en) 2001-11-30 2009-08-11 Surgient, Inc. Virtual server cloud interfacing
US7043632B2 (en) 2001-12-12 2006-05-09 Nortel Networks Limited End-to-end security in data networks
US7093121B2 (en) 2002-01-10 2006-08-15 Mcafee, Inc. Transferring data via a secure network connection
NO318842B1 (en) 2002-03-18 2005-05-09 Telenor Asa Authentication and access control
CN1653779B (en) 2002-03-20 2010-09-29 捷讯研究有限公司 System and method for supporting multiple certificate status providers on a mobile communication device
AU2003237094A1 (en) 2002-04-12 2003-10-27 Karbon Systems, Llc System and method for secure wireless communications using pki
US7082535B1 (en) 2002-04-17 2006-07-25 Cisco Technology, Inc. System and method of controlling access by a wireless client to a network that utilizes a challenge/handshake authentication protocol
US7240366B2 (en) 2002-05-17 2007-07-03 Microsoft Corporation End-to-end authentication of session initiation protocol messages using certificates
US7007163B2 (en) 2002-05-31 2006-02-28 Broadcom Corporation Methods and apparatus for accelerating secure session processing
US7219120B2 (en) 2002-07-09 2007-05-15 Savvis Communications Corporation Systems, methods and protocols for securing data in transit over networks
US7430755B1 (en) 2002-09-03 2008-09-30 Fs Networks, Inc. Method and system for providing persistence in a secure network access
US7343398B1 (en) 2002-09-04 2008-03-11 Packeteer, Inc. Methods, apparatuses and systems for transparently intermediating network traffic over connection-based authentication protocols
AU2003284204A1 (en) 2002-10-15 2004-05-04 Ingrian Networks, Inc. Client-side ssl connection completion through secure proxy server
US7516491B1 (en) 2002-10-17 2009-04-07 Roger Schlafly License tracking system
US7630305B2 (en) 2003-07-29 2009-12-08 Orbital Data Corporation TCP selective acknowledgements for communicating delivered and missed data packets
US7120666B2 (en) 2002-10-30 2006-10-10 Riverbed Technology, Inc. Transaction accelerator for client-server communication systems
US8176186B2 (en) 2002-10-30 2012-05-08 Riverbed Technology, Inc. Transaction accelerator for client-server communications systems
US7698453B2 (en) 2003-07-29 2010-04-13 Oribital Data Corporation Early generation of acknowledgements for flow control
US8233392B2 (en) 2003-07-29 2012-07-31 Citrix Systems, Inc. Transaction boundary detection for reduction in timeout penalties
US7574738B2 (en) 2002-11-06 2009-08-11 At&T Intellectual Property Ii, L.P. Virtual private network crossovers based on certificates
US7454785B2 (en) 2002-12-19 2008-11-18 Avocent Huntsville Corporation Proxy method and system for secure wireless administration of managed entities
US7506368B1 (en) 2003-02-13 2009-03-17 Cisco Technology, Inc. Methods and apparatus for network communications via a transparent security proxy
US7430557B1 (en) 2003-03-19 2008-09-30 Unisys Corporation System and method for improving database reorganization time
US8069225B2 (en) 2003-04-14 2011-11-29 Riverbed Technology, Inc. Transparent client-server transaction accelerator
US7318100B2 (en) 2003-04-14 2008-01-08 Riverbed Technology, Inc. Cooperative proxy auto-discovery and connection interception
US7644275B2 (en) 2003-04-15 2010-01-05 Microsoft Corporation Pass-thru for client authentication
US7206846B1 (en) 2003-04-29 2007-04-17 Cisco Technology, Inc. Method and apparatus for adaptively coupling processing components in a distributed system
WO2005001660A2 (en) 2003-06-25 2005-01-06 Anonymizer, Inc. Secure network privacy system using proxy server
US7472285B2 (en) * 2003-06-25 2008-12-30 Intel Corporation Apparatus and method for memory encryption with reduced decryption latency
US20050001660A1 (en) 2003-06-26 2005-01-06 Amit Roy Power-on reset circuit
US7496755B2 (en) 2003-07-01 2009-02-24 International Business Machines Corporation Method and system for a single-sign-on operation providing grid access and network access
WO2005004418A1 (en) 2003-07-04 2005-01-13 Nippon Telegraph And Telephone Corporation Remote access vpn mediation method and mediation device
KR100523357B1 (en) 2003-07-09 2005-10-25 한국전자통신연구원 Key management device and method for providing security service in epon
US7472413B1 (en) * 2003-08-11 2008-12-30 F5 Networks, Inc. Security for WAP servers
US7650416B2 (en) * 2003-08-12 2010-01-19 Riverbed Technology Content delivery for client-server protocols with user affinities using connection end-point proxies
US7769994B2 (en) 2003-08-13 2010-08-03 Radware Ltd. Content inspection in secure networks
US20050081026A1 (en) 2003-08-15 2005-04-14 Imcentric, Inc. Software product for installing SSL certificates to SSL-enablable devices
US8321512B2 (en) 2003-08-22 2012-11-27 Geobytes, Inc. Method and software product for identifying unsolicited emails
US20050050316A1 (en) 2003-08-25 2005-03-03 Amir Peles Passive SSL decryption
US7117333B2 (en) * 2003-08-25 2006-10-03 International Business Machines Corporation Apparatus, system, and method to estimate memory for recovering data
US20050080428A1 (en) * 2003-09-03 2005-04-14 White Ralph Richard Extracapsular surgical procedure for repair of anterior cruciate ligament rupture and surgical referencing instrument therefor
US20050086342A1 (en) 2003-09-19 2005-04-21 Andrew Burt Techniques for client-transparent TCP migration
US7328686B2 (en) * 2003-09-23 2008-02-12 Ford Global Technologies Llc System and method to control cylinder activation and deactivation
US7590840B2 (en) 2003-09-26 2009-09-15 Randy Langer Method and system for authorizing client devices to receive secured data streams
US20050203849A1 (en) * 2003-10-09 2005-09-15 Bruce Benson Multimedia distribution system and method
US7584500B2 (en) 2003-11-19 2009-09-01 Hughes Network Systems, Llc Pre-fetching secure content using proxy architecture
US7890751B1 (en) 2003-12-03 2011-02-15 Comtech Ef Data Corp Method and system for increasing data access in a secure socket layer network environment
WO2005060202A1 (en) 2003-12-10 2005-06-30 International Business Machines Corporation Method and system for analysing and filtering https traffic in corporate networks
US7665126B2 (en) 2003-12-17 2010-02-16 Microsoft Corporation Mesh networks with exclusion capability
US7523314B2 (en) 2003-12-22 2009-04-21 Voltage Security, Inc. Identity-based-encryption message management system
US20050160161A1 (en) 2003-12-29 2005-07-21 Nokia, Inc. System and method for managing a proxy request over a secure network using inherited security attributes
AU2005203856B2 (en) 2004-01-09 2009-07-30 Paypal Israel Ltd. Detecting relayed communications
US20050187979A1 (en) 2004-02-09 2005-08-25 Microsoft Corporation System and method for message-level connection management
US7293034B2 (en) 2004-02-23 2007-11-06 Microsoft Coporation Dynamically customizing a user interface for the aggregation of content
US8116776B1 (en) * 2004-03-23 2012-02-14 Cisco Technology, Inc. Mobile communication handoff between heterogeneous networks
US7380129B2 (en) 2004-04-22 2008-05-27 International Business Machines Corporation Method and apparatus for detecting grid intrusions
US20060036755A1 (en) 2004-05-07 2006-02-16 Abdullah Ibrahim S Meta-protocol
US7506369B2 (en) 2004-05-27 2009-03-17 Microsoft Corporation Secure federation of data communications networks
US20050265235A1 (en) 2004-05-27 2005-12-01 International Business Machines Corporation Method, computer program product, and data processing system for improving transaction-oriented client-server application performance
US8136149B2 (en) 2004-06-07 2012-03-13 Check Point Software Technologies, Inc. Security system with methodology providing verified secured individual end points
US20050273650A1 (en) 2004-06-07 2005-12-08 Tsou Henry H Systems and methods for backing up computer data to disk medium
JP4339184B2 (en) * 2004-06-07 2009-10-07 パナソニック株式会社 Server apparatus, communication device, communication system, communication method, program, and recording medium
US7543146B1 (en) 2004-06-18 2009-06-02 Blue Coat Systems, Inc. Using digital certificates to request client consent prior to decrypting SSL communications
US7506164B2 (en) 2004-08-09 2009-03-17 Research In Motion Limited Automated key management system and method
KR100588211B1 (en) * 2004-09-07 2006-06-08 엘지이노텍 주식회사 Optical disc turn table structure
US20060075114A1 (en) 2004-09-30 2006-04-06 Citrix Systems, Inc. In-line modification of protocol handshake by protocol aware proxy
KR20060062356A (en) 2004-12-03 2006-06-12 엘지노텔 주식회사 Apparatus and method for processing of ssl proxy on ggsn
US7742406B1 (en) * 2004-12-20 2010-06-22 Packeteer, Inc. Coordinated environment for classification and control of network traffic
US7627896B2 (en) 2004-12-24 2009-12-01 Check Point Software Technologies, Inc. Security system providing methodology for cooperative enforcement of security policies during SSL sessions
US8943310B2 (en) 2005-01-25 2015-01-27 Cisco Technology, Inc. System and method for obtaining a digital certificate for an endpoint
US7661131B1 (en) 2005-02-03 2010-02-09 Sun Microsystems, Inc. Authentication of tunneled connections
US7958347B1 (en) 2005-02-04 2011-06-07 F5 Networks, Inc. Methods and apparatus for implementing authentication
US9118717B2 (en) 2005-02-18 2015-08-25 Cisco Technology, Inc. Delayed network protocol proxy for packet inspection in a network
US20070180227A1 (en) * 2005-03-01 2007-08-02 Matsushita Electric Works, Ltd. Decryption apparatus for use in encrypted communications
US8533473B2 (en) 2005-03-04 2013-09-10 Oracle America, Inc. Method and apparatus for reducing bandwidth usage in secure transactions
US7853699B2 (en) 2005-03-15 2010-12-14 Riverbed Technology, Inc. Rules-based transaction prefetching using connection end-point proxies
US20060248194A1 (en) 2005-03-18 2006-11-02 Riverbed Technology, Inc. Connection forwarding
US8364815B2 (en) 2005-03-18 2013-01-29 Riverbed Technology, Inc. Reliability and availability of distributed servers
US7975140B2 (en) 2005-04-08 2011-07-05 Nortel Networks Limited Key negotiation and management for third party access to a secure communication session
WO2006110021A1 (en) 2005-04-15 2006-10-19 Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. Apparatus and method for triggering session re-negotiation between access network and access terminal in a high rate packet data system
US9436804B2 (en) 2005-04-22 2016-09-06 Microsoft Technology Licensing, Llc Establishing a unique session key using a hardware functionality scan
FI20050491A0 (en) 2005-05-09 2005-05-09 Nokia Corp A system for delivering certificates in a communications system
US8266452B2 (en) 2005-06-01 2012-09-11 Cisco Technology, Inc. System and method for communicating confidential messages
US8478986B2 (en) 2005-08-10 2013-07-02 Riverbed Technology, Inc. Reducing latency of split-terminated secure communication protocol sessions
US20090119504A1 (en) 2005-08-10 2009-05-07 Riverbed Technology, Inc. Intercepting and split-terminating authenticated communication connections
US8438628B2 (en) 2005-08-10 2013-05-07 Riverbed Technology, Inc. Method and apparatus for split-terminating a secure network connection, with client authentication
US8613071B2 (en) * 2005-08-10 2013-12-17 Riverbed Technology, Inc. Split termination for secure communication protocols
US20090083537A1 (en) 2005-08-10 2009-03-26 Riverbed Technology, Inc. Server configuration selection for ssl interception
US20070074282A1 (en) 2005-08-19 2007-03-29 Black Jeffrey T Distributed SSL processing
US20070078986A1 (en) 2005-09-13 2007-04-05 Cisco Technology, Inc. Techniques for reducing session set-up for real-time communications over a network
CA2623120C (en) 2005-10-05 2015-03-24 Byres Security Inc. Network security appliance
US7725927B2 (en) 2005-10-28 2010-05-25 Yahoo! Inc. Low code-footprint security solution
JP4670598B2 (en) 2005-11-04 2011-04-13 日本電気株式会社 Network system, proxy server, session management method, and program
US7904949B2 (en) 2005-12-19 2011-03-08 Quest Software, Inc. Apparatus, systems and methods to provide authentication services to a legacy application
US8316429B2 (en) 2006-01-31 2012-11-20 Blue Coat Systems, Inc. Methods and systems for obtaining URL filtering information
US7650389B2 (en) * 2006-02-01 2010-01-19 Subhashis Mohanty Wireless system and method for managing logical documents
US20070192845A1 (en) 2006-02-07 2007-08-16 Xoom Corporation System and method for passively detecting a proxy
US20070266233A1 (en) 2006-05-12 2007-11-15 Mahesh Jethanandani Method and apparatus to minimize latency by avoiding small tcp segments in a ssl offload environment
GB0612775D0 (en) 2006-06-28 2006-08-09 Ibm An apparatus for securing a communications exchange between computers
US8352728B2 (en) 2006-08-21 2013-01-08 Citrix Systems, Inc. Systems and methods for bulk encryption and decryption of transmitted data
US8095787B2 (en) * 2006-08-21 2012-01-10 Citrix Systems, Inc. Systems and methods for optimizing SSL handshake processing
US8181227B2 (en) 2006-08-29 2012-05-15 Akamai Technologies, Inc. System and method for client-side authenticaton for secure internet communications
US20080101445A1 (en) 2006-08-31 2008-05-01 Stoke,Inc. DSL wake-up
US7886352B2 (en) 2006-09-22 2011-02-08 Oracle International Corporation Interstitial pages
JP2008109404A (en) * 2006-10-25 2008-05-08 Ricoh Co Ltd Information processor, communication method, and program
GB0623101D0 (en) 2006-11-20 2006-12-27 British Telecomm Secure network architecture
US8214635B2 (en) 2006-11-28 2012-07-03 Cisco Technology, Inc. Transparent proxy of encrypted sessions
KR20080048764A (en) 2006-11-29 2008-06-03 삼성전자주식회사 Method and apparatus for signing right object by proxy and issuing proxy-certificate
US7493383B1 (en) 2006-12-29 2009-02-17 F5 Networks, Inc. TCP-over-TCP using multiple TCP streams
US7827405B2 (en) 2007-01-19 2010-11-02 Microsoft Corporation Mechanism for utilizing kerberos features by an NTLM compliant entity
US7647404B2 (en) 2007-01-31 2010-01-12 Edge Technologies, Inc. Method of authentication processing during a single sign on transaction via a content transform proxy service
US7979555B2 (en) 2007-02-27 2011-07-12 ExtraHop Networks,Inc. Capture and resumption of network application sessions
US8190875B2 (en) 2007-03-22 2012-05-29 Cisco Technology, Inc. Reducing processing load in proxies for secure communications
US20100031337A1 (en) 2007-04-09 2010-02-04 Certeon, Inc. Methods and systems for distributed security processing
US8549157B2 (en) 2007-04-23 2013-10-01 Mcafee, Inc. Transparent secure socket layer
US8225085B2 (en) 2007-06-05 2012-07-17 Blue Coat Systems, Inc. System and method for distributed SSL processing between co-operating nodes
US20090073943A1 (en) 2007-08-17 2009-03-19 Qualcomm Incorporated Heterogeneous wireless ad hoc network
WO2009036391A2 (en) 2007-09-12 2009-03-19 Proximetry, Inc. Systems and methods for delivery of wireless data and multimedia content to aircraft
WO2009042919A2 (en) 2007-09-26 2009-04-02 Nicira Networks Network operating system for managing and securing networks
US8650389B1 (en) 2007-09-28 2014-02-11 F5 Networks, Inc. Secure sockets layer protocol handshake mirroring
US8650615B2 (en) 2007-09-28 2014-02-11 Emc Corporation Cross domain delegation by a storage virtualization system
CA2703719C (en) 2007-10-26 2014-07-08 Telcordia Technologies, Inc. Method and system for secure session establishment using identity-based encryption (vdtls)
US20090113537A1 (en) 2007-10-30 2009-04-30 James Woo Proxy authentication server
US8190876B2 (en) 2007-11-19 2012-05-29 Red Hat, Inc. Renegotiating SSL/TLS connections with client certificates on post requests
JP5006941B2 (en) * 2007-12-26 2012-08-22 富士通株式会社 Communication terminal
US8788805B2 (en) 2008-02-29 2014-07-22 Cisco Technology, Inc. Application-level service access to encrypted data streams
EP2308212A4 (en) 2008-07-14 2016-06-22 Riverbed Technology Inc Methods and systems for secure communications using a local certification authority
US8850553B2 (en) 2008-09-12 2014-09-30 Microsoft Corporation Service binding
US20100071046A1 (en) 2008-09-17 2010-03-18 Yahoo! Inc. Method and System for Enabling Access to a Web Service Provider Through Login Based Badges Embedded in a Third Party Site
US8572676B2 (en) 2008-11-06 2013-10-29 Mcafee, Inc. System, method, and device for mediating connections between policy source servers, corporate repositories, and mobile devices
US7984160B2 (en) 2009-03-05 2011-07-19 Riverbed Technology, Inc. Establishing a split-terminated communication connection through a stateful firewall, with network transparency
US8782755B2 (en) * 2009-03-20 2014-07-15 Citrix Systems, Inc. Systems and methods for selecting an authentication virtual server from a plurality of virtual servers
US20100242097A1 (en) 2009-03-20 2010-09-23 Wavemarket, Inc. System and method for managing application program access to a protected resource residing on a mobile device
US9654505B2 (en) 2009-06-22 2017-05-16 Citrix Systems, Inc. Systems and methods for encoding the core identifier in the session identifier
US8700892B2 (en) * 2010-03-19 2014-04-15 F5 Networks, Inc. Proxy SSL authentication in split SSL for client-side proxy agent resources with content insertion
US9338147B1 (en) 2015-04-24 2016-05-10 Extrahop Networks, Inc. Secure communication secret sharing

Cited By (3)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US20140245359A1 (en) * 2011-06-01 2014-08-28 Interdigital Patent Holdings, Inc. Content Delivery Network Interconnection (CDNI) Mechanism
US10681085B2 (en) 2017-10-16 2020-06-09 International Business Machines Corporation Quick transport layer security/secure sockets layer connection for internet of things devices
US10652224B2 (en) 2017-12-05 2020-05-12 International Business Machines Corporation Stateless session synchronization between secure communication interceptors

Also Published As

Publication number Publication date
JP5744172B2 (en) 2015-07-01
US9178706B1 (en) 2015-11-03
US9172682B2 (en) 2015-10-27
US9210131B2 (en) 2015-12-08
US9705852B2 (en) 2017-07-11
WO2011116342A3 (en) 2011-12-22
US20160072811A1 (en) 2016-03-10
WO2011116342A2 (en) 2011-09-22
US9667601B2 (en) 2017-05-30
HK1161787A1 (en) 2012-08-03
US20110231655A1 (en) 2011-09-22
US9166955B2 (en) 2015-10-20
US8700892B2 (en) 2014-04-15
CN202206418U (en) 2012-04-25
US9100370B2 (en) 2015-08-04
US20110231651A1 (en) 2011-09-22
CN102195878A (en) 2011-09-21
JP2013523050A (en) 2013-06-13
US20110231923A1 (en) 2011-09-22
EP2548332A4 (en) 2015-07-15
CN102195878B (en) 2015-07-22
EP2548332A2 (en) 2013-01-23
US20160080328A1 (en) 2016-03-17
US20110231652A1 (en) 2011-09-22
US20110231649A1 (en) 2011-09-22
US9509663B2 (en) 2016-11-29
US20110231653A1 (en) 2011-09-22

Similar Documents

Publication Publication Date Title
US9838362B2 (en) Method and system for sending a message through a secure connection
US10305904B2 (en) Facilitating secure network traffic by an application delivery controller
US10771262B2 (en) Providing forward secrecy in a terminating SSL/TLS connection proxy using ephemeral Diffie-Hellman key exchange
US9749292B2 (en) Selectively performing man in the middle decryption
US10419348B2 (en) Efficient intercept of connection-based transport layer connections
US10630784B2 (en) Facilitating a secure 3 party network session by a network device
US9456002B2 (en) Selective modification of encrypted application layer data in a transparent security gateway
US20180270660A1 (en) Method and system for peer-to-peer enforcement
US9461975B2 (en) Method and system for traffic engineering in secured networks
US20170244681A1 (en) Terminating SSL connections without locally-accessible private keys
US10804976B2 (en) Secure end-to-end transport through intermediary nodes
Hummen et al. Delegation-based Authentication and Authorization for the IP-based Internet of Things
US9917812B2 (en) Inline inspection of security protocols
AU2013266624B2 (en) Multi-tunnel virtual private network
US8838958B2 (en) Systems and methods for bulk encryption and decryption of transmitted data
Brachmann et al. End-to-end transport security in the IP-based internet of things
US8793486B2 (en) Systems and methods for optimizing SSL handshake processing
CN107018134B (en) Power distribution terminal safety access platform and implementation method thereof
US8615654B2 (en) Systems and methods for optimizing SSL handshake processing
US9479534B2 (en) Method, system, and logic for in-band exchange of meta-information
US9210163B1 (en) Method and system for providing persistence in a secure network access
EP1678918B1 (en) A persistent and reliable session securely traversing network components using an encapsulating protocol
US10091170B2 (en) Method and apparatus for distributing encryption and decryption processes between network devices
US7587591B2 (en) Secure transport of multicast traffic
US7028183B2 (en) Enabling secure communication in a clustered or distributed architecture

Legal Events

Date Code Title Description
AS Assignment

Owner name: F5 NETWORKS, INC., WASHINGTON

Free format text: ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNORS INTEREST;ASSIGNORS:BOLLAY, BENN SAPIN;WARREN, JEFFREY MICHAEL;REEL/FRAME:040652/0366

Effective date: 20101207

STPP Information on status: patent application and granting procedure in general

Free format text: NON FINAL ACTION MAILED

STCB Information on status: application discontinuation

Free format text: ABANDONED -- FAILURE TO RESPOND TO AN OFFICE ACTION