US20160255058A1

US20160255058A1 - System and method for policy driven protection of remote computing environments

Info

Publication number: US20160255058A1
Application number: US15/150,000
Authority: US
Inventors: Fred Hewitt Smith; Cynthia Smith; Benjamin Smith; Daniel Sabin
Original assignee: Angel Secure Networks Inc
Current assignee: Angel Secure Networks Inc
Priority date: 2012-07-13
Filing date: 2016-05-09
Publication date: 2016-09-01
Also published as: US9355228B2; US20140020049A1

Abstract

A system that incorporates teachings of the subject disclosure may include, for example, determining examination results based on sensory information obtained from sensors operating in a deployed environment, wherein the sensory information includes a combination of more than one of temperature, position, motion, and mission status. Software agents conduct reviews of examination results based on sensory ranges. Encryption key fragments are generated in response to the reviews of the examination results. The encryption key fragments are combined, to obtain a cryptographic session key. A clear-text version of encrypted sensitive information is obtained via the cryptographic session key responsive to the examination results falling within the sensory ranges. Decryption of the encrypted sensitive information is prevented responsive at least one of the examination results falling outside the sensory ranges. Other embodiments are disclosed.

Description

PRIOR APPLICATIONS

This application claims priority to and is a continuation of U.S. application Ser. No. 13/942,319, filed Jul. 15, 2013.
The present application claims the benefit of priority to U.S. Provisional Application No. 61/671,673, filed on Jul. 13, 2012, entitled “Secure Control Logic for Computing Environments.”
The present application claims the benefit of priority to U.S. Provisional Application No. 61/671,675, filed on Jul. 13, 2012, entitled “Simultaneous Installation of Software on Vehicle and Control Station.”
The present application also claims the benefit of priority to U.S. Provisional Application No. 61/671,676, filed on Jul. 13, 2012, entitled “Audit of Remote Computing Environments.”
All sections of the aforementioned applications are incorporated herein by reference in their entirety.

RELATED APPLICATIONS

U.S. patent application Ser. No. 08/689,767, filed Aug. 13, 1996, by Benjamin H Smith et al., entitled “System for Installing Information Related to a Software Application to a Remote Computer Over a Network,” now U.S. Pat. No. 6,067,582.
U.S. patent application Ser. No. 09/441,403, filed Nov. 16, 1999, by Benjamin H Smith et al., entitled “System for Installing Information Related to a Software Application to a Remote Computer Over a Network,” now U.S. Pat. No. 6,918,038.
U.S. patent application Ser. No. 09/500,883, filed Feb. 9, 2000, by Benjamin H Smith et al., entitled “System for Installing Information Related to a Software Application to a Remote Computer Over a Network,” now U.S. Pat. No. 6,532,543.
U.S. patent application Ser. No. 10/600,738, filed Jun. 20, 2003, by Fred Hewitt Smith et al., entitled “Secure Detection Network System,” now U.S. Pat. No. 7,475,428.
U.S. patent application Ser. No. 12/277,100, filed Nov. 24, 2008, by Fred Hewitt Smith et al., entitled “Secure Detection Network System,” now U.S. Pat. No. 7,930,761.
U.S. patent application Ser. No. 13/088,824, filed Apr. 18, 2011, by Fred Hewitt Smith et al., entitled “Secure Detection Network System.”
U.S. patent application Ser. No. 11/724,879, filed Mar. 15, 2007, by Fred Hewitt Smith, entitled “Secure Panel with Remotely Controlled Embedded Devices,” now U.S. Pat. No. 7,576,653.
U.S. patent application Ser. No. 11/178,527, filed Jul. 11, 2005, by Fred Hewitt Smith, entitled “System and Method for Defending Against Reverse Engineering of Software, Firmware and Hardware,” now U.S. Pat. No. 7,841,009.
U.S. patent application Ser. No. 12/150,373, filed Apr. 28, 2008, by Fred Hewitt Smith, entitled “System and Methods for Defending Against Root,” now U.S. Pat. No. 8,336,107.
U.S. patent application Ser. No. 12/837,540, filed Jul. 16, 2010, by Fred Hewitt Smith, entitled “Protecting Information in an Untethered Asset.”
U.S. patent application Ser. No. 12/596,967, filed May 10, 2010, by Charles T. Hess et al., entitled “Container Security Devices, Systems, and Method.”
U.S. patent application Ser. No. 12/358,132, filed Jan. 22, 2009, by Fred Hewitt Smith, entitled “Container with Interior Enclosure of Composite Material Having Embedded Security Element,” now U.S. Pat. No. 8,344,885.
U.S. patent application Ser. No. 13/410,257, filed Ser. No. 13/410,257, by Fred Hewitt Smith, entitled “Polymorphic Assured Network.”
All sections of the aforementioned applications are incorporated herein by reference in their entirety.

FIELD OF THE DISCLOSURE

The subject disclosure relates to a system and method for policy driven protection of remote computing environments.

BACKGROUND

Remote installation of software is common in the context of commercial computing. For example, it is a routine matter for software and system vendors, such as Microsoft®, Adobe® and Apple® to remotely install updates, sometimes referred to as “patches” for their products running on consumer platforms, such as personal computers, workstations, tablet computers and smart phones. Some devices, such as smart phones routinely recharge their batteries when placed in a cradle, allowing software vendors to install software upgrades while the smart phone is resting in the cradle, even when the device is not in use.
In some instances, such software upgrades can occur automatically, e.g., without user interaction or approval. For example, a user may pre-authorize software updates from one or more authorized software vendors for certain applications, e.g., operating systems or security software. In other instances, the availability of such updates can be determined and presented to a user without updating the software automatically. Rather, installation of any of the available software upgrades can be accomplished in response to user authorization, which can be provided, e.g., on a case-by-case basis.
Anyone with a smart phone or personal computer running any of the popular operating systems or security software is accustomed to the frequent occurrence of such software updates. It would not be unusual to expect several software updates per week, e.g., for a smartphone hosting a modest number of applications. In order to make such software updates minimally invasive or otherwise unnoticeable to a user, a user's data files are typically not removed or otherwise modified. For example, a user configuration file, data files, and the like, will remain substantially unchanged on the device being updated. Such frequent software upgrades are less common in sensitive applications, such as in a military applications due to security concerns. Namely, each modification to software and/or data on a sensitive platform poses an opportunity for the introduction of malware, spyware, and the like.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

Reference will now be made to the accompanying drawings, which are not necessarily drawn to scale, and wherein:

FIG. 1 depicts an illustrative embodiment of a securable remote processing environment;

FIG. 2A and FIG. 2B depicts an illustrative embodiment of a remote control system applying the securable remote processing environment of FIG. 1;

FIG. 3 depicts an illustrative embodiment of a process operating in portions of the system described in FIG. 1, FIG. 2A and FIG. 2B;

FIG. 4 and FIG. 5 depicts illustrative embodiments of alternative processes operating in portions of the system described in FIG. 1, FIG. 2A and FIG. 2B;

FIG. 6 is a diagrammatic representation of a machine in the form of a computer system within which a set of instructions, when executed, may cause the machine to perform any one or more of the processes described herein; and

FIG. 7 is a diagrammatic representation of an audit of a remove environment from an auditing platform.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION

The subject disclosure describes, among other things, illustrative embodiments of policy driven protection of remotely operated computing environments. Other embodiments are included in the subject disclosure.
One embodiment of the subject disclosure includes a process that includes receiving, by a system including a processor, multiple software agents, and configuring, by the system, a network of the multiple software agents according to a predetermined policy. The process further includes facilitating, by the system, secure communications among software agents of the network of the multiple software agents according to the predetermined policy, and determining, by the system, a state of one of the system, a system environment within which the system operates, or a combination thereof, based on the secure communications among the software agents of the network of the multiple software agents. A computing environment is facilitated by the system to support a mission application. The facilitating of the computing environment is conditional on the state of the one of the system, the system environment, or the combination thereof, according to the predetermined policy.
Another embodiment of the subject disclosure includes a system, including a memory to store instructions and a processor in communication with the memory. The processor, responsive to executing the instructions, performs operations including receiving multiple software agents and configuring a network of the multiple software agents according to a predetermined policy. The processor further performs operations including facilitating secure communications among software agents of the network of the multiple software agents, and determining a state of one of the system, a system environment within which the system operates, or a combination thereof, based on the secure communications among the software agents of the network of the multiple software agents according to the predetermined policy. A computing environment is facilitated to support a mission application. The facilitating of the computing environment is conditional on the state of the one of the system, the system environment, or the combination thereof, according to the predetermined policy.
Yet another embodiment of the subject disclosure includes a process, including implementing a predetermined policy and sending, by a system including a processor, multiple software agents to a first device. The multiple software agents, when installed upon the first device according to the predetermined policy, cause the first device to perform operations. The operations performed by the first device include configuring a network of the multiple software agents according to the predetermined policy, and facilitating secure communications among software agents of the network of the multiple software agents according to the predetermined policy. The operations performed by the first device further include determining a state of one of the first device, an environment within which the first device operates, or a combination thereof, based on the secure communications among the software agents of the plurality of software agents and facilitating a computing environment to support a mission application. The facilitating of the computing environment is conditional on the state of one of the first device, the respective environment, or a combination thereof, according to the predetermined policy.
The techniques disclosed herein relate generally to the protection of computing environments and more particularly to the protection of remote computing environments that include a controllable platform and a controller to remotely control the controllable platform. One or more of the controllable platform, the controller or a combined control system of the controlled platform and the controller, include one or more applications, sometimes referred to herein as mission applications. The applications can include communication between one or more elements or components, such as circuit boards, modules, processes or combinations thereof of the controllable platform, the controller or the combined control system that communicate with the control module. By way of non-limiting example, such control systems can include industrial processes, e.g., in association with manufacturing and/or supply chain applications, e-commerce applications, and control systems in which the controllable platform is a mobile platform. Some examples of mobile platforms include robots, automobiles, which can be controlled remotely, piloted aircraft which communicate with remote controllers, and unpiloted aircraft (drones), both military and civilian, which communicate with remote controllers. More generally, the techniques disclosed herein apply to securable remote computing environments in which elements communicate with one another over one or more communication channels, e.g., in which network connections of such communication channels can be predefined.
FIG. 1 depicts an illustrative embodiment of a system 100 implanting policy driven protection of a remote computing environment. The system 100 includes a system configuration server 102, a policy definition file 104, one or more function definitions 105 and other information, such as a configuration file 106. The configuration server 102 is in communication with a first device 110 a by way of a communication channel 108. The first device 110 a, in turn, includes at least one processor 112 and one or more sensors 114 a, 114 b (generally 114). The first device 110 a also includes a memory 116. The memory 116 can be configured to store one or more operating systems 118, one or more programs, e.g., application programs 120, and one or more other data structures 122, such as data files, including image files, sound files and the like.
In operation, the system configuration server 102 obtains policy information from the policy definition file 104 and configuration information from the configuration file 106. Policy information can also be included in one or more files of functions, which are run on the system 100 by installed software agents. The policy information causes the installed software agents to examine the system and in at least some instances, to provide cryptographic material based the results of their examinations. The system configuration server 102 sends information to the first device 110 a to cause generation of a network of software agents, at least some of which can reside on the first device 110 a. In the illustrative example, the configuration server 102 sends information causing the generation of a first networked group of software agents 124 a, including a first software agent 126 a and a second software agent 126 b. The first networked group of software agents 124 a is configured to support secure communications between the first and second software agents 126 a, 126 b. The first networked group of software agents 124 a can be configured to perform one or more tasks, such as determining an encryption key, e.g., for decrypting sensitive information. The sensitive information can represent one or more of the operating system 118, the application programs 120 or the data structures 122. The sensitive information can originally reside in the memory 116 prior to generation of the first networked group of software agents 124 a, or be provided from another source, such as the configuration server 102 before, after, or at the time of generation of the first networked group of software agents 124.
The software agents are computer programs configured to achieve one or more objectives. The software agents that can include one or more attributes of artificial intelligence, e.g., exhibiting some aspects of learning and/or reasoning. Alternatively or in addition, the software agents are computer programs that can include one or more attributes of autonomy, e.g., capable of modifying a manner in which they achieve their objectives. The software agents can be distributed, e.g., being executed on one or more of the same processor, different processors of the same computer, and/or physically distinct computers or processors. In at least some of the embodiments disclosed herein the software agents are configured in multi-agent systems, including distributed agents that do not necessarily have capabilities to achieve an objective alone. Such distributed agents can be arranged into the networks of software agents disclosed herein to facilitate communication among two or more software agents of the networks of software agents.
In at least some embodiment, one or more of the software agents 126 a, 126 b receives sensor information from one or more of the sensors 114 a, 114 b. The sensor information can provide information obtained from or otherwise indicative of the first device 110 a. Alternatively or in addition, the sensor information can provide information obtained from or otherwise indicative of an environment within which the first device 110 a is operating. According to one or more of the policy definition file 104 and the configuration file 106, one or more of the software agents 126 a, 126 b implements a respective function 105 based upon at least a portion of the sensor information. By way of illustration, a system designer can determine an authorized environment within which the first device 110 a is authorized to operate. The authorized environment can have one or more aspects that are detectable by way of sensory information obtained by one or more of the sensors 114 a, 114 b. The system designer determines which sensor information from one or more of the sensors 114 a, 114 b is suitable for arriving at a determination that the first device 110 a is operating in an authorized environment and what values or range of values represent positive results indicative of the authorized environment. The one or more functions 105 implemented by the software agents 126 a, 126 b can provide a result indicative of an authorized environment in response to sensor data indicative of the authorized environment. Such a successful determination can be used to allow one or more of the software agents 126 a, 126 b to perform one or more other functions.
In an illustrative example, the software agents 126 a, 126 b include functionality to produce a decryption key to allow for decryption of encrypted sensitive information. Alternatively or in addition, the software agents 126 a, 126 b install one or more of the operating system 118, the application programs 120 and the data structures 122. By way of illustrative example, the software agents 126 a, 126 b allow for an installation process, e.g., an application program 120 running on the first device 110 a, and/or a similar process running on the configuration server 102. The installation process can re-image the 1st device, e.g., by re-imaging at least a first operating system 118. The operating system 118 can include operating system function(s) and supporting file structure sufficient to proceed with normal operations, or a simplified version, e.g., a kernel, requiring further enhancements before normal operations are possible.
According to the policy information file 104 and configuration information from the configuration file 106 and various functions 105, the system configuration server 102 sends further information to the first device 110 a to cause generation of a second network of software agents 124 b, including a first software agent 128 a and a second software agent 128 b. The second networked group of software agents 124 b can also be configured to support secure communications between the first and second software agents 128 a, 128 b. The second networked group of software agents 124 b can be configured to perform one or more of determining another encryption key, e.g., for decrypting further sensitive information. The further sensitive information can represent one or more of enhancements to the operating system 118 installed or otherwise configured by way of the first group of software agents 124 a, the application programs 120 and/or the data structures 122. Alternatively or in addition, the further sensitive information can represent one or more of application programs 120. In at least some embodiments, the process can be repeated again, e.g., producing a third networked group of software agents 124 c, including a first software agent 130 a and a second software agent 130 b. In some embodiments the first networked group of software agents 124 a can be removed or otherwise rendered inoperable before installing the second networked group of software agents 124 b, and the second networked group of software agents 124 b can be removed or otherwise rendered inoperable before installing the third networked group of software agents 124 c. Thus, only one of the networked groups of software agents is operable at any given time. Alternatively, the first networked group of software agents 124 a is not removed of otherwise rendered inoperable before installing the second and/or third networked groups of software agents 124 b, 124 c, such that more than one of the networked group of software agents 124 a, 124 b, 124 c can be operable at the same time.
In at least some of the embodiments, one or more of the first, second and third networked groups of software agents 124 a, 124 b, 124 c can be configured, e.g., according to the policy, to periodically monitor the sensor data. The expected sensor data, as identified in one or more of the policy file 104 or the configuration file 106 can include expected environmental conditions that vary, e.g., according to a particular mission. Thus, it is conceivable that appropriate environmental conditions may vary over the course of a particular mission. The groups of software agents 124 a, 124 b, 124 c can be configured to periodically monitor sensors and take action conditionally in response to the updated sensor data.
A characteristic configuration of the networked software agents 124 a, 124 b, 124 c is that the first device 110 a, e.g., a controllable platform or process, such as a vehicle, has an embedded operating system 118 that receives input from one or more sensors 114, as shown an described above. The sensors 114 can also be embedded within the first device 110 a and otherwise adapted to receive information from one or more of the process, e.g., the device 110 a itself, and from a local environment of the device 110 a, referred to generally as a surrounding environment.
In at least some embodiments, the controllable platform or process of the first device 110 a is capable of communicating with another remote device, such as a remote server. The remote server can be configured as a remote monitor, e.g., adapted to send instructions to the controllable platform or process and/or to monitor processing and/or mission progress of the first device 110 a.
One or more of a controller or the controllable platform or process of the first device 110 a can be adapted to contain sensitive information, referred to generally as sensitive technology. It is understood that such sensitive technology should remain confidential, even if one or more of the controller or the controllable platform or process were to fall into the hands of an unintended recipient. Thus, the sensitive technology should not be maintained in an unprotected state for any substantial period of time. In at least some embodiments, such sensitive information is encrypted or otherwise obfuscated until needed, in preparation for, during, or after completion of a mission.
A particular challenge addressed by the techniques disclosed herein is that the controllable platform or process of the first device 110 a can communicate with a second device 110 b, such as the remote monitor before, during or after a given mission. In at least some embodiments, the second device 110 b is configured similar to the first device 110 b, understanding that one or more of the operating system, application programs or data structures may differ from the first device 110 a, as a matter of course.
Communications between a controllable platform or process of the first device 110 a and one or more of the remote monitor or a remote controller of the second device 110 b can occur on any suitable communication mode, such as the communication channel 108 of FIG. 1, or a separate communication channel (not shown). Examples of such communication modes include wired communications, wireless communications, e.g., radio communications, free-space optical communications, guided wave optical communications, and acoustic wave communications. Other examples of such communication modes include wide area networks, such as the Internet, regional or metro communication networks, campus communication networks, local area networks, personal area networks and the like. Still other examples of such communication modes include satellite communication networks, terrestrial radio communication networks, such as cellular radio networks, cable communication networks, fiber-optic communication networks, and telecommunication networks, including plain old telephone service (POTS).
Any of these communication modes can be used alone or in combination with others. It is understood that one or more components of such communication channels 108 or modes can be unguarded, e.g., public, thereby introducing a risk that the controllable platform or process can be monitored or even taken over by unintended entities or individuals. Under such circumstances, it is likely that any sensitive technology embedded in one or more of the controllable platform or process or the remote controller or monitor can be accessed without proper authorization or otherwise stolen. Such a compromise would likely jeopardize a mission. Even worse, a capture of the controllable platform or process might allow it to be used by an adversary, a competitor, or a disturbing party for nefarious purposes, such as an attack on one's business, or physical premises, including targets both military and civilian.
According to the policy-driven techniques disclosed herein to protect such computing environments from compromise, any embedded sensitive technology as might otherwise be obtained by capture and reverse engineering can be protected. One such approach includes installation of one or more of the operating system 118 and software 120 nearly simultaneously on both the controllable platform or process and the controller. Such operating system and other software can be provided from a remote source prior to start of mission. In particular, such remote provisioning of operating systems and other software can be accomplished just-in-time with respect to a mission.
Anticipating missions with multiple phases, it is understood that one or more of the operating systems 118 and other software 120 can be installed on one or more of the controllable platform or process of the first device 110 a, or the controller of the second device 110 b prior to, e.g., just-in-time, with respect to a particular phase of a mission. Thus, a control system including a mission profile having a preliminary phase and a terminal phase may load one or more of the operating system 118 and other software 120 related to the initial phase just prior to the initial phase, without necessarily loading one or more of the operating system 118 and other software 120 related to the terminal phase. In the illustrative example, one or more of the operating system and the other software related to the terminal phase can be loaded during execution of, and/or after completion of the initial phase.
At least some of the techniques disclosed herein include the use of agent technology. Such agent technology can be used, e.g., to examine a controllable platform or process and a remote controller before installation of protection software and application software. In at least some embodiments, such agent technology can be used to provide continued examination of one or more of the controllable platform or process of the first device 110 a or the remote controller of the second device 110 b, while one or more mission applications on one or more of the controllable platform or process of the first device 110 a, or the remote controller of the second device 110 b are executing.
In some cases, the intelligent software agents operate entirely at the software level. In other cases, the intelligent software agents interact with hardware, such as physical sensors. Examples of sensors include, without limitation, one or more of environmental sensors, biological sensors, and more generally physical sensors and/or software sensors or monitors used to monitor application. The software or sensors that can detection values from the mission scenario, software and sensors that can detect unique characteristics of the hardware environment to prevent software from being executed in a falsified virtual environment, Environmental sensors include, without limitation, temperature sensors, humidity sensors, light sensors, position sensors, orientation sensors, altitude sensors, and motion sensors including one or more of speed or acceleration. Biological sensors include, without limitation, blood pressure sensors, blood oximeter sensors, electrical conductivity sensors, pulse rate sensors, image sensors, retinal scan sensors, finger print sensors, and the like. The system of installed software agents also is able to detect attacks and unauthorized activity. The software agents can be configured to check on one another. For example, one agent can determine if another agent is slow in responding or otherwise not available. Such indications might indicate unauthorized activity such as the presence of a debugger or an attempt to execute the software in an unauthorized environment or an attempt to execute individual software agents when the entire network of software agents is not running.
In at least some embodiments, intelligent software agents can be configured to perform collaborative tasks, e.g., by functioning in, so-called, “chains.”
In a chain, multiple intelligent software agents work together to perform a specific task. Examples of such chains are disclosed, e.g., in commonly owned U.S. Pat. No. 7,841,009, entitled “System and Method for Defending Against Reverse Engineering of Software, Firmware and Hardware,” the entire contents of which are incorporated herein by reference in its entirety. In the present disclosure, the chains of intelligent software agents are configured to include one or more functions 105 in FIG. 1. The functions can be prepared by a system design team and imposed or otherwise implemented, e.g., according to a predefined policy. For example, one or more of the functions can be configured to expect one or more values. Such values can be expressed as a particular value, e.g., a number, or as a range of values. In operation, if a function returns a value that is out of range, the chain can continue to execute without indicating to an observer that such an out of range result was obtained. In one embodiment, a function testing for a scenario, environmental or system value that falls within a range, produces cryptographic values with high entropy using a hash or other such technology. For example, a chain configured to produce cryptographic material, such as an encryption and/or decryption key, still produces a key, although the key will not decrypt its target object. Such an approach complicates attempts at reverse engineering and/or unauthorized attempts to access features of the system, such as sensitive information.
Sensitive technologies, sometimes referred to as sensitive or critical technologies, e.g., depending upon a particular mission or application, can be-made very difficult to obtain by encryption with appropriate algorithms and keys. Policy can be embedded in one or more elements of the control system to examine one or more of the mission application and local environments, while the applications executes. A so-called “safe” environment can be identified by policy, such that sensitive information related to a mission or application can be conditioned upon a belief or conclusion of the environment is safe. Thus, if the examination reveals that the application is operating in a safe environment, the sensitive technology can be decrypted and executed; otherwise, the critical technology is not decrypted. If a system safety state changes from safe to unsafe as defined by the embedded policy, any unencrypted, e.g., “clear text” instances of the sensitive technology are deleted and/or otherwise destroyed. In at least some embodiments, a penalty can be imposed, e.g., in response to a determination that the system state is unsafe, so that the sensitive technology can never be decrypted. In some embodiments, this penalty can be covertly imposed, so that an adversary attempting to reverse engineer the system does not immediately realize that the task of obtaining a correct key has been rendered impossible.
FIG. 2A depicts a functional block diagram of an example of a system 200 including a controllable platform or process 200 and a remote control station 202. Policy is input to a configuration server 204, e.g., a random obfuscating compiler (ROC), through a network definition file and various functions that the network will execute. Sensitive technology is also input to the ROC by way of the configuration server 204. The configuration server 204 also accesses one or more policy documents and functions and the selection of critical technology are under the control of the system design team. The configuration server 204 then produces a first installed network of software agents. The software agents are referred to herein as nodes of the installed network of software agents. Some nodes are installed on the controllable platform or process; other nodes are installed on the controller. The nodes communicate with one another as shown by the thin lines with double arrows, although it is not necessary that all communications are bidirectional. Some communications can be unidirectional.
The control system 200 includes a control station 208 including at least one workstation or personal computer (PC). In the illustrative example, the control station 208 includes a first PC 210 a and a second PC 210 b. Each of the PCs 210 a, 210 b includes a respective embedded operating system 212 a, 212 b. The first PC 210 a includes at least one software agent. In the illustrative example, the first PC 210 a includes a first software agent 214 a and a second software agent 214 b. Likewise, the second PC 210 b includes a first software agent 214 c and a second software agent 214 d.
The control system 200 also includes a controllable platform or process 216 including a first board or module 218 a and a second board or module 218 b. Each of the modules 218 a, 218 b includes a respective embedded operating system 220 a, 220 b. The first module 218 a includes a first software agent 214 e and a second software agent 214 f. Likewise, the second module 218 b includes a first software agent 214 g and a second software agent 214 h. In the illustrative embodiment a secure environment 206 including the configuration server 204 also includes a software agent 214 i, and a remote server 222 includes yet another software agent 214 j.
A series of thick arrows marked Install extend from the configuration server to each of the PCs 210 a, 210 b of the control station 208, each of the modules or boards 218 a, 218 b of the controllable platform 216 and the server 222 These arrows identify that, during installation of the software agent network that protects the controlled process the configuration server 204 installs all of the software to the control station 208, the controllable platform 216 and the server 222, including the operating systems 212 a, 212 b, 220 a, 220 b and the software to implement functionality of the controllable platform 216 and the control station 208.
As with installation of all operating systems, the installation process can proceed through multiple stages, starting with installation of a temporary small operating system and proceeding through using small operating system to install the complete operating system and applications that run on it. However, the installation process depends on the hardware and the circumstances and the policy as to whether everything should be installed.
As with installation of operating systems, installation of networks of software agents can also proceed through several stages, which involve initial examination of the respective environment (e.g., each of the control station environment and the controllable platform environment), running a special software agent network designed to develop cryptographic keys according to sensory information obtained from the respective environments and mission scenario (e.g., speed and/or location of the controllable platform during each phase of the mission). In the illustrative example, a network of software agents 214 a, 214 b, 214 c, 214 d, 214 e, 214 f, 214 g, 214 h, 214 i, 214 j (generally 214) is installed and configured along with operating systems 212 a, 212 b, 220 a, 220 b and application software for the respective target environments.
FIG. 2B depicts an embodiment of the control system 200′ using other software agents to install additional software and conduct examinations. For example, the network of software agents 214 (FIG. 1) can be used to install the operation systems 212 a, 212 b, 220 a, 220 b, as described above. An updated or otherwise modified network of software agents can be initialized or otherwise configured. In the illustrative example, the first PC 210 a includes a first software agent 254 a and a second software agent 254 b, the second PC 210 b includes a first software agent 254 c and a second software agent 254 d. Likewise, the first module 218 a of the controllable platform 216 includes a first software agent 254 e and a second software agent 254 f and a the second module 218 b includes a first software agent 254 g and a second software agent 254 h. The server 222 includes a software agent 254 i and software 252 of the development environment 202 is associated with a software agent 254 j. The software agents 254 a through 254 j (generally 254) represent the updated/modified software agent network.
In the illustrative example, the second software agent network 254 can be used to initialize or otherwise install software 256 a on the first PC 210 a, software 256 b on the second PC 210 b, software 258 a on the first module 218 a and software 258 b on the second module 218 b. Installation of the software, according to the techniques disclosed herein can include one or more of generation of encryption keys, or installation and/or execution of the software by way of the software agent network 254 according to the predetermined policy and/or configuration information.
The area of applicability concerns policy-driven protection of computing environments which consist of a controlled process and a controller. Such environments can include industrial processes and their controllers, automobile and remote controllers that communicate with the automobiles over the Internet; modern piloted airplane software that communicates with a remote controller, and military and civilian unpiloted aircraft.
Generally speaking, the techniques disclosed herein refer to a generic design for a network of software agents in which some software agents are installed on a platform (e.g., drone, automobile, aircraft) or a controlled process; whereas, some are installed on a controller used in control of the platform. In at least some embodiments such installation occurs within a relatively short period of time, referred to as a time delay threshold. An example time delay threshold can be measured in seconds, or perhaps minutes, but generally not more than a few hours. In at least some embodiments, the software agents are installed automatically, and “right before” or “just in time” before” a “mission,” that is an occasion when the controller will be used to control the controllable platform or process.
According to the techniques disclosed herein, the agent technology can be used in various commercial and military scenarios to provide frequent software installation in a manner that would provide a very powerful level of security that is otherwise unobtainable. By way of example, the Android® operating system user community admits that completely reinstalling all software on a device provides very powerful security. See, e.g., online information available at www.windowsreinstallguide.com and www.droidlessons.com/how-to-factory-reset-your-android-device.
However, the commercial community in its software installation activities often operates under several severely restrictive conditions that might not be present in a certain commercial contexts and military contexts. In the commercial community, at least in the consumer electronics community, there is a requirement to preserve a customer's personal data, which is the reason that a complete reinstallation is an infrequent and cumbersome occurrence. The customer generally backs up his or her data before a reinstallation—a tedious procedure that subjects the customer to a significant inconvenience. A remote re-installer that attempts a backup of customer data, would require the re-installer to distinguish between legitimate customer data and hidden malware, which is very difficult. It would also defeat a major purpose of the reinstallation, which is to remove, with a high level of certain, all hidden malware.
In a military context, a drone might have surveillance data that was gathered during a mission, which will be removed after a mission (or communicated to the monitor during the course of the mission in many cases) and analyzed. But the drone has no “personal” data apart from its known mission data. Consequently, a drone could be reimaged after a mission, assuming that the equipment and procedures were available to do so, and that proper security procedures were available. Thus, the personal data protection restriction does not apply. Similarly, many industrial processes can transfer their important data to a remote server and afterward have no personal data that cannot be overwritten. These processes can be wiped clean and reimaged. Thus, software, e.g., including operating systems, can be re-installed or otherwise re-imaged on a periodic basis, e.g., daily or weekly.
If just-in-time installation is feasible in a particular context, the techniques disclosed herein can be used to install a network of software agents throughout the system, while at the same time reinstalling all or some of the operational software for the underlying system.
Consequently, a generic system, such as shown in FIG. 2A-2B includes a compiler running in a development environment 202 that installs operating systems 212 a, 212 b, 220 a, 220 b and software agents 214, 254 on an installation server 222 and on various components of a control station 208 and a controllable platform 216. The installation server 222 and the development environment 202 can be located in a secure environment. The environment for the control station and the drone need not be secure, or at least not as secure as the secure development environment 202. Thus, in at least some embodiments, the installation process completely reimages the target hardware and installs the operating system, the network of software agents, and the software required to operate controller and the controlled process.
The software agents 214, 254 initialize secure communication channels with one another and check out the environments in which they have been installed, both during the installation process and when the controller and controlled process are operating. The software agents 214, 254 also communicate with the underlying application software 256 a, 256 b, 258 a, 258 b and provide sensitive technology to the underlying software applications if the environment and the scenario are determined to be “safe”, e.g., as defined in the policy developed by the system design team and installed in the network of software agents 214, 254.
It is envisioned that the entire procedure that could be accomplished in perhaps an hour or two, or less, depending on the complexity of the target controller and controlled process.
At least some advantages of the techniques disclosed herein include that the controlled process and the controller contain only software provided from the development environment, just-in-time for this mission. All software agents 214, 254 (and other elements that communicate over the network) could have cryptographic keys to communicate with one another that have just been installed, so that initial communication would not require any sort of asymmetric key exchange.
Inappropriate software that might have been downloaded, e.g., from the Internet by one or more of the control station 208 and the controllable platform 216, would be removed. Malware and root kits that might have loaded onto the control station 208 and the controllable platform 216 would necessarily be removed. The installation would occur automatically from the development environment based on a network definition file, so there would be minimal opportunity for malicious interference or careless error.
Depending on the circumstances, the network of software agents 214, 254 could be deleted after installation. In this use, the network of software agents 214, 254 would assure a secure complete reimaging of the target system. Alternatively or in addition, the network of software agents 214, 254 could be used as an anti-tamper system and provide protection of the sensitive technology located on the system by making available the sensitive technology when required if the system 200 is in a “safe” state, “safe” being defined by the file definition used to create the network. Additionally, the network of software agents 214, 254 can be configured to destroy the sensitive technology if the environment changes, e.g., from a “safe” state to an “unsafe” state. Alternatively or in addition, the network of software agents 214, 254 can be configured to effectively “poison” the system so that the sensitive technology can never be recovered if the environment becomes unsafe. Still further, the techniques disclosed herein can be used to defend the sensitive technology in circumstances in which the controllable platform 216 has lost communication with the control station 208 (e.g., is operating autonomously) and the environment then becomes “unsafe.”
In at least some embodiments, remote installation of an operating system, a network of software agents, and additional software, uses standard installation methods supplemented by additional procedures disclosed herein. Standard installation methods for installation of operating system kernels such as are found in Linux® and VxWorks® and supporting file systems are readily available and can be accomplished over the wire, although they are complex. A slightly different approach available in at least some embodiments is to use one or more of an existing kernel and an existing file system already resident or otherwise available on the target platform or media.
Whether an entirely new kernel and file system are installed, or existing file system and kernel are used, the installation can be configured to verify that the kernel and the file system are authentic and genuine. For example, the elements of the target installation can be examined by using procedures to hash appropriate software and to examine hardware elements such as hardware IDs, the bios, and the disk IDs. The installation procedure can be secured further if the installing programs know in advance the correct hashes of one or more of the kernel and the file system and the hardware IDs on the target media. Confirmation of by way of such hash comparisons can provide at least some measure of assurance that the kernel and file system as well as the hardware IDs on the target media have not been tampered with.
If a controlled process is running VxWorks, and the software is written in kernel mode, all software for the controllable platform would be installed according to the system illustrated in FIG. 2A. The consequences are that for installation on a VxWorks target operating in kernel mode, which is commonly used in military applications, installation of the operating system and the file system occurs substantially simultaneously, when the agent network is installed. If a Linux target is part of the system, the kernel, the file system, and other software can be installed in stages.
Referring again to FIG. 2A, a network definition file 232, various functions 238 written by the developers, and the sensitive technologies 240 to be protected are input to the configuration server, e.g., the ANGEL ROC compiler, which then produces the artifacts to be installed as described above.
The network definition file 232 implies that the software agent network 214 to be installed, and the characteristics of the target environment, including the IP addresses, are known in advance, and that the network to be built matches this definition. An option is to build another preliminary agent network to examine the target system 208, 216, to then use the information collected by the software agents to construct the network definition file 232, and then use the network definition file 232 to build the installed agent network 214.
One or more of the software agent network disclosed herein can be implemented in a chained configuration. A chained software agent network includes several software agents collaborating to conduct a common function. While information is traversing the software agents of a chain, the software agents in the chain can be configured to run various functions to examine the system. Examination of the system can include examination of sensory input, process status, and status of one or more of the software agents themselves. In at least some embodiments, chains of software agents are used to generate encryption and/or decryption key material, e.g., resulting from examinations conducted by software agents of the chain. For example, respective fragments of key material determined by each software agent of the chain can be combined to produce a key. If the examinations performed by the software agents fall within a predetermined or otherwise established range, the resulting key can be used decrypt its target object; otherwise, despite the key being generated, the resulting key will not decrypt the target object. The target object can be sensitive technology embedded within an installed artifact or it can be a target object designed to test whether the system is in certain state.
It is understood that multiple chains can be created to perform different cryptographic or examination functions in a cooperative manner in order to obtain a key. Such cooperative approaches can include logical combinations of one or more individual chains, such that a desired result, e.g., generation of a successful key, is obtained only when each of the chains produces a respective result that when combined according to the logic results in the desired result.
Thus, functions can be written by system designer following appropriate format rules or written by programmers to achieve certain objectives. The ranges of successful performance of the functions are specified by the system designers. The functions, the chains, the software agents which composed the chains, and the functions a specific agent executes within a specific chain can all defined or identified by the network definition file 232.
The design of a software agent network can be different for each system and can also depend on one or more of the functionality of the target system or the decisions of the system designer with respect to sensitive technology protection and the functions that the network of software agents is to perform. Using the techniques disclosed herein, it is possible to design a network of software agents that will make the sensitive technology available in an unencrypted fashion only if the system is in a predefined state as pre-chosen by the system designer during a design phase, generally conducted in a secure environment 202.
Using the techniques disclosed herein, it is also possible to continue to examine the control system and to destroy the unprotected instances of the sensitive technology should the system state change from a safe state to an unsafe state.
The procedure described in FIG. 2A for the installation of an angel network can be divided into several phases. In the first phase, the network of software agents can be used to gather information about the target system 200. In a second phase, a version of the network of software agents is run on the target hardware 200′ to produce key material assuming the system is running in a safe state. The key thus produced is used to encrypt and/or decrypt the sensitive technology. In a third phase, the encrypted sensitive technology is embedded in a third version of the network of software agents. The third version of the network of software agents is used to protect the controlled process and the controller when they execute the application on the controlled process. Other versions of the network of software agents are destroyed.
Multiple instances of sensitive technology can be protected in this fashion using multiple chains which will produce different keys for each instance. It is also possible to produce functions or code fragments which can be passed from agent to agent so that the function or fragment is sent from one agent and executes on another agent. This technique can be used to examine a target execution environment by running software on the target that has never before appeared on the target. This technique can be used to examine the target during the installation process when the sending agent would be the agent 214 j on the server 222 (FIG. 2A) or during operation of the system when the sending agent would be the agent 254 on the control station 208 and/or the controllable platform 216. If the controllable platform 216 process loses contact with the control station 208, the same technique can be employed by software agent on the controllable platform 216 or process sending code for execution by different agent on the controlled process.
The network of software agents 214, 254 can conduct examinations of the system state and optionally, at the request of the system designer, can impose a penalty so that the critical technology can never be decrypted. If the change in system state is discovered before an adversary has been able to copy the entire system to a virtualized environment, the penalty can be imposed on cryptographic material that is stored in a non-volatile medium on the system hardware. If the adversary has successfully copied the system to another medium, the penalty can be imposed within the copied artifacts. The penalty should be imposed covertly so that the adversary will not realize that the penalty has been imposed and will continue to experiment with the abstracted system rather than refreshing it. The strategy of always producing a key, even if the key does not correctly decrypt, hides from the adversary whether a penalty has already been imposed and hopefully will require the adversary to engage in months or years of fruitless reverse engineering effort.
The network definition file can be utilized to define blocks of data, such as randomly generated data that are installed into artifacts that make up the network of angels that will run on the target system. These blocks of data can be used to provide session keys that are used for initial communications among the angels and also to produce longer keys that can be used to encrypt communications among the angels. Any of the keys produced according to the techniques disclosed herein could be used to perturb blocks of installed random data so as to produce longer keys to encrypt and decrypt the critical technology.
FIG. 3 depicts an illustrative embodiment of a process 300 used by one or more of the PCs 210 a, 210 b of the control station 208 or the modules or boards 218 a, 218 b of the controllable platform 216 or process. One or more software agents 214, 254 are received at 304. A network of the received software agents 214, 254 is configured at 306 according to a policy definition, e.g., one or more of a network definition file 232, an authentication function 234, response functions 236, other functions 238 and sensitive technologies. A state of one or more of the system and/or the environment is determined at 310. To the extent the determined state is not favorable at 312, corrective and/or evasive action can be taken at 314. To the extent the determined state is favorable 312, however, the computing environment can be initialized or otherwise updated to support a mission application at 316.
In at least some embodiments, a determination is made at 318 whether a system update should be determined. In response to concluding that a system update should be determined, the process is directed to 310, in which an updated state of the system and/or environment is determined at 310, and so forth.
Alternatively or in addition, a determination can be made at 320 whether the software agents of the initialized network of software agents should be updated. To the extent that it is determined to update the software agents, the process 300 is directed to 304, in which new and/or updated software agents are received. The process continues from 304 as described above, instead using the new and/or updated software agents.
FIG. 4 depicts an illustrative embodiment of an alternative embodiment of a process 400 used by one or more of the PCs 210 a, 210 b of the control station 208 or the modules or boards 218 a, 218 b of the controllable platform 216 or process. One or more software agents 214, 254 are received at 402. A network of the received software agents 214, 254 is configured at 404 according to a policy definition, e.g., one or more of a network definition file 232, an authentication function 234, response functions 236, other functions 238 and sensitive technologies. Secure communications are initialized between software agents of the network of software agents at 406. A state of one or more of the system and/or the environment is determined at 408. To the extent the determined state is not favorable at 410, an incorrect or otherwise ineffective encryption key can be determined at 418. Such an ineffective encryption key prohibits facilitation at 420 of a computing environment to support mission applications. In some embodiments, an irreversible change can be imposed at 416 (shown in phantom) to ensure that future determination of encryption keys will always result in determination of an incorrect encryption key. To the extent the determined state is favorable at 410, however, the correct or otherwise effective encryption key can be determined at 412. Facilitation of a computing environment to support mission applications can be accomplished at 414.
FIG. 5 depicts an illustrative embodiment of a process 500 used by one or more of the configuration server 204 and the server 222. A policy is implemented at 502. One or more software agents 214, 254 are sent to one or more of the control station 208 and the controllable platform at 504. A network of the received software agents 214, 254 is configured at 506 according to a policy definition, e.g., one or more network definition file 232, an authentication function 234, response functions 236, other functions 238 and sensitive technologies. A state of one or more of the system and/or the environment is determined at 510. To the extent the determined state is not favorable at 512, corrective and/or evasive action can be taken at 514. To the extent the determined state is favorable at 512, however, the computing environment can be initialized or otherwise updated to support a mission application at 516.
In at least some embodiments, a determination is made at 518 (shown in phantom) whether a system update should be determined. In response to concluding that a system update should be determined, the process is directed to 510, in which an updated state of the system and/or environment is determined at 510, and so forth.
Alternatively or in addition, a determination can be made at 520 (also shown in phantom) whether the software agents of the initialized network of software agents should be updated. To the extent that it is determined to update the software agents, the process 500 is directed to 502, in which the policy is implemented. The process continues from 502 as described above, instead using the new and/or updated software agents.
FIG. 6 depicts an exemplary diagrammatic representation of a machine in the form of a computer system 600 within which a set of instructions, when executed, may cause the machine to perform any one or more of the processes and techniques describe above. One or more instances of the machine can operate, for example, as the configuration server 102, the first and/or second devices 110 a, 110 b, the server 222, the configuration server 204, the first and/or second PCs 210 a, 210 b of the control station 208 and the first and/or second boards or modules 218 a, 218 b of the controllable platform 216. In some embodiments, the machine can be connected (e.g., using a communication mode, such as a control channel 108, e.g., network to other machines. In a networked deployment, the machine may operate in the capacity of a server or a client user machine in server-client user network environment, or as a peer machine in a peer-to-peer (or distributed) network environment.
The machine may comprise a server computer, a client user computer, a personal computer (PC), a tablet PC, a smart phone, a laptop computer, a desktop computer, a control system, a network router, switch or bridge, or any machine capable of executing a set of instructions (sequential or otherwise) that specify actions to be taken by that machine. It will be understood that a communication device of the subject disclosure includes broadly any electronic device that provides voice, video or data communication. Further, while a single machine is illustrated, the term “machine” shall also be taken to include any collection of machines that individually or jointly execute a set (or multiple sets) of instructions to perform any one or more of the methods discussed herein.
The computer system 600 may include a processor (or controller) 602 (e.g., a central processing unit (CPU), a graphics processing unit (GPU, or both), a main memory 604 and a static memory 606, which communicate with each other via a bus 608. The computer system 600 may further include a display unit 610 (e.g., a liquid crystal display (LCD), a flat panel, or a solid state display. The computer system 600 may include an input device 612 (e.g., a keyboard), a cursor control device 614 (e.g., a mouse), a disk drive unit 616, a signal generation device 618 (e.g., a speaker or remote control) and a network interface device 620. In distributed environments, the embodiments described in the subject disclosure can be adapted to utilize multiple display units 610 controlled by two or more computer systems 600. In this configuration, presentations described by the subject disclosure may in part be shown in a first of the display units 610, while the remaining portion is presented in a second of the display units 610.
The disk drive unit 616 may include a tangible computer-readable storage medium 622 on which is stored one or more sets of instructions (e.g., software 624) embodying any one or more of the methods or functions described herein, including those methods illustrated above. The instructions 624 may also reside, completely or at least partially, within the main memory 604, the static memory 606, and/or within the processor 602 during execution thereof by the computer system 600. The main memory 604 and the processor 602 also may constitute tangible computer-readable storage media.
There are several exemplary scenarios in which the technology may be implemented. In a first scenario, a wireless device or devices (i.e., “remote nodes”) may be attached to or embedded in shipping containers. The remote nodes may couple by wired or wireless means to various detectors configured, for example, to detect weapons of mass destruction. The detectors can be located inside the container and distributed as needed to adequately perform their surveillance functions. The detectors can be packaged with remote nodes or external to the remote nodes. The remote nodes are queried by appropriate external monitor systems to determine if the nodes and detectors have sensed weapons of mass destruction or other contraband. One issue to be confronted in such a scenario is that an enemy might attempt to sabotage or reverse engineer the nodes so that they falsely report a safe status, so that the container would pass query by authorities. This scenario is referred to as the shipping container scenario.
In another scenario, wireless remote nodes may be attached to soldiers so that these nodes can be queried on the battlefield to determine whether a person is friend or foe. One issue here is that an enemy might capture the soldiers or the equipment and reverse engineer the wireless remote node, thereby allowing the enemy to masquerade as a friend. Conversely, friendly forces might mistakenly consider a soldier on the battlefield who cannot be authenticated to be the enemy and open fire. This scenario is referred to as the soldier scenario.
In yet another scenario, wireless remote nodes may be attached to equipment such as tanks or airplanes. In such a case, the remote nodes can be queried on the battlefield to determine whether the vehicle is friend or foe. This scenario is referred to as the vehicle scenario.
In still another scenario, wireless remote nodes may be attached to individuals so that the individuals can gain authorized access to a building or an event. An issue to be confronted is that an enemy may capture an authorized individual, reverse engineer the remote node, and gain unauthorized admission. This scenario is referred to as the pass holder scenario.
In each scenario above, the wireless remote node passes through the following stages:
(1) A secure stage or stages, where the wireless remote node will be securely provided with cryptographic material.
(2) An insecure stage, where the wireless remote node will be subject to attack by an enemy.
(3) A stage where the wireless remote node will be able to detect an attack by an enemy.
(4) A stage where the wireless remote node will be queried by an external responsible agent (e.g., military or civilian authorities).
Provided in accordance with one aspect of the technology, is the ability to detect in stage (4) if an enemy attack has occurred in stage (3). This goal could be achieved by providing in stage (4) a measure of the probability that an attack has or has not occurred in stage (3). An additional goal in the soldier and vehicle scenarios is to positively identify an unknown person or vehicle as friend or foe. Table 1 shows, for each scenario, a set of secure stages and a corresponding set of attack detection approaches, as examples.

TABLE 1

Scenario	Secure Stages	Attack Detection

Shipping	Manufacturing plant	Several devices monitor one
Container	Shipping Line premises	another inside the same
	US Port	container
	US Controlled facilities	Several devices monitor one
		another across different
		containers
		Other sensors detect WMD
		Individual device senses
		attack against it
Soldier	Squad room before mission	Device attaches to body sensor
	Presence of other soldiers
	or equipment during
	mission
Military	Before takeoff or before	Device attaches to sensors
vehicle or	mission	embedded in vehicle.
airplane	For vehicle, in presence of	Device attaches to body
	other soldiers or equipment	sensors or devices of
		occupants
Pass	From home via telephone.	Device attaches to body sensor
holder	Company facility

Shipping Container Scenario. Each shipping container would contain one or more wireless remote nodes that is configured to communicate internally with one another and externally with other nodes. The remote nodes would include an interface to facilitate coupling to various sensors disposed to detect the presence of illegal conditions within the container. Such detectors could, for example, be embedded in or attached to the container, as could be the remote nodes. In addition to sensing the presence of illegal conditions, the sensors could be configured to detect access to the container, whether authorized or unauthorized. Illegal conditions could be the presence of anyone or more of dangerous chemicals, biological agents or radioactive materials, explosives, drugs, or the like.
The shipping container will at various times be in facilities that are relatively secure, such as the manufacturing plant or a US Port or US controlled facility. At these times, the remote nodes can be securely provided with cryptographic materials via the Secure Network.
The wireless devices would detect an attack when they sensed prohibited substances or when an individual device sensed that it was being attacked. Several remote nodes could also continually monitor one another inside the container. Adjacent containers could also monitor one another.
Soldier Scenario. The soldier will have a wireless device connected to a body sensor. An attack will be sensed when reports from the body sensor indicate that something is amiss or when the body sensor is removed. A soldier can include a soldier, an airman or any person that formally participates in military missions. Prevention of friendly fire instances is an important goal of the soldier wireless device.
The soldier is in a relatively secure environment in the squad room before leaving for a mission and on the battlefield in the visual presence of other soldiers. At these times, the soldier can be provided with cryptographic material using Secure Network methodologies.
Military Vehicle or Airplane Scenario. The number of friendly fire instances in the Iraq war indicates the need for methods of securely identifying unknown vehicles and aircraft.
The technique in the present disclosure involves remotely auditing the remote vehicle by executing code on the remote vehicle that has been introduced over the communication channel just before execution.
This technique also can be applied to remote computing environments that are not located in vehicles.
FIG. 7 depicts a generic audit of a remote environment from an auditing platform. Agents are represented by the angel icon are already installed when the secure audit begins. From the auditing platform, code snippets are sent over the communications channel to the remote environment, are executed on the remote environment
The process that manages a node can do other things. For example, database servers can be nodes. A process that runs a browser can be a node. Intermediary routers that are used in a massive Secure Network can be nodes, including a massively scalable secure network, e.g., having 27 different nodes, with each node having a different number.
The above described techniques can be implemented in a distributed computing system that includes a back-end component. The back-end component can, for example, be a data server, a middleware component, and/or an application server. The above described techniques can be implemented in a distributing computing system that includes a front-end component. The front-end component can, for example, be a client computer having a graphical user interface, a Web browser through which a user can interact with an example implementation, and/or other graphical user interfaces for a transmitting device. The components of the system can be interconnected by any form or medium of digital data communication (e.g., a communication network). Examples of communication networks include a local area network (LAN), a wide area network (WAN), the Internet, wired networks, and/or wireless networks.
The system can include clients and servers. A client and a server are generally remote from each other and typically interact through a communication network. The relationship of client and server arises by virtue of computer programs running on the respective computers and having a client-server relationship to each other.
Packet-based networks can include, for example, the Internet, a carrier internet protocol (IP) network (e.g., local area network (LAN), wide area network (WAN), campus area network (CAN), metropolitan area network (MAN), home area network (HAN)), a private IP network, an IP private branch exchange (IPBX), a wireless network (e.g., radio access network (RAN), 802.11 network, 802.16 network, general packet radio service (GPRS) network, HiperLAN), and/or other packet-based networks. Circuit-based networks can include, for example, the public switched telephone network (PSTN), a private branch exchange (PBX), a wireless network (e.g., RAN, Bluetooth, code-division multiple access (CDMA) network, time division multiple access (TD MA) network, global system for mobile communications (GSM) network), and/or other circuit-based networks.
The transmitting device can include, for example, a computer, a computer with a browser device, a telephone, an IP phone, a mobile device (e.g., cellular phone, personal digital assistant (PDA) device, laptop computer, electronic mail device), and/or other communication devices. The browser device includes, for example, a computer (e.g., desktop computer, laptop computer) with a World Wide Web browser (e.g., Microsoft® Internet Explorer® available from Microsoft Corporation, Mozilla® Firefox available from Mozilla Corporation). The mobile computing device includes, for example, a Blackberry®.
References to comprise, include, and/or plural forms of each are open ended and include the listed parts and can include additional parts that are not listed. References to and/or are open ended and include one or more of the listed parts and combinations of the listed parts.
Dedicated hardware implementations including, but not limited to, application specific integrated circuits, programmable logic arrays and other hardware devices that can likewise be constructed to implement the methods described herein. Application specific integrated circuits and programmable logic array can use downloadable instructions for executing state machines and/or circuit configurations to implement embodiments of the subject disclosure. Applications that may include the apparatus and systems of various embodiments broadly include a variety of electronic and computer systems. Some embodiments implement functions in two or more specific interconnected hardware modules or devices with related control and data signals communicated between and through the modules, or as portions of an application-specific integrated circuit. Thus, the example system is applicable to software, firmware, and hardware implementations.
In accordance with various embodiments of the subject disclosure, the methods described herein are intended for operation as software programs running on a computer processor or other forms of instructions manifested as a state machine implemented with logic components in an application specific integrated circuit or field programmable array. Furthermore, software implementations can include, but not limited to, distributed processing or component/object distributed processing, parallel processing, or virtual machine processing can also be constructed to implement the methods described herein. It is further noted that a computing device such as a processor, a controller, a state machine or other suitable device for executing instructions to perform operations on a controllable device may perform such operations on the controllable device directly or indirectly by way of an intermediate device directed by the computing device.
While the tangible computer-readable storage medium 622 is shown in an example embodiment to be a single medium, the term “tangible computer-readable storage medium” should be taken to include a single medium, or multiple media (e.g., a centralized or distributed database, and/or associated caches and servers) that store the one or more sets of instructions. The term “tangible computer-readable storage medium” shall also be taken to include any non-transitory medium including a device that is capable of storing or encoding a set of instructions for execution by the machine and that cause the machine to perform any one or more of the methods of the subject disclosure.
The term “tangible computer-readable storage medium” shall accordingly be taken to include, but not be limited to devices, such as: solid-state memories such as a memory card or other package that houses one or more read-only (non-volatile) memories, random access memories, or other re-writable (volatile) memories, a magneto-optical or optical medium such as a disk or tape, or other tangible media which can be used to store information. Accordingly, the disclosure is considered to include any one or more of a tangible computer-readable storage medium, as listed herein and including art-recognized equivalents and successor media, in which the software implementations herein are stored.
Although the present specification describes components and functions implemented in the embodiments with reference to particular standards and protocols, the disclosure is not limited to such standards and protocols. Each of the standards for Internet and other packet switched network transmission (e.g., TCP/IP, UDP/IP, HTML, HTTP) represent examples of the state of the art. Such standards are from time-to-time superseded by faster or more efficient equivalents having essentially the same functions. Wireless standards for device detection (e.g., RFID), short-range communications (e.g., Bluetooth, WiFi, Zigbee), and long-range communications (e.g., WiMAX, GSM, CDMA, LTE) can be used by computer system 600.
The illustrations of embodiments described herein are intended to provide a general understanding of the structure of various embodiments, and they are not intended to serve as a complete description of all the elements and features of apparatus and systems that might make use of the structures described herein. Many other embodiments will be apparent to those of skill in the art upon reviewing the above description. Other embodiments may be utilized and derived therefrom, such that structural and logical substitutions and changes may be made without departing from the scope of this disclosure. Figures are also merely representational and may not be drawn to scale. Certain proportions thereof may be exaggerated, while others may be minimized. Accordingly, the specification and drawings are to be regarded in an illustrative rather than a restrictive sense.
Although specific embodiments have been illustrated and described herein, it should be appreciated that any arrangement calculated to achieve the same purpose may be substituted for the specific embodiments shown. This disclosure is intended to cover any and all adaptations or variations of various embodiments. Combinations of the above embodiments, and other embodiments not specifically described herein, can be used in the subject disclosure.
The Abstract of the Disclosure is provided with the understanding that it will not be used to interpret or limit the scope or meaning of the claims. In addition, in the foregoing Detailed Description, it can be seen that various features are grouped together in a single embodiment for the purpose of streamlining the disclosure. This method of disclosure is not to be interpreted as reflecting an intention that the claimed embodiments require more features than are expressly recited in each claim. Rather, as the following claims reflect, inventive subject matter lies in less than all features of a single disclosed embodiment. Thus the following claims are hereby incorporated into the Detailed Description, with each claim standing on its own as a separately claimed subject matter.

Claims

What is claimed is:

1. A method, comprising:

determining, by a processing system comprising a processor, a plurality of examination results based on sensory information obtained from a plurality of sensors operating within a deployed environment, wherein the sensory information comprises a combination of more than one of temperature, position, motion, and mission status, and wherein each software agent of a plurality of software agents conducts a review of a respective examination result of the plurality of examination results of the deployed environment based on a plurality of sensory ranges, to obtain reviews of the plurality of examination results of the deployed environment;

generating, by the processing system, a plurality of encryption key fragments in response to the reviews of the plurality of examination results of the deployed environment, wherein each encryption key fragment of the plurality of encryption key fragments is determined by a respective software agent of the plurality of software agents, based on the review of the respective examination result of the plurality of examination results of the deployed environment; and

combining, by the processing system, key fragments of the plurality of encryption key fragments, to obtain a cryptographic session key, wherein a clear text version of encrypted sensitive information is obtained via the cryptographic session key, responsive to the plurality of examination results of the deployed environment falling within the plurality of sensory ranges, and wherein decryption of the encrypted information is prevented via the cryptographic session key, responsive to an examination result of the plurality of examination results of the deployed environment falling outside of the plurality of sensory ranges.

2. The method of claim 1, wherein decryption of the encrypted sensitive information occurs by way of the cryptographic session key, responsive to the cryptographic session key being identical to a symmetric encryption key used to obtain the encrypted sensitive information prior to exposure of the plurality of sensors to the deployed environment, wherein no key exists to decrypt the encrypted sensitive information until the cryptographic session key is obtained.

3. The method of claim 2, wherein the plurality of software agents return the plurality of examination results of the deployed environment, and wherein the cryptographic session key differs from the symmetric encryption key, responsive to an examination result of the plurality of examination results falling within a predetermined unacceptable range.

4. The method of claim 3, wherein the symmetric encryption key is determined before the plurality of sensors are exposed to the deployed environment, wherein the symmetric key used to encrypt the sensitive information is determined before the plurality of sensors exposed to the deployed environment, and wherein the encrypted sensitive information is transferred to a transportable device comprising the plurality of sensors before the transportable device is exposed to the deployed environment.

5. The method of claim 2, wherein the plurality of software agents return the reviews of the plurality of examination results of the deployed environment, and wherein the cryptographic session key matches the symmetric encryption key based on each examination result of the plurality of examination results of the deployed environment falling within a predetermined acceptable range.

6. The method of claim 5, wherein the symmetric encryption key is determined based on a plurality of examinations of a secure environment, wherein the plurality of examinations of the secure environment produce a plurality of examination results that fall within a plurality of predetermined acceptable ranges.

7. The method of claim 6, responsive to the plurality of predetermined acceptable ranges of the deployed environment not being available within the secure environment, applying software functions within the secure environment that produce a correct symmetric encryption key expected in the deployed environment.

8. The method of claim 1, wherein the sensory information comprises a status of a process executing on a transportable device comprising the plurality of sensors, a status of a software agent of the plurality of software agents, and a combination thereof.

9. The method of claim 8, wherein the plurality of sensors are associated with a transportable device comprising a shipping container, equipment of a soldier, a vehicle, a piloted airplane, a drone, an ordinance, or equipment of a pass holder.

10. A system, comprising:

a plurality of sensors;

a processing system including a processor in communication with the plurality of sensors; and

a memory that stores executable instructions that, when executed by the processing system facilitate performance of operations, comprising:

determining sensory information obtained by the plurality of sensors exposed to a predetermined environment, wherein the sensory information comprises a combination of more than one of position and mission status;

evaluating a plurality of examination results, wherein each software agent of a plurality of software agents generates an examination result of the plurality of examination results of the predetermined environment based on a respective range of a plurality of sensory ranges;

wherein a plurality of encryption key fragments are generated by the plurality of software agents based on the plurality of examination results; and

generating a cryptographic session key based on the plurality of encryption key fragments, wherein decryption of encrypted sensitive information is obtained via the cryptographic session key, responsive to the plurality of examination results falling within the plurality of sensory ranges, to obtain a clear text version of the encrypted sensitive information, and wherein decryption of the encrypted sensitive information via the cryptographic session key is prevented, responsive to an examination result of the plurality of examination results falling outside of the plurality of sensory ranges.

11. The system of claim 10, wherein the encrypted sensitive information is decrypted by way of the cryptographic session key, responsive to the cryptographic session key corresponding to a symmetric encryption key used to obtain the encrypted sensitive information, wherein no key exists to decrypt the encrypted sensitive information until the cryptographic session key is obtained.

12. The system of claim 11, wherein the plurality of software agents return the plurality of examination results of the predetermined environment, and wherein the cryptographic session key fails to match the symmetric encryption key based on an examination result of the plurality of examination results falling within a predetermined unacceptable range.

13. The system of claim 12, wherein the symmetric encryption key is determined before the plurality of sensors are exposed to the predetermined environment, wherein the symmetric key is used to encrypt the sensitive information before the plurality of sensors are exposed to the predetermined environment, and wherein the encrypted sensitive information is transferred to a deployable system comprising the plurality of sensors before the deployable system is exposed to the predetermined environment.

14. A machine-readable storage medium, comprising executable instructions that when executed by a processing system including a processor, facilitate performance of operations, comprising:

determining sensory information from a plurality of sensors exposed to a field environment, wherein the sensory information comprises a combination of more than one of position, and mission status;

evaluating a plurality of examination results based on the sensory information, wherein each software agent of a plurality of software agents conducts an examination of the sensory information from a sensor of the plurality of sensors to obtain an examination result of the plurality of examination results of the field environment, wherein the examination of the sensory information from the sensor is based on a respective range of a plurality of sensory ranges, wherein each software agent of the plurality of software agents generates an encryption key fragment of a plurality of encryption key fragments in response to an examination result of the plurality of examination results of the field environment; and

combining the plurality of encryption key fragments, to obtain a field-determined session key, wherein decryption of encrypted sensitive information is obtainable via the field-determined session key, responsive to the plurality of examination results falling within the plurality of sensory ranges, and wherein decryption of the encrypted sensitive information is prevented by way of the field-determined session key, responsive to an examination result of the plurality of examination results of the field environment falling outside of the plurality of sensory ranges.

15. The machine-readable storage medium of claim 14, wherein the encrypted sensitive information is decrypted by way of the field-determined session key, responsive to the field-determined session key matching a previously determined symmetric encryption key used to obtain the encrypted sensitive information, and wherein the previously determined symmetric encryption key is unavailable in the field environment, and wherein the field-determined session key, as a combination of the plurality of encryption key fragments, is only obtainable by way of the plurality of examinations of the field environment.

16. The machine-readable storage medium of claim 15, wherein the plurality of software agents return the plurality of examination results of the field environment, and wherein the field-determined session key matches the symmetric encryption key based on each examination result of the plurality of examination results falling within a predetermined acceptable range.

17. The machine-readable storage medium of claim 16, wherein the symmetric encryption key is determined based on a plurality of examinations of a secure environment, wherein the plurality of examinations of the secure environment produce a plurality of examination results that fall within a plurality of predetermined acceptable ranges.

18. The machine-readable storage medium of claim 17 responsive to the predetermined acceptable ranges of the field environment not being available within the secure the environment, applying software functions within the secure environment that produce a correct symmetric encryption key expected in the field environment.

19. The machine-readable storage medium of claim 14, wherein the sensory information comprises a status of a process executing on a transportable device comprising the plurality of sensors, a status of a software agent of the plurality of software agents, and a combination thereof.

20. The machine-readable storage medium of claim 19, wherein the plurality of sensors are associated with a transportable device comprising a shipping container, equipment of a soldier, a vehicle, a piloted airplane, a drone, an ordinance, or equipment of a pass holder.