US20160232351A1 - Method and device for identifying computer virus variants - Google Patents

Method and device for identifying computer virus variants Download PDF

Info

Publication number
US20160232351A1
US20160232351A1 US15/016,048 US201615016048A US2016232351A1 US 20160232351 A1 US20160232351 A1 US 20160232351A1 US 201615016048 A US201615016048 A US 201615016048A US 2016232351 A1 US2016232351 A1 US 2016232351A1
Authority
US
United States
Prior art keywords
virus
api call
api
matching
call sequence
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Granted
Application number
US15/016,048
Other versions
US10460106B2 (en
Inventor
Yuehua GUO
Honggang Tang
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Banma Zhixing Network Hongkong Co Ltd
Original Assignee
Algoblu Holdings Ltd
Alibaba Group Holding Ltd
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Algoblu Holdings Ltd, Alibaba Group Holding Ltd filed Critical Algoblu Holdings Ltd
Assigned to Algoblu Holdings Limited reassignment Algoblu Holdings Limited ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNORS INTEREST (SEE DOCUMENT FOR DETAILS). Assignors: TANG, Honggang, GUO, Yuehua
Priority to PCT/US2016/016741 priority Critical patent/WO2016127037A1/en
Publication of US20160232351A1 publication Critical patent/US20160232351A1/en
Assigned to ALIBABA GROUP HOLDING LIMITED reassignment ALIBABA GROUP HOLDING LIMITED CORRECTIVE ASSIGNMENT TO CORRECT THE CORRECTIVE ASSIGNMENT TO CORRECT NAME OF ASSIGNEE PREVIOUSLY RECORDED AT REEL: 037669 FRAME: 0374. ASSIGNOR(S) HEREBY CONFIRMS THE ASSIGNMENT. Assignors: TANG, Honggang, GUO, Yuehua
Priority to US16/588,398 priority patent/US11126717B2/en
Application granted granted Critical
Publication of US10460106B2 publication Critical patent/US10460106B2/en
Assigned to BANMA ZHIXING NETWORK (HONG KONG) CO., LIMITED reassignment BANMA ZHIXING NETWORK (HONG KONG) CO., LIMITED ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNORS INTEREST (SEE DOCUMENT FOR DETAILS). Assignors: ALIBABA GROUP HOLDING LIMITED
Expired - Fee Related legal-status Critical Current
Adjusted expiration legal-status Critical

Links

Images

Classifications

    • GPHYSICS
    • G06COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06FELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/50Monitoring users, programs or devices to maintain the integrity of platforms, e.g. of processors, firmware or operating systems
    • G06F21/55Detecting local intrusion or implementing counter-measures
    • G06F21/56Computer malware detection or handling, e.g. anti-virus arrangements
    • G06F21/562Static detection
    • G06F21/564Static detection by virus signature recognition
    • GPHYSICS
    • G06COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06FELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/50Monitoring users, programs or devices to maintain the integrity of platforms, e.g. of processors, firmware or operating systems
    • G06F21/55Detecting local intrusion or implementing counter-measures
    • G06F21/56Computer malware detection or handling, e.g. anti-virus arrangements
    • G06F21/561Virus type analysis
    • GPHYSICS
    • G06COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06FELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/50Monitoring users, programs or devices to maintain the integrity of platforms, e.g. of processors, firmware or operating systems
    • G06F21/55Detecting local intrusion or implementing counter-measures
    • G06F21/56Computer malware detection or handling, e.g. anti-virus arrangements
    • G06F21/568Computer malware detection or handling, e.g. anti-virus arrangements eliminating virus, restoring damaged files

Definitions

  • Embodiments relate to the field of Internet technology and, more particularly, to identifying virus variants.
  • the Android platform has quickly grown to become the smart device operating system with the largest market share because it is free and open source.
  • safety issues including, but not limited to, malwares, worms, Trojans, and botnets are emerging.
  • Developments have been made in combating antivirus technology by those who develop and transmit viruses, including but not limited to, modifying condition codes, using Java reflection call mechanisms, character string decoding technology, as well as fine tuning-function can structure. This creates a large number of virus variants, thereby leading to inefficiency in the detection and removal of the viruses.
  • the antivirus software under the Android platform usually uses the technique of identifying condition codes to detect and remove viruses.
  • those who develop and transmit viruses keep developing techniques to make viruses non-detectable. For example, they use mechanisms such as ProGuard, which mixes feature information of virus programs such as virus class names, function names, and constant strings, to mix the information, carried by viruses and make the current antivirus software incapable of detecting and removing viruses and their variants.
  • Embodiments according to the disclosure provide the identifying of computer virus variants to improve the accuracy of detecting and removing viruses.
  • the present disclosure overcomes the deficiencies explained above by providing techniques for identifying virus variants by a dynamic detecting mechanism, which improves the accuracy of detecting virus variants, as well as enlarges the applicable range of the techniques for detecting and removing viruses. Regardless of whether or not the identity of the virus sample to be tested has been masked by technical means, virus variants may be accurately detected.
  • the dynamic detection mechanism vastly increases the application scope of virus identification and removal technology and greatly improves the virus recall ratio.
  • An embodiment of the present disclosure includes a process to identify virus variants, where the process runs or operates a virus sample to be tested and records an application program interface (API) call sequence produced during the running of the virus sample. Also, a plurality of characteristic API call sequences that respectively correspond to a plurality of virus families are obtained, where each characteristic API call sequence represents the behavior that characterizes the corresponding virus family. The API call sequence produced by running the virus sample to be tested is matched with the plurality of characteristic API call sequences to obtain matching results. Based on the matching results, it is determined whether the virus sample is a type of virus variant by the extent of a match between the API call sequence of the virus sample and at least one of the plurality of characteristic API call sequences that respectively correspond to the plurality of virus families.
  • API application program interface
  • An embodiment of the present disclosure includes an apparatus for identifying virus variants, where the apparatus includes an execution unit, a matching unit, and a recognition unit.
  • the execution unit runs or operates the virus sample to be tested and records an API call sequence produced during the running of the virus sample.
  • the matching unit obtains a plurality of characteristic API call sequences that respectively correspond to a plurality of virus families, where each characteristic API call sequence represents the behavior that characterizes the corresponding virus family.
  • the matching unit matches the API call sequence of the virus sample with the plurality of characteristic API call sequences to obtain a matching result.
  • the recognition unit determines whether the virus sample is a virus variant by the extent of a match between the API call sequence of the virus sample and at least one of the plurality of characteristic API call sequences that respectively correspond to the plurality of virus families.
  • the present disclosure takes the plurality of characteristic API call sequences that respectively correspond to the plurality of virus families as references to monitor the API calls during the running of the virus sample to be tested.
  • the virus sample to be tested may be or possibly be considered to be a virus variant.
  • This dynamic detecting mechanism provides accurate detection of virus variants and expands the applicable range of identification and detection techniques that improve the recall ratio of viruses and decrease the rate of virus manslaughters.
  • the detectable viruses that are referred to in the present disclosure include, but are not limited to, malwares, worms, Trojans, or botnets. Also, the applicable scope of the present disclosure includes, but is not limited to, virus variant techniques aimed at modifying a condition code of a virus.
  • FIG. 1 illustrates a flowchart of a method of identifying virus variants in accordance with an embodiment of the present disclosure.
  • FIG. 2 illustrates a block diagram of an apparatus for identifying virus variants in accordance with an embodiment of the present disclosure.
  • FIG. 3 illustrates a computer system in accordance with one embodiment of the present disclosure.
  • the present disclosure provides a method that identifies virus variants using simulation techniques. This method expands the applicable range for detecting and removing viruses, improves the detection rate, and decreases the rate of virus manslaughters.
  • a feature library of characteristic API call sequences for a plurality of virus families is established to provide information of characteristic API call sequences for identifying virus variants in subsequent stages, where each characteristic API call sequence represents the behavior that characterizes the corresponding virus family.
  • an Android simulation environment is called to pile and mark key APIs in a system.
  • APIs are a set of defined functions designed to provide access to a set of routines based on certain software or hardware, with no need to access the source code for an application program. APIs also assist in understanding the details of how components interact in a program. Piling is performed to record key information of every key API at its spot, such as the calling party of an API, the API name, the API class name, etc.
  • an Android simulator is created to pile and mark the APIs called by the system in the framework or the native layer of the Android system.
  • the Android simulator can record and call data such as the user identification of the program.
  • a virus family is composed of a series of viruses that share the same source. Therefore, based on a virus sample of a virus family, the same characteristic API call sequence that viruses in the same virus family call can be identified and extracted to generate a feature library of characteristic API call sequences that respectively correspond to the plurality of virus families.
  • the API call sequence a virus family shares will be referred to as the characteristic API call sequence of that virus family.
  • the framework logic of the Android simulator may be modified to avoid the wait for the occurrence of a physical triggering event that activates the viruses in the virus family. Instead, the system periodically sends different kinds of simulated self-activated events that are used to trigger the running of the virus sample of the virus family. For example, if the physical triggering event that the virus family “A” depends on is “system activation,” then during the running process of the system, instead of restarting the system during its operation, the simulated self-activation will be programmed periodically to activate “system activation” to indicate to the virus sample of the virus family “A” that its triggering condition has been met and its operation may be initiated.
  • the user's operating environment such as a mobile phone operating environment and personal computer operating environment
  • the user's operating environment may be simulated using “Monkey” and “UI Automator” modules.
  • “Monkey” is a tool to test an Android application package on the Android system automatically.
  • “UI Automator” is a framework that is used on the Android system to conduct automated tests. Users may use the logic of the framework “UI Automator” to write a test case of a certain Android application package.
  • virus variant a1 has called API1, API2, API3, and API4 during operation;
  • virus variant a2 has called API1, API3, API5, and API6;
  • the virus variant a3 has called API2, API3, API6, and API7.
  • the call rates of these three APIs exceed a preset threshold, if the preset threshold is assumed to be 50%. Then, the final choice of the characteristic API call sequence of virus family A may be determined as API1, API2, and API3.
  • the call order of the APIs may or may riot be recorded depending on the application environment.
  • a feature library of characteristic API call sequences may be established and used to provide characteristic API call sequences any time in the subsequent stages.
  • a key API call sequence for each one of the virus families may be selected from the characteristic API call sequences that respectively correspond to the plurality of virus families.
  • the key API call sequences may be stored in the feature library as well.
  • the key API call sequence of each one of the virus families includes the selected key APIs that have been piled and marked from the corresponding characteristic API call sequences. Those key APIs correspond to key operations in the system, such as self-activation, connecting to Internet, obtaining private data, sending text messages, etc.
  • FIG. 1 illustrates a method 1000 of identifying virus variants in accordance with an embodiment of the present disclosure.
  • Step 100 a virus sample to be tested starts to run.
  • Step 110 an API call sequence produced by the virus sample during the running of the virus sample is recorded.
  • a single virus sample to be tested there may be a single virus sample to be tested or a group of virus samples to be tested. Since the detection process is similar for every virus sample to be tested, the present disclosure will discuss the case of a single virus sample to be tested, as an example.
  • an API call sequence is generated in accordance with the API type and call order called during the operation of the virus sample to be tested.
  • the framework logic of the Android simulator may be modified in order to avoid the wait time for the occurrence of a certain physical triggering event that activates the virus sample during the operation of the virus sample. Instead, the system sends different kinds of simulated self-activated events periodically to automatically trigger the activation of viruses in the virus families to be tested.
  • the physical triggering event that activates the operating of viruses in the virus families to be tested relies on is “a user sends a text massage,” during the operating of the system, instead of sending the text messages regularly, the system periodically simulates a self-activating event “sending text message.” This indicates to the virus sample to be tested that the requirements to trigger its activation have been met and the operating of the virus sample may be initiated.
  • the user operating environment such as a mobile phone environment and a personal computer environment, may be simulated by using “Monkey” and “UI Automator” modules.
  • a characteristic API call sequence is obtained for each one of the virus families.
  • the feature library includes a plurality of characteristic API call sequences that respectively correspond to a plurality of virus families, where each characteristic API call sequence represents the behavior that characterizes the corresponding virus family.
  • the API call sequence produced by the virus sample to be tested during its operation is matched with the characteristic API call sequences of the virus families.
  • the matching result is obtained.
  • the generated characteristic API call sequences that respectively correspond to each one of the virus families may be obtained from the feature library of the characteristic API call sequence that has been generated in the preprocessing stage. Then, the API call sequence of the virus sample may be matched with each one of the characteristic API call sequences of the virus families.
  • a string matching algorithm may be adopted.
  • the string matching algorithm may be used to determine whether there is at least one API timing sequence in the API call sequence path of the virus sample that matches to an extent at least one of the characteristic API call sequences of the virus families.
  • the virus sample to be tested may be or possibly be considered to be a virus variant of the virus families.
  • String matching algorithm is an exemplary matching algorithm used in the present disclosure. For example, assuming a call path of a function has a series of virus features “P:p1p2p3p4” and assuming a call path of a function “T:t1t2t3t4t5t6t7t8t9” is obtained after the operation of a virus sample. In order to compare these two call paths using the string matching algorithm, it may be determined whether there is a “p1p2p3p4” call path in the call path “t1t2t3t4t5t6t7t8t9.” The simplest way to perform the matching is first to compare “t1” and “p1” to determine if “t1” and “p1” are equivalent.
  • Examples of classic algorithms in the family of string matching algorithms include the Knuth-Morris-Pratt algorithm and the Boyer-Moore algorithm.
  • the operations that can be conducted include, but are not limited to the following operations: determining a first API type and APT call order called when operating the characteristic API call sequence “1” of the virus family and determining a second API type and API call order called when operating the API call sequence of the virus sample to be tested.
  • the matching rate between the first and second API types and API call orders may be calculated using an algorithm including, but not limited to, a string matching algorithm. If the matching rate reaches a first set limit (e.g., 80%) for at least one of the characteristic APT call sequences of virus families, it may be determined that the matching is complete and successful.
  • a first set limit e.g., 80%
  • a key API call sequence “1” that corresponds to the characteristic API call sequence “1” of the virus family may be selected from the feature library of characteristic API call sequences configured in the preprocessing stage.
  • the key API call sequence “1” includes the key APIs that are appointed and selected from the characteristic API call sequence, which are also interpreted as the piled and marked APIs in the preprocessing stage.
  • the key API is appointed in advance and is able to influence the safe operation of the system.
  • the next step is to determine a third API type and API call order when operating the key API call sequence “1” and to calculate the matching rate between the second and third API types and APT call orders. If the matching rate between the second and third API types and API call orders reaches a second set limit, it may be determined that the matching is complete and successful.
  • the API call sequence of the virus sample to be tested may also be matched with the key API call sequences or one or more of the characteristic API call sequences of the virus families. Alternatively, the matching result may be presented to a client or a user that sent the virus sample. Based on a feedback from the client or the user, it may be determined whether the matching is complete and successful.
  • a supplemental matching may be performed.
  • matching between the API call sequence of the virus sample and the key API call sequences of each one of the virus families is accomplished.
  • This supplemental matching may also be referred as approximate string matching or fuzzy string searching.
  • the matching rate between the API call sequence of the virus sample and the characteristic API call sequence of one of the virus families reaches a limit
  • a more accurate result may be obtained by returning the virus sample to the sender (e.g., administrator) with a notice that it is possible that the virus sample is a new type of virus variant and that a confirmation is requested.
  • the sender e.g., administrator
  • whether or not the virus sample is a new type of virus variant may be recorded in accordance with the instructions from the administrator.
  • Step 150 it is determined whether the matching between the API call sequence of the virus sample and the characteristic API call sequences of the virus families is complete and successful.
  • Step 160 it is determined that the matching is complete and successful.
  • the virus sample to be tested may be determined to be a virus variant depending on the extent of a match between the API call sequence of the virus sample and at least one of the plurality of characteristic API call sequences of the virus families.
  • the API call sequence of this virus sample may be recorded and included in the feature library of characteristic API call sequences. Also, a key API call sequence for the virus sample (or new virus variant) is also selected from the API call sequence of this virus sample (or new virus variant) to be recorded in the feature library of characteristic API call sequences. In this way, the feature library of characteristic API sequences keeps updating according to the matching results of the continuous matching processes to ensure that its data is up to date and effective.
  • FIG. 2 illustrates an apparatus 2000 for identifying virus variants in accordance with an embodiment.
  • the apparatus 2000 includes an execution unit 20 , a matching unit 21 coupled to the execution unit 20 , and a recognition unit 22 coupled to the matching unit 21 .
  • the execution unit 20 , the matching unit 21 , and the recognition unit 22 are implemented in a computer (e.g., 3000 FIG. 3 ) including a memory that is accessible by a processor and/or a GPU (graphics processor unit).
  • the execution unit 20 , the matching unit 21 , and the recognition unit 22 are computer-executable instructions stored in the memory of a computer (e.g., 3000 FIG. 3 ), where the computer-executable instructions are executed by a processor and/or a GPU.
  • the execution unit 20 runs a virus sample to be tested and records an API call sequence produced during the running of the virus sample. Further, the matching unit 21 obtains a characteristic API call sequence of each one of the virus families and matches the API call sequence produced by the virus sample during running with each one of the characteristic API call sequences of each one of the virus families to obtain a matching result. The plurality of characteristic API call sequences that respectively correspond to the plurality of virus families are obtained, where each characteristic API call sequence represents the behavior that characterizes the corresponding virus family. The recognition unit 22 determines, based on the analysis of the matching result, whether the virus sample to be tested is virus variant by extent of a match between the API call sequence of the virus sample to be tested and any one of the characteristic API call sequences of any one of the virus families.
  • the execution unit 20 may further run a set of virus samples of the virus families and record API types and API call orders called during the running of the set of virus samples to generate the characteristic API call sequences for each one of the virus families in order to establish a feature library of characteristic API call sequences.
  • the execution unit 20 may also simulate a physical triggering event that activates the running of a virus according to a set interval during the process of fuming the virus sample to be tested and the running of the set of virus samples.
  • the matching unit 21 may further determine a first API type and API call order called when running any of the characteristic API call sequences of any of the virus families. Also, the matching unit 21 may further determine a second API type and API call order called for the sample virus based on the API call sequence. Then, the matching rate between the first and the second API types and API call orders may be calculated by the matching unit 21 .
  • the recognition unit 22 may further determine whether the API call sequence of the virus sample to be tested matches any of the characteristic API call sequences of any of the virus families by the matching rate meeting a first set limit.
  • the matching unit 21 may further obtain a key API call sequence of any of the virus families and determine a third API type and API call order called based on the key API call sequence during running of the virus family when a notice is received from the recognition unit 22 carrying a message indicating that the matching rate of the first and second API types and API call orders does not meet the first set limit.
  • the key API call sequence includes the appointed key API selected from the characteristic API call sequences of any of the virus families.
  • the key API is preset and is able to influence the safe operation of the system. Then, a second matching rate between the second and third API types and API call orders may be calculated by the matching unit 21 .
  • the recognition unit 22 may further determine whether the API call sequence of the virus sample matches the key API call sequence by determining whether the second matching rate meets a second set limit. The matching is between the second and the third API types and API call orders. Also, the recognition unit 22 may present the matching result to a client or a user that sent the virus sample and may determine whether the API call sequence of the virus sample matches the key API call sequence based on a feedback from the client or the user (or the sender). The calculation may be conducted using a string matching algorithm in an embodiment.
  • FIG. 3 shows a computer system 3000 in accordance with one embodiment of the present disclosure.
  • Computer system 3000 depicts the components of a basic computer system in accordance with embodiments of the present disclosure providing the execution platform for certain hardware-based and software-based functionality.
  • computer system 3000 comprises at least one CPU 101 , a system memory 115 , and at least one graphics processor unit (GPI)) 180 .
  • the CPU 101 can be coupled to the system memory 115 via a bridge component/memory controller (not shown) or can be directly coupled to the system memory 115 via a memory controller (not shown) internal to the CPU 101 .
  • the GPU 180 is coupled to a display 112 .
  • One or more additional GPUs can optionally be coupled to system 3000 to further increase its computational power.
  • System 3000 can be implemented as, for example, a desktop computer system or server computer system, having a powerful general-purpose CPU 101 coupled to a dedicated graphics rendering GPU 180 . In such an embodiment, components can be included that add peripheral buses, specialized graphics memory, IO devices, and the like. Similarly, system 3000 can be implemented as a handheld device (e.g., cellphone, etc.) or a set-top video game console device.
  • the GPU 180 can be implemented as a discrete component, a discrete graphics card designed to couple to the computer system 3000 via a connector (e.g., AGP slot, PCI-Express slot, etc.), a discrete integrated circuit die (e.g., mounted directly on a motherboard), or as an integrated GPU included within the integrated circuit die of a computer system chipset component (not shown). Additionally, a local graphics memory 114 can be included for the GPU 180 for high bandwidth graphics data storage.
  • the call states of the characteristic API call sequences of the virus families are set as references to monitor the call states of the API call sequences produced during running of virus sample to be tested. Regardless of whether the identification of the virus sample is covered by certain techniques or not, as long as the call state of the API call sequence produced during running of the virus sample matches to an extent the call state of any of the characteristic API call sequences of any of the virus families, the virus sample may be or possibly be considered to be a virus variant in the virus family corresponding with that characteristic API call sequence to which it matches to an extent. Thus, the detection of a virus variant is more accurate. By using a dynamic detecting mechanism, the applicable range of the identification and detection techniques is expanded and the recall ratio is improved.
  • the detectable viruses include, but are not limited to, malwares, worms, Trojans, or botnets.
  • the applicable scope of the present disclosure includes, but is not limited to, virus variants techniques such as modifying condition codes, etc.
  • the present disclosure may be provided in the forms of methods, systems, or computer program products. Therefore, the present disclosure may be embodied as an entirely hardware embodiment, entirely software embodiment, or a combination of a hardware and software embodiment. Moreover, the present disclosure may be used in the forms of computer programmable products that adopt one or multiple computer usable storage mediums including, but no limited to, magnetic storage disks, CD-ROMs, or optical storage containing computer usable program codes.
  • each one of the steps and/or blocks in the flow diagrams and/or block diagrams as well as the combinations between each one of the steps/blocks in the flow and/or block diagrams may be embodied by computer program instructions.
  • the computer program instructions may be provided for by general purpose computers, dedicated computers, embedded matching units, or other matching units of programmable data processing devices to generate a device that embodies, by computers or matching units of other programmable data processing devices executing instructions, appointed functions in one or multiple steps in the flow diagrams and/or one or multiple blocks in the block diagrams.
  • These computer instructions may also be stored in computer readable storage mediums that guide computers or other matching units of programmable data processing devices and work in a specified manner to have the instructions that are stored in the computer readable storage mediums produce results.
  • the devices implement functions it one or multiple steps in the flow diagrams and/or one or multiple blocks in the block diagrams.
  • These computer program instructions may also be loaded to computers or other programmable data processing devices to produce computer embodied processing by executing a series of operations on computers or other programmable data processing devices to provide, on computers or other programmable data processing devices, steps to embody appointed functions that can be embodied in one or multiple steps in the flow diagrams and/or one or multiple blocks in the block diagrams.

Landscapes

  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
  • Virology (AREA)
  • Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
  • General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Health & Medical Sciences (AREA)
  • Software Systems (AREA)
  • General Health & Medical Sciences (AREA)
  • General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Stored Programmes (AREA)
  • Measuring Or Testing Involving Enzymes Or Micro-Organisms (AREA)
  • Telephonic Communication Services (AREA)

Abstract

A method and apparatus for identifying computer virus variants are disclosed to improve the accuracy of virus identification and removal, and may relate to the field of internet technology. The method includes running a virus sample to be tested and recording an API call sequence produced during running of the virus sample. The method further includes obtaining a characteristic API call sequence for each one of a plurality of virus families, matching the API call sequence produced during running of the virus sample to be tested with the characteristic API call sequences of the virus families, and obtaining a matching result. The method also includes determining the virus sample to be tested is a virus variant by extent of a match between the API call sequence produced by the virus sample and any characteristic API call sequence of any one of the virus families.

Description

    CROSS-REFERENCE TO RELATED APPLICATION
  • This application claims priority to and the benefit of Chinese Patent Application No. 201510065074.8, filed on Feb. 6, 2015, which is incorporated herein by reference in its entirety.
  • TECHNICAL FIELD
  • Embodiments relate to the field of Internet technology and, more particularly, to identifying virus variants.
  • BACKGROUND
  • Owing to the popularization of Internet technology and smart devices, the Android platform has quickly grown to become the smart device operating system with the largest market share because it is free and open source. However, safety issues including, but not limited to, malwares, worms, Trojans, and botnets are emerging. Developments have been made in combating antivirus technology by those who develop and transmit viruses, including but not limited to, modifying condition codes, using Java reflection call mechanisms, character string decoding technology, as well as fine tuning-function can structure. This creates a large number of virus variants, thereby leading to inefficiency in the detection and removal of the viruses.
  • The antivirus software under the Android platform usually uses the technique of identifying condition codes to detect and remove viruses. However, those who develop and transmit viruses keep developing techniques to make viruses non-detectable. For example, they use mechanisms such as ProGuard, which mixes feature information of virus programs such as virus class names, function names, and constant strings, to mix the information, carried by viruses and make the current antivirus software incapable of detecting and removing viruses and their variants.
  • SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION
  • Embodiments according to the disclosure provide the identifying of computer virus variants to improve the accuracy of detecting and removing viruses. The present disclosure overcomes the deficiencies explained above by providing techniques for identifying virus variants by a dynamic detecting mechanism, which improves the accuracy of detecting virus variants, as well as enlarges the applicable range of the techniques for detecting and removing viruses. Regardless of whether or not the identity of the virus sample to be tested has been masked by technical means, virus variants may be accurately detected. The dynamic detection mechanism vastly increases the application scope of virus identification and removal technology and greatly improves the virus recall ratio.
  • An embodiment of the present disclosure includes a process to identify virus variants, where the process runs or operates a virus sample to be tested and records an application program interface (API) call sequence produced during the running of the virus sample. Also, a plurality of characteristic API call sequences that respectively correspond to a plurality of virus families are obtained, where each characteristic API call sequence represents the behavior that characterizes the corresponding virus family. The API call sequence produced by running the virus sample to be tested is matched with the plurality of characteristic API call sequences to obtain matching results. Based on the matching results, it is determined whether the virus sample is a type of virus variant by the extent of a match between the API call sequence of the virus sample and at least one of the plurality of characteristic API call sequences that respectively correspond to the plurality of virus families.
  • An embodiment of the present disclosure includes an apparatus for identifying virus variants, where the apparatus includes an execution unit, a matching unit, and a recognition unit. The execution unit runs or operates the virus sample to be tested and records an API call sequence produced during the running of the virus sample. The matching unit obtains a plurality of characteristic API call sequences that respectively correspond to a plurality of virus families, where each characteristic API call sequence represents the behavior that characterizes the corresponding virus family. Also, the matching unit matches the API call sequence of the virus sample with the plurality of characteristic API call sequences to obtain a matching result. The recognition unit determines whether the virus sample is a virus variant by the extent of a match between the API call sequence of the virus sample and at least one of the plurality of characteristic API call sequences that respectively correspond to the plurality of virus families.
  • The present disclosure takes the plurality of characteristic API call sequences that respectively correspond to the plurality of virus families as references to monitor the API calls during the running of the virus sample to be tested. As long as there is a match to some extent between the API call sequence of the virus sample and at least one of the plurality of characteristic API call sequences that respectively correspond to the plurality of virus families, regardless of whether or not the identity of the virus sample to be tested is concealed, the virus sample to be tested may be or possibly be considered to be a virus variant. This dynamic detecting mechanism provides accurate detection of virus variants and expands the applicable range of identification and detection techniques that improve the recall ratio of viruses and decrease the rate of virus manslaughters. The detectable viruses that are referred to in the present disclosure include, but are not limited to, malwares, worms, Trojans, or botnets. Also, the applicable scope of the present disclosure includes, but is not limited to, virus variant techniques aimed at modifying a condition code of a virus.
  • BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
  • Embodiments according to the present disclosure will be better understood from a reading of the following detailed description, taken in conjunction with the accompanying figures, in which like reference characters designate like elements.
  • FIG. 1 illustrates a flowchart of a method of identifying virus variants in accordance with an embodiment of the present disclosure.
  • FIG. 2 illustrates a block diagram of an apparatus for identifying virus variants in accordance with an embodiment of the present disclosure.
  • FIG. 3 illustrates a computer system in accordance with one embodiment of the present disclosure.
  • DETAILED DESCRIPTION
  • Reference will now be made in detail to the embodiments of the present disclosure. While the disclosure will be described in conjunction with these embodiments, it will be understood that they are not intended to limit the disclosure to these embodiments. On the contrary, the disclosure is intended to cover alternatives, modifications, and equivalents which may be included within the spirit and scope of the appended claims.
  • Furthermore, in the following detailed description of the present disclosure, numerous specific details are set forth in order to provide a thorough understanding of the present disclosure. However, it will be recognized by one of ordinary skill in the art that the present disclosure may be practiced without these specific details. In other instances, well-known methods, procedures, components, and circuits have not been described in detail so as not to unnecessarily obscure aspects of the present disclosure.
  • In order to improve the accuracy for detecting and removing viruses, the present disclosure provides a method that identifies virus variants using simulation techniques. This method expands the applicable range for detecting and removing viruses, improves the detection rate, and decreases the rate of virus manslaughters.
  • In an embodiment, at a preprocessing stage, a feature library of characteristic API call sequences for a plurality of virus families is established to provide information of characteristic API call sequences for identifying virus variants in subsequent stages, where each characteristic API call sequence represents the behavior that characterizes the corresponding virus family. First, at the preprocessing stage, an Android simulation environment is called to pile and mark key APIs in a system. APIs are a set of defined functions designed to provide access to a set of routines based on certain software or hardware, with no need to access the source code for an application program. APIs also assist in understanding the details of how components interact in a program. Piling is performed to record key information of every key API at its spot, such as the calling party of an API, the API name, the API class name, etc. Since a virus or a virus variant usually calls a few key APIs during operation to implement the virus vandalism, the APIs that possess important impact may be marked as key APIs based on past development experience so that they can be used when identifying viruses and virus variants. Specifically, an Android simulator is created to pile and mark the APIs called by the system in the framework or the native layer of the Android system. The Android simulator can record and call data such as the user identification of the program.
  • There is a feature library of characteristic API call sequences established by recording API types and API call orders called during the running of virus samples of the plurality of virus families to generate a characteristic API call sequence for each one of the virus families. It is appreciated that, in applications, the malicious behaviors of a certain virus family during operation are similar, which means that the behaviors of calling APIs are similar for the same virus family. A virus family is composed of a series of viruses that share the same source. Therefore, based on a virus sample of a virus family, the same characteristic API call sequence that viruses in the same virus family call can be identified and extracted to generate a feature library of characteristic API call sequences that respectively correspond to the plurality of virus families. In the present disclosure, the API call sequence a virus family shares will be referred to as the characteristic API call sequence of that virus family.
  • When running a virus sample of a virus family, the framework logic of the Android simulator may be modified to avoid the wait for the occurrence of a physical triggering event that activates the viruses in the virus family. Instead, the system periodically sends different kinds of simulated self-activated events that are used to trigger the running of the virus sample of the virus family. For example, if the physical triggering event that the virus family “A” depends on is “system activation,” then during the running process of the system, instead of restarting the system during its operation, the simulated self-activation will be programmed periodically to activate “system activation” to indicate to the virus sample of the virus family “A” that its triggering condition has been met and its operation may be initiated.
  • Furthermore, when a known virus sample of a virus family is operating on the Android simulator, the user's operating environment, such as a mobile phone operating environment and personal computer operating environment, may be simulated using “Monkey” and “UI Automator” modules. “Monkey” is a tool to test an Android application package on the Android system automatically. “UI Automator” is a framework that is used on the Android system to conduct automated tests. Users may use the logic of the framework “UI Automator” to write a test case of a certain Android application package. For example, assuming that there are virus variants a1, a2, and a3 in virus family A, the virus variant a1 has called API1, API2, API3, and API4 during operation; the virus variant a2 has called API1, API3, API5, and API6; and the virus variant a3 has called API2, API3, API6, and API7.
  • In the example above, all three virus variants have called API3 and two virus variants have called API1 and API2. Therefore, the call rates of these three APIs exceed a preset threshold, if the preset threshold is assumed to be 50%. Then, the final choice of the characteristic API call sequence of virus family A may be determined as API1, API2, and API3. When recording the characteristic API call sequences for virus families, the call order of the APIs may or may riot be recorded depending on the application environment.
  • Based on the characteristic API call sequence generated for each virus family, a feature library of characteristic API call sequences may be established and used to provide characteristic API call sequences any time in the subsequent stages. After the establishment of a characteristic API call sequence for each one of the virus families, a key API call sequence for each one of the virus families may be selected from the characteristic API call sequences that respectively correspond to the plurality of virus families. The key API call sequences may be stored in the feature library as well. The key API call sequence of each one of the virus families includes the selected key APIs that have been piled and marked from the corresponding characteristic API call sequences. Those key APIs correspond to key operations in the system, such as self-activation, connecting to Internet, obtaining private data, sending text messages, etc.
  • FIG. 1 illustrates a method 1000 of identifying virus variants in accordance with an embodiment of the present disclosure. In Step 100, a virus sample to be tested starts to run. In Step 110, an API call sequence produced by the virus sample during the running of the virus sample is recorded.
  • In applications, there may be a single virus sample to be tested or a group of virus samples to be tested. Since the detection process is similar for every virus sample to be tested, the present disclosure will discuss the case of a single virus sample to be tested, as an example.
  • Specifically, when running or operating the virus sample to be tested, an API call sequence is generated in accordance with the API type and call order called during the operation of the virus sample to be tested. When running the virus sample to be tested, the framework logic of the Android simulator may be modified in order to avoid the wait time for the occurrence of a certain physical triggering event that activates the virus sample during the operation of the virus sample. Instead, the system sends different kinds of simulated self-activated events periodically to automatically trigger the activation of viruses in the virus families to be tested. For example, if the physical triggering event that activates the operating of viruses in the virus families to be tested relies on is “a user sends a text massage,” during the operating of the system, instead of sending the text messages regularly, the system periodically simulates a self-activating event “sending text message.” This indicates to the virus sample to be tested that the requirements to trigger its activation have been met and the operating of the virus sample may be initiated. Furthermore, when the virus sample to be tested is running on the Android simulator, the user operating environment, such as a mobile phone environment and a personal computer environment, may be simulated by using “Monkey” and “UI Automator” modules.
  • In Step 120, a characteristic API call sequence is obtained for each one of the virus families. As explained above, the feature library includes a plurality of characteristic API call sequences that respectively correspond to a plurality of virus families, where each characteristic API call sequence represents the behavior that characterizes the corresponding virus family. In Step 130, in a first matching procedure, the API call sequence produced by the virus sample to be tested during its operation is matched with the characteristic API call sequences of the virus families. In Step 140, the matching result is obtained. Specifically, the generated characteristic API call sequences that respectively correspond to each one of the virus families may be obtained from the feature library of the characteristic API call sequence that has been generated in the preprocessing stage. Then, the API call sequence of the virus sample may be matched with each one of the characteristic API call sequences of the virus families.
  • Since the API call sequence of the virus sample to be tested may require large amount of resources to accomplish the testing in some applications, in order to improve the efficiency of matching the API call sequence of the virus sample to be tested with the characteristic API call sequences of the virus families, a string matching algorithm may be adopted. The string matching algorithm may be used to determine whether there is at least one API timing sequence in the API call sequence path of the virus sample that matches to an extent at least one of the characteristic API call sequences of the virus families. Depending on the extent of the match, the virus sample to be tested may be or possibly be considered to be a virus variant of the virus families.
  • String matching algorithm is an exemplary matching algorithm used in the present disclosure. For example, assuming a call path of a function has a series of virus features “P:p1p2p3p4” and assuming a call path of a function “T:t1t2t3t4t5t6t7t8t9” is obtained after the operation of a virus sample. In order to compare these two call paths using the string matching algorithm, it may be determined whether there is a “p1p2p3p4” call path in the call path “t1t2t3t4t5t6t7t8t9.” The simplest way to perform the matching is first to compare “t1” and “p1” to determine if “t1” and “p1” are equivalent. If they are equivalent, then compare “t2” and “p2” to determine if “t2” and “p2” are equivalent. If “t1” and “p1” are not equivalent, compare “t2” with “p1” to determine if “t2” with “p1” are equivalent. Using the same analogy, the comparisons between each one of the components in the call paths may be conducted using the string matching algorithm until rest of the components in the call paths are compared.
  • Examples of classic algorithms in the family of string matching algorithms include the Knuth-Morris-Pratt algorithm and the Boyer-Moore algorithm.
  • Taking call sequence “1” in a characteristic API call sequence of a virus family as an example, in the process of matching, the operations that can be conducted include, but are not limited to the following operations: determining a first API type and APT call order called when operating the characteristic API call sequence “1” of the virus family and determining a second API type and API call order called when operating the API call sequence of the virus sample to be tested. Once the first and the second API types and APT call orders are determined, the matching rate between the first and second API types and API call orders may be calculated using an algorithm including, but not limited to, a string matching algorithm. If the matching rate reaches a first set limit (e.g., 80%) for at least one of the characteristic APT call sequences of virus families, it may be determined that the matching is complete and successful.
  • Furthermore, if the matching rate between the first and the second API types and API call orders does not reach the first set limit, a key API call sequence “1” that corresponds to the characteristic API call sequence “1” of the virus family may be selected from the feature library of characteristic API call sequences configured in the preprocessing stage. The key API call sequence “1” includes the key APIs that are appointed and selected from the characteristic API call sequence, which are also interpreted as the piled and marked APIs in the preprocessing stage. In an embodiment, the key API is appointed in advance and is able to influence the safe operation of the system.
  • In the second matching procedure, the next step is to determine a third API type and API call order when operating the key API call sequence “1” and to calculate the matching rate between the second and third API types and APT call orders. If the matching rate between the second and third API types and API call orders reaches a second set limit, it may be determined that the matching is complete and successful. The API call sequence of the virus sample to be tested may also be matched with the key API call sequences or one or more of the characteristic API call sequences of the virus families. Alternatively, the matching result may be presented to a client or a user that sent the virus sample. Based on a feedback from the client or the user, it may be determined whether the matching is complete and successful.
  • An operation to record the key API call sequences of each one of the virus families in addition to the characteristic API call sequences of each one of the virus families recorded in the feature library of API sequences exists. Even if the API call sequence of the virus sample to be tested recorded during the operating of the virus sample to be tested does not match to a certain extent any one of the characteristic API call sequences of the any one of the virus families on the record, it may not be concluded that there is no possibility that the virus sample is not a virus variant. In fact, it indicates the possibility that the virus sample is a new type of virus variant. This is possible because there is great variation in the API type and API call order of this virus sample compared to the characteristic API call sequences of the virus families, causing the API call sequence of the virus sample to not match to a certain extent any of the characteristic API call sequences of the existing virus families.
  • In order to avoid non-detection of a virus variant, at the point where there is not a match to a certain extent between the API call sequence of the virus sample and any of the characteristic API call sequences of the virus families on record, a supplemental matching may be performed. In the supplemental matching, matching between the API call sequence of the virus sample and the key API call sequences of each one of the virus families is accomplished. This supplemental matching may also be referred as approximate string matching or fuzzy string searching. In this supplemental matching, if there is a certain key API called during the executing or running of the API call sequence of the virus sample and the call order of this key API is similar to a characteristic API call sequence of one of the virus families, or the matching rate between the API call sequence of the virus sample and the characteristic API call sequence of one of the virus families reaches a limit, it may be determined that the matching is complete and successful and that the virus sample may be considered as a new type of virus variant. A more accurate result may be obtained by returning the virus sample to the sender (e.g., administrator) with a notice that it is possible that the virus sample is a new type of virus variant and that a confirmation is requested. When a feedback from the administrator is received, whether or not the virus sample is a new type of virus variant may be recorded in accordance with the instructions from the administrator.
  • In Step 150, it is determined whether the matching between the API call sequence of the virus sample and the characteristic API call sequences of the virus families is complete and successful. In Step 160, it is determined that the matching is complete and successful. Continuing, in Step 170, the virus sample to be tested may be determined to be a virus variant depending on the extent of a match between the API call sequence of the virus sample and at least one of the plurality of characteristic API call sequences of the virus families.
  • When the virus sample is determined to be a virus variant, the API call sequence of this virus sample (or new virus variant) may be recorded and included in the feature library of characteristic API call sequences. Also, a key API call sequence for the virus sample (or new virus variant) is also selected from the API call sequence of this virus sample (or new virus variant) to be recorded in the feature library of characteristic API call sequences. In this way, the feature library of characteristic API sequences keeps updating according to the matching results of the continuous matching processes to ensure that its data is up to date and effective.
  • FIG. 2 illustrates an apparatus 2000 for identifying virus variants in accordance with an embodiment. The apparatus 2000 includes an execution unit 20, a matching unit 21 coupled to the execution unit 20, and a recognition unit 22 coupled to the matching unit 21. In an embodiment, the execution unit 20, the matching unit 21, and the recognition unit 22 are implemented in a computer (e.g., 3000 FIG. 3) including a memory that is accessible by a processor and/or a GPU (graphics processor unit). In an embodiment, the execution unit 20, the matching unit 21, and the recognition unit 22 are computer-executable instructions stored in the memory of a computer (e.g., 3000 FIG. 3), where the computer-executable instructions are executed by a processor and/or a GPU. The execution unit 20 runs a virus sample to be tested and records an API call sequence produced during the running of the virus sample. Further, the matching unit 21 obtains a characteristic API call sequence of each one of the virus families and matches the API call sequence produced by the virus sample during running with each one of the characteristic API call sequences of each one of the virus families to obtain a matching result. The plurality of characteristic API call sequences that respectively correspond to the plurality of virus families are obtained, where each characteristic API call sequence represents the behavior that characterizes the corresponding virus family. The recognition unit 22 determines, based on the analysis of the matching result, whether the virus sample to be tested is virus variant by extent of a match between the API call sequence of the virus sample to be tested and any one of the characteristic API call sequences of any one of the virus families.
  • The execution unit 20 may further run a set of virus samples of the virus families and record API types and API call orders called during the running of the set of virus samples to generate the characteristic API call sequences for each one of the virus families in order to establish a feature library of characteristic API call sequences. The execution unit 20 may also simulate a physical triggering event that activates the running of a virus according to a set interval during the process of fuming the virus sample to be tested and the running of the set of virus samples.
  • When it is determined that there is a match to a certain extent between the API call sequence of the virus sample to be tested and any of the characteristic API call sequences of any of the virus families based on the matching result, the matching unit 21 may further determine a first API type and API call order called when running any of the characteristic API call sequences of any of the virus families. Also, the matching unit 21 may further determine a second API type and API call order called for the sample virus based on the API call sequence. Then, the matching rate between the first and the second API types and API call orders may be calculated by the matching unit 21.
  • The recognition unit 22 may further determine whether the API call sequence of the virus sample to be tested matches any of the characteristic API call sequences of any of the virus families by the matching rate meeting a first set limit.
  • The matching unit 21 may further obtain a key API call sequence of any of the virus families and determine a third API type and API call order called based on the key API call sequence during running of the virus family when a notice is received from the recognition unit 22 carrying a message indicating that the matching rate of the first and second API types and API call orders does not meet the first set limit. The key API call sequence includes the appointed key API selected from the characteristic API call sequences of any of the virus families. In an embodiment, the key API is preset and is able to influence the safe operation of the system. Then, a second matching rate between the second and third API types and API call orders may be calculated by the matching unit 21.
  • The recognition unit 22 may further determine whether the API call sequence of the virus sample matches the key API call sequence by determining whether the second matching rate meets a second set limit. The matching is between the second and the third API types and API call orders. Also, the recognition unit 22 may present the matching result to a client or a user that sent the virus sample and may determine whether the API call sequence of the virus sample matches the key API call sequence based on a feedback from the client or the user (or the sender). The calculation may be conducted using a string matching algorithm in an embodiment.
  • FIG. 3 shows a computer system 3000 in accordance with one embodiment of the present disclosure. Computer system 3000 depicts the components of a basic computer system in accordance with embodiments of the present disclosure providing the execution platform for certain hardware-based and software-based functionality. In general, computer system 3000 comprises at least one CPU 101, a system memory 115, and at least one graphics processor unit (GPI)) 180. The CPU 101 can be coupled to the system memory 115 via a bridge component/memory controller (not shown) or can be directly coupled to the system memory 115 via a memory controller (not shown) internal to the CPU 101. The GPU 180 is coupled to a display 112. One or more additional GPUs can optionally be coupled to system 3000 to further increase its computational power. The GPU(s) 180 is coupled to the CPU 101 and the system memory 115. System 3000 can be implemented as, for example, a desktop computer system or server computer system, having a powerful general-purpose CPU 101 coupled to a dedicated graphics rendering GPU 180. In such an embodiment, components can be included that add peripheral buses, specialized graphics memory, IO devices, and the like. Similarly, system 3000 can be implemented as a handheld device (e.g., cellphone, etc.) or a set-top video game console device.
  • It should be appreciated that the GPU 180 can be implemented as a discrete component, a discrete graphics card designed to couple to the computer system 3000 via a connector (e.g., AGP slot, PCI-Express slot, etc.), a discrete integrated circuit die (e.g., mounted directly on a motherboard), or as an integrated GPU included within the integrated circuit die of a computer system chipset component (not shown). Additionally, a local graphics memory 114 can be included for the GPU 180 for high bandwidth graphics data storage.
  • In the embodiments discussed above, the call states of the characteristic API call sequences of the virus families are set as references to monitor the call states of the API call sequences produced during running of virus sample to be tested. Regardless of whether the identification of the virus sample is covered by certain techniques or not, as long as the call state of the API call sequence produced during running of the virus sample matches to an extent the call state of any of the characteristic API call sequences of any of the virus families, the virus sample may be or possibly be considered to be a virus variant in the virus family corresponding with that characteristic API call sequence to which it matches to an extent. Thus, the detection of a virus variant is more accurate. By using a dynamic detecting mechanism, the applicable range of the identification and detection techniques is expanded and the recall ratio is improved. The detectable viruses include, but are not limited to, malwares, worms, Trojans, or botnets. The applicable scope of the present disclosure includes, but is not limited to, virus variants techniques such as modifying condition codes, etc.
  • Those skilled in the art should appreciate that the present disclosure may be provided in the forms of methods, systems, or computer program products. Therefore, the present disclosure may be embodied as an entirely hardware embodiment, entirely software embodiment, or a combination of a hardware and software embodiment. Moreover, the present disclosure may be used in the forms of computer programmable products that adopt one or multiple computer usable storage mediums including, but no limited to, magnetic storage disks, CD-ROMs, or optical storage containing computer usable program codes.
  • The present disclosure is presented based on flow diagrams and/or block diagrams of methods, devices or systems, and computer program products of the embodiments of the present disclosure. It should be understood that each one of the steps and/or blocks in the flow diagrams and/or block diagrams as well as the combinations between each one of the steps/blocks in the flow and/or block diagrams may be embodied by computer program instructions. The computer program instructions may be provided for by general purpose computers, dedicated computers, embedded matching units, or other matching units of programmable data processing devices to generate a device that embodies, by computers or matching units of other programmable data processing devices executing instructions, appointed functions in one or multiple steps in the flow diagrams and/or one or multiple blocks in the block diagrams.
  • These computer instructions may also be stored in computer readable storage mediums that guide computers or other matching units of programmable data processing devices and work in a specified manner to have the instructions that are stored in the computer readable storage mediums produce results. The devices implement functions it one or multiple steps in the flow diagrams and/or one or multiple blocks in the block diagrams.
  • These computer program instructions may also be loaded to computers or other programmable data processing devices to produce computer embodied processing by executing a series of operations on computers or other programmable data processing devices to provide, on computers or other programmable data processing devices, steps to embody appointed functions that can be embodied in one or multiple steps in the flow diagrams and/or one or multiple blocks in the block diagrams.
  • It is also necessary to point out that, in the claims and specification of the present disclosure, terms such as “first” and “second” only are for distinguishing an embodiment or an operation from another embodiment or operation. It does not require or imply that those embodiments or operations have any such real relationship or order. Further, as used herein, the terms “comprising,” “including,” or any other variation is intended to cover a non-exclusive inclusion such that a process, method, article, or device that comprises a list of elements does not include only those elements but may include other elements not expressly listed or inherent to such process, method, article, or device. Absent further limitation, elements recited by the phrase “comprising a” do not exclude a process, method, article, or device that comprises such elements from including other same elements.
  • Although certain embodiments and methods have been disclosed herein, it will be apparent from the foregoing disclosure to those skilled in the art that variations and modifications of such embodiments and methods may be made without departing from the spirit and scope of the disclosure. It is intended that the disclosure shall be limited only to the extent required by the appended claims and the rules and principles of applicable law.

Claims (20)

What is claimed:
1. A method of identifying computer virus variants, the method comprising:
running a virus sample to be tested;
recording an API (Application Program Interface) call sequence produced during the running of the virus sample;
obtaining a plurality of characteristic API call sequences that respectively correspond to a plurality of virus families;
matching the API call sequence with the plurality of characteristic API call sequences to obtain a matching result; and
based on the matching result, determining whether the virus sample is a virus variant by extent of a match between the API call sequence and at least one of the plurality of characteristic API call sequences.
2. The method of claim 1, further comprising:
running a set of virus samples of the plurality of virus families;
recording an API type and an API call order called in each one of the plurality of virus families during the running of the set of virus samples;
generating the plurality of characteristic API call sequences by using the recorded API type and the recorded API call order; and
establishing a feature library of the plurality of characteristic API call sequences.
3. The method of claim 2, further comprising:
simulating a physical triggering event that is used to activate the running of a virus according to a set period during the running of the virus sample and the running of the set of virus samples.
4. The method of claim 2, wherein, based on the matching result, the API call sequence of the virus sample matches to an extent at least one of the plurality of characteristic API call sequences that respectively correspond to the plurality of virus families, further comprising:
determining a first API type and API call order called for each one of the plurality of virus families;
determining a second API type and API call order called for the virus sample;
for each one of the plurality of virus families, calculating a matching rate between the first and the second API types and API call orders; and
determining the API call sequence of the virus sample matches at least one of the plurality of characteristic API call sequences by the matching rate meeting a first set limit.
5. The method of claim 4, wherein the matching rate does not meet the first set limit, further comprising:
obtaining a key API call sequence of at least one of the plurality of virus families;
determining a third API type and API call order called for the at least one of the plurality of virus families by using the key API call sequence, herein the key API call sequence includes a key API selected from a characteristic API call sequence that respectively corresponds to the at least one of the plurality of virus families, and wherein the key API is preset and able to affect safe operation of a system; and
generating a second matching result by calculating a second matching rate between the second and the third API types and API call orders.
6. The method of claim 5, further comprising:
determining whether the API call sequence of the virus sample matches the key API call sequence by determining whether the second matching rate meets a second set limit.
7. The method of claim 5, further comprising:
presenting the second matching result to a sender of the virus sample; and
determining whether the API call sequence of the virus sample matches the key API call sequence based on a feedback from the sender.
8. The method of claim 7, wherein the sender includes a client.
9. The method of claim 4, wherein the calculating the matching rate comprises:
using a string matching algorithm.
10. A computer for identifying computer virus variants, comprising:
a processor; and
a memory comprising:
an execution unit configured to run a virus sample to be tested and to record an API call sequence produced during the running of the virus sample;
a matching unit coupled to the execution unit and configured to obtain a plurality of characteristic API call sequences that respectively correspond to a plurality of virus families, to match the API call sequence with the plurality of characteristic API call sequences, and to obtain a matching result; and
a recognition unit coupled to the matching unit and configured, based on the matching result, to determine whether the virus sample is a virus variant by extent of a match between the API call sequence and at least one of the plurality of characteristic API call sequences.
11. The computer of claim 10, wherein the execution unit is further configured: to run a set of virus samples of the plurality of virus families; to record an API type and API call order called during the running of the set of virus samples; to generate the plurality of characteristic API call sequences by using the recorded API type and the recorded API call order; and to establish a feature library of the plurality of characteristic API call sequences.
12. The computer of claim 11, wherein the execution unit is further configured to simulate a physical triggering event that is used to activate the running of a virus during the running of the virus sample and the running of the set of virus samples.
13. The computer of claim 11, wherein, based on the matching result, the API call sequence of the virus sample matches to an extent at least one of the plurality of characteristic API call sequences that respectively correspond to the plurality of virus families, wherein the matching unit is further configured to:
determine a first API type and API call order called for each one of the plurality of virus families;
determine a second API type and API call order called for the virus sample;
for each one of the plurality of virus families, calculate a matching rate between the first and the second API types and API call orders; and
wherein the recognition unit is further configured to determine the API call sequence of the virus sample matches at least one of the plurality of characteristic API call sequences by the matching rate meeting a first set limit.
14. The computer of claim 13, wherein the matching rate does not meet the first set limit in accordance with a notice produced by the recognition unit, wherein the matching unit is further configured to:
obtain a key API call sequence of at least one of plurality of virus families;
determine a third API type and API call order called for the at least one of the plurality of virus families by using the key API call sequence, wherein the key API call sequence includes a key API selected from a characteristic API call sequence that respectively corresponds to the at least one of the plurality of virus families, wherein the key API is preset and able to affect safe operation of a system; and
generate a second matching result by calculating a second matching rate between the second and the third API types and API call orders.
15. The computer of claim 14, wherein the recognition unit is further configured to determine whether the API call sequence of the virus sample matches the key API call sequence by determining whether the second matching rate meets a second set limit.
16. The computer of claim 14, wherein the recognition unit is further configured to present the second matching result to a sender of the virus sample and to determine whether the API call sequence of the virus sample matches the key API call sequence based on a feedback from the sender.
17. The computer of claim 16, wherein the sender includes a client.
18. The computer of claim 13, wherein the matching unit is further configured to calculate the matching rate by using a string matching algorithm.
19. A method of identifying computer virus variants, the method comprising:
performing a first matching procedure between an API call sequence of a virus sample and a plurality of characteristic API call sequences that respectively correspond to a plurality of virus families to generate a first matching result including a first matching rate; and
if the first matching rate does not meet a first set limit, performing a second matching procedure between the API call sequence of the virus sample and a key API call sequence of at least one of the plurality of virus families to generate a second matching result including a second matching rate; and
using at least one of the first matching result or the second matching result to determine whether the virus sample is a virus variant.
20. The method of claim 19, further comprising:
calculating at least one of the first matching result or the second matching result by using a string matching algorithm.
US15/016,048 2015-02-06 2016-02-04 Method and device for identifying computer virus variants Expired - Fee Related US10460106B2 (en)

Priority Applications (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
PCT/US2016/016741 WO2016127037A1 (en) 2015-02-06 2016-02-05 Method and device for identifying computer virus variants
US16/588,398 US11126717B2 (en) 2015-02-06 2019-09-30 Techniques for identifying computer virus variant

Applications Claiming Priority (3)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
CN201510065074.8 2015-02-06
CN201510065074 2015-02-06
CN201510065074.8A CN105989283B (en) 2015-02-06 2015-02-06 A kind of method and device identifying virus mutation

Related Child Applications (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
US16/588,398 Continuation US11126717B2 (en) 2015-02-06 2019-09-30 Techniques for identifying computer virus variant

Publications (2)

Publication Number Publication Date
US20160232351A1 true US20160232351A1 (en) 2016-08-11
US10460106B2 US10460106B2 (en) 2019-10-29

Family

ID=56566017

Family Applications (2)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
US15/016,048 Expired - Fee Related US10460106B2 (en) 2015-02-06 2016-02-04 Method and device for identifying computer virus variants
US16/588,398 Active 2036-02-28 US11126717B2 (en) 2015-02-06 2019-09-30 Techniques for identifying computer virus variant

Family Applications After (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
US16/588,398 Active 2036-02-28 US11126717B2 (en) 2015-02-06 2019-09-30 Techniques for identifying computer virus variant

Country Status (3)

Country Link
US (2) US10460106B2 (en)
CN (1) CN105989283B (en)
TW (1) TW201629832A (en)

Cited By (10)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
CN107220546A (en) * 2017-06-27 2017-09-29 广东欧珀移动通信有限公司 Using operation method, device and terminal device
CN109214178A (en) * 2017-06-30 2019-01-15 中国电信股份有限公司 APP application malicious act detection method and device
CN109241742A (en) * 2018-10-23 2019-01-18 北斗智谷(北京)安全技术有限公司 A kind of recognition methods of rogue program and electronic equipment
US10192053B2 (en) * 2014-12-19 2019-01-29 Baidu Online Network Technology (Beijing) Co., Ltd. Method, apparatus, system, device and computer storage medium for treating virus
WO2019156718A1 (en) * 2018-02-06 2019-08-15 Didi Research America, Llc System and method for program security protection
US11270016B2 (en) 2018-09-12 2022-03-08 British Telecommunications Public Limited Company Ransomware encryption algorithm determination
US11449612B2 (en) 2018-09-12 2022-09-20 British Telecommunications Public Limited Company Ransomware remediation
US11481498B2 (en) * 2019-01-28 2022-10-25 Visa International Service Association Continuous vulnerability management for modern applications
US11677757B2 (en) 2017-03-28 2023-06-13 British Telecommunications Public Limited Company Initialization vector identification for encrypted malware traffic detection
US12008102B2 (en) 2018-09-12 2024-06-11 British Telecommunications Public Limited Company Encryption key seed determination

Families Citing this family (19)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
CN105989283B (en) 2015-02-06 2019-08-09 阿里巴巴集团控股有限公司 A kind of method and device identifying virus mutation
JP2018109910A (en) * 2017-01-05 2018-07-12 富士通株式会社 Similarity determination program, similarity determination method, and information processing apparatus
JP6866645B2 (en) 2017-01-05 2021-04-28 富士通株式会社 Similarity determination program, similarity determination method and information processing device
CN107682314A (en) * 2017-08-30 2018-02-09 北京明朝万达科技股份有限公司 A kind of detection method and device of APT attacks
CN109472134B (en) * 2017-12-25 2022-04-19 北京安天网络安全技术有限公司 Method and system for extracting control terminal based on API (application program interface) calling sequence
CN108804922A (en) * 2018-05-30 2018-11-13 郑州云海信息技术有限公司 A kind of determined property method of unknown code
CN110210219B (en) * 2018-05-30 2023-04-18 腾讯科技(深圳)有限公司 Virus file identification method, device, equipment and storage medium
CN110944332B (en) * 2018-09-21 2023-05-02 武汉安天信息技术有限责任公司 Short message interception horse detection method and device
CN109492391B (en) * 2018-11-05 2023-02-28 腾讯科技(深圳)有限公司 Application program defense method and device and readable medium
CN110399720B (en) * 2018-12-14 2022-12-16 腾讯科技(深圳)有限公司 File detection method and related device
CN110414228B (en) * 2018-12-20 2023-01-03 腾讯科技(深圳)有限公司 Computer virus detection method and device, storage medium and computer equipment
CN109815700B (en) * 2018-12-29 2021-10-01 360企业安全技术(珠海)有限公司 Application program processing method and device, storage medium and computer equipment
US10929276B2 (en) * 2019-06-14 2021-02-23 Paypal, Inc. Simulation computing services for testing application functionalities
CN112580041B (en) * 2019-09-30 2023-07-07 奇安信安全技术(珠海)有限公司 Malicious program detection method and device, storage medium and computer equipment
CN112580043B (en) * 2019-09-30 2023-08-01 奇安信安全技术(珠海)有限公司 Virtual machine-based disinfection method and device, storage medium and computer equipment
CN112580042B (en) * 2019-09-30 2024-02-02 奇安信安全技术(珠海)有限公司 Method and device for combating malicious programs, storage medium and computer equipment
DE202020106660U1 (en) 2020-11-19 2020-12-04 Dominik Heinzelmann Lifting aid
CN114969734B (en) * 2022-05-16 2024-05-14 北京航空航天大学 Lesovirus variant detection method based on API call sequence
CN117540385B (en) * 2024-01-09 2024-03-29 北京数基信息有限公司 Script file monitoring method, system and storage medium

Citations (3)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US20100115620A1 (en) * 2008-10-30 2010-05-06 Secure Computing Corporation Structural recognition of malicious code patterns
US8555385B1 (en) * 2011-03-14 2013-10-08 Symantec Corporation Techniques for behavior based malware analysis
US9165142B1 (en) * 2013-01-30 2015-10-20 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Malware family identification using profile signatures

Family Cites Families (35)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
JP2501771B2 (en) 1993-01-19 1996-05-29 インターナショナル・ビジネス・マシーンズ・コーポレイション Method and apparatus for obtaining multiple valid signatures of an unwanted software entity
US5440723A (en) 1993-01-19 1995-08-08 International Business Machines Corporation Automatic immune system for computers and computer networks
US6479055B1 (en) 1993-06-07 2002-11-12 Trimeris, Inc. Methods for inhibition of membrane fusion-associated events, including respiratory syncytial virus transmission
US6017536A (en) 1993-06-07 2000-01-25 Trimeris, Inc. Simian immunodeficiency virus peptides with antifusogenic and antiviral activities
US5684875A (en) 1994-10-21 1997-11-04 Ellenberger; Hans Method and apparatus for detecting a computer virus on a computer
US6067618A (en) 1998-03-26 2000-05-23 Innova Patent Trust Multiple operating system and disparate user mass storage resource separation for a computer system
US6347375B1 (en) 1998-07-08 2002-02-12 Ontrack Data International, Inc Apparatus and method for remote virus diagnosis and repair
US6356937B1 (en) 1999-07-06 2002-03-12 David Montville Interoperable full-featured web-based and client-side e-mail system
US6792543B2 (en) 2001-08-01 2004-09-14 Networks Associates Technology, Inc. Virus scanning on thin client devices using programmable assembly language
US7356736B2 (en) 2001-09-25 2008-04-08 Norman Asa Simulated computer system for monitoring of software performance
US7266844B2 (en) 2001-09-27 2007-09-04 Mcafee, Inc. Heuristic detection of polymorphic computer viruses based on redundancy in viral code
US7478431B1 (en) 2002-08-02 2009-01-13 Symantec Corporation Heuristic detection of computer viruses
WO2004104825A1 (en) 2003-05-15 2004-12-02 Applianz Technologies, Inc. Systems and methods of creating and accessing software simulated computers
US7284273B1 (en) 2003-05-29 2007-10-16 Symantec Corporation Fuzzy scanning system and method
US7360253B2 (en) 2004-12-23 2008-04-15 Microsoft Corporation System and method to lock TPM always ‘on’ using a monitor
US20070083930A1 (en) 2005-10-11 2007-04-12 Jim Dumont Method, telecommunications node, and computer data signal message for optimizing virus scanning
US7822782B2 (en) 2006-09-21 2010-10-26 The University Of Houston System Application package to automatically identify some single stranded RNA viruses from characteristic residues of capsid protein or nucleotide sequences
US20110047618A1 (en) 2006-10-18 2011-02-24 University Of Virginia Patent Foundation Method, System, and Computer Program Product for Malware Detection, Analysis, and Response
US8250655B1 (en) 2007-01-12 2012-08-21 Kaspersky Lab, Zao Rapid heuristic method and system for recognition of similarity between malware variants
CN101632083A (en) 2007-05-09 2010-01-20 国际商业机器公司 A method and data processing system to prevent manipulation of computer systems
US20090313700A1 (en) * 2008-06-11 2009-12-17 Jefferson Horne Method and system for generating malware definitions using a comparison of normalized assembly code
US9781148B2 (en) * 2008-10-21 2017-10-03 Lookout, Inc. Methods and systems for sharing risk responses between collections of mobile communications devices
US20100154062A1 (en) 2008-12-16 2010-06-17 Elad Baram Virus Scanning Executed Within a Storage Device to Reduce Demand on Host Resources
US8424091B1 (en) * 2010-01-12 2013-04-16 Trend Micro Incorporated Automatic local detection of computer security threats
US20120124007A1 (en) 2010-11-16 2012-05-17 F-Secure Corporation Disinfection of a file system
US20120173155A1 (en) 2010-12-30 2012-07-05 St. Louis University Network threading approach for predicting a patient's response to hepatitis c virus therapy
CN102622536B (en) * 2011-01-26 2014-09-03 中国科学院软件研究所 Method for catching malicious codes
CN102930206B (en) 2011-08-09 2015-02-25 腾讯科技(深圳)有限公司 Cluster partitioning processing method and cluster partitioning processing device for virus files
CN102930210B (en) 2012-10-14 2015-11-25 江苏金陵科技集团有限公司 Rogue program behavior automated analysis, detection and classification system and method
US9202053B1 (en) 2013-02-27 2015-12-01 Trend Micro Inc. MBR infection detection using emulation
US9311480B2 (en) 2013-03-15 2016-04-12 Mcafee, Inc. Server-assisted anti-malware client
US9438620B2 (en) * 2013-10-22 2016-09-06 Mcafee, Inc. Control flow graph representation and classification
CN103839005B (en) * 2013-11-22 2016-09-28 北京智谷睿拓技术服务有限公司 The malware detection method of Mobile operating system and malware detection system
US9652362B2 (en) * 2013-12-06 2017-05-16 Qualcomm Incorporated Methods and systems of using application-specific and application-type-specific models for the efficient classification of mobile device behaviors
CN105989283B (en) 2015-02-06 2019-08-09 阿里巴巴集团控股有限公司 A kind of method and device identifying virus mutation

Patent Citations (3)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US20100115620A1 (en) * 2008-10-30 2010-05-06 Secure Computing Corporation Structural recognition of malicious code patterns
US8555385B1 (en) * 2011-03-14 2013-10-08 Symantec Corporation Techniques for behavior based malware analysis
US9165142B1 (en) * 2013-01-30 2015-10-20 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Malware family identification using profile signatures

Cited By (11)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US10192053B2 (en) * 2014-12-19 2019-01-29 Baidu Online Network Technology (Beijing) Co., Ltd. Method, apparatus, system, device and computer storage medium for treating virus
US11677757B2 (en) 2017-03-28 2023-06-13 British Telecommunications Public Limited Company Initialization vector identification for encrypted malware traffic detection
CN107220546A (en) * 2017-06-27 2017-09-29 广东欧珀移动通信有限公司 Using operation method, device and terminal device
CN109214178A (en) * 2017-06-30 2019-01-15 中国电信股份有限公司 APP application malicious act detection method and device
WO2019156718A1 (en) * 2018-02-06 2019-08-15 Didi Research America, Llc System and method for program security protection
US10853457B2 (en) 2018-02-06 2020-12-01 Didi Research America, Llc System and method for program security protection
US11270016B2 (en) 2018-09-12 2022-03-08 British Telecommunications Public Limited Company Ransomware encryption algorithm determination
US11449612B2 (en) 2018-09-12 2022-09-20 British Telecommunications Public Limited Company Ransomware remediation
US12008102B2 (en) 2018-09-12 2024-06-11 British Telecommunications Public Limited Company Encryption key seed determination
CN109241742A (en) * 2018-10-23 2019-01-18 北斗智谷(北京)安全技术有限公司 A kind of recognition methods of rogue program and electronic equipment
US11481498B2 (en) * 2019-01-28 2022-10-25 Visa International Service Association Continuous vulnerability management for modern applications

Also Published As

Publication number Publication date
TW201629832A (en) 2016-08-16
US11126717B2 (en) 2021-09-21
CN105989283A (en) 2016-10-05
CN105989283B (en) 2019-08-09
US10460106B2 (en) 2019-10-29
US20200026854A1 (en) 2020-01-23

Similar Documents

Publication Publication Date Title
US11126717B2 (en) Techniques for identifying computer virus variant
WO2020019484A1 (en) Simulator recognition method, recognition device, and computer readable medium
Rathnayaka et al. An efficient approach for advanced malware analysis using memory forensic technique
US8533831B2 (en) Systems and methods for alternating malware classifiers in an attempt to frustrate brute-force malware testing
US9798981B2 (en) Determining malware based on signal tokens
US9239922B1 (en) Document exploit detection using baseline comparison
WO2020019485A1 (en) Simulator identification method, identification device, and computer readable medium
US20110277033A1 (en) Identifying Malicious Threads
WO2020019483A1 (en) Emulator identification method, identification device, and computer readable medium
CN110929264B (en) Vulnerability detection method and device, electronic equipment and readable storage medium
TW201220118A (en) A method and a system for automatically analyzing and classifying a malicious program
US10607011B1 (en) Method to detect zero-day malware applications using dynamic behaviors
US20240104205A1 (en) Malware detection based on user interactions
CN106326737A (en) System and method for detecting harmful files executable on a virtual stack machine
CN108898014B (en) Virus checking and killing method, server and electronic equipment
US11809556B2 (en) System and method for detecting a malicious file
CN106415577B (en) System and method for identifying the source of a suspicious event
WO2019019356A1 (en) Application program test method and apparatus, computer device and storage medium
CN110298173A (en) The detection Malware hiding by the delay circulation of software program
WO2016127037A1 (en) Method and device for identifying computer virus variants
CN109145589B (en) Application program acquisition method and device
CN105447348B (en) A kind of hidden method of display window, device and user terminal
US11321453B2 (en) Method and system for detecting and classifying malware based on families
JP6258189B2 (en) Specific apparatus, specific method, and specific program
CN111131223B (en) Test method and device for click hijacking

Legal Events

Date Code Title Description
AS Assignment

Owner name: ALGOBLU HOLDINGS LIMITED, CAYMAN ISLANDS

Free format text: ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNORS INTEREST;ASSIGNORS:GUO, YUEHUA;TANG, HONGGANG;SIGNING DATES FROM 20160203 TO 20160204;REEL/FRAME:037669/0374

STPP Information on status: patent application and granting procedure in general

Free format text: RESPONSE TO NON-FINAL OFFICE ACTION ENTERED AND FORWARDED TO EXAMINER

STPP Information on status: patent application and granting procedure in general

Free format text: NOTICE OF ALLOWANCE MAILED -- APPLICATION RECEIVED IN OFFICE OF PUBLICATIONS

AS Assignment

Owner name: ALIBABA GROUP HOLDING LIMITED, CAYMAN ISLANDS

Free format text: CORRECTIVE ASSIGNMENT TO CORRECT THE CORRECTIVE ASSIGNMENT TO CORRECT NAME OF ASSIGNEE PREVIOUSLY RECORDED AT REEL: 037669 FRAME: 0374. ASSIGNOR(S) HEREBY CONFIRMS THE ASSIGNMENT;ASSIGNORS:GUO, YUEHUA;TANG, HONGGANG;SIGNING DATES FROM 20160203 TO 20160204;REEL/FRAME:050258/0414

STPP Information on status: patent application and granting procedure in general

Free format text: PUBLICATIONS -- ISSUE FEE PAYMENT VERIFIED

STCF Information on status: patent grant

Free format text: PATENTED CASE

AS Assignment

Owner name: BANMA ZHIXING NETWORK (HONG KONG) CO., LIMITED, HONG KONG

Free format text: ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNORS INTEREST;ASSIGNOR:ALIBABA GROUP HOLDING LIMITED;REEL/FRAME:054328/0726

Effective date: 20201028

FEPP Fee payment procedure

Free format text: MAINTENANCE FEE REMINDER MAILED (ORIGINAL EVENT CODE: REM.); ENTITY STATUS OF PATENT OWNER: LARGE ENTITY

LAPS Lapse for failure to pay maintenance fees

Free format text: PATENT EXPIRED FOR FAILURE TO PAY MAINTENANCE FEES (ORIGINAL EVENT CODE: EXP.); ENTITY STATUS OF PATENT OWNER: LARGE ENTITY

STCH Information on status: patent discontinuation

Free format text: PATENT EXPIRED DUE TO NONPAYMENT OF MAINTENANCE FEES UNDER 37 CFR 1.362

FP Lapsed due to failure to pay maintenance fee

Effective date: 20231029