US20150345884A1 - Remotely authorizing and disabling weapons - Google Patents
Remotely authorizing and disabling weapons Download PDFInfo
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- US20150345884A1 US20150345884A1 US14/291,088 US201414291088A US2015345884A1 US 20150345884 A1 US20150345884 A1 US 20150345884A1 US 201414291088 A US201414291088 A US 201414291088A US 2015345884 A1 US2015345884 A1 US 2015345884A1
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- F—MECHANICAL ENGINEERING; LIGHTING; HEATING; WEAPONS; BLASTING
- F41—WEAPONS
- F41A—FUNCTIONAL FEATURES OR DETAILS COMMON TO BOTH SMALLARMS AND ORDNANCE, e.g. CANNONS; MOUNTINGS FOR SMALLARMS OR ORDNANCE
- F41A17/00—Safety arrangements, e.g. safeties
- F41A17/06—Electric or electromechanical safeties
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- F—MECHANICAL ENGINEERING; LIGHTING; HEATING; WEAPONS; BLASTING
- F41—WEAPONS
- F41A—FUNCTIONAL FEATURES OR DETAILS COMMON TO BOTH SMALLARMS AND ORDNANCE, e.g. CANNONS; MOUNTINGS FOR SMALLARMS OR ORDNANCE
- F41A17/00—Safety arrangements, e.g. safeties
- F41A17/06—Electric or electromechanical safeties
- F41A17/063—Electric or electromechanical safeties comprising a transponder
Definitions
- FIG. 3 shows a flowchart illustrating a method of initializing the weapon
- FIG. 7 shows a flowchart 700 illustrating an exemplary process performed at the weapon 100 for authorizing the weapon in an embodiment of the present disclosure. Once issued, the weapon periodically performs this process to either maintain or alter its authorization state.
- FIG. 8 shows a schematic illustration of the processes illustrated in the flowchart of FIG. 7 .
- the processor 112 operates the monitoring program 116 to receive a transmitted authorization message 502 from the authorization center 200 .
- the processor 112 compares the weapon ID 510 included in the authorization message 512 with the weapon ID 125 stored at the weapon 100 .
- Box 706 if the weapon ID 510 matches the stored weapon ID 125 , the process proceeds to Box 708 . Otherwise, the process proceeds to Box 710 , in which the weapon is disabled or de-authorized.
- the weapon 100 may additionally be de-authorized by stopping or interrupting the timed authorization messages. This therefore results in a “dead man's switch” in which the destruction or interruption of the authorization center 200 or of its transmitter 202 causes the weapon 100 to be de-authorized by default.
- the dead man's switch prevents, for example, an opposing army or force from capturing the weapon and then blocking or otherwise interfering with a de-authorization message.
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Abstract
A weapon, a method of authorizing the weapon and weapon security system are disclosed. An authorization string is stored at the weapon. An authorization message may be received at the weapon from an authorization center. A processor at the weapon may obtain a first substring from the authorization message, the first substring being obtained from a copy of the authorization string. The processor compares the first substring to a second substring and authorizes the weapon when the first substring matches the second substring.
Description
- The present invention relates to weapons security, and more specifically, to a system and method for authorizing or de-authorizing a weapon remotely.
- In times of war, with two warring parties attempting to cause destruction and death to the each other, it is possible for weapons from a first party to be captured or otherwise obtained by a second party. These captured weapons may then be used against the first party, the very party that brought them into the field of battle, or against other parties. The impact of losing these weapons to the second party can therefore result in lost lives to the first party or its allies and can sway an outcome of a battle or skirmish or provide the means for terror attacks elsewhere. Considering another situation, a first party may supply weapons to a second party, which sells the weapons to a third party, which then uses the weapons against a fourth party. Thus, the present method of proliferating arms may have unintended consequences. Therefore weapons security, or the ability to prevent such weapons from being used counter to their intended purposes, is an important aspect of warfare.
- In one aspect, the present disclosure provides a method of authorizing a weapon, including: storing an authorization string at the weapon; receiving an authorization message at the weapon that includes a first substring obtained from a copy of the authorization string; comparing the first substring to a second substring obtained from the authorization string stored at the weapon; and authorizing the weapon when the first substring matches the second substring.
- In another aspect, the present disclosure provides a weapon, the weapon including: a memory configured to store an authorization string; a receiver configured to receive a first substring obtained from a copy of the authorization string; and a processor configured to: obtain a second substring from the authorization string stored in memory, compare the first substring to the second substring, and authorize the weapon when the first substring matches the second substring.
- In another aspect, the present disclosure provides a weapon security system, the system including: an authorization center that transmits an authorization message that includes a first substring obtained from a copy of an authorization string; and a weapon that includes: a memory configured to store the authorization string; a receiver configured to receive the authorization message; and a processor configured to: obtain the first substring from the received authorization message; obtain a second substring from the authorization string stored in memory, compare the first substring to the second substring, and authorize the weapon when the first substring matches the second substring.
- Additional features and advantages are realized through the techniques of the present invention. Other embodiments and aspects of the invention are described in detail herein and are considered a part of the claimed invention. For a better understanding of the invention with the advantages and the features, refer to the description and to the drawings.
- The subject matter which is regarded as the invention is particularly pointed out and distinctly claimed in the claims at the conclusion of the specification. The forgoing and other features, and advantages of the invention are apparent from the following detailed description taken in conjunction with the accompanying drawings in which:
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FIG. 1 illustrates anexemplary weapon 100 in one embodiment of the present invention; -
FIG. 2 shows an exemplary authorization center that communicates with the exemplary weapon ofFIG. 1 in order to place the weapon into a selected authorization state; -
FIG. 3 shows a flowchart illustrating a method of initializing the weapon; -
FIG. 4 shows a flowchart illustrating a process for sending an authorization message from the authorization center to a weapon in the field, in one embodiment; -
FIG. 5 schematically illustrates the method described in the flowchart ofFIG. 4 ; -
FIG. 6 shows an example of a transformation method which determines a starting location from the transmission time; -
FIG. 7 shows a flowchart illustrating an exemplary process performed at the weapon for authorizing the weapon in an embodiment of the present disclosure; and -
FIG. 8 shows a schematic illustration of the processes illustrated in the flowchart ofFIG. 7 . -
FIG. 1 illustrates anexemplary weapon 100 in one embodiment of the present invention. The weapon in various embodiments may include a gun, a missile, an explosive, etc. Theweapon 100 may include apayload 102 and apayload delivery system 104. Theweapon 100 may further include anactivation system 106 that activates thedelivery system 104 to delivery thepayload 102. In one example, theweapon 100 may be a missile such that thepayload 102 is an explosive material, generally at a forward location of theweapon 100, and thedelivery system 104 is a propellant generally ejected from an aft location of theweapon 100. Theactivation system 106 may be a trigger mechanism, switch or an electronic signal that activates thedelivery system 104. Theactivation system 106 may be coupled mechanically or electronically to anauthorization unit 108. Theauthorization unit 108 may be used to enable (authorize) or disable (de-authorize) theactivation system 106 and thus enable or disable theweapon 100 by determining an authorization state of theweapon 100 using the methods disclosed herein. In other words, theauthorization unit 108 places theweapon 100 into either an authorized state or an unauthorized state. In the authorized state, theweapon 100 is armed and can be fired, detonated, or otherwise used. In the unauthorized state, theweapon 100 is essentially harmless and may be prevented from being fired, detonated, or otherwise used. In one example, theauthorization unit 108 may prevent theactivation system 106 from activating thedelivery system 104. In another example, theauthorization unit 108 may perform an action, such as sending a “disarm” signal to adisarming unit 126 that disarms the payload. - The
authorization unit 108 may include acontrol unit 110 for performing various methods disclosed herein for placing theweapon 100 into either the authorized state or the unauthorized state. Thecontrol unit 110 may include aprocessor 112 that performs the various methods and processes described herein. Theprocessor 112 may have access to amemory device 114 that may includevarious programs processor 112, enable theprocessor 112 to perform the various methods for selecting or determining the authorization state of theweapon 100. Thememory device 114 may be any non-transitory computer-readable medium such as a solid-state memory device. In various embodiments, thememory device 114 may include a read-only memory (ROM), a programmable read-only memory (PROM), or other suitable memory type. - The
memory device 114 may further contain an encoded string of bits, also referred to as a stored authorization string orfirst authorization string 124 that is used when determining the authorization state of theweapon 100. Thememory device 114 also stores a weapon identification 125 (also referred to herein as a weapon ID or WID) that identifies theweapon 100. Theweapon ID 125 may be unique to theweapon 100 or may be an identification number or code that is uniquely assigned to a group of weapons, so that the entire group of weapons may be responsive to thesame weapon ID 125. Thememory device 114 also stores amaximum authorization interval 123 that determines the maximum period of time that may elapse since the last authorization without causing the weapon to be disabled. - The
authorization unit 108 also includes various additional components that ensure the operation of theauthorization unit 108. These components include apower supply 130, areceiver 132 and its associatedantenna 134, and aclock 136.Power supply 130 provides power to thecontrol unit 110,processor 112,receiver 132,clock 136 and any other electrical components used in the authorization and/or deployment of theweapon 100.Receiver 132 andantenna 134 may be suitable for communication over any selected radio frequency or other selected frequency of the electromagnetic spectrum.Clock 136 may be an internal digital clock or any suitable type of clock for maintaining time to a suitable degree of accuracy. For the purposes of authorizing/de-authorizing theweapon 100,clock 136 keeps a count of elapsed time since the weapon has been issued and/or since the most recent completed authorization. Whenever theweapon 100 is re-issued or re-authorized, the elapsed time stored in theclock 136 may be reset to t=0, or the time of authorization may be stored in such a way as to allow calculation of elapsed time from the time at which the weapon is re-issued or most recently re-authorized. When the time between receiving authorization messages exceed the maximum authorization interval, the weapon may be automatically disabled. Issuance of the weapon is discussed below with respect toFIG. 3 . Upon issue of theweapon 100, the activation time of theclock 136 is stored at an authorization center, as discussed below with respect toFIG. 2 . - Referring further to
FIG. 1 , thememory device 114 of theweapon 100 may contain, among other programs, amonitoring program 116, an encryption/decryption program 118, amatching program 120 and anauthorization program 122. Theprocessor 112 may run theseprograms weapon 100. Themonitoring program 116 includes a set of instructions that cause thereceiver 132 to listen continuously or periodically at a designated interval for radio frequency messages transmitted on a specified frequency or set of frequencies and to identify and record a transmitted authorization message (seeFIG. 5 , 512) when a weapon ID in the authorization message matches astored weapon ID 125 that is stored in thememory device 114 of theparticular weapon 100. - Once the
weapon 100 receives an authorization message and is authorized, if theclock 136 counts to a selected value K before themonitoring program 116 receives a next authorization signal, theweapon 100 will shut down or de-authorize. Whenever aweapon 100 is issued, itsweapon ID 125 is stored in itsmemory 114 and itsinternal clock 136 starts to count from an assigned or selected start time. In one embodiment, the assigned start time may be selected to be represented by t=0. However, the assigned start time may be any recorded time, such as an issue time, a re-issue time, an authorization time, a re-authorization time or other time suitable for the purposes described herein. Every time the weapon re-authorizes, the clock is reset to a new assigned start time and begins its count from the new assigned start time. - In another embodiment, the
monitoring program 116 may have access to theclock 136 and activate thereceiver 132 periodically to listen for the transmitted authorization message at an end of a selected time interval as indicated by theclock 136. The selected time interval may be, for example, 12 hours, 24 hours, 30 minutes, etc. Listening periodically may be used in order to preserve battery life. - The encryption/
decryption program 118 includes a set of instructions that obtains the authorization message and obtains a first substring or first encrypted substring from the authorization message. The encryption/decryption program 118 may then obtain a second substring from the storedauthorization string 124. The encryption/decryption program 118 may use a conversion formula or encryption formula that provides a “one-way” conversion or encryption to obtain a second encrypted substring from the second substring. A “one-way” conversion formula may be a formula that can be performed easily and/or in a relatively short amount of time, but for which the inverse of the conversion formula is difficult or time-intensive to perform. - The
matching program 120 includes a set of instructions that compares the first substring to the second substring. Theauthorization program 122 includes a set of instructions that select an authorization state of theweapon 100 based on the results of thematching program 120. In one embodiment, theauthorization program 122 prevents the arming and/or firing of theweapon 100 when thematching program 122 does not register a match between the received message and stored data. In another embodiment, theauthorization program 122 prevents the arming and/or firing of theweapon 100 when the interval since last authorization (stored in the clock 136) exceeds themaximum authorization interval 123. Methods for authorizing the weapon are discussed below with respect toFIGS. 5 and 6 . - Referring now to
FIG. 2 ,FIG. 2 shows anexemplary authorization center 200 that communicates with theexemplary weapon 100 ofFIG. 1 in order to place theweapon 100 into a selected authorization state. Theauthorization center 200 includes one ormore transmitters 202 and associated antenna(s) 204 for transmitting an authorization message to theweapon 100. Theauthorization center 200 further includes aprocessor 206 having access to amemory device 208 andvarious programs 210 stored therein that when accessed by theprocessor 206, enable theprocessor 206 to transmit a selected authorization message to one or more weapons. Thememory device 208 may have a database orvarious memory locations exemplary memory location 212 may include a weapon ID, as well as an authorization string and an activation time of theweapon 100. Thememory device 208 may be any non-transitory computer-readable medium such as a solid-state memory device, read-only memory (ROM), programmable read-only memory (PROM), etc. -
FIG. 3 shows aflowchart 300 illustrating a method of initializingweapon 100. The method shown inflowchart 300 prepares the authorization center (200,FIG. 2 ) and the weapon (100,FIG. 1 ) so that the authorization method disclosed herein may be executed. Prior to issuing theweapon 100, a computer or other device generates a random string of bits, referred to herein as an authorization string (Box 302). In various embodiments, this authorization string is generally a large string, such as greater than 1 gigabyte. Inbox 304, theauthorization string 124 and theweapon ID 125 of theweapon 100 is stored at thememory device 114 of theweapon 100. Inbox 306, when theweapon 100 is issued, the authorization string, weapon ID and activation time is stored at thememory device 208 of theauthorization center 200, such as atmemory location 212. Theclock 136 of theweapon 100 records the activation time using an initiation signal at theauthorization center 200. Any interlocks and/or anti-tampering devices and/or programs that prevent theweapon 100 from being altered, analyzed, interrogated, reprogrammed, or disassembled by unauthorized personnel may then be applied. -
FIG. 4 shows aflowchart 400 illustrating a process for sending an authorization message from theauthorization center 200 to aweapon 100 in the field, in one embodiment.FIG. 5 schematically illustrates the method described in theflowchart 400 ofFIG. 4 . Referring toFIGS. 4 and 5 , inBox 402, anauthorization string 502 is obtained or accessed. Theauthorization string 502 is generally the authorization string that is stored at theauthorization center 200 ofFIG. 2 . InBox 404, a first substring (SS) 504 is selected from theauthorization string 502 based on a selected transmission time of an authorization message. Eachauthorization message 502 has one or more associated time slots (also referred to herein as transmission time (TT)) for transmitting theauthorization message 502. - The
first substring 504 may be obtained using a hashing algorithm or other suitable transformation algorithm. In one embodiment, the hashing algorithm is used to transform the transmission time into a starting location (SL) in the authorization string.FIG. 6 shows an example of a transformation method which determines a starting location from the transmission time. For illustrative purposes, time is shown in time array 602 and increases in a downward direction on the page. The authorization string 604 is shown having a plurality of bit locations, where the numbering of the bit locations increase in a downward direction on the page. Arrows 606 indicate the effects of applying transformation algorithm to select the SL for a selected TT. The transformation may be a non-sequential transformation. For example, a scheduled first TT may be transformed to obtain an SL of 9797, while a second TT that is scheduled for five seconds after the first TT may be transformed to obtain an SL of 183, which is less than 9797. - Referring back to
FIGS. 4 and 5 , inBox 406 thefirst substring 504 is encrypted to obtain a first encrypted substring (ESS) 506. Inbox 408, thefirst ESS 506,TT 508, and theweapon ID 510 are concatenated to each other or otherwise combined to obtain anauthorization message 512. In another embodiment, the transmission time (TT) may be encrypted to obtain encrypted transmission time (ETT). Theauthorization message 512 may then include thefirst ESS 506, theETT 508 and theweapon ID 510. Inbox 410, theauthorization message 512 is transmitted to theweapon 100. -
FIG. 7 shows aflowchart 700 illustrating an exemplary process performed at theweapon 100 for authorizing the weapon in an embodiment of the present disclosure. Once issued, the weapon periodically performs this process to either maintain or alter its authorization state.FIG. 8 shows a schematic illustration of the processes illustrated in the flowchart ofFIG. 7 . InBox 702, theprocessor 112 operates themonitoring program 116 to receive a transmittedauthorization message 502 from theauthorization center 200. InBox 704, theprocessor 112 compares theweapon ID 510 included in theauthorization message 512 with theweapon ID 125 stored at theweapon 100. InBox 706, if theweapon ID 510 matches the storedweapon ID 125, the process proceeds toBox 708. Otherwise, the process proceeds toBox 710, in which the weapon is disabled or de-authorized. - In
Box 708,TT 508 is obtained from theauthorization message 512. If an encrypted transmission time (ETT) has been sent in the authorization message, encryption/decryption program 118 may be performed on the ETT to obtain itscorresponding TT 508. The obtainedTT 508 is then compared to a reception time (RT) of the message. The reception time may be determined from theclock 136 of theweapon 100. If the difference between TT and RT is less than a selected time threshold Δ (e.g., Δ=3 seconds) then the method proceeds toBox 716. Otherwise, the method proceeds to Box 718 at which point the attempt to re-authorize the weapon is discontinued. - In
Box 716, theTT 508 received via transmission of theauthorization message 512 is used to obtain asecond substring 702 from theauthorization string 124. The same hashing algorithm that is used to select a starting location for the first substring at theauthorization center 200 may be used to select the starting location of the second substring at theweapon 100. Proceeding toBox 718, theprocessor 112 runs an encryption algorithm on thesecond substring 802 to obtain a secondencrypted substring 804. The secondencrypted substring 804 is then compared to the received (first)ESS 506. InBox 720, if theencrypted substrings Box 722. If theencrypted substrings first ESS 506 and second ESS 804) match exactly bit-for-bit. InBox 722, theprocessor 112 maintains or places theweapon 100 into an authorized state. FromBox 722, theprocessor 112 may start themonitoring program 116 again atBox 702 so as to be able to run the authorization process again at the end of the next time interval. - The
weapon 100 is therefore in an authorized state only temporarily, i.e., until a time at which a next authorization signal is expected to be received. At some point at or prior to the end of this time interval, the authorization state must be renewed by the methods disclosed herein or the weapon will be disabled or de-authorized. Therefore, a default state of theweapon 100 is an unauthorized or disabled state. - The amount of time between receiving a valid authorization message and disabling the weapon may be selected to be greater than the product of the number of weapon IDs and the time required to transmit one authorization message, so that weapons may be maintained in an authorized state in a given theater of operation. As an example, let K=the number of seconds since receiving a valid authorization message before a weapon becomes disabled, N=the maximum number of weapon IDs being issued using a same frequency or transmission system in a selected theater of operation, and L=the length of time needed or allotted to transmit a single authorization message, including any buffering time that may be required between messages. Therefore, K>N*L in order for all weapons in the theater to maintain their authorization state given normal authorization operations. For example, if it takes 1 second to transmit an authorization message and there are 10,000 unique weapon IDs in the theater of operation assigned to the same frequency or group of frequencies, K will need to be greater than 10,000 seconds (about 2.8 hours). Otherwise, a weapon may de-authorize before its next authorization message is even transmitted. Having the weapon listen continuously for the authorization message may allow authorization messages to be sent more frequently than necessary, providing redundancy and increased reliability
- If weapon IDs are assigned to groups of weapons in a theater of operation, the number of unique weapon IDs may be less than the number of weapons in the theater. For example, by assigning weapon IDs to groups, 1200 unique IDs may be used rather than 10,000 unique IDs. This may allow authorization messages to be transmitted more frequently than necessary, thereby reducing the probability that a weapon misses an authorization message and disables or de-authorizes the weapon inadvertently. Therefore, in the above scenario, one may transmit each of the weapons' authorization messages in a non-stop loop that is 20 minutes in duration, rather than using a non-stop loop that is 10,000 seconds (about 2.8 hours) in duration.
- The time interval between authorization messages may be set at a duration that is appropriate to the circumstances in which the
weapon 100 is being issued. For example, a 12-hour authorization interval or a daily authorization interval may allow aweapon 100 to be used in a local theater of operations, but still prevent theweapon 100 from being shipped any considerable distance. Alternatively, a short authorization time interval may be chosen, with the option that several re-authorizations may be missed in sequence before the weapon is disabled or de-authorized. This allows theweapon 100 to remain authorized in the face of issues that may arise that may cause authorization messages to occasionally be missed, such as jamming, static, accidental shielding, etc. - The
weapon 100 may additionally be de-authorized by stopping or interrupting the timed authorization messages. This therefore results in a “dead man's switch” in which the destruction or interruption of theauthorization center 200 or of itstransmitter 202 causes theweapon 100 to be de-authorized by default. The dead man's switch prevents, for example, an opposing army or force from capturing the weapon and then blocking or otherwise interfering with a de-authorization message. - While the invention is described with respect to artillery, weapons and weaponry, the method of authorizing and de-authorizing may also be used in other devices and/or systems not specifically disclosed herein.
- The terminology used herein is for the purpose of describing particular embodiments only and is not intended to be limiting of the invention. As used herein, the singular forms “a,” “an” and “the” are intended to include the plural forms as well, unless the context clearly indicates otherwise. It will be further understood that the terms “comprises” and/or “comprising,” when used in this specification, specify the presence of stated features, integers, steps, operations, elements, and/or components, but do not preclude the presence or addition of one more other features, integers, steps, operations, element components, and/or groups thereof.
- The corresponding structures, materials, acts, and equivalents of all means or step plus function elements in the claims below are intended to include any structure, material, or act for performing the function in combination with other claimed elements as specifically claimed. The description of the present invention has been presented for purposes of illustration and description, but is not intended to be exhaustive or limited to the invention in the form disclosed. Many modifications and variations will be apparent to those of ordinary skill in the art without departing from the scope and spirit of the invention. The embodiment was chosen and described in order to best explain the principles of the invention and the practical application, and to enable others of ordinary skill in the art to understand the invention for various embodiments with various modifications as are suited to the particular use contemplated
- The flow diagrams depicted herein are just one example. There may be many variations to this diagram or the steps (or operations) described therein without departing from the spirit of the invention. For instance, the steps may be performed in a differing order or steps may be added, deleted, or modified. All of these variations are considered a part of the claimed invention.
- While the preferred embodiment to the invention had been described, it will be understood that those skilled in the art, both now and in the future, may make various improvements and enhancements which fall within the scope of the claims which follow. These claims should be construed to maintain the proper protection for the invention first described.
Claims (22)
1. A method of authorizing a weapon, comprising:
storing an authorization string at the weapon;
receiving an authorization message at the weapon that includes a first substring obtained from a copy of the authorization string;
comparing the first substring to a second substring obtained from the authorization string stored at the weapon; and
authorizing the weapon when the first substring matches the second substring.
2. The method of claim 1 , further comprising de-authorizing and thereby disabling the weapon when the weapon is not re-authorized within a selected time interval.
3. The method of claim 1 , wherein comparing the first substring to the second substring further comprises encrypting the first substring to obtain a first encrypted substring, encrypting the second substring to obtain a second encrypted substring, and comparing the first encrypted substring to the second encrypted substring.
4. The method of claim 1 , wherein the received authorization message includes receiving a transmission time of the authorization message, the method further comprising using the received transmission time to obtain the second substring of from the authorization string stored at the weapon.
5. The method of claim 3 , further comprising using the transmission time to determine a starting location for selecting the first substring from the copy and to determine a starting location for selecting the second substring the stored authorization string.
6. The method of claim 1 , further comprising authorizing the weapon when:
(i) the weapon obtains the authorization message before the end of a selected time interval;
(ii) the weapon identification associated with the authorization message matches a weapon identification stored at the weapon;
(iii) a difference between a reception time of the authorization message and a transmission time of the authorization message is less than a selected time threshold; and
(iv) the first encrypted substring matches the second encrypted substring.
7. The method of claim 1 , wherein the authorization message includes an encrypted transmission time, the method further comprising decrypting the transmission time at the weapon.
8. The method of claim 1 wherein the weapon shares a weapon identification with one or more additional weapons and the weapon and the one or more additional weapons are authorized using a same authorization message.
9. A weapon, comprising:
a memory configured to store an authorization string;
a receiver configured to receive a first substring obtained from a copy of the authorization string; and
a processor configured to:
obtain a second substring from the authorization string stored in memory,
compare the first substring to the second substring, and
authorize the weapon when the first substring matches the second substring.
10. The weapon of claim 9 , wherein the processor is further configured to receive first encrypted substring corresponding to the first substring, select and encrypt the second substring to obtain a second encrypted substring, and compare the first encrypted substring to the second encrypted substring.
11. The weapon of claim 9 , wherein the authorization message includes a transmission time of the authorization message and the processor is further configured to obtain the second substring of from the authorization string stored at the weapon using the received transmission time.
12. The weapon of claim 11 , wherein the transmission time is further configured to obtain a starting location for selecting the first substring from the copy of the authorization string.
13. The weapon of claim 9 , wherein the processor is further configured to authorize the weapon when:
(i) the weapon obtains the authorization message before the end of a selected time interval;
(ii) the weapon identification associated with the authorization message matches a weapon identification stored at the weapon;
(iii) a difference between a reception time of the authorization message and a transmission time of the authorization message is less than a selected time threshold; and
(iv) the first encrypted substring matches the second encrypted substring.
14. The weapon of claim 9 , wherein the processor is further configured to decrypt an encrypted transmission time included in the received authorization message.
15. The weapon of claim 9 , wherein a weapon identification of the weapon is the same as a weapon identification of one or more additional weapons and the processor authorizes the weapon use the same authorization message used to authorized the one or more additional weapons.
16. A weapon security system, comprising:
an authorization center that transmits an authorization message that includes a first substring obtained from a copy of an authorization string; and
a weapon that includes:
a memory configured to store the authorization string;
a receiver configured to receive the authorization message; and
a processor configured to:
obtain the first substring from the received authorization message;
obtain a second substring from the authorization string stored in memory,
compare the first substring to the second substring, and
authorize the weapon when the first substring matches the second substring.
17. The weapon security system of claim 16 , wherein the processor is further configured to receive first encrypted substring corresponding to the first substring, encrypt the second substring to obtain a second encrypted substring, and compare the first encrypted substring to the second encrypted substring.
18. The weapon security system of claim 16 , wherein a transmission time is used to obtain the first substring form the copy of the authorization message and to obtain the second substring from the authorization string stored at the weapon.
19. The weapon security system of claim 16 , wherein the processor is further configured to disarm the weapon when the weapon does not receive a valid authorization message by the end of the selected time interval.
20. The weapon security system of claim 16 , wherein the processor is configured to decrypt an encrypted transmission time included in the received authorization message to obtain the transmission time of the authorization message at the weapon.
21. The weapon security system of claim 16 , wherein the processor is configured to authorize the weapon when:
(i) the weapon obtains the authorization message before the end of a selected time interval;
(ii) the weapon identification associated with the authorization message matches a weapon identification stored at the weapon;
(iii) a difference between a reception time of the authorization message and a transmission time of the authorization message is less than a selected time threshold; and
(iv) the first encrypted substring matches the second encrypted substring.
22. The weapon security system of claim 16 , further comprising a plurality of weapons having a same weapon identification, wherein the authorization center transmits the authorization message to the plurality of weapons to authorize the plurality of weapons as a group.
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US3888181A (en) | 1959-09-10 | 1975-06-10 | Us Army | Munition control system |
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