US20150244828A1 - Thwarting traffic analysis - Google Patents

Thwarting traffic analysis Download PDF

Info

Publication number
US20150244828A1
US20150244828A1 US14/316,529 US201414316529A US2015244828A1 US 20150244828 A1 US20150244828 A1 US 20150244828A1 US 201414316529 A US201414316529 A US 201414316529A US 2015244828 A1 US2015244828 A1 US 2015244828A1
Authority
US
United States
Prior art keywords
transmission
data packets
communication device
wireless communication
profile
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Abandoned
Application number
US14/316,529
Inventor
Robin Heydon
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Qualcomm Technologies International Ltd
Original Assignee
Cambridge Silicon Radio Ltd
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Priority claimed from GB1403314.6A external-priority patent/GB2512733B/en
Priority claimed from GB1403312.0A external-priority patent/GB2515853B/en
Application filed by Cambridge Silicon Radio Ltd filed Critical Cambridge Silicon Radio Ltd
Assigned to CAMBRIDGE SILICON RADIO LIMITED reassignment CAMBRIDGE SILICON RADIO LIMITED ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNORS INTEREST (SEE DOCUMENT FOR DETAILS). Assignors: HEYDON, ROBIN
Publication of US20150244828A1 publication Critical patent/US20150244828A1/en
Assigned to QUALCOMM TECHNOLOGIES INTERNATIONAL, LTD. reassignment QUALCOMM TECHNOLOGIES INTERNATIONAL, LTD. CHANGE OF NAME (SEE DOCUMENT FOR DETAILS). Assignors: CAMBRIDGE SILICON RADIO LIMITED
Abandoned legal-status Critical Current

Links

Images

Classifications

    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/30—Authentication, i.e. establishing the identity or authorisation of security principals
    • G06F21/44—Program or device authentication
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L43/00—Arrangements for monitoring or testing data switching networks
    • H04L43/08—Monitoring or testing based on specific metrics, e.g. QoS, energy consumption or environmental parameters
    • H04L43/0805—Monitoring or testing based on specific metrics, e.g. QoS, energy consumption or environmental parameters by checking availability
    • H04L43/0817—Monitoring or testing based on specific metrics, e.g. QoS, energy consumption or environmental parameters by checking availability by checking functioning
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/70—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer
    • G06F21/71—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer to assure secure computing or processing of information
    • G06F21/73—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer to assure secure computing or processing of information by creating or determining hardware identification, e.g. serial numbers
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/70—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer
    • G06F21/71—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer to assure secure computing or processing of information
    • G06F21/76—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer to assure secure computing or processing of information in application-specific integrated circuits [ASIC] or field-programmable devices, e.g. field-programmable gate arrays [FPGA] or programmable logic devices [PLD]
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q10/00—Administration; Management
    • G06Q10/08—Logistics, e.g. warehousing, loading or distribution; Inventory or stock management
    • G06Q10/083—Shipping
    • G06Q10/0833—Tracking
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04B—TRANSMISSION
    • H04B7/00—Radio transmission systems, i.e. using radiation field
    • H04B7/14—Relay systems
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04H—BROADCAST COMMUNICATION
    • H04H20/00—Arrangements for broadcast or for distribution combined with broadcast
    • H04H20/65—Arrangements characterised by transmission systems for broadcast
    • H04H20/71—Wireless systems
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L41/00—Arrangements for maintenance, administration or management of data switching networks, e.g. of packet switching networks
    • H04L41/08—Configuration management of networks or network elements
    • H04L41/0803—Configuration setting
    • H04L41/0813—Configuration setting characterised by the conditions triggering a change of settings
    • H04L41/082—Configuration setting characterised by the conditions triggering a change of settings the condition being updates or upgrades of network functionality
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L41/00—Arrangements for maintenance, administration or management of data switching networks, e.g. of packet switching networks
    • H04L41/08—Configuration management of networks or network elements
    • H04L41/0803—Configuration setting
    • H04L41/084—Configuration by using pre-existing information, e.g. using templates or copying from other elements
    • H04L41/0846—Configuration by using pre-existing information, e.g. using templates or copying from other elements based on copy from other elements
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L41/00—Arrangements for maintenance, administration or management of data switching networks, e.g. of packet switching networks
    • H04L41/08—Configuration management of networks or network elements
    • H04L41/085—Retrieval of network configuration; Tracking network configuration history
    • H04L41/0853—Retrieval of network configuration; Tracking network configuration history by actively collecting configuration information or by backing up configuration information
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L41/00—Arrangements for maintenance, administration or management of data switching networks, e.g. of packet switching networks
    • H04L41/12—Discovery or management of network topologies
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L41/00—Arrangements for maintenance, administration or management of data switching networks, e.g. of packet switching networks
    • H04L41/14—Network analysis or design
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L43/00—Arrangements for monitoring or testing data switching networks
    • H04L43/06—Generation of reports
    • H04L43/065—Generation of reports related to network devices
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L43/00—Arrangements for monitoring or testing data switching networks
    • H04L43/08—Monitoring or testing based on specific metrics, e.g. QoS, energy consumption or environmental parameters
    • H04L43/0852—Delays
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L43/00—Arrangements for monitoring or testing data switching networks
    • H04L43/08—Monitoring or testing based on specific metrics, e.g. QoS, energy consumption or environmental parameters
    • H04L43/0876—Network utilisation, e.g. volume of load or congestion level
    • H04L43/0882—Utilisation of link capacity
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L43/00—Arrangements for monitoring or testing data switching networks
    • H04L43/10—Active monitoring, e.g. heartbeat, ping or trace-route
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L45/00—Routing or path finding of packets in data switching networks
    • H04L45/02—Topology update or discovery
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L47/00—Traffic control in data switching networks
    • H04L47/10—Flow control; Congestion control
    • H04L47/11—Identifying congestion
    • H04L47/115—Identifying congestion using a dedicated packet
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L47/00—Traffic control in data switching networks
    • H04L47/10—Flow control; Congestion control
    • H04L47/16—Flow control; Congestion control in connection oriented networks, e.g. frame relay
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L49/00—Packet switching elements
    • H04L49/15—Interconnection of switching modules
    • H04L49/1553—Interconnection of ATM switching modules, e.g. ATM switching fabrics
    • H04L49/1584—Full Mesh, e.g. knockout
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L5/00—Arrangements affording multiple use of the transmission path
    • H04L5/003—Arrangements for allocating sub-channels of the transmission path
    • H04L5/0053—Allocation of signaling, i.e. of overhead other than pilot signals
    • H04L5/0055—Physical resource allocation for ACK/NACK
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/06—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network
    • H04L63/061—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network for key exchange, e.g. in peer-to-peer networks
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
    • H04L63/0853—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities using an additional device, e.g. smartcard, SIM or a different communication terminal
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/14—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for detecting or protecting against malicious traffic
    • H04L63/1441—Countermeasures against malicious traffic
    • H04L63/1475—Passive attacks, e.g. eavesdropping or listening without modification of the traffic monitored
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/14—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for detecting or protecting against malicious traffic
    • H04L63/1441—Countermeasures against malicious traffic
    • H04L63/1491—Countermeasures against malicious traffic using deception as countermeasure, e.g. honeypots, honeynets, decoys or entrapment
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/18—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security using different networks or channels, e.g. using out of band channels
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L67/00—Network arrangements or protocols for supporting network services or applications
    • H04L67/2866—Architectures; Arrangements
    • H04L67/30—Profiles
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L69/00—Network arrangements, protocols or services independent of the application payload and not provided for in the other groups of this subclass
    • H04L69/22—Parsing or analysis of headers
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0861—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0861—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0877—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords using additional device, e.g. trusted platform module [TPM], smartcard, USB or hardware security module [HSM]
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/04—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/06—Authentication
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/50—Secure pairing of devices
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W16/00—Network planning, e.g. coverage or traffic planning tools; Network deployment, e.g. resource partitioning or cells structures
    • H04W16/18—Network planning tools
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W24/00—Supervisory, monitoring or testing arrangements
    • H04W24/06—Testing, supervising or monitoring using simulated traffic
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W4/00—Services specially adapted for wireless communication networks; Facilities therefor
    • H04W4/02—Services making use of location information
    • H04W4/029—Location-based management or tracking services
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W4/00—Services specially adapted for wireless communication networks; Facilities therefor
    • H04W4/06—Selective distribution of broadcast services, e.g. multimedia broadcast multicast service [MBMS]; Services to user groups; One-way selective calling services
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W4/00—Services specially adapted for wireless communication networks; Facilities therefor
    • H04W4/30—Services specially adapted for particular environments, situations or purposes
    • H04W4/38—Services specially adapted for particular environments, situations or purposes for collecting sensor information
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W4/00—Services specially adapted for wireless communication networks; Facilities therefor
    • H04W4/70—Services for machine-to-machine communication [M2M] or machine type communication [MTC]
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W4/00—Services specially adapted for wireless communication networks; Facilities therefor
    • H04W4/80—Services using short range communication, e.g. near-field communication [NFC], radio-frequency identification [RFID] or low energy communication
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W40/00—Communication routing or communication path finding
    • H04W40/24—Connectivity information management, e.g. connectivity discovery or connectivity update
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W52/00—Power management, e.g. TPC [Transmission Power Control], power saving or power classes
    • H04W52/02—Power saving arrangements
    • H04W52/0209—Power saving arrangements in terminal devices
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W52/00—Power management, e.g. TPC [Transmission Power Control], power saving or power classes
    • H04W52/02—Power saving arrangements
    • H04W52/0209—Power saving arrangements in terminal devices
    • H04W52/0225—Power saving arrangements in terminal devices using monitoring of external events, e.g. the presence of a signal
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W52/00—Power management, e.g. TPC [Transmission Power Control], power saving or power classes
    • H04W52/02—Power saving arrangements
    • H04W52/0209—Power saving arrangements in terminal devices
    • H04W52/0251—Power saving arrangements in terminal devices using monitoring of local events, e.g. events related to user activity
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W52/00—Power management, e.g. TPC [Transmission Power Control], power saving or power classes
    • H04W52/02—Power saving arrangements
    • H04W52/0209—Power saving arrangements in terminal devices
    • H04W52/0261—Power saving arrangements in terminal devices managing power supply demand, e.g. depending on battery level
    • H04W52/0274—Power saving arrangements in terminal devices managing power supply demand, e.g. depending on battery level by switching on or off the equipment or parts thereof
    • H04W52/028—Power saving arrangements in terminal devices managing power supply demand, e.g. depending on battery level by switching on or off the equipment or parts thereof switching on or off only a part of the equipment circuit blocks
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W52/00—Power management, e.g. TPC [Transmission Power Control], power saving or power classes
    • H04W52/04—TPC
    • H04W52/38—TPC being performed in particular situations
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W64/00—Locating users or terminals or network equipment for network management purposes, e.g. mobility management
    • H04W64/003—Locating users or terminals or network equipment for network management purposes, e.g. mobility management locating network equipment
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W72/00—Local resource management
    • H04W72/12—Wireless traffic scheduling
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W72/00—Local resource management
    • H04W72/20—Control channels or signalling for resource management
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W76/00—Connection management
    • H04W76/10—Connection setup
    • H04W76/11—Allocation or use of connection identifiers
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W76/00—Connection management
    • H04W76/10—Connection setup
    • H04W76/14—Direct-mode setup
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W8/00—Network data management
    • H04W8/22—Processing or transfer of terminal data, e.g. status or physical capabilities
    • H04W8/24—Transfer of terminal data
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W8/00—Network data management
    • H04W8/22—Processing or transfer of terminal data, e.g. status or physical capabilities
    • H04W8/24—Transfer of terminal data
    • H04W8/245—Transfer of terminal data from a network towards a terminal
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W84/00—Network topologies
    • H04W84/18—Self-organising networks, e.g. ad-hoc networks or sensor networks
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W88/00—Devices specially adapted for wireless communication networks, e.g. terminals, base stations or access point devices
    • H04W88/02—Terminal devices
    • H04W88/04—Terminal devices adapted for relaying to or from another terminal or user
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W88/00—Devices specially adapted for wireless communication networks, e.g. terminals, base stations or access point devices
    • H04W88/02—Terminal devices
    • H04W88/06—Terminal devices adapted for operation in multiple networks or having at least two operational modes, e.g. multi-mode terminals
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W92/00—Interfaces specially adapted for wireless communication networks
    • H04W92/02—Inter-networking arrangements
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/60—Context-dependent security
    • H04W12/69—Identity-dependent
    • H04W12/77—Graphical identity
    • Y—GENERAL TAGGING OF NEW TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS; GENERAL TAGGING OF CROSS-SECTIONAL TECHNOLOGIES SPANNING OVER SEVERAL SECTIONS OF THE IPC; TECHNICAL SUBJECTS COVERED BY FORMER USPC CROSS-REFERENCE ART COLLECTIONS [XRACs] AND DIGESTS
    • Y02—TECHNOLOGIES OR APPLICATIONS FOR MITIGATION OR ADAPTATION AGAINST CLIMATE CHANGE
    • Y02A—TECHNOLOGIES FOR ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE CHANGE
    • Y02A10/00—TECHNOLOGIES FOR ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE CHANGE at coastal zones; at river basins
    • Y02A10/40—Controlling or monitoring, e.g. of flood or hurricane; Forecasting, e.g. risk assessment or mapping
    • Y—GENERAL TAGGING OF NEW TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS; GENERAL TAGGING OF CROSS-SECTIONAL TECHNOLOGIES SPANNING OVER SEVERAL SECTIONS OF THE IPC; TECHNICAL SUBJECTS COVERED BY FORMER USPC CROSS-REFERENCE ART COLLECTIONS [XRACs] AND DIGESTS
    • Y02—TECHNOLOGIES OR APPLICATIONS FOR MITIGATION OR ADAPTATION AGAINST CLIMATE CHANGE
    • Y02D—CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION TECHNOLOGIES IN INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES [ICT], I.E. INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES AIMING AT THE REDUCTION OF THEIR OWN ENERGY USE
    • Y02D30/00—Reducing energy consumption in communication networks
    • Y02D30/70—Reducing energy consumption in communication networks in wireless communication networks

Definitions

  • This invention relates to preventing traffic analysis of a communication network.
  • a home may contain a lighting system, heating appliances and sensor devices. By allowing these devices to communicate with each other certain controls can be automated, such as turning on the lights and the heating when the sensor detects that a user has entered a room.
  • IoT internet of things
  • IoT Internet of things
  • the communication equipment can be equipped with communication devices. As many of these objects may not have access to, or require, power themselves, it may be desirable for the communication equipment to be self-powered, such as by a battery. It may therefore be desirable for the communication equipment to have low power requirements.
  • allowing the equipment to communicate wirelessly can otter several advantages over wired communications, such as increased mobility of the devices and the reduction of unsightly communication wires and cables.
  • the communication equipment is low-powered, it may not have a communication range sufficient to communicate directly with other equipment located in the network. That is, devices spread across the network over a large distance compared to the communication range of the attached equipment may not all may be able to communicate directly with each other.
  • a suitable network for such devices to adopt is a mesh network, in which one device can communicate with a remote device outside its communication range via one or more intermediary devices. In this arrangement the intermediary devices function to relay a received message.
  • Such a mesh network may have a traffic profile that is somewhat predictable or capable of being characterised in some way.
  • the heating may be configured to come on at the same point each day, or a person may arrive home at roughly the same time each day, causing the sensor device to communicate with a lighting device in a somewhat regular pattern for example.
  • a profiling of the network traffic can lead to situations in which security may be compromised.
  • a third party who is aware of the average or typical network traffic profile of a mesh network within an automated home may monitor the network traffic to look for anomalies in the traffic profile and use the presence of such anomalies to conclude that the regular occupants of the home are absent. There is therefore a need to prevent the traffic analysis of a communication network.
  • a wireless communication device capable of operating according to a wireless communication protocol and capable of operating in a mesh network, the device being configured to: at a first time transmit data packets in accordance with a mesh network protocol; determine an activity profile that characterises the pattern of transmission of those data packets from the communication device; and subsequently transmit dummy data packets in accordance with the mesh network protocol so as to adopt an activity profile that mimics the determined activity profile.
  • the determined activity profile may specify a number of data packets to be transmitted over a time period according to the characterisation.
  • the activity profile mat delineate the transmission of data packets over a period of time according to the characterisation.
  • the device may be configured to characterise the transmission of data packets as an average such that the determined activity profile is an average transmission profile.
  • the device may be configured to determine the average transmission profile from a plurality of transmission profiles each delineating the transmission of data packets over a period of time.
  • Each of the said plurality of transmission profiles may delineate the transmission of data packets over a period of twenty-four hours.
  • the device could be configured to characterise the transmission of the data packets as a mode such that the determined activity profile is a modal transmission profile.
  • the device could foe configured to determine the modal transmission profile from a plurality of transmission profiles each delineating the transmission of data packets over a period of time.
  • Each of the said plurality of transmission profiles could delineate the transmission of data packets over a period of 24 hours.
  • the activity profile could delineate the transmission of data packets in time bins.
  • the device may be configured to operate according to the Bluetooth Low Energy protocol.
  • the mesh network may be an ad-hoc network.
  • the device may be configured to transmit dummy packets in a form indicative of a request for an acknowledgement.
  • the device could be configured to transmit an acknowledgement in response to receiving a data packet similar to said dummy packets indicative of a request for acknowledgement.
  • the device may be configured to transmit at least some data packets configured to control and/or monitor the state of remote objects within the mesh network during the first time.
  • the device may be configured to exclusively transmit data packets configured to control and/or monitor the state of remote objects within the mesh network during the first time.
  • a wireless communication device capable of operating according to a wireless communication protocol and capable of operating in a mesh network, the device being configured to: at a first time transmit data packets of a first type in accordance with a mesh network protocol to control and/or monitor the state of remote devices within the mesh network, and transmit, independently of the transmission of the first type of data packets, dummy data packets in accordance with the mesh network protocol so as to obscure a variation in transmission of the first type of data packets from the first time.
  • the device may be configured to transmit the dummy data packets according to a desired transmission profile.
  • the desired transmission profile may delineate the desired transmission of data packets from the wireless communication device over a period of time.
  • the device may be configured to determine an activity profile that characterises the transmission of the first type of data packets during the first time.
  • the device may be configured to characterise the transmission of the first type of data packets as an average such that the activity profile is an average transmission profile.
  • the device may be configured to determine the average transmission profile from a plurality of transmission profiles each delineating the transmission of the first types of data packet over a period of time.
  • the device may be configured to characterise the transmission of the first type of data packets as a mode such that the activity profile is a modal transmission profile.
  • the determined activity profile may have an associated average transmission rate.
  • the desired transmission profile may have an associated average transmission rate that is substantially higher than the average transmission rate of the activity profile.
  • the device may be configured to transmit the dummy data packets according to the desired transmission profile at an average transmission rate that is high enough so as to obscure a variation in transmission of the first type of data packets from the first time.
  • the device may be configured to transmit the dummy data packets in a pseudo-random manner.
  • the device may be configured to transmit the dummy data packets at an average rate high enough so as to obscure a variation in transmission of the first type of data packets from the first time.
  • the device may operate according to the Bluetooth Low Energy protocol.
  • the mesh network may be an ad-hoc network.
  • FIG. 1 shows a schematic diagram of a mesh network
  • FIG. 2 shows a schematic diagram of a wireless communication device for communicating in the mesh network
  • FIG. 3 shows a schematic illustration of the architecture of a mesh network
  • FIG. 4 shows a schematic illustration of a mesh transport packet.
  • Embodiments of the present disclosure are directed to wireless communication devices operating within a mesh network that can operate so as to obscure changes to the network traffic. By making it more difficult to identify changes to network traffic, the security of the environment within the coverage area of the network can be increased.
  • Embodiments of the present disclosure relate to a wireless communication device that can operate according to a wireless communication protocol.
  • the wireless communication device is part of a mesh network comprising a plurality of other remote devices.
  • the wireless communication device can communicate as part of the mesh network by transmitting data packets to, and receiving data packets from, other devices that are part of the mesh network.
  • a device may operate as a relay device by re-transmitting received data packets.
  • the wireless communication device can process data packets to execute instructions contained in that packet that are addressed to that device.
  • the communication device may transmit data packets that contain instructions for other remote devices operating within the mesh network.
  • the wireless communication device may be attached to an appliance that can perform a certain function.
  • the appliance could be, for example, a household appliance such as a light switch, light bulb, heating element or security sensor.
  • the other remote devices can also be attached or associated with an appliance so that the appliances can communicate with each other (via their respective communication devices) over the mesh network.
  • Data packets transmitted from the communication device can be provided with an authentication field that permits them to be authenticated as pertaining to the mesh network.
  • the content of the field may originally be generated by applying an authentication algorithm such as HMAC-SHA-256 to at least some of the packet content and to an authentication key that is unique to the mesh network in question.
  • the packets may subsequently be authenticated by applying the inverse of that algorithm to the same predetermined part of the packet content and the authentication key, to generate an authentication result, and comparing the authentication result to the authentication field of the packet. If the two match then the packet can be considered to be authenticated to the mesh network in question, and otherwise not.
  • the payload of a packet may be encrypted with a network key which is unique to all packets pertaining to that mesh network. In this case the network key prevents a third party that is not part of the mesh network from deciphering the content of the data packets and from transmitting data packets of its own as part of the network.
  • Communication devices that are part of the mesh network can transmit and receive data packets in some characteristic fashion. For example, a device may transmit a data packet at roughly the same point each day, transmit a certain number of packets each day or may have a higher level of average activity at certain points of time compared to other points of time. Some devices may also transmit data packets that require an acknowledgement message to be sent in return to ensure a safe receipt of the transmitted data packet. This means that the network traffic of the mesh network as a whole may have certain characteristic features. For example, a user may wake up at a characteristic time of day and turn on a light by means of a light switch that is in wireless communication with the light. This activity could agnate a characteristic pattern of communication when the user wakes up.
  • a third party to the mesh network can listen to this network traffic, though they would not be able to determine the content of any particular data packet without knowledge of the network key. If the third party analyses the network traffic profile and detects that the current network traffic profile differs substantially from the regular (or average, or characteristic) traffic profile, for example because the level of network traffic is substantially lower than normal, they may conclude that there are a reduced number of users operating appliances within the mesh network.
  • the communication device can operate so as to prevent such an analysis of the traffic profile. It may do this by operating in various modes.
  • the communication device transmits data packets comprising a dummy payload in lieu of its regular transmission of data packets.
  • the regular data packets can be data packets transmitted to either monitor or control the state of other devices in the mesh network.
  • the communication device may have knowledge of its regular or characteristic transmission activity, for example the device may store in its memory a log of its transmission activity over a previous time period, or the device may be configured to transmit a message at a particular time of day in accordance with a user setting.
  • the device can then transmit dummy data packets so as to mimic its characteristic transmissions.
  • the dummy data packets are transmitted in accordance with the wireless communication protocol and so to a third party without knowledge of the network key, are indiscernible from the regular data packets.
  • the wireless communication device transmits dummy data packets at a rate so as to mask the transmission of the regular data packets. That is, independently of the transmission of the regular data packets, the device also transmits dummy data packets.
  • the device can transmit the dummy packets at a much higher average rate than it transmits regular packets. This means that, should the communication device reduce its transmission rate of regular data packets over a time period (e.g., because a user of appliances in the mesh network is away), a third party listening to the network traffic will not be able to identify the reduction in regular data packet traffic due to the continuous transmission of the dummy packets, i.e. the dummy packets obscure any variation in the transmission of the regular data packets.
  • a communication device operating according to these modes can therefore prevent analysis of the mesh network traffic by a third party, advantageously leading to increased security of the environment within the coverage area of the mesh network.
  • FIG. 1 shows a schematic diagram of a mesh network 100 .
  • Network 100 comprises a number of communication devices 101 . Each communication device is attached to or associated with an object so as to enable the objects to communicate with each other.
  • Network 100 comprises lights 103 B and 103 C, a light switch 104 A, a fan 105 D, a sensor 106 E and a temperature sensor 107 D.
  • the communication devices communicate according to a wireless communication protocol, such as the Bluetooth Low Energy protocol (now marketed as Bluetooth SMART) for example.
  • a wireless communication protocol such as the Bluetooth Low Energy protocol (now marketed as Bluetooth SMART) for example.
  • Bluetooth Low Energy protocol now marketed as Bluetooth SMART
  • Such low power communication protocols are particularly suitable for implementation in a network in which the appliances or objects do not have their own power source.
  • Each communication device has associated with it a coverage area 102 which defines the communication range for the device.
  • a communication device can communicate directly with other devices that are within its coverage area, but cannot communicate directly with devices outside its coverage area.
  • coverage area 102 A may include communication devices 101 A, 101 B and 101 C; coverage area 102 D may include communication devices 101 B and 101 D; and coverage area 102 E may include communication devices 101 D and 101 E.
  • the coverage area for a device may be insufficient to cover the whole network.
  • communication device 101 A is outside the coverage area of device 101 D.
  • a message is sent to device 101 B, which then relays the message to device 101 D.
  • the devices can not only receive and act upon messages, but can also repeat those messages for transmission to surrounding devices to form a mesh network.
  • Each message transmitted by a communication device in accordance with the communication protocol can be encrypted with a network key.
  • the network key is common to the mesh network so that 100 so that each message transmitted by the devices over the network is encrypted with the same key.
  • the appliances may be housed in or be part of a building, for example a home or an office.
  • the communication devices may then communicate with each other over the mesh network to control or monitor the appliances in accordance with a user's settings or in response to a user action. For example, if sensor device 106 E detects that a user has entered the building, communication device 101 E can communicate over the mesh network to devices 101 B and 101 C so as to turn on lights 103 B and 103 C. In an alternative example, a user may turn on the fights using switch 104 A. In response, device 101 A communicates with device 101 D, which causes the temperature sensor 107 D to measure the ambient temperature and controls the operation of the fan 105 D accordingly.
  • the fan and temperature sensor may operate to maintain the temperature at a value set by a user, however they may only do so when they have determined that the lights are on so as to save power.
  • FIG. 2 shows the architecture of a communication device 101 .
  • the communication device comprises an antenna 201 connected to a transceiver 202 .
  • the communication device can use the transceiver to communicate with at least one other communication device in the network according to the communications protocol.
  • the communication device 101 also comprises a processor 203 that is capable of executing a set of program instructions that are stored in non-transitory form in a memory 204 .
  • the memory 204 can be a non-volatile memory that stores in non-transitory form program code that is executable by the processor 203 to cause the communication device to communicate according to the communications protocol.
  • the processor 203 can be a microprocessor.
  • the memory 204 may be part of processor 203 or connected to processor 203 via a bus. Whilst the processor 203 and transceiver 202 are shown in FIG. 2 as separate elements, it will be appreciated that at least processor 203 and transceiver 202 could be incorporated in to one element, for example, being incorporated on a single chip.
  • the communication device 101 may also comprise a power source 205 .
  • This power source may be a battery.
  • the communication device may not comprise a power source and be connected to an external power source such as art electrical outlet.
  • the communication device also comprises an interface 206 for sending and receiving data that is to be sent over the network using the communications protocol.
  • This interface 208 may be a wired link to sensors for sensing external events, such as the operation of a light switch in the building environment described above, or a link to appliances for issuing control signals to those appliances, such as the light or fan in the building environment described above.
  • FIG. 3 is a schematic diagram of the architecture of a mesh network.
  • the architecture comprises three layers: the bearer layer, the transport layer and the protocol layer.
  • the bearer layer defines how transport layer messages can be transmitted to one or more devices within the network. Examples of suitable bearers for a mesh network are Bluetooth Low Energy (Bluetooth SMART) 301 , UDP IPv4 302 and UDP IPv6 303 .
  • the mesh transport layer 304 provides a service to transmit messages across devices 101 in the network.
  • the Transport Layer is responsible for the transmission of a message throughout the mesh network.
  • Each device within the mesh network is a peer. Some of the devices within the mesh network, in addition to transmitting or receiving messages their own messages, can retransmit received messages from other devices within the network.
  • a device that provides this retransmitting functionality is known as a relay capable device.
  • a protocol layer may define multiple protocols which each have a specific purpose for the devices 101 .
  • protocols at this layer can include an association protocol 305 that is used to associate devices to a specific network, a control protocol 306 that enables the control and monitoring of devices within a specific network, and an update protocol 307 that is used to update the firmware of devices over the mesh network.
  • the messages transmitted to communication devices to control a functionality of an associated appliance e.g., turning on a light
  • FIG. 4 shows an example of the packet format for a mesh transport message.
  • the packet 400 comprises three fields: a higher layer payload 401 : a message authentication code (MAC) 402 , and a time-to-live (TTL) code 403 .
  • the MAC is calculated from the network key and the higher layer payload, and is used to verify the authenticity of the message and network identification.
  • the time-to-live code operates as a counter, and is either incremented or decremented each time a message is re-transmitted by relay.
  • the mesh devices are configured not to retransmit messages whose TTL values are at or beyond a predefined threshold value, e.g. zero.
  • the control protocol message comprises a sequence number, a source address, a destination address, an opcode and parameters.
  • the sequence number 405 is a value unique for each new message sent by the source device.
  • the address of the source device (or sending device) is contained in the source address field (SRC) 406 .
  • the destination address field (DST) 407 contains the device address of the target device or group address of a set of target devices.
  • the opcode field 408 is used to determine the format of the operation parameters.
  • the parameter field 409 contains the information relating to the monitoring or control of the objects within the network, for example lighting equipment, fans, sensors etc. For example, the parameter field can contain information to control the brightness of a light, or to turn on the fan etc.
  • the communication device can transmit data packets with a dummy payload so as to maintain a characteristic transmission profile.
  • a communication device 101 may transmit data packets to other devices within the mesh network to control and/or monitor the state of remote objects within the network.
  • communication device 101 E can communicate with devices 101 B and 101 C so as to turn on lights 103 in response to sensor 108 E detecting the presence of a person.
  • communication device 101 A can communicate with devices 101 B and 101 C to turn on lights 103 in response to a user switching light the switch 104 A.
  • Data packets comprising a payload containing instructions relating to the state of an object, such as instructions for controlling, monitoring or configuring an object, will be referred to hereafter as ‘active packets’.
  • the payload could correspond to payload 401 , for example, with a suitable parameter field 409 .
  • the state of the remote objects may be configured by a user of the mesh network, and may be configured in real-time or in a predetermined fashion.
  • An example of a real-time configuration would be the user turning on the light switch 104 A, whereas an example of a predetermined configuration would be configuring the lights to turn on upon detection of a person by sensor 106 E.
  • the pattern of transmission of active data packets from the communication device can be characterised by an activity profile.
  • the activity profile may contain information relating to the transmission of active packets from the communication device in various degrees of detail. For example, the activity profile may simply list the number of activity data packets transmitted from the communication device over a suitable time period, e.g. twenty-four hours. Alternatively, the activity profile may delineate the transmission of activity data packets over a period of time. In particular, the activity profile may list the number of data packets transmitted over discrete time bins that cover the time period.
  • the communication device may characterise its pattern of transmission in a number of different ways.
  • the device may log its transmissions over a suitable time period and store this log in memory 204 .
  • the device could log its transmissions over multiple time periods so as to produce multiple logs of data. For example, the device could log its transmissions over a twenty-four hour period and then repeat the logging process over separate twenty-four periods to produce several logs. The device could then average these logs to generate the activity profile, which in this example would characterise the pattern of transmission of activity packets as an average transmission profile.
  • the logged data may be stored in tabular form, for example.
  • the device could use the multiple logs of data to determine an activity profile that characterises the pattern of transmission of activity packets as a modal transmission profile.
  • the modal transmission profile could be produced by determining the modal number of data packets transmitted for each time bin across each of the data logs, and assembling the time bins to produce the activity profile, which would be representative of the most common, or most likely transmission profile.
  • the communication device can determine what its average, or general, or typical, or most likely transmission profile for activity packets is.
  • the device can transmit data packets comprising a dummy payload (referred to hereafter as ‘dummy packets’) in order to adopt a transmission profile that mimics the activity profile.
  • a dummy packet could be transmitted in a suitable format for the communications protocol, for example a mesh transport packet.
  • the dummy packet may contain a payload that does not correspond to a higher layer protocol.
  • a dummy payload may not contain a control parameter field for monitoring or controlling devices within the network.
  • communication device 101 E may determine that it transmits an average of four active data packets between the hours of 5 pm and 7 pm, corresponding to people entering a house having come home from work. If some or all of these people are away for some reason, the device 101 E would transmit less, or no active packets during this same time period. The device could then transmit a number of dummy packets so that the total number of data packets transmitted during this time period was equal to, or approximately equal to, the number of packets according to the determined activity profile.
  • the device may be configured to transmit data packets so as to mimic the activity profile when in a certain operational mode.
  • the device may be placed into such a mode by a user. For example, if the user determines that they are going to be absent from the house or building for a period of time, they may place the device into an operational mode so that the device transmits data packets to mimic the determined activity profile.
  • the device may be configured directly by the user, or may be configured wirelessly.
  • the device may be configured by a data packet received over the mesh network, or may be configurable via some other wireless communications protocol, such as the internet. This could allow the user to place the device into the mimicking operational mode remotely.
  • the communication device may transmit data packets to other devices in the mesh network that require an acknowledgement to be sent in return, referred to hereafter as reliable data packets.
  • the communication device may also receive such a data packet and in response transmit an acknowledgement message to another device in the network.
  • the transmission and receipt of reliable data packets and associated acknowledgements may have a characterising pattern. For example, device 101 D may transmit a reliable data packet to device 101 E at one or more certain points each day. In response, device 101 E may transmit an acknowledgement to device 101 D to confirm receipt of the reliable data packet.
  • such transmission of messages may be characterised by or identifiable by messages transmitted across the network in short succession (i.e. the reliable data packet and its associated acknowledgement). Therefore, to better mimic the determined activity profile, the communication device may be configured to transmit dummy packets that require an acknowledgement to be sent if it regularly transmits activity packets that require an acknowledgement.
  • Such data packets are still dummy packets in the sense that their payload may not contain information relating to a higher layer of the protocol stack, however they are configured to require an acknowledgement to be sent to the communication device in return and so are in a form indicative of a request for an acknowledgement.
  • the communication device may also be configured to transmit an acknowledgement message via the mesh network in response to receiving a data packet similar to the data packets indicative of a request for acknowledgement.
  • the communication device may be configured to better mimic its determined activity profile by mimicking the transmission behaviour associated with reliable data packets using dummy packets.
  • a third party without the mesh network key cannot determine the difference between an active packet and a dummy packet because the payload of these packets is encrypted by the network key. Therefore, to such a third party analysing the network traffic there would be no discernible difference to the network activity despite the fact a reduced number of people have entered the house. The third party would therefore not be able to determine from an analysis of the network traffic that a reduced number of people have entered the house, leading to increased security.
  • the communication device can be configured to transmit active
  • a device may transmit active data packets to other devices within the mesh network to monitor or control the behaviour of appliances within the building/home in accordance with configurations set by one or more of those users, such as turning on a fan within a room when the light is switched on so as to keep the temperature of the room within a desired range.
  • a device may transmit active data packets to other devices within the mesh network to monitor or control the behaviour of appliances within the building/home in accordance with configurations set by one or more of those users, such as turning on a fan within a room when the light is switched on so as to keep the temperature of the room within a desired range.
  • the transmission of active packets from a communication device may decrease as compared to when users are present.
  • the communication device instead transmits dummy packets independently of the transmission of activity packets so as to obscure any variation in tire transmission of the activity packets, for example a variation from a ‘normal’ or ‘typical’ transmission pattern associated with user's being present within the home or building.
  • the device could transmit the dummy packets according to a desired transmission profile.
  • the desired transmission profile may contain information relating to the transmission of dummy packets from the communication device in various degrees of detail. For example, the desired transmission profile may simply list the number of dummy data packets to be sent over a particular time period. The communication device could then simply make sure it transmits the required number of dummy packets over the given period. Alternatively, the desired transmission profile may delineate the transmission of dummy packets over a period of time, for example through the use of discrete time bins.
  • the desired transmission profile could be preconfigured and stored in memory 204 in the device. This has the advantage of requiring minimal processing power and power consumption to implement at the communication device.
  • the desired transmission profile may be adaptable based upon the transmission behaviour of active packets from the device. Determining the desired transmission profile upon the transmission behaviour of active packets can have the advantage of ensuring the dummy packets are transmitted at a rate that is sufficient to mask the transmission of active packets.
  • One way of determining the desired transmission profile based on the transmission of active packets is to determine an activity profile that characterises the transmission of the active packets, for example using one of the methods described above.
  • the communication device can use the determined activity profile to generate a desired transmission profile that transmits dummy packets at a rate sufficient to mask the transmission of active packets. For example, if the activity profile delineates some characteristic transmission of activity packets over discrete time bins, a desired transmission profile can be generated that delineates transmission of dummy packets over corresponding time bins where the transmission rate of the dummy packets within each time bin is sufficient to mask the transmission of activity packets within that bin. If the transmission rate of the dummy packets is sufficient to mask the transmission of activity packets, then any variation in the transmission rate of the activity packets will be obscured by the dummy packets.
  • the desired transmission profile can be relatively uniform over time. That is, the desired transmission profile could have an average transmission rate that it consistently maintains over time, independently of the transmission of activity packets.
  • the communication device could be configured to transmit the dummy data packets in a pseudo-random fashion. That is, the transmission of the dummy packets would not be in accordance with a profile, but instead would be pseudo-random.
  • the term ‘pseudo-random’ is being used because the transmission of such packets would need to have a suitably high average transmission rate so as to mask the transmission of the active packets, and so cannot be truly random.
  • the dummy packets appear to be transmitted with any real pattern or characteristic profile, and would appear to a third party observing the network traffic to be random.
  • the pseudo-random transmission of the data packets could be controlled by a suitably implemented algorithm at the communication device.
  • the communication device transmits the dummy packets (either pseudo-randomly or according to some desired profile) independently of the transmission of the active data packets. That is, regardless of whether the transmission of active packets is following a ‘normal’ profile or not, the communication device will transmit the dummy packets: no attempt is made to mimic the device's normal transmission profile.
  • the communication device will transmit the dummy packets (either pseudo-randomly or according to some desired profile) at an average transmission rate that is suitably high so as to obscure any variation in the transmission rate of the activity packets. If the average transmission rate of the dummy packets is suitably high enough, then a third party observing the network traffic of the mesh network will not be able to determine any discernible difference to the traffic profile should the transmission of active packets be lower than normal, for example because the users of the home or building are away.
  • the dummy packets may be transmitted at an average rate that is a certain number of times higher than the average transmission rate of the active packets, e.g. at least five times higher.
  • the communication device can operate to prevent network traffic analysis by masking or drowning the transmission of the active packets, which can vary depending on the presence of users operating or controlling objects throughout the mesh network, with dummy packets.

Landscapes

  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
  • General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computing Systems (AREA)
  • Business, Economics & Management (AREA)
  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Economics (AREA)
  • Environmental & Geological Engineering (AREA)
  • Software Systems (AREA)
  • General Business, Economics & Management (AREA)
  • Tourism & Hospitality (AREA)
  • Strategic Management (AREA)
  • Quality & Reliability (AREA)
  • Operations Research (AREA)
  • Marketing (AREA)
  • Human Resources & Organizations (AREA)
  • Entrepreneurship & Innovation (AREA)
  • Development Economics (AREA)
  • General Health & Medical Sciences (AREA)
  • Cardiology (AREA)
  • Health & Medical Sciences (AREA)
  • Multimedia (AREA)
  • Databases & Information Systems (AREA)
  • Mathematical Physics (AREA)
  • Microelectronics & Electronic Packaging (AREA)
  • Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)
  • Information Transfer Between Computers (AREA)
  • Data Exchanges In Wide-Area Networks (AREA)
  • Storage Device Security (AREA)
  • Telephone Function (AREA)

Abstract

A wireless communication device capable of operating according to a wireless communication protocol and capable of operating in a mesh network, the device being configured to: at a first time transmit data packets in accordance with a mesh network protocol; determine an activity profile that characterises the pattern of transmission of those data packets from the communication device; and subsequently transmit dummy data packets in accordance with the mesh network protocol so as to adopt an activity profile that mimics the determined activity profile.

Description

    TECHNICAL FIELD
  • This invention relates to preventing traffic analysis of a communication network.
    • BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION
  • Increasing numbers of devices are being networked together so as to be able to transmit and receive messages between themselves. For example, in the home, it may be desirable for multiple devices to be able to communicate with each other and also potentially with the internet in order to allow for an automated control of the home. For example, a home may contain a lighting system, heating appliances and sensor devices. By allowing these devices to communicate with each other certain controls can be automated, such as turning on the lights and the heating when the sensor detects that a user has entered a room.
  • In general, when devices are connected in this way, one device may undertake a certain action in response to determining that another device is in a particular state. This intercommunication of diverse devices/appliances within a network forms part of what is known as the ‘internet of things’ (IoT). To enable arbitrary objects to communicate, they can be equipped with communication devices. As many of these objects may not have access to, or require, power themselves, it may be desirable for the communication equipment to be self-powered, such as by a battery. It may therefore be desirable for the communication equipment to have low power requirements. In addition, allowing the equipment to communicate wirelessly can otter several advantages over wired communications, such as increased mobility of the devices and the reduction of unsightly communication wires and cables.
  • It the communication equipment is low-powered, it may not have a communication range sufficient to communicate directly with other equipment located in the network. That is, devices spread across the network over a large distance compared to the communication range of the attached equipment may not all may be able to communicate directly with each other. A suitable network for such devices to adopt is a mesh network, in which one device can communicate with a remote device outside its communication range via one or more intermediary devices. In this arrangement the intermediary devices function to relay a received message.
  • Such a mesh network may have a traffic profile that is somewhat predictable or capable of being characterised in some way. For example in the case of a mesh network of devices within a home, the heating may be configured to come on at the same point each day, or a person may arrive home at roughly the same time each day, causing the sensor device to communicate with a lighting device in a somewhat regular pattern for example.
  • Unfortunately, such a profiling of the network traffic can lead to situations in which security may be compromised. For example, a third party who is aware of the average or typical network traffic profile of a mesh network within an automated home may monitor the network traffic to look for anomalies in the traffic profile and use the presence of such anomalies to conclude that the regular occupants of the home are absent. There is therefore a need to prevent the traffic analysis of a communication network.
    • SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION
  • According to a first aspect of the present disclosure there is provided a wireless communication device capable of operating according to a wireless communication protocol and capable of operating in a mesh network, the device being configured to: at a first time transmit data packets in accordance with a mesh network protocol; determine an activity profile that characterises the pattern of transmission of those data packets from the communication device; and subsequently transmit dummy data packets in accordance with the mesh network protocol so as to adopt an activity profile that mimics the determined activity profile.
  • The determined activity profile may specify a number of data packets to be transmitted over a time period according to the characterisation.
  • The activity profile mat delineate the transmission of data packets over a period of time according to the characterisation.
  • The device may be configured to characterise the transmission of data packets as an average such that the determined activity profile is an average transmission profile.
  • The device may be configured to determine the average transmission profile from a plurality of transmission profiles each delineating the transmission of data packets over a period of time.
  • Each of the said plurality of transmission profiles may delineate the transmission of data packets over a period of twenty-four hours.
  • The device could be configured to characterise the transmission of the data packets as a mode such that the determined activity profile is a modal transmission profile.
  • The device could foe configured to determine the modal transmission profile from a plurality of transmission profiles each delineating the transmission of data packets over a period of time.
  • Each of the said plurality of transmission profiles could delineate the transmission of data packets over a period of 24 hours.
  • The activity profile could delineate the transmission of data packets in time bins.
  • The device may be configured to operate according to the Bluetooth Low Energy protocol. The mesh network may be an ad-hoc network.
  • The device may be configured to transmit dummy packets in a form indicative of a request for an acknowledgement.
  • The device could be configured to transmit an acknowledgement in response to receiving a data packet similar to said dummy packets indicative of a request for acknowledgement.
  • The device may be configured to transmit at least some data packets configured to control and/or monitor the state of remote objects within the mesh network during the first time.
  • The device may be configured to exclusively transmit data packets configured to control and/or monitor the state of remote objects within the mesh network during the first time.
  • According to a second aspect of the present disclosure there is provided a wireless communication device capable of operating according to a wireless communication protocol and capable of operating in a mesh network, the device being configured to: at a first time transmit data packets of a first type in accordance with a mesh network protocol to control and/or monitor the state of remote devices within the mesh network, and transmit, independently of the transmission of the first type of data packets, dummy data packets in accordance with the mesh network protocol so as to obscure a variation in transmission of the first type of data packets from the first time.
  • The device may be configured to transmit the dummy data packets according to a desired transmission profile.
  • The desired transmission profile may delineate the desired transmission of data packets from the wireless communication device over a period of time.
  • The device may be configured to determine an activity profile that characterises the transmission of the first type of data packets during the first time.
  • The device may be configured to characterise the transmission of the first type of data packets as an average such that the activity profile is an average transmission profile.
  • The device may be configured to determine the average transmission profile from a plurality of transmission profiles each delineating the transmission of the first types of data packet over a period of time.
  • The device may be configured to characterise the transmission of the first type of data packets as a mode such that the activity profile is a modal transmission profile.
  • The determined activity profile may have an associated average transmission rate.
  • The desired transmission profile may have an associated average transmission rate that is substantially higher than the average transmission rate of the activity profile.
  • The device may be configured to transmit the dummy data packets according to the desired transmission profile at an average transmission rate that is high enough so as to obscure a variation in transmission of the first type of data packets from the first time.
  • The device may be configured to transmit the dummy data packets in a pseudo-random manner.
  • The device may be configured to transmit the dummy data packets at an average rate high enough so as to obscure a variation in transmission of the first type of data packets from the first time.
  • The device may operate according to the Bluetooth Low Energy protocol.
  • The mesh network may be an ad-hoc network.
    • BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
  • The present disclosure will now be described by way of example with reference to
  • the accompanying drawings. In the drawings:
  • FIG. 1 shows a schematic diagram of a mesh network;
  • FIG. 2 shows a schematic diagram of a wireless communication device for communicating in the mesh network;
  • FIG. 3 shows a schematic illustration of the architecture of a mesh network; and
  • FIG. 4 shows a schematic illustration of a mesh transport packet.
    •  DETAILED DESCRIPTION
  • Embodiments of the present disclosure are directed to wireless communication devices operating within a mesh network that can operate so as to obscure changes to the network traffic. By making it more difficult to identify changes to network traffic, the security of the environment within the coverage area of the network can be increased.
  • Embodiments of the present disclosure relate to a wireless communication device that can operate according to a wireless communication protocol. The wireless communication device is part of a mesh network comprising a plurality of other remote devices. The wireless communication device can communicate as part of the mesh network by transmitting data packets to, and receiving data packets from, other devices that are part of the mesh network. Within the mesh network, a device may operate as a relay device by re-transmitting received data packets.
  • The wireless communication device can process data packets to execute instructions contained in that packet that are addressed to that device. In addition, the communication device may transmit data packets that contain instructions for other remote devices operating within the mesh network. The wireless communication device may be attached to an appliance that can perform a certain function. The appliance could be, for example, a household appliance such as a light switch, light bulb, heating element or security sensor. The other remote devices can also be attached or associated with an appliance so that the appliances can communicate with each other (via their respective communication devices) over the mesh network.
  • Data packets transmitted from the communication device can be provided with an authentication field that permits them to be authenticated as pertaining to the mesh network. The content of the field may originally be generated by applying an authentication algorithm such as HMAC-SHA-256 to at least some of the packet content and to an authentication key that is unique to the mesh network in question. The packets may subsequently be authenticated by applying the inverse of that algorithm to the same predetermined part of the packet content and the authentication key, to generate an authentication result, and comparing the authentication result to the authentication field of the packet. If the two match then the packet can be considered to be authenticated to the mesh network in question, and otherwise not. Alternatively the payload of a packet may be encrypted with a network key which is unique to all packets pertaining to that mesh network. In this case the network key prevents a third party that is not part of the mesh network from deciphering the content of the data packets and from transmitting data packets of its own as part of the network.
  • Communication devices that are part of the mesh network can transmit and receive data packets in some characteristic fashion. For example, a device may transmit a data packet at roughly the same point each day, transmit a certain number of packets each day or may have a higher level of average activity at certain points of time compared to other points of time. Some devices may also transmit data packets that require an acknowledgement message to be sent in return to ensure a safe receipt of the transmitted data packet. This means that the network traffic of the mesh network as a whole may have certain characteristic features. For example, a user may wake up at a characteristic time of day and turn on a light by means of a light switch that is in wireless communication with the light. This activity could agnate a characteristic pattern of communication when the user wakes up.
  • A third party to the mesh network can listen to this network traffic, though they would not be able to determine the content of any particular data packet without knowledge of the network key. If the third party analyses the network traffic profile and detects that the current network traffic profile differs substantially from the regular (or average, or characteristic) traffic profile, for example because the level of network traffic is substantially lower than normal, they may conclude that there are a reduced number of users operating appliances within the mesh network.
  • The communication device according to embodiments of the present disclosure can operate so as to prevent such an analysis of the traffic profile. It may do this by operating in various modes.
  • In a first mode, the communication device transmits data packets comprising a dummy payload in lieu of its regular transmission of data packets. The regular data packets can be data packets transmitted to either monitor or control the state of other devices in the mesh network. The communication device may have knowledge of its regular or characteristic transmission activity, for example the device may store in its memory a log of its transmission activity over a previous time period, or the device may be configured to transmit a message at a particular time of day in accordance with a user setting. The device can then transmit dummy data packets so as to mimic its characteristic transmissions. The dummy data packets are transmitted in accordance with the wireless communication protocol and so to a third party without knowledge of the network key, are indiscernible from the regular data packets.
  • In a second mode, the wireless communication device transmits dummy data packets at a rate so as to mask the transmission of the regular data packets. That is, independently of the transmission of the regular data packets, the device also transmits dummy data packets. The device can transmit the dummy packets at a much higher average rate than it transmits regular packets. This means that, should the communication device reduce its transmission rate of regular data packets over a time period (e.g., because a user of appliances in the mesh network is away), a third party listening to the network traffic will not be able to identify the reduction in regular data packet traffic due to the continuous transmission of the dummy packets, i.e. the dummy packets obscure any variation in the transmission of the regular data packets.
  • A communication device operating according to these modes can therefore prevent analysis of the mesh network traffic by a third party, advantageously leading to increased security of the environment within the coverage area of the mesh network.
  • FIG. 1 shows a schematic diagram of a mesh network 100.
  • Network 100 comprises a number of communication devices 101. Each communication device is attached to or associated with an object so as to enable the objects to communicate with each other. Network 100 comprises lights 103B and 103C, a light switch 104A, a fan 105D, a sensor 106E and a temperature sensor 107D. These objects are given for the purposes of illustration only, and it will be readily appreciated that the object could be any suitable appliance, device, widget etc.
  • The communication devices communicate according to a wireless communication protocol, such as the Bluetooth Low Energy protocol (now marketed as Bluetooth SMART) for example. Such low power communication protocols are particularly suitable for implementation in a network in which the appliances or objects do not have their own power source.
  • Each communication device has associated with it a coverage area 102 which defines the communication range for the device. A communication device can communicate directly with other devices that are within its coverage area, but cannot communicate directly with devices outside its coverage area. For the purposes of clarity, only the coverage areas for communication devices 101A, 101D and 101E are shown. For example, coverage area 102A may include communication devices 101A, 101B and 101C; coverage area 102D may include communication devices 101B and 101D; and coverage area 102E may include communication devices 101D and 101E.
  • Because the communication devices are low powered devices, the coverage area for a device may be insufficient to cover the whole network. For example, communication device 101A is outside the coverage area of device 101D. In order for device 101A to communicate with device 101D, a message is sent to device 101B, which then relays the message to device 101D. Thus, the devices can not only receive and act upon messages, but can also repeat those messages for transmission to surrounding devices to form a mesh network. Each message transmitted by a communication device in accordance with the communication protocol can be encrypted with a network key. The network key is common to the mesh network so that 100 so that each message transmitted by the devices over the network is encrypted with the same key.
  • The appliances may be housed in or be part of a building, for example a home or an office. The communication devices may then communicate with each other over the mesh network to control or monitor the appliances in accordance with a user's settings or in response to a user action. For example, if sensor device 106E detects that a user has entered the building, communication device 101E can communicate over the mesh network to devices 101B and 101C so as to turn on lights 103B and 103C. In an alternative example, a user may turn on the fights using switch 104A. In response, device 101A communicates with device 101D, which causes the temperature sensor 107D to measure the ambient temperature and controls the operation of the fan 105D accordingly. The fan and temperature sensor may operate to maintain the temperature at a value set by a user, however they may only do so when they have determined that the lights are on so as to save power. These examples are given merely to illustrate how the communication devices can communicate over a mesh network in a practical implementation, and it will be appreciated that other implementations are equally possible.
  • FIG. 2 shows the architecture of a communication device 101.
  • The communication device comprises an antenna 201 connected to a transceiver 202. The communication device can use the transceiver to communicate with at least one other communication device in the network according to the communications protocol. The communication device 101 also comprises a processor 203 that is capable of executing a set of program instructions that are stored in non-transitory form in a memory 204. The memory 204 can be a non-volatile memory that stores in non-transitory form program code that is executable by the processor 203 to cause the communication device to communicate according to the communications protocol. The processor 203 can be a microprocessor. The memory 204 may be part of processor 203 or connected to processor 203 via a bus. Whilst the processor 203 and transceiver 202 are shown in FIG. 2 as separate elements, it will be appreciated that at least processor 203 and transceiver 202 could be incorporated in to one element, for example, being incorporated on a single chip.
  • The communication device 101 may also comprise a power source 205. This power source may be a battery. Alternatively, the communication device may not comprise a power source and be connected to an external power source such as art electrical outlet.
  • The communication device also comprises an interface 206 for sending and receiving data that is to be sent over the network using the communications protocol. This interface 208 may be a wired link to sensors for sensing external events, such as the operation of a light switch in the building environment described above, or a link to appliances for issuing control signals to those appliances, such as the light or fan in the building environment described above.
  • FIG. 3 is a schematic diagram of the architecture of a mesh network. The architecture comprises three layers: the bearer layer, the transport layer and the protocol layer. The bearer layer defines how transport layer messages can be transmitted to one or more devices within the network. Examples of suitable bearers for a mesh network are Bluetooth Low Energy (Bluetooth SMART) 301, UDP IPv4 302 and UDP IPv6 303.
  • The mesh transport layer 304 provides a service to transmit messages across devices 101 in the network. The Transport Layer is responsible for the transmission of a message throughout the mesh network. Each device within the mesh network is a peer. Some of the devices within the mesh network, in addition to transmitting or receiving messages their own messages, can retransmit received messages from other devices within the network. A device that provides this retransmitting functionality is known as a relay capable device.
  • In an example protocol stack for implementing the mesh network a protocol layer may define multiple protocols which each have a specific purpose for the devices 101. Examples of protocols at this layer can include an association protocol 305 that is used to associate devices to a specific network, a control protocol 306 that enables the control and monitoring of devices within a specific network, and an update protocol 307 that is used to update the firmware of devices over the mesh network. In the example of the mesh network described above with reference to FIG. 1, the messages transmitted to communication devices to control a functionality of an associated appliance (e.g., turning on a light) could he transmitted according to the control protocol.
  • FIG. 4 shows an example of the packet format for a mesh transport message. The packet 400 comprises three fields: a higher layer payload 401: a message authentication code (MAC) 402, and a time-to-live (TTL) code 403. The MAC is calculated from the network key and the higher layer payload, and is used to verify the authenticity of the message and network identification. The time-to-live code operates as a counter, and is either incremented or decremented each time a message is re-transmitted by relay. The mesh devices are configured not to retransmit messages whose TTL values are at or beyond a predefined threshold value, e.g. zero.
  • An example of the payload structure for a transport packet transmitted in accordance with the mesh control protocol is shown at 404. The control protocol message comprises a sequence number, a source address, a destination address, an opcode and parameters.
  • The sequence number 405 is a value unique for each new message sent by the source device. The address of the source device (or sending device) is contained in the source address field (SRC) 406. The destination address field (DST) 407 contains the device address of the target device or group address of a set of target devices. The opcode field 408 is used to determine the format of the operation parameters. The parameter field 409 contains the information relating to the monitoring or control of the objects within the network, for example lighting equipment, fans, sensors etc. For example, the parameter field can contain information to control the brightness of a light, or to turn on the fan etc.
  • Operational modes of the communication device to aid the prevention of network traffic analysis by a third party will now be described.
    • First Mode
  • In this mode, the communication device can transmit data packets with a dummy payload so as to maintain a characteristic transmission profile.
  • A communication device 101 may transmit data packets to other devices within the mesh network to control and/or monitor the state of remote objects within the network. For example, in the building environment illustrated in FIG. 1 communication device 101E can communicate with devices 101B and 101C so as to turn on lights 103 in response to sensor 108E detecting the presence of a person. Alternatively, communication device 101A can communicate with devices 101B and 101C to turn on lights 103 in response to a user switching light the switch 104A. Data packets comprising a payload containing instructions relating to the state of an object, such as instructions for controlling, monitoring or configuring an object, will be referred to hereafter as ‘active packets’. The payload could correspond to payload 401, for example, with a suitable parameter field 409.
  • The state of the remote objects may be configured by a user of the mesh network, and may be configured in real-time or in a predetermined fashion. An example of a real-time configuration would be the user turning on the light switch 104A, whereas an example of a predetermined configuration would be configuring the lights to turn on upon detection of a person by sensor 106E.
  • The pattern of transmission of active data packets from the communication device can be characterised by an activity profile. The activity profile may contain information relating to the transmission of active packets from the communication device in various degrees of detail. For example, the activity profile may simply list the number of activity data packets transmitted from the communication device over a suitable time period, e.g. twenty-four hours. Alternatively, the activity profile may delineate the transmission of activity data packets over a period of time. In particular, the activity profile may list the number of data packets transmitted over discrete time bins that cover the time period.
  • The communication device may characterise its pattern of transmission in a number of different ways. In one example, the device may log its transmissions over a suitable time period and store this log in memory 204. The device could log its transmissions over multiple time periods so as to produce multiple logs of data. For example, the device could log its transmissions over a twenty-four hour period and then repeat the logging process over separate twenty-four periods to produce several logs. The device could then average these logs to generate the activity profile, which in this example would characterise the pattern of transmission of activity packets as an average transmission profile. The logged data may be stored in tabular form, for example.
  • Alternatively, the device could use the multiple logs of data to determine an activity profile that characterises the pattern of transmission of activity packets as a modal transmission profile. The modal transmission profile could be produced by determining the modal number of data packets transmitted for each time bin across each of the data logs, and assembling the time bins to produce the activity profile, which would be representative of the most common, or most likely transmission profile.
  • By characterising its transmission activity in some way, the communication device can determine what its average, or general, or typical, or most likely transmission profile for activity packets is.
  • Once the device has determined an activity profile, it can transmit data packets comprising a dummy payload (referred to hereafter as ‘dummy packets’) in order to adopt a transmission profile that mimics the activity profile. A dummy packet could be transmitted in a suitable format for the communications protocol, for example a mesh transport packet. However, the dummy packet may contain a payload that does not correspond to a higher layer protocol. For example, a dummy payload may not contain a control parameter field for monitoring or controlling devices within the network.
  • As an example, communication device 101E may determine that it transmits an average of four active data packets between the hours of 5 pm and 7 pm, corresponding to people entering a house having come home from work. If some or all of these people are away for some reason, the device 101E would transmit less, or no active packets during this same time period. The device could then transmit a number of dummy packets so that the total number of data packets transmitted during this time period was equal to, or approximately equal to, the number of packets according to the determined activity profile.
  • The device may be configured to transmit data packets so as to mimic the activity profile when in a certain operational mode. The device may be placed into such a mode by a user. For example, if the user determines that they are going to be absent from the house or building for a period of time, they may place the device into an operational mode so that the device transmits data packets to mimic the determined activity profile. The device may be configured directly by the user, or may be configured wirelessly. For example, the device may be configured by a data packet received over the mesh network, or may be configurable via some other wireless communications protocol, such as the internet. This could allow the user to place the device into the mimicking operational mode remotely.
  • The communication device may transmit data packets to other devices in the mesh network that require an acknowledgement to be sent in return, referred to hereafter as reliable data packets. The communication device may also receive such a data packet and in response transmit an acknowledgement message to another device in the network. The transmission and receipt of reliable data packets and associated acknowledgements may have a characterising pattern. For example, device 101D may transmit a reliable data packet to device 101E at one or more certain points each day. In response, device 101E may transmit an acknowledgement to device 101D to confirm receipt of the reliable data packet.
  • To a third party monitoring the network traffic, such transmission of messages may be characterised by or identifiable by messages transmitted across the network in short succession (i.e. the reliable data packet and its associated acknowledgement). Therefore, to better mimic the determined activity profile, the communication device may be configured to transmit dummy packets that require an acknowledgement to be sent if it regularly transmits activity packets that require an acknowledgement. Such data packets are still dummy packets in the sense that their payload may not contain information relating to a higher layer of the protocol stack, however they are configured to require an acknowledgement to be sent to the communication device in return and so are in a form indicative of a request for an acknowledgement.
  • The communication device may also be configured to transmit an acknowledgement message via the mesh network in response to receiving a data packet similar to the data packets indicative of a request for acknowledgement. In this way, the communication device may be configured to better mimic its determined activity profile by mimicking the transmission behaviour associated with reliable data packets using dummy packets.
  • A third party without the mesh network key cannot determine the difference between an active packet and a dummy packet because the payload of these packets is encrypted by the network key. Therefore, to such a third party analysing the network traffic there would be no discernible difference to the network activity despite the fact a reduced number of people have entered the house. The third party would therefore not be able to determine from an analysis of the network traffic that a reduced number of people have entered the house, leading to increased security.
  • Although the above example has been describe with reference to communication devices 101D and 101E and with respect to a particular scenario, it will be appreciated that this was merely for the purposes of illustration and the communication device can transmit dummy packets to mimic any suitable activity profile.
    • Second Mode
  • As described above, the communication device can be configured to transmit active
  • data packets to other devices within the mesh network to control and/or monitor those devices. For example, at times when users are occupying a building or a house, a device may transmit active data packets to other devices within the mesh network to monitor or control the behaviour of appliances within the building/home in accordance with configurations set by one or more of those users, such as turning on a fan within a room when the light is switched on so as to keep the temperature of the room within a desired range. As discussed above, if users of the building are absent, then the transmission of active packets from a communication device may decrease as compared to when users are present.
  • In this mode, rather than sending dummy packets to mimic a characteristic transmission profile, the communication device instead transmits dummy packets independently of the transmission of activity packets so as to obscure any variation in tire transmission of the activity packets, for example a variation from a ‘normal’ or ‘typical’ transmission pattern associated with user's being present within the home or building.
  • The device could transmit the dummy packets according to a desired transmission profile. The desired transmission profile may contain information relating to the transmission of dummy packets from the communication device in various degrees of detail. For example, the desired transmission profile may simply list the number of dummy data packets to be sent over a particular time period. The communication device could then simply make sure it transmits the required number of dummy packets over the given period. Alternatively, the desired transmission profile may delineate the transmission of dummy packets over a period of time, for example through the use of discrete time bins.
  • The desired transmission profile could be preconfigured and stored in memory 204 in the device. This has the advantage of requiring minimal processing power and power consumption to implement at the communication device. Alternatively, the desired transmission profile may be adaptable based upon the transmission behaviour of active packets from the device. Determining the desired transmission profile upon the transmission behaviour of active packets can have the advantage of ensuring the dummy packets are transmitted at a rate that is sufficient to mask the transmission of active packets. One way of determining the desired transmission profile based on the transmission of active packets is to determine an activity profile that characterises the transmission of the active packets, for example using one of the methods described above.
  • The communication device can use the determined activity profile to generate a desired transmission profile that transmits dummy packets at a rate sufficient to mask the transmission of active packets. For example, if the activity profile delineates some characteristic transmission of activity packets over discrete time bins, a desired transmission profile can be generated that delineates transmission of dummy packets over corresponding time bins where the transmission rate of the dummy packets within each time bin is sufficient to mask the transmission of activity packets within that bin. If the transmission rate of the dummy packets is sufficient to mask the transmission of activity packets, then any variation in the transmission rate of the activity packets will be obscured by the dummy packets.
  • In yet another alternative embodiment, the desired transmission profile can be relatively uniform over time. That is, the desired transmission profile could have an average transmission rate that it consistently maintains over time, independently of the transmission of activity packets. Alternatively the communication device could be configured to transmit the dummy data packets in a pseudo-random fashion. That is, the transmission of the dummy packets would not be in accordance with a profile, but instead would be pseudo-random. The term ‘pseudo-random’ is being used because the transmission of such packets would need to have a suitably high average transmission rate so as to mask the transmission of the active packets, and so cannot be truly random. However, neither would the dummy packets appear to be transmitted with any real pattern or characteristic profile, and would appear to a third party observing the network traffic to be random. The pseudo-random transmission of the data packets could be controlled by a suitably implemented algorithm at the communication device.
  • In contrast to the first mode of operation, in this mode the communication device transmits the dummy packets (either pseudo-randomly or according to some desired profile) independently of the transmission of the active data packets. That is, regardless of whether the transmission of active packets is following a ‘normal’ profile or not, the communication device will transmit the dummy packets: no attempt is made to mimic the device's normal transmission profile.
  • In any event, the communication device will transmit the dummy packets (either pseudo-randomly or according to some desired profile) at an average transmission rate that is suitably high so as to obscure any variation in the transmission rate of the activity packets. If the average transmission rate of the dummy packets is suitably high enough, then a third party observing the network traffic of the mesh network will not be able to determine any discernible difference to the traffic profile should the transmission of active packets be lower than normal, for example because the users of the home or building are away. In one example, the dummy packets may be transmitted at an average rate that is a certain number of times higher than the average transmission rate of the active packets, e.g. at least five times higher.
  • Thus, in this embodiment the communication device can operate to prevent network traffic analysis by masking or drowning the transmission of the active packets, which can vary depending on the presence of users operating or controlling objects throughout the mesh network, with dummy packets.
  • The applicant hereby discloses in isolation each individual feature described herein and any combination of two or more such features, to the extent that such features or combinations are capable of being earned out based on the present specification as a whole in the light of the common general knowledge of a person skilled in the art, irrespective of whether such features or combinations of features solve any problems disclosed herein, and without limitation to the scope of the claims. The applicant indicates that aspects of the present invention may consist of any such individual feature or combination of features. In view of the foregoing description it will be evident to a person skilled in the art that various modifications may be made within the scope of the invention.

Claims (20)

What is claimed is:
1. A wireless communication device capable of operating according to a wireless communication protocol and capable of operating in a mesh network, the device being configured to:
at a first time transmit data packets in accordance with a mesh network protocol;
determine an activity profile that characterises the pattern of transmission of those data packets from the communication device; and
subsequently transmit dummy data packets in accordance with the mesh network protocol so as to adopt an activity profile that mimics the determined activity profile.
2. A wireless communication device as claimed in claim 1, wherein the determined activity profile specifies a number of data packets to be transmitted over a time period according to the characterisation.
3. A wireless communication device as claimed in claim 2, wherein the activity profile delineates the transmission of data packets over a period of time according to the characterisation.
4. A wireless communication device as claimed in claim 3, wherein the device is configured to characterise the transmission of data packets as an average such that the determined activity profile is an average transmission profile.
5. A wireless communication device as claimed in claim 4, wherein the device is configured to determine the average transmission profile from a plurality of transmission profiles each delineating the transmission of data packets over a period of time.
6. A wireless communication device as claimed in claim 3, wherein the device is configured to characterise the transmission of the data packets as a mode such that the determined activity profile is a modal transmission profile.
7. A wireless communication device as claimed in claim 6, wherein the device is configured to determine the modal transmission profile from a plurality of transmission profiles each delineating the transmission of data packets over a period of time.
8. A wireless communication device as claimed in claim 1, wherein the device is configured to operate according to the Bluetooth Low Energy protocol and wherein the mesh network is an ad-hoc network.
9. A wireless communication device as claimed in claim 1, wherein the device is configured to transmit dummy packets in a form indicative of a request for an acknowledgement.
10. A wireless communication device as claimed in claim 9, wherein the device is configured to transmit an acknowledgement in response to receiving a data packet similar to said dummy packets indicative of a request for acknowledgement.
11. A wireless communication device as claimed in claim 1, wherein the device is configured to transmit at least some data packets configured to control and/or monitor the state of remote objects within the mesh network during the first time.
12. A wireless communication device as claimed in claim 1, wherein the device is configured to exclusively transmit data packets configured to control and/or monitor the state of remote objects within the mesh network during the first time.
13. A wireless communication device capable of operating according to a wireless communication protocol and capable of operating in a mesh network, the device being configured to:
at a first time transmit data packets of a first type in accordance with a mesh network protocol to control and/or monitor the state of remote devices within the mesh network; and
transmit, independently of the transmission of the first type of data packets, dummy data packets in accordance with the mesh network protocol so as to obscure a variation in transmission of the first type of data packets from the first time.
14. A wireless communication device as claimed in claim 13, wherein the device is configured to transmit the dummy data packets according to a desired transmission profile, wherein the desired transmission profile delineates the desired transmission of data packets from the wireless communication device over a period of time.
15. A wireless communication device as claimed in claim 14, wherein the device is configured to determine an activity profile that characterises the transmission of the first type of data packets during the first time.
16. A wireless communication device as claimed in claim 15, wherein the device is configured to characterise the transmission of the first type of data packets as one of: (i) an average such that the activity profile Is an average transmission profile or (ii) a mode such that the activity profile is a modal transmission profile.
17. A wireless communication device as claimed in claim 15, wherein the determined activity profile has an associated average transmission rate and wherein the desired transmission profile has an associated average transmission rate that is substantially higher than the average transmission rate of the activity profile.
18. A wireless communication device as claimed in claim 14, wherein the device is configured to transmit the dummy data packets according to the desired transmission profile at an average transmission rate that is high enough so as to obscure a variation in transmission of the first type of data packets from the first time.
19. A wireless communication device as claimed in claim 13, wherein the device is configured to transmit the dummy data packets in a pseudo-random manner at an average rate high enough so as to obscure a variation in transmission of the first type of data packets from the first time.
20. A wireless communication device as claimed in claim 13, wherein the device operates according to the Bluetooth Low Energy protocol and wherein the mesh network is an ad-hoc network.
US14/316,529 2014-02-25 2014-06-26 Thwarting traffic analysis Abandoned US20150244828A1 (en)

Applications Claiming Priority (6)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
GB1403314.6A GB2512733B (en) 2014-02-25 2014-02-25 Broadcast retransmission
GB1403312.0A GB2515853B (en) 2014-02-25 2014-02-25 Latency mitigation
GB1403314.6 2014-02-25
GB1403312.0 2014-02-25
GB1405786.3 2014-03-31
GB1405786.3A GB2512746B (en) 2014-02-25 2014-03-31 Thwarting traffic analysis

Publications (1)

Publication Number Publication Date
US20150244828A1 true US20150244828A1 (en) 2015-08-27

Family

ID=50737759

Family Applications (14)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
US14/270,884 Abandoned US20150244648A1 (en) 2014-02-25 2014-05-06 Auto-configuration of a mesh relay's tx/rx schedule
US14/270,961 Active 2035-05-12 US10055570B2 (en) 2014-02-25 2014-05-06 Mesh relay
US14/297,324 Active 2034-12-08 US9489506B2 (en) 2014-02-25 2014-06-05 Linking ad hoc networks
US14/298,177 Abandoned US20150245203A1 (en) 2014-02-25 2014-06-06 Packet identification
US14/316,404 Abandoned US20150245204A1 (en) 2014-02-25 2014-06-26 Device authentication
US14/316,529 Abandoned US20150244828A1 (en) 2014-02-25 2014-06-26 Thwarting traffic analysis
US14/505,454 Expired - Fee Related US9842202B2 (en) 2014-02-25 2014-10-02 Device proximity
US14/505,437 Abandoned US20150245369A1 (en) 2014-02-25 2014-10-02 Communicating data over a mesh network
US14/505,458 Active US9672346B2 (en) 2014-02-25 2014-10-02 Object tracking by establishing a mesh network and transmitting packets
US14/505,418 Abandoned US20150242614A1 (en) 2014-02-25 2014-10-02 Provisioning of security credentials
US14/505,465 Abandoned US20150244565A1 (en) 2014-02-25 2014-10-02 Network configuration
US14/505,399 Active 2035-04-03 US9910976B2 (en) 2014-02-25 2014-10-02 Processing mesh communications
US14/505,443 Active 2035-06-01 US9754096B2 (en) 2014-02-25 2014-10-02 Update management
US14/505,466 Abandoned US20150244623A1 (en) 2014-02-25 2014-10-02 Mesh profiling

Family Applications Before (5)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
US14/270,884 Abandoned US20150244648A1 (en) 2014-02-25 2014-05-06 Auto-configuration of a mesh relay's tx/rx schedule
US14/270,961 Active 2035-05-12 US10055570B2 (en) 2014-02-25 2014-05-06 Mesh relay
US14/297,324 Active 2034-12-08 US9489506B2 (en) 2014-02-25 2014-06-05 Linking ad hoc networks
US14/298,177 Abandoned US20150245203A1 (en) 2014-02-25 2014-06-06 Packet identification
US14/316,404 Abandoned US20150245204A1 (en) 2014-02-25 2014-06-26 Device authentication

Family Applications After (8)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
US14/505,454 Expired - Fee Related US9842202B2 (en) 2014-02-25 2014-10-02 Device proximity
US14/505,437 Abandoned US20150245369A1 (en) 2014-02-25 2014-10-02 Communicating data over a mesh network
US14/505,458 Active US9672346B2 (en) 2014-02-25 2014-10-02 Object tracking by establishing a mesh network and transmitting packets
US14/505,418 Abandoned US20150242614A1 (en) 2014-02-25 2014-10-02 Provisioning of security credentials
US14/505,465 Abandoned US20150244565A1 (en) 2014-02-25 2014-10-02 Network configuration
US14/505,399 Active 2035-04-03 US9910976B2 (en) 2014-02-25 2014-10-02 Processing mesh communications
US14/505,443 Active 2035-06-01 US9754096B2 (en) 2014-02-25 2014-10-02 Update management
US14/505,466 Abandoned US20150244623A1 (en) 2014-02-25 2014-10-02 Mesh profiling

Country Status (3)

Country Link
US (14) US20150244648A1 (en)
DE (13) DE102014012257B4 (en)
GB (18) GB2512502B (en)

Cited By (12)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US9489506B2 (en) 2014-02-25 2016-11-08 Qualcomm Technologies International, Ltd. Linking ad hoc networks
US20170171241A1 (en) * 2015-12-14 2017-06-15 Afero, Inc. Apparatus and method for obscuring wireless communication patterns
US9692538B2 (en) 2014-02-25 2017-06-27 Qualcomm Technologies International, Ltd. Latency mitigation
US9781603B1 (en) * 2016-10-20 2017-10-03 Fortress Cyber Security, LLC Combined network and physical security appliance
US9843929B2 (en) 2015-08-21 2017-12-12 Afero, Inc. Apparatus and method for sharing WiFi security data in an internet of things (IoT) system
US9942837B2 (en) 2015-08-25 2018-04-10 Afero, Inc. Apparatus and method for a dynamic scan interval for a wireless device
US10091242B2 (en) 2015-12-14 2018-10-02 Afero, Inc. System and method for establishing a secondary communication channel to control an internet of things (IOT) device
US10447784B2 (en) 2015-12-14 2019-10-15 Afero, Inc. Apparatus and method for modifying packet interval timing to identify a data transfer condition
US20190394180A1 (en) * 2017-03-08 2019-12-26 Abb Schweiz Ag Methods and devices for preserving relative timing and ordering of data packets in a network
US10650023B2 (en) * 2018-07-24 2020-05-12 Booz Allen Hamilton, Inc. Process for establishing trust between multiple autonomous systems for the purposes of command and control
US10990616B2 (en) * 2015-11-17 2021-04-27 Nec Corporation Fast pattern discovery for log analytics
US11368436B2 (en) * 2018-08-28 2022-06-21 Bae Systems Information And Electronic Systems Integration Inc. Communication protocol

Families Citing this family (123)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
CN103974225B (en) * 2013-02-01 2018-03-13 财团法人工业技术研究院 Communication device, device-to-device communication system and wireless communication method thereof
US9234757B2 (en) 2013-11-29 2016-01-12 Fedex Corporate Services, Inc. Determining node location using a variable power characteristic of a node in a wireless node network
US9918351B2 (en) * 2014-04-01 2018-03-13 Belkin International Inc. Setup of multiple IOT networks devices
US9451462B2 (en) * 2014-08-10 2016-09-20 Belkin International Inc. Setup of multiple IoT network devices
US10453023B2 (en) 2014-05-28 2019-10-22 Fedex Corporate Services, Inc. Methods and node apparatus for adaptive node communication within a wireless node network
US9386605B2 (en) * 2014-07-11 2016-07-05 Motorola Solutions, Inc. Mobile dynamic mesh cluster bridging method and apparatus at incident scenes
US9872240B2 (en) 2014-08-19 2018-01-16 Belkin International Inc. Network device source entity triggered device configuration setup
FR3026587A1 (en) * 2014-09-30 2016-04-01 Orange METHOD OF ACCESS BY A MASTER DEVICE TO A VALUE TAKEN BY A CHARACTERISTIC MANAGED BY A PERIPHERAL DEVICE
FR3031822B1 (en) * 2015-01-16 2018-04-13 Airbus Operations DOWNLOADING DATA ON REMOTE EQUIPMENT
US10681479B2 (en) 2015-01-30 2020-06-09 Cassia Networks Inc. Methods, devices and systems for bluetooth audio transmission
US9769594B2 (en) 2015-01-30 2017-09-19 Cassia Networks Inc. Methods, devices and systems for increasing wireless communication range
US11238397B2 (en) 2015-02-09 2022-02-01 Fedex Corporate Services, Inc. Methods, apparatus, and systems for generating a corrective pickup notification for a shipped item using a mobile master node
US9426616B1 (en) * 2015-02-10 2016-08-23 Tyco Fire & Security Gmbh Wireless sensor network controlled low energy link
FR3033118B1 (en) * 2015-02-19 2017-02-17 Sigfox METHOD AND SYSTEM FOR WIRELESS COMMUNICATION BETWEEN TERMINALS AND SEMI-DUPLEX BASE STATIONS
US11122034B2 (en) 2015-02-24 2021-09-14 Nelson A. Cicchitto Method and apparatus for an identity assurance score with ties to an ID-less and password-less authentication system
US10848485B2 (en) 2015-02-24 2020-11-24 Nelson Cicchitto Method and apparatus for a social network score system communicably connected to an ID-less and password-less authentication system
US11171941B2 (en) 2015-02-24 2021-11-09 Nelson A. Cicchitto Mobile device enabled desktop tethered and tetherless authentication
CN107409433B (en) 2015-02-26 2020-09-15 瑞典爱立信有限公司 Energy efficient BLE mesh initialization and operation
JP6566669B2 (en) * 2015-03-12 2019-08-28 キヤノン株式会社 Information processing apparatus, control method thereof, communication method, and program
TWI552001B (en) * 2015-04-13 2016-10-01 聚眾聯合科技股份有限公司 Connection information sharing system, computer program, and connection information sharing method thereof
CN106304303B (en) * 2015-06-09 2019-11-12 沈阳中科奥维科技股份有限公司 A kind of power regulating method suitable for WIA-PA wireless network
WO2015132419A2 (en) 2015-06-30 2015-09-11 Sonova Ag Method of fitting a hearing assistance device
WO2017007409A1 (en) * 2015-07-06 2017-01-12 Telefonaktiebolaget Lm Ericsson (Publ) Apparatus and method for forwarding messages
US10305744B2 (en) 2015-07-08 2019-05-28 Fedex Corporate Services, Inc. System, apparatus, and methods of event monitoring for an event candidate related to an ID node within a wireless node network
EP3357266B1 (en) * 2015-09-30 2020-10-28 Google LLC Systems, devices, and methods for simulataneously exchanging messages between a low-energy radio device and multiple communication devices
US10673646B1 (en) * 2018-12-09 2020-06-02 Olibra Llc System, device, and method of multi-path wireless communication
US10432461B2 (en) * 2015-12-04 2019-10-01 T-Mobile Usa, Inc. Peer-to-peer distribution of radio protocol data for software defined radio (SDR) updates
KR102381371B1 (en) * 2015-12-10 2022-03-31 삼성전자주식회사 System and method for providing information by using near field communication
US9992065B2 (en) * 2015-12-15 2018-06-05 T-Mobile Usa, Inc. Selective wi-fi calling router updates
US10659442B1 (en) * 2015-12-21 2020-05-19 Marvell International Ltd. Security in smart configuration for WLAN based IOT device
US20170187602A1 (en) * 2015-12-29 2017-06-29 Vivek Pathela System and method of troubleshooting network source inefficiency
US10708842B2 (en) * 2016-01-13 2020-07-07 Locus Control LLC Low power communications system
US10148453B2 (en) * 2016-02-24 2018-12-04 Qualcomm Incorporated Using update slot to synchronize to Bluetooth LE isochronous channel and communicate state changes
EP3433809A4 (en) 2016-03-23 2019-10-02 Fedex Corporate Services, Inc. Systems, apparatus, and methods for self-adjusting a broadcast setting of a node in a wireless node network
GB2549735B (en) * 2016-04-26 2020-07-29 Checkit Ltd Network access control
US10644746B2 (en) 2016-04-29 2020-05-05 Texas Instruments Incorporated Pseudo channel hopping using scan dwell times in mesh networks without time synchronization
US10205606B2 (en) 2016-06-15 2019-02-12 Abl Ip Holding Llc Mesh over-the-air (OTA) luminaire firmware update
US10873854B2 (en) * 2016-07-28 2020-12-22 Lg Electronics Inc. Method and apparatus for establishing connection of devices
WO2018038459A1 (en) * 2016-08-22 2018-03-01 엘지전자(주) Method for controlling device by using bluetooth technology, and apparatus
EP3312762B1 (en) * 2016-10-18 2023-03-01 Axis AB Method and system for tracking an object in a defined area
US10348514B2 (en) * 2016-10-26 2019-07-09 Abl Ip Holding Llc Mesh over-the-air (OTA) driver update using site profile based multiple platform image
US11210678B2 (en) 2016-11-18 2021-12-28 Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. Component for provisioning security data and product including the same
US10728026B2 (en) * 2016-11-24 2020-07-28 Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. Data management method
DE102016124168A1 (en) * 2016-12-13 2018-06-14 Endress+Hauser Conducta Gmbh+Co. Kg Method for operating a specific field device via a mobile operating device
US20180172664A1 (en) * 2016-12-20 2018-06-21 Abbott Diabetes Care Inc. Systems, devices, and methods for wireless communications in analyte monitoring systems
CN106792853B (en) * 2016-12-22 2020-05-12 青岛亿联客信息技术有限公司 New equipment adding method for Bluetooth mesh network
CN106713047A (en) * 2017-01-12 2017-05-24 泰凌微电子（上海）有限公司 Node upgrading method and system in mesh network
US10433134B2 (en) * 2017-01-24 2019-10-01 Arris Enterprises Llc Video gateway as an internet of things mesh enhancer apparatus and method
JP6809614B2 (en) * 2017-02-21 2021-01-06 オムロン株式会社 Field device control method and control device
US10362612B2 (en) * 2017-03-06 2019-07-23 Citrix Systems, Inc. Virtual private networking based on peer-to-peer communication
DE102017106381A1 (en) 2017-03-24 2018-09-27 Newtec Gmbh Method and apparatus for wirelessly transmitting a data signal
WO2018191198A1 (en) * 2017-04-10 2018-10-18 Itron Networked Solutions, Inc. Efficient internet-of-things device configuration via quick response codes
US10116523B1 (en) * 2017-04-12 2018-10-30 Fisher-Rosemount Systems, Inc. Predictive connectivity diagnostics for a wireless mesh network in a process control system
US11229023B2 (en) 2017-04-21 2022-01-18 Netgear, Inc. Secure communication in network access points
US10605609B2 (en) 2017-05-03 2020-03-31 Microsoft Technology Licensing, Llc Coupled interactive devices
DE102017207871A1 (en) * 2017-05-10 2018-11-15 Tridonic Gmbh & Co Kg Firmware Update-Over-The Air (FOTA) in building technology
WO2018217280A1 (en) 2017-05-23 2018-11-29 Walmart Apollo, Llc Automated inspection system
US10389854B2 (en) * 2017-06-15 2019-08-20 Infinet, LLC Method and system for forming an ad-hoc network over heterogeneous protocols
US9955307B1 (en) * 2017-08-03 2018-04-24 Here Global B.V. Distributed relative positioning
CA3069348A1 (en) * 2017-08-15 2019-02-21 General Electric Company Smart equipment, method used by smart equipment, smart lamp, and method therefore for use in a bluetooth low energy mesh network
US10666624B2 (en) * 2017-08-23 2020-05-26 Qualcomm Incorporated Systems and methods for optimized network layer message processing
CN107635215A (en) * 2017-08-25 2018-01-26 西安电子科技大学 Mesh network-building methods based on low-power consumption bluetooth
US10951653B2 (en) 2017-09-22 2021-03-16 Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. Apparatus including secure component and method of provisioning security information into the apparatus
CN107508714B (en) * 2017-09-26 2020-09-15 深圳市微智电子有限公司 Method and device for carrying out network configuration on Bluetooth equipment based on Bluetooth mesh
US11212089B2 (en) * 2017-10-04 2021-12-28 Amir Keyvan Khandani Methods for secure data storage
CN109756324A (en) * 2017-11-02 2019-05-14 大唐移动通信设备有限公司 Cryptographic key negotiation method, terminal and gateway in a kind of Mesh network
US11490400B2 (en) * 2017-11-15 2022-11-01 Telefonaktiebolaget Lm Ericsson (Publ) End node, relay node, and methods performed therein for handling transmission of information
CN108064034A (en) * 2017-11-17 2018-05-22 芯海科技（深圳）股份有限公司 A kind of data collection network method of mesh networkings
EP3489922B1 (en) 2017-11-24 2022-01-05 Andreas Stihl AG & Co. KG Method of operating a wireless transmitter and a wireless receiver and system
WO2019105523A1 (en) * 2017-11-28 2019-06-06 Telefonaktiebolaget Lm Ericsson (Publ) Message transmission with reduced interference
WO2019117763A1 (en) * 2017-12-11 2019-06-20 Telefonaktiebolaget Lm Ericsson (Publ) Channel scanning in a mesh network
US10554562B2 (en) * 2017-12-22 2020-02-04 International Business Machines Corporation Streaming network
RU2666306C1 (en) * 2017-12-27 2018-09-06 федеральное государственное автономное образовательное учреждение высшего образования "Санкт-Петербургский политехнический университет Петра Великого" (ФГАОУ ВО "СПбПУ") Method of controlling communication of single-range intercomputer data network
US10607012B2 (en) 2017-12-29 2020-03-31 Delphian Systems, LLC Bridge computing device control in local networks of interconnected devices
US10706179B2 (en) * 2018-01-10 2020-07-07 General Electric Company Secure provisioning of secrets into MPSoC devices using untrusted third-party systems
KR102530441B1 (en) 2018-01-29 2023-05-09 삼성전자주식회사 Electronic device, external electronic device, system comprising the same and control method thereof
US10944669B1 (en) 2018-02-09 2021-03-09 GoTenna, Inc. System and method for efficient network-wide broadcast in a multi-hop wireless network using packet echos
EP3766276B1 (en) * 2018-03-16 2023-11-15 Telefonaktiebolaget Lm Ericsson (Publ) Methods and nodes for obtaining information regarding a bluetooth mesh network
US11448632B2 (en) 2018-03-19 2022-09-20 Walmart Apollo, Llc System and method for the determination of produce shelf life
US11658865B2 (en) * 2018-03-20 2023-05-23 Delphian Systems, LLC Updating devices in a local network of interconnected devices
CA3094300C (en) * 2018-03-23 2023-09-19 Telefonaktiebolaget Lm Ericsson (Publ) Message cache management in a mesh network
US10613505B2 (en) 2018-03-29 2020-04-07 Saudi Arabian Oil Company Intelligent distributed industrial facility safety system
US10311705B1 (en) * 2018-03-29 2019-06-04 Saudi Arabian Oil Company Distributed industrial facility safety system
US10303147B1 (en) 2018-03-29 2019-05-28 Saudi Arabian Oil Company Distributed industrial facility safety system modular remote sensing devices
US11018871B2 (en) * 2018-03-30 2021-05-25 Intel Corporation Key protection for computing platform
KR102114992B1 (en) * 2018-04-25 2020-05-25 (주)휴맥스 Wireless communication equipment and method for configuring mesh network thereof
US11146540B2 (en) * 2018-05-09 2021-10-12 Datalogic Ip Tech S.R.L. Systems and methods for public key exchange employing a peer-to-peer protocol
US11308950B2 (en) 2018-05-09 2022-04-19 4PLAN Corporation Personal location system for virtual assistant
CN110493758B (en) 2018-05-14 2023-01-13 阿里巴巴集团控股有限公司 Bluetooth Mesh network and network distribution method, equipment and storage medium thereof
CN110505606B (en) * 2018-05-18 2022-12-02 阿里巴巴集团控股有限公司 Bluetooth Mesh network and distribution network authentication method, equipment and storage medium thereof
US10574475B2 (en) * 2018-05-24 2020-02-25 Haier Us Appliance Solutions, Inc. Household appliance with bluetooth connection and authentication
CN111886843B (en) * 2018-06-13 2023-04-04 卧安科技(深圳)有限公司 Low power consumption Bluetooth network maintenance method, electronic device, bluetooth network and medium
CN110636478B (en) 2018-06-22 2023-04-14 阿里巴巴集团控股有限公司 Bluetooth Mesh network system, communication method, device and storage medium thereof
WO2020023762A1 (en) 2018-07-26 2020-01-30 Walmart Apollo, Llc System and method for produce detection and classification
WO2020023909A1 (en) 2018-07-27 2020-01-30 GoTenna, Inc. Vine™: zero-control routing using data packet inspection for wireless mesh networks
US11140659B2 (en) * 2018-08-21 2021-10-05 Signify Holding B.V. Wireless organization of electrical devices by sensor manipulation
US11715059B2 (en) * 2018-10-12 2023-08-01 Walmart Apollo, Llc Systems and methods for condition compliance
FI128520B (en) * 2018-11-14 2020-07-15 Xiphera Oy Method for providing a secret unique key for a volatile FPGA
WO2020106332A1 (en) 2018-11-20 2020-05-28 Walmart Apollo, Llc Systems and methods for assessing products
WO2020123958A1 (en) * 2018-12-14 2020-06-18 Denso International America, Inc. System and method of determining real-time location
CN109673014B (en) * 2019-01-25 2022-07-15 欧普照明股份有限公司 Network combination method
CN111669732B (en) * 2019-03-06 2021-09-07 乐鑫信息科技（上海）股份有限公司 Method for filtering redundant data packets at nodes in bluetooth Mesh network
CN109862548B (en) 2019-03-06 2021-01-26 乐鑫信息科技（上海）股份有限公司 Method for processing data packets at a node in a bluetooth Mesh network
SG10201902395SA (en) * 2019-03-18 2019-11-28 Qrypted Tech Pte Ltd Method and system for a secure transaction
US11777715B2 (en) 2019-05-15 2023-10-03 Amir Keyvan Khandani Method and apparatus for generating shared secrets
CN111988268A (en) * 2019-05-24 2020-11-24 魏文科 Method for establishing and verifying input value by using asymmetric encryption algorithm and application thereof
EP3844935B1 (en) * 2019-07-05 2023-02-22 Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. System and method for dynamic group data protection
CN110636486B (en) * 2019-09-25 2021-06-18 珠海格力电器股份有限公司 Method for establishing communication connection after equipment is offline and intelligent home system
CN110779500B (en) * 2019-11-14 2021-11-30 中国人民解放军国防科技大学 Mesoscale vortex detection method for incremental deployment sensor
KR102324374B1 (en) 2019-11-18 2021-11-11 한국전자통신연구원 Method and apparatus for configuring cluster in wireless communication system
US11245784B1 (en) * 2020-01-06 2022-02-08 Vorbeck Materials Corp. Self-organizing communications network nodes and systems
US11432167B2 (en) 2020-01-22 2022-08-30 Abl Ip Holding Llc Selective updating of nodes of a nodal wireless network
US20210273920A1 (en) * 2020-02-28 2021-09-02 Vmware, Inc. Secure certificate or key distribution for synchronous mobile device management (mdm) clients
US11166253B2 (en) * 2020-03-27 2021-11-02 Dell Products L.P. Data center automatic inventory and location data population and recovery using mesh network
EP3968600A1 (en) * 2020-09-11 2022-03-16 Volkswagen Ag Controlling a communication between a vehicle and a backend device
US12069050B1 (en) 2020-12-29 2024-08-20 Strat ID GIC, Inc. Reciprocal authentication of digital transmissions and method
WO2022148695A1 (en) * 2021-01-06 2022-07-14 Signify Holding B.V. A method of, a node device and a system for relaying a message in a network comprising at least two mesh networks
US20220330020A1 (en) * 2021-04-08 2022-10-13 Amir Keyvan Khandani Methods and apparatus for automated multi-factor authentication
US20230266960A1 (en) * 2022-02-24 2023-08-24 Whirlpool Corporation Systems and methods of offline over the air (ota) programming of appliances
CN115051921B (en) * 2022-05-27 2023-11-07 北京交通大学 Self-adaptive heterogeneous network attribute information collection method
EP4390807A1 (en) * 2022-12-19 2024-06-26 Hitachi Energy Ltd Automatic detection and storage of asset location and asset composition
US11870879B1 (en) * 2023-01-04 2024-01-09 Getac Technology Corporation Device communication during emergent conditions
FR3146739A1 (en) * 2023-03-15 2024-09-20 Pa.Cotte Sa Remote computer update system for a fleet of computer objects

Citations (1)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US20140266669A1 (en) * 2013-03-14 2014-09-18 Nest Labs, Inc. Devices, methods, and associated information processing for security in a smart-sensored home

Family Cites Families (187)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US6079034A (en) * 1997-12-05 2000-06-20 Hewlett-Packard Company Hub-embedded system for automated network fault detection and isolation
JP4451566B2 (en) * 1998-10-30 2010-04-14 バーネットエックス インコーポレーティッド Agile network protocol for secure communication with guaranteed system availability
US6986046B1 (en) 2000-05-12 2006-01-10 Groove Networks, Incorporated Method and apparatus for managing secure collaborative transactions
US6836466B1 (en) * 2000-05-26 2004-12-28 Telcordia Technologies, Inc. Method and system for measuring IP performance metrics
US6745027B2 (en) 2000-12-22 2004-06-01 Seekernet Incorporated Class switched networks for tracking articles
US20030014507A1 (en) 2001-03-13 2003-01-16 International Business Machines Corporation Method and system for providing performance analysis for clusters
WO2002078272A1 (en) * 2001-03-23 2002-10-03 Kent Ridge Digital Labs A method and system for providing bridged mobile ad-hoc networks
US20030037237A1 (en) 2001-04-09 2003-02-20 Jean-Paul Abgrall Systems and methods for computer device authentication
DE10145596A1 (en) * 2001-09-15 2003-04-03 Philips Corp Intellectual Pty Network with several sub-networks
WO2003034669A1 (en) 2001-10-17 2003-04-24 British Telecommunications Public Limited Company Network location management system
KR100408525B1 (en) * 2001-10-31 2003-12-06 삼성전자주식회사 System and method of network adaptive real- time multimedia streaming
US7391731B1 (en) 2002-03-07 2008-06-24 Ibasis, Inc. Method for determining best path
US6917974B1 (en) * 2002-01-03 2005-07-12 The United States Of America As Represented By The Secretary Of The Air Force Method and apparatus for preventing network traffic analysis
CA2419767C (en) 2002-02-25 2011-01-04 Olsonet Communications Corporation Method for routing ad-hoc signals
US7532862B2 (en) 2002-03-19 2009-05-12 Apple Inc. Method and apparatus for configuring a wireless device through reverse advertising
US20030212821A1 (en) 2002-05-13 2003-11-13 Kiyon, Inc. System and method for routing packets in a wired or wireless network
US7251235B2 (en) 2002-06-12 2007-07-31 Conexant, Inc. Event-based multichannel direct link
US20040001483A1 (en) 2002-06-27 2004-01-01 Schmidt Kurt E. Distribution and reconstruction of AD-HOC timing signals
US7474874B2 (en) 2002-06-28 2009-01-06 Nokia Corporation Local browsing
US6898751B2 (en) * 2002-07-31 2005-05-24 Transdimension, Inc. Method and system for optimizing polling in systems using negative acknowledgement protocols
US7657748B2 (en) 2002-08-28 2010-02-02 Ntt Docomo, Inc. Certificate-based encryption and public key infrastructure
GB0313473D0 (en) 2003-06-11 2003-07-16 Koninkl Philips Electronics Nv Configuring a radio network for selective broadcast
KR100547133B1 (en) 2003-07-11 2006-01-26 삼성전자주식회사 Apparatus and method for constructing ad-hoc network of heterogeneous terminals
KR100640327B1 (en) * 2003-11-24 2006-10-30 삼성전자주식회사 The Frame Structure and Data Transmission Method for Bridge Operation of WPAN
US20050175184A1 (en) * 2004-02-11 2005-08-11 Phonex Broadband Corporation Method and apparatus for a per-packet encryption system
CN1934881A (en) 2004-03-25 2007-03-21 捷讯研究有限公司 Wireless access point methods and apparatus for reduced power consumption and cost
US20080069030A1 (en) 2004-05-31 2008-03-20 Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. Mobile Terminal Managing Device, Mobile Terminal, and Communication System
US20060025180A1 (en) 2004-07-30 2006-02-02 Qualcomm Incorporated Method for waking a wireless device
US7656901B2 (en) 2004-08-10 2010-02-02 Meshnetworks, Inc. Software architecture and hardware abstraction layer for multi-radio routing and method for providing the same
DE102004040069B3 (en) 2004-08-18 2006-03-23 Siemens Ag Establishment of a wireless communication network with determination of local topology information from the identifiers of the communication devices
US7747774B2 (en) * 2004-08-23 2010-06-29 At&T Intellectual Property I, L.P. Methods, systems and computer program products for obscuring traffic in a distributed system
WO2006071380A2 (en) 2004-11-12 2006-07-06 Pufco, Inc. Securely field configurable device
KR100594127B1 (en) * 2004-11-16 2006-06-28 삼성전자주식회사 Bonding process method and device in a Bluetooth device
US7496059B2 (en) * 2004-12-09 2009-02-24 Itt Manufacturing Enterprises, Inc. Energy-efficient medium access control protocol and system for sensor networks
US7533258B2 (en) 2005-01-07 2009-05-12 Cisco Technology, Inc. Using a network-service credential for access control
JP4550636B2 (en) * 2005-03-18 2010-09-22 富士通株式会社 Electronic device, its registration method and registration program
US7522540B1 (en) 2005-04-15 2009-04-21 Nvidia Corporation Extended service set mesh topology discovery
US8027289B2 (en) * 2005-04-27 2011-09-27 Raytheon Bbn Technologies Corp. Ultra-low latency packet transport in ad hoc networks
US7653011B2 (en) 2005-05-31 2010-01-26 Cisco Technology, Inc. Spanning tree protocol for wireless networks
US7606178B2 (en) 2005-05-31 2009-10-20 Cisco Technology, Inc. Multiple wireless spanning tree protocol for use in a wireless mesh network
US7894372B2 (en) 2005-05-31 2011-02-22 Iac Search & Media, Inc. Topology-centric resource management for large scale service clusters
KR20080025095A (en) 2005-06-01 2008-03-19 밀레니얼 넷, 인크. Communicating over a wireless network
US9654200B2 (en) 2005-07-18 2017-05-16 Mutualink, Inc. System and method for dynamic wireless aerial mesh network
WO2007013914A1 (en) * 2005-07-21 2007-02-01 Firetide, Inc. Method for enabling the efficient operation of arbitrarily interconnected mesh networks
US7787361B2 (en) 2005-07-29 2010-08-31 Cisco Technology, Inc. Hybrid distance vector protocol for wireless mesh networks
US8948805B2 (en) * 2005-08-26 2015-02-03 Qualcomm Incorporated Method and apparatus for reliable transmit power and timing control in wireless communication
US7778270B1 (en) 2005-08-31 2010-08-17 Hrl Laboratories, Llc Code-switching in wireless multi-hop networks
US7546139B2 (en) 2005-12-27 2009-06-09 F4W, Inc. System and method for establishing and maintaining communications across disparate networks
WO2007045937A1 (en) * 2005-10-18 2007-04-26 Nokia Corporation Security in wireless environments using out-of-band channel communication
JP4641245B2 (en) 2005-10-26 2011-03-02 三菱電機株式会社 Ad hoc network system, wireless ad hoc terminal and failure detection method thereof
US7978666B2 (en) 2005-10-31 2011-07-12 Robert Bosch Gmbh Node control in wireless sensor networks
US7539488B2 (en) 2005-11-09 2009-05-26 Texas Instruments Norway As Over-the-air download (OAD) methods and apparatus for use in facilitating application programming in wireless network devices of ad hoc wireless communication networks
US20070110024A1 (en) 2005-11-14 2007-05-17 Cisco Technology, Inc. System and method for spanning tree cross routes
US7593376B2 (en) 2005-12-07 2009-09-22 Motorola, Inc. Method and apparatus for broadcast in an ad hoc network using elected broadcast relay nodes
US20130219482A1 (en) 2006-01-31 2013-08-22 Sigma Designs, Inc. Method for uniquely addressing a group of network units in a sub-network
US7848261B2 (en) * 2006-02-17 2010-12-07 Isilon Systems, Inc. Systems and methods for providing a quiescing protocol
US8023478B2 (en) 2006-03-06 2011-09-20 Cisco Technology, Inc. System and method for securing mesh access points in a wireless mesh network, including rapid roaming
US7647078B2 (en) * 2006-03-07 2010-01-12 Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. Power-saving method for wireless sensor network
US8340106B2 (en) * 2006-03-13 2012-12-25 Microsoft Corporation Connecting multi-hop mesh networks using MAC bridge
US8519566B2 (en) 2006-03-28 2013-08-27 Wireless Environment, Llc Remote switch sensing in lighting devices
US8681671B1 (en) * 2006-04-25 2014-03-25 Cisco Technology, Inc. System and method for reducing power used for radio transmission and reception
US7786885B2 (en) 2006-04-25 2010-08-31 Hrl Laboratories, Llc Event localization within a distributed sensor array
US8406794B2 (en) 2006-04-26 2013-03-26 Qualcomm Incorporated Methods and apparatuses of initiating communication in wireless networks
CN101083597A (en) 2006-05-31 2007-12-05 朗迅科技公司 SIP based instant message of mobile self-organizing network
DE102006036109B4 (en) 2006-06-01 2008-06-19 Nokia Siemens Networks Gmbh & Co.Kg Method and system for providing a mesh key
EP2041910A4 (en) * 2006-07-06 2013-05-22 Apple Inc Wireless access point security for multi-hop networks
FR2903830B1 (en) 2006-07-11 2008-08-22 Alcatel Sa METHOD AND DEVICE FOR MONITORING OPTICAL CONNECTION PATHS FOR A TRANSPARENT OPTICAL NETWORK
US8411651B2 (en) 2006-07-27 2013-04-02 Interdigital Technology Corporation Media independent multi-rat function in a converged device
EP1892913A1 (en) 2006-08-24 2008-02-27 Siemens Aktiengesellschaft Method and arrangement for providing a wireless mesh network
US8634342B2 (en) 2006-10-05 2014-01-21 Cisco Technology, Inc. Upgrading mesh access points in a wireless mesh network
US8270302B2 (en) 2006-10-20 2012-09-18 Stmicroelectronics, Inc. System and method for providing an adaptive value of TTL (time to live) for broadcast/multicast messages in a mesh network using a hybrid wireless mesh protocol
US8149748B2 (en) 2006-11-14 2012-04-03 Raytheon Company Wireless data networking
KR100879026B1 (en) 2006-12-05 2009-01-15 한국전자통신연구원 Method for grouping among sensor nodes in heterogeneous wireless sensor networks
US8838481B2 (en) * 2011-07-26 2014-09-16 Golba Llc Method and system for location based hands-free payment
MX2009005491A (en) 2006-12-19 2009-06-03 Ericsson Telefon Ab L M Handling of idle gap commands in a telecommunication sysytem.
US9760146B2 (en) 2007-01-08 2017-09-12 Imagination Technologies Limited Conditional activation and deactivation of a microprocessor
US7787427B1 (en) 2007-01-09 2010-08-31 Dust Networks, Inc. Providing low average latency communication in wireless mesh networks
US20080205385A1 (en) 2007-02-26 2008-08-28 Motorola, Inc. Data frame formats to improve groupcast efficiency in multi-hop wireless networks
US8325627B2 (en) 2007-04-13 2012-12-04 Hart Communication Foundation Adaptive scheduling in a wireless network
US8660108B2 (en) 2007-04-13 2014-02-25 Hart Communication Foundation Synchronizing timeslots in a wireless communication protocol
US8451752B2 (en) 2007-05-21 2013-05-28 Arrowspan, Inc. Seamless handoff scheme for multi-radio wireless mesh network
US20080292105A1 (en) 2007-05-22 2008-11-27 Chieh-Yih Wan Lightweight key distribution and management method for sensor networks
WO2009016513A2 (en) * 2007-08-01 2009-02-05 Philip Morris Products S.A. Degradable cigarette filters
US8189506B2 (en) * 2007-09-12 2012-05-29 Nokia Corporation Deep sleep mode for mesh points
KR101405688B1 (en) 2007-09-14 2014-06-12 엘지이노텍 주식회사 Zigbee system
US20090089408A1 (en) 2007-09-28 2009-04-02 Alcatel Lucent XML Router and method of XML Router Network Overlay Topology Creation
US7941663B2 (en) 2007-10-23 2011-05-10 Futurewei Technologies, Inc. Authentication of 6LoWPAN nodes using EAP-GPSK
EP2211499A4 (en) 2007-11-16 2017-06-21 Fujitsu Ten Limited Authentication method, authentication system, on-vehicle device, and authentication device
US9166934B2 (en) 2007-11-25 2015-10-20 Trilliant Networks, Inc. System and method for operating mesh devices in multi-tree overlapping mesh networks
US8289883B2 (en) 2007-12-21 2012-10-16 Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. Hybrid multicast routing protocol for wireless mesh networks
US7929446B2 (en) 2008-01-04 2011-04-19 Radiient Technologies, Inc. Mesh networking for wireless communications
KR20090090461A (en) * 2008-02-21 2009-08-26 삼성전자주식회사 Method for prolonging lifetime of sensor nodes in a wireless sensor network and system therefor
JP4613969B2 (en) 2008-03-03 2011-01-19 ソニー株式会社 Communication apparatus and communication method
US8116247B2 (en) * 2008-03-11 2012-02-14 Nokia Siemens Networks Oy Adaptive mechanism for dynamic reconfiguration of mesh networks
US8923285B2 (en) 2008-04-30 2014-12-30 Qualcomm Incorporated Apparatus and methods for transmitting data over a wireless mesh network
WO2010012926A1 (en) 2008-07-29 2010-02-04 France Telecom Routing adaptable to electromagnetic conditions in a multihop network
US8179845B2 (en) 2008-08-21 2012-05-15 Motorola Solutions, Inc. Antenna-aware method for transmitting packets in a wireless communication network
US8699377B2 (en) 2008-09-04 2014-04-15 Trilliant Networks, Inc. System and method for implementing mesh network communications using a mesh network protocol
CA2733268A1 (en) 2008-09-25 2010-04-01 Fisher-Rosemount Systems, Inc. Wireless mesh network with pinch point and low battery alerts
GB2464125A (en) 2008-10-04 2010-04-07 Ibm Topology discovery comprising partitioning network nodes into groups and using multiple discovery agents operating concurrently in each group.
US8782746B2 (en) 2008-10-17 2014-07-15 Comcast Cable Communications, Llc System and method for supporting multiple identities for a secure identity device
EP2350910B1 (en) * 2008-11-24 2018-07-25 Certicom Corp. System and method for hardware based security
US8294573B2 (en) 2008-12-11 2012-10-23 International Business Machines Corporation System and method for optimizing power consumption of container tracking devices through mesh networks
US8498229B2 (en) 2008-12-30 2013-07-30 Intel Corporation Reduced power state network processing
US8904177B2 (en) * 2009-01-27 2014-12-02 Sony Corporation Authentication for a multi-tier wireless home mesh network
US8254251B2 (en) 2009-02-03 2012-08-28 Mobix Wireless Solutions Ltd. Mesh hybrid communication network
US8964634B2 (en) 2009-02-06 2015-02-24 Sony Corporation Wireless home mesh network bridging adaptor
US9172612B2 (en) 2009-02-12 2015-10-27 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. Network device configuration management by physical location
ES2396014T3 (en) 2009-02-13 2013-02-18 Nokia Siemens Networks Oy Method, system and nodes for a network topology detection in communication networks
US8194576B2 (en) 2009-03-27 2012-06-05 Research In Motion Limited Wireless access point methods and apparatus using dynamically-activated service intervals
US8171292B2 (en) 2009-04-08 2012-05-01 Research In Motion Limited Systems, devices, and methods for securely transmitting a security parameter to a computing device
US9069727B2 (en) * 2011-08-12 2015-06-30 Talari Networks Incorporated Adaptive private network with geographically redundant network control nodes
WO2011010181A1 (en) * 2009-07-23 2011-01-27 Nokia Corporation Method and apparatus for reduced power consumption when operating as a bluetooth low energy device
KR20110020005A (en) * 2009-08-21 2011-03-02 주식회사 팬택 Method for tranmitting and receiving data in wireless communication system
JP5338567B2 (en) * 2009-08-25 2013-11-13 沖電気工業株式会社 Wireless terminal and wireless system
EP2306692B1 (en) * 2009-10-02 2014-05-21 BlackBerry Limited Methods and devices for facilitating bluetooth pairing using a camera as a barcode scanner
US8879994B2 (en) 2009-10-02 2014-11-04 Blackberry Limited Methods and devices for facilitating Bluetooth pairing using a camera as a barcode scanner
US20150058409A1 (en) 2013-03-22 2015-02-26 Frank C. Wang Enhanced content delivery system and method spanning multiple data processing systems
EP2486697B1 (en) 2009-10-06 2013-12-11 Thomson Licensing A method and apparatus for hop-by hop reliable multicast in wireless networks
CN102045280B (en) 2009-10-26 2013-08-07 国基电子（上海）有限公司 Cable modem (CM) and certificate test method thereof
JP5544863B2 (en) 2009-12-17 2014-07-09 富士通株式会社 Reception device, reception method, and reception program
CN101729296B (en) 2009-12-29 2012-12-19 中兴通讯股份有限公司 Method and system for statistical analysis of ethernet traffic
WO2011089143A1 (en) 2010-01-20 2011-07-28 Intrinsic Id B.V. Device and method for obtaining a cryptographic key
US10645628B2 (en) 2010-03-04 2020-05-05 Rosemount Inc. Apparatus for interconnecting wireless networks separated by a barrier
US8495618B1 (en) 2010-03-31 2013-07-23 American Megatrends, Inc. Updating firmware in a high availability enabled computer system
US8516269B1 (en) 2010-07-28 2013-08-20 Sandia Corporation Hardware device to physical structure binding and authentication
US9173196B2 (en) 2010-10-07 2015-10-27 GM Global Technology Operations LLC Adaptive multi-channel access for vehicular networks
WO2012064178A1 (en) * 2010-11-11 2012-05-18 Mimos Berhad Method for use in providing an adaptable sensor nodes schedule in a wireless sensor network
JP6045503B2 (en) 2010-11-25 2016-12-14 フィリップス ライティング ホールディング ビー ヴィ System and method for optimizing data transmission to nodes of a wireless mesh network
US8873526B2 (en) 2010-12-17 2014-10-28 Cisco Technology, Inc. Collision avoidance for wireless networks
US20120163292A1 (en) 2010-12-23 2012-06-28 Nokia Corporation Frame Header in Wireless Communication System
US9094316B2 (en) 2011-01-28 2015-07-28 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. Dynamic name generation
US8769525B2 (en) 2011-01-31 2014-07-01 Digi International Inc. Remote firmware upgrade device mapping
US20120198434A1 (en) 2011-01-31 2012-08-02 Digi International Inc. Virtual bundling of remote device firmware upgrade
US20120196534A1 (en) 2011-02-01 2012-08-02 Nokia Corporation Method, apparatus, and computer program product for broadcasting in short-range communication
WO2012122994A1 (en) 2011-03-11 2012-09-20 Kreft Heinz Off-line transfer of electronic tokens between peer-devices
US9716659B2 (en) * 2011-03-23 2017-07-25 Hughes Network Systems, Llc System and method for providing improved quality of service over broadband networks
US9268545B2 (en) * 2011-03-31 2016-02-23 Intel Corporation Connecting mobile devices, internet-connected hosts, and cloud services
CN102761941B (en) 2011-04-28 2016-08-03 北京云天创科技有限公司 A kind of method utilizing ultra-low power consumption wireless smart sensor's network protocol transmission
US20130128809A1 (en) 2011-05-19 2013-05-23 Qualcomm Incorporated Apparatus and methods for media access control header compression
US8553536B2 (en) 2011-07-12 2013-10-08 General Electric Company Mesh network management system
CN102355351B (en) 2011-07-21 2014-11-05 华为技术有限公司 Key generation, backup and migration method and system based on trusted computing
US8849202B2 (en) 2011-08-19 2014-09-30 Apple Inc. Audio transfer using the Bluetooth Low Energy standard
US8982785B2 (en) 2011-09-08 2015-03-17 Cisco Technology, Inc. Access point assisted direct client discovery
US9445305B2 (en) 2011-09-12 2016-09-13 Microsoft Corporation Low energy beacon encoding
CN103828477B (en) 2011-09-15 2018-05-22 费希尔-罗斯蒙特系统公司 Data frame is transmitted across the communication network of incompatible network routing protocol is used
US8892866B2 (en) 2011-09-26 2014-11-18 Tor Anumana, Inc. Secure cloud storage and synchronization systems and methods
US8649883B2 (en) 2011-10-04 2014-02-11 Advanergy, Inc. Power distribution system and method
WO2013057666A1 (en) 2011-10-17 2013-04-25 Koninklijke Philips Electronics N.V. Automatic recommissioning of electronic devices in a networked system
US8654869B2 (en) 2011-10-27 2014-02-18 Cooper Technologies Company Multi-path radio transmission input/output devices, network, systems and methods with link suitability determination
US9936382B2 (en) * 2011-11-21 2018-04-03 Vital Connect, Inc. Method and system for pairing a sensor device to a user
US8953790B2 (en) 2011-11-21 2015-02-10 Broadcom Corporation Secure generation of a device root key in the field
US9191461B2 (en) 2012-02-21 2015-11-17 Entropic Communications, Inc. Software upgrade using layer-2 management entity messaging
US9270584B2 (en) * 2012-02-28 2016-02-23 Cisco Technology, Inc. Diverse paths using a single source route in computer networks
US9172636B2 (en) 2012-02-28 2015-10-27 Cisco Technology, Inc. Efficient link repair mechanism triggered by data traffic
US20130279410A1 (en) 2012-04-18 2013-10-24 Draker, Inc. Communicating Data in a Mesh Network
US9629063B2 (en) 2012-05-09 2017-04-18 Trellisware Technologies, Inc. Method and system for global topology discovery in multi-hop ad hoc networks
US8844026B2 (en) 2012-06-01 2014-09-23 Blackberry Limited System and method for controlling access to secure resources
WO2014000163A1 (en) 2012-06-26 2014-01-03 Nokia Corporation Method and apparatus for providing device ringtone coordination
US8751615B2 (en) 2012-07-18 2014-06-10 Accedian Networks Inc. Systems and methods of discovering and controlling devices without explicit addressing
JP5881047B2 (en) 2012-08-08 2016-03-09 株式会社日立製作所 Network management system, network management computer, and network management method
US10779212B2 (en) 2012-09-05 2020-09-15 Interdigital Patent Holdings, Inc. Methods for MAC frame extensibility and frame specific MAC header design for WLAN systems
US9081643B2 (en) 2012-09-21 2015-07-14 Silver Sring Networks, Inc. System and method for efficiently updating firmware for nodes in a mesh network
US9306660B2 (en) * 2012-10-22 2016-04-05 Qualcomm Technologies International, Ltd. Dynamic interactive zone driven proximity awareness system
US9279856B2 (en) 2012-10-22 2016-03-08 Infineon Technologies Ag Die, chip, method for driving a die or a chip and method for manufacturing a die or a chip
CN102984798B (en) 2012-11-21 2016-02-03 越亮传奇科技股份有限公司 Position-based accurate positioning method
US20140167912A1 (en) 2012-12-17 2014-06-19 David M. Snyder System, method and apparatus for providing security systems integrated with solid state lighting systems
US20150351014A1 (en) 2012-12-19 2015-12-03 Lg Electronics Inc. Method for communicating in wireless communication system supporting multiple access network and apparatus supporting same
US9628373B2 (en) 2012-12-19 2017-04-18 Comcast Cable Communications, Llc Multipath communication in a network
US20140171062A1 (en) 2012-12-19 2014-06-19 Telefonaktiebolaget L M Ericsson (Publ) Wireless Devices, Network Node and Methods for Handling Relay Assistance in a Wireless Communications Network
US20140181172A1 (en) 2012-12-20 2014-06-26 Brent J. Elliott Offloading tethering-related communication processing
EP2939495A4 (en) 2012-12-26 2016-08-17 Ict Res Llc Mobility extensions to industrial-strength wireless sensor networks
US8938792B2 (en) 2012-12-28 2015-01-20 Intel Corporation Device authentication using a physically unclonable functions based key generation system
US9032480B2 (en) 2012-12-28 2015-05-12 Cellco Partnership Providing multiple APN connections support in a browser
US9239723B2 (en) 2013-05-13 2016-01-19 Lenovo (Singapore) Pte. Ltd. Configuring a device based on proximity to other devices
US9264892B2 (en) 2013-07-03 2016-02-16 Verizon Patent And Licensing Inc. Method and apparatus for attack resistant mesh networks
US9983651B2 (en) 2013-07-15 2018-05-29 Google Technology Holdings LLC Low-power near-field communication authentication
US9386008B2 (en) 2013-08-19 2016-07-05 Smartguard, Llc Secure installation of encryption enabling software onto electronic devices
US20150071216A1 (en) 2013-09-09 2015-03-12 Qualcomm Connected Experiences, Inc. Allowing mass re-onboarding of headless devices
US9565576B2 (en) 2013-10-09 2017-02-07 At&T Intellectual Property I, L.P. Network operating system client architecture for mobile user equipment
US10591969B2 (en) 2013-10-25 2020-03-17 Google Technology Holdings LLC Sensor-based near-field communication authentication
US20150143130A1 (en) 2013-11-18 2015-05-21 Vixs Systems Inc. Integrated circuit provisioning using physical unclonable function
GB2512502B (en) 2014-02-25 2015-03-11 Cambridge Silicon Radio Ltd Device authentication
GB2512733B (en) 2014-02-25 2018-09-05 Qualcomm Technologies Int Ltd Broadcast retransmission
GB2515853B (en) 2014-02-25 2015-08-19 Cambridge Silicon Radio Ltd Latency mitigation
US9660836B2 (en) 2014-05-06 2017-05-23 Lattice Semiconductor Corporation Network topology discovery
US10142799B2 (en) * 2014-08-19 2018-11-27 Qualcomm Incorporated Multicasting traffic using multi-connectivity

Patent Citations (1)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US20140266669A1 (en) * 2013-03-14 2014-09-18 Nest Labs, Inc. Devices, methods, and associated information processing for security in a smart-sensored home

Cited By (24)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US9910976B2 (en) 2014-02-25 2018-03-06 Qualcomm Technologies International, Ltd. Processing mesh communications
US9672346B2 (en) 2014-02-25 2017-06-06 Qualcomm Technologies International, Ltd. Object tracking by establishing a mesh network and transmitting packets
US9489506B2 (en) 2014-02-25 2016-11-08 Qualcomm Technologies International, Ltd. Linking ad hoc networks
US9692538B2 (en) 2014-02-25 2017-06-27 Qualcomm Technologies International, Ltd. Latency mitigation
US9754096B2 (en) 2014-02-25 2017-09-05 Qualcomm Technologies International, Ltd. Update management
US10055570B2 (en) 2014-02-25 2018-08-21 QUALCOMM Technologies International, Ltd Mesh relay
US9842202B2 (en) 2014-02-25 2017-12-12 Qualcomm Technologies International, Ltd. Device proximity
US10149154B2 (en) 2015-08-21 2018-12-04 Afero, Inc. Apparatus and method for sharing WiFi security data in an internet of things (IoT) system
US9843929B2 (en) 2015-08-21 2017-12-12 Afero, Inc. Apparatus and method for sharing WiFi security data in an internet of things (IoT) system
US10659961B2 (en) 2015-08-21 2020-05-19 Afero, Inc. Apparatus and method for sharing WiFi security data in an internet of things (IoT) system
US9942837B2 (en) 2015-08-25 2018-04-10 Afero, Inc. Apparatus and method for a dynamic scan interval for a wireless device
US10990616B2 (en) * 2015-11-17 2021-04-27 Nec Corporation Fast pattern discovery for log analytics
US10091242B2 (en) 2015-12-14 2018-10-02 Afero, Inc. System and method for establishing a secondary communication channel to control an internet of things (IOT) device
US20170171241A1 (en) * 2015-12-14 2017-06-15 Afero, Inc. Apparatus and method for obscuring wireless communication patterns
US10447784B2 (en) 2015-12-14 2019-10-15 Afero, Inc. Apparatus and method for modifying packet interval timing to identify a data transfer condition
US10805344B2 (en) * 2015-12-14 2020-10-13 Afero, Inc. Apparatus and method for obscuring wireless communication patterns
US9781603B1 (en) * 2016-10-20 2017-10-03 Fortress Cyber Security, LLC Combined network and physical security appliance
US10331473B2 (en) 2016-10-20 2019-06-25 Fortress Cyber Security, LLC Combined network and physical security appliance
US11314540B2 (en) 2016-10-20 2022-04-26 Fortress Cyber Security, LLC Combined network and physical security appliance
US11115398B2 (en) * 2017-03-08 2021-09-07 Abb Power Grids Switzerland Ag Methods and devices for preserving relative timing and ordering of data packets in a network
US20190394180A1 (en) * 2017-03-08 2019-12-26 Abb Schweiz Ag Methods and devices for preserving relative timing and ordering of data packets in a network
US10650023B2 (en) * 2018-07-24 2020-05-12 Booz Allen Hamilton, Inc. Process for establishing trust between multiple autonomous systems for the purposes of command and control
US11392615B2 (en) * 2018-07-24 2022-07-19 Booz Allen Hamilton, Inc. Process for establishing trust between multiple autonomous systems for the purposes of command and control
US11368436B2 (en) * 2018-08-28 2022-06-21 Bae Systems Information And Electronic Systems Integration Inc. Communication protocol

Also Published As

Publication number Publication date
DE102015101620A1 (en) 2015-08-27
GB2512748A (en) 2014-10-08
GB2512542A (en) 2014-10-01
GB2512543A (en) 2014-10-01
US20150245220A1 (en) 2015-08-27
GB2513265A (en) 2014-10-22
US20150242614A1 (en) 2015-08-27
US9489506B2 (en) 2016-11-08
GB2512749A (en) 2014-10-08
GB2512781A (en) 2014-10-08
GB201415177D0 (en) 2014-10-08
GB201412716D0 (en) 2014-09-03
GB2512748B (en) 2015-02-18
GB2515923A8 (en) 2015-06-17
DE102014012379B4 (en) 2016-05-12
GB2512545B (en) 2015-04-08
GB201501075D0 (en) 2015-03-11
GB2512502A (en) 2014-10-01
GB2512746B (en) 2015-03-11
DE102014013471A1 (en) 2015-08-27
US20150244565A1 (en) 2015-08-27
US9842202B2 (en) 2017-12-12
GB201412717D0 (en) 2014-09-03
US20150244623A1 (en) 2015-08-27
GB201412719D0 (en) 2014-09-03
GB2518120A (en) 2015-03-11
DE102014012518A1 (en) 2015-08-27
GB2517844A (en) 2015-03-04
US20150244648A1 (en) 2015-08-27
GB2517844B (en) 2015-09-09
GB2515923A (en) 2015-01-07
DE102014012257A1 (en) 2015-08-27
GB201412722D0 (en) 2014-09-03
US20150245182A1 (en) 2015-08-27
US20150245369A1 (en) 2015-08-27
GB2513048A (en) 2014-10-15
GB2512747B (en) 2015-04-01
US10055570B2 (en) 2018-08-21
DE102014012257B4 (en) 2015-12-03
GB2512256B8 (en) 2015-07-01
GB2518120B (en) 2015-09-30
DE102014012379A1 (en) 2015-08-27
GB201405791D0 (en) 2014-05-14
GB2512543B (en) 2015-02-11
US20150245179A1 (en) 2015-08-27
GB2512544B (en) 2016-08-17
GB2515923B8 (en) 2015-06-17
DE102014019749B3 (en) 2017-08-31
GB2512749B (en) 2015-04-01
DE102015101699B4 (en) 2019-12-24
DE102014012252A1 (en) 2015-08-27
GB2512781B (en) 2015-08-05
GB201415178D0 (en) 2014-10-08
GB2512542B (en) 2015-02-25
GB2512502B (en) 2015-03-11
GB2512544A (en) 2014-10-01
US20150245231A1 (en) 2015-08-27
US9672346B2 (en) 2017-06-06
GB2523444B (en) 2016-05-18
GB2512256A8 (en) 2015-07-01
GB2512746A (en) 2014-10-08
DE102014012517B4 (en) 2017-03-02
GB201405789D0 (en) 2014-05-14
US9754096B2 (en) 2017-09-05
GB2512501A (en) 2014-10-01
US9910976B2 (en) 2018-03-06
GB2513265B (en) 2016-10-26
GB201405785D0 (en) 2014-05-14
DE102015101699A1 (en) 2015-08-27
GB201412718D0 (en) 2014-09-03
DE102014012258A1 (en) 2015-08-27
DE102015101698A1 (en) 2015-08-27
US20150245296A1 (en) 2015-08-27
GB2512747A (en) 2014-10-08
DE102014012517A1 (en) 2015-08-27
GB2523444A (en) 2015-08-26
GB201405786D0 (en) 2014-05-14
US20150245204A1 (en) 2015-08-27
DE102015101604A1 (en) 2015-08-27
GB201412720D0 (en) 2014-09-03
GB2512545A (en) 2014-10-01
GB201405790D0 (en) 2014-05-14
GB2512256B (en) 2015-04-15
GB201412715D0 (en) 2014-09-03
GB2512256A (en) 2014-09-24
GB201421698D0 (en) 2015-01-21
GB2513048B (en) 2015-08-26
GB2515923B (en) 2015-06-03
US20150245412A1 (en) 2015-08-27
DE102015101697A1 (en) 2015-08-27
GB201412714D0 (en) 2014-09-03
US20150245203A1 (en) 2015-08-27
GB201405797D0 (en) 2014-05-14

Similar Documents

Publication Publication Date Title
US20150244828A1 (en) Thwarting traffic analysis
AU2019275648B2 (en) Mesh network commissioning
AU2011265316B2 (en) Field optimized, configurable wireless fire system
US10849016B2 (en) Packet segmentation and reassembly for mesh networks
US10986559B1 (en) Network message transmissions reduction systems and methods
US20220053409A1 (en) Network Devices
EP4000242B1 (en) Network filtering with private resolvable addresses
US20200092729A1 (en) Method for controlling a radio signal emitted by a gateway, and corresponding gateway and computer program
US10187402B2 (en) Network intrusion mitigation
EP2910089B1 (en) Apparatus and method for interpreting received control commands
KR20190118134A (en) System and method for secure appliance operation
WO2017093559A1 (en) Intelligent lighting and sensing system and method thereof
US20200245244A1 (en) Controlling end nodes of a low-power wide area network
Granzer et al. Future challenges for building automation: Wireless and security
GB2517086A (en) Communicating data over a mesh network
Collotta et al. A real-time network based on IEEE 802.15. 4/ZigBee to control home automation environment
JP6628120B2 (en) Communication monitoring device and communication monitoring system
ES2687460T3 (en) Control of a home automation system
US11425206B2 (en) Method and system for sharing communication between connected home-automation devices and a remote device
Riecker et al. A secure monitoring and control system for Wireless Sensor Networks

Legal Events

Date Code Title Description
AS Assignment

Owner name: CAMBRIDGE SILICON RADIO LIMITED, UNITED KINGDOM

Free format text: ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNORS INTEREST;ASSIGNOR:HEYDON, ROBIN;REEL/FRAME:033191/0417

Effective date: 20140522

AS Assignment

Owner name: QUALCOMM TECHNOLOGIES INTERNATIONAL, LTD., UNITED

Free format text: CHANGE OF NAME;ASSIGNOR:CAMBRIDGE SILICON RADIO LIMITED;REEL/FRAME:036663/0211

Effective date: 20150813

STCB Information on status: application discontinuation

Free format text: ABANDONED -- FAILURE TO RESPOND TO AN OFFICE ACTION