US20150130636A1 - Integrated Circuit Device with Tamper Detection Input and having Real Time Clock Calendar Logging Thereof - Google Patents
Integrated Circuit Device with Tamper Detection Input and having Real Time Clock Calendar Logging Thereof Download PDFInfo
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- US20150130636A1 US20150130636A1 US14/538,253 US201414538253A US2015130636A1 US 20150130636 A1 US20150130636 A1 US 20150130636A1 US 201414538253 A US201414538253 A US 201414538253A US 2015130636 A1 US2015130636 A1 US 2015130636A1
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Images
Classifications
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04Q—SELECTING
- H04Q9/00—Arrangements in telecontrol or telemetry systems for selectively calling a substation from a main station, in which substation desired apparatus is selected for applying a control signal thereto or for obtaining measured values therefrom
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- B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
- B65—CONVEYING; PACKING; STORING; HANDLING THIN OR FILAMENTARY MATERIAL
- B65D—CONTAINERS FOR STORAGE OR TRANSPORT OF ARTICLES OR MATERIALS, e.g. BAGS, BARRELS, BOTTLES, BOXES, CANS, CARTONS, CRATES, DRUMS, JARS, TANKS, HOPPERS, FORWARDING CONTAINERS; ACCESSORIES, CLOSURES, OR FITTINGS THEREFOR; PACKAGING ELEMENTS; PACKAGES
- B65D25/00—Details of other kinds or types of rigid or semi-rigid containers
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- B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
- B65—CONVEYING; PACKING; STORING; HANDLING THIN OR FILAMENTARY MATERIAL
- B65D—CONTAINERS FOR STORAGE OR TRANSPORT OF ARTICLES OR MATERIALS, e.g. BAGS, BARRELS, BOTTLES, BOXES, CANS, CARTONS, CRATES, DRUMS, JARS, TANKS, HOPPERS, FORWARDING CONTAINERS; ACCESSORIES, CLOSURES, OR FITTINGS THEREFOR; PACKAGING ELEMENTS; PACKAGES
- B65D5/00—Rigid or semi-rigid containers of polygonal cross-section, e.g. boxes, cartons or trays, formed by folding or erecting one or more blanks made of paper
- B65D5/42—Details of containers or of foldable or erectable container blanks
- B65D5/4212—Information or decoration elements, e.g. content indicators, or for mailing
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- B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
- B65—CONVEYING; PACKING; STORING; HANDLING THIN OR FILAMENTARY MATERIAL
- B65D—CONTAINERS FOR STORAGE OR TRANSPORT OF ARTICLES OR MATERIALS, e.g. BAGS, BARRELS, BOTTLES, BOXES, CANS, CARTONS, CRATES, DRUMS, JARS, TANKS, HOPPERS, FORWARDING CONTAINERS; ACCESSORIES, CLOSURES, OR FITTINGS THEREFOR; PACKAGING ELEMENTS; PACKAGES
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- B65D90/48—Arrangements of indicating or measuring devices
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- G—PHYSICS
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- G01R—MEASURING ELECTRIC VARIABLES; MEASURING MAGNETIC VARIABLES
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- G01R11/02—Constructional details
- G01R11/24—Arrangements for avoiding or indicating fraudulent use
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- G—PHYSICS
- G01—MEASURING; TESTING
- G01R—MEASURING ELECTRIC VARIABLES; MEASURING MAGNETIC VARIABLES
- G01R22/00—Arrangements for measuring time integral of electric power or current, e.g. electricity meters
- G01R22/06—Arrangements for measuring time integral of electric power or current, e.g. electricity meters by electronic methods
- G01R22/061—Details of electronic electricity meters
- G01R22/066—Arrangements for avoiding or indicating fraudulent use
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- G—PHYSICS
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- G08B—SIGNALLING OR CALLING SYSTEMS; ORDER TELEGRAPHS; ALARM SYSTEMS
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- B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
- B65—CONVEYING; PACKING; STORING; HANDLING THIN OR FILAMENTARY MATERIAL
- B65D—CONTAINERS FOR STORAGE OR TRANSPORT OF ARTICLES OR MATERIALS, e.g. BAGS, BARRELS, BOTTLES, BOXES, CANS, CARTONS, CRATES, DRUMS, JARS, TANKS, HOPPERS, FORWARDING CONTAINERS; ACCESSORIES, CLOSURES, OR FITTINGS THEREFOR; PACKAGING ELEMENTS; PACKAGES
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Definitions
- the present disclosure relates to integrated circuit devices, in particular to a peripheral having a tamper detection input and real time clock and calendar (RTCC) time stamping when a tamper event is detected.
- RTCC real time clock and calendar
- Metering of gas, electricity and water must ensure that the usage data collected is valid for customer billing purposes. If a metering device has been tampered with, e.g., opened or vandalized, the billing information may not be correct thereafter. Meter tampering may be shunting of current measuring devices in an electric meter, bypassing or altering the flow measuring device in gas and water meters, etc.
- Tampering and/or mishandling of shipping containers may occur during shipping transient but what happened and when it happened generally is a mystery. Thus when there are multiple shippers involved, responsibility on who is to blame may be hard to determine and collection for damages equally difficult.
- an integrated circuit device may comprise: a real time clock and calendar (RTCC) circuit configured to be coupled with an external power source; a time stamp capture register coupled with the RTCC; and an external input coupled with the time stamp capture register for receiving an event signal that may initiate capture of time and date information provided by the RTCC into the time stamp capture register.
- RTCC real time clock and calendar
- the time stamp capture register may be non-volatile. According to a further embodiment, the time stamp capture register has secured access thereto. According to a further embodiment, a false trigger filter may be coupled between the external input and the time stamp capture register. According to a further embodiment, the false trigger filter may comprise a low pass filter. According to a further embodiment, the false trigger filter may comprise a digital sampling and averaging filter. According to a further embodiment, the time stamp capture register may be a plurality of time stamp capture registers. According to a further embodiment, a plurality of false trigger filters may be provided, wherein each of the plurality of false trigger filters may be coupled to a respective one of the plurality of time stamp capture registers. According to a further embodiment, the RTCC, the time stamp capture register, the external input, and the false trigger filter may be powered by a continuous power source.
- the continuous power source may be a battery.
- an application circuit and a communications interface may be coupled with the RTCC and the time stamp capture register.
- the RTCC, time stamp capture register, and application circuit may be provided by a microcontroller.
- the event signal may be a tamper signal from a tamper sensor.
- the tamper sensor may be selected from the group consisting of a pressure activated switch, a magnetically activated switch, a mechanically activated switch, a Hall effect magnetic sensor, a pressure transducer, and a capacitive proximity sensor.
- the event signal may be a mishandling signal from a mishandling sensor.
- the mishandling sensor may be selected from the group consisting of an acceleration sensor, a vibration sensor, a tilt sensor, a temperature sensor, a moisture sensor, a pressure sensor, a humidity sensor, an ultraviolet sensor, an infrared sensor, a radiation sensor, and an altitude sensor.
- a metering device having tamper detection may comprise: a meter housing; a process metering sensor in the meter housing; a tamper sensor for detecting tampering of the meter housing; and an integrated circuit device in the meter housing and may comprise a real time clock and calendar (RTCC) circuit that may be configured to be coupled with an external power source; a time stamp capture register coupled with the RTCC, an external input coupled with the time stamp capture register for receiving a signal from the tamper sensor that initiates capture of time and date information provided by the RTCC into the time stamp capture register, and an application circuit coupled to the process metering sensor and the time stamp capture register.
- RTCC real time clock and calendar
- the metering device may be a utility meter.
- the utility meter may be selected from the group consisting of an electric power meter, a natural gas meter, a propane meter, and a water meter.
- a shipping container having mishandling detection may comprise: a storage housing; a mishandling sensor for detecting mishandling of the storage housing; and an integrated circuit device in the storage housing and may comprise a real time clock and calendar (RTCC) circuit configured to be coupled with an external power source; a time stamp capture register coupled with the RTCC, and an external input coupled with the time stamp capture register for receiving a signal from the mishandling sensor that initiates capture of time and date information provided by the RTCC into the time stamp capture register.
- RTCC real time clock and calendar
- the mishandling sensor may be selected from the group consisting of an acceleration sensor, a vibration sensor, a tilt sensor, a temperature sensor, a moisture sensor, a pressure sensor, a humidity sensor, an ultraviolet sensor, an infrared sensor, and an altitude sensor.
- the storage housing may be an intermodal steel container.
- the storage housing may be a shipping box.
- the storage housing may be a suitcase.
- an electronic device having non-volatile memory that may be erased when unauthorized access of the electronic device may comprise: a digital processor; a non-volatile memory coupled with the digital processor; a tamper sensor; a real time clock and calendar (RTCC) circuit configured to be coupled with an external power source; a time stamp capture register coupled with the RTCC and having an input coupled to the tamper sensor, wherein when a tamper signal may be received from the tamper sensor the time stamp capture register stores time and date information provided by the RTCC; and the tamper signal also initiates the digital processor to erase data from the non-volatile memory.
- RTCC real time clock and calendar
- the non-volatile memory may be a hard disk.
- the electronic device may be selected from the group consisting of a personal computer, a tablet computer, a smart phone, and a bank ATM.
- FIG. 1 illustrates a schematic block diagram of a metering device having a tamper sensor and real time clock and calendar (RTCC) time stamping, according to a specific example embodiment of this disclosure
- FIG. 2 illustrates a partial schematic block diagram of a metering device having a plurality of tamper sensors and RTCC time stamping, according to another specific example embodiment of this disclosure
- FIG. 3 illustrates a schematic block diagram of a package, shipping container or suitcase having a plurality of tamper and/or mishandling sensors and RTCC time stamping, according to yet another specific example embodiment of this disclosure.
- FIG. 4 illustrates a schematic block diagram of a computer system having memories that erase upon a tamper event, according to still another specific example embodiment of this disclosure.
- Tamper detection is necessary when a metering device supplies billing information or a shipping container or suitcase is mishandled so that proper corrective actions may be taken for verifying the integrality of the billing information, or determining who is at fault for the mishandling of the shipping container or suitcase.
- these devices must ensure that the data collected is valid for customer billing purposes. If the enclosure of the metering device is opened or vandalized, the application software must determine when the metering history information became unreliable, and further notification to the utility may be desirable.
- a shipping container or suitcase that has been opened or mishandled during shipping transient may be attributed to a particular location and/or handling person(s) when the time and date of the mishandling occurrence are known.
- energy meters and other ‘money tracking’ devices must ensure data is valid.
- Examples for tampering are bypassing current shunts in an electric meter or the blocking of a paddle wheel sensor in a water meter.
- Other requirements are that these applications must run basically substantially forever on minimal battery power. For example, a meter unit may sit on a shelf for a long time prior to installation/commissioning.
- a transition on a special device input captures real-time clock/calendar (RTCC) information that may provide to a software application the time and date of the detected tampering or mishandling event.
- This transition may also cause memory storage of the RTCC information related to the event.
- an integrated circuit device for example a microcontroller or any other integrated circuit device may comprise such an RTCC and external input (pin), and, optionally, memory storage of the RTCC event occurrence.
- Microcontrollers such as PIC microcontrollers manufactured by Applicant, may have a separate, battery-backed voltage domain. For example, a small portion of the device circuitry remains active, while the rest of integrated circuit device may be shut down (Deep Sleep).
- the Real Time Clock/Calendar (RTCC) may be included on this battery-backed voltage domain and remain functional at all times.
- the RTCC may be modified to include capture registers for RTCC time and date.
- at least one external input pin may be provided to activate the RTCC time/date capture.
- the at least one external input pin may be powered from the alternate voltage domain, if available.
- the at least one input pin may be connected to external switches, sensors, etc., that indicate mechanical or electrical tampering. If time/date capture of a tampering event occurs, the billing application may determine the last time at which data may be considered valid. Knowing the time/date of a tampering or mishandling event may facilitate where and who was handling a package or suitcase, and how badly the package or suitcase was mistreated.
- a plurality of tampering/mistreatment inputs may be provided for coupling to tampering sensors at various locations, or mistreatment sensors having various degrees of punishment and abuse measurement to the package or suitcase, e.g., g-force sensors of different g-force trip values, etc.
- the word “tampering” used herein shall also include any unauthorized access, mistreatment, abuse, rough handling, or subjection to damaging heat, vibration, water intrusion, radiation, sunlight, and the like.
- a metering device 102 may comprise a process metering sensor 124 coupled to applications electronics 108 , a tamper sensor 120 , optionally coupled to a false trigger filter 118 , and a real time clock and calendar (RTCC) 112 comprising a time/date clock 114 , and at least one time/date capture (or hereinafter “time stamp capture”) register 116 for storing a time/date from the RTCC 114 .
- RTCC real time clock and calendar
- the tamper sensor 120 triggers storage of the time and date of the tamper event occurrence in the at least one time stamp capture register 116 .
- the least one time stamp capture register 116 may be a plurality of time stamp capture registers 116 , e.g., a memory pushdown stack.
- the time stamp capture register 116 may be non-volatile and may be a register with secured or encrypted access.
- a microcontroller unit (MCU) 104 may contain at least one instance of a real-time-clock and calendar (RTCC) peripheral 110 , optionally having a false trigger filter 118 .
- the RTCC peripheral 110 may operate on the same, or a different power domain than the rest of the MCU 104 , making it operational at all times.
- the tamper detect input 128 may operate on the same power domain as the RTCC peripheral 110 . Therefore, the two may function together for very low power tampering detection.
- the RTCC 112 accepts a time stamp input from the tamper sensor 120 that initiates the data capture (time and date of tamper event occurrence).
- the time stamp input may be supplied from an input pin 128 that remains powered when the RTCC peripheral 110 is powered from the battery 122 .
- the time stamp register 116 may be a non-volatile register, for example, a non-volatile register with secure access to avoid further tampering with the captured data. For example, a password access scheme may be implemented. Other secure access means may be employed. It is contemplated and within the scope of this disclosure that wireless communications may be provided with a communications interface 106 and antenna 126 from the applications electronics 108 that is coupled to the at least one time stamp register 116 and time/date clock 114 . Therefore a remote service programmer may read the contents of the at least one time stamp register 116 , then reset same after reading its contents, and may also be used to set the RTCC 114 to a correct time and date.
- Communications may be any one of a number of wireless protocols, e.g., Bluetooth®, Zigbee®, Wi-Fi, BodyCom® and the like.
- An RFID device (not shown) may be coupled to the time/date stamp register(s) 116 for content readout thereof.
- Bluetooth® is a registered trademark of Bluetooth Sig, Inc., Suite 350 5209, Lake Washington Boulevard, Kirkland, Wash. 98033.
- Zigbee® is a registered trademark of ZigBee Alliance, 2400 Camino Ramon, Suite 375, San Ramon, Calif. 94583.
- BodyCom® is a registered trademark of Microchip Technology Incorporated, 2355 West Chandler Boulevard, Chandler, Ariz. 85224-6199.
- the tamper input 128 optionally may have a false trigger input filter 118 to substantially eliminate false triggers.
- the tamper input 128 may be connected to some type of switch contacts, loss of pressure switch, etc., or other type of sensor that may be part of the metering application hardware.
- a signal from the tamper sensor 120 to the tamper input 128 may indicate mechanical tampering with the metering application enclosure.
- the current time and date may be captured in the at least one time/date stamp register 116 .
- the captured time/date stamp data provides the last known time and date at which the data may be considered valid.
- the false trigger filter 118 may be as simple as a combination of a resistor(s) and a capacitor(s) configured as a low pass filter to substantially reduce noise spikes from appearing as a false tamper event.
- the false trigger filter 118 may also comprise a digital filter taking a plurality of samples of the tamper sensor 120 output then averaging these samples over time to indicate whether a tamper event has occurred.
- a metering device as described hereinabove may comprise a plurality of tamper sensors 220 , false trigger filters 218 , time/date stamp registers 216 , a time/date clock 214 and application electronics 208 .
- a communications interface ( 106 in FIG. 1 ) and housing 102 are not shown but are contemplated herein.
- Each of the time/date stamp registers 216 may comprise a plurality of memory registers, e.g., push down stacks memory, for storing a plurality of tamper events.
- more than one tamper sensor 220 may be used for backup and redundancy in critical metering applications.
- FIG. 3 depicted is a schematic block diagram of a package, shipping container or suitcase having a plurality of tamper and/or mishandling sensors and RTCC time/date stamping, according to yet another specific example embodiment of this disclosure.
- Any one or more of a plurality of different sensors 320 - 326 may be utilized in a package, shipping container or suitcase (not shown) to determine when an undesired event has occurred thereto, e.g., dropping, tipping, excess vibration (bumpy roads), excessive temperature and/or humidity, altitude, ultra violet and infrared sensors, water intrusion, etc.
- a false trigger filter 218 and time/date stamp register 216 may be coupled with a respective one of the sensors 320 - 326 , and when an undesired event may occur the time and date thereof will be recorded.
- a wireless interface 308 may also be provided and coupled to the time/date stamp registers 216 for time/date readout therefrom. The communications protocols mentioned hereinabove may be used.
- An RFID device (not shown) may be coupled to the time/date stamp register(s) 216 for content readout thereof and have an antenna 326 .
- FIG. 4 depicted is a schematic block diagram of a computer system having memories that erase upon a tamper event, according to still another specific example embodiment of this disclosure.
- An electronic device 402 has non-volatile memory(ies) 430 , e.g., personal computer, tablet, smart phone, bank ATM, and the like, that stores confidential data may prevent this confidential data from being compromised by automatically erasing the confidential data from the memory(ies) 430 thereof.
- non-volatile memory(ies) 430 e.g., personal computer, tablet, smart phone, bank ATM, and the like, that stores confidential data may prevent this confidential data from being compromised by automatically erasing the confidential data from the memory(ies) 430 thereof.
- the electronic device 402 may comprise a digital processor 432 , a non-volatile memory (hard disk) 430 , a memory erase circuit 428 , a RTCC 112 comprising a time/date clock 114 and at least one time stamp register 116 , a false trigger filter 118 , a backup battery 422 , and a tamper sensor 420 .
- the memory erase circuit 428 may notify and wake up the digital processor 432 (if necessary) so that the processor 432 may erase all confidential data in the non-volatile memory 430 , e.g., hard disk, non-voltage RAM and battery backed-up RAM.
- the tamper sensor(s) 120 may be, for example but is not limited to, any one or more of the following sensors: a pressure activated switch, a magnetically activated switch, a mechanically activated switch, a Hall Effect magnetic sensor, a pressure transducer, and/or a capacitive proximity sensor.
- the mishandling sensor(s) 320 may be, for example but is not limited to, any one or more of the following sensors: an acceleration sensor, a vibration sensor, a tilt sensor, a temperature sensor, a moisture sensor, a pressure sensor, a humidity sensor, an ultraviolet sensor, an infrared sensor, a radiation sensor, and/or an altitude sensor.
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Abstract
Description
- This application claims priority to commonly owned U.S. Provisional Patent Application Ser. No. 61/903,979; filed Nov. 14, 2013; is hereby incorporated by reference herein for all purposes.
- The present disclosure relates to integrated circuit devices, in particular to a peripheral having a tamper detection input and real time clock and calendar (RTCC) time stamping when a tamper event is detected.
- Metering of gas, electricity and water must ensure that the usage data collected is valid for customer billing purposes. If a metering device has been tampered with, e.g., opened or vandalized, the billing information may not be correct thereafter. Meter tampering may be shunting of current measuring devices in an electric meter, bypassing or altering the flow measuring device in gas and water meters, etc.
- Tampering and/or mishandling of shipping containers, e.g., boxes, suitcases, and the like, may occur during shipping transient but what happened and when it happened generally is a mystery. Thus when there are multiple shippers involved, responsibility on who is to blame may be hard to determine and collection for damages equally difficult.
- Therefore a need exists for determining when a metering device has been tampered with, or a shipping container has been tampered with or mishandled.
- According to an embodiment, an integrated circuit device may comprise: a real time clock and calendar (RTCC) circuit configured to be coupled with an external power source; a time stamp capture register coupled with the RTCC; and an external input coupled with the time stamp capture register for receiving an event signal that may initiate capture of time and date information provided by the RTCC into the time stamp capture register.
- According to a further embodiment, the time stamp capture register may be non-volatile. According to a further embodiment, the time stamp capture register has secured access thereto. According to a further embodiment, a false trigger filter may be coupled between the external input and the time stamp capture register. According to a further embodiment, the false trigger filter may comprise a low pass filter. According to a further embodiment, the false trigger filter may comprise a digital sampling and averaging filter. According to a further embodiment, the time stamp capture register may be a plurality of time stamp capture registers. According to a further embodiment, a plurality of false trigger filters may be provided, wherein each of the plurality of false trigger filters may be coupled to a respective one of the plurality of time stamp capture registers. According to a further embodiment, the RTCC, the time stamp capture register, the external input, and the false trigger filter may be powered by a continuous power source.
- According to a further embodiment, the continuous power source may be a battery. According to a further embodiment, an application circuit and a communications interface may be coupled with the RTCC and the time stamp capture register. According to a further embodiment, the RTCC, time stamp capture register, and application circuit may be provided by a microcontroller. According to a further embodiment, the event signal may be a tamper signal from a tamper sensor. According to a further embodiment, the tamper sensor may be selected from the group consisting of a pressure activated switch, a magnetically activated switch, a mechanically activated switch, a Hall effect magnetic sensor, a pressure transducer, and a capacitive proximity sensor. According to a further embodiment, the event signal may be a mishandling signal from a mishandling sensor. According to a further embodiment, the mishandling sensor may be selected from the group consisting of an acceleration sensor, a vibration sensor, a tilt sensor, a temperature sensor, a moisture sensor, a pressure sensor, a humidity sensor, an ultraviolet sensor, an infrared sensor, a radiation sensor, and an altitude sensor.
- According to another embodiment, a metering device having tamper detection may comprise: a meter housing; a process metering sensor in the meter housing; a tamper sensor for detecting tampering of the meter housing; and an integrated circuit device in the meter housing and may comprise a real time clock and calendar (RTCC) circuit that may be configured to be coupled with an external power source; a time stamp capture register coupled with the RTCC, an external input coupled with the time stamp capture register for receiving a signal from the tamper sensor that initiates capture of time and date information provided by the RTCC into the time stamp capture register, and an application circuit coupled to the process metering sensor and the time stamp capture register.
- According to a further embodiment, the metering device may be a utility meter. According to a further embodiment, the utility meter may be selected from the group consisting of an electric power meter, a natural gas meter, a propane meter, and a water meter.
- According to yet another embodiment, a shipping container having mishandling detection may comprise: a storage housing; a mishandling sensor for detecting mishandling of the storage housing; and an integrated circuit device in the storage housing and may comprise a real time clock and calendar (RTCC) circuit configured to be coupled with an external power source; a time stamp capture register coupled with the RTCC, and an external input coupled with the time stamp capture register for receiving a signal from the mishandling sensor that initiates capture of time and date information provided by the RTCC into the time stamp capture register.
- According to a further embodiment, the mishandling sensor may be selected from the group consisting of an acceleration sensor, a vibration sensor, a tilt sensor, a temperature sensor, a moisture sensor, a pressure sensor, a humidity sensor, an ultraviolet sensor, an infrared sensor, and an altitude sensor. According to a further embodiment, the storage housing may be an intermodal steel container. According to a further embodiment, the storage housing may be a shipping box. According to a further embodiment, the storage housing may be a suitcase.
- According to still another embodiment, an electronic device having non-volatile memory that may be erased when unauthorized access of the electronic device may be detected and may comprise: a digital processor; a non-volatile memory coupled with the digital processor; a tamper sensor; a real time clock and calendar (RTCC) circuit configured to be coupled with an external power source; a time stamp capture register coupled with the RTCC and having an input coupled to the tamper sensor, wherein when a tamper signal may be received from the tamper sensor the time stamp capture register stores time and date information provided by the RTCC; and the tamper signal also initiates the digital processor to erase data from the non-volatile memory.
- According to a further embodiment, the non-volatile memory may be a hard disk. According to a further embodiment, the electronic device may be selected from the group consisting of a personal computer, a tablet computer, a smart phone, and a bank ATM.
- A more complete understanding of the present disclosure may be acquired by referring to the following description taken in conjunction with the accompanying drawings wherein:
-
FIG. 1 illustrates a schematic block diagram of a metering device having a tamper sensor and real time clock and calendar (RTCC) time stamping, according to a specific example embodiment of this disclosure; -
FIG. 2 illustrates a partial schematic block diagram of a metering device having a plurality of tamper sensors and RTCC time stamping, according to another specific example embodiment of this disclosure; -
FIG. 3 illustrates a schematic block diagram of a package, shipping container or suitcase having a plurality of tamper and/or mishandling sensors and RTCC time stamping, according to yet another specific example embodiment of this disclosure; and -
FIG. 4 illustrates a schematic block diagram of a computer system having memories that erase upon a tamper event, according to still another specific example embodiment of this disclosure. - While the present disclosure is susceptible to various modifications and alternative forms, specific example embodiments thereof have been shown in the drawings and are herein described in detail. It should be understood, however, that the description herein of specific example embodiments is not intended to limit the disclosure to the particular forms disclosed herein, but on the contrary, this disclosure is to cover all modifications and equivalents as defined by the appended claims.
- Tamper detection is necessary when a metering device supplies billing information or a shipping container or suitcase is mishandled so that proper corrective actions may be taken for verifying the integrality of the billing information, or determining who is at fault for the mishandling of the shipping container or suitcase. For example, in metering applications for electricity, gas, and water, these devices must ensure that the data collected is valid for customer billing purposes. If the enclosure of the metering device is opened or vandalized, the application software must determine when the metering history information became unreliable, and further notification to the utility may be desirable. Likewise, a shipping container or suitcase that has been opened or mishandled during shipping transient may be attributed to a particular location and/or handling person(s) when the time and date of the mishandling occurrence are known.
- For example, energy meters and other ‘money tracking’ devices must ensure data is valid. Examples for tampering are bypassing current shunts in an electric meter or the blocking of a paddle wheel sensor in a water meter. Other requirements are that these applications must run basically substantially forever on minimal battery power. For example, a meter unit may sit on a shelf for a long time prior to installation/commissioning.
- According to various embodiments, a transition on a special device input (pin), captures real-time clock/calendar (RTCC) information that may provide to a software application the time and date of the detected tampering or mishandling event. This transition may also cause memory storage of the RTCC information related to the event. Thus, an integrated circuit device, for example a microcontroller or any other integrated circuit device may comprise such an RTCC and external input (pin), and, optionally, memory storage of the RTCC event occurrence.
- Microcontrollers, such as PIC microcontrollers manufactured by Applicant, may have a separate, battery-backed voltage domain. For example, a small portion of the device circuitry remains active, while the rest of integrated circuit device may be shut down (Deep Sleep). The Real Time Clock/Calendar (RTCC) may be included on this battery-backed voltage domain and remain functional at all times.
- According to various embodiments, the RTCC may be modified to include capture registers for RTCC time and date. Furthermore, at least one external input pin may be provided to activate the RTCC time/date capture. The at least one external input pin may be powered from the alternate voltage domain, if available. The at least one input pin may be connected to external switches, sensors, etc., that indicate mechanical or electrical tampering. If time/date capture of a tampering event occurs, the billing application may determine the last time at which data may be considered valid. Knowing the time/date of a tampering or mishandling event may facilitate where and who was handling a package or suitcase, and how badly the package or suitcase was mistreated. A plurality of tampering/mistreatment inputs may be provided for coupling to tampering sensors at various locations, or mistreatment sensors having various degrees of punishment and abuse measurement to the package or suitcase, e.g., g-force sensors of different g-force trip values, etc. The word “tampering” used herein shall also include any unauthorized access, mistreatment, abuse, rough handling, or subjection to damaging heat, vibration, water intrusion, radiation, sunlight, and the like.
- Referring now to
FIG. 1 , depicted is a schematic block diagram of a metering device having a tamper sensor and real time clock and calendar (RTCC) time stamping, according to a specific example embodiment of this disclosure. Ametering device 102 may comprise aprocess metering sensor 124 coupled toapplications electronics 108, atamper sensor 120, optionally coupled to afalse trigger filter 118, and a real time clock and calendar (RTCC) 112 comprising a time/date clock 114, and at least one time/date capture (or hereinafter “time stamp capture”)register 116 for storing a time/date from theRTCC 114. When a tamper event occurs thetamper sensor 120 triggers storage of the time and date of the tamper event occurrence in the at least one timestamp capture register 116. The least one timestamp capture register 116 may be a plurality of time stamp capture registers 116, e.g., a memory pushdown stack. The timestamp capture register 116 may be non-volatile and may be a register with secured or encrypted access. - A microcontroller unit (MCU) 104 may contain at least one instance of a real-time-clock and calendar (RTCC) peripheral 110, optionally having a
false trigger filter 118. The RTCC peripheral 110 may operate on the same, or a different power domain than the rest of theMCU 104, making it operational at all times. The tamper detectinput 128 may operate on the same power domain as the RTCC peripheral 110. Therefore, the two may function together for very low power tampering detection. - In the case of the latter, the
RTCC 112 and a limited amount of device circuitry, e.g.,false trigger filter 118, typically operate from asmall battery 122 in themetering device 102. This allows time keeping while the rest of theMCU 104 is powered down, e.g., low power sleep mode. TheRTCC 112 accepts a time stamp input from thetamper sensor 120 that initiates the data capture (time and date of tamper event occurrence). The time stamp input may be supplied from aninput pin 128 that remains powered when the RTCC peripheral 110 is powered from thebattery 122. Thetime stamp register 116 may be a non-volatile register, for example, a non-volatile register with secure access to avoid further tampering with the captured data. For example, a password access scheme may be implemented. Other secure access means may be employed. It is contemplated and within the scope of this disclosure that wireless communications may be provided with acommunications interface 106 andantenna 126 from theapplications electronics 108 that is coupled to the at least onetime stamp register 116 and time/date clock 114. Therefore a remote service programmer may read the contents of the at least onetime stamp register 116, then reset same after reading its contents, and may also be used to set theRTCC 114 to a correct time and date. Communications may be any one of a number of wireless protocols, e.g., Bluetooth®, Zigbee®, Wi-Fi, BodyCom® and the like. An RFID device (not shown) may be coupled to the time/date stamp register(s) 116 for content readout thereof. Bluetooth® is a registered trademark of Bluetooth Sig, Inc., Suite 350 5209, Lake Washington Boulevard, Kirkland, Wash. 98033. Zigbee® is a registered trademark of ZigBee Alliance, 2400 Camino Ramon, Suite 375, San Ramon, Calif. 94583. BodyCom® is a registered trademark of Microchip Technology Incorporated, 2355 West Chandler Boulevard, Chandler, Ariz. 85224-6199. - The
tamper input 128 optionally may have a falsetrigger input filter 118 to substantially eliminate false triggers. Thetamper input 128 may be connected to some type of switch contacts, loss of pressure switch, etc., or other type of sensor that may be part of the metering application hardware. A signal from thetamper sensor 120 to thetamper input 128 may indicate mechanical tampering with the metering application enclosure. When a transition is detected on thetamper input 128, the current time and date may be captured in the at least one time/date stamp register 116. The captured time/date stamp data provides the last known time and date at which the data may be considered valid. - The
false trigger filter 118 may be as simple as a combination of a resistor(s) and a capacitor(s) configured as a low pass filter to substantially reduce noise spikes from appearing as a false tamper event. Thefalse trigger filter 118 may also comprise a digital filter taking a plurality of samples of thetamper sensor 120 output then averaging these samples over time to indicate whether a tamper event has occurred. - Referring to
FIG. 2 , depicted is a partial schematic block diagram of a metering device having a plurality of tamper sensors and RTCC time/date stamping, according to another specific example embodiment of this disclosure. A metering device as described hereinabove may comprise a plurality of tamper sensors 220, false trigger filters 218, time/date stamp registers 216, a time/date clock 214 andapplication electronics 208. A communications interface (106 inFIG. 1 ) andhousing 102 are not shown but are contemplated herein. Each of the time/date stamp registers 216 may comprise a plurality of memory registers, e.g., push down stacks memory, for storing a plurality of tamper events. Thus, more than one tamper sensor 220 may be used for backup and redundancy in critical metering applications. - Referring to
FIG. 3 , depicted is a schematic block diagram of a package, shipping container or suitcase having a plurality of tamper and/or mishandling sensors and RTCC time/date stamping, according to yet another specific example embodiment of this disclosure. Any one or more of a plurality of different sensors 320-326 may be utilized in a package, shipping container or suitcase (not shown) to determine when an undesired event has occurred thereto, e.g., dropping, tipping, excess vibration (bumpy roads), excessive temperature and/or humidity, altitude, ultra violet and infrared sensors, water intrusion, etc. A false trigger filter 218 and time/date stamp register 216 may be coupled with a respective one of the sensors 320-326, and when an undesired event may occur the time and date thereof will be recorded. Awireless interface 308 may also be provided and coupled to the time/date stamp registers 216 for time/date readout therefrom. The communications protocols mentioned hereinabove may be used. An RFID device (not shown) may be coupled to the time/date stamp register(s) 216 for content readout thereof and have anantenna 326. - Referring to
FIG. 4 , depicted is a schematic block diagram of a computer system having memories that erase upon a tamper event, according to still another specific example embodiment of this disclosure. Anelectronic device 402 has non-volatile memory(ies) 430, e.g., personal computer, tablet, smart phone, bank ATM, and the like, that stores confidential data may prevent this confidential data from being compromised by automatically erasing the confidential data from the memory(ies) 430 thereof. Theelectronic device 402 may comprise adigital processor 432, a non-volatile memory (hard disk) 430, a memory erasecircuit 428, aRTCC 112 comprising a time/date clock 114 and at least onetime stamp register 116, afalse trigger filter 118, abackup battery 422, and atamper sensor 420. Upon the occurrence of tamper event detected by thetamper sensor 420 and stored in atime stamp register 116, the memory erasecircuit 428 may notify and wake up the digital processor 432 (if necessary) so that theprocessor 432 may erase all confidential data in thenon-volatile memory 430, e.g., hard disk, non-voltage RAM and battery backed-up RAM. - The tamper sensor(s) 120 may be, for example but is not limited to, any one or more of the following sensors: a pressure activated switch, a magnetically activated switch, a mechanically activated switch, a Hall Effect magnetic sensor, a pressure transducer, and/or a capacitive proximity sensor. The mishandling sensor(s) 320 may be, for example but is not limited to, any one or more of the following sensors: an acceleration sensor, a vibration sensor, a tilt sensor, a temperature sensor, a moisture sensor, a pressure sensor, a humidity sensor, an ultraviolet sensor, an infrared sensor, a radiation sensor, and/or an altitude sensor.
- While embodiments of this disclosure have been depicted, described, and are defined by reference to example embodiments of the disclosure, such references do not imply a limitation on the disclosure, and no such limitation is to be inferred. The subject matter disclosed is capable of considerable modification, alteration, and equivalents in form and function, as will occur to those ordinarily skilled in the pertinent art and having the benefit of this disclosure. The depicted and described embodiments of this disclosure are examples only, and are not exhaustive of the scope of the disclosure.
Claims (27)
Priority Applications (6)
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US14/538,253 US9602895B2 (en) | 2013-11-14 | 2014-11-11 | Integrated circuit device with tamper detection input and having real time clock calendar logging thereof |
CN201480053085.8A CN105593691A (en) | 2013-11-14 | 2014-11-12 | Integrated circuit device with tamper detection input and having real time clock and calendar logging thereof |
EP14805750.8A EP3069152A1 (en) | 2013-11-14 | 2014-11-12 | Integrated circuit device with tamper detection input and having real time clock and calendar logging thereof |
PCT/US2014/065150 WO2015073495A1 (en) | 2013-11-14 | 2014-11-12 | Integrated circuit device with tamper dtection input and having real time clock and calendar logging thereof |
KR1020167008280A KR20160086321A (en) | 2013-11-14 | 2014-11-12 | Integrated circuit device with tamper detection input and having real time clock and calendar logging thereof |
TW103139661A TWI652598B (en) | 2013-11-14 | 2014-11-14 | Integrated circuit device with tamper detection input and having real time clock and calendar logging thereof |
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US14/538,253 US9602895B2 (en) | 2013-11-14 | 2014-11-11 | Integrated circuit device with tamper detection input and having real time clock calendar logging thereof |
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EP3069152A1 (en) | 2016-09-21 |
KR20160086321A (en) | 2016-07-19 |
US9602895B2 (en) | 2017-03-21 |
TW201525764A (en) | 2015-07-01 |
WO2015073495A8 (en) | 2016-05-06 |
WO2015073495A1 (en) | 2015-05-21 |
CN105593691A (en) | 2016-05-18 |
TWI652598B (en) | 2019-03-01 |
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