US20120137137A1 - Method and apparatus for key provisioning of hardware devices - Google Patents

Method and apparatus for key provisioning of hardware devices Download PDF

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Publication number
US20120137137A1
US20120137137A1 US12/956,793 US95679310A US2012137137A1 US 20120137137 A1 US20120137137 A1 US 20120137137A1 US 95679310 A US95679310 A US 95679310A US 2012137137 A1 US2012137137 A1 US 2012137137A1
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United States
Prior art keywords
key
provisioning
hardware device
encrypted
derived
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Abandoned
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US12/956,793
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English (en)
Inventor
Ernest F. Brickell
Shay Gueron
Jiangtao Li
Carlos V. Rozas
Daniel Nemiroff
Vincent R. Scarlata
Uday R. Savagaonkar
Simon P. Johnson
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Intel Corp
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Intel Corp
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Priority to US12/956,793 priority Critical patent/US20120137137A1/en
Assigned to INTEL CORPORATION reassignment INTEL CORPORATION ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNORS INTEREST (SEE DOCUMENT FOR DETAILS). Assignors: NEMIROFF, DANIEL, BRICKELL, ERNEST F., JOHNSON, SIMON P., SAVAGAONKAR, UDAY R., SCARLATA, VINCENT R., LI, JIANGTAO, ROZAS, CARLOS V., GUERON, SHAY
Priority to EP11844100.5A priority patent/EP2647156A4/en
Priority to CN201180057317.3A priority patent/CN103229451B/zh
Priority to JP2013536941A priority patent/JP5690412B2/ja
Priority to PCT/US2011/060345 priority patent/WO2012074720A1/en
Priority to TW100142701A priority patent/TWI567579B/zh
Publication of US20120137137A1 publication Critical patent/US20120137137A1/en
Priority to US13/987,807 priority patent/US9043604B2/en
Abandoned legal-status Critical Current

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    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/50—Monitoring users, programs or devices to maintain the integrity of platforms, e.g. of processors, firmware or operating systems
    • G06F21/57—Certifying or maintaining trusted computer platforms, e.g. secure boots or power-downs, version controls, system software checks, secure updates or assessing vulnerabilities
    • G06F21/572—Secure firmware programming, e.g. of basic input output system [BIOS]
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/70—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer
    • G06F21/71—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer to assure secure computing or processing of information
    • G06F21/73—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer to assure secure computing or processing of information by creating or determining hardware identification, e.g. serial numbers

Definitions

  • FIG. 3 is a flow graph illustrating a method for initial manufacturing provisioning of the device unique key 110 with shared key protection of a device unique key 110 to the hardware device;
  • FIG. 4 is a flow graph illustrating a method for secure initial manufacturing provisioning of a device unique key 110 to the hardware device
  • FIG. 5 illustrates a system that includes a key generation server, a provisioning server and a platform including the device coupled to a communications network;
  • FIG. 6 illustrates an embodiment of an on-line method for a device to obtain a key from the provisioning server
  • FIG. 8 is a block diagram of an embodiment of a Trusted Computing Base (TCB) of a trusted platform
  • FIG. 9 is a flowgraph illustrating a method to recover from a security vulnerability in the TCB shown in FIG. 8 ;
  • FIG. 14 illustrates an embodiment of a Device Authentication Key (DAK) provisioning protocol between a platform and a provisioning server;
  • DAK Device Authentication Key
  • FIG. 15 illustrates an embodiment of the re-provisioning protocol in FIG. 14 between the platform and the provisioning server that supports privacy;
  • Another method to provision key materials is for the device manufacturer to store a unique asymmetric Device Authentication Key (DAK) in write-once memory during the manufacturing process. Later, a provisioning server can provision keys (transmit keys) remotely to the hardware device installed in a platform using an interactive provisioning protocol. After validating the stored DAK received from the hardware device, the provisioning server sends the key materials to the hardware device.
  • DAK Device Authentication Key
  • the disadvantages of this method include the size of the region of write-once memory used to store a unique DAK in the hardware device, the possibility of security breach via a manufacturing tester machine that stores the keys in write-once memory, no support for off-line provisioning (that is, when no Internet connection is available to the platform in which the hardware device is installed), and the use of asymmetric key operations which requires more memory for a larger Trusted Computing Base (TCB) size in the hardware device.
  • TDB Trusted Computing Base
  • FIG. 1 is a block diagram illustrating a system 100 for performing the initial key provisioning in a manufacturing environment.
  • the system 100 includes a hardware device 102 , a manufacturing tester machine 104 and a key generation server 106 .
  • the manufacturing tester machine 104 and the key generation server 106 communicate via a secure channel 108 .
  • a secure channel is an authenticated and encrypted communication channel between two entities. For example, using Transport Layer Security (TLS), a platform can set up a secure channel with a server to perform online banking.
  • TLS Transport Layer Security
  • a device unique key 110 is assigned to the hardware device 102 by the key generation server 106 and stored in a protected memory 109 in the hardware device 102 .
  • This device unique key 110 is protected by the hardware and is never exposed later to software executing in a platform in which the hardware device 102 is later installed.
  • the platform in which the hardware device 102 is installed may be any computing device, for example, a mobile phone or computer.
  • an integrated circuit in the chipset can link the processor to high speed devices such as memory and graphics controllers and another integrated circuit in the chipset can link the processor to lower-speed peripherals accessed via a Peripheral Controller Interface (PCI), Universal Serial Bus (USB) or communications protocol such as Ethernet.
  • PCI Peripheral Controller Interface
  • USB Universal Serial Bus
  • Ethernet communications protocol
  • FIG. 2 is a flow graph illustrating a method for basic initial manufacturing provisioning of a device unique key to the hardware device.
  • the key generation server 106 chooses a random device unique key for the hardware device 102 that is coupled to the manufacturing tester machine 104 . Processing continues with block 202 .
  • the key generation server 106 sends the device unique key 110 for the hardware device 102 under test to the manufacturing tester machine 104 using a secure channel 108 .
  • the manufacturing tester machine 104 Upon receiving the device unique key 110 , the manufacturing tester machine 104 stores the device unique key 110 in a protected memory 109 which can be a write-once memory or a re-writable memory such as a Flash memory device in the hardware device 102 .
  • the write-once memory comprises a plurality of fuses, and the unique key is stored by blowing fuses to permanently store the device unique key 110 in the device 102 . Processing continues with block 204 .
  • the key generation server 106 stores the provisioning identifier and the provisioning key derived from the device unique key 110 in a provisioning database 112 for use later in on-the-field key provisioning of other security keys to the hardware device 102 . Processing continues with block 208 .
  • the key generation server 106 deletes the copy of the device unique key 110 stored in the key generation server 106 which was used to generate the provisioning key and provisioning identifier (ID) stored in the provisioning database 112 .
  • FIG. 3 is a flow graph illustrating a method for initial manufacturing provisioning of the device unique key with a shared key protection to the hardware device.
  • the key generation server 106 encrypts the device unique key 110 with a shared key that is embedded in each hardware device 102 such that only the hardware device 102 can decrypt the device unique key 110 .
  • the manufacturing tester machine 104 does not store or have access to the shared key. Thus, the manufacturing tester machine 104 cannot decrypt the device unique key 110 generated by the key generation server 106 .
  • the key generation server 106 derives a provisioning identifier and provisioning key from the device unique key as described earlier in conjunction with the embodiment shown in FIG. 2 . Processing continues with block 306 .
  • the key generation server 106 deletes the device unique key 110 that it has generated and stores the provisioning identifier and provisioning key derived from the device unique key 110 in the provisioning database 112
  • FIG. 4 is a flow graph illustrating a method for secure initial manufacturing provisioning of the device key to the hardware device.
  • the method described in conjunction with FIG. 4 is more secure than the methods described in conjunction with FIGS. 2 and 3 because the device unique key is generated in the device and is not transmitted over a communications channel to any other hardware device 102 .
  • the hardware device 102 has a symmetric shared key (GK) embedded in logic.
  • GK is known to the hardware device 102 and the key generation server 106 , but not known to the manufacturing tester machine 104 .
  • GK symmetric shared key
  • Ciphertext C 1 ⁇ C 2.
  • RSA-Enc(K, M) denotes RSA (Rivest, Shamir and Adleman) encryption of message M using an RSA public encryption key K.
  • the Message Authentication Code (MAC) function is HMAC.
  • the MAC function is AES-CMAC. 5.
  • the hardware device 102 outputs the ciphertext (encrypted keys) to the manufacturing tester machine 104 .
  • the key generation server 106 stores the provisioning identifier and provisioning key in a provisioning database 112 .
  • the hardware device 102 may be distributed to Outside Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) and installed in platforms. Typically, the platforms are distributed to end users. There may be a need for the hardware device manufacturer to send (provision) a key to the end user of the platform that includes the hardware device 102 .
  • the hardware device manufacturer can provision a unique key per hardware device 102 , such as, a symmetric device authentication key, a Trusted Platform Module (TPM) endorsement key, a High-bandwidth Digital Content Protection (HDCP) key, or an Advanced Access Content System (AACS) device key or a common key to the hardware device 102 .
  • a unique key per hardware device 102 such as, a symmetric device authentication key, a Trusted Platform Module (TPM) endorsement key, a High-bandwidth Digital Content Protection (HDCP) key, or an Advanced Access Content System (AACS) device key or a common key to the hardware device 102 .
  • TPM Trusted Platform Module
  • HDCP High-bandwidth Digital Content Protection
  • the provisioning database 112 in the key generation server 106 stores a provisioning identifier and a provisioning key for each hardware device 102 that has been tested by the manufacturing tester machine 104 .
  • the key generation server 106 prepares the key material to be provisioned to the hardware device 102 .
  • the key material also referred to as a “key blob” can be a single key, for example, a TPM key or a plurality of keys, for example, a TPM key and a HDCP key.
  • Each hardware device 102 can be assigned different key material.
  • the key generation server 106 encrypts the key material using the provisioning key.
  • the encryption is performed by a key wrapping (encryption) algorithm that can be any encryption algorithm, such as Advanced Encryption Standard-Galois/Counter Mode (AES-GCM) mode encryption or Advanced Encryption Standard-Cipher Block Chaining (AES-CBC) mode encryption combined with a pseudo random function (PRF).
  • AES-GCM and AES-CBC are defined in NIST standard FIPS-197.
  • the key generation server 106 prepares the provisioning database 112 to store all of the provisioning IDs and corresponding encrypted key(s).
  • FIG. 5 illustrates a system that includes a key generation server 106 , a provisioning server 500 and a platform 502 including the hardware device 102 coupled to a communications network 504 .
  • the system also includes a storage device 506 which may be a disk drive, for example, a Compact Disk (CD) or Digital Video Disk (DVD) with a removable storage medium (CD or DVD).
  • a storage device 506 which may be a disk drive, for example, a Compact Disk (CD) or Digital Video Disk (DVD) with a removable storage medium (CD or DVD).
  • the key generation server 106 sends the contents of the provisioning database 112 to the provisioning server 500 so that the provisioning server 500 can perform on-line provisioning of keys via a communications network 504 to platforms 502 in which the hardware device 102 is installed.
  • the provisioning database 112 can also be stored on a removable storage device, for example, a non-volatile memory device such as a Flash memory or a Compact Disk (CD) or Digital Video Disk (DVD) to perform off-line provisioning of the key to the hardware device 102 .
  • the device When the hardware device 102 is installed in a platform (for example, a host system), and discovers that its keys have been revoked, the device issues a request to contact the provisioning server 500 .
  • the request is sent from the hardware device 102 via a host network stack in the platform 502 over a secure communications channel to the provisioning server 500 .
  • the secure channel is robust against man-in-the-middle attack, even if the host network stack is corrupted, the security of key provisioning is not affected because only firmware can access the provisioning ID and provisioning key.
  • FIG. 6 illustrates an embodiment of an on-line method for a hardware device 102 to obtain a key from the provisioning server.
  • the hardware device 102 in the platform obtains its device unique key stored in protected memory 109 in the hardware device 102 , for example, in fuses or in random gates. If the hardware device unique key 110 is encrypted, the hardware device 102 decrypts it using the shared key (GK). The hardware device 102 derives the Provisioning ID from the device unique key using a pseudo random function as discussed earlier in conjunction with the key generation server 106 . Processing continues with block 602 .
  • the hardware device 102 initiates a key exchange protocol with the provisioning server 500 to set up a secure channel.
  • the key exchange protocol is performed using a Secure Sockets Layer (SSL)/Transport Layer Security (TLS) session to verify that the provisioning server is authorized.
  • SSL Secure Sockets Layer
  • TLS Transport Layer Security
  • the security channel is not necessary and is not used. Processing continues with block 604 .
  • the hardware device 102 sends its Provisioning ID to the provisioning server 500 via the secure channel over the communication network, for example, the Internet. Processing continues with block 606 .
  • the provisioning server 500 receives the Provisioning ID from the provisioning database 112 and obtains the encrypted key associated with the provisioning ID stored in the provisioning data base.
  • the hardware device 102 receives the encrypted key from the provisioning server 500 via the secure channel.
  • the hardware device 102 may not have access to the communications network and requires a key to be provisioned in order to provide security functions in the hardware device 102 .
  • the key can be provisioned to the hardware device 102 off-line by distributing the provisioning database 112 on a removable storage device to the end user of the hardware device 102 .
  • the end user receives the entire provisioning database on the removable storage device but can only use the key(s) in the provisioning database that are encrypted by the hardware device's Provisioning key that is derived from the unique device key.
  • the hardware device 102 obtains its provisioning ID using the method discussed for on-line provisioning. However, instead of sending its provisioning ID via the communications network, the hardware device 102 searches the local provisioning database for the encrypted key(s) associated with its provisioning ID.
  • FIG. 7 illustrates a method implemented in the hardware device 102 for decrypting the encrypted key(s). The method shown in FIG. 7 applies to an encrypted key provisioned using either on-line or off-line provisioning.
  • the hardware device 102 obtains it device unique key 110 stored in the hardware device 102 . Processing continues with block 702 .
  • the hardware device 102 derives the Provisioning Key and a Storage Key from the device unique key 110 using one-way pseudo random functions (PRF).
  • the derived Storage key can be used to seal arbitrary secrets of the platform.
  • the derived Provisioning key is used for provisioning. Processing continues with block 704 .
  • the hardware device 102 uses the derived provisioning key to decrypt the encrypted key(s) obtained using the online or offline key provisioning method discussed in conjunction with FIG. 6 . Processing continues with block 706 .
  • the hardware device 102 stores the encrypted key(s) locally in its secure storage.
  • the encrypted key(s) can be encrypted again using the storage key and a pseudo-random function, the result of this additional encryption can be stored locally in secure storage instead of the received encrypted key(s).
  • a hardware device 102 can successfully remotely obtain key materials (encrypted keys) from the manufacturer of the hardware device 102 because it can derive the provisioning key used to encrypt the key materials.
  • An attacker for example, malware
  • An attacker cannot get the key materials from the hardware device manufacturer without the device unique key 110 from which the provisioning key is derived using a pseudo random function.
  • the attacker may have access to the provisioning database via the removable storage device, but the attacker cannot decrypt the encrypted keys without a valid Provisioning Key.
  • the shared key discussed in conjunction with FIG. 3 if the manufacturing tester machine 104 is corrupted, the attacker cannot get the encrypted key(s) from the manufacture because all the device unique keys are encrypted by the shared key which is unknown to the manufacturing tester machine 104 .
  • the manufacturing tester machine 104 has knowledge of the shared key, it is unable to learn the device unique key or Provisioning Key.
  • a small write-once memory is used to store a device unique key as a root of trust for the hardware device 102 which is used to derive other keys used to protect the hardware device 102 against malicious attackers.
  • the write-once memory is 128-bits.
  • the write-once memory is 256-bits.
  • the write-once memory is 128-bits or 192-bits or another size that is dependent on the length of the key used by symmetric encryption.
  • each integrated circuit in the chipset and processor can include a security engine with a device unique key.
  • the provisioning of keys is simple and scalable and because of the use of symmetric key operations, the size of the Trusted Computing Base (TCB) is reduced.
  • DAA Direct Anonymous Attestation
  • TPM Trusted Platform Module
  • TLB Trusted Computing Base
  • the vulnerability may be patched by installing another version of firmware in the platform.
  • the platform cannot cryptographically prove that the vulnerability in the firmware has been corrected to others, for example, external entities.
  • a device unique key 110 embedded in a hardware device 102 in a platform 502 .
  • the device unique key 110 is permanently stored in a protected storage 109 in the hardware device 102 .
  • This device unique key 110 is the “root key” for other keys in the platform, that is, several other keys in the Trusted Computing Base 800 are derived from this device unique key 110 , such as, a provisioning ID 802 , a provisioning base key 822 , a provisioning key 804 and a storage key 806 .
  • the provisioning ID 802 and provisioning key 804 are used to download a unique DAK key from a key provisioning server 500 .
  • the storage key 806 is used for encrypting keys and secrets of the platform 502 including the DAK key.
  • the upgraded firmware in the TCB 802 needs to access these derived keys, for example, provisioning ID 802 , provisioning key 804 , and storage key 806 to be functional.
  • a unique identifier is assigned to identify different versions of the firmware.
  • the unique identifier is a Security Version Number (SVN) 808 that can be stored in non-reportable firmware code 818 in non-volatile memory and read by the unrecoverable TCB 810 .
  • the unique identifier for each firmware version can be derived by performing a cryptographic function on each version of the firmware image.
  • the keys that are derived from the device unique key 110 that is, the provisioning ID 802 , provisioning key 804 , and storage key 806 are computed inside a signature verification portion of the TCB 810 , which is designated to be non-recoverable and can also be referred to as the “unrecoverable TCB”.
  • the provisioning key 804 and storage key 806 are derived based on the Security Version Number 808 , then output from the signature verification portion of the TCB 810 to a recoverable portion of the TCB 800 .
  • the signature verification portion of the TCB 810 “locks” access to the device unique key 110 , preventing recoverable portions of the TCB 800 from accessing the device unique key 110 , that is, the raw “root key”.
  • the Provisioning key 804 and Storage key 806 are stored in the recoverable portions of the TCB, the Provisioning key 804 and Storage key 806 are updated when there is an update to the SVN 808 of the TCB 800 .
  • the key derivations are performed inside the recoverable TCB 810 during device boot. Each time new firmware is installed in the platform, a device re-boot is performed which results in a new provisioning key and storage key that are computed during the device re-boot.
  • FIG. 9 is a flowgraph illustrating a method to recover from a security vulnerability in a TCB 800 . If security vulnerability has been discovered in the recoverable TCB, a TCB recovery event is triggered.
  • the platform/hardware manufacturer when a security vulnerability is found in the TCB 800 , the platform/hardware manufacturer generates a new version of the firmware that includes a software modification to fix the vulnerability.
  • the new version of the firmware is assigned a security version number 808 .
  • the new version of the firmware is digitally signed (encrypted) by the hardware manufacturer.
  • the unrecoverable TCB 810 can verify the signature using the manufacturer's public key, that is, the firmware verification key embedded in the hardware device 102 and make sure that the new firmware image was received from the hardware manufacturer and is not malware.
  • the manufacturer distributes the new firmware to each platform using known methods, for example, via a firmware update from an Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM), or a software update from a software manufacturer. Processing continues with block 902 .
  • OEM Original Equipment Manufacturer
  • the signature verification portion of the TCB 800 verifies the signature of the new firmware for the recoverable TCB using the firmware verification key 820 embedded in the hardware device 102 in the platform.
  • the signature verification portion of the TCB 810 retrieves the Security Version Number (SVN) 808 of the new firmware embedded in the firmware and retrieves the device unique key 110 stored in the hardware device 102 .
  • the provisioning ID 802 and Provisioning Base Key 822 are derived from the device unique key 110 .
  • the Provisioning key 804 is derived from the Provisioning Base Key 822 and the SVN 808 .
  • the Storage Key 806 is derived from the device unique key 110 and the SVN 808 . Methods for deriving these keys will be described later.
  • the derived provisioning ID 802 , provisioning key 804 , and storage key 806 are sent to the recoverable TCB. Processing continues with block 804 .
  • a new DAK is generated for the new version of firmware.
  • the hardware manufacturer re-provisions a Device Authentication Key (DAK) to each platform 502 that received the new version of the firmware to fix the security vulnerability.
  • DAK Device Authentication Key
  • the key generation server 106 generates the DAKs and sends to the respective platforms 502 via the communications network 504 .
  • the provisioning database 112 in the key generation server 106 stores a provisioning ID 802 and a Provisioning Base Key 822 for each hardware device 102 that was tested by the manufacturing tester device.
  • a provisioning key 804 is derived from the stored provisioning base key 822 based on the latest Security Version Number 808 .
  • the key derivation method selected is the same as used in block 904 .
  • the new unique DAK is generated for the hardware device 102 and encrypted using the provisioning key 804 .
  • Any symmetric encryption algorithm can be used, for example, AES-GCM.
  • the key generation server 106 prepares a DAK provisioning database in which each database entry has a provisioning key 804 and the corresponding encrypted DAK.
  • the key generation server 106 sends the DAK provisioning database to the key provisioning server 500 .
  • Each platform downloads a new DAK from the key provisioning server 500 .
  • the recoverable TCB has the provisioning ID 802 and provisioning key 804 and communicates with the provisioning server 500 using a provisioning protocol to obtain the new DAK key for the platform 502 .
  • the platform 502 encrypts its provisioning ID 802 using the provisioning server 500 's public key and sends the encrypted provisioning ID to the provisioning server 500 .
  • the provisioning server 500 decrypts the received encrypted provisioning ID using its private key to obtain the unencrypted provisioning ID 802 of the requesting platform 502 .
  • the provisioning server 500 searches the DAK provisioning database for an entry corresponding to the provisioning ID 802 that stores the encrypted new DAK key which is encrypted by the new provisioning key for the hardware device 102 in the platform 502 .
  • the provisioning server 500 sends the encrypted new DAK to the platform 502 .
  • the platform 502 decrypts the new DAK using the new provisioning key.
  • the platform 502 re-encrypts the new DAK using its new storage key 806 and stores the encrypted new DAK securely.
  • the encrypted new DAK is stored in non-volatile memory in the platform 502 .
  • the non-volatile memory can be BIOS flash memory, chipset flash memory, a solid state drive or hard disk drive. As the DAK is encrypted by the storage key, even if the non-volatile memory is accessed by an attacker, the attacker is unable to decrypt the DAK.
  • the platform 502 If the platform 502 has not installed the new firmware to fix the security vulnerability, it cannot derive the new provisioning key 804 corresponding to the latest SVN. Thus, the platform 502 cannot decrypt the new DAK; even it receives the encrypted new DAK from the provisioning server 500 . Processing continues with block 908 .
  • a new storage key is derived because if an attacker has corrupted the old version of the TCB firmware and extracted the storage key 806 associated with the old version, the attacker can still decrypt the platform secrets (including the new DAK) even after the firmware update.
  • the recoverable TCB cannot obtain a provisioning key 804 for the latest SVN, thus it cannot get the current version of the DAK key. Also, if the recoverable TCB gets access to previous storage Keys 824 for the key migration purpose and the recoverable TCB has been upgraded to a new SVN, the new recoverable TCB can decrypt the keys and data from the previous version and encrypt them using the new storage key.
  • the initial value assigned to the SVN is 1 and for each new firmware update the SVN increments by one.
  • SK[i] denotes the Storage Key corresponding to SVN i.
  • the Provisioning ID and provisioning key 804 are computed as shown below:
  • Provisioning ID PRF(device unique key,“Provisioning ID”)
  • Provisioning Base Key PRF(device unique key,“Provisioning Base Key”)
  • Provisioning Key PRF(Provisioning Base Key,“Provisioning Key” ⁇ SVN).
  • the unrecoverable TCB derives all of the previous Storage Keys 824 as follows:
  • the unrecoverable TCB then sends all the Storage Keys to the recoverable TCB.
  • only one prior storage key is computed.
  • a platform 502 that controls storage of data protected by a storage key 806 may only require access to the current Storage Key and its prior Storage Key.
  • the prior storage key is the storage key that was used by the platform 502 prior to the last firmware update.
  • the unrecoverable TCB 810 outputs two Storage Keys, a first storage key 806 for the current SVN and a second storage key 824 for the prior SVN. As the user of the platform may skip some firmware upgrades, the prior SVN (pSVN) may not be SVN ⁇ 1.
  • the unrecoverable TCB 802 computes the following:
  • SK[SVN] PRF(device unique key,“Storage Key” ⁇ SVN).
  • SK[ p SVN] PRF(device unique key,“Storage Key” ⁇ p SVN).
  • SVN is the current SVN
  • pSVN is the prior SVN
  • PRF is a pseudo random function
  • the SVN 808 is available from the firmware of the TCB 800 .
  • the pSVN can be provided to the unrecoverable TCB 810 from the non-volatile memory in which it is stored.
  • the platform stores pSVN in the Flash Partition Table FPT partition of the Built In Operating System (BIOS).
  • BIOS Built In Operating System
  • a previous storage key can be derived without using a pSVN.
  • FIG. 10 is a flowgraph of an embodiment of a hash chain method to perform key derivation to compute prior storage keys.
  • a platform 502 that does not have control over where protected data is stored, multiple prior storage keys 824 are needed to ensure proper access to previously protected data.
  • the current SVN 808 is read from the recoverable TCB firmware. Processing continues with block 1002 .
  • n there are a maximum number of recoverable prior SVNs (‘n’).
  • the maximum number of recoverable prior SVNs can be 32. If the current SVN is less than the maximum number of recoverable prior SVNs, processing continues with block 1004 . If not, that is SVN is greater than n, the provisioning key and storage key cannot be derived and the TCB is no longer recoverable.
  • the value of the storage key corresponding to the maximum number of recoverable storage keys is computed as follows:
  • SK[ n ] PRF(device unique key,“Storage Key” ⁇ n).
  • SK[SVN] is output.
  • the unrecoverable TCB 810 only needs to output a single storage key 806 .
  • the amount of computation to derive the storage key increases as maximum number of prior storage keys increases but if the maximum number of prior storage keys is small, the number of prior storage keys that can be recovered is reduced.
  • some storage keys are directly derived from the device unique key 110 , and other storage keys are computed from the hash of the next version.
  • the value of the storage keys are defined as follows:
  • SK[ i ] PRF(device unique key,“Storage Key” ⁇ i )if i is a multiplier of n,
  • FIG. 11 is a flowgraph illustrating an embodiment of a method performed by the unrecoverable TCB to derive the storage keys.
  • the SVN 808 is read from the unrecoverable TCB firmware. Processing continues with block 1102 .
  • the current storage key is derived using the device unique key 110 as follows:
  • the prior storage keys are computed using the current storage key as follows:
  • the compute storage keys, SK[SVN], SK[n], SK[2n], . . . , SK[(m ⁇ 1) ⁇ n] are output to the recoverable TCB.
  • Embodiments of methods to compute previous storage keys 824 for a single recoverable TCB have been described.
  • a platform can have multiple layers of recoverable TCBs.
  • each layer of TCB has its own SVN 808 .
  • Each layer has a derived key computed by the previous layer. If the security version number is an integer, each layer of TCB may need to verify the signature of the next layer TCB firmware.
  • the unrecoverable TCB can be a firmware patch loader
  • the layer 1 TCB is firmware layer 1
  • layer 2 TCB is the firmware implementation of a higher level technology.
  • FIG. 12 is a block diagram illustrating the unrecoverable TCB 810 and layer 1 TCB 1202 .
  • the unrecoverable TCB 810 receives the device unique key 110 .
  • the unrecoverable TCB 810 verifies the signature of unrecoverable TCB firmware and forwards unrecoverable TCB's SVN to block 1206 .
  • the unrecoverable TCB derives a key for Layer 1 TCB 1202 based on performing a pseudo random function on the received device unique key 110 and unrecoverable TCB's SVN.
  • each level of a multi-layer TCB can produce two keys based on the SVN and pSVN of that layer. These two keys are derived from the SVN and pSVN keys of the previous layer.
  • the hash chain method discussed in conjunction with FIG. 10 provides single layer TCB recovery, however this does not scale to multiple layers.
  • a hybrid approach uses the hash chain to protect a recoverable layer.
  • the recoverable layer stores the remaining layer SVNs and can derive storage keys for any arbitrary combination of pSVN of different layers on demand.
  • FIG. 13 is a block diagram illustrating a hybrid approach using a hash chain to protect a recoverable layer.
  • Four layers are shown: an unrecoverable TCB layer 810 , layer 1 TCB 1300 , layer 2 TCB 1302 and layer 3 1304 . All four layers shown can be implemented in an embodiment for a processor unit. Only two of the layers: an unrecoverable TCB layer 810 and layer 1 TCB 1300 are typically used in an embodiment for a chipset.
  • the key register 1314 can be a special register in the processor unit or chipset that is used by the unrecoverable TCB layer 810 and by layer 3 1304 in an embodiment for a processor unit.
  • the TCB for each layer (i) is computed as follows:
  • TCB[ i ] SVN of TCB layer i.
  • the unrecoverable TCB layer 810 receives the stored device unique key 110 , verifies the integrity and source of Layer 1 recoverable TCB firmware and calculates SK[TCB[1]] using hash chaining in the PRF loop 1312 .
  • the PRF loop 1312 derives a provisioning key for a particular layer for a particular revision of the key and stores the provisioning key for layer 1 CB 1300 in the key register.
  • the PRF loop also generates the Layer 1 SVN 1305 , Layer 2 SVN 1306 and Layer 3 SVN 1308 .
  • the PRF function performed in the PRF loop 1312 can be a hash function that is performed on the root key and the current TCB version (or a previous TCB version number).
  • Layer 1 TCB 1302 verifies the integrity and source of Layer 2 and stores Layer 2 's Security Version Number (SVN) 1306 generated by PRF loop 1312 in a protected register, for example, in a TCBSVN Register 1310 .
  • the TCBSVN Register 1310 can be protected from being overwritten by the other layers.
  • Layer 2 through the last layer perform the same operations as discussed in conjunction with layer 1 1300 .
  • Instructions implemented in the last layer can call a layer 1 function getKey (TCB_request[ ]) which performs the following operations.
  • TCB_request[i] > TCB[i]
  • tmp SK[TCB_request[i]] using chaining Return PRF(tmp, “Storage Key” ⁇ j ⁇ k); where j and k are SVNs for layer 1 TCB 1300 and layer 2 TCB 1302.
  • the storage key 806 for any previous permutation of TCB layers can be derived, if layer 1 remains active.
  • Layer 3 1304 also uses the provisioning key stored in the key register 1314 and performs an optional PRF function in PRF loop 1318 if required to generate a previous version of the provisioning key.
  • a PRF function is performed at 1320 on either the stored provisioning key stored in the key register 1314 or derived in PRF loop 1318 with the stored layer 2 SVN 1306 and stored layer 3 SVN 1308 .
  • the storage keys are computed based on the result of this PRF function 1326 .
  • FIG. 14 illustrates an embodiment of a DAK provisioning protocol between a platform 502 and a provisioning server 500 .
  • the platform 502 and the provisioning server 500 set up a secure communication channel using a standard protocol, such as TLS/SSL.
  • the platform 502 encrypts a message using its previous DAK and sends the encrypted message to the provisioning server 500 .
  • the provisioning server 500 checks the previous DAK and performs a revocation check on the previous DAK to determine if it has been revoked. If the platform 502 has been revoked, the provisioning server 500 terminates the protocol.
  • the Platform sends the Provisioning ID 802 over the secure channel to the provisioning server 500 .
  • the provisioning server 500 searches the DAK provisioning database using the received provisioning ID (one per hardware device 102 ) and retrieves the encrypted new DAK for the platform 502 .
  • the provisioning server 500 sends the new encrypted DAK to the platform 502 .
  • the DAK re-provisioning is modified to store the DAK in the provisioning server 500 .
  • FIG. 15 illustrates an embodiment of the re-provisioning protocol in FIG. 14 between the platform 502 and the provisioning server 500 that supports privacy.
  • the platform 502 sets up a secure channel with the provisioning server 500 .
  • the platform 502 proves that it has not been revoked by sending its previous DAK to the provisioning server 500 .
  • the platform 502 sends the Provisioning ID over the secure channel to the provisioning server 500 .
  • the provisioning server 500 searches the DAK provisioning database for a match for the previous DAK and retrieves the new DAK for the platform 502 .
  • the provisioning server 500 sends the new DAK encrypted using the provisioning key 804 back to platform 502 .
  • the platform 502 decrypts the encrypted DAK using its provisioning key 804 .
  • the platform 502 re-encrypts the received new DAK using its storage key 806 , which is unknown to the provisioning server 500 and key generation server 106 .
  • the platform 502 sends the new DAK encrypted by its storage key 806 to the provisioning server 500 .
  • the provisioning server 500 deletes the platform's DAK from its database and stores the new DAK encrypted by its storage key in the database.
  • FIG. 16 illustrates an embodiment of a DAK backup retrieval protocol between the platform and the provisioning server 500 that stores the platform's DAK encrypted by its storage key.
  • the platform If the platform loses its DAK, it can download the DAK stored in the database in the provisioning server 500 .
  • the platform 502 encrypts its provisioning ID 804 using the provisioning server's public key and sends the encrypted provisioning ID to the provisioning server 500 .
  • the provisioning server 500 decrypts the provisioning ID and searches for an entry corresponding to the provisioning ID in the provisioning server's database.
  • the provisioning server 500 sends the DAK encrypted in by the platform's storage key 806 that is stored in the provisioning server 500 's database to the platform.
  • the platform 502 uses its storage key to decrypt the received encrypted DAK (the backup copy of the DAK).
  • the Previous Security Version Number (PSVN) is stored in a non-volatile re-writable memory such as a Flash memory in the platform 502 .
  • a simple wear-out protection algorithm is used to store the PSVN persistently in the non-volatile re-writable memory with minimal flash file system support to avoid erase cycles in the non-volatile re-writable memory.
  • a 64-byte block (partition) in the non-volatile re-writable memory is used to store the Previous Security Version (PSVN).
  • Each byte represents a potential PSVN, with only a single byte of the 64-byte block being valid at any time.
  • the default value for a byte in the 64-byte block is 255 (0xFF in hexadecimal representation). If the value of the byte is 0 (0x00 in hexadecimal representation), the PSVN entry has already been used and is now invalid. Any other value (1 through 254 (0x01-0xFE in hexadecimal representation)) indicates that the PSVN entry is valid.
  • FIG. 17 is flowgraph of an embodiment of a method for storing a PSVN in the non-volatile re-writable memory.
  • processing continues with block 1705 . If not, processing continues with block 1706 .
  • the previous root key is derived.
  • the number of PSVN entries exceeds 64 (the number of locations available in the 64-byte block reserved for storing PSVN entries), no provisioning keys can be derived and the DAK keys cannot be re-keyed.
  • a method and apparatus has been described for a platform to prove the TCB has been patched by facilitating provisioning of a new DAK.
  • This method and apparatus can be used by security applications such as, Manageability Engine (ME), and TPM.
  • ME Manageability Engine
  • a computer usable medium may consist of a read only memory device, such as a Compact Disk Read Only Memory (CD ROM) disk or conventional ROM devices, or a computer diskette, having a computer readable program code stored thereon.
  • a computer usable medium may consist of a read only memory device, such as a Compact Disk Read Only Memory (CD ROM) disk or conventional ROM devices, or a computer diskette, having a computer readable program code stored thereon.
  • CD ROM Compact Disk Read Only Memory

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US12/956,793 US20120137137A1 (en) 2010-11-30 2010-11-30 Method and apparatus for key provisioning of hardware devices
EP11844100.5A EP2647156A4 (en) 2010-11-30 2011-11-11 Method and apparatus for key provisioning of hardware devices
CN201180057317.3A CN103229451B (zh) 2010-11-30 2011-11-11 用于硬件设备的密钥供应的方法和装置
JP2013536941A JP5690412B2 (ja) 2010-11-30 2011-11-11 ハードウェアデバイスの鍵プロビジョン方法および装置
PCT/US2011/060345 WO2012074720A1 (en) 2010-11-30 2011-11-11 Method and apparatus for key provisioning of hardware devices
TW100142701A TWI567579B (zh) 2010-11-30 2011-11-22 用於對硬體裝置提供金鑰的方法和設備
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CN103229451A (zh) 2013-07-31
US9043604B2 (en) 2015-05-26
EP2647156A4 (en) 2017-07-05
JP5690412B2 (ja) 2015-03-25
US20140089659A1 (en) 2014-03-27
WO2012074720A1 (en) 2012-06-07
CN103229451B (zh) 2015-11-25
TWI567579B (zh) 2017-01-21

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