US20100242102A1 - Biometric credential verification framework - Google Patents
Biometric credential verification framework Download PDFInfo
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- US20100242102A1 US20100242102A1 US11/477,160 US47716006A US2010242102A1 US 20100242102 A1 US20100242102 A1 US 20100242102A1 US 47716006 A US47716006 A US 47716006A US 2010242102 A1 US2010242102 A1 US 2010242102A1
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/30—Authentication, i.e. establishing the identity or authorisation of security principals
- G06F21/31—User authentication
- G06F21/32—User authentication using biometric data, e.g. fingerprints, iris scans or voiceprints
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/30—Authentication, i.e. establishing the identity or authorisation of security principals
- G06F21/31—User authentication
- G06F21/33—User authentication using certificates
- G06F21/335—User authentication using certificates for accessing specific resources, e.g. using Kerberos tickets
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
- G06Q20/38—Payment protocols; Details thereof
- G06Q20/40—Authorisation, e.g. identification of payer or payee, verification of customer or shop credentials; Review and approval of payers, e.g. check credit lines or negative lists
- G06Q20/401—Transaction verification
- G06Q20/4014—Identity check for transactions
- G06Q20/40145—Biometric identity checks
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
- H04L63/0823—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities using certificates
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
- H04L63/083—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities using passwords
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
- H04L63/0861—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities using biometrical features, e.g. fingerprint, retina-scan
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/10—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for controlling access to devices or network resources
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/12—Applying verification of the received information
- H04L63/126—Applying verification of the received information the source of the received data
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/14—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols using a plurality of keys or algorithms
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
- H04L63/0428—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/06—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network
- H04L63/067—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network using one-time keys
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
- H04L63/0807—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities using tickets, e.g. Kerberos
Definitions
- Biometric samples used for interactive user or network authentication are different from the traditional password or cryptographic key used in current authentication schemes in that they differ every time they are sampled. Biometric samples are not ideal for cryptographic key material for several reasons. They have limited strength and the entropy of a cryptographic seed can be regenerated or changed. Biometric samples are not absolute values; they are samples and may differ from one sampling to the next. Cryptographic keys are absolutes defined from an original seed whereas biometric readings vary. Because of these limitations, biometric samples are not optimum choices for cryptographic key material.
- Biometric samples are typically matched against a stored sample (often referred to in the industry as a “template”) that was previously scanned and/or computed, and if a live match with a stored sample is validated, then stored cryptographic key material is released to the system to allows a user login session to proceed using that key material.
- a stored sample often referred to in the industry as a “template”
- stored cryptographic key material is released to the system to allows a user login session to proceed using that key material.
- the matching process and/or key storage is done outside a secure environment, such as a physically secure server, the key material and/or reference template is subject to attacks and disclosure.
- the current WindowsTM architecture provided by Microsoft® Corporation of Redmond, Wash. supports password or Kerberos/PKINIT authentication, but does not support matching of biometric templates on the server as a normal part of authentication.
- Solutions provided today by biometric solution vendors typically store traditional login credentials such as passwords or x.509 based certificates on the client machines and then submit them after a valid template match against a reference biometric sample that is also stored on the client PC.
- the passwords, x.509 based certificates and reference templates are all subject to attack and disclosure because they reside outside the physically secured servers.
- the client computer securely communicates with a biometric matching server which can match the user biometric data with a set of templates of biometric data for the user.
- the biometric server can verify that the user is authorized and identified.
- the matching server transmits a temporary certificate along with cryptographic keys to the client computer.
- the temporary certificate and the keys are used to gain immediate access to the Kerberos authentication system. Subsequent use of the temporary certificate by the client will result in denied access to the Kerberos authentication system because the certificate has expired.
- Once the client computer gains access to the Kerberos system then subsequent access to a secure set of computing resources may be obtained.
- FIG. 1 is a block diagram showing a prior art authentication system
- FIG. 2 is an example block diagram depicting functional aspects of the invention
- FIG. 3 is an example flow diagram showing an embodiment of the invention.
- FIG. 4 is a block diagram showing an example host computing environment.
- FIG. 1 is a block diagram of a typical Kerberos System.
- Kerberos is a computer network authentication protocol which allows individuals communicating over an insecure network to prove their identity to one another in a secure manner. Kerberos prevents eavesdropping or replay attacks, and ensures the integrity of the data. Kerberos provides mutual authentication where both the user and the service verify each other's identity. Kerberos builds on symmetric key cryptography and requires a trusted third party.
- Kerberos includes two functional parts: an Authentication Server (AS) 104 and a Ticket Granting Server (TGS) 106 . Kerberos works on the basis of “tickets” which serve to prove the identity of users. Using Kerberos, a client 102 can prove its identity to use the resources of a service server (SS) 108 . Kerberos maintains a database of secret keys; each entity on the network, whether a client or a server, shares a secret key known only to itself and to Kerberos. Knowledge of this key serves to prove an entity's identity. For communication between two entities, Kerberos generates a session key which they can use to secure their interactions.
- AS Authentication Server
- TSS Ticket Granting Server
- the client authenticates itself to an AS 104 , then demonstrates to the TGS 106 that it's authorized to receive a ticket for a service (and receives it), then demonstrates to the SS that it has been approved to receive the service.
- the process begins when a user enters a username and password on the client 102 .
- the client performs a one-way hash on the entered password, and this becomes the secret key of the client.
- the client sends a clear-text message to the AS 104 via link 110 requesting services on behalf of the user. At this point, neither the secret key nor the password is sent to the AS.
- the AS 104 checks to see if the client 102 is in its database. If it is, the AS sends back the following two messages to the client via link 110 :
- *Message A A client/TGS session key encrypted using the secret key of the user
- *Message B A Ticket-Granting Ticket (which includes the client ID, client network address, ticket validity period, and the client/TGS session key) encrypted using the secret key of the TGS.
- the client 102 When requesting services, the client 102 sends the following two messages to the TGS 106 via link 112 :
- *Message C Composed of the Ticket-Granting Ticket from message B and the ID of the requested service
- *Message D Authenticator (which is composed of the client ID and the timestamp), encrypted using the client/TGS session key.
- the TGS 106 decrypts message D (Authenticator) using the client/TGS session key and sends the following two messages to the client 102 via link 112 :
- *Message E Client-to-server ticket (which includes the client ID, client network address, validity period) encrypted using the service's secret key
- *Message F Client/server session key encrypted with the client/TGS session key.
- the client 102 Upon receiving messages E and F from TGS 106 , the client 102 has enough information to authenticate itself to the SS 108 .
- the client 102 connects to the SS 108 via link 114 and sends the following two messages:
- *Message G the client-to-server ticket, encrypted using service's secret key
- *Message H a new Authenticator, which includes the client ID, timestamp and is encrypted using client/server session key.
- the SS 108 decrypts the ticket using its own secret key and sends the following message to the client 102 via link 114 to confirm its true identity and willingness to serve the client.
- the present invention may advantageously use aspects of the Kerberos system with a biometric sampler device.
- a new framework may be implemented wherein a claimed user identity, such as a username, domain name, UPN, etc., a PIN/password and a reader-signed cryptographic biometric sample is sent securely to a newly defined Biometric-Matching Server that holds the reference templates for each user that is enrolled in the biometric system.
- a temporary credential such as an X.509 certificate or a symmetric key or a one-time-password
- an alternate temporary certificate can be used, such as is known by those of skill in the art. The user may then use the certificate for login in an automated or manual way with the authentication system.
- This new framework provides better protection of cryptographic key material used for an interactive or network user login than current biometric implementations, such as the one described above.
- Advantages of the new framework include a cryptographic key inside a biometric sampling device may be used to protect the sample from tampering. This cryptographic key may be provided within integrated circuitry inside the biometric sampler.
- a key on the Biometric-Matching Server may be used for generating the temporary login certificate. This key resides on a physically secure server and is trusted by the network for creating credentials. The certificate that is given to the user for login is usable only for a very short time. And, this new framework is compatible with the current Kerberos/PKINIT authentication structure.
- FIG. 2 is a block diagram showing functional aspects of the invention.
- a user input 202 is provided to both a client computer 206 and a biometric sampler 204 .
- the user input is required in a biometric identification system to log onto the client to gain access to resources in a service server 212 .
- the user In order to access the server 212 , the user needs to be identified via the biometric sampler device 204 and the client computer 206 using a biometric matching server 208 .
- the user may then be able to use the service server 212 if the user is authenticated.
- the user can begin an access of the client by entering a user ID and PIN or password. This forms part of the user input 202 .
- Client computer 206 can prompt the user to present a biometric sample.
- the biometric sample may simply be collected passively instead of actively.
- the biometric sampler 204 collects the biometric sample of the user.
- the biometric sampler 204 then cryptographically signs the biometric sample and forwards to the client computer system 206 .
- the cryptographic signature is used to protect the biometric sample against tampering within the client computer.
- the digital cryptographic signature establishes origin authentication to the biometric device that has taken the sample. This action attests that a fresh sample from a known source is provided to the client.
- the client computer 206 then establishes a secure connection 226 to the biometric matching server 208 and transfers the biometric sample information.
- a secure socket layer (SSL) and or a transport layer security (TLS) connection is made between the client 206 and the biometric matching server 208 or other secure link method to protect the sample from tampering in transit.
- SSL secure socket layer
- TLS transport layer security
- Information sent from the client 206 to the biometric server 208 includes the digital signature, biometric sample, user input PIN and/or password, and timestamp and/or nonce. If this data matches reference data associated with the user in the database of the biometric matching server 208 , then the biometric matching server generates a cryptographic public/private key pair and digital certificate, such as a x.509 certificate for the user login session.
- the digital certificate is constructed with a short validity period such that it will expire in a short time.
- the digital certificate and key pair are sent via a secure link from the biometric matching computer 208 to the client computer 206 .
- a temporary digital certificate is issued so as to increase the security level in obtaining access to the services server 212 resources.
- biometric device readers or biometric systems store a permanent certificate in their biometric reader or client computer. This increases the risk of illegitimate access by presentation of a certificate used in a prior access.
- a temporary or ephemeral certificate recognized by the authentication system By generating a temporary or ephemeral certificate recognized by the authentication system, the freshness of the biometric reading and the strength of the certificate are enhanced.
- An ephemeral certificate that is temporary in viability is more secure because it cannot be re-used to acquire more than one set of authentication system credentials in a fixed time period. In one embodiment, the fixed time period may be fixed at time interval from ten minutes to several hours. Hence, the certificates are unique for the particular authentication session. Failure to use the temporary certificate within the allotted time for authentication system access will result in denial of authentication system access due to the expiration of the certificate.
- the client 206 can go forward to authenticate itself to a secure system 210 which in an exemplary implementation would be a Kerberos KDC (Key Distribution Center).
- An example authentication system is the Kerberos system.
- the client presents the user ID, certificate, and signature as an authentication request to the Kerberos Authentication server (see FIG. 1 ) using the current PKINIT protocols. If the PKINIT authentication protocol succeeds, a user token containing a Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT) is issued to the client 206 for subsequent use in the Kerberos-based network. The client 106 may at that time discard the temporary PKI certificate and key or key pair. The client 206 is then free to gain access to the service server 212 via further Kerberos access protocols.
- TGT Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket
- FIG. 3 is a flow diagram depicting a method 300 of using a biometric device in conjunction with an authentication system.
- the process begins by a user starting a login session of a client computer that uses a biometric identification system (step 302 ).
- an interactive process is encountered where the client computer prompts the user to provide a biometric sample.
- the biometric sampling device collects a sample passively. In either case, the client collects the users ID, personal identification number (PIN), and or password (step 304 ).
- PIN personal identification number
- password password
- a PIN and/or password adds further authority and trust to the process of collecting user credentials in a biometric sampling system because it requires the cooperation of the user and can be indicative of live data.
- a PIN or password may be required both locally by the biometric sampling device and by the remote biometric matching server.
- the biometric data collected from the user is digitally signed.
- This digital signature of the biometric data indicates that a particular biometric sampling device was used to collect the data. For example, if a biometric device data that is not recognized by the client computer is presented, the client computer can reject the biometric data based on a failure of the client to recognize the sampling device used.
- a timestamp may be added to the biometric sample to attest to the freshness of the biometric sample data. For example, if time-stale data is presented to the client computer, the client computer may reject the biometric data as being old and possibly fraudulently submitted.
- a nonce may be added along with or in lieu of a timestamp. In the instance where a timestamp and/or nonce is/are added, the digital signature may be applied to all of the collected data.
- a secure link is developed with the biometric matching server and the client computer securely transmits the collected data (step 306 ).
- the secure link may be established using a private key from the client to the biometric matching server.
- the private key used may come the biometric server if the key was given to the client in a secure transaction. Alternately, the private key could have securely provisioned by an external authority and given to the client.
- the client then uses the private key to encrypt the page a of data which includes the signed biometric data, the user ID and PIN or password, and the timestamp or nonce.
- step 308 - 316 may be performed in any logical order.
- the package of biometric data and user credentials, along with timestamp and nonce data is examined for validity.
- the user ID is checked and matched with a list of authorized users listed in the biometric matching server (step 308 ).
- the biometric matching server verifies that a user matching the identity information exists. If the user does not exist the process 300 fails and the user logon terminates.
- biometric data itself is matched (step 312 ).
- the comparison of the submitted biometric data is preferably performed against a secure template of biometric data available via the biometric matching server.
- the template information may be provisioned by any secure means known to those of skill in the art. If the biometric match does not yield a statistically significant correlation or match, the process 300 fails and the user login terminates.
- Another verification of the biometric data may be performed (step 314 ) if a timestamp or nonce was submitted or added at the time of biometric data collection.
- This timestamp or nonce data helps ensure that the biometric data obtained is fresh and not merely copied and resubmitted.
- the nonce or timestamp may be generated by the biometric sampling device itself or by the client computer.
- the timestamp or nonce data may be added as a hardware added stamp on the biometric sample data as an indication of a recently collected sample.
- the hardware may be in integrated circuit in the biometric sampling device that adds a timestamp, nonce, and/or digital signature.
- biometric data Another verification of the biometric data is the confirmation that the digital signature added by the biometric sampling device (step 316 ) authenticates the biometric device. If the biometric matching server does not recognize that the biometric sampling device indicated via the digital signature is one associate with the client computer, then the process 300 fails and the user login is terminated.
- the digital signature can also be used to verify that the biometric data and the timestamp and/or nonce have not been manipulated after generation by the sampling device.
- the biometric matching server Upon verification that the package of information given to the biometric matching server meets all of the criteria for acceptance, then keys and at least one temporary credential or certificate are generated (step 318 ).
- the biometric matching server generates a public/private key pair for use by the client.
- the public/private key pair is not limited by any specific cryptographic algorithm such as RSA, ECC, DH, or any other type as known to those of skill in the art. All types of cryptographic means compatible with the client and authentication system are useable in the present invention.
- the certificate format is not limited to X.509. The format can be XrML, ISO REL, SAML, or any other format known to those of skill in the art. All types of digital certificates may be used provided that they are compatible with the client and authentication system.
- the cryptographic keys and methods used in any connection between functions such as the client, the biometric matching server, the authentication system, and the service server may be either symmetric or asymmetric.
- the cryptographic keys used in the biometric readers, scanning or sampling devices may be provisioned during manufacture or they may be provisioned by an organization using a cryptographic key hierarchy, public key infrastructure, or other external authority.
- the cryptographic keys generated on the biometric matching server may be generated in software, they may be generated using a hardware devices such as an HSM or accelerator, they may be generated using a pre-computed list of keys loaded from an external source traceable to a key authority.
- the keys and certification are given to the client (step 320 ).
- all of the information uploaded to the biometric matching server are returned along with the keys and certification. This permits the client to have access to the user credentials (user lD, PIN, and or password) without storing the data on the client computer.
- the client can then apply the received information to the authentication system to access the desired computer resources (step 322 ).
- embodiments of the invention may vary depending on the nature of the authentication system. In one embodiment, the Kerberos authentication protocols are used.
- the client may initiate a Kerberos protocol as described above with respect to FIG. 1 .
- the client will eventually present the temporary certificate, user ID, PIN and or password, and cryptographic keys and transmit the information to a Kerberos ticket granting server to request service tickets so that access to computer resources via the protected service server is granted.
- Other embodiments may use different protocols as demanded by the needs of the specific authentication server used.
- the user ID, PIN and or password and biometric sample may be validated locally by a hardware device first prior to sending the data to the biometric matching server.
- all of the data may be collected by the client and passed to the server and validated only by the server in a secure process.
- the transmittal of a data package (step 306 ) to the biometric server also includes a public key that is part of a private/public key pair generated by the client computer 206 .
- the public key sent in the data package to the biometric server is certified by the biometric server before being sent back (step 320 ) along with a credential, such as a digital certification, to the client computer 206 .
- the functions of FIG. 2 may be combined in various forms.
- the client 206 and biometric matching server may be combined, or the authentication system 210 and the client computer may be combined, or the biometric sampler 204 and client computer 206 may be combined, or the authentication server 210 and the biometric matching server 208 may be combined.
- the functional blocks of FIG. 2 may be combined in a variety of ways, the overall function of the resulting system 200 remains intact.
- FIG. 4 and the following discussion are intended to provide a brief general description of host computer suitable for interfacing with the media storage device. While a general purpose computer is described below, this is but one single processor example, and embodiments of the host computer with multiple processors may be implemented with other computing devices, such as a client having network/bus interoperability and interaction.
- embodiments of the invention can also be implemented via an operating system, for use by a developer of services for a device or object, and/or included within application software.
- Software may be described in the general context of computer-executable instructions, such as program modules, being executed by one or more computers, such as client workstations, servers or other devices.
- program modules include routines, programs, objects, components, data structures and the like that perform particular tasks or implement particular abstract data types.
- the functionality of the program modules may be combined or distributed as desired in various embodiments.
- those skilled in the art will appreciate that various embodiments of the invention may be practiced with other computer configurations.
- PCs personal computers
- server computers hand-held or laptop devices
- multi-processor systems microprocessor-based systems
- programmable consumer electronics network PCs, appliances, lights, environmental control elements, minicomputers, mainframe computers and the like.
- program modules may be located in both local and remote computer storage media including memory storage devices and client nodes may in turn behave as server nodes.
- an exemplary system for implementing an example host computer includes a general purpose computing device in the form of a computer system 410 .
- Components of computer system 410 may include, but are not limited to, a processing unit 420 , a system memory 430 , and a system bus 421 that couples various system components including the system memory to the processing unit 420 .
- the system bus 421 may be any of several types of bus structures including a memory bus or memory controller, a peripheral bus, and a local bus using any of a variety of bus architectures.
- Computer system 410 typically includes a variety of computer readable media.
- Computer readable media can be any available media that can be accessed by computer system 410 and includes both volatile and nonvolatile media, removable and non-removable media.
- Computer readable media may comprise computer storage media.
- Computer storage media includes volatile and nonvolatile, removable and non-removable media implemented in any method or technology for storage of information such as computer readable instructions, data structures, program modules or other data.
- Computer storage media includes, but is not limited to, Random Access Memory (RAM), Read Only Memory (ROM), Electrically Erasable Programmable Read Only Memory (EEPROM), flash memory or other memory technology, Compact Disk Read Only Memory (CDROM), compact disc-rewritable (CDRW), digital versatile disks (DVD) or other optical disk storage, magnetic cassettes, magnetic tape, magnetic disk storage or other magnetic storage devices, or any other medium which can be used to store the desired information and which can accessed by computer system 410 .
- RAM Random Access Memory
- ROM Read Only Memory
- EEPROM Electrically Erasable Programmable Read Only Memory
- CDROM Compact Disk Read Only Memory
- CDDRW compact disc-rewritable
- DVD digital versatile disks
- magnetic cassettes magnetic tape
- magnetic disk storage magnetic disk storage devices
- the system memory 430 includes computer storage media in the form of volatile and/or nonvolatile memory such as read only memory (ROM) 431 and random access memory (RAM) 432 .
- ROM read only memory
- RAM random access memory
- BIOS basic input/output system 433
- RAM 432 typically contains data and/or program modules that are immediately accessible to and/or presently being operated on by processing unit 420 .
- FIG. 4 illustrates operating system 433 , application programs 435 , other program modules 436 , and program data 437 .
- the computer system 410 may also include other removable/non-removable, volatile/nonvolatile computer storage media.
- FIG. 4 illustrates a hard disk drive 431 that reads from or writes to non-removable, nonvolatile magnetic media, a magnetic disk drive 451 that reads from or writes to a removable, nonvolatile magnetic disk 452 , and an optical disk drive 455 that reads from or writes to a removable, nonvolatile optical disk 456 , such as a CD ROM, CDRW, DVD, or other optical media.
- removable/non-removable, volatile/nonvolatile computer storage media that can be used in the exemplary operating environment include, but are not limited to, magnetic tape cassettes, flash memory cards, digital versatile disks, digital video tape, solid state RAM, solid state ROM, and the like.
- the hard disk drive 441 is typically connected to the system bus 421 through a non-removable memory interface such as interface 440
- magnetic disk drive 451 and optical disk drive 455 are typically connected to the system bus 421 by a removable memory interface, such as interface 450 .
- the drives and their associated computer storage media discussed above and illustrated in FIG. 4 provide storage of computer readable instructions, data structures, program modules and other data for the computer system 410 .
- hard disk drive 441 is illustrated as storing operating system 444 , application programs 445 , other program modules 446 , and program data 447 .
- operating system 444 application programs 445 , other program modules 446 , and program data 447 .
- operating system 444 , application programs 445 , other program modules 446 , and program data 447 are given different numbers here to illustrate that, at a minimum, they are different copies.
- a user may enter commands and information into the computer system 410 through input devices such as a keyboard 462 and pointing device 461 , commonly referred to as a mouse, trackball or touch pad.
- Other input devices may include a microphone, joystick, game pad, satellite dish, scanner, or the like.
- These and other input devices are often connected to the processing unit 420 through a user input interface 460 that is coupled to the system bus 421 , but may be connected by other interface and bus structures, such as a parallel port, game port or a universal serial bus (USB).
- a monitor 491 or other type of display device is also connected to the system bus 421 via an interface, such as a video interface 490 , which may in turn communicate with video memory (not shown).
- computer systems may also include other peripheral output devices such as speakers 497 and printer 496 , which may be connected through an output peripheral interface 495 .
- the computer system 410 may operate in a networked or distributed environment using logical connections to one or more remote computers, such as a remote computer 480 .
- the remote computer 480 may be a personal computer, a server, a router, a network PC, a peer device or other common network node, and typically includes many or all of the elements described above relative to the computer system 410 , although only a memory storage device 481 has been illustrated in FIG. 4 .
- the logical connections depicted in FIG. 4 include a local area network (LAN) 471 and a wide area network (WAN) 473 , but may also include other networks/buses.
- LAN local area network
- WAN wide area network
- Such networking environments are commonplace in homes, offices, enterprise-wide computer networks, intranets and the Internet.
- the computer system 410 When used in a LAN networking environment, the computer system 410 is connected to the LAN 471 through a network interface or adapter 470 . When used in a WAN networking environment, the computer system 410 typically includes a modem 472 or other means for establishing communications over the WAN 473 , such as the Internet.
- the modem 472 which may be internal or external, may be connected to the system bus 421 via the user input interface 460 , or other appropriate mechanism.
- program modules depicted relative to the computer system 410 may be stored in the remote memory storage device.
- FIG. 4 illustrates remote application programs 485 as residing on memory device 481 . It will be appreciated that the network connections shown are exemplary and other means of establishing a communications link between the computers may be used.
- MICROSOFT®'s .NETTM platform available from Microsoft Corporation, includes servers, building-block services, such as Web-based data storage, and downloadable device software. While exemplary embodiments herein are described in connection with software residing on a computing device, one or more portions of an embodiment of the invention may also be implemented via an operating system, application programming interface (API) or a “middle man” object between any of a coprocessor, a display device and a requesting object, such that operation may be performed by, supported in or accessed via all of .NETTM's languages and services, and in other distributed computing frameworks as well.
- API application programming interface
- the various techniques described herein may be implemented in connection with hardware or software or, where appropriate, with a combination of both.
- the methods and apparatus of the invention, or certain aspects or portions thereof may take the form of program code (i.e., instructions) embodied in tangible media, such as floppy diskettes, CD-ROMs, hard drives, or any other machine-readable storage medium, wherein, when the program code is loaded into and executed by a machine, such as a computer, the machine becomes an apparatus for practicing the invention.
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US11/477,160 US20100242102A1 (en) | 2006-06-27 | 2006-06-27 | Biometric credential verification framework |
PCT/US2007/014718 WO2008091277A2 (en) | 2006-06-27 | 2007-06-25 | Biometric credential verification framework |
JP2009518201A JP2010505286A (ja) | 2006-06-27 | 2007-06-25 | バイオメトリック証明書確認フレームワーク |
CA002653615A CA2653615A1 (en) | 2006-06-27 | 2007-06-25 | Biometric credential verification framework |
KR1020087031324A KR20090041365A (ko) | 2006-06-27 | 2007-06-25 | 인증 시스템과 함께 생물학적 샘플링 장치를 사용하는 방법, 이러한 방법을 수행하기 위한 컴퓨터 실행가능 명령어를 구비하는 컴퓨터 판독가능 매체 및 인증 시스템에액세스하는 컴퓨터 시스템 |
EP07872535.5A EP2033359A4 (en) | 2006-06-27 | 2007-06-25 | Biometric credential verification framework |
MX2008015958A MX2008015958A (es) | 2006-06-27 | 2007-06-25 | Estructura de verificacion de credencial biometrica. |
AU2007345313A AU2007345313B2 (en) | 2006-06-27 | 2007-06-25 | Biometric credential verification framework |
CNA2007800246724A CN101479987A (zh) | 2006-06-27 | 2007-06-25 | 生物测定凭证验证框架 |
RU2008152118/09A RU2434340C2 (ru) | 2006-06-27 | 2007-06-25 | Инфраструктура верификации биометрических учетных данных |
NO20085023A NO20085023L (no) | 2006-06-27 | 2008-12-03 | Rammeverk for verifikasjon av biometriske akkreditiver |
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NO20085023L (no) | 2008-12-12 |
AU2007345313A1 (en) | 2008-07-31 |
WO2008091277A2 (en) | 2008-07-31 |
RU2434340C2 (ru) | 2011-11-20 |
MX2008015958A (es) | 2009-03-06 |
WO2008091277A3 (en) | 2008-12-18 |
EP2033359A2 (en) | 2009-03-11 |
CA2653615A1 (en) | 2008-07-31 |
RU2008152118A (ru) | 2010-07-10 |
EP2033359A4 (en) | 2017-05-31 |
KR20090041365A (ko) | 2009-04-28 |
CN101479987A (zh) | 2009-07-08 |
JP2010505286A (ja) | 2010-02-18 |
AU2007345313B2 (en) | 2010-12-16 |
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