US20070234067A1 - Identity verfication method using a central biometric authority - Google Patents
Identity verfication method using a central biometric authority Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- US20070234067A1 US20070234067A1 US11/761,734 US76173407A US2007234067A1 US 20070234067 A1 US20070234067 A1 US 20070234067A1 US 76173407 A US76173407 A US 76173407A US 2007234067 A1 US2007234067 A1 US 2007234067A1
- Authority
- US
- United States
- Prior art keywords
- message
- identity
- cba
- biometric
- enrollee
- Prior art date
- Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
- Abandoned
Links
Images
Classifications
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/006—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols involving public key infrastructure [PKI] trust models
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/30—Authentication, i.e. establishing the identity or authorisation of security principals
- G06F21/31—User authentication
- G06F21/32—User authentication using biometric data, e.g. fingerprints, iris scans or voiceprints
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
- H04L9/0819—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s)
- H04L9/0825—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s) using asymmetric-key encryption or public key infrastructure [PKI], e.g. key signature or public key certificates
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/321—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving a third party or a trusted authority
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3226—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using a predetermined code, e.g. password, passphrase or PIN
- H04L9/3231—Biological data, e.g. fingerprint, voice or retina
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
- H04L2209/56—Financial cryptography, e.g. electronic payment or e-cash
Definitions
- the present invention relates to an identity verification system; and, more particularly, to a method for effectively establishing the identification of users by utilizing a central biometric authority (CBA).
- CBA central biometric authority
- a public/private key infrastructure is an excellent mechanism to ensure that data remains confidential and unchanged during transit over insecure networks such as the Internet.
- the PKI is based on the premise that a user has two mathematically related numerical keys, a private key and a public key, which serve to encrypt data. It is possible to secure a message by encrypting it with a sender's private key and a receiver's public key, which is obtained from a repository known as a certificate authority (CA). The receiver can read the message by decrypting it using his private key and the sender's public key.
- CA certificate authority
- the keys used in the PKI are very long; and, the longer they are, the more secure the system is. It is not feasible, however, for a user to remember or input a long key, e.g., 64 character or longer, when the user wants to send or receive a message. To prevent unauthorized users from accessing private keys and thus falsely originating, reading or changing messages, private keys are usually protected by a secret code.
- Secret codes such as a personal identification number (PIN) and a password can be compromised through the use of various techniques well known in the art. For instance, people often choose easy to remember pins and passwords, which also make them easy to guess. Birthdays, children's names and social security numbers are among the most commonly chosen. To combat this, many organizations require that passwords be changed often, and many PINs are assigned to prevent easily guessed PINs. Unfortunately, many times this leads to people writing down the secret information, making it accessible to fraud perpetrators.
- the reliability of the PKI depends on any method used to secure the private key.
- Biometrics are more secure than secret codes; and therefore the security of the PKI can be enhanced.
- Biometrics are technologies that verify identity based upon one's physiological or behavioral characteristics, such as one's fingerprint, eye scan, voice print, hand geometry, facial image or signature. Biometrics can verify one's identity by either performing a one-to-one comparison to authenticate a submission or by performing a one-to-many comparison to identify one's submission out of a database containing a plurality of biometrics samples.
- a biometric sample is either the direct information obtained from the user, e.g., fingerprint, hand image, voice print, facial image, handwriting sample or facial image, or processed form of such information.
- a biometric sample includes one's fingerprint and a minutia template based on one's fingerprint.
- a revocation list used in the PKI is a list of certificates that have been compromised and are thus no longer valid.
- the fundamental problem with relying solely on this list to confirm that a certificate is being used by a legitimate user is that revocation lists are not immediately updated. The moment a private key is compromised it does not appear on the revocation list. No one, with the exception of the fraud perpetrator, knows that a compromise has taken place and certainly he or she will not notify the CA to add that certificate to the revocation list. In addition, once the certificate is reported as compromised, there is a time lag before the distributed lists are updated. The real value of a revocation list is to prevent repeated fraud to be perpetrated on the same certificate.
- a method for verifying the identity of one or more parties that are transmitting information comprising the steps of:
- (b) issuing, by one the parties, a second message concerning a posting to a central biometric authority (CBA), wherein the second message includes a biometric sample of the party, and the UMI, and a submission profile of the party;
- CBA central biometric authority
- (d) issuing, by the CBA, a third message including a verification result of the party.
- a method for verifying the identity of one or more parties to a transaction using biometrics whereby a third party stores the biometric templates and performs the identity verification.
- FIG. 1 is a schematic block diagram of an identity verification system in accordance with the present invention.
- FIGS. 2A-2D present drawings for illustrating implementations of a CBA in accordance with the present invention, respectively.
- FIG. 1 there is provided a schematical block diagram of an identity verification system 100 incorporating therein a method for performing biometric verifications to authenticate the identification of users in accordance with the present invention.
- a unique message identifier (UMI) block 110 establishes the identity of two parties that are involved with a message or transaction.
- the UMI block 110 has a sender/authorized transactor (AT) ID, a receiver/proxy ID, a data and time stamp and a hash value.
- the hash value is used to ensure that the message/biometric has not been altered. An additional number may be added to ensure that the UMI block 110 is indeed unique.
- a submission profile record block 120 describes to the CBA 140 the system that captured a biometric template.
- the block 120 has information on a hardware maker and model, a software maker and version number, and which sample is being submitted.
- a verification requirement record block 130 tells the CBA 140 the criteria that the sender/AT sets out for the receiver/proxy to successfully verify.
- the block 130 has a verification score being required to verify and a maximum number of attempts being allowed to attain the verification score and a minimum ESL, as defined below.
- the CBA 140 has various features as follows. First of all, an ideal candidate company to serve as the CBA 140 is a trusted independent third party with the transaction processing capability to handle a high throughput of submitted samples, perform verification on the samples, and provide verification scores. These characteristics are similar to that of a CA (Certificate Authority). As such, there is likely to be much synergy from the CA and the CBA being the same entity.
- the enrollment process involves identifying an enrollee and collecting biometrics samples. The robustness of the identification process that performs during the enrollment will dictate to what degree the enrollment can be relied upon. This robustness is qualified by an enrollment security level (ESL). Whenever a verification score is reported, the ESL of the template to which comparison is being made is also returned.
- ESL enrollment security level
- the CBA 140 will accept enrollments from other parties. Financial service providers are likely to serve among enrollment locations. During account opening, identification of customers already takes place, and therefore it would be a suitable time to enroll a new user into the CBA 140 .
- the ESL will be affected by the trustworthiness of the point of enrollment. Thus, an enrollment at a large bank would have a much higher ESL than a self-guided enrollment at home.
- enrollments may include enrollments from vendors of the same technology discipline, enrollments from different disciplines, enrollments of different biometric samples, enrollments with different ESL's, and any combination of the above.
- the actual number of enrollments for a given individual depends on their identification needs.
- EIP enrollee information profile
- This information can only be released by the permission of the enrollee, and for specific purposes. For instance, the enrollee's age may be released to gain access to a bar or to purchase alcohol or cigarettes.
- the enrollee's credit rating information may be released when applying for a new credit card or mortgage.
- Enrollee's group, group permissions, and organization affiliations may also described in the EIP. This would allow, for instance, a hotel operator to determine if someone is eligible for a corporate rate based upon the persons group or company affiliations.
- the enrollee it is possible for the enrollee to designate certain portions of his EIP as “open” to certain people or groups. This means that no submission from the enrollee is needed to access this information. For instance, an enrollee might make a list of his allergies to medicines open to anyone who is a member of the emergency room doctor group.
- the biometric template is stored in the CBA 140 .
- this activity is limited to the trusted CBA 140 .
- Biometric submissions are never shared with anyone besides the CBA 140 .
- the two parties communicating with each other never share submissions with one another.
- Biometric information shared between the parties is limited to verification scores and ratings, which are shared only via the CBA 140 .
- the enrollment templates on file with the CBA 140 are never released during standard transactions.
- the structure is analogous to the secure electronic transaction (SET) protocol for credit card transactions.
- SET secure electronic transaction
- CBA 140 is a central authority, acting as a simple entity. While the CBA 140 virtually acts as a single authority, where verification can be performed and scores returned the physical structure may be distributed. This distribution may be for performance, throughput or other reasons. Different groups offering competing CBA services may duplicate each other services and data. There may be duplicate (in whole or part) CBAs for backup purposes, e.g., disaster recovery.
- biometrics templates will be stored on portable medium such as smart cards or magnetic stripe cards. There is a need, however, to allow for easy recreation of these cards should they be lost or stolen.
- the CBA serves as a repository for these templates. As such, there may be templates on record for an enrollee that are not accessible on a normal day to day basis, but are only accessible by certain organizations to recreate lost templates. For those companies that do maintain local biometrics databases, the CBA will serve as an off site back up/hot site facility for the templates in case of data loss or system failure.
- the need for a notary public is to establish the one's identity. Such identity is currently established by relying on one's photo ID and signature. In cases where a biometric can be submitted, the service by a notary public is accomplished by the CBA 140 more effectively.
- biometric sample includes the direct sample and the template created therefrom.
- the CBA 140 architecture can function with either the biometric sample or the measurements of the sample. There are advantages and disadvantages of each. By sending the measurements of the sample, less information needs to be sent, thus requiring less transaction time and less bandwidth. By sending the entire sample, less processing power and time is required at the point of capture, and more updated extraction algorithms can be used at the CBA 140 . In addition, if the entire sample is sent, the sample can be more processed through multiple systems from different vendors.
- Verification scores are only valuable if the reader of the score knows how to interpret it.
- each biometric vendor reports scores in different ways.
- the scale is a logarithmic 0 to 1
- the scale is a linear 1 to 100.
- high scores are best, and in other low scores are best.
- a score of 75 out of an ideal 100 on a retina scan unit may carry a very different confidence level than a 75 out of an ideal 100 on a dynamic signature verification system.
- the verification score-rating table classifies vendors output into easily understandable categories.
- the objective analysis relates to the different vendors on the same scale, and the subjective analysis relates to different technologies based on their underlying performance. This analysis classifies each verification score into categories (or rating) such as “high”, “medium”, “low”, and “fail” with regard to the confidence of the match. This latter analysis is optional, and not a required aspect of the CBA 140 .
- FIGS. 2A-2D depict the embodiments, respectively.
- the first and second embodiments relate to electronic commerce and messaging and the third and fourth embodiments relate to face to face transactions.
- a sample transaction is a customer sending a message to their bank to wire transfer money into their stockbroker's account.
- a sender generates a message to a receiver.
- the message includes the substantive message? and the UMI.
- the sender generates a message relating to a posting to the CBA.
- This message includes the sender's biometrics sample, the UMI, and the sender's submission profile record.
- An aging off to expiration scheme can be implemented to remove unclaimed posting after a predetermined amount of time. Note that in actual implementation, process at the receiver side may automate a seamless verification of every message regardless of content.
- Receiver generates a message relating to a receiver posting to the CBA, the message including only the UMI, as received from the sender's message.
- the CBA generates a reply to a receiver's posting including only the sender's verification results.
- the second embodiment of the invention is provided, wherein a method to verify the identity of both the sender and the receiver of a message is described.
- a sample transaction is someone sending a secure message to an important client.
- a synchronous or secret key is created for the transaction by the sender, and held from the receiver until they have been biometrically identified to the satisfaction of the sender.
- a sender generates a message to a receiver.
- the message includes the substantive message encrypted with a synchronous key and the UMI.
- the sender generates a message relating to a posting to the CBA.
- This message includes the sender's biometrics sample, the UMI, the sender's submission profile record, the synchronous key used in step, and the verification requirements record.
- the receiver generates a message relating to a receiver posting to the CBA including the UMI, as received from the sender's message and the receiver's biometric sample.
- the CBA generates a reply to the receiver's posting to CBA including the sender's verification results and the synchronous key to decrypt the message.
- a sample transaction is a credit card transaction at point of sale, a cash withdrawal at an ATM or teller window, or someone picking up their car at the mechanics shop.
- the POT operator e.g., cashier
- This message includes the authorized transactor (AT)'s claimed identity, the AT's biometric sample and the POT submission profile record.
- the CBA compares the biometric sample from the step 31 to that registered on the AT and generates the reply to the POT posting. This message includes only the AT's verification score/rating.
- a sample transaction includes a proxy going to a day care center to pick up an AT's child.
- the AT generates a message relating to a proxy authorization posting, including their biometric sample, the UMI, the submission profile record, an instruction block and the verification requirements record.
- the instruction block is a message to the POT operator as to what the proxy should be allowed to do on their behalf.
- the instruction block will usually contain expiration data in addition to the allowed actions.
- the POT operator generates a message relating to a POT posting to the CBA, including the proxy's claimed ID, the proxy's biometrics sample, and the POT submission profile record.
- the CBA generates a reply to the POT posting, which includes the AT's name and verification results and the instruction block.
- the CBA serves as a point of verification for any transaction where identity must be established. Additionally, an authorized transactor can designate another person as their proxy to carry out a transaction. Furthermore, the need for each company to build and maintain local databases of biometric enrollments and process verifications are reduced. And since biometrics samples and templates are not shared with anyone except the trusted CBA, privacy is increased. Finally, there is an ability to determine the authority of an individual to perform a specific transaction, by consulting the enrollee information profile.
Landscapes
- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
- Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
- Signal Processing (AREA)
- Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
- General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Software Systems (AREA)
- Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
- Health & Medical Sciences (AREA)
- Life Sciences & Earth Sciences (AREA)
- Biodiversity & Conservation Biology (AREA)
- Biomedical Technology (AREA)
- General Health & Medical Sciences (AREA)
- Collating Specific Patterns (AREA)
- Financial Or Insurance-Related Operations Such As Payment And Settlement (AREA)
Abstract
A method performs biometric verifications to authenticate the identification of users using a central biometric authority (CBA). This allows parties to an electronic transaction to be assured of each other's identity. Specifically, at the sender side, a first message to a receiver is generated, wherein the first message includes a message text and a unique message identifier (UMI). At the sender side, a second message concerning a posting to the CBA is also generated, wherein the second message includes the sender's biometric sample, the UMI, and the sender's submission profile record. At a receiver side, it is decided that if a receiver wishes to verify the sender's identity and if so, the first message is automatically verified. At the receiver side, a third message concerning a receiver's posting to the CBA is issued, the third message including only the UMI, as received from the sender side. Finally, at the CBA, a reply to the third message is provided, the reply including the sender's verification result.
Description
- The present invention relates to an identity verification system; and, more particularly, to a method for effectively establishing the identification of users by utilizing a central biometric authority (CBA).
- It is known that a public/private key infrastructure (PKI) is an excellent mechanism to ensure that data remains confidential and unchanged during transit over insecure networks such as the Internet. The PKI is based on the premise that a user has two mathematically related numerical keys, a private key and a public key, which serve to encrypt data. It is possible to secure a message by encrypting it with a sender's private key and a receiver's public key, which is obtained from a repository known as a certificate authority (CA). The receiver can read the message by decrypting it using his private key and the sender's public key.
- The keys used in the PKI are very long; and, the longer they are, the more secure the system is. It is not feasible, however, for a user to remember or input a long key, e.g., 64 character or longer, when the user wants to send or receive a message. To prevent unauthorized users from accessing private keys and thus falsely originating, reading or changing messages, private keys are usually protected by a secret code.
- Secret codes such as a personal identification number (PIN) and a password can be compromised through the use of various techniques well known in the art. For instance, people often choose easy to remember pins and passwords, which also make them easy to guess. Birthdays, children's names and social security numbers are among the most commonly chosen. To combat this, many organizations require that passwords be changed often, and many PINs are assigned to prevent easily guessed PINs. Unfortunately, many times this leads to people writing down the secret information, making it accessible to fraud perpetrators.
- Shoulder surfing is also a known technique that can be used to compromise secret codes. This simply involves a fraud perpetrator watching over the shoulder of the person entering the code as a secret code is entered.
- Also brute force attacks can compromise secret codes. This method simply involves rapidly entering many codes, until the secret one is stumbled upon. Long codes, mixing letters and numbers and frequent changing of codes can prevent the success of brute force attempts. Additionally, systems locking up after a predefined number of incorrect password attempts can prevent the success of brute force attacks.
- If the private key is compromised by one of the various techniques, then it is no longer possible to ensure that information is kept confidential and unchanged. Therefore, the reliability of the PKI depends on any method used to secure the private key.
- Various techniques have been suggested to enhance the performance of the PKI, such as securing the private key with biometrics instead of secret codes. Biometrics are more secure than secret codes; and therefore the security of the PKI can be enhanced. Biometrics are technologies that verify identity based upon one's physiological or behavioral characteristics, such as one's fingerprint, eye scan, voice print, hand geometry, facial image or signature. Biometrics can verify one's identity by either performing a one-to-one comparison to authenticate a submission or by performing a one-to-many comparison to identify one's submission out of a database containing a plurality of biometrics samples. A biometric sample is either the direct information obtained from the user, e.g., fingerprint, hand image, voice print, facial image, handwriting sample or facial image, or processed form of such information. For example, a biometric sample includes one's fingerprint and a minutia template based on one's fingerprint. By securing the private key with a biometric, the sender can assure the integrity of the private key so that a message using it will not be fraudulently originated. Likewise, a receiver protecting his private key with a biometric can rest assured that no one will be able to read the message that is intended for his eyes only. Only after a local verification of the biometric submission releases a local private key, the message can be originated or read.
- However, even with a biometrically protected private key, neither party is assured that biometric authentication is processed on the other end. That is, the sender is not assured that the intended receiver is reading the message and the receiver is not assured that the intended sender sent the message. For example, neither party is assured that the other party uses a biometric, instead of a secrete code to protect the private key. There are myriad problems with one party relying on the other to use a biometric system to secure the private key. Neither party can be certain that other party has installed a biometric system on its computer; nor can they be certain that the other party's private key is securely protected by the biometric.
- Furthermore, there is no quality control over enrollment. That is, there is no way to ensure that samples submitted during enrollment belong to a claimed enrollee. And a fake sample could have been enrolled. Additionally, neither party has any control over the environment of other party's computer. In other words, there could be a network of supercomputers working to hack into the biometrically protected key. Dozens of attempts might be made before a sample is falsely verified.
- If the sender and the receiver know with certainty that the other's private keys are being secured with a biometric, and if they could receive, interpret and rely on a biometric verification score, then the process would be secure. In addition, there are different disciplines of biometrics (e.g., voice verification, finger scanning, iris scanning, retina scanning, hand geometry), and many vendors within each of these disciplines, each having its own accuracy levels. There is currently no infrastructure for interpreting the verification score of each of these vendors. As such, if the receiver learns that the sender is verified on a biometric system from a vendor with a score of 75, they would have difficulty in determining if this was a good match. Finally, there is no way for a sender or receiver to ensure that the results of a biometric comparison are in fact legitimate. Because in the conventional approach all biometric verifications are performed on local machines, there is no assurance that the biometric verification is processed as it should.
- A revocation list used in the PKI is a list of certificates that have been compromised and are thus no longer valid. The fundamental problem with relying solely on this list to confirm that a certificate is being used by a legitimate user is that revocation lists are not immediately updated. The moment a private key is compromised it does not appear on the revocation list. No one, with the exception of the fraud perpetrator, knows that a compromise has taken place and certainly he or she will not notify the CA to add that certificate to the revocation list. In addition, once the certificate is reported as compromised, there is a time lag before the distributed lists are updated. The real value of a revocation list is to prevent repeated fraud to be perpetrated on the same certificate.
- Without the CBA infrastructure, individual institutions will have to maintain local databases of biometric enrollments. There are a number of problems with this scenario. First, there is a large overhead for a typical company to create and maintain a biometric enrollment for each customer. This includes the cost and time to properly identify each enrollee, train each enrollee on proper system use, etc. Second, customers may trust a company enough to buy from them, but may not want to enroll in their biometric system. Third, there are a number of bills pending relating to the use of such local databases. Companies risk losing the right to use their database in the manner they intend, or having a databases or related processes that do not comply with new laws. There could be substantial overhead in restructuring databases to comply with new laws. There are liability issues with maintaining databases of enrollments. It is preferable for companies avoid such risks and not maintain an internal biometric database.
- It is, therefore, a primary object of the present invention to provide a method capable of improving the performance of an identity verification system by verifying the identification of users using a CBA.
- In accordance with one aspect of the present invention, there is provided a method for verifying the identity of one or more parties that are transmitting information, comprising the steps of:
- (a) generating, on the sender side, a first message to the receiver, wherein the first message includes a substantive message to be transmitted and a unique message identifier (UMI);
- (b) issuing, by one the parties, a second message concerning a posting to a central biometric authority (CBA), wherein the second message includes a biometric sample of the party, and the UMI, and a submission profile of the party;
- (c) providing, at the CBA, verification of the party's biometric sample; and
- (d) issuing, by the CBA, a third message including a verification result of the party.
- In accordance with another aspect of the present invention, there is provided A method for verifying the identity of one or more parties to a transaction using biometrics whereby a third party stores the biometric templates and performs the identity verification.
- The above and other objects and features of the present invention will become apparent from the following description of preferred embodiments given in conjunction with the accompanying drawings, in which:
-
FIG. 1 is a schematic block diagram of an identity verification system in accordance with the present invention; and -
FIGS. 2A-2D present drawings for illustrating implementations of a CBA in accordance with the present invention, respectively. - Referring to
FIG. 1 , there is provided a schematical block diagram of anidentity verification system 100 incorporating therein a method for performing biometric verifications to authenticate the identification of users in accordance with the present invention. - A unique message identifier (UMI) block 110 establishes the identity of two parties that are involved with a message or transaction. The
UMI block 110 has a sender/authorized transactor (AT) ID, a receiver/proxy ID, a data and time stamp and a hash value. The hash value is used to ensure that the message/biometric has not been altered. An additional number may be added to ensure that theUMI block 110 is indeed unique. - A submission
profile record block 120 describes to theCBA 140 the system that captured a biometric template. Theblock 120 has information on a hardware maker and model, a software maker and version number, and which sample is being submitted. - A verification
requirement record block 130 tells theCBA 140 the criteria that the sender/AT sets out for the receiver/proxy to successfully verify. Theblock 130 has a verification score being required to verify and a maximum number of attempts being allowed to attain the verification score and a minimum ESL, as defined below. - The
CBA 140 has various features as follows. First of all, an ideal candidate company to serve as theCBA 140 is a trusted independent third party with the transaction processing capability to handle a high throughput of submitted samples, perform verification on the samples, and provide verification scores. These characteristics are similar to that of a CA (Certificate Authority). As such, there is likely to be much synergy from the CA and the CBA being the same entity. In theCBA 140, the enrollment process involves identifying an enrollee and collecting biometrics samples. The robustness of the identification process that performs during the enrollment will dictate to what degree the enrollment can be relied upon. This robustness is qualified by an enrollment security level (ESL). Whenever a verification score is reported, the ESL of the template to which comparison is being made is also returned. - In a preferred embodiment of the invention, it is likely that the
CBA 140 will accept enrollments from other parties. Financial service providers are likely to serve among enrollment locations. During account opening, identification of customers already takes place, and therefore it would be a suitable time to enroll a new user into theCBA 140. The ESL will be affected by the trustworthiness of the point of enrollment. Thus, an enrollment at a large bank would have a much higher ESL than a self-guided enrollment at home. - In a preferred embodiment of the invention, it is likely that a single user will have multiple enrollment templates on file at the
CBA 140. These enrollments may include enrollments from vendors of the same technology discipline, enrollments from different disciplines, enrollments of different biometric samples, enrollments with different ESL's, and any combination of the above. The actual number of enrollments for a given individual depends on their identification needs. - In addition to the templates, additional information or pointers to information can be maintained in the enrollee information profile (EIP). This information can only be released by the permission of the enrollee, and for specific purposes. For instance, the enrollee's age may be released to gain access to a bar or to purchase alcohol or cigarettes.
- The enrollee's credit rating information may be released when applying for a new credit card or mortgage. Enrollee's group, group permissions, and organization affiliations may also described in the EIP. This would allow, for instance, a hotel operator to determine if someone is eligible for a corporate rate based upon the persons group or company affiliations.
- It is possible for the enrollee to designate certain portions of his EIP as “open” to certain people or groups. This means that no submission from the enrollee is needed to access this information. For instance, an enrollee might make a list of his allergies to medicines open to anyone who is a member of the emergency room doctor group.
- When a user enrolls into the
CBA 140, the biometric template is stored in theCBA 140. Instead of multiple organizations (every organization that a customer does business with) having biometric enrollments and processing each submission, this activity is limited to the trustedCBA 140. Biometric submissions are never shared with anyone besides theCBA 140. The two parties communicating with each other never share submissions with one another. Biometric information shared between the parties is limited to verification scores and ratings, which are shared only via theCBA 140. The enrollment templates on file with theCBA 140 are never released during standard transactions. The structure is analogous to the secure electronic transaction (SET) protocol for credit card transactions. In the SET framework, a merchant never sees the credit card number of a customer, only the approval that the credit card is valid and sufficient credit is available. In the same way, with CBA, biometric submissions are never shared between parties, only the approval that verification took place is shared. - It is also possible for an enrollee to designate another person or persons as a proxy for themselves. This may be a full function proxy, or limited to specific transactions. A permanent proxy authorization posting is made, which grants the permissions. Such proxies, in most cases, can be revoked. By definition, the
CBA 140 is a central authority, acting as a simple entity. While theCBA 140 virtually acts as a single authority, where verification can be performed and scores returned the physical structure may be distributed. This distribution may be for performance, throughput or other reasons. Different groups offering competing CBA services may duplicate each other services and data. There may be duplicate (in whole or part) CBAs for backup purposes, e.g., disaster recovery. - For off-line transactions, biometrics templates will be stored on portable medium such as smart cards or magnetic stripe cards. There is a need, however, to allow for easy recreation of these cards should they be lost or stolen. The CBA serves as a repository for these templates. As such, there may be templates on record for an enrollee that are not accessible on a normal day to day basis, but are only accessible by certain organizations to recreate lost templates. For those companies that do maintain local biometrics databases, the CBA will serve as an off site back up/hot site facility for the templates in case of data loss or system failure.
- The need for a notary public is to establish the one's identity. Such identity is currently established by relying on one's photo ID and signature. In cases where a biometric can be submitted, the service by a notary public is accomplished by the
CBA 140 more effectively. - After collecting a biometric sample, features are extracted to create the biometric data (sometimes referred to a template). The term “biometric sample” includes the direct sample and the template created therefrom. The
CBA 140 architecture can function with either the biometric sample or the measurements of the sample. There are advantages and disadvantages of each. By sending the measurements of the sample, less information needs to be sent, thus requiring less transaction time and less bandwidth. By sending the entire sample, less processing power and time is required at the point of capture, and more updated extraction algorithms can be used at theCBA 140. In addition, if the entire sample is sent, the sample can be more processed through multiple systems from different vendors. - Verification scores are only valuable if the reader of the score knows how to interpret it. Unfortunately, each biometric vendor reports scores in different ways. In some cases the scale is a logarithmic 0 to 1, in other cases the scale is a linear 1 to 100. In some cases, high scores are best, and in other low scores are best. Even when the same relative scales are used, different technologies and different vendors have different accuracy levels. Thus, a score of 75 out of an ideal 100 on a retina scan unit may carry a very different confidence level than a 75 out of an ideal 100 on a dynamic signature verification system. As such, the verification score-rating table classifies vendors output into easily understandable categories. The objective analysis relates to the different vendors on the same scale, and the subjective analysis relates to different technologies based on their underlying performance. This analysis classifies each verification score into categories (or rating) such as “high”, “medium”, “low”, and “fail” with regard to the confidence of the match. This latter analysis is optional, and not a required aspect of the
CBA 140. - Hereinafter, four embodiments of the
CBA 140 will be illustratively provided in detail with reference toFIGS. 2A-2D , which depict the embodiments, respectively. The first and second embodiments relate to electronic commerce and messaging and the third and fourth embodiments relate to face to face transactions. - Specifically, in a first embodiment of the present invention, a method to verify the identity only of the sender of a message is described. A sample transaction is a customer sending a message to their bank to wire transfer money into their stockbroker's account.
- With reference to
FIG. 2A , atstep 11, a sender generates a message to a receiver. The message includes the substantive message? and the UMI. - Meanwhile, at
step 12, the sender generates a message relating to a posting to the CBA. This message includes the sender's biometrics sample, the UMI, and the sender's submission profile record. Atstep 13, it is necessary to take place only if the receiver desires verification of the sender's identity. In many cases (low risk level involved with message communication, low chance of suspected fraud, junk e-mail, etc.) this verification may not be desired, and the CBA process may never be completed. In this case, thestep 12 will remain “unclaimed”. An aging off to expiration scheme can be implemented to remove unclaimed posting after a predetermined amount of time. Note that in actual implementation, process at the receiver side may automate a seamless verification of every message regardless of content. - Receiver generates a message relating to a receiver posting to the CBA, the message including only the UMI, as received from the sender's message. At
step 14, the CBA generates a reply to a receiver's posting including only the sender's verification results. - With reference to
FIG. 2B , the second embodiment of the invention is provided, wherein a method to verify the identity of both the sender and the receiver of a message is described. A sample transaction is someone sending a secure message to an important client. To accomplish this, a synchronous or secret key is created for the transaction by the sender, and held from the receiver until they have been biometrically identified to the satisfaction of the sender. - Specifically, at
step 21, a sender generates a message to a receiver. The message includes the substantive message encrypted with a synchronous key and the UMI. - Meanwhile, at
step 22, the sender generates a message relating to a posting to the CBA. This message includes the sender's biometrics sample, the UMI, the sender's submission profile record, the synchronous key used in step, and the verification requirements record. Atstep 23, the receiver generates a message relating to a receiver posting to the CBA including the UMI, as received from the sender's message and the receiver's biometric sample. Atstep 24, the CBA generates a reply to the receiver's posting to CBA including the sender's verification results and the synchronous key to decrypt the message. - Referring now to
FIG. 2C , the third embodiment of the invention is given, wherein a method to verify the identity of a person presenting themselves to complete any face-to-face transaction (authorized transactor or AT). A sample transaction is a credit card transaction at point of sale, a cash withdrawal at an ATM or teller window, or someone picking up their car at the mechanics shop. - Specifically, at
step 31, at a point of transaction (POT) the POT operator (e.g., cashier) issues a message relating to a POT posting to CBA. This message includes the authorized transactor (AT)'s claimed identity, the AT's biometric sample and the POT submission profile record. Atstep 32, the CBA compares the biometric sample from thestep 31 to that registered on the AT and generates the reply to the POT posting. This message includes only the AT's verification score/rating. - Referring to
FIG. 2D , the fourth embodiment of the invention is provided, wherein a method to verify the identity of someone who is standing in as a proxy for an authorized transactor is illustrated. A sample transaction includes a proxy going to a day care center to pick up an AT's child. Specifically, atstep 41, the AT generates a message relating to a proxy authorization posting, including their biometric sample, the UMI, the submission profile record, an instruction block and the verification requirements record. The instruction block is a message to the POT operator as to what the proxy should be allowed to do on their behalf. The instruction block will usually contain expiration data in addition to the allowed actions. Atstep 42, the POT operator generates a message relating to a POT posting to the CBA, including the proxy's claimed ID, the proxy's biometrics sample, and the POT submission profile record. Atstep 43, the CBA generates a reply to the POT posting, which includes the AT's name and verification results and the instruction block. - As may be seen from the above, by centralizing the verification of the sender's and/or receiver's biometrics sample, each can be assured as to the other's identity. Since there is control over the enrollment and verification conditions at the CBA, verification can safely be interpreted as an assurance of identity. In addition, since a message specific key as well as the PKI private keys is used, the concerns of non-biometrically protected copies of private keys are mitigated. Finally, by using conversion tables, users of different biometric systems can set minimum verification thresholds for users of systems different from their own. While it is not essential for a CBA system to be used in conjunction with a PKI, all embodiments of the present invention to be described later use a CBA in addition to a PKI. It is recognized that, although PKI and CBA work very well together, they may be used independently.
- Prior to the CBA, there has been little work to establish an infrastructure to automate the exchange of biometric samples for day to day identification needs. The CBA serves as a point of verification for any transaction where identity must be established. Additionally, an authorized transactor can designate another person as their proxy to carry out a transaction. Furthermore, the need for each company to build and maintain local databases of biometric enrollments and process verifications are reduced. And since biometrics samples and templates are not shared with anyone except the trusted CBA, privacy is increased. Finally, there is an ability to determine the authority of an individual to perform a specific transaction, by consulting the enrollee information profile.
- While the present invention has been shown and described with respect to the particular embodiments, it will be apparent to those skilled in the art that many changes and modifications may be made without departing from the spirit and scope of the invention as defined in the appended claims.
Claims (2)
1. An identity verification system comprising:
a) data storage;
b) at least one database of biometric data related to biometric samples obtained from enrollees during an enrollment process, said at least one database stored in said data storage, and said biometric data accessible in said at least one database using a non-private code;
c) at least one incoming identity verification request message processor for receiving an electronic request to verify the identity of an enrollee, said incoming identity verification request message including biometric data about the enrollee whose identity is to be verified, and a non-private code chosen by the enrollee at the time of enrollment;
d) a biometric data comparator in communication with the at least one incoming identity verification request message processor and with said data storage, said comparator accessing the at least one database of biometric data, and using the non-private code in the incoming identity verification request message, making a comparison of the biometric data in the incoming message with the biometric data in the at least one database corresponding to the enrollee's non-private code and scoring the comparison; and
e) at least one outgoing identity verification request message processor for communicating the results of said comparison to a party interested in verifying the identity of the enrollee.
2. An identity verification method comprising:
a) creating at least one database of biometric data related to biometric samples obtained from enrollees during the enrollment process, said biometric data accessible in said at least one database using a non-private code;
b) receiving at least one electronic request to verify the identity of an enrollee, said incoming identity verification request message including biometric data about the enrollee whose identity is to be verified, and a non-private code chosen by the enrollee at the time of enrollment;
c) comparing the biometric data in the incoming message with the biometric data in the at least one database corresponding to the enrollee's non-private code,
d) scoring the comparison; and
e) communicating the results of said comparison to a party interested in verifying the identity of the enrollee.
Priority Applications (1)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
US11/761,734 US20070234067A1 (en) | 1999-05-14 | 2007-06-12 | Identity verfication method using a central biometric authority |
Applications Claiming Priority (3)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
US09/311,928 US6928546B1 (en) | 1998-05-14 | 1999-05-14 | Identity verification method using a central biometric authority |
US11/153,221 US7246244B2 (en) | 1999-05-14 | 2005-06-15 | Identity verification method using a central biometric authority |
US11/761,734 US20070234067A1 (en) | 1999-05-14 | 2007-06-12 | Identity verfication method using a central biometric authority |
Related Parent Applications (2)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
---|---|---|---|
US09/311,928 Continuation US6928546B1 (en) | 1998-05-14 | 1999-05-14 | Identity verification method using a central biometric authority |
US11/153,221 Continuation US7246244B2 (en) | 1999-05-14 | 2005-06-15 | Identity verification method using a central biometric authority |
Publications (1)
Publication Number | Publication Date |
---|---|
US20070234067A1 true US20070234067A1 (en) | 2007-10-04 |
Family
ID=35240729
Family Applications (2)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
---|---|---|---|
US11/153,221 Expired - Lifetime US7246244B2 (en) | 1999-05-14 | 2005-06-15 | Identity verification method using a central biometric authority |
US11/761,734 Abandoned US20070234067A1 (en) | 1999-05-14 | 2007-06-12 | Identity verfication method using a central biometric authority |
Family Applications Before (1)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
---|---|---|---|
US11/153,221 Expired - Lifetime US7246244B2 (en) | 1999-05-14 | 2005-06-15 | Identity verification method using a central biometric authority |
Country Status (1)
Country | Link |
---|---|
US (2) | US7246244B2 (en) |
Cited By (8)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
US20040014457A1 (en) * | 2001-12-20 | 2004-01-22 | Stevens Lawrence A. | Systems and methods for storage of user information and for verifying user identity |
US20040236694A1 (en) * | 2001-06-18 | 2004-11-25 | Oliver Tattan | Electronic data vault providing biometrically protected electronic signatures |
US20080209226A1 (en) * | 2007-02-28 | 2008-08-28 | Microsoft Corporation | User Authentication Via Biometric Hashing |
US20080209227A1 (en) * | 2007-02-28 | 2008-08-28 | Microsoft Corporation | User Authentication Via Biometric Hashing |
US20100205425A1 (en) * | 2009-02-11 | 2010-08-12 | Kristof Takacs | Multi-level data storage |
US20130173466A1 (en) * | 2011-12-28 | 2013-07-04 | Nokia Corporation | Method and apparatus for utilizing recognition data in conducting transactions |
US9118674B2 (en) | 2012-11-26 | 2015-08-25 | Bank Of America Corporation | Methods and processes for storing and utilizing state information for service providers |
US10341112B2 (en) * | 2014-03-21 | 2019-07-02 | Koninklijke Philips N.V. | Soft generation of biometric candidates and references based on empirical bit error probability |
Families Citing this family (75)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
US6950810B2 (en) * | 1994-11-28 | 2005-09-27 | Indivos Corporation | Tokenless biometric electronic financial transactions via a third party identicator |
US7343351B1 (en) | 1999-08-31 | 2008-03-11 | American Express Travel Related Services Company, Inc. | Methods and apparatus for conducting electronic transactions |
US7953671B2 (en) | 1999-08-31 | 2011-05-31 | American Express Travel Related Services Company, Inc. | Methods and apparatus for conducting electronic transactions |
US7889052B2 (en) | 2001-07-10 | 2011-02-15 | Xatra Fund Mx, Llc | Authorizing payment subsequent to RF transactions |
US9613483B2 (en) | 2000-12-27 | 2017-04-04 | Proxense, Llc | Personal digital key and receiver/decoder circuit system and method |
US7725427B2 (en) | 2001-05-25 | 2010-05-25 | Fred Bishop | Recurrent billing maintenance with radio frequency payment devices |
US7360689B2 (en) | 2001-07-10 | 2008-04-22 | American Express Travel Related Services Company, Inc. | Method and system for proffering multiple biometrics for use with a FOB |
US7303120B2 (en) | 2001-07-10 | 2007-12-04 | American Express Travel Related Services Company, Inc. | System for biometric security using a FOB |
US20040236699A1 (en) | 2001-07-10 | 2004-11-25 | American Express Travel Related Services Company, Inc. | Method and system for hand geometry recognition biometrics on a fob |
US9024719B1 (en) | 2001-07-10 | 2015-05-05 | Xatra Fund Mx, Llc | RF transaction system and method for storing user personal data |
US7705732B2 (en) | 2001-07-10 | 2010-04-27 | Fred Bishop | Authenticating an RF transaction using a transaction counter |
US7249112B2 (en) | 2002-07-09 | 2007-07-24 | American Express Travel Related Services Company, Inc. | System and method for assigning a funding source for a radio frequency identification device |
US7735725B1 (en) | 2001-07-10 | 2010-06-15 | Fred Bishop | Processing an RF transaction using a routing number |
US8001054B1 (en) | 2001-07-10 | 2011-08-16 | American Express Travel Related Services Company, Inc. | System and method for generating an unpredictable number using a seeded algorithm |
US7668750B2 (en) | 2001-07-10 | 2010-02-23 | David S Bonalle | Securing RF transactions using a transactions counter |
US8548927B2 (en) | 2001-07-10 | 2013-10-01 | Xatra Fund Mx, Llc | Biometric registration for facilitating an RF transaction |
US9031880B2 (en) | 2001-07-10 | 2015-05-12 | Iii Holdings 1, Llc | Systems and methods for non-traditional payment using biometric data |
US8294552B2 (en) | 2001-07-10 | 2012-10-23 | Xatra Fund Mx, Llc | Facial scan biometrics on a payment device |
US8279042B2 (en) | 2001-07-10 | 2012-10-02 | Xatra Fund Mx, Llc | Iris scan biometrics on a payment device |
US9454752B2 (en) | 2001-07-10 | 2016-09-27 | Chartoleaux Kg Limited Liability Company | Reload protocol at a transaction processing entity |
US7464059B1 (en) | 2001-09-21 | 2008-12-09 | Yt Acquisition Corporation | System and method for purchase benefits at a point of sale |
US7269737B2 (en) | 2001-09-21 | 2007-09-11 | Pay By Touch Checking Resources, Inc. | System and method for biometric authorization for financial transactions |
US9189788B1 (en) | 2001-09-21 | 2015-11-17 | Open Invention Network, Llc | System and method for verifying identity |
US7437330B1 (en) | 2002-09-20 | 2008-10-14 | Yt Acquisition Corp. | System and method for categorizing transactions |
US6805287B2 (en) | 2002-09-12 | 2004-10-19 | American Express Travel Related Services Company, Inc. | System and method for converting a stored value card to a credit card |
US9020854B2 (en) | 2004-03-08 | 2015-04-28 | Proxense, Llc | Linked account system using personal digital key (PDK-LAS) |
US20080184272A1 (en) * | 2004-06-16 | 2008-07-31 | Brownewell Michael L | Documentation system for loss control |
US7318550B2 (en) | 2004-07-01 | 2008-01-15 | American Express Travel Related Services Company, Inc. | Biometric safeguard method for use with a smartcard |
US20060016868A1 (en) * | 2004-07-01 | 2006-01-26 | American Express Travel Related Services Company, Inc. | Method and system for hand geometry recognition biometrics on a smartcard |
US7107220B2 (en) * | 2004-07-30 | 2006-09-12 | Sbc Knowledge Ventures, L.P. | Centralized biometric authentication |
AU2005319019A1 (en) | 2004-12-20 | 2006-06-29 | Proxense, Llc | Biometric personal data key (PDK) authentication |
US8234494B1 (en) * | 2005-12-21 | 2012-07-31 | At&T Intellectual Property Ii, L.P. | Speaker-verification digital signatures |
US8271769B2 (en) * | 2005-12-30 | 2012-09-18 | Sap Ag | Dynamic adaptation of a configuration to a system environment |
US8219129B2 (en) | 2006-01-06 | 2012-07-10 | Proxense, Llc | Dynamic real-time tiered client access |
US11206664B2 (en) | 2006-01-06 | 2021-12-21 | Proxense, Llc | Wireless network synchronization of cells and client devices on a network |
US20070214364A1 (en) * | 2006-03-07 | 2007-09-13 | Roberts Nicole A | Dual layer authentication system for securing user access to remote systems and associated methods |
US7904718B2 (en) | 2006-05-05 | 2011-03-08 | Proxense, Llc | Personal digital key differentiation for secure transactions |
US20080066188A1 (en) * | 2006-08-08 | 2008-03-13 | Dusic Kwak | Identity verification system |
US9269221B2 (en) | 2006-11-13 | 2016-02-23 | John J. Gobbi | Configuration of interfaces for a location detection system and application |
US7933835B2 (en) * | 2007-01-17 | 2011-04-26 | The Western Union Company | Secure money transfer systems and methods using biometric keys associated therewith |
US8818904B2 (en) | 2007-01-17 | 2014-08-26 | The Western Union Company | Generation systems and methods for transaction identifiers having biometric keys associated therewith |
US8660966B2 (en) * | 2007-08-31 | 2014-02-25 | Microsoft Corporation | Payment system and method |
US8346657B1 (en) | 2007-10-25 | 2013-01-01 | United Services Automobile Association (Usaa) | Systems and methods for implementing a reverse mortgage |
WO2009062194A1 (en) | 2007-11-09 | 2009-05-14 | Proxense, Llc | Proximity-sensor supporting multiple application services |
US8171528B1 (en) | 2007-12-06 | 2012-05-01 | Proxense, Llc | Hybrid device having a personal digital key and receiver-decoder circuit and methods of use |
US8886952B1 (en) | 2007-12-06 | 2014-11-11 | The United States Of America As Represented By The Director Of The National Security Agency | Method of controlling a transaction |
WO2009079666A1 (en) | 2007-12-19 | 2009-06-25 | Proxense, Llc | Security system and method for controlling access to computing resources |
WO2009102979A2 (en) | 2008-02-14 | 2009-08-20 | Proxense, Llc | Proximity-based healthcare management system with automatic access to private information |
WO2009126732A2 (en) | 2008-04-08 | 2009-10-15 | Proxense, Llc | Automated service-based order processing |
US20100161468A1 (en) * | 2008-12-18 | 2010-06-24 | Hickman Justin A | Systems and methods for authenticating parties engaging in a financial transaction |
US7865937B1 (en) | 2009-08-05 | 2011-01-04 | Daon Holdings Limited | Methods and systems for authenticating users |
US8443202B2 (en) | 2009-08-05 | 2013-05-14 | Daon Holdings Limited | Methods and systems for authenticating users |
US7685629B1 (en) | 2009-08-05 | 2010-03-23 | Daon Holdings Limited | Methods and systems for authenticating users |
US9418205B2 (en) | 2010-03-15 | 2016-08-16 | Proxense, Llc | Proximity-based system for automatic application or data access and item tracking |
US8826030B2 (en) | 2010-03-22 | 2014-09-02 | Daon Holdings Limited | Methods and systems for authenticating users |
BR112012026380A2 (en) * | 2010-04-16 | 2016-08-02 | Nokia Siemens Networks Oy | virtual identities |
WO2011149558A2 (en) | 2010-05-28 | 2011-12-01 | Abelow Daniel H | Reality alternate |
US8918854B1 (en) | 2010-07-15 | 2014-12-23 | Proxense, Llc | Proximity-based system for automatic application initialization |
US8857716B1 (en) | 2011-02-21 | 2014-10-14 | Proxense, Llc | Implementation of a proximity-based system for object tracking and automatic application initialization |
US8655027B1 (en) | 2011-03-25 | 2014-02-18 | The United States of America, as represented by the Director, National Security Agency | Method of image-based user authentication |
US9959539B2 (en) | 2012-06-29 | 2018-05-01 | Apple Inc. | Continual authorization for secured functions |
US9832189B2 (en) | 2012-06-29 | 2017-11-28 | Apple Inc. | Automatic association of authentication credentials with biometrics |
US10212158B2 (en) | 2012-06-29 | 2019-02-19 | Apple Inc. | Automatic association of authentication credentials with biometrics |
US9819676B2 (en) | 2012-06-29 | 2017-11-14 | Apple Inc. | Biometric capture for unauthorized user identification |
US9094388B2 (en) | 2013-05-01 | 2015-07-28 | Dmitri Tkachev | Methods and systems for identifying, verifying, and authenticating an identity |
WO2014183106A2 (en) | 2013-05-10 | 2014-11-13 | Proxense, Llc | Secure element as a digital pocket |
US10331866B2 (en) | 2013-09-06 | 2019-06-25 | Apple Inc. | User verification for changing a setting of an electronic device |
US20150073998A1 (en) | 2013-09-09 | 2015-03-12 | Apple Inc. | Use of a Biometric Image in Online Commerce |
US20150220931A1 (en) * | 2014-01-31 | 2015-08-06 | Apple Inc. | Use of a Biometric Image for Authorization |
US9817960B2 (en) * | 2014-03-10 | 2017-11-14 | FaceToFace Biometrics, Inc. | Message sender security in messaging system |
US10275583B2 (en) | 2014-03-10 | 2019-04-30 | FaceToFace Biometrics, Inc. | Expression recognition in messaging systems |
US11436597B1 (en) * | 2017-05-01 | 2022-09-06 | Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. | Biometrics-based e-signatures for pre-authorization and acceptance transfer |
US11847651B2 (en) | 2017-05-23 | 2023-12-19 | Kenneth A Kopf | Systems and methods for facilitating biometric tokenless authentication for services |
KR20200100481A (en) * | 2019-02-18 | 2020-08-26 | 삼성전자주식회사 | Electronic device for authenticating biometric information and operating method thereof |
US10832244B1 (en) | 2019-11-14 | 2020-11-10 | Capital One Services, Llc | Protocol to secure electronic transactions using two way handshakes |
Citations (61)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
US626348A (en) * | 1899-06-06 | The hohris peters co | ||
US648260A (en) * | 1898-08-11 | 1900-04-24 | Peter S Holum | Transplanter. |
US5073934A (en) * | 1990-10-24 | 1991-12-17 | International Business Machines Corporation | Method and apparatus for controlling the use of a public key, based on the level of import integrity for the key |
US5142578A (en) * | 1991-08-22 | 1992-08-25 | International Business Machines Corporation | Hybrid public key algorithm/data encryption algorithm key distribution method based on control vectors |
US5245657A (en) * | 1991-07-08 | 1993-09-14 | Mitsubishi Denki Kabushiki Kaisha | Verification method and apparatus |
US5359669A (en) * | 1992-04-13 | 1994-10-25 | Motorola, Inc. | Remote retinal scan identifier |
US5497421A (en) * | 1992-04-28 | 1996-03-05 | Digital Equipment Corporation | Method and apparatus for protecting the confidentiality of passwords in a distributed data processing system |
US5613012A (en) * | 1994-11-28 | 1997-03-18 | Smarttouch, Llc. | Tokenless identification system for authorization of electronic transactions and electronic transmissions |
US5615277A (en) * | 1994-11-28 | 1997-03-25 | Hoffman; Ned | Tokenless security system for authorizing access to a secured computer system |
US5680470A (en) * | 1993-12-17 | 1997-10-21 | Moussa; Ali Mohammed | Method of automated signature verification |
US5706427A (en) * | 1995-09-08 | 1998-01-06 | Cadix Inc. | Authentication method for networks |
US5764789A (en) * | 1994-11-28 | 1998-06-09 | Smarttouch, Llc | Tokenless biometric ATM access system |
US5790669A (en) * | 1996-07-01 | 1998-08-04 | Sun Microsystems, Inc. | Lightweight non-repudiation system and method |
US5790674A (en) * | 1995-05-08 | 1998-08-04 | Image Data, Llc | System and method of providing system integrity and positive audit capabilities to a positive identification system |
US5799083A (en) * | 1996-08-26 | 1998-08-25 | Brothers; Harlan Jay | Event verification system |
US5799086A (en) * | 1994-01-13 | 1998-08-25 | Certco Llc | Enhanced cryptographic system and method with key escrow feature |
US5802199A (en) * | 1994-11-28 | 1998-09-01 | Smarttouch, Llc | Use sensitive identification system |
US5805719A (en) * | 1994-11-28 | 1998-09-08 | Smarttouch | Tokenless identification of individuals |
US5841970A (en) * | 1995-09-08 | 1998-11-24 | Cadix, Inc. | Authentication method for networks |
US5850442A (en) * | 1996-03-26 | 1998-12-15 | Entegrity Solutions Corporation | Secure world wide electronic commerce over an open network |
US5870723A (en) * | 1994-11-28 | 1999-02-09 | Pare, Jr.; David Ferrin | Tokenless biometric transaction authorization method and system |
US5887140A (en) * | 1995-03-27 | 1999-03-23 | Kabushiki Kaisha Toshiba | Computer network system and personal identification system adapted for use in the same |
US5926549A (en) * | 1996-02-12 | 1999-07-20 | Bull S.A. | Process for verifying the preservation of the integrity of an unprotected request sent by a client to a server by verifying the integrity of the response |
US5930804A (en) * | 1997-06-09 | 1999-07-27 | Philips Electronics North America Corporation | Web-based biometric authentication system and method |
US5982898A (en) * | 1997-03-07 | 1999-11-09 | At&T Corp. | Certification process |
US5982914A (en) * | 1997-07-29 | 1999-11-09 | Smarttouch, Inc. | Identification of individuals from association of finger pores and macrofeatures |
US5987153A (en) * | 1996-04-29 | 1999-11-16 | Quintet, Inc. | Automated verification and prevention of spoofing for biometric data |
US6012039A (en) * | 1994-11-28 | 2000-01-04 | Smarttouch, Inc. | Tokenless biometric electronic rewards system |
US6026166A (en) * | 1997-10-20 | 2000-02-15 | Cryptoworx Corporation | Digitally certifying a user identity and a computer system in combination |
US6035402A (en) * | 1996-12-20 | 2000-03-07 | Gte Cybertrust Solutions Incorporated | Virtual certificate authority |
US6038315A (en) * | 1997-03-17 | 2000-03-14 | The Regents Of The University Of California | Method and system for normalizing biometric variations to authenticate users from a public database and that ensures individual biometric data privacy |
US6104922A (en) * | 1998-03-02 | 2000-08-15 | Motorola, Inc. | User authentication in a communication system utilizing biometric information |
US6105010A (en) * | 1997-05-09 | 2000-08-15 | Gte Service Corporation | Biometric certifying authorities |
US6154727A (en) * | 1998-04-15 | 2000-11-28 | Cyberhealth, Inc. | Visit verification |
US6202151B1 (en) * | 1997-05-09 | 2001-03-13 | Gte Service Corporation | System and method for authenticating electronic transactions using biometric certificates |
US6230148B1 (en) * | 1994-11-28 | 2001-05-08 | Veristar Corporation | Tokenless biometric electric check transaction |
US6269348B1 (en) * | 1994-11-28 | 2001-07-31 | Veristar Corporation | Tokenless biometric electronic debit and credit transactions |
US6310996B1 (en) * | 1997-09-22 | 2001-10-30 | Nortel Networks Limited | Writing Bragg gratings in optical waveguides |
US6310966B1 (en) * | 1997-05-09 | 2001-10-30 | Gte Service Corporation | Biometric certificates |
US6332193B1 (en) * | 1999-01-18 | 2001-12-18 | Sensar, Inc. | Method and apparatus for securely transmitting and authenticating biometric data over a network |
US20020019811A1 (en) * | 2000-05-31 | 2002-02-14 | Veristar Corporation | Biometric financial transaction system and method |
US6366682B1 (en) * | 1994-11-28 | 2002-04-02 | Indivos Corporation | Tokenless electronic transaction system |
US6381631B1 (en) * | 1999-06-03 | 2002-04-30 | Marimba, Inc. | Method and apparatus for controlling client computer systems |
US20020056043A1 (en) * | 1999-01-18 | 2002-05-09 | Sensar, Inc. | Method and apparatus for securely transmitting and authenticating biometric data over a network |
US6397332B2 (en) * | 1997-07-18 | 2002-05-28 | Fuji Xerox Co., Ltd. | Verification data generating apparatus, data verification apparatus and storage medium for storing verification data generating program |
US6397198B1 (en) * | 1994-11-28 | 2002-05-28 | Indivos Corporation | Tokenless biometric electronic transactions using an audio signature to identify the transaction processor |
US6424249B1 (en) * | 1995-05-08 | 2002-07-23 | Image Data, Llc | Positive identity verification system and method including biometric user authentication |
US6484260B1 (en) * | 1998-04-24 | 2002-11-19 | Identix, Inc. | Personal identification system |
US20030014372A1 (en) * | 2000-08-04 | 2003-01-16 | Wheeler Lynn Henry | Trusted authentication digital signature (tads) system |
US6580814B1 (en) * | 1998-07-31 | 2003-06-17 | International Business Machines Corporation | System and method for compressing biometric models |
US20030135740A1 (en) * | 2000-09-11 | 2003-07-17 | Eli Talmor | Biometric-based system and method for enabling authentication of electronic messages sent over a network |
US6607136B1 (en) * | 1998-09-16 | 2003-08-19 | Beepcard Inc. | Physical presence digital authentication system |
US6657538B1 (en) * | 1997-11-07 | 2003-12-02 | Swisscom Mobile Ag | Method, system and devices for authenticating persons |
US20040128249A1 (en) * | 1994-11-28 | 2004-07-01 | Indivos Corporation, A Delaware Corporation | System and method for tokenless biometric electronic scrip |
US6879966B1 (en) * | 1994-11-28 | 2005-04-12 | Indivos Corporation | Tokenless biometric electronic financial transactions via a third party identicator |
US6928546B1 (en) * | 1998-05-14 | 2005-08-09 | Fusion Arc, Inc. | Identity verification method using a central biometric authority |
US6957770B1 (en) * | 2002-05-10 | 2005-10-25 | Biopay, Llc | System and method for biometric authorization for check cashing |
US6980670B1 (en) * | 1998-02-09 | 2005-12-27 | Indivos Corporation | Biometric tokenless electronic rewards system and method |
US7004389B1 (en) * | 2005-01-13 | 2006-02-28 | Biopay, Llc | System and method for tracking a mobile worker |
US7082415B1 (en) * | 2001-09-21 | 2006-07-25 | Biopay, Llc | System and method for biometrically-initiated refund transactions |
US7152045B2 (en) * | 1994-11-28 | 2006-12-19 | Indivos Corporation | Tokenless identification system for authorization of electronic transactions and electronic transmissions |
Family Cites Families (2)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
WO1997008868A1 (en) | 1995-08-25 | 1997-03-06 | Quintet, Inc. | Method of secure communication using signature verification |
US6167517A (en) * | 1998-04-09 | 2000-12-26 | Oracle Corporation | Trusted biometric client authentication |
-
2005
- 2005-06-15 US US11/153,221 patent/US7246244B2/en not_active Expired - Lifetime
-
2007
- 2007-06-12 US US11/761,734 patent/US20070234067A1/en not_active Abandoned
Patent Citations (78)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
US626348A (en) * | 1899-06-06 | The hohris peters co | ||
US648260A (en) * | 1898-08-11 | 1900-04-24 | Peter S Holum | Transplanter. |
US5073934A (en) * | 1990-10-24 | 1991-12-17 | International Business Machines Corporation | Method and apparatus for controlling the use of a public key, based on the level of import integrity for the key |
US5245657A (en) * | 1991-07-08 | 1993-09-14 | Mitsubishi Denki Kabushiki Kaisha | Verification method and apparatus |
US5142578A (en) * | 1991-08-22 | 1992-08-25 | International Business Machines Corporation | Hybrid public key algorithm/data encryption algorithm key distribution method based on control vectors |
US5359669A (en) * | 1992-04-13 | 1994-10-25 | Motorola, Inc. | Remote retinal scan identifier |
US5497421A (en) * | 1992-04-28 | 1996-03-05 | Digital Equipment Corporation | Method and apparatus for protecting the confidentiality of passwords in a distributed data processing system |
US5680470A (en) * | 1993-12-17 | 1997-10-21 | Moussa; Ali Mohammed | Method of automated signature verification |
US5799086A (en) * | 1994-01-13 | 1998-08-25 | Certco Llc | Enhanced cryptographic system and method with key escrow feature |
US5857022A (en) * | 1994-01-13 | 1999-01-05 | Certco Llc | Enhanced cryptographic system and method with key escrow feature |
US5838812A (en) * | 1994-11-28 | 1998-11-17 | Smarttouch, Llc | Tokenless biometric transaction authorization system |
US20040128249A1 (en) * | 1994-11-28 | 2004-07-01 | Indivos Corporation, A Delaware Corporation | System and method for tokenless biometric electronic scrip |
US6985608B2 (en) * | 1994-11-28 | 2006-01-10 | Indivos Corporation | Tokenless electronic transaction system |
US6230148B1 (en) * | 1994-11-28 | 2001-05-08 | Veristar Corporation | Tokenless biometric electric check transaction |
US20050203841A1 (en) * | 1994-11-28 | 2005-09-15 | Indivos Corporation | Tokenless biometric electronic transactions using an audio signature to identify the transaction processor |
US7152045B2 (en) * | 1994-11-28 | 2006-12-19 | Indivos Corporation | Tokenless identification system for authorization of electronic transactions and electronic transmissions |
US5802199A (en) * | 1994-11-28 | 1998-09-01 | Smarttouch, Llc | Use sensitive identification system |
US5805719A (en) * | 1994-11-28 | 1998-09-08 | Smarttouch | Tokenless identification of individuals |
US6269348B1 (en) * | 1994-11-28 | 2001-07-31 | Veristar Corporation | Tokenless biometric electronic debit and credit transactions |
US5615277A (en) * | 1994-11-28 | 1997-03-25 | Hoffman; Ned | Tokenless security system for authorizing access to a secured computer system |
US6920435B2 (en) * | 1994-11-28 | 2005-07-19 | Indivos Corporation | Tokenless biometric electronic transactions using an audio signature to identify the transaction processor |
US5613012A (en) * | 1994-11-28 | 1997-03-18 | Smarttouch, Llc. | Tokenless identification system for authorization of electronic transactions and electronic transmissions |
US5870723A (en) * | 1994-11-28 | 1999-02-09 | Pare, Jr.; David Ferrin | Tokenless biometric transaction authorization method and system |
US20010029493A1 (en) * | 1994-11-28 | 2001-10-11 | Veristar Corporation | Tokenless biometric electronic check transactions |
US6879966B1 (en) * | 1994-11-28 | 2005-04-12 | Indivos Corporation | Tokenless biometric electronic financial transactions via a third party identicator |
US5764789A (en) * | 1994-11-28 | 1998-06-09 | Smarttouch, Llc | Tokenless biometric ATM access system |
US20040020982A1 (en) * | 1994-11-28 | 2004-02-05 | Indivos Corporation, A Delaware Corporation | Tokenless electronic transaction system |
US6662166B2 (en) * | 1994-11-28 | 2003-12-09 | Indivos Corporation | Tokenless biometric electronic debit and credit transactions |
US6594376B2 (en) * | 1994-11-28 | 2003-07-15 | Indivos Corporation | Tokenless electronic transaction system |
US6012039A (en) * | 1994-11-28 | 2000-01-04 | Smarttouch, Inc. | Tokenless biometric electronic rewards system |
US6581042B2 (en) * | 1994-11-28 | 2003-06-17 | Indivos Corporation | Tokenless biometric electronic check transactions |
US20020174067A1 (en) * | 1994-11-28 | 2002-11-21 | Indivos Corporation, A Delaware Corporation | Tokenless electronic transaction system |
US20020111917A1 (en) * | 1994-11-28 | 2002-08-15 | Indivos Corporation, A Delaware Corporation | Tokenless biometric electronic transactions using an audio signature to identify the transaction processor |
US20010039533A1 (en) * | 1994-11-28 | 2001-11-08 | Veristar Corporation | Tokenless biometric electronic debit and credit transactions |
US6397198B1 (en) * | 1994-11-28 | 2002-05-28 | Indivos Corporation | Tokenless biometric electronic transactions using an audio signature to identify the transaction processor |
US6366682B1 (en) * | 1994-11-28 | 2002-04-02 | Indivos Corporation | Tokenless electronic transaction system |
US5887140A (en) * | 1995-03-27 | 1999-03-23 | Kabushiki Kaisha Toshiba | Computer network system and personal identification system adapted for use in the same |
US6424249B1 (en) * | 1995-05-08 | 2002-07-23 | Image Data, Llc | Positive identity verification system and method including biometric user authentication |
US5790674A (en) * | 1995-05-08 | 1998-08-04 | Image Data, Llc | System and method of providing system integrity and positive audit capabilities to a positive identification system |
US5841970A (en) * | 1995-09-08 | 1998-11-24 | Cadix, Inc. | Authentication method for networks |
US5706427A (en) * | 1995-09-08 | 1998-01-06 | Cadix Inc. | Authentication method for networks |
US5926549A (en) * | 1996-02-12 | 1999-07-20 | Bull S.A. | Process for verifying the preservation of the integrity of an unprotected request sent by a client to a server by verifying the integrity of the response |
US5850442A (en) * | 1996-03-26 | 1998-12-15 | Entegrity Solutions Corporation | Secure world wide electronic commerce over an open network |
US5987153A (en) * | 1996-04-29 | 1999-11-16 | Quintet, Inc. | Automated verification and prevention of spoofing for biometric data |
US5790669A (en) * | 1996-07-01 | 1998-08-04 | Sun Microsystems, Inc. | Lightweight non-repudiation system and method |
US5799083A (en) * | 1996-08-26 | 1998-08-25 | Brothers; Harlan Jay | Event verification system |
US6035402A (en) * | 1996-12-20 | 2000-03-07 | Gte Cybertrust Solutions Incorporated | Virtual certificate authority |
US5982898A (en) * | 1997-03-07 | 1999-11-09 | At&T Corp. | Certification process |
US6038315A (en) * | 1997-03-17 | 2000-03-14 | The Regents Of The University Of California | Method and system for normalizing biometric variations to authenticate users from a public database and that ensures individual biometric data privacy |
US6202151B1 (en) * | 1997-05-09 | 2001-03-13 | Gte Service Corporation | System and method for authenticating electronic transactions using biometric certificates |
US6105010A (en) * | 1997-05-09 | 2000-08-15 | Gte Service Corporation | Biometric certifying authorities |
US6310966B1 (en) * | 1997-05-09 | 2001-10-30 | Gte Service Corporation | Biometric certificates |
US5930804A (en) * | 1997-06-09 | 1999-07-27 | Philips Electronics North America Corporation | Web-based biometric authentication system and method |
US6182076B1 (en) * | 1997-06-09 | 2001-01-30 | Philips Electronics North America Corporation | Web-based, biometric authetication system and method |
US6397332B2 (en) * | 1997-07-18 | 2002-05-28 | Fuji Xerox Co., Ltd. | Verification data generating apparatus, data verification apparatus and storage medium for storing verification data generating program |
US5982914A (en) * | 1997-07-29 | 1999-11-09 | Smarttouch, Inc. | Identification of individuals from association of finger pores and macrofeatures |
US6411728B1 (en) * | 1997-07-29 | 2002-06-25 | Indivos Corporation | Association of finger pores and macrofeatures for identification of individuals |
US6591002B2 (en) * | 1997-07-29 | 2003-07-08 | Indivos Corporation | Association of finger pores and macrofeatures for identification of individuals |
US20020154795A1 (en) * | 1997-07-29 | 2002-10-24 | Indivos Corporation, A Delaware Corporation | Association of finger pores and macrofeatures for identification of individuals |
US6310996B1 (en) * | 1997-09-22 | 2001-10-30 | Nortel Networks Limited | Writing Bragg gratings in optical waveguides |
US6026166A (en) * | 1997-10-20 | 2000-02-15 | Cryptoworx Corporation | Digitally certifying a user identity and a computer system in combination |
US6657538B1 (en) * | 1997-11-07 | 2003-12-02 | Swisscom Mobile Ag | Method, system and devices for authenticating persons |
US6980670B1 (en) * | 1998-02-09 | 2005-12-27 | Indivos Corporation | Biometric tokenless electronic rewards system and method |
US6104922A (en) * | 1998-03-02 | 2000-08-15 | Motorola, Inc. | User authentication in a communication system utilizing biometric information |
US6154727A (en) * | 1998-04-15 | 2000-11-28 | Cyberhealth, Inc. | Visit verification |
US6484260B1 (en) * | 1998-04-24 | 2002-11-19 | Identix, Inc. | Personal identification system |
US6928546B1 (en) * | 1998-05-14 | 2005-08-09 | Fusion Arc, Inc. | Identity verification method using a central biometric authority |
US6580814B1 (en) * | 1998-07-31 | 2003-06-17 | International Business Machines Corporation | System and method for compressing biometric models |
US6607136B1 (en) * | 1998-09-16 | 2003-08-19 | Beepcard Inc. | Physical presence digital authentication system |
US20020056043A1 (en) * | 1999-01-18 | 2002-05-09 | Sensar, Inc. | Method and apparatus for securely transmitting and authenticating biometric data over a network |
US6332193B1 (en) * | 1999-01-18 | 2001-12-18 | Sensar, Inc. | Method and apparatus for securely transmitting and authenticating biometric data over a network |
US6381631B1 (en) * | 1999-06-03 | 2002-04-30 | Marimba, Inc. | Method and apparatus for controlling client computer systems |
US20020019811A1 (en) * | 2000-05-31 | 2002-02-14 | Veristar Corporation | Biometric financial transaction system and method |
US20030014372A1 (en) * | 2000-08-04 | 2003-01-16 | Wheeler Lynn Henry | Trusted authentication digital signature (tads) system |
US20030135740A1 (en) * | 2000-09-11 | 2003-07-17 | Eli Talmor | Biometric-based system and method for enabling authentication of electronic messages sent over a network |
US7082415B1 (en) * | 2001-09-21 | 2006-07-25 | Biopay, Llc | System and method for biometrically-initiated refund transactions |
US6957770B1 (en) * | 2002-05-10 | 2005-10-25 | Biopay, Llc | System and method for biometric authorization for check cashing |
US7004389B1 (en) * | 2005-01-13 | 2006-02-28 | Biopay, Llc | System and method for tracking a mobile worker |
Cited By (16)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
US7865449B2 (en) | 2001-06-18 | 2011-01-04 | Daon Holdings Limited | Electronic data vault providing biometrically protected electronic signatures |
US7941380B2 (en) | 2001-06-18 | 2011-05-10 | Daon Holdings Limited | Electronic data vault providing biometrically protected electronic signatures |
US20090282260A1 (en) * | 2001-06-18 | 2009-11-12 | Oliver Tattan | Electronic data vault providing biometrically protected electronic signatures |
US20100088233A1 (en) * | 2001-06-18 | 2010-04-08 | Oliver Tattan | Electronic data vault providing biometrically protected electronic signatures |
US20040236694A1 (en) * | 2001-06-18 | 2004-11-25 | Oliver Tattan | Electronic data vault providing biometrically protected electronic signatures |
US7676439B2 (en) * | 2001-06-18 | 2010-03-09 | Daon Holdings Limited | Electronic data vault providing biometrically protected electronic signatures |
US20040014457A1 (en) * | 2001-12-20 | 2004-01-22 | Stevens Lawrence A. | Systems and methods for storage of user information and for verifying user identity |
US7929951B2 (en) * | 2001-12-20 | 2011-04-19 | Stevens Lawrence A | Systems and methods for storage of user information and for verifying user identity |
US20080209227A1 (en) * | 2007-02-28 | 2008-08-28 | Microsoft Corporation | User Authentication Via Biometric Hashing |
US20080209226A1 (en) * | 2007-02-28 | 2008-08-28 | Microsoft Corporation | User Authentication Via Biometric Hashing |
US20100205425A1 (en) * | 2009-02-11 | 2010-08-12 | Kristof Takacs | Multi-level data storage |
US8924742B2 (en) * | 2009-02-11 | 2014-12-30 | Blackberry Limited | Multi-level data storage |
US20130173466A1 (en) * | 2011-12-28 | 2013-07-04 | Nokia Corporation | Method and apparatus for utilizing recognition data in conducting transactions |
US8762276B2 (en) * | 2011-12-28 | 2014-06-24 | Nokia Corporation | Method and apparatus for utilizing recognition data in conducting transactions |
US9118674B2 (en) | 2012-11-26 | 2015-08-25 | Bank Of America Corporation | Methods and processes for storing and utilizing state information for service providers |
US10341112B2 (en) * | 2014-03-21 | 2019-07-02 | Koninklijke Philips N.V. | Soft generation of biometric candidates and references based on empirical bit error probability |
Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
---|---|
US20050251688A1 (en) | 2005-11-10 |
US7246244B2 (en) | 2007-07-17 |
Similar Documents
Publication | Publication Date | Title |
---|---|---|
US6928546B1 (en) | Identity verification method using a central biometric authority | |
US7246244B2 (en) | Identity verification method using a central biometric authority | |
EP1425645B1 (en) | A distributed network system using biometric authentication access | |
US4993068A (en) | Unforgeable personal identification system | |
AU2003212617B2 (en) | A biometric authentication system and method | |
JP4511684B2 (en) | Biometrics identity verification service provision system | |
EP0986209B1 (en) | Remote authentication system | |
KR100486062B1 (en) | Biometric certificates | |
CA2417901C (en) | Entity authentication in electronic communications by providing verification status of device | |
US20070180263A1 (en) | Identification and remote network access using biometric recognition | |
US20030101348A1 (en) | Method and system for determining confidence in a digital transaction | |
US20040005051A1 (en) | Entity authentication in eletronic communications by providing verification status of device | |
US20030172272A1 (en) | Authentication system and method | |
WO2003007527A2 (en) | Biometrically enhanced digital certificates and system and method for making and using | |
KR20040082674A (en) | System and Method for Authenticating a Living Body Doubly | |
US20050076213A1 (en) | Self-enrollment and authentication method | |
JP2008502045A (en) | Secure electronic commerce | |
WO2003061186A1 (en) | Identity verification method using a central biometric authority | |
US20230362009A1 (en) | User identification and authentication method and system | |
US20230410098A1 (en) | Authentication method secured by structural decoupling of personal and service identifiers | |
He et al. | A secure mechanism for network authentication combining hand shapes verification and encryption | |
Rakngam et al. | Design and Implementation of Transaction Signing Process with OTP Encryption Keys by Using Biometric Features | |
DRAFT | IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION |
Legal Events
Date | Code | Title | Description |
---|---|---|---|
STCB | Information on status: application discontinuation |
Free format text: ABANDONED -- FAILURE TO RESPOND TO AN OFFICE ACTION |