US20070150740A1 - Method for providing information security for wireless transmissions - Google Patents

Method for providing information security for wireless transmissions Download PDF

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Publication number
US20070150740A1
US20070150740A1 US11/483,176 US48317606A US2007150740A1 US 20070150740 A1 US20070150740 A1 US 20070150740A1 US 48317606 A US48317606 A US 48317606A US 2007150740 A1 US2007150740 A1 US 2007150740A1
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US
United States
Prior art keywords
correspondent
public key
intermediary
message
certificate
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Abandoned
Application number
US11/483,176
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English (en)
Inventor
Walter Davis
Douglas Ayerst
Scott Vanstone
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Certicom Corp
Malikie Innovations Ltd
Motorola Solutions Inc
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Individual
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Individual filed Critical Individual
Priority to US11/483,176 priority Critical patent/US20070150740A1/en
Assigned to MOTOROLA INC. reassignment MOTOROLA INC. ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNORS INTEREST (SEE DOCUMENT FOR DETAILS). Assignors: AYERST, DOUGLAS L
Assigned to MOTOROLA INC. reassignment MOTOROLA INC. ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNORS INTEREST (SEE DOCUMENT FOR DETAILS). Assignors: DAVIS, WALTER LEE
Assigned to CERTICOM CORP. reassignment CERTICOM CORP. ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNORS INTEREST (SEE DOCUMENT FOR DETAILS). Assignors: VANSTONE, SCOTT ALEXANDER
Publication of US20070150740A1 publication Critical patent/US20070150740A1/en
Priority to US12/848,745 priority patent/US20110010540A1/en
Priority to US13/549,176 priority patent/US9003182B2/en
Assigned to BLACKBERRY LIMITED reassignment BLACKBERRY LIMITED CHANGE OF NAME (SEE DOCUMENT FOR DETAILS). Assignors: RESEARCH IN MOTION LIMITED
Assigned to MALIKIE INNOVATIONS LIMITED reassignment MALIKIE INNOVATIONS LIMITED ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNORS INTEREST (SEE DOCUMENT FOR DETAILS). Assignors: BLACKBERRY LIMITED
Abandoned legal-status Critical Current

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Classifications

    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3247—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/321—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving a third party or a trusted authority
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3263—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving certificates, e.g. public key certificate [PKC] or attribute certificate [AC]; Public key infrastructure [PKI] arrangements
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/06—Authentication
    • H04W12/069—Authentication using certificates or pre-shared keys
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/10—Integrity
    • H04W12/106—Packet or message integrity
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
    • H04L2209/56—Financial cryptography, e.g. electronic payment or e-cash
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
    • H04L2209/80—Wireless

Definitions

  • the present invention relates generally to cryptographic schemes, and specifically to cryptographic schemes relating to wireless applications.
  • Information security is required to secure many types of transactions performed electronically using a wide range of computing and communication technologies.
  • technologies such as wireless networks, paging infrastructures and smart cards are being deployed to support critical, information sensitive applications including account inquiries, electronic cash, secure communications and access control.
  • One of the key features of each of these technologies is that they offer consumers the convenience of service anywhere, any time. The convenience offered to consumers results in a challenge for the vendors to create smaller and faster devices while providing a high level of security for information computed and transmitted.
  • cryptosystems Information security is provided through the application of cryptographic systems (commonly referred to as cryptosystems).
  • the two main classes of cryptosystems are symmetric and public key.
  • a symmetric cryptosystem two users wishing to participate in a secure transaction must share a common key. Therefore, each user must trust the other not to divulge the key to a third party.
  • Users participating in a secure transaction using public key cryptosystems will each have two keys, known as a key pair. One of the keys is kept secret and is referred to as the private key, while the other can be published and is referred to as the public key.
  • applications use a combination of both these classes of cryptosystems to provide information security.
  • Symmetric technologies are typically used to perform bulk data encryption
  • public key technologies are commonly used to perform key agreement, key transport, digital signatures and encryption of small messages.
  • Elliptic curve cryptosystems are based on an exceptionally difficult mathematical problem, Thus, elliptic curve systems can maintain security equivalent to many other systems while using much smaller public keys.
  • the smaller key size has significant benefits in terms of the amount of information that must be exchanged between users, the time required for that exchange, the amount of information that must be stored for digital signature transactions, and the size and energy consumption of the hardware or software used to implement the system.
  • the public key is a point (Q) on an elliptic curve (represented as a pair of field elements) and the private key is an integer (k).
  • Elliptic curves are defined over an underlying field and may be implemented over the multiplicative group F p , (the integers modules a prime p) or characteristic 2 finite fields (F 2 m where m is a positive integer).
  • Wireless devices including cellular telephones, two-way pagers, wireless modems, and contactless smart cards, are increasing in popularity because of the convenience they provide while maintaining a low cost and small form factor.
  • a method of communicating between a pair of correspondents through an intermediary comprising the steps, registering one of said correspondents with said intermediary to share an identifier, preparing at said one correspondent a secure communication including a message between said correspondents, preparing a signature component including a derivation of said secure communication and said identifier forwarding said signature component to said intermediary and verifying said signature component at said intermediary, attaching to said communication a certificate of the public key and identity of the said one correspondent, and forwarding said communication and certificate to said other correspondent.
  • FIG. 1 is a schematic drawing of a pager system
  • FIG. 3 is a representation of a message transfer system for the system of FIG. 1
  • FIG. 4 is a schematic representation of an alternative embodiment of a communication system.
  • a paging system is represented generally by the numeral 100 .
  • a first pager 102 is operatively coupled with a first home terminal 104 through a wireless communication.
  • the first home terminal 104 is operatively coupled to a second home terminal 106 via a network 108 and the second home terminal 106 in turn is operatively coupled to a second pager 110 .
  • the pagers 102 , 110 are typically coupled to their respective home terminals 104 , 106 by radio frequency.
  • the network 108 is typically a public switched telephone network (PSTN), but can include a data network, and the Internet.
  • PSTN public switched telephone network
  • Every pager 102 contains a subscriber unit address and a public key C of the pager manufacturer or service provider (herein referred to as the company public key). This information is loaded at the manufacture stage.
  • the company public key Q C is derived from a company private key d C .
  • Each home terminal 104 has a private key d H and a public key Q H .
  • the public key Q N is signed by the company private key d C to create a certificate denoted C M .
  • the company public key Q C could be system wide or defined for a given region.
  • a subscriber purchases a pager 102 from a retail outlet and the pager is then loaded with a home index 112 and identifier ID using the protocol outlined below.
  • the home index is typically a 32-bit index which uniquely identifies the pager 102 and correlates it with a specific home terminal 104 .
  • the subscriber calls a number, typically a toll-free number, to contact a service provider and a home terminal 104 is assigned.
  • the home terminal 104 sends the pager 102 its public key Q H and its certificate C M .
  • the pager verifies Q H , with the company public key Q C .
  • the pager generates a private key d p and a corresponding public key Q p which is communicated to the home terminal 104 .
  • the pager 102 sends to the home terminal 104 the necessary authorization information (including identification, credit card number, subscriber unit address, and the like) encrypted under the home terminal public key Q H ).
  • the home terminal gets authorization from a central repository that this subscriber unit has not already been activated and thereby prevents counterfeiting of subscriber units.
  • the home terminal 104 sets up a subscriber account and sends the pager 102 its home index and identifier ID encrypted under Q p and signed by the home terminal.
  • Each pager 102 in a paging infrastructure 100 is registered with a home terminal using the registration protocol described above.
  • the pagers have a private and public key pair, dp,Q p , each of which are approximately 20 bytes in length.
  • the home terminals 104 have a private and public key pair dh, Q H each of which are approximately 25 bytes in length. It is desirable to have a longer key length at the home terminal for providing additional security. Further, since the home terminal 104 does not have the same power constraints as the pager 102 , the extra computational power required for the longer key is not a significant issue. The additional security at the home terminal 102 is important since a compromise of the home terminal would permit counterfeiting of subscriber units.
  • each of the pagers 102 has a certificate registered for it at the home terminal 104 .
  • the certificate, cert ca validates the public key Q p , and identity ID.
  • Each of the home terminals maintains a table for the pagers and their associated certificate. Rather than having the pager sign the certificate and send the message to the home terminal, the certificate cert ca is signed by the pager's home terminal. The transmission process used to implement such a protocol is described in detail below.
  • the first pager P 1 wishes to send a message M to a recipient, e.g. a second pager P 2 having a public key Q P 1 .
  • the sender P 1 initially obtains an authentic copy of a recipient's public key Q P 2 .
  • the first pager then transmits the signature, m a , and the signed, encrypted message, W, to the first home terminal.
  • the signature, m a is used by the home terminal 104 associated with pager P 1 to verify that P 1 is a legitimate user.
  • the message W and a nonce CN which is unique for each transmission, are coupled with the ID of P 1 and signed.
  • the nonce is used to prevent replay of the transmission, W is a signed, encrypted form of the message M. Signing then encrypting is preferred over encrypting then signing.
  • the bandwidth requirement of the transmission from the pager to the base are reduced since the pager does not have to transmit a certificate.
  • the first home terminal 104 stores a pre-computed table of values which allows it to increase the speed of verifying P 1 's signature. Alternately, if verification is fast enough, as would be the case with a hardware implementation, the table of values is not required.
  • the second home terminal, 106 receives the transmission and verifies Q P 1 using Cert ca (Q P 1 , ID P 1 ). To save bandwidth, the second home terminal 106 signs Q P 1 according to the signature function S dp 1 (W
  • Q P1 has been validated by the signature of the home terminal 104 and therefore communicating between the second home terminal 106 and the second pager 110 in this manner keeps the certificates off the transmission channel and reduces bandwidth requirements.
  • M consists of t bytes. If the Nyberg-Rueppel protocol is used for signing the message, t+20 bytes are required for S P 1 (M). A further 20 bytes a used to encrypt S P 1 (M), therefore W is t+40 bytes in length. Hashing h(W) uses 20 bytes if SHA-1 is used. The nonce CN uses 4 bytes and the identification ID P 1 uses 4 bytes. Once again, if Nyberg-Rueppel is We for signing, 20 additional bytes are used. Hence m a will be 48 bytes. Therefore, the transmission between the first pager and the first home terminal uses t+92 bytes.

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)
  • Telephonic Communication Services (AREA)
US11/483,176 2000-10-05 2006-07-10 Method for providing information security for wireless transmissions Abandoned US20070150740A1 (en)

Priority Applications (3)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
US11/483,176 US20070150740A1 (en) 2000-10-05 2006-07-10 Method for providing information security for wireless transmissions
US12/848,745 US20110010540A1 (en) 2000-10-05 2010-08-02 Method for Providing Information Security for Wireless Transmissions
US13/549,176 US9003182B2 (en) 2000-10-05 2012-07-13 Communication system and method for securely communicating a message between correspondents through an intermediary terminal

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
US68050100A 2000-10-05 2000-10-05
US11/483,176 US20070150740A1 (en) 2000-10-05 2006-07-10 Method for providing information security for wireless transmissions

Related Parent Applications (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
US68050100A Continuation 2000-10-05 2000-10-05

Related Child Applications (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
US12/848,745 Continuation US20110010540A1 (en) 2000-10-05 2010-08-02 Method for Providing Information Security for Wireless Transmissions

Publications (1)

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US20070150740A1 true US20070150740A1 (en) 2007-06-28

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US11/483,176 Abandoned US20070150740A1 (en) 2000-10-05 2006-07-10 Method for providing information security for wireless transmissions
US12/848,745 Abandoned US20110010540A1 (en) 2000-10-05 2010-08-02 Method for Providing Information Security for Wireless Transmissions
US13/549,176 Expired - Fee Related US9003182B2 (en) 2000-10-05 2012-07-13 Communication system and method for securely communicating a message between correspondents through an intermediary terminal

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US13/549,176 Expired - Fee Related US9003182B2 (en) 2000-10-05 2012-07-13 Communication system and method for securely communicating a message between correspondents through an intermediary terminal

Country Status (6)

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US (3) US20070150740A1 (de)
EP (2) EP2309670B1 (de)
AU (1) AU2001293598A1 (de)
CA (2) CA2793746C (de)
HK (1) HK1155869A1 (de)
WO (1) WO2002030038A2 (de)

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US9717012B2 (en) 2015-06-01 2017-07-25 Afero, Inc. Internet of things (IOT) automotive device, system, and method
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US20110010540A1 (en) * 2000-10-05 2011-01-13 Certicom Corp. Method for Providing Information Security for Wireless Transmissions
US8943323B2 (en) 2006-07-20 2015-01-27 Blackberry Limited System and method for provisioning device certificates
US20150089220A1 (en) * 2009-10-31 2015-03-26 Dipen Patel Technique For Bypassing an IP PBX
US9641400B2 (en) 2014-11-21 2017-05-02 Afero, Inc. Internet of things device for registering user selections
US10291595B2 (en) 2014-12-18 2019-05-14 Afero, Inc. System and method for securely connecting network devices
US9832173B2 (en) * 2014-12-18 2017-11-28 Afero, Inc. System and method for securely connecting network devices
US9894473B2 (en) 2014-12-18 2018-02-13 Afero, Inc. System and method for securely connecting network devices using optical labels
US10045150B2 (en) 2015-03-30 2018-08-07 Afero, Inc. System and method for accurately sensing user location in an IoT system
US10798523B2 (en) 2015-03-30 2020-10-06 Afero, Inc. System and method for accurately sensing user location in an IoT system
US9704318B2 (en) 2015-03-30 2017-07-11 Afero, Inc. System and method for accurately sensing user location in an IoT system
US9717012B2 (en) 2015-06-01 2017-07-25 Afero, Inc. Internet of things (IOT) automotive device, system, and method
US9729528B2 (en) 2015-07-03 2017-08-08 Afero, Inc. Apparatus and method for establishing secure communication channels in an internet of things (IOT) system
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EP2309670B1 (de) 2013-05-01
US20120284509A1 (en) 2012-11-08
HK1155869A1 (en) 2012-05-25
CA2793746C (en) 2016-09-20
EP2309670A3 (de) 2011-11-23
EP1325586A2 (de) 2003-07-09
CA2793746A1 (en) 2002-04-11
AU2001293598A1 (en) 2002-04-15
WO2002030038A2 (en) 2002-04-11
CA2424897A1 (en) 2002-04-11
US9003182B2 (en) 2015-04-07
CA2424897C (en) 2015-08-04
EP2309670A2 (de) 2011-04-13
WO2002030038A3 (en) 2002-12-12
US20110010540A1 (en) 2011-01-13

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