US20040242195A1 - Method for processing security message in mobile communication system - Google Patents

Method for processing security message in mobile communication system Download PDF

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Publication number
US20040242195A1
US20040242195A1 US10/746,985 US74698503A US2004242195A1 US 20040242195 A1 US20040242195 A1 US 20040242195A1 US 74698503 A US74698503 A US 74698503A US 2004242195 A1 US2004242195 A1 US 2004242195A1
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Prior art keywords
security
message
check
value
relating
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Abandoned
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US10/746,985
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English (en)
Inventor
Sung Chun
Seung Yi
Young Lee
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LG Electronics Inc
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LG Electronics Inc
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Priority to US10/777,843 priority Critical patent/US7471943B2/en
Publication of US20040242195A1 publication Critical patent/US20040242195A1/en
Abandoned legal-status Critical Current

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    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W88/00—Devices specially adapted for wireless communication networks, e.g. terminals, base stations or access point devices
    • H04W88/02—Terminal devices
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/12—Applying verification of the received information
    • H04L63/123—Applying verification of the received information received data contents, e.g. message integrity
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/03—Protecting confidentiality, e.g. by encryption
    • H04W12/037—Protecting confidentiality, e.g. by encryption of the control plane, e.g. signalling traffic
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/10—Integrity

Definitions

  • the present invention relates to a message processing method applied to mobile communication, and more particularly, to a method for processing a security message in a RRC layer.
  • UMTS universal mobile telecommunications system
  • UE user equipment
  • UTRAN UMTS terrestrial radio access network
  • CN core network
  • the UTRAN comprises a plurality of RNSs (radio network subsystems).
  • Each of the RNS comprises RNC (radio network controller) and a plurality of Node Bs managed by the RNC.
  • RNC radio network controller
  • a Node B receives uplink signals transmitted from UE and transmits downlink signals to the UE.
  • the RNC takes charge of allocation and management of radio resource, and plays a role of an access point to connect the Node Bs to the CN.
  • Each UE connected to the UMTS is managed by a specific RNC in the UTRAN, and the specific RNC is called SRNC (serving RNC).
  • SRNC serving RNC
  • the UTRAN configures, maintains, and manages RABs (radio access bearers) for the communications between the UE and the CN.
  • the CN applies end-to-end QoS (quality of service) requirements to the RAB, and the RAB supports QoS requirements set up by the CN.
  • the UTRAN therefore configures, maintains, and manages the RAB, thereby enabling to meet the end-to-end QoS requirements.
  • a radio interface protocol vertically comprises a physical layer, a data link layer, and a network layer and horizontally comprises a user plane for providing data information and a control plane for providing signaling.
  • the protocol layers are grouped into L1 (layer 1), L2 (layer 2), and L3 (layer 3) based on three lower layers of an OSI (open system interconnection) reference model.
  • L1 provides upper layers with information transfer service using various radio transmission techniques.
  • the L1 is connected to a MAC (medium access control) layer of the upper layers via transport channels.
  • a RLC layer supports data transmission reliably and carries out segmentation and concatenation on RLC SDUs (service data units) transferred from the upper layers.
  • the RLC SDUs transferred from the upper layers are divided into RLC data units that can be processed in the RLC layer, and header information is added to the divided RLC data units to transfer to the MAC layer as a form of PDU (protocol data unit).
  • PDU protocol data unit
  • a PDCP (packet data convergence protocol) layer is disposed over the RLC layer.
  • the PDCP layer makes data, which is transferred through the network protocol, be transmitted efficiently over a radio interface of which bandwidth is relatively narrow.
  • a BMC (broadcast/multicast control) layer schedules UEs to which a CB (cell broadcast) message transferred from the CN will be transmitted, and transfers the CB message to the corresponding UEs located in specific cell(s) on the basis of the scheduling.
  • a RRC (radio resource control) layer controls transport and physical channels to perform the establishment, reconfiguration, and release of RBs (radio bearers).
  • the RB means a service provided by the L2 for data transfer between the UE and UTRAN.
  • various channels for receiving/transmitting data are defined between the UEs and the UTRAN to use.
  • Data are sent and received between the PHY layer of UE and that of the UTRAN using the physical channel.
  • data transport paths between the protocol layers are defined as transport and logical channels in the radio access network of the UMTS.
  • the logical channels are provided for data exchange between the RLC and MAC layer, while the transport channels are provided for data exchange between the MAC and PHY layer. Mapping between transport channels is performed in the MAC layer, while another mapping between the transport and physical layers is performed in the physical layer.
  • the ciphering adds a specific mask, which is known to both of transmitting and receiving parties only, to a message so that a third party failing to know the mask is unable to recognize the contents of the message.
  • the integrity check is used for checking whether an unauthorized third party has altered the contents of the message or whether the transmission is made by an unauthenticated party. Namely, the integrity check is performed for integrity protection and is a procedure required for checking whether the contents of the received message are intentionally and previously changed by the third party.
  • the ciphering and the integrity check are simultaneously carried out on most of the messages transferred to the RRC layer and most of the control messages transmitted to the upper layers of the RRC layer. And, the ciphering is carried out on other general user data only. Such integrity check can be carried out in the RRC layer.
  • the receiving party carries out the integrity check on the received message.
  • the received message is normally processed or discarded according to whether the received message passes the integrity check or not.
  • one of the received messages may be a security setup control message.
  • the security setup control message is used for initiating to secure messages that will be transmitted thereafter.
  • the security setup control message can be used for controlling security-relating environment variables that are used for the connection on which the security process has been carried out.
  • security-relating environment setup information Information, which is related to controlling the security-relating environment variables, among the contents contained in the security setup control message is called security-relating environment setup information. Yet, the security-relating information contained in the security setup control message itself can be changed by the unauthenticated third party or can be transmitted by the unauthenticated transmitting party, whereby it is unable to rely on such security-relating information.
  • the present invention is directed to a method for processing a security message in mobile communication system that substantially obviates one or more problems due to limitations and disadvantages of the related art.
  • An object of the present invention is to provide a security setup control message processing method including security check of a security message itself.
  • a method for processing security message in mobile communication system includes the steps of receiving the security message, storing previous security-relating variables, carrying out security check on the security message, discarding or processing the security message according to a result of the security check, and updating the security-relating variables.
  • the present invention is characterized in that the security check of the security message itself is performed to secure integrity protection.
  • FIG. 1 illustrates a flowchart of a general message processing method
  • FIG. 2 illustrates a flowchart of a method for processing a security setup control message according to a first embodiment of the present invention
  • FIG. 3 illustrates a flowchart of a method for processing a security setup control message according to a second embodiment of the present invention
  • FIG. 4 illustrates a diagram of one embodiment representing COUNT-I in security-relating environment variables
  • FIG. 5 illustrates a diagram for explaining one embodiment of generating an authentication value in integrity check.
  • FIG. 1 illustrates a flowchart of a general message processing method.
  • UE user equipment
  • S 11 general message
  • S 12 carries out integrity check on it
  • the message is normally processed or discarded. Namely, if the message passes the integrity check, it is normally processed (S 13 ) If the message fails to pass the integrity check, it is discarded since there exists a security problem (S 14 ).
  • FIG. 2 illustrates a flowchart of a method for processing a security setup control message according to a first embodiment of the present invention.
  • UE user equipment receives a security setup control message (S 21 ). And, security-relating environment variables are updated using security-relating environment setup information contained in the received security setup control message (S 22 ).
  • the UE (ex. terminal) carries out security check on the security setup control message itself using the updated security-relating environment variables (S 23 ).
  • the security check includes integrity check. If the security setup control message passes the integrity check, the message is normally processed (S 24 ). Yet, if the security setup control message fails to pass the integrity check, the message is judged as abnormal so that the received security setup control message is discarded (S 25 ). Moreover, it is unable to rely on the security-relating environment setup information included in the security setup control message. Hence, it is unable to use the security-relating environment setup information.
  • the security-relating environment variables of the receiving party do not coincide with those of a transmitting party anymore, it is unable to further exchange messages, and the receiving party cannot be provided with further requested services.
  • FIG. 3 illustrates a flowchart of a method for processing a security setup control message according to a second embodiment of the present invention.
  • a method for processing a security setup control message is carried out in a following manner.
  • UE user equipment receives a security setup control message (S 31 ). Before the UE carries out security check on the security setup control message itself, security-relating environment variables which were previously set are temporarily stored (S 32 ). And, the security-relating environment variables are updated using security-relating environment setup information included in the received security setup control message (S 33 ).
  • the UE (ex. terminal) carries out security check on the security setup control message itself using the updated security-relating environment variables (S 34 ). And, the security check includes integrity check. If the security setup control message passes a result of the integrity check, the temporarily stored security-relating environment variables are deleted (S 35 ). Thereafter, security check is carried out on messages received later using the updated security-relating environment variables and the message is normally processed (S 36 ).
  • the security setup control message fails to pass the integrity check, it is handled such that the security setup control message is not received. Namely, if it is judged that the message is abnormal, the received security setup control message is discarded (S 37 ). Moreover, the security-relating environment setup information included in the security setup control message cannot be used since it is not reliable. Thus, in case that the security setup control message is unable to pass the security check, the security setup control message is discarded as well as the temporarily stored security-relating environment variables are restored (S 38 ). And, messages received later are processed using the restored security-relating environment variables.
  • a method of performing the integrity check is explained in detail as follows. For such explanation, parameters required for performing the integrity check are explained. In order to perform the integrity check, required are such parameters as IK (integrity key), COUNT-I, MESSAGE, DIRECTION (direction identifier, 1 bit), and FRESH.
  • FIG. 4 illustrates a diagram of one embodiment representing COUNT-I in security-relating environment variables.
  • COUNT-I is one of security-relating environment variables. Namely, the COUNT-I is a value corresponding to a sequence number for integrity check.
  • the COUNT-I includes a pair or areas.
  • One area of the two includes RRC HFN (hyper frame number) of 28 bits, while the other area of the two includes RRC SN (sequence number) of 4 bits.
  • a procedure of updating the security-relating environment variables is carried out in a manner that HFN as a value of upper 28 bits of the COUNT-I is reset.
  • the reset HFN may be a START value transmitted recently by a terminal, 0, or a specific value.
  • UE carries out security check on the received security setup control message using the updated security-relating environment variables.
  • the IK among the parameters for performing the integrity check indicates an integrity key, which is generated from an authentication procedure in an upper layer of the RRC layer to have the RRC layer be informed of.
  • a value of the IK is not transmitted via a radio interface, but the upper layer of the RRC layer in the terminal and a network (ex. UTRAN) calculate values of the IK to use based on specific input values, respectively.
  • a value of the START is read from an SIM card when the terminal initiates connection between RRC layers of the UTRAN and the terminal, and is transmitted to the UTRAN.
  • the value of the START which is included in a message transmitted from the upper layer of the RRC layer of the terminal, may be transmitted to the UTRAN.
  • the value of the START is defined as the greatest number of upper 20 bits of the currently used values of the COUNT-I or COUNT-C (which is used for ciphering and plays a role similar to the COUNT-I) And the value of the START currently used between the RRC layers of the terminal and UTRAN is stored in the SIM card when the connection between the RRC layers of the terminal and UTRAN ends.
  • the MESSAGE means a message which is transmitted itself.
  • the DIRECTION is a direction discriminator and its value varies in accordance with uplink or downlink.
  • the DIRECTION can be set as ‘0’ or ‘1’ on uplink or downlink.
  • the FRESH is a value given to each terminal independently, and is a value that UTRAN transmits to UE on an initial state of the RRC connection. Namely, the value of the FRESH is an arbitrary number that UTRAN transmits to UE, which is for securing the security of the UTRAN from the terminal reusing the values of the COUNT-I and MAC-I in a manner that UTRAN provides UE with a new value every RRC connection.
  • a value of the MAC-I (message authentication code-I) is a message authentication code calculated using UIA (UMTS integrity algorithm) with security-relating environment values, which is an integrity checksum inserted in RRC PDU.
  • FIG. 5 illustrates a diagram for explaining one embodiment of generating an authentication value in integrity check, in which ‘f9’ is a standardized integrity check authentication generation algorithm adopted by 3GPP.
  • UTRAN and terminal use values of the parameters as input values, thereby generating values of MAC-I and XMAC-I using such an algorithm as ‘f9’.
  • the MAC-I is an integrity check authentication value generated from the UTRAN
  • the XMAC-I is an integrity check authentication value generated from the terminal. If all input values of the UTRAN and terminal are equal to each other, the values of the MAC-I and XMAC-I generated from the procedure of FIG. 3 will be equal to each other. Yet, if the message is changed in the middle of processing, input values of MESSAGE of receiving and transmitting parties are different from each other so that the value of the XMAC-I is not equal to that of the MAC-I.
  • the terminal judges that contents of the received security setup control message are intentionally changed during transmission or that the received security setup control message is transmitted from an unauthenticated party. In such a case the security setup control message is judged as invalid, thereby failing to pass the integrity check.
  • UTRAN changes a portion of the input values used for the procedure in FIG. 3 whenever sending a new message. And, the UTRAN generates a new MAC-I each time using the partial change of input values. This is performed to prevent that an unauthorized party reuses the value of the MAC-I to pass the integrity check.
  • the UTRAN increases the SN value of the COUNT-I by increment of ‘1’ whenever sending a message.
  • the SN value constructs lower 4 bits of the COUNT-I. Being 4 bits, the SN value can have values ranging between 0 ⁇ 15 and sequentially increases by ‘1’ from ‘0’. Once the SN value becomes ‘15’, the next SN value becomes ‘0’ and then increases by the increment of ‘1’ again.
  • HFN corresponding to upper value of the COUNT-I value is increased by ‘1’ whenever the SN becomes back to ‘0’ from 15.
  • the terminal recognizes the SN value of the received message and judges that the SN value has completed one cycle, the terminal increases its HFN value by ‘1’.
  • the COUNT-I can coincide with that of the transmitting party. If such a method is used, the terminal and UTRAN can have the same COUNT-I information even if SN information is sent only. Besides, security information leakage, which may occur when the entire COUNT-I is sent, to a third party can be prevented.
  • UTRAN enables the receiving party to accurately calculate the XMAC-I value as well as adds the SN value as lower value of the COUNT-I to the message of each message transmission to prevent the unauthorized third party from passing the integrity check.
  • the LMAC-I value which will be used as a reference for the terminal to perform the integrity check, is added to the message to transmit.
  • UE Once UE receives the security setup control message, it is necessary to perform the security check of the SN value. For this, UE manages its local parameter SN only using the SN values received so far. If the SN value transmitted together with the security setup control message is equal to the local parameter SN value of the terminal, it can be assumed that a third party sends the message using the same security information of the transmitting party or that the same message is transmitted again from the authenticated UTRAN. In such a case, the terminal immediately discards the security setup control message.
  • the terminal configures COUNT-I using the SN value received together with the security setup control message and calculates XMAC-I using the parameters set previously in COUNT-I and UE.
  • the parameters set previously in UE include MESSAGE, DIRECTION, FRESH.
  • the UE By comparing the MAC-I value transmitted together with the security setup control message to the XMAC- 1 value calculated by UE, the UE performs the integrity check of the security setup control message.
  • the receiving party stores the SN value included in the message in the local parameter SN and uses it for the SN value check of the next message.
  • the method according to the present invention is implemented as a program and can be stored in recording media (CD ROM, floppy disk, hard disk, optical magnetic disk, etc.) as a form that can be read by computer.
  • recording media CD ROM, floppy disk, hard disk, optical magnetic disk, etc.

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
  • Computing Systems (AREA)
  • General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)
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EP1593278A1 (fr) 2005-11-09
AU2003288764A1 (en) 2004-09-06
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KR20040072858A (ko) 2004-08-19
UA85178C2 (uk) 2009-01-12
EP1593278B1 (fr) 2012-08-01
KR100956823B1 (ko) 2010-05-11
CN1748438A (zh) 2006-03-15
MXPA05008418A (es) 2006-02-03
US7471943B2 (en) 2008-12-30
RU2336665C2 (ru) 2008-10-20
AU2003288764B2 (en) 2008-10-30
RU2005128294A (ru) 2006-01-27
CN100544478C (zh) 2009-09-23
WO2004073347A1 (fr) 2004-08-26
JP4397818B2 (ja) 2010-01-13
ZA200506363B (en) 2006-07-26
US20040162065A1 (en) 2004-08-19

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