US20030217268A1 - System and method for using acoustic digital signature generator as oracle - Google Patents

System and method for using acoustic digital signature generator as oracle Download PDF

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Publication number
US20030217268A1
US20030217268A1 US10/171,960 US17196002A US2003217268A1 US 20030217268 A1 US20030217268 A1 US 20030217268A1 US 17196002 A US17196002 A US 17196002A US 2003217268 A1 US2003217268 A1 US 2003217268A1
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United States
Prior art keywords
challenge
token
signed
requesting application
private key
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Abandoned
Application number
US10/171,960
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English (en)
Inventor
Alexander Gantman
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Qualcomm Inc
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Qualcomm Inc
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Qualcomm Inc filed Critical Qualcomm Inc
Priority to US10/171,960 priority Critical patent/US20030217268A1/en
Assigned to QUALCOMM INCORPORATED reassignment QUALCOMM INCORPORATED ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNORS INTEREST (SEE DOCUMENT FOR DETAILS). Assignors: GANTMAN, ALEXANDER
Priority to PCT/US2003/015612 priority patent/WO2003098865A1/en
Priority to EP03726904A priority patent/EP1510029A4/en
Priority to KR10-2004-7018418A priority patent/KR20050003461A/ko
Priority to CA002485892A priority patent/CA2485892A1/en
Priority to JP2004506235A priority patent/JP2005526449A/ja
Priority to BR0309953-9A priority patent/BR0309953A/pt
Priority to CN038148188A priority patent/CN1663171B/zh
Priority to AU2003229316A priority patent/AU2003229316C1/en
Publication of US20030217268A1 publication Critical patent/US20030217268A1/en
Priority to IL16507404A priority patent/IL165074A0/xx
Priority to HK05111737.0A priority patent/HK1079926A1/xx
Priority to US11/349,328 priority patent/US7669053B2/en
Abandoned legal-status Critical Current

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Classifications

    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3247—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F11/00—Error detection; Error correction; Monitoring
    • G06F11/30—Monitoring
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04K—SECRET COMMUNICATION; JAMMING OF COMMUNICATION
    • H04K1/00—Secret communication
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3271—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using challenge-response
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04N—PICTORIAL COMMUNICATION, e.g. TELEVISION
    • H04N21/00—Selective content distribution, e.g. interactive television or video on demand [VOD]
    • H04N21/20—Servers specifically adapted for the distribution of content, e.g. VOD servers; Operations thereof
    • H04N21/23—Processing of content or additional data; Elementary server operations; Server middleware
    • H04N21/234—Processing of video elementary streams, e.g. splicing of video streams or manipulating encoded video stream scene graphs
    • H04N21/2347—Processing of video elementary streams, e.g. splicing of video streams or manipulating encoded video stream scene graphs involving video stream encryption
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/03—Protecting confidentiality, e.g. by encryption
    • H04W12/033—Protecting confidentiality, e.g. by encryption of the user plane, e.g. user's traffic
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
    • H04L2209/80—Wireless
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
    • H04L2209/84—Vehicles
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/60—Context-dependent security
    • H04W12/65—Environment-dependent, e.g. using captured environmental data

Definitions

  • the present invention relates generally to pseudorandom oracles.
  • sonic tokens have the advantage of transmitting the private information on the token in a fashion that prevents the receiver from knowing the private information without a confidential key.
  • the above-referenced applications disclose sonic tokens that digitally sign a message using private key/public principles. More specifically, the sonic tokens digitally sign a message by combining the message with secret information (a private key) and with a pseudorandom number (PN) to render a signed message that can be verified as authentic only by an entity possessing the public key that corresponds to the private key.
  • PN pseudorandom number
  • the above-discussed properties of sonic tokens render them suitable for use as pseudorandom oracles for encryption purposes. More particularly, the present invention recognizes that if an application requires a relatively strong encryption key, it selectively can be granted access to the token by a user of the token to obtain, for use as an encryption key, the product of the secret information in the token, but not the secret information itself, thereby keeping it secure.
  • a method for essentially converting an easy to remember challenge to a pseudorandom encryption key using a hand-held sonic token as a pseudorandom oracle.
  • the pseudorandom encryption key that is generated by the sonic token is a relatively strong key that is difficult for unauthorized parties to violate.
  • a method for encryption includes generating a challenge, and acoustically sending the challenge to a portable token.
  • the method further includes deciding whether to allow the token to function as a pseudorandom oracle, and if so, causing the token to digitally sign the challenge to render a signed challenge.
  • the signed challenge is acoustically transmitted for use thereof to encrypt data.
  • the challenge is generated by a requesting application which encrypts data using the signed challenge.
  • the challenge may be displayed in human readable form to help a user decide whether to allow the token to be used as a pseudorandom oracle.
  • the token digitally signs the challenge at least in part by combining the challenge with a private key.
  • the private key can be a secret and can have a corresponding public key.
  • the signed challenge can be generated using a process that always renders the same signed challenge when presented with the same challenge.
  • the token can digitally sign the challenge by combining the challenge with the private key and with a pseudorandom number (PN), and when a challenge is signed, the PN can be stored for reuse upon a second receipt of the same challenge for, e.g., decryption purposes.
  • PN pseudorandom number
  • a system for encryption includes a requesting application transmitting a challenge to a token using a wireless communication path.
  • a token receives the challenge and digitally signs it with a private key to render a signed challenge.
  • the token then transmits the signed challenge to the requesting application using a wireless communication path, so that the requesting application can use the signed challenge to encrypt data.
  • an encryption system includes acoustic means for transmitting a challenge from a requesting application, and means for receiving the challenge and generating a signed challenge in response. Acoustic means are provided for transmitting the signed challenge to the requesting application. Means are also provided for encrypting data associated with the requesting application using the signed challenge.
  • FIG. 1 is a block diagram of the present system
  • FIG. 2 is a flow chart of the encryption logic
  • FIG. 3 is a flow chart of the decryption logic.
  • a system is shown, generally designated 10 , that includes a portable hand-held token 12 that can be configured as a key fob or other small device.
  • the present invention applies to other token configurations, such as mobile communication stations including laptop computers, wireless handsets or telephones, data transceivers, or paging and position determination receivers that can be hand-held or portable as in vehicle-mounted (including cars, trucks, boats, planes, trains), as desired.
  • Wireless communication devices are also sometimes referred to as user terminals, mobile stations, mobile units, subscriber units, mobile radios or radiotelephones, wireless units, or simply as “users” and “mobiles” in some communication systems.
  • the preferred token 12 includes a visual display 14 and an electronic data store 16 .
  • the token 12 can include a pseudorandom number (PN) generator 18 .
  • a token microprocessor 20 accesses the PN generator 18 and data store 16 , and can cause the display 14 to present alpha-numeric or graphical information that a user can read or hear.
  • PN pseudorandom number
  • the token microprocessor 20 can receive electronic signals from a microphone 22 , which generates the electronic signals by transforming received sound waves 24 received by the microphone 22 . Also, the token microprocessor 20 can send electronic signals to a speaker 26 , which transforms the electronic signals to transmitted sound signals 28 . As disclosed further below, the received sound signals 24 might represent a challenge (e.g., a request for encryption key) from a user component 30 , and the transmitted sound signals 28 might represent a signed challenge (e.g., the requested encryption key). While an acoustic wireless communication is preferred, other wireless paths, e.g., rf paths, might be used.
  • a challenge e.g., a request for encryption key
  • the transmitted sound signals 28 might represent a signed challenge (e.g., the requested encryption key). While an acoustic wireless communication is preferred, other wireless paths, e.g., rf paths, might be used.
  • the user component 30 can be, e.g., a computer that includes a requesting microprocessor 32 which executes a software-implemented user application 34 .
  • the user application 34 can be, e.g., a word processing application or other document-generating or more generally data-generating application that might wish to encrypt the generated data with a relatively strong encryption key.
  • the user component 30 can include a speaker 36 for transmitting an acoustic representation of a challenge and a microphone 38 for receiving an acoustic representation of the response. Both the speaker 36 and microphone 38 communicate with the requesting microprocessor 32 .
  • the signature algorithm in the token 12 can combine a private key with a message to be signed and with a random number “k” from the PN generator 18 to render a digital signature which is a random pair (r,s).
  • the token microprocessor 20 executes the signature algorithm upon receipt of activation signals from, e.g., one or more activation elements 40 such as toggle switches, voice activation devices, or pushbuttons.
  • the token microprocessor 20 can include a digital processor proper as well as necessary clocks, analog to digital conversion circuitry, and digital to analog conversion circuitry known in the art.
  • the token microprocessor 20 accesses the data store 16 , such that when multiple activation elements 40 are used, one or more can be associated with a respective private key in the store 16 .
  • the data store 16 may hold public key IDs, and if desired PNs that have already been generated and used to sign challenges, along with a correlation of the PNs to the challenges, in accordance with one non-limiting exemplary embodiment disclosed below.
  • FIG. 2 shows the encryption logic of the present invention.
  • a challenge e.g., an easy to remember challenge such as the word “password”
  • the token 12 can display the challenge and, if desired, the source of the challenge in human readable form on the display 14 , so that a user may decide, at decision diamond 46 , whether to allow the token 12 to function as a pseudorandom oracle. If the user decides against allowing the application 34 to access the token 12 for oracle purposes, the logic ends at state 48 .
  • the token 12 uses a signing process that always renders the same signed challenge when presented with the same challenge.
  • the token 12 might combine the challenge with a private key in the data store 16 but not with a PN from the PN generator 18 .
  • the conventional private key protocol might be followed, wherein the signed challenge is generated by combining the challenge with both the private key and with a PN, but with the PN subsequently being stored in the data store 16 along with a correlation of the PN to the particular challenge with which it was used, for purposes to be shortly disclosed.
  • the token 12 sends the signed challenge to the user component 30 using the communication paths disclosed above for use of the signed challenge as an encryption key by the user application 34 to encrypt data at block 54 using, e.g., DES encryption principles known in the art.
  • the application then proceeds to block 56 to delete the signed challenge from its memory and from any peripheral storage devices (e.g., hard disk drives) associated with the user component 30 on which the signed challenge might have been stored.
  • peripheral storage devices e.g., hard disk drives
  • the logic of FIG. 3 is invoked.
  • the same challenge that was used in FIG. 2 is sent by the user component 30 to the token 12 .
  • the token 12 can display the challenge in human readable form on the display 14 , so that a user may decide, at decision diamond 62 , whether to allow the token 12 to function as a pseudorandom oracle for decryption purposes. If the user decides against this, the logic ends at state 64 . Otherwise, the logic proceeds to block 66 , wherein the token digitally signs the challenge to render a signed challenge.
  • the token can, e.g., regenerate the same signed challenge as was generated for encryption using a signing process that does not require a PN, or it can regenerate the same signed challenge using conventional private key protocol, with the following exception.
  • the PN that was used to generate the signed challenge during encryption and that was subsequently stored in the data store 16 (along with a correlation of the challenge) can be retrieved at block 66 based on the challenge and then combined with the challenge and the private key to render the signed challenge.
  • the token 12 sends the signed challenge to the user component 30 for use of the signed challenge by the user application 34 to decrypt data at block 70 .
  • the application then proceeds to block 72 to delete the signed challenge from its memory and from any peripheral storage devices (e.g., hard disk drives) associated with the user component 30 on which the signed challenge might have been stored.
  • peripheral storage devices e.g., hard disk drives

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
  • Quality & Reliability (AREA)
  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Multimedia (AREA)
  • Storage Device Security (AREA)
  • Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)
US10/171,960 2002-05-15 2002-06-13 System and method for using acoustic digital signature generator as oracle Abandoned US20030217268A1 (en)

Priority Applications (12)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
US10/171,960 US20030217268A1 (en) 2002-05-15 2002-06-13 System and method for using acoustic digital signature generator as oracle
AU2003229316A AU2003229316C1 (en) 2002-05-15 2003-05-15 System and method for using acoustic digital signature generator as oracle
BR0309953-9A BR0309953A (pt) 2002-05-15 2003-05-15 Sistema e método para uso de um gerador acústico de assinatura digital como um oráculo
EP03726904A EP1510029A4 (en) 2002-05-15 2003-05-15 SYSTEM AND METHOD FOR USE OF AN ACOUSTIC DIGITAL SIGNATURE GENERATOR AS ORAKEL
KR10-2004-7018418A KR20050003461A (ko) 2002-05-15 2003-05-15 음향 디지털 시그너쳐 생성기를 오라클로서 이용하기 위한시스템 및 방법
CA002485892A CA2485892A1 (en) 2002-05-15 2003-05-15 System and method for using acoustic digital signature generator as oracle
JP2004506235A JP2005526449A (ja) 2002-05-15 2003-05-15 音響電子署名生成器をオラクルとして用いるシステムおよび方法
PCT/US2003/015612 WO2003098865A1 (en) 2002-05-15 2003-05-15 System and method for using acoustic digital signature generator as oracle
CN038148188A CN1663171B (zh) 2002-05-15 2003-05-15 使用声音数字签名发生器作为预言的系统和方法
IL16507404A IL165074A0 (en) 2002-05-15 2004-11-07 System and method for using acoustic digal signature generator as oracle
HK05111737.0A HK1079926A1 (en) 2002-05-15 2005-12-20 System and method for using acoustic digital signature generator as oracle
US11/349,328 US7669053B2 (en) 2002-05-15 2006-02-06 System and method for using acoustic digital signature generator as oracle

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US38065202P 2002-05-15 2002-05-15
US10/171,960 US20030217268A1 (en) 2002-05-15 2002-06-13 System and method for using acoustic digital signature generator as oracle

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US11/349,328 Expired - Fee Related US7669053B2 (en) 2002-05-15 2006-02-06 System and method for using acoustic digital signature generator as oracle

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EP (1) EP1510029A4 (zh)
JP (1) JP2005526449A (zh)
KR (1) KR20050003461A (zh)
CN (1) CN1663171B (zh)
AU (1) AU2003229316C1 (zh)
BR (1) BR0309953A (zh)
CA (1) CA2485892A1 (zh)
HK (1) HK1079926A1 (zh)
IL (1) IL165074A0 (zh)
WO (1) WO2003098865A1 (zh)

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US20070162743A1 (en) * 2006-01-12 2007-07-12 Savant Protection, Inc. Sliding acoustical signatures
US20090060180A1 (en) * 2007-08-29 2009-03-05 Red Hat, Inc. Method and an apparatus to generate pseudo random bits for a cryptographic key
US20090060179A1 (en) * 2007-08-29 2009-03-05 Red Hat, Inc. Method and an apparatus to generate pseudo random bits from polynomials
US20090214024A1 (en) * 2008-02-21 2009-08-27 Schneider James P Block cipher using multiplication over a finite field of even characteristic
US20090220083A1 (en) * 2008-02-28 2009-09-03 Schneider James P Stream cipher using multiplication over a finite field of even characteristic
US20090292751A1 (en) * 2008-05-22 2009-11-26 James Paul Schneider Non-linear mixing of pseudo-random number generator output
US20100135486A1 (en) * 2008-11-30 2010-06-03 Schneider James P Nonlinear feedback mode for block ciphers
US8588412B2 (en) 2008-05-23 2013-11-19 Red Hat, Inc. Mechanism for generating pseudorandom number sequences
US20200374277A1 (en) * 2019-05-24 2020-11-26 AVAST Software s.r.o. Secure authentication in adverse environments

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US20070162743A1 (en) * 2006-01-12 2007-07-12 Savant Protection, Inc. Sliding acoustical signatures
US8265272B2 (en) * 2007-08-29 2012-09-11 Red Hat, Inc. Method and an apparatus to generate pseudo random bits for a cryptographic key
US20090060180A1 (en) * 2007-08-29 2009-03-05 Red Hat, Inc. Method and an apparatus to generate pseudo random bits for a cryptographic key
US20090060179A1 (en) * 2007-08-29 2009-03-05 Red Hat, Inc. Method and an apparatus to generate pseudo random bits from polynomials
US8781117B2 (en) * 2007-08-29 2014-07-15 Red Hat, Inc. Generating pseudo random bits from polynomials
US20090214024A1 (en) * 2008-02-21 2009-08-27 Schneider James P Block cipher using multiplication over a finite field of even characteristic
US8416947B2 (en) 2008-02-21 2013-04-09 Red Hat, Inc. Block cipher using multiplication over a finite field of even characteristic
US20090220083A1 (en) * 2008-02-28 2009-09-03 Schneider James P Stream cipher using multiplication over a finite field of even characteristic
US7945049B2 (en) 2008-02-28 2011-05-17 Red Hat, Inc. Stream cipher using multiplication over a finite field of even characteristic
US8560587B2 (en) 2008-05-22 2013-10-15 Red Hat, Inc. Non-linear mixing of pseudo-random number generator output
US20090292751A1 (en) * 2008-05-22 2009-11-26 James Paul Schneider Non-linear mixing of pseudo-random number generator output
US8588412B2 (en) 2008-05-23 2013-11-19 Red Hat, Inc. Mechanism for generating pseudorandom number sequences
US8358781B2 (en) 2008-11-30 2013-01-22 Red Hat, Inc. Nonlinear feedback mode for block ciphers
US20100135486A1 (en) * 2008-11-30 2010-06-03 Schneider James P Nonlinear feedback mode for block ciphers
US20200374277A1 (en) * 2019-05-24 2020-11-26 AVAST Software s.r.o. Secure authentication in adverse environments
US11968202B2 (en) * 2019-05-24 2024-04-23 AVAST Software s.r.o. Secure authentication in adverse environments

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KR20050003461A (ko) 2005-01-10
BR0309953A (pt) 2005-04-05
JP2005526449A (ja) 2005-09-02
HK1079926A1 (en) 2006-04-13
AU2003229316C1 (en) 2009-08-27
US7669053B2 (en) 2010-02-23
AU2003229316A1 (en) 2003-12-02
EP1510029A4 (en) 2007-01-31
IL165074A0 (en) 2005-12-18
CN1663171A (zh) 2005-08-31
CN1663171B (zh) 2010-05-05
EP1510029A1 (en) 2005-03-02
AU2003229316B2 (en) 2008-11-06
WO2003098865A1 (en) 2003-11-27
CA2485892A1 (en) 2003-11-27
US20070180243A1 (en) 2007-08-02

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