TWI625643B - Anonymity based authentication method for wireless sensor networks - Google Patents

Abstract

The invention provides an anonymous authentication method in a wireless sensing network. Through the smart card carried by the user, the anonymous authentication method of the present invention can provide two-factor authentication protection. In addition, in all message transmission processes, random number factors and hash operations are used to package the transmitted messages. Therefore, the anonymous authentication method of the present invention has a relatively high security. Furthermore, all operations for transmitting messages use only a combination of a hash function and an XOR operand. Therefore, the anonymous authentication method of the present invention has the advantage of high operation efficiency.

Description

Anonymous authentication method for wireless sensing network

The present invention relates to an anonymous authentication method in a network environment, and more particularly, the present invention relates to an anonymous authentication method in a wireless sensing network.

A wireless sensor network includes many sensor nodes distributed in space. Each sensing node can be regarded as a device provided with a sensor. These devices are used to collaboratively monitor physical or environmental conditions (such as temperature, sound, vibration, pressure, motion, or pollutants) at different locations. The user can obtain the required sensing data by accessing the sensing node. Wireless sensing networks are now being used in various fields such as environmental and ecological monitoring, health monitoring, home automation, and traffic control.

Because wireless sensing networks pass messages wirelessly, their communications are easily exposed and monitored. The open environment also makes wireless sensing networks vulnerable to attacks including DoS, gateway node camouflage, sensor node camouflage, etc., allowing hackers to obtain illegal information. In addition, in order to block the above-mentioned attack methods, the conventionally mentioned methods are often too complicated, which makes their computational efficiency low. drop. Therefore, it is important to find authentication methods suitable for wireless sensing networks that have high efficiency, high performance, and security.

To solve the above problems, the present invention proposes an anonymous authentication method for wireless sensor networks. Two-factor authentication can be performed through the smart card carried by the user, which can improve security. In addition, the anonymous authentication method of the wireless sensing network of the present invention uses random number factors and hash operations to package the transmitted message in the registration procedure, the login procedure, and the authentication and key agreement procedure, thereby taking advantage of Provide anonymous features. In addition, all operations for transmitting messages use only a combination of hash functions and XOR operands, which has the advantages of high operation efficiency and low energy consumption, which can greatly reduce system construction costs.

To achieve the above object, in one embodiment, the anonymous authentication method for a wireless sensing network provided by the present invention includes a registration procedure, a login procedure, and an authentication and key agreement procedure. The registration procedure includes a use User registration procedure and a sensor node registration procedure; the user registration procedure includes: a user selects a user identity ID _i and a user password PW _i ; the user generates a random number factor r _i and calculates h ( r _i ⊕PW _i ), where h (.) is a one-way hash function operation; the user transmits the user identity ID _i and h (r _i ⊕PW _i ) to a gateway node through a secure channel; received from After the message sent by the user, the gateway node selects one of the user's temporary credentials TC _i , a deadline time TE _i , and calculates: P _i = h (ID _i ∥ ID _GWN ∥ TE _i ), TC _i = h (P _i ∥ K _GWN-U ∥ TE _i ), PTC _i = TC _i ⊕h (r _i ⊕PW _i ), Q _i = h (ID _i ∥ K _GWN-U ), B _i = Q _i ⊕h _{(ID i ∥ h (r i} ⊕PW i)) and _{R i = h (Q i)} , and credentials issued by the user temporarily TC _i to a user, wherein characters ∥ is the concatenation, XOR is ⊕ Operator element; gateway node issuing a set of secret safety parameter set through a channel to one user smart card _{(Smart Card) {ID GWN,} PTC i, TE i, B i, R i, h (.)}; And The user enters the random number factor r _i into the smart card. At this time, the smart card contains the secret parameter set {ID _GWN , PTC _i , TE _i , B _i , R _i , r _i , h (.)}; The sensing node registration procedure. Including: a sensing node sets a sensing node identity SID _{j in} advance; the sensing node generates a random number factor r _j and calculates h (r _j ⊕SID _j ); the sensing node transmits the identity of the sensing node through a secure channel Identify SID _j and h (r _j ⊕SID _j ) to the gateway node; after receiving the message sent from the sensing node, the gateway node calculates: TC _j = h (K _GWN-S ∥ SID _j ) to issue a The temporary credentials of the sensing node TC _j to the sensing node; the gateway node calculates RTC _j = TC _j ⊕h (h (r _j ⊕SID _j ) ∥ SID _j ), and transmits RTC _j to the sensing node through a secure channel; and after receiving the message transmitted by the gateway node, the sense node calculation _{TC j = RTC j ⊕h (h} (r j ⊕SID j) ∥ SID j) sense node to verify whether the certificate is temporarily positive TC _j And stored; sign (the Login) program comprising: a smart card inserted by the user of it to a portable reader, a smart card and provide a corresponding identification of the user identity ID _i and the user password PW _i; computing smart card _{Q i = B i ⊕h (ID} i ∥ h (r i ⊕PW i)) and ^{_{R i * = h (Q i}} ), this ratio R _i ^* and the value previously stored in the smart card in the R _i the values are equal; if its value is not equal, then the smart card reject login process; if its value matches, then the user is recognized as legitimate, then the user can read the smart card in the stored message; user computing TC _i = PTC _i ⊕h (r _i ⊕PW _i ) to obtain the user's temporary certificate TC _i ; the authentication and key agreement procedure includes: the user generates a random number factor N _i and calculates: P _i = h (ID _i ∥ ID _GWN ∥ TE _i ), DID _i = ID _i ⊕h (TC _i ∥ ID _GWN ∥ N _i ), and q ₁ = h (ID _i ∥ TC _i ∥ N _i ); the user randomly selects a shared key K _i , And calculate PKS _i = K _i ⊕h (TC _i ∥ N _i ); after the calculation is completed, the user sends a login request message set m ₁ = {DID _i , q ₁ , PKS _i , TE _i , P _i , N _i} to the gateway node; in Sign m eligible request message set to _1, the gateway node _{calculation: TC i = h (P i} ∥ K GWN-U ∥ TE i), ID i = DID i ⊕h (TC i ∥ ID GWN ∥ N i) and q _i ^* = h (ID _i ∥ TC _i ∥ N _i ); whether the gateway nodes compare q ₁ ^* and q ₁ are equal; if q ₁ ^* ≠ q ₁ , the gateway node terminates the user's login request and sends a Reject the message to the user; if q ₁ ^* = q ₁ , the user is judged to be legitimate, the gateway node accepts the user's login request and records the login status of one of the users; the gateway node calculates K _i = PKS _i ⊕h (TC _i ∥ N _i ); At this time, the gateway node selects the nearest and appropriate sensing node as the sensing node to be accessed, the identity of the sensing node is identified as SID _j , and the sensing of the sensing node is calculated The node's temporary identity certificate TC _j = h (K _GWN-S ∥ SID _j ); the gateway node generates a random number factor N _GWN and calculates DID _GWN = ID _i ⊕h (TC _j ∥ DID _i ∥ N _GWN ), q ₂ = h (ID _i ∥ TC _j ∥ N _GWN ) and PKS _GWN = K _i ⊕h (TC _j ∥ N _GWN ); after the calculation is completed, the gateway node sends a message set m ₂ = {DID _i 、 DID _GWN 、 q _2, PKS _GWN, ID _GWN N _i, N _GWN} to the sensing node; after receipt of the message set to ₂ m, the sensing node ID _GWN identifiable Evaluation node to determine whether the gateway node Alliance (Ally); if the judging result is valid, the sense node Calculation: ID _i = DID _GWN ⊕h (TC _j ∥ DID _i ∥ N _GWN ) and q ₂ ^* = h (ID _i ∥ TC _j ∥ N _GWN ); whether the sensing nodes compare q ₂ ^* and q ₂ are equal; If q ₂ ^* ≠ q ₂ , the sensing node terminates the request and returns a rejection message; if q ₂ ^* = q ₂ , the gateway node is judged to be legitimate and the sensing node accepts the request; at this time, the sensing node Calculation: K _i = PKS _GWN ⊕h (TC _j ∥ N _GWN ); the sensing node randomly selects a shared key K _j and calculates q ₃ = h (ID _i ∥ SID _j ∥ K _i ∥ N _i ∥ N _GWN ) And PKS _j = K _j ⊕h (K _i ∥ N _i ∥ N _GWN ); the sensing node sends a message set m ₃ = {SID _j , q ₃ , PKS _j , N _i , N _GWN } to the user and Gateway node; after receiving the message set m ₃ , the user and the gateway node separately calculate q ₃ ^* = h (ID _i ∥ SID _j ∥ K _i ∥ N _i ∥ N _GWN ); after the calculation, the gateway Node comparison q ₃ ^* and q ₃ are equal; if q ₃ ^* = q ₃ , the gateway node judges that the sensing node is legal; similarly, the user also compares whether q ₃ ^* and q ₃ are equal. If q ₃ ^* = q ₃ , the user confirms the sensing node And the gateway node are legal; the user and the gateway node respectively calculate K _j = PKS _j ih (K _i ∥ N _i ∥ N _GWN ); after the authentication process is completed, the user, the gateway node, and the sensing node each Calculate a shared conference key KEY _ij = h (K _i ∥ K _j ∥ N _i ∥ N _GWN ∥ SID _j ). Among them, P _i , PTC _i , Q _i , B _i , R _i , RTC _j , PKS _i , PKS _GWN , PKS _j , q _i ^* , q ₁ , q ₂ ^* , q ₂ , q ₃ ^* , q ₃ , R _i and ^{_{R i *, P i new,}} B i new, PTC i new calculated value.

The anonymous authentication method of the wireless sensing network further includes a password replacement procedure. The password replacement procedure includes: a user inserts a smart card into a card reader, and provides a user identity ID _i and a password PW _i .

Calculate Q _i = B _i ⊕h (ID _i ∥ h (r _i ⊕PW _i )) and R _i ^* = h (Q _i ) on the user's smart card, and then verify that the calculated R _i ^* is stored in the original Whether the R _i values in the smart card are equal; if they are not equal, the smart card rejects the login request; if they are equal, the user is judged to be legal, and the user can read the information stored in the smart card; Password PW _i ^new and a new random number factor r _i ^new ; smart card calculation B _i ^new = Q _i ⊕h (ID _i ∥ h (r _i ^new ⊕PW _i ^new )), PTC _i ^new = PTC _i ⊕ h (r _i ⊕PW _i ) ⊕h (r _i ^new ⊕PW _i ^new ); the smart card replaces the original {PTC _i , B _i , r _i with the parameters {PTC _i ^new , B _i ^new , r _i ^new } }, At this time, the smart card contains a secret parameter set {ID _GWN , PTC _i ^new , TE _i , B _i ^new , R _i , r _i ^new , h (.)}, Where P _i ^new , B _i ^new , PTC _i ^new is a calculated value.

In the foregoing anonymous authentication method for a wireless sensing network, the gateway node may be a computer having a storage function. The smart card may be a multi-function card including a chip.

U _i ‧‧‧ user

S _j ‧‧‧ sensing node

GWN‧‧‧Gateway node

ID _i ‧‧‧user identification

ID _GWN ‧‧‧Gateway node identification

PW _i ‧‧‧User Password

PW _j ‧‧‧ sensor node password

DID _i ‧‧‧Dynamic user identification

DID _GWN ‧‧‧ Identification of Dynamic Gateway Node

SID _j ‧‧‧Sensing node identity recognition

K _GWN-U ‧‧‧ Private Key

K _GWN-S ‧‧‧ Private Key

KEY _ij ‧‧‧ shared conference key

K _i , K _j ‧‧‧ shared key

TC _i ‧‧‧ temporary user certificate

TC _j ‧‧‧ sensor node temporary credentials

TE _i ‧‧‧ Deadline

_{r i, r j, N i} , N GWN, r i new ‧‧‧ nonce factor

→ ‧‧‧Message

⊕‧‧‧XOR

h (.) ‧‧‧ one-way hash function operation

∥‧‧‧Character connection operation

m ₁ ‧‧‧Login request message collection

m ₂ ‧‧‧Message Collection

m ₃ ‧‧‧Message Collection

P _i , PTC _i , Q _i , B _i , R _i , RTC _j , PKS _i , PKS _GWN , PKS _j , q ₁ ^* , q ₁ , q ₂ ^* , q ₂ , q ₃ ^* , q ₃ , R _i , R _i ^* ‧‧‧ calculated value

FIG. 1 illustrates a schematic diagram of a user registration procedure for an anonymous authentication method of a wireless sensing network according to an embodiment of the present invention; FIG. 2 illustrates an anonymous authentication method of a wireless sensing network according to an embodiment of the present invention; Schematic diagram of the registration procedure of the sensing node; FIG. 3A illustrates a schematic diagram of the login procedure, authentication, and key agreement procedure of the wireless sensing network according to an embodiment of the present invention; FIG. 3B illustrates the wireless sensing network following FIG. 3A The schematic diagram of the login procedure, authentication, and key agreement procedure of the anonymous authentication method of the present invention; and FIG. 3C shows the schematic diagram of the login procedure, authentication, and key agreement procedure of the anonymous authentication method following the wireless sensing network of FIG. 3B.

Hereinafter, a plurality of embodiments of the present invention will be described with reference to the drawings. For the sake of clarity, many practical details will be explained in the following description. It should be understood, however, that these practical details should not be used to limit the invention. That is, in some embodiments of the present invention, these practical details are unnecessary. In addition, in order to simplify the drawings, some conventional structures and components will be shown in the drawings in a simple and schematic manner.

In order to make the content of the present invention more clearly understood, the results calculated by different participants should have different calculation values, which are used for mutual authentication and comparison between different participants. The calculated values mentioned above, for example, the calculated values P _i , PTC _i , Q _i , B _i , R _i , RTC _j , PKS _i , PKS _GWN , PKS _j , q _{1 ^{*, q 1, q 2 *}} , q 2, q 3 *, q 3, R i, R i *, P i new, B i new, PTC i new.

The invention provides a high-efficiency authentication method based on anonymity under a Wireless Sensor Networks. In a wireless sensing network, there will be three participants, namely a user U _i , a sensing node S _j and a gateway node GWN. The anonymous authentication method of the wireless sensing network of the present invention includes a registration procedure, a login procedure, an authentication and key agreement procedure, and may optionally include a password replacement procedure.

The registration process includes two parts, one is the user U _i registration process, and the other is the sensing node S _j registration process. Please refer to FIG. 1 and FIG. 2 respectively. First, the user U _i registration procedure will be described. The steps are as follows.

The user U _i selects a user identification ID _i and a user password PW _i .

The user U _i generates a random number factor r _i and calculates a hash function h (r _i ⊕PW _i ). Among them, the h (.) Form operates on a hash function, a table XOR operator, and a table character concatenation operation.

The user transmits the user identification ID _i and h (r _i ⊕PW _i ) to the gateway node GWN through a secure channel to prepare for registration.

After receiving the message transmitted from the user U _i, the user select a user gateway node GWN temporary credentials of one U _{i i} deadline TC TE _i, and _{calculates: P i = h (ID i} ∥ ID GWN ∥ TE _i ), TC _i = h (P _i ∥ K _GWN-U ∥ TE _i ), PTC _i = TC _i ⊕h (r _i ⊕PW _i ), Q _i = h (ID _i ∥ K _GWN-U ), B _i = Q _i ⊕h (ID _i ∥ h (r _i ⊕PW _i )) and R _i = h (Q _i ) and issue the user temporary certificate TC _i to the user U _i .

GWN gateway connection node issuing a set of secret parameters set via a secure channel _{{ID GWN, PTC i, TE} i, B i, R i, h (.)} U _i to one user smart card (Smart Card).

The user U _i inputs the random number factor r _i to the smart card. At this time, the smart card includes a secret parameter set {ID _GWN , PTC _i , TE _i , B _i , R _i , r _i , h (.)}.

The following describes the registration procedure of the sensing node _Sj . The registration steps of the sensing node _Sj are as follows.

The sensing node S _j sets a sensing node identity SID _{j in} advance.

The sensing node S _j generates a random number factor r _j and calculates h (r _j ⊕SID _j ).

The sensing node S _j transmits the sensing node identity SID _j and h (r _j ⊕SID _j ) to the gateway node GWN for registration through a secure channel.

After receiving the message transmitted from the sensing node S _j , the gateway node GWN calculates: TC _j = h (K _GWN-S ∥ SID _j ) to issue the temporary certificate TC _{j of the} sensing node to the sensing node S _j . Subsequently, the gateway node GWN calculates RTC _j = TC _j ⊕h (h (r _j ⊕SID _j ) ∥ SID _j ), and transmits RTC _j to the sensing node S _j through a secure channel.

After receiving the message sent by the gateway node GWN, the sensing node S _j calculates the temporary credentials of the sensing node TC _j = RTC _j ⊕h (h (r _j ⊕SID _j ) ∥ SID _j ) to confirm the temporary credentials of the sensing node TC _j is correct and stored.

The following describes the operation of the login procedure, authentication, and key agreement procedure. Please refer to Figures 3A to 3C together.

When the user U _i wants to log in the system, the user continues to enter the login process. The login procedure steps are as follows.

The user U _i inserts his smart card into a card reader, and provides the user identification ID _i and the user password PW _{i of the} corresponding smart card. The smart card calculates Q _i = B _i ⊕h (ID _i ∥ h (r _i ⊕PW _i )) and R _i ^* = h (Q _i ), and compares the value of R _i ^* with the original value stored in the smart card. Whether the values of R _i are equal. If the values are not equal, the smart card refuses the login process; if the values are equal, the user U _i confirms that it is legal, and at this time the user U _i can read the information stored in the smart card.

Subsequently, the user U _i calculates the user temporary certificate TC _i = PTC _i ⊕h (r _i iPW _i ) to obtain the user temporary certificate TC _i .

After confirming the user U _i and obtaining the user's temporary credentials TC _i , the connection must be performed between the user U _i , the gateway node GWN, and the sensing node S _j .

First, the user U _i is authenticated by the gateway node GWN; then, the sensor node S _j authenticates the gateway node GWN; finally, the user U _i and the gateway node GWN authenticate the sensor node S _j . After mutual authentication, the user U _i and the sensing node S _j are agreed to obtain the shared conference key KEY _ij between the user U _i and the sensing node S _j , and the conference key is shared during the message transmission process. KEY _ij will be used to encrypt the message.

The above mutual authentication steps are as follows: the user U _i generates a random number factor N _i and calculates: P _i = h (ID _i ∥ ID _GWN ∥ TE _i ), DID _i = ID _i ⊕h (TC _i ∥ ID _GWN ∥ N _i ) and q ₁ = h (ID _i ∥ TC _i ∥ N _i ).

Subsequently, the user U _i randomly selects a shared key K _i and calculates PKS _i = K _i ⊕h (TC _i ∥ N _i ). After completion of the calculation, the user U _i transmits the login request message set _{m 1 = {DID i, q} 1, PKS i, TE i, P i, N i} to the gateway node GWN.

After receiving the login request message set m ₁ , the gateway node GWN calculates: TC _i = h (P _i ∥ K _GWN-U ∥ TE _i ), ID _i = DID _i ⊕h (TC _i ∥ ID _GWN ∥ N _i ) And q ₁ ^* = h (ID _i ∥ TC _i ∥ N _i ). Then, the gateway node GWN compares whether q ₁ ^* and q ₁ are equal. If q ₁ ^* ≠ q ₁ , the gateway node GWN terminates the login request of user U _i and sends a rejection message to user Ui. If q ₁ ^* = q ₁ , it is judged that the user U _i is legitimate, and the gateway node GWN accepts the login request of the user U _i . At this time, the gateway node GWN will record the login status of the user U _i in order to confirm that the user U _i is logging in to the system. Gateway node GWN and calculate K _i = PKS _i ⊕h (TC _i ∥ N _i ). Connection, GWN select the nearest gateway node and the appropriate sense node S _j S _j as the sense node will be accessed, and the sense node S _j is calculated sense node temporarily Credential _{TC j = h (K GWN-} S ∥ SID _j ), where SID _j is the identity identification of the sensing node. Next, the gateway node GWN generates a random number factor N _GWN and calculates DID _GWN = ID _i ⊕h (TC _j ∥ DID _i ∥ N _GWN ), q ₂ = h (ID _i ∥ TC _j ∥ N _GWN ) and PKS _GWN = K _i ⊕h (TC _j ∥ N _GWN ). After the calculation is completed, the gateway node GWN sends a message set m ₂ = {DID _i , DID _GWN , q ₂ , PKS _GWN , ID _GWN , N _i , N _GWN } to the sensing node S _j .

After receiving the message set m ₂ , the sensing node S _j evaluates the gateway node identity ID _GWN to determine whether the gateway node GWN is an ally. If the judgment result is valid, the sensing node S _j calculates: ID _i = DID _GWN ⊕h (TC _j ∥ DID _i ∥ N _GWN ) and q ₂ ^* = h (ID _i ∥ TC _j ∥ N _GWN ). Subsequently, the sensing node S _j compares whether q ₂ ^* and q ₂ are equal. If q ₂ ^* ≠ q ₂ , the sensing node S _j terminates the request and returns a rejection message. If q ₂ ^* = q ₂ , it is judged that the gateway node GWN is legal, and the sensing node S _j accepts the request. At this time, the sensing node S _j calculates: K _i = PKS _GWN ⊕h (TC _j ∥ N _GWN ). Next, the sensing node S _j randomly selects a shared key K _j and calculates q ₃ = h (ID _i ∥ SID _j ∥ K _i ∥ N _i ∥ N _GWN ) and PKS _j = K _j ⊕h (K _i ∥ N _i ∥ N _GWN ). After calculation, the sensing node S _j sends a message set m ₃ = {SID _j , q ₃ , PKS _j , N _i , N _GWN } to the user U _i and the gateway node GWN.

After receiving the message set m ₃ , the user U _i and the gateway node GWN separately calculate q ₃ ^* = h (ID _i ∥ SID _j ∥ K _i ∥ N _i ∥ N _GWN ). After calculation, the gateway node GWN compares whether q ₃ ^* and q ₃ are equal. If q ₃ ^* = q ₃ , the gateway node GWN determines that the sensing node S _j is valid. Similarly, the user U _i also compares whether q ₃ ^* and q ₃ are equal. If q ₃ ^* = q ₃ , the user U _i can confirm that the sensing node S _j and the gateway node GWN are legal.

Subsequently, the user U _i and the gateway node GWN each calculate K _j = PKS _j ⊕h (K _i ∥ N _i ∥ N _GWN ). Finally, after the mutual authentication procedure is completed, the user U _i , the gateway node GWN, and the sensing node S _j respectively calculate KEY _ij = h (K _i ∥ K _j ∥ N _i ∥ N _GWN ∥ SID _j ) to generate a shared conference secret. Key KEY _ij .

When the user U _i wants to change a new password, the following password replacement procedure can be performed.

The user U _i inserts the smart card into the card reader, and provides the user's identity ID _i and the password PW _i .

Next, calculate Q _i = B _i ⊕h (ID _i ∥ h (r _i ⊕PW _i )) and R _i ^* = h (Q _i ) on the smart card of user U _i , and then verify the calculated R _i ^* Whether it is equal to the R _i value originally stored in the smart card.

If they are not equal, the smart card rejects the login request. If they are equal, the user U _i is judged to be legal, and at this time the user U _i can read the information stored in the smart card.

At this time, the user U _i selects a new password PW _i ^new and generates a new random number factor r _i ^new .

Smart card calculation B _i ^new = Q _i ⊕h (ID _i ∥ h (r _i ^new ⊕PW _i ^new )), PTC _i ^new = PTC _i ⊕h (r _i ⊕PW _i ) ⊕h (r _i ^new ⊕PW _i ^new ).

Subsequently, the smart card replaces the original {PTC _i , B _i , r _i } with the parameters {PTC _i ^new , B _i ^new , r _i ^new }. At this time, the smart card contains the secret parameter set {ID _GWN , PTC _i ^new , TE _i , B _i ^new , R _i , r _i ^new , h (.)}.

The anonymous authentication method of the wireless sensing network provided by the present invention has higher security than the conventional similar authentication method, which will be described below.

(a) Password protection, guessing attack blocking, and smart card theft blocking: The anonymous authentication method of the wireless sensing network provided by the present invention can ensure that passwords are not leaked and important information is leaked, that is, others cannot pass offline passwords. Guess and get important information. The smart card theft attack means that when the user U _i 's smart card is stolen or lost, others can obtain important information in the smart card, thereby pretending to be a legitimate user U _i and logging in to the gateway node GWN. Because in the present invention, the passwords are all presented in the form of a hash function h (r _i ⊕PW _i ). At this time, the random number factor r _i and the user password PW _i are both hidden, and the hash function h (r _i ⊕PW _i ) is not stored in the smart card, the gateway node GWN, or other devices. Therefore, others cannot obtain the real password value through offline guessing attack on the hash function h (r _i ⊕PW _i ).

(b) Two-Factor protection: In the anonymous authentication method of the wireless sensing network of the present invention, when the user U _i , the sensing node S _j and the gateway node GWN perform mutual authentication, the original user is required Identity authentication ID _i , user password PW _i, and the information recorded in the smart card can be jointly authenticated. In this way, when the user U _i to steal the smart card or user password PW _i lost or hackers can not be achieved by a single smart card in the message or the user password PW _i and to sign and certification.

(c) Camouflage attack blocking and retransmission attack blocking: In the anonymous authentication method of the wireless sensing network of the present invention, a smart card is used as the input user identification ID _i and the user password PW _i for mutual authentication. jobs. In a similar conventional authentication method, the message to verify the login process, all messages may be made without knowledge of the user password PW _i U _i users, so easy to be stricken disguised attack (masquerade attacks). However, under the condition that the smart card is lost, the anonymous authentication method provided by the present invention can still ensure the security. Although the hacker can retrieve the information stored in the smart card, it still cannot disguise as a legitimate user U _i or a gateway node GWN.

(d) Stealing authentication attack and internal attack blocking: In the present invention, the gateway node GWN and the sensing node S _j do not need to maintain any authentication table, so they can block the stealing authentication attack. In addition, when the user U _i registers with the gateway node GWN, the user password PW _{i is} not directly used, but a hash value generated by performing a hash operation on the user password PW _i and the selected random number factor r _i . Moreover, the gateway node GWN does not store this hash value. Thus, gateway node user GWN user U _i can not know the password PW _i, but may avoid internal hacker to guess the password through offline attack.

(e) Password update, free selection of passwords, addition of new users and time synchronization: In the present invention, a new user U _i can freely choose his user identity ID _i and user password PW _i without a gateway. With the help of the node GWN, the user U _i can be easily added. In addition, since the present invention does not use a timestamp, there is no problem in the conventional technology that the wireless sensing network time is synchronized.

(f) Mutual authentication and establishment of conference key: In the anonymous authentication method of the wireless sensing network of the present invention, the user U _i , the gateway node GWN and the sensing node S _j can effectively perform mutual authentication, and The conference key was successfully established.

(g) Anonymous authentication: In the anonymous authentication method of the wireless sensing network provided by the present invention, it can be ensured that the information of the user identification ID _i can only be obtained by a specific service provider and cannot be obtained by others. Because in all the processes of transmitting the message, the random number factor r _{i is used} to package the transmitted message, so the effect of anonymous authentication can be achieved. This anonymous authentication makes it difficult for hackers to track the whereabouts of user U _i , thus ensuring security.

(h) Bypass GWN gateway node and gateway node blocking attacks GWN impersonation attack barrier: Anonymous wireless sensor network authentication method of the present invention is provided, not by a hacker that q ₂ to obtain a set of post m _2, This is because it cannot know the temporary credentials TC _{j of the} sensing node. Therefore, the hacker cannot bypass the gateway node GWN and create a message set m ₂ for the sensing node S _j . With no message set m ₂ , the sensing node S _j cannot respond to any message and has no effect. Similarly, when the hacker wants to disguise as the gateway node GWN and obtain the private login information of the user U _i , because the hacker cannot obtain K _i , he cannot know TC _j . Therefore, the message set q ₃ cannot be known. Therefore, the hacker cannot send the message set m ₃ to the user U _i , nor can he pretend to be a legitimate gateway node GWN to deceive the user U _i and obtain the user's private login message.

Compared with the conventional authentication method, the anonymous authentication method of the wireless sensing network of the present invention is not only more secure, but also more functional and computationally efficient. The functions and computational efficiency of the anonymous authentication method of the wireless sensing network of the present invention will be described in Tables 2 and 1, respectively, and compared with conventional techniques. Table 2 is a list of operation efficiency of the anonymous authentication method of the present invention. Table 1 is a list of functions related to the anonymous authentication method of the present invention. The computing efficiency described here can generally be divided into an evaluation of computational cost and an evaluation of communication cost.

The anonymous authentication method of the wireless sensing network of the present invention includes four procedures: a registration procedure, a login procedure, an authentication and key agreement procedure, and a password replacement procedure. The demonstration of computing efficiency focuses on authentication and key agreement procedures.

Table 1 lists the calculation cost and communication cost of each step in the authentication and key agreement procedure of the present invention, and compares it with the conventional technology; the cost of the XOR operation is extremely small and is omitted here. In the conventional technology, in addition to using the XOR operand and the one-way hash function (Hash) in the same manner as the present invention, there are additional uses such as elliptic curve operation encryption / decryption operations. To simplify the description, the time complexity of the hash operation and the elliptic curve encryption / decryption operation are represented by T _h and T _ecc respectively. The elliptic curve encryption / decryption operation is quite complicated, and the cost is much higher than the anonymous authentication method of the present invention.

In the anonymous authentication method of the present invention, in addition to the XOR operator, only a hash function is used to obtain a hash value. It is known that the time complexity of the hash function is O (1). Therefore, the anonymous authentication method of the present invention is quite simple in practice.

Regarding communication consumption, in the process of completing the authentication and key agreement procedures, the anonymous authentication method of the present invention only has four processes of message transmission, and the communication consumption is low, so the operation efficiency can be increased.

Table 2 lists the functions of the anonymous authentication method of the present invention.

From Table 2 above, it can be known that the smart card theft blocking function of the present invention is not available in most conventional technologies, and the anonymous authentication method in this case can block camouflage attacks and internal attacks, and solve the security of similar similar technologies Lack of deficiency.

The anonymous authentication method of the present invention is completed by a smart card carried by a user, and can provide double authentication protection. Therefore, compared with the conventional authentication method, the anonymous authentication method of the present invention has higher security and better operation efficiency.

The anonymous authentication method of the present invention can block various attacks and provide higher security in the process of message transmission, and uses a relatively simple calculation method. In practical use, the anonymous authentication method of the present invention has proven to have multi-function and high calculation efficiency. Therefore, the present invention provides an anonymous authentication method for a wireless sensing network that is more secure, efficient, and functional.

Although the present invention has been disclosed in the above embodiments, it is not intended to limit the present invention. Therefore, the protection scope of the present invention shall be determined by the scope of the attached patent application.

Claims (4)

An anonymous authentication method for a wireless sensing network includes a registration procedure, a login procedure, and an authentication and key agreement procedure. The registration procedure includes a user registration procedure and a sensing node registration procedure. The user registration process includes: a user selects a user identity ID _i and a user password PW _i ; the user generates a random number factor r _i and calculates h (r _i ⊕PW _i ), where h (. ) Is a one-way hash function operation; the user transmits the user's identity ID _i and h (r _i ⊕PW _i ) to a gateway node through a secure channel; after receiving the message sent from the user, The gateway node selects one of the users' temporary credentials TC _i, one of the deadlines TE _i and calculates: P _i = h (ID _i ∥ID _GWN ∥TE _i ), TC _i = h (P _i ∥K _GWN-U ∥TE _i ), PTC _i = TC _i ⊕h (r _i ⊕PW _i ), Q _i = h (ID _i ∥K _GWN-U ), B _i = Q _i ⊕h (ID _i ∥h ( r _i ⊕PW _i)) and _{R i = h (Q i)} , and the user temporary certificate issued to the user TC _i, where ∥ is the concatenation character, ⊕ is an XOR operation element; through the gateway node Issued through a secure channel from a set of secret parameter set _{{ID GWN, PTC i, TE} i, B i, R i, h (.)} One user to the smart card (Smart Card); and the input of the user The random number factor r _{i arrives} at the smart card. At this time, the smart card includes a secret parameter set {ID _GWN , PTC _i , TE _i , B _i , R _i , r _i , h (.)}; The sensing node registration procedure. Including: a sensor node presets a sensor node identity SID _{j in} advance; the sensor node generates a random number factor r _j and calculates h (r _j ⊕SID _j ); the sensor node transmits the sensor through a secure channel The identity of the test node identifies SID _j and h (r _j ⊕SID _j ) to the gateway node; after receiving the message transmitted from the sensor node, the gateway node calculates a temporary certificate of the sensor node TC _j = h ( K _GWN-S ∥SID _j ) to issue the temporary credentials TC _{j of} the sensing node to the sensing node; the gateway node calculates RTC _j = TC _j ⊕h (h (r _j ⊕SID _j ) ∥SID _j ), And transmitting RTC _j to the sensing node through a secure channel; and after receiving the message transmitted by the gateway node, the sensing node calculates the temporary credentials of the sensing node TC _j = RTC _j ⊕h (h (r _j ⊕SID _j ) ∥SID _j ) to confirm whether the temporary credentials TC _{j of the} sensing node are correct and store it; the Login procedure includes: the user inserts the smart card that he carries with him to A card reader, and provides the user's identity ID _i and the user password PW _{i corresponding to} the smart card; the smart card calculates Q _i = B _i ⊕h (ID _i ∥h (r _i ⊕PW _i ) ) and ^{_{R i * = h (Q i}} ), _i ^* R and the ratio of this value with the value R _i of the originally stored in the Smart card in the equality; if its value is not equal, the smart card rejects the sign Procedure; if the values are equal, the user confirms that the user is legitimate, at which time the user can read the information stored in the smart card; calculate the user's temporary credentials TC _i = PTC _i ⊕h (r _i ⊕PW _i ) to obtain the user's temporary certificate TC _i ; the authentication and key agreement procedure includes: the user generates a random number factor N _i and calculates: P _i = h (ID _i ∥ID _GWN ∥TE _i ), DID _i = ID _i ⊕h (TC _i ∥ID _GWN ∥N _i ) and q ₁ = h (ID _i ∥TC _i ∥N _i ); the user randomly selects a shared key K _i and calculates PKS _i = K _i ⊕h (TC _i ∥N _i ); After the calculation is completed, the user sends a login request message set m ₁ = {DID _i , q ₁ , PKS _i , TE _i , P _i , N _i } to the gateway node; upon receiving the login request message set m _{After 1} , the gateway node calculates: TC _i = h (P _i ∥K _GWN-U ∥TE _i ), ID _i = DID _i ⊕h (TC _i ∥ID _GWN ∥N _i ), and q ₁ ^* = h ( ID _i ∥TC _i ∥N _i ); whether the gateway node compares q ₁ ^* and q ₁ are equal; if q ₁ ^* ≠ q ₁ , the gateway node terminates the user's login request and sends a rejection message To the user; if q ₁ ^* = q ₁ , the user is judged to be legitimate, the gateway node accepts the user's login request, and records one of the user's login statuses; the gateway node calculates K _i = PKS _i ⊕h (TC _i ∥N _i ); at this time, the gateway node selects the nearest and suitable sensing node as the sensing node to be accessed, and the identity of the sensing node is identified as SID _j , And calculate the temporary credentials TC _j of the sensing node TC _j = h (K _GWN-S jSID _j ); the gateway node generates a random number factor N _GWN and calculates DID _GWN = ID _i ⊕h (TC _j ∥DID _i ∥N _GWN ), q ₂ = h (ID _i ∥TC _j ∥N _GWN ) and PKS _GWN = K _i ⊕h (TC _j ∥N _GWN ); after the calculation is completed, the gateway node sends a message set m ₂ = {DID _i 、 DID _{GWN , q 2, PKS GWN, ID} GWN, N i, N GWN} to the sensing node; set after the receipt of the message m _2, the sensing node of the evaluation node ID _GWN identity to determine whether the gateway node Is ally; if the judgment result is valid, the sensing node calculates: ID _i = DID _GWN ⊕h (TC _j ∥DID _i ∥N _GWN ) and q ₂ ^* = h (ID _i ∥TC _j ∥N _GWN ); The sensing node compares whether q ₂ ^* and q ₂ are equal; if q ₂ ^* ≠ q ₂ , the sensing node terminates the request and returns a rejection message; if q ₂ ^* = q ₂ , it judges The gateway node is legal, and the sensing node accepts the request. At this time, the sensing node calculates K _i = PKS _GWN ⊕h (TC _j ∥N _GWN ); the sensing node randomly selects a shared key K _j , And calculate q ₃ = h (ID _i ∥SID _j ∥K _i ∥N _i ∥N _GWN ) and PKS _j = K _j ⊕h (K _i ∥N _i ∥N _GWN ); the sensing node transmits the message set m _{3 = {SID j, q 3} , PKS j, N i, N GWN} to the gateway section And the user; after receiving the message collection m _3, the user of the gateway node and each separately calculate ^{_{q 3 * = h (ID i}} ∥SID j ∥K i ∥N i ∥N GWN); a computing Then, the gateway node compares whether q ₃ ^* and q ₃ are equal; if q ₃ ^* = q ₃ , the gateway node judges that the sensing node is legal; similarly, the user also compares q ₃ ^* And q ₃ are equal. If q ₃ ^* = q ₃ , the user confirms that the sensing node and the gateway node are legitimate; the user and the gateway node each calculate a shared key K _j = PKS _j ⊕ h (K _i ∥N _i ∥N _GWN ); after the authentication procedure is completed, the user, the gateway node, and the sensing node each calculate a shared conference key KEY _ij = h (K _i ∥K _j ∥N _i ∥N _GWN ∥SID _j ); wherein the above-mentioned P _i , PTC _i , Q _i , B _i , R _i , RTC _j , PKS _i , PKS _GWN , PKS _j , q ₁ ^* , q ₁ , q ₂ ^* , q ₂ , Q ₃ ^* , q ₃ , R _i , R _i ^* are calculated values. The anonymous authentication method for the wireless sensing network as described in item 1 of the patent application scope further includes a password replacement procedure. The password replacement procedure includes: the user inserts the smart card into the card reader and provides the use. The user's identity ID _i and the user's password PW _i ; calculate Q _i = B _i (h (ID _i (h (r _i ⊕PW _i )) and R _i ^* = h (Q _i ), and then verify whether the calculated R _i ^* is equal to the R _i value originally stored in the smart card; if not, the smart card rejects the login request; if they are equal, the user is judged to be legitimate, at this time The user can read the information stored in the smart card; the user selects a new user password PW _i ^new and generates a new random number factor r _i ^new ; the smart card calculates B _i ^new = Q _i ⊕h (ID _i ∥h (r _i ^new ⊕PW _i ^new )), PTC _i ^new = PTC _i ⊕h (r _i ⊕PW _i ) ⊕h (r _i ^new ⊕PW _i ^new ); the smart card uses the parameter {PTC _i ^new , B _i ^new , r _i ^new } replace the original {PTC _i , B _i , r _i }. At this time, the smart card contains a secret parameter set {ID _GWN , PTC _i ^new , TE _i , B _i ^new , R _i , r _i ^new , h (.)}; where P _i ^new , B _i ^new , and PTC _i ^new are calculated values. The anonymous authentication method of the wireless sensing network according to item 1 of the patent application scope, wherein the gateway node is a computer with a storage function. The anonymous authentication method of the wireless sensing network according to item 1 of the scope of patent application, wherein the smart card is a multifunctional card including a chip.