TWI506466B - Optical dna - Google Patents

Description

Optical DNA

The present invention relates to optical DNA.

Optical media, such as optical discs (CDs, "Compact Discs") or digital versatile discs (DVDs, "Digital Versatile Discs"), and related hardware to read optical media are very common. A typical single-sided DVD can reach only $10 to $ ¹³ per storage location, and optical media represents the cheapest means of storing information so far. Therefore, optical media may be the most widely used means of protecting content, and optical media is also the main target of malicious third parties, such as theft, forgery or counterfeiting, because there is no good way to detect forged optics. media.

Malicious actions can be distinguished by, for example, "stealing" and "forging." The situation of theft is about the fact that a purchaser believes that the purchased item is not genuine due to a particularly low price, but there is still a willingness to trade. These transactions are basically not converted into real income for bandits because low transaction prices are usually much lower than the market price of copyrighted items. The status of forgery is that the seller deceives the buyer to believe that the goods are genuine and obtains the full market price of the product. In this case, the counterfeiter's real income, because it does not require research and development, marketing costs, etc., its profit margin is basically higher than the original manufacturer.

According to the International Police Organization (Interpol), the World Customs Organization and the International Chamber of Commerce (International Chamber of Commerce) Of Commerce estimates that approximately 7-8% of the world's trade each year is counterfeit goods. In particular, Glaxo-Smith-Kline and the US Food and Drug Administration estimate that pseudo-drugs account for about 10% of the global pharmaceutical market, while the Business Software Alliance (BSA, "Business Software Alliance") estimates About 36% of the world's software sales are forged. In addition, according to BSA, Motion Picture Associate of America, Recording Industry Association of America, the International Federation of the Phonographic Industries, etc., software, music and The loss of the film industry far exceeds one billion dollars.

The short content of the claimed subject matter will be presented below to provide a basic understanding of some aspects of the claimed subject matter. This content is not an extensive overview of the claimed subject matter. It is not intended to identify key or critical elements of the claimed subject matter, and is not intended to describe the scope of the claimed subject matter. The sole purpose is to use a simplified form as a representation of the claimed subject matter as a preamble to a more detailed description that will be presented later.

The subject matter disclosed and claimed herein, in one aspect thereof, includes an architecture that can issue an "o-DNA" signature to authenticate an optical medium. In accordance with one aspect of the claimed subject matter, the architecture can provide a mechanism for examining an optical media instance to confirm the presence of certain manufacturing errors in all optical media. These error locations can be encoded Make a fingerprint and use the private key of the issuer to sign the password to generate the o-DNA signature.

According to another aspect of the claimed subject matter, the o-DNA signature can be embedded in a corresponding optical media instance. Thus, the optical media instance can include the manufacturing error in which the erroneous fingerprint can be obtained, as well as the signed version of the fingerprint. Thus, the optical media instance can be distinguished from other optical media instances (eg, forged optical media instances) based on the physical topology of the optical media instance relative to a digitally signed false fingerprint (eg, o-DNA) known to be authentic. come out.

In another aspect of the claimed subject matter, an architecture can be provided to verify the o-DNA signature for authentication of the optical media instance. For example, the architecture provides a mechanism for reading an o-DNA signature from an optical media instance. The o-DNA can be decrypted and/or verified to be generated from a legal entity (eg, signed based on the issuer's private key). In addition, the architecture can also receive erroneous data that is actually observed from the optical media instance and compare the erroneous data to the erroneous fingerprints included in the o-DNA.

The following description and the annexed drawings provide a detailed description of certain aspects of the claimed subject matter. However, these aspects are only a few of the many ways in which the principles of the claimed subject matter can be utilized, and the claimed subject matter is intended to include all such aspects and their equivalents. Other advantages and unique features of the claimed subject matter will be apparent from the description of the appended claims.

The claimed elements are now described with reference to the drawings, in which the same element symbols refer to all the same elements in the specification. In the following description, for the purposes of illustration However, it is obvious that the claimed subject matter may not be implemented using these specific details. In other instances, well-known structures and devices are shown in the form of block diagrams, which are used to illustrate the claimed subject matter.

The terms "component", "module", "system", "interface" or the like as used in this application are intended to represent a computer-related entity, which may be a combination of hardware, hardware and software. Software, software in execution or software in execution. For example, a component can be, but is not limited to being, a program executed on a processor, a processor, an object, an executable file, a thread, a program, and/or a computer. By way of illustration, an application executing on a controller and the controller can be a component. One or more components can reside within a program and/or a thread, and a component can be located in a computer and/or distributed between two or more computers.

Furthermore, the claimed subject matter can be implemented as a method, apparatus, or commodity using standard stylized manufacturing, and/or engineering techniques to make software, firmware, hardware, or any combination thereof, to control a computer to implement the Reveal the subject matter. The term "manufactured goods" as used herein is intended to encompass a computer program accessible by any computer readable device, vehicle or media. For example, computer readable media may include, but is not limited to, magnetic storage devices (eg, hard disk drives, floppy drives, magnetic tapes...), optical discs (eg, compact discs (CDs), digital versatile discs (DVD).. .), smart card, and flash memory device (such as memory card, Memory stick, Key drive...). In addition, it must be understood that a carrier can be used to carry computer-readable electronic data, such as those used to transmit and receive e-mail, or to access a network, such as the Internet or a regional network (LAN, "Local" Area network”). Of course, it will be apparent to those skilled in the art that various modifications can be made to this configuration without departing from the scope or spirit of the claimed subject matter.

In addition, the term "exemplary" is used herein to mean an example, instance, or illustration. Any aspect or design described herein as "exemplary" is not necessarily considered to be preferred or advantageous over other aspects or designs. Instead, use the wording example to present ideas in a concrete way. The term "or" as used in this application is intended to mean an inclusive "or" rather than an exclusive "or". That is, unless otherwise specified or clear from the content, "X uses A or B" is meant to represent any natural inclusion arrangement. That is, if X uses A; X uses B; or X uses both A and B, then "X uses A or B" can be satisfied in any of the foregoing examples. In addition, the articles "a" and "an" as used in this application and the appended claims are to be construed as generally as "one or more" unless otherwise specified or Type.

The term "inference" as used herein generally refers to a procedure for reasoning, or a state of inference of the system, environment, and/or user, from a set of observations captured through events and/or data. Inference can be used to identify a particular content or action, or can generate, for example, a probability distribution for a state. This inference can be probabilistic, that is, calculating a probability distribution among interested states based on consideration of data and events. References may also be referred to as being used for a set of events and/or funds. Manufacturing errors in learning media instances are present and may remain unrelated to technological evolution. Furthermore, such manufacturing errors can be substantially confirmed to be unique. Therefore, to produce a DVD of the latest technology of a well-known studio or a CD or DVD of a large software provider, it is possible to see different combinations of manufacturing errors on each instance, even for the same manufacturing equipment. Different manufacturing error combinations also occur for those instances that are manufactured in a short interval of time.

As described, the consumer-grade device is capable of detecting an existing manufacturing error of a particular optical media instance (in fact, such detected errors are typically used in an error correction procedure). Such error material 104 can be received and utilized by inspection component 102 to construct an erroneous fingerprint associated with the particular optical media instance. Because the set of manufacturing errors for an instance of a particular optical medium may be unique, the erroneous fingerprint constructed by inspection component 102 may also be unique to any given optical media instance.

According to one aspect of the claimed subject matter, the erroneous fingerprint can be constructed based on the number and/or relative position of a given set of manufacturing errors on the particular optical media instance. However, please understand that not all manufacturing errors on a particular optical media instance need to be used to construct the wrong fingerprint. Specifically, the erroneous fingerprint may be limited to errors on certain portions of the optical media instance and/or certain types of errors, such as errors that occur within a given distance of a continuous or adjacent error. It is described in detail below.

It can also be seen that in some scenarios, it is best to manage the size of the wrong fingerprint (such as the number of bits). Thus, the erroneous fingerprint can be a fixed length string of bits that can represent all or one of the manufacturing errors on an optical media instance. Off part. Moreover, depending on one aspect of the claimed subject matter, the erroneous fingerprint can be compressed and/or optimized such that the number of bits needed to describe a related error can be substantially minimized, as further explained below.

System 100 also includes a distribution component 106 operatively coupled to inspection component 102. Regardless of the method used by inspection component 102 to encode and/or represent the erroneous fingerprint, the erroneous fingerprint can be passed to issue component 106. The issue component 106 can generate the o-DNA signature 108 of the optical media instance based on at least a portion of the erroneous fingerprint.

It must be understood and appreciated that the o-DNA signature 108 can include information other than the wrong fingerprint, such as the product ID associated with the content stored in the optical media instance, as well as other suitable materials. In addition, the issue component 106 can cryptographically sign the erroneous fingerprint (and other message material) in a manner known in the art, thereby generating an o-DNA signature 108. An example would be to use the Bellare-Rogaway Probabilistic Signature Scheme (PSS/PSS-R) to sign up for the message data included in the o-DNA signature 108. According to one aspect of the claimed subject matter, the o-DNA signature 108 can be signed using a publisher's private key, such as the optical media instance or the publisher of the content stored thereon.

Moreover, as will be further appreciated in conjunction with FIG. 3, the o-DNA signature 108 can be embedded in an optical media instance that receives the underlying layer of the erroneous material 104. The o-DNA signature 108 can be embedded in a portion of the production process known or later developed in the art, or part of a standard programming, such as for a writable/re-burnable optical medium. Thus, the o-DNA signature 108 can serve as a mechanism to uniquely identify and/or verify the underlying optics The media instance is true. For example, the multi-dimensional physical structure of the underlying optical media instance, particularly the erroneously created pattern, can effectively be used as a Certificate of Authenticity (COA), which can be verified by the o-DNA signature 108 and/or Or OK.

By way of illustration, a COA is basically a cheap physical object with a random and unique multi-dimensional structure S that is difficult to accurately replicate. An inexpensive device must scan the physical "fingerprint" of the object to obtain a set of features of the multi-dimensional signal x , ie, virtually uniquely representing S. For a given fingerprint x , there is no need to access S , which must be computationally difficult to construct a fixed dimension object using a fingerprint y that is located with a limited proximity to x according to a normalized distance metric. At the office. Thus, in light of the features and concepts described herein, it should be understood that an existing optical media instance can be used as a COA.

In addition, COA can be used to protect against counterfeiting and other types of counterfeiting. Accordingly, a COA can be a digitally signed fixed-dimensional physical object having a random unique structure that satisfies the following requirements: R1 : The cost of generating and signing the original COA is lower relative to the required security level.

R2 : The cost of manufacturing a COA instance is lower than the cost of accurately or nearly accurately replicating the unique and stochastic entity structure of this instance.

R3 : The cost of authenticating a signed COA is again lower than the required level of security. The key to COA instance analysis is the capture of fingerprints (for example, features that can reliably represent their multidimensional structure). This program is basically based on a specific entity phenomenon and produces an integer x The cardinality of N ^N - the N vector. This can represent: R4 : It must be computationally difficult to construct a fixed-dimensional object using a fingerprint y such that ∥ xy ∥ < δ , where x is a given fingerprint of an unknown COA instance, and δ is relative to a standardized Distance measure ∥. ∥ defines the neighborhood of x and y .

Since it is primarily affected by the degree of usability required, there is an additional need: the COA must be strong enough to withstand general wear and tear. COA instances can be generated in a number of ways. For example, when a surface is covered with an epoxy substrate, the particles form a low but random 3D shape that uniquely reflects light from an angular direction.

Referring now to Figure 2, an exemplary optical media example 200 is shown. In summary, optical media instance 200 can be virtually any type of optical media including, but not limited to, the following formats, standards, and/or technologies: CD, CD-R, CD-RW, Laser Disc, Mini MiniDisc, Universal Media Disc (UMD), DVD, DVD±R, DVD±RW, DVD±R DL, DVD-RAM, Blu-ray Disc (BD), BD-R, BD-RE, high density (HD, "High Density") DVD, HD DVD-R, ultra-dense optical disc (UDO, "Ultra Density Optical") and so on. Optical media instance 200 can be substantially any type of optical media format, and example optical media instance 200, as well as other examples included herein, will be further described in the context of a standard DVD-R for simplicity and clarity. Moreover, unless otherwise indicated, optical media example 200 would be a standard 120 mm (4.72 in) single-sided disc (such as DVD-5 or DVD-9), although it should be understood that double-sided optical media example 200 and others Dimensions (eg, 80mm or 3.15in) are considered to be within the spirit and scope of the claimed subject matter.

The manufacture of many optical media instances 200 by tablet manufacturing is a well-known procedure that produces low variability output in the same manufacturing facility; however, there may be strong output variability between different facilities. Especially for low quality manufacturing facilities. In order to provide additional content for the claimed subject matter, the following is an exemplary manufacturing procedure for a DVD-R disc.

DVD-R media is produced using a high speed automated copying program. The initial glass master to be used for disc generation is produced by a lithographic process that uses a laser beam reordering to expose a photoresist coated blank glass master. For DVD-5 (eg single-sided, single-layer), a single glass master is required because the data is entirely contained on one layer of the disc. For DVD-9 (eg single-sided, double-layered), two glass masters must be produced, one for each layer. The glass master is "developed" after exposure, resulting in a pattern of protrusions in the remaining photoresist. The glass master is substantially plated with nickel metal to create a "father" or a negative mirror image of the material is generated by a laser beam reordering procedure on the glass master. The "father" is separated from the glass master and nickel plated again to produce a "mother" positive image (eg, the same as the original glass master). Each "mother" is again nickel plated to create an "imprinter". The stamper is again a negative image of the original data (e.g., "father") produced by the laser beam master. A "father" can produce 5 to 20 "mothers", while a single "mother" can produce up to 50 stamps. Accordingly, each stamp can produce up to 10 ⁵ discs. The stamps are separated from the "mother" after electroplating, then "punched" to correct the outer diameter and to correct the inner diameter of the hub bore, which is required for the particular molding equipment used in the manufacturing plant.

The perforated stamp is mounted within the molding cavity of the line. The melted polycarbonate (or some other optically clear and stable resin) is sprayed into the molding cavity under pressure, heat and humidity. The pattern of holes and faces on the stamp is pressed into clear polycarbonate under pressures up to several tons. The polycarbonate is rapidly cooled by the ice water flowing through the molded cavity of the cavity, separated from the stamper, and withdrawn from the molding cavity. This is considered a DVD half disc because it is a layer of the last DVD. At this stage, the disc is very sharp and does not reflect the laser beam in conventional DVD players.

For DVD-5, perform the following steps. Using a sputtering process, the ejected clear polycarbonate is plated with a fully reflective material, such as aluminum, to reflect the laser beam in a DVD player. A clear half disc (no data imprinted in polycarbonate) is bonded to a half disc covered with aluminum, resulting in a final disc with a thickness of 1.2 mm, the data in the middle of the disc, approximately with the disc The bottom surface distance is 0.6 mm.

For DVD-9, perform the following steps. The bottom half of the disc is covered There are half of the reflective material that not only reflects part of the laser beam in the DVD player, but also allows the laser beam to pass through this layer. The upper half of the disc is covered with aluminum as a complete reflection. The two halves are bonded together such that the semi-reflective material and the aluminum are opposite each other at the bonding junction, approximately 0.6 mm from the bottom of the disc.

Mechanical tolerances will be presented in each of the above steps. The degree of jitter and run out in the original glass master will set the bottom line of the final finished disc to the number of errors presented. When each plating procedure is performed to produce a "father", "mother" and a stamper, additional mechanical tolerances and microscopic differences are created, again causing a variation in the inherent error. Each stamper will have its own unique combination of errors due to the tolerance of the stamper and the mechanical mounting of the stamp into a molded cavity.

Once the molding process begins, the source of the error is the mechanical wear on the stamp. If a single stamper can produce up to 10 ⁵ presses, the stamper will wear out when stamping each disc, causing the disc #1 of the stamper and the disc #10 ⁵ from the stamper. The difference. Furthermore, if the production line is less than 10 ^5, the platen is removed, put back into a subsequent mold cavity, disassembling the stamp, processing, storage and re-install the program stamp Will cause additional mechanical tolerance changes.

Furthermore, each disc produced by the molding process is subjected to the feed temperature of the polycarbonate, the heat, humidity and pressure in the molding cavity, the quality of the polycarbonate, and how fast the polycarbonate cools. The impact of etc. Mechanical processing that separates from the stamp and transfers it to the rest of the program creates mechanical stresses and changes that affect the final wrong signature of the disc. For example, polycarbonate Both the cooling rate and the speed at which the polycarbonate is pushed out by the stamp cause changes in the shape of the holes and faces, and these changes can cause errors.

In addition, the sputtering process is to apply a semi-reflective material or a fully reflective aluminum, which also has mechanical tolerances that affect the thickness of the reflective material and the reflective properties across the surface of the disc. The change in reflectivity on the disc will affect the error rate of the disc as it is scanned by the laser in the DVD player. Bonding two halves together can cause a possible difference in the departure of the two halves. Finally, the finishing of the label on the upper surface of the disc can also cause erroneous mechanical stresses. All of these sources of mechanical differences on the finished disc will affect the error rate of the finished disc. Thus, the example optical media example 200 can include some manufacturing errors even when it is freshly produced by the production line, some of which are labeled with the component symbol 202.

Referring now to Figure 3, there is illustrated an exemplary system 300 that can issue an o-DNA signature and embed the o-DNA signature in an optical media instance for authentication of the optical media. In summary, system 300 can include an inspection component that can receive error material 304 associated with an optical media instance 306. The error material 304 can be, for example, a manufacturing error related to all or a portion of the optical media instance 306, such as the error 202 described in conjunction with FIG. The error material 304 can include a count of related errors, as well as information related to the location of each associated error. Inspection component 302 can construct a fingerprint 308 (labeled as f ) based on all or a portion of error data 304. As previously described, the fingerprint 308 can be compressed and/or optimized to encode the error material 304 with a minimum number of bits per error. Additionally, the fingerprint 308 can be a fixed length string of strings, for example, for multi-system integration. .

Inspection component 302 can transmit fingerprint 308 to a distribution component 310 that can issue an o-DNA signature of optical media instance 306 based at least in part on fingerprint 308. According to one aspect of the claimed subject, the issuance component 310 can connect the fingerprint 308 with the tag data 312 (labeled t ) obtained by a tag 314. The tag 314 is described as including a product ID associated with the material included on the optical media instance 306; an expiration date (eg, related to a digital authentication or the like); an option; and an available area (eg, related to the media player and/or Or information on the coding scheme of the data). However, it should be understood that the label 314 is merely exemplary and may include other suitable materials. Similarly, tag 314 need not include some or all of the described fields. In any event, the tag data 312, which may be all or part of the data included in the tag 314, may be coupled to the fingerprint 308 to produce a combined bit string 316 (labeled w ). Therefore, w can be f ∥ t .

The combined bit string 316 can be supplied to a signature component 318, wherein the combined bit string 316 can be cryptographically signed (labeled S ) and/or hashed (labeled H ) based on any suitable means. In accordance with one aspect of the claimed subject matter, the signature component 318 can utilize a private key associated with an issuer (described in detail below). Thus, the signature component 318 can output a signature 322 (labeled as s ) which is substantially s = S ( H ( w )). The signature 322 and (optionally) the combined bit string 316 can include information representative of the o-DNA signature 326, which can, for example, uniquely identify the optical media instance 306. In addition, signature 322 (and combined bit string 316) can be supplied to a compression component 324 that can embed o-DNA signature 326 into optical media instance 306.

Since the o-DNA signature 326 is unique and based on optical media The corresponding unique entity property of instance 306 embeds o-DNA signature 326 into optical media instance 306 so that optical media instance 306 can be authenticated as authentic. It should be appreciated that the compression assembly 324 can be embedded in the o-DNA signature 326 in a variety of ways. For example, using a standard DVD±RW disc, the o-DNA signature 326 is burned to the disc using a conventional DVD player (with burning capability) before completing the form and/or completing the form of the contents of the disc. on. In another example, using a standard DVD-R disc (which is substantially uneditable), the o-DNA signature 326 can be embedded into the disc by utilizing well-known post-production programs that provide a mechanism to A certain number of bits are written to an optical media instance that is post-molded and bonded.

Figures 4 through 7 show additional content of the claimed subject matter and are used to aid in understanding the disclosure herein. In particular, Figures 4 through 7 provide additional details or clarity regarding additional aspects, features, and/or embodiments, or outlines, and are discussed in conjunction with Figure 3. . For example, as previously discussed, only a portion of the unavoidable error associated with the manufacture of an optical media instance 306 is required to generate fingerprint 308. Thus, fingerprint 308 can be constructed based on an error model associated with a well-known and/or standard means of detecting errors in optical media instance 306 (eg, by inspection component 302).

Referring now to Figure 4A, there is shown a graphical representation of an exemplary encoding 400 of 100010010 using a NZRI (Non-Return to Zero, Inverted) encoder. NZRI is a method of mapping binary signals to a physical signal for transmission over some transmission media. The immediate output actually read by the DVD-R consists of an NRZI-encoded signal of a 26.1 MHz clock. The signal is determined to be high or low depending on whether there is a hole or a platform on the disc. The NRZI encoding is such that between two 1s (e.g., a ground changing signal), the signal can be maintained at the same level in certain clock cycles k , where k is an integer in the C set, where C ≡ {3, 4 , 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 14}. That is, the NRZI signal has a transition on a clock boundary when the transmitted bit is a logic one, and there is no transition when the transmitted bit is a logic 0, and in two logics The number of clock cycles between 1 (eg, ground changes) is valid for k .

As described, the first logic 1 changes the ground from low to high, where it is maintained for the next four (for a valid k value) clock cycle, where the second logic 1 represents the next three clocks. The loop (also a valid k value) changes from high to low, and so on. However, it is to be understood that the example code 400 is an "ideal" representation. In the past, due to manufacturing inefficiencies, the distance between the ground changes of the two signals could not always be the exact multiple of the clock cycle. Rather, the multiple can be a random variable t , which can be expressed as follows: t _i ≡ k _i + □ (0, σ _M ), k _i (1) where □(0, σ _M ) may represent a random zero-mean Gaussian variable having a standard deviation equal to σ _M . In summary, it must be understood that high quality manufacturing must have a relatively low σ _M . It can be assumed that legitimate publishers of protected DVDs and other optical media instances 306 will use state of the art manufacturing, and thus there will be considerable challenges to achieve a significantly better error rate by a competing manufacturing process. Therefore, an exemplary error model can be described as follows: (i) has -ε<∣ t _i -k _i ∣< The probability that the signal is incorrect is 0.5.

(ii) has -ε ∣ t _i -k _i ∣ The signal with an incorrect signal is 0.

(iii) have +ε ∣ t _i -k _i ∣ The signal with an incorrect signal is 1.

This probability model is likely to be smooth on ∣ t _i -k _i ∣. Accordingly, the model can be simplified for two reasons: 1) it can be expected that the player will have a sharp (but smooth) change for a particular ε ; and 2) all parameters need not be estimated for the model.

Referring to Figure 4B, an exemplary graphical representation 402 of the distribution of pulse widths t _i is shown. The representation 402 is based on the 24th mm of a single-sided high quality DVD (eg, optical media example 302), which is an installation data for a commonly used Integrated Development Environment (IDE). It can be appreciated that other portions of the optical media instance 302 can be read and/or the optical media instance 302 can include other content and that there is no substantial change from the representation 402. It is worth emphasizing that the pulse width distribution will be a peak 404 at an integer value (such as k ) or near an integer value, and a valley 406 in the middle between the integer values. Therefore, the probability that t _{i is} close to an integer value is quite high, and conversely, the probability that t _i is intermediate between two integers is approximately less than two orders of magnitude.

Figure 5A shows an exemplary graphical representation 500 of the distribution of ∥ t _i - k _i ∣ - 0.5 第 on the 24mm of a high quality DVD. For example, to estimate the error rate, the distribution of ∥ t _i - k _i ∣ - 0.5 系 is on the same portion of the same optical media instance 302 used to plot the distribution in Figure 4B. This data can be obtained using a DVD player with an analog-transistor-transistor logic (TTL) output representing the NRZI encoded signal recorded at the output of the optical sensor in the DVD player. . The TTL output is sampled at a rate of 10 G samples/second and an accurate statistic for t _i is generated for the optical media instance 302 under test. The graphical representation 500 illustrates the possible error rate on the optical media instance 302, assuming an error threshold ε [0.05, 0.1], and Pr [ +ε ∣ t _i -k _i ∣] = 0, approximately at the level of 10 ³ . This estimate can be used to verify other results as described below.

The DVD-R standard utilizes an efficient codec that converts the letter A (which consists of 16-bit symbols encoded using NRZI) to the letter L of 256 8-bit characters. It must be understood that not all 16-bit symbols belong to A. Thus, legal 16-bit symbols (such as those belonging to A ) can be distinguished from illegal 16-bit symbols (such as those not belonging to A) even though the symbol read by optical media instance 302 can be one. Wrong result.

Referring now to Figure 5B, which is an exemplary graphical representation 502 of the probability of an illegal symbol after a single position error has occurred on A to a legal 16-bit symbol. For example, graphical representation 502 illustrates a legitimate 16-bit keyword maintaining a legitimate probability after an arbitrary single location error event. Because the probability of an error itself is quite low, only a condition from A that is affected by a single error needs to be considered here.

It can be noted that the overall probability that a 16-bit symbol error cannot be found in the lookup table A → L is approximately p = 0.11. This represents that although there is an error on the disc, the probability that it will be detected during NRZI decoding is quite low and equal to p . However, these errors can be accurately detected in higher level decoding.

The primary source of synchronization for low-order encoding in the DVD-R standard can be a cluster of 26 data fields. Each field may contain a particular synchronization pattern (eg, 32 NRZI-bit length) and a 91-symbol payload from A (eg, a payload of 1456 NRZI bits). The synchronization pattern can be a 32-bit synchronization symbol selected by a particular 32-symbol letter S. Thus, the 38688 bit cluster can represent the primary storage unit on an optical media instance 302 such as a DVD-R. The classification of these types of errors can be found in conjunction with Figure 6.

Referring now to Figure 6, there is shown an exemplary graphical representation 600 including an upper half describing the percentage of the pie chart associated with each error category and a lower half illustrating the number of offsets required for a resynchronization. The occurrence of each type of error detected is again within the 24th mm of a single DVD disc. In summary, the types of errors that can occur can be summarized as follows: (a) Illegal code - A payload symbol changes due to an error, and the resulting code cannot be found in a set of legal characters A. An illegal code, symbolic component symbol 604, is responsible for decoding approximately one-third of the errors detected using low-order NRZI decoding.

(b) The code number still in A after the error - a payload symbol changes due to an error; the new symbol exists in A. These kinds of errors are not easily detected using low-order encoding and are therefore not illustrated in graphical representation 600.

(c) Correcting the offset-error required for a synchronized symbol - the offset is common to offset the synchronized symbol relative to their correct position in a cluster. Basically, an adjustment offset to one or two positions is sufficient to realign the synchronized symbols. This error type is labeled as component symbol 608 and is responsible for nearly two-thirds of the detected errors.

(d) Illegal Synchronization Code - A synchronization symbol changes due to an error, and no new code number is found in the combination method synchronization code S. This type of error is represented by symbol 606 and is responsible for less than 1% of errors.

(e) All zero code - all bits of a symbol are equal to zero. This symbol is not legal in either A or S. Therefore, such symbols are particularly noticed because they correspond to a particular manufacturing error. A "all zero code" is represented by component symbol 602 and is responsible for detecting errors of approximately 4%.

Again, because eight to fourteen (EFM, "Eight-to-Fourteen") decoding is not used (eg, higher order decoding), no error category (b) is detected. As previously mentioned, the number of expected error categories (b) is approximately nine times the error category (a) (eg, 89% vs. 11%). The lower half of the graphical representation 600 illustrates that once an error category (c) is detected (e.g., symbol 606) The offset of the x integer position resynchronizes the probability of a synchronization code to its proper location. It can be observed that virtually all error categories (c) cause a position offset (such as a position forward or a position backward) to resynchronize the payload cluster.

Referring again to FIG. 3, it will be appreciated that in addition to using an error model and misclassification, such as to receive error material 304 and construct fingerprint 308, another noteworthy aspect of inspection component 302 can be included in the compression for errors. The wrong location of the error is created in the data 304. In particular, this aspect may be related to compression and/or optimization of fingerprint 308 and is more fully explained in conjunction with Figure 7.

Still referring to FIG. 3, but also to FIG. 7, an exemplary graphical representation 700 of the distribution of distances between two consecutive errors on a disc (eg, optical media example 302). Again, the data appears at the 24mm of a single DVD disc. The distance is measured in terms of the number of 16-bit symbols that occur between each error. In particular, the distance between two consecutive error locations e _i and e _{i +1} can be expressed as d _i . It can be noticed immediately, and it is additionally emphasized by reference circle 702 that the variable d over all collected error distances is concentrated in 1 d 92, and is a multiple of 93 symbols, which is the length of a single cell in a cluster (eg, a synchronization code after the 91 payload code).

Accordingly, the following selection of codes can be used, whereby only errors at distance d _E ≡[1,92]∪ 93 k can be compressed, where k N ⁺ . Approximately 75% of all errors can be represented by this choice. Finally, the number of bits needed to encode a single error location can be estimated. For example, the entropy of the wrong distance on d _E can be computed from the collected results, and it can be observed that an error location can be compressed on average using 7.72 bits.

Referring now to Figure 8, an exemplary optical media example 800 having one of o-DNA is shown. In summary, optical media instance 800 can include a set of manufacturing errors 802, as with optical media instances 200, 306 from Figures 2 and 3, respectively. Optical media instance 800 can also include an o-DNA signature 804 that can encode a combination of the set of manufacturing errors 802 for authentication of optical media instance 800. The o-DNA signature 804 can be cryptographically signed with a key associated with an issuer, which is essentially a private key.

The publisher may be, for example, an author or copyright owner of the content stored in optical media instance 800, such as multimedia content (eg, software applications, feature movies, video, music, or some comments thereon). In addition, the issuer may be an authorized manufacturer of optical media instance 800, or a third party agent of the author, copyright owner, or manufacturer, who may sign with a private key on behalf of the author, copyright owner, or manufacturer. o-DNA signature 804.

It should be appreciated that optical media (e.g., optical media instance 800) is the least costly means of storing information today. A typical single-sided DVD can reach only $ ^10-13 per storage location. Therefore, optical media is indispensable for storage and mass supply of materials. Similarly, optical media is also a major target for deceiving third parties, such as theft, counterfeiting or forgery. There is currently no good way to detect forged optical media. However, an advantage of including the o-DNA signature 804 is that the optical media instance 800 can be authenticated. Conversely, by including the o-DNA signature 804 on the optical media instance 800, non-real optical media can be detected. Furthermore, the o-DNA signature 804 as described herein can be used in conjunction with such media as a very low cost mechanism for preventing counterfeiting, which can be further cryptographically preserved and predictably strong. The cost of each optical media instance 800 added to the o-DNA signature 804 is virtually zero for writable/rewritable optical media and is largely negligible in optical media that cannot be written.

Referring now to Figure 9, there is shown a system 900 that can be used to verify an o-DNA signature for optical media authentication. In summary, system 900 can include a receiving component 902 that can receive information read from an optical media instance (not shown), such as, for example, optical media instance 800 in FIG. For example, the received information can include both error data 904 and an o-DNA signature 906. The error material 904 can correlate a count of manufacturing errors and/or individual locations present on the optical media instance. The o-DNA signature 906 can include a cryptographically signed composite bit string that includes an erroneous fingerprint f , wherein the erroneous fingerprint corresponds to manufacturing error material (e.g., error material 904) on a real optical media instance.

System 900 can also include a verification component 904 operatively coupled to receiving component 902. The verification component 904 can compare the o-DNA signature 906 with the error material 904 to, for example, determine if the optical media instance is genuine. For example, if the o-DNA signature 906 includes a signature s that is signed with a private key of the issuer, the verification component 904 can decrypt the o-DNA signature using a public key associated with the issuer. 906. As noted, the o-DNA signature 906 can also include an erroneous fingerprint, which is known to correspond to an error on a real optical media instance. If the erroneous fingerprint is compressed, verification component 904 can decompress the erroneous fingerprint and compare the decompressed information with error 904 to determine if the subject optical media instance includes a substantially similar set of manufacturing errors.

In short, when there are some possible scenarios, if the subject optical media instance (such as the source of the error message 904) and the material included in the o-DNA signature 906 (such as from a known real optical media instance) The error material) maintains a high degree of similarity, and the subject optical media instance can be considered genuine. Otherwise, the subject optical media instance can be considered to be counterfeit, the degree of similarity being based on a comparison metric δ, which can be a predefined and statistically verified threshold. For example, δ may be defined based on a variety of factors, such as possible differences between media players/readers (eg, the reader is used to construct o-DNA signature 906 to obtain error data 904 via comparison with the reader) ), wear, or other degradation effects on optical media, or the like.

Accordingly, it is immediately known that the o-DNA signature 906 can be used to deter counterfeiting. For example, in the context of software distribution, a user is typically provided with an optical media instance having a copy of a protected software. The software can also be an original equipment manufacturer (OEM, "Original Equipment Manufacturer") pre-installed on a computer. In either case, the user will likely believe that the copy is genuine, or that it needs to be authenticated. Moreover, during installation, the software itself would require the user to place a real optical media instance with an o-DNA signature 906 into a DVD player (or other device) that can host the verification component 904 and system 900. System 900 can correspond to the following four cases: Really true - where the user can confirm that the copy is genuine. This information can be used to replace or supplement an existing product ID.

True denial - the user can be notified (in conjunction with Figure 11 below) that the o-DNA is invalid. In this example, the issuer and/or copyright owner may provide an incentive to the user to report the results of the test, which may be implemented in an automated manner such that, for example, the user only needs to agree to deliver the information. It is important to understand that in most cases, the likelihood of this copy being forged is very certain for this diagnosis.

False indeed - this example represents a forged copy that passes the certification test. The purpose of the o-DNA signature 906 and other aspects described herein can reduce false positives. Therefore, the probability of a false positive is small relative to an opposite attack with limited funds.

False Denial - This example represents a real copy that has become a forgery. Here, the user can report the result to the issuer or copyright owner, which includes the identification of the software vendor. This has an adverse effect on software vendors, and the entire ecosystem must be able to tolerate a relatively high probability of false denials, since copyright owners can choose to do only when they receive unusually high false denial ratios from a particular seller. Out of reaction.

Similarly, the o-DNA signature 906 can be used by an individual user who produces a recordable optical medium, or in another example by an entertainment studio. use. In the first example, the user can produce a DVD (or other optical media instance) that can be authenticated to a recording device. In a second example, a particular CD or DVD player (or other device) can verify the authenticity of the optical media content and can provide a mechanism for the user to report the certification test results to an entertainment studio or other party.

It is also known that conventional consumer-level media players can read low-level error data (such as error data 904), but this information is often only used for internal programs, such as error checking. Thus, if a player is present, when it is determined that the error material 904 can be read, it is not set to store and/or transmit the error material 904 (e.g., to the receiving component 902), a correction can be made to provide this functionality. For example, minor modifications to the basic input-output system (BIOS, "Basic Input-Output System") can implement this feature. Again, based on the aspects described herein, players that are manufactured in the future can be immediately set to low-order error material 904.

Furthermore, it must also be understood that some manufacturing errors can be expressed as signals having a pulse width that is far from the integer clock value. When these errors tend to be less (see, for example, symbol 406 of Figure 4B), it is possible that these types of errors can be read differently when reading from different DVDs. For example, assume a pulse width d _i = 3.503 clock cycle. A DVD player can read this pulse width to 2 or 3 zeros in different readouts. It is clear that only one of these values is correct, so the others are wrong. Because this is the result of the possibility, when the o-DNA error is issued and verified at the same time, the player can read the same track several times to detect "all errors". To reasonably be reliable, it is assumed that the combination of tracks required to read about 10 times from an optical media instance should be sufficient to detect most of the errors in the area.

According to one aspect of the claimed subject matter, the verification component 904 can verify the authenticity of an optical media instance based on the following steps: I. Verify that the disc in the presence is the same as the issuer - here from the o-DNA The signature 906 error can be retrieved, and the verification component 904 can establish ∣ E _M ∩ E _T ∣>α∣ E _M ∣, where E _M can represent a set of errors signed during the o-DNA release, E _T One set of errors can be taken in the field, the operator ∣·∣ can return the cardinality of an array, and α can be a positive real vector less than but close to 1.

II. Verification of E _T does not have too many errors - although not possible, it is also possible that a counterfeiter can imprint E _M during a reverse effort, thus producing an I. However, the opponent cannot control the manufacturing process to some extent to prevent additional expected manufacturing errors. Therefore, it is expected that the opponent will have an additional error of approximately ∣ E _M on the forged disc. Thus, verification component 904 can check if ∣ E _M ∣ < ∣ E _M ∣ (1 + β), where β can be a positive real number vector (eg, β = 0.8) that is less than but fairly close to one.

Based on the provided detector description, the probability of false and false denial can be calculated for a given alpha and beta. Assuming no opponent attacks, the probability of a false positive is actually equal to zero, even for a fairly small ∣ E _M ∣.

One of the important features of a successful COA system in many scenarios To resist wear. For the o-DNA signature 906, the need for robustness can affect, for example, Test II. For example, scratches and other surface wear can cause additional errors, but rarely affect the errors that are present on the disc.

It is important that the set of extra erroneous bases E _S due to wear is not greater than β ∣ E _M ∣, in the opposite example, the verification component 904 will report false negatives. As mentioned earlier, false denials usually do not represent a significant threat to the ecosystem, as anti-piracy activities can be aggregated based on responses from a particular seller. Even so, it is still possible to observe an increase in ∣ E _S , because the disc is scratched, which is explained in detail in conjunction with Figure 10.

Figure 10 provides an exemplary table of erroneous scan results obtained by reading errors in four different optical media instances with three different contents. For example, the content of the disc 1 is an IDE kit; the disc 2 is an operating system; and the disc 3 is a commercial kit. Each disc is scratched three times: the first time is only slight - this level is similar to the condition in which the DVD is normally used on the DVD; the second is slightly stronger - this level is similar to heavy use of software or music and video DVDs The third time is very serious, so the data cannot be read by the test disc. These results indicate that normal heavy usage rarely doubles the number of errors on a disc. Therefore, the assumption regarding the verification step II can be efficiently provided. It should be understood that the solution to this problem is entirely technical, as some scratch-resistant materials can be used, which can greatly improve the robustness for o-DNA wear.

When implementing an o-DNA type optical media distribution system, the system designer can select ∣ E _M 藉 by reading an error from a desired portion of the optical medium. Here, ∣ E _M ∣ can be balanced by the following characteristics: Since the safety, reliability, and error rate are improved, a large ∣ E _M ∣ is desired. Conversely, at the same time, during the issuance and verification, the o-DNA signature on the optical media instance and the smaller footprint of the shorter error read time would require a relatively small ∣ E _M ∣. At an error rate of 0.014%, an erroneous readout at 24 mm during a single rotation of the DVD is sufficient to cause ∣ E _M ∣ >100. The o-DNA signature obtained by storing it back on the DVD will be approximately 850 bits long. Since the disc has 24 revolutions per second at 1x playback rate, it can be observed that a significantly larger E _M group can simply be considered a realistic system of conventional functions.

Referring now to Figure 11, an exemplary system 1100 that can be used to implement and provide notifications is shown. In summary, system 1100 can include a receiving component 1102 that can receive information 1104 from an optical media instance 1106 having an o-DNA signature 1108. Information 1104 may include, for example, error data related to manufacturing errors of optical media instance 1106, and o-DNA signature 1108. The system can also include a verification component 1110 that can compare the error data with the o-DNA signature 1108 to determine if the optical media instance is authentic, as described above in conjunction with FIG.

Additionally, system 1110 can include a notification component 1112 that can transmit a notification 1114. The notification component 1112 can transmit a different notification 1114 based on a content. For example, as described above with respect to Figure 3, the o-DNA signature can include a label. Thus, in accordance with one aspect of the claimed subject matter, the notification 1114 can include information related to the tag, and the notification component 1112 can transmit such information to, for example, a display, such as a monitor coupled to an optical media player or TV.

According to another aspect, the notification 1114 can be related by the verification component 1110. To a decision, the optical media instance 1106 is not authentic. For example, as described in FIG. 9, when an optical media instance is considered to be falsified (eg, a true denial scheme or a false denial scheme), then an issuer and/or copyright owner may be notified. In accordance with this, the notification component 1112 can transmit relevant material (eg, notification 1114) to the copyright owner. In addition, the notification component 1112 can also, for example, act as a pre-request to generate a display that notifies a user that the optical media instance 1106 is not genuine and requests permission to transmit the information to the issuer and/or copyright owner.

Referring now to Figures 12A and 12B, the systems 1200 and 1210 described above can be implemented for optical media authentication, respectively. System 1200 displays an inspection component 1202 that receives error material 1204 and constructs an error fingerprint 1206 in a manner substantially similar to that described with reference to Figures 1 and 3. System 1210 shows a verification component 1212 that can receive information 1214, such as an o-DNA signature and error data from an optical media instance, which is substantially similar to the description of FIG. Both systems 1200 and 1210 can include a smart component 1208. Basically, the smart component 1208 can assist in a variety of decisions or inferences. For example, smart component 1208 can interact with inspection component 1202, for example, to assist in the optimization/compression of false fingerprints 1206. Similarly, smart component 1208 can be interfaced to verification component 1212 to, for example, assist in non-integer pulse width readout.

However, it should be understood that the foregoing functionality is merely exemplary, and that smart component 1208 can implement a variety of other suitable functions, all of which are considered to be applicable to the claimed subject matter. In particular, the smart component 1208 can check the entire available or secondary combination of available data and can provide inferences about or infer the system. The state, environment, and/or users from a set of observations are captured as events and/or materials. Inference can be used to identify a particular content or action, or can generate, for example, a probability distribution for a state. This inference can be probabilistic, that is, calculating a probability distribution among interested states based on consideration of data and events. Inference can also be referred to as a technique for constructing higher order events from a set of events and/or data.

Such inferences result in the construction of new events or actions from a set of observed events and/or stored event data, whether or not such events are related to temporary proximity and whether such events and information are from one or more events and source. Multiple classifications (clearly and / or implicitly trained) methods and / or systems (such as support vector machines, neural networks, expert systems, Bayesian trust network, fuzzy logic, data fusion engine...) can be coordinated Execution is automated and/or used in conjunction with the inferred actions of the claimed subject matter.

A classifier is a function that maps the input attribute vector x = (x1, x2, x3, x4, xn ) to the confidence that the input belongs to a class, that is, f(x) = confidence(class) . This classification can utilize a probabilistic and/or applied statistical analysis (eg, decomposition to analysis usage and cost) to predict or infer an action that a user wants to perform automatically. A support vector machine (SVM, "Support vector machine") is an example of a classifier that can be used. The SVM operates by looking for a supersurface in the space of possible input, which in turn attempts to separate the trigger condition by a non-triggering event. Intuitively, this allows the classification to be corrected for similar test data, but not equal to the training data. Other guided and unoriented model classification methods may include, for example, simple shell (na Ve Bayes), shell-type networks, decision trees, neural networks, fuzzy logic models, and probabilistic classification models provide different independent styles that can be used. The classification used here also includes statistical regression, which is used to develop a priority model.

The above description includes examples of various specific embodiments. Of course, it is not possible to describe each of the conceivable components or combinations of methods for the purpose of illustrating the specific embodiments, but it will be apparent to those skilled in the art that many other combinations and permutations are possible. Therefore, the embodiment is intended to cover all such modifications, variations and changes in the spirit and scope of the appended claims.

In particular, with respect to the various functions performed by the above-described components, devices, circuits, systems, etc., the terms used to describe these components (including the "means" referred to) are to be corresponding (unless otherwise indicated) to any executable The components of the specified function of the component (e.g., a functional equivalent), even if not structurally equivalent to the disclosed structure, perform the functions of the exemplary aspects of the specific embodiments illustrated herein. In this regard, it will also be appreciated that such specific embodiments include a system and computer readable media having computer executable instructions for performing the steps and/or events of the various methods.

In addition, when a particular feature has been disclosed for only one of several implementations, such features may be combined with one or more other features of other implementations as needed and advantageous for any given or particular application. Furthermore, to the extent that the term "comprises" and variations thereof are used in the context of the embodiments or claims, these terms are encompassed by the use of the term "comprising".

100‧‧‧ system

102‧‧‧Check components

104‧‧‧Error data

106‧‧‧ issuance of components

108‧‧‧o-DNA signature

200‧‧‧Example of an optical media

202‧‧‧Manufacture error

300‧‧‧Exemplary system

302‧‧‧Check components

304‧‧‧Error data

306‧‧‧Optical media examples

308‧‧‧ Fingerprint

310‧‧‧Distribution components

312‧‧‧ Label Information

314‧‧‧ label

316‧‧‧ bit string

318‧‧‧Signature component

320‧‧‧Private key

322‧‧‧Signature

324‧‧‧Compression assembly

326‧‧‧o-DNA signature

400‧‧‧ exemplary coding

402‧‧‧Executive graphical representation

404‧‧‧ spike

406‧‧‧ low valley

500‧‧‧Executive graphical representation

502‧‧‧Executive graphical representation

600‧‧‧Executive graphical representation

602‧‧‧All zero code

604‧‧‧Illegal code

606‧‧‧Illegal synchronization code

608‧‧‧Replace the offset required for the synchronization symbol

700‧‧‧Executive graphical representation

800‧‧‧Example optical media examples

802‧‧‧ Manufacturing error

804‧‧‧o-DNA signature

900‧‧‧ system

902‧‧‧ Receiving components

904‧‧‧Error data

906‧‧‧o-DNA signature

908‧‧‧Verification component

908‧‧‧Second mechanism

1100‧‧‧Model System

1100‧‧‧ second mechanism

1102‧‧‧ Receiving components

1104‧‧‧Information

1106‧‧‧Optical media examples

1108‧‧o-DNA signature

1110‧‧‧Verification component

1112‧‧‧Notification component

1114‧‧ Notice

1200‧‧‧ system

1202‧‧‧Check components

1204‧‧‧Error data

1206‧‧‧Error fingerprint

1208‧‧‧Smart components

1210‧‧‧ system

1212‧‧‧Verification component

1214‧‧‧Information

Figure 1 is a block diagram of a system that can issue an optical DNA (o-DNA) signature for optical media authentication.

Figure 2 is an example of an exemplary optical media that includes a set of manufacturing errors.

Figure 3 is an exemplary block diagram that can issue an o-DNA signature and embed the o-DNA signature in an optical media instance for optical media authentication.

Figure 4A is a graphical representation of an exemplary encoding of 100010010 using a NZRI (Non-Return to Zero, Inverted) encoder.

Figure 4B is an exemplary graphical representation 402 of the distribution of pulse widths.

Figure 5A is an exemplary graphical representation of the distribution of t _i - k _i ∣ - 0.5 第 after the 24 mm of the high quality DVD.

Figure 5B is an exemplary graphical representation of the probability of an illegal symbol after a single position error has occurred on A to a legal 16-bit symbol.

Figure 6 is an exemplary graphical representation including an upper half depicting the percentage of the pie chart associated with each error category and a lower half illustrating the number of offsets required for a resynchronization.

Figure 7 is an exemplary graphical representation of the distance distribution between two consecutive errors on a disc.

Figure 8 is an illustration of an exemplary optical media with an o-DNA signature.

Figure 9 is a block diagram of an exemplary system that verifies an o-DNA signature for authentication of an optical medium.

Figure 10 shows four different optical media with three different content. An example table of the error scan results obtained by reading the error in the example.

Figure 11 is a block diagram of an exemplary system in which notifications can be made and provided.

Figures 12A and 12B are block diagrams of an exemplary system including a smart component.

100‧‧‧ system

102‧‧‧Check components

104‧‧‧Error data

106‧‧‧ issuance of components

108‧‧‧o-DNA signature

Claims (23)

A system for optical DNA, comprising: an inspection component configured to: receive an intrinsic error material of an optical media instance having a plurality of existing manufacturing errors, wherein the plurality of existing manufacturing errors result from the The optical media instance reads an illegal code identifying the location of the illegal code from the optical media instance; and the locations at which the illegal code is read from the optical media instance by encoding At least some of them to construct an error fingerprint of one of the optical media instances, the error fingerprint being constructed using an error model that reflects the probability of reading the illegal code from the optical media instance; Configuring to generate, at least in part, the erroneous fingerprint constructed using the error model to generate one of the optical media instances, the erroneous fingerprint being authenticated as one of the optical media instances when verified or determined by the signature; An embossing assembly configured to embed the signature in the optical media instance, the signature being at least partially The erroneous fingerprint constructed using the error model; and one or more hardware processors configured to implement the inspection component, the distribution component, and the embossing component, wherein the issuing component further generates the signature Configured to: Connecting the error fingerprint with a tag to obtain the error fingerprint is connected to one of the tags, and cryptographically signing the error fingerprint with one of the connections of the tag. The system of claim 1, wherein the tag comprises a product ID associated with one of the content stored in the optical media instance. The system of claim 1, wherein the label includes an expiration date of the signature. The system of claim 3, wherein the issuance component is further configured to cryptographically sign the hash with a private key to generate the signature, the private key having a verification key for verifying the signature An associated public key. The system of claim 1, wherein the tag specifies a geographic area. The system of claim 1, wherein the intrinsic error data used by the inspection component to construct the false fingerprint is readable by a conventional consumer level media player. The system of claim 1, wherein the optical medium Examples are optical discs (CD, "Compact Disc") or digital versatile discs (DVD, "Digital Versatile Disc"). A method for optical DNA, the method being performed using one or more hardware processors executing instructions, the method comprising the steps of: receiving an error material that reflects a manufacturing error on an optical media instance, wherein the method A manufacturing error causes an illegal code to be read from the optical media instance, and the error data identifies an error location from the optical media instance that reads the illegal code; the code is read from the optical media instance to the illegal At least some of the error locations of the code to construct an erroneous fingerprint of the optical media instance, the erroneous fingerprint being constructed using an error model that reflects the probability of reading the illegitimate code from the optical media instance Connecting the error fingerprint with a label to obtain the error fingerprint to be connected with one of the labels; hashing the connection between the wrong fingerprint and the label to obtain a hash of the connection between the wrong fingerprint and the label; cryptographic signature The hash of the connection between the erroneous fingerprint and the tag to generate one of the optical media instances, the signature Authenticating the optical medium instances; and embedding the signature in this instance optical medium. The method of claim 8, wherein the light is embedded in the light The signature in the media instance is part of a post production process. The method of claim 8, further comprising the step of generating the error model by modeling a random variable representing a signal for one of the master clock cycles of an optical media reader One of the distances between ground changes. The method of claim 8, wherein the tag specifies an expiration date associated with a digital authentication. The method of claim 8, wherein the tag identifies a product identification associated with one of the materials included on the optical media instance. The method of claim 8, wherein the erroneous fingerprint is constructed such that the erroneous fingerprint reflects only an independent manufacturing error, the independent manufacturing error being within a given distance of one of the other independent manufacturing errors, and the optical medium At least some further manufacturing errors in the examples are excluded from the false fingerprint. An optical media product produced by the method of claim 8, wherein the optical media example has the signature embedded therein. An optical media product produced by the method of claim 13, wherein the optical media instance has an embedded stamp, wherein the embedded stamp identifies only the independent manufacturing errors, and the independent manufacturing The error is within the given distance of the other independent manufacturing errors, and does not identify the at least some further manufacturing errors on the optical media instance excluded from the erroneous fingerprint. A computer readable memory device or storage device comprising instructions, when executed by a processor, causing the processor to perform an action of receiving an error material that reflects a manufacturing error on an optical media instance, wherein The manufacturing errors cause an illegal code to be read from the optical media instance, and the error data identifies an error location from the optical media instance that reads the illegal code; reading from the optical media instance by encoding At least some of the erroneous locations of the illegal code to construct an erroneous fingerprint of the optical media instance, the erroneous fingerprint being constructed using an error model reflecting the reading of the illegitimate code from the optical media instance Probably; connecting the error fingerprint with a label to obtain the error fingerprint to be connected to one of the labels; hashing the connection between the error fingerprint and the label to obtain a hash of the error fingerprint and the connection of the label; Cryptically signing the hash of the connection between the wrong fingerprint and the tag to generate one of the optical media instances Wherein the error The fingerprint is authenticated as one of the optical media instances when verified or determined by the signature; and the signature is embedded in the optical media instance. The computer readable memory device or the storage device of claim 16, wherein the optical media instance comprises a plurality of first symbols encoded by a first letter, the plurality of first symbols being Converting the codec to a plurality of second symbols of a second letter, and the act of receiving the error data includes the act of receiving at least some of the error locations of the particular symbol read from the optical media instance, the particular The symbol is not part of the first letter. The computer readable memory device or the storage device of claim 17, wherein: the plurality of first symbols of the first letter are 16-bit symbols, and the plural of the second letter The second symbol is an 8-bit symbol, and the action of constructing the erroneous fingerprint includes the act of encoding an independent error location that does not include any of the 16-bit symbols of the first letter. The computer readable memory device or the storage device of claim 17, wherein the action of receiving the error data comprises Next action: Use the NZRI (Non-Return to Zero, Inverted) technology to read the illegal code. The computer readable memory device or the storage device of claim 16, further comprising: signing the error fingerprint or the error fingerprint and one of the private keys to hash the signature to generate the signature, The private key is associated with one of the optical media instances. A system for optical DNA, comprising a hardware processor; and a computer readable storage device or one or more computer readable storage devices for causing the hardware processing when executed by the hardware processor The apparatus performs the steps of: receiving an error material reflecting a manufacturing error on an optical media instance, wherein the manufacturing error causes an illegal code to be read from the optical media instance, and the error data identification is read from the optical media instance Obtaining an error location of the illegal code; by encoding at least some of the error locations of the illegal code from the optical media instance to construct an error fingerprint of the optical media instance, the error fingerprint Constructed using an error model that reflects the probability of reading the illegal code from the optical media instance; Connecting the error fingerprint with a label to obtain the error fingerprint connected to one of the labels; performing a hash operation on the connection of the error fingerprint and the label to obtain one of the connection of the error fingerprint and the label Scribing; by cryptographically signing the hash of the connection of the erroneous fingerprint and the tag to generate a signature of the optical media instance, the signature being used to authenticate the optical media instance; and embedding in the optical media instance The signature. The system of claim 21, wherein the computer executable instructions further cause the hardware processor to construct the error fingerprint such that the error fingerprint reflects only independent manufacturing errors, and the independent manufacturing errors are independent One of the manufacturing errors is within a given distance, and at least some of the further manufacturing errors on the optical media instance are excluded from the false fingerprint. The system of claim 21, wherein the computer executable instructions further cause the hardware processor to compress at least some of the error locations read from the optical media instance to the illegal code to Construct the wrong fingerprint.