TW202312707A - Data backup carrier and backup system having the same - Google Patents

Abstract

A data backup carrier and backup system having the same are disclosed. The backup carrier stores an encrypted public key, an encrypted private key corresponding to the encrypted public key, a signature public key, a signature private key corresponding to the signature public key, and a signature data. The backup carrier has a hardware security module. When the backup carrier is installed in a host and activated by the host, the host decrypts the signature data with the signature private key through the hardware security module, and confirms the obtained decrypted data whether it is the encrypted public key. If the decrypted data is the encrypted public key, the host obtains a stored data from a third party, decrypts with the encrypted private key through the hardware security module to obtain a protected data, and stores the obtained protected data in the backup carrier.

Description

Data backup carrier and backup system including the data backup carrier

The present invention relates to a backup carrier and a backup system, in particular to a backup carrier that is confidential and cannot copy data arbitrarily and a backup system including the backup carrier.

In today's world where data is the market, many physical activities, business transactions and identity verification are rapidly circulated around the world in different types of data. Some of the confidential data may involve a huge amount of money, and if it is stolen or tampered with, there will be unbearable losses. These confidential data, such as digital currency keys, are usually kept in a safe place. That is to say, these confidential data may also go through other encryption procedures, or be stored in hardware that cannot be obtained arbitrarily, and be decrypted when needed, or obtained by opening the storage hardware through a specific unlocking method. For example, a digital currency key may be stored in a smartphone's Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) card through a specific encryption program, and the phone implements password-controlled access to the SIM card chipset. access control. It is conceivable that if the smartphone or SIM card fails, the digital currency key may be lost forever. In order to prevent this from happening, generally confidential data may also be backed up in third-party hardware, such as a private cloud server, in a uniquely obtained manner. When the original storage hardware is damaged, the backup hardware can retrieve the confidential data from the third-party hardware according to the only way to obtain it.

There are two problems in the aforementioned backup process. First, how to confirm that the retrieved confidential data is the original backup; second, whether the backup hardware has been certified and has the same function and protection level as the original storage hardware (that is, to ensure that the source of the backup hardware is safe, so as not to malicious software to steal confidential data). In order to solve the aforementioned problems, there is the origin of the present invention.

This paragraph extracts and compiles certain features of the present invention. Other features will be disclosed in subsequent paragraphs. It is intended to cover various modifications and similar arrangements within the spirit and scope of the appended claims.

In order to solve the foregoing problems, the present invention discloses a data backup carrier. The backup carrier of the data can be activated by a working host to back up a protected data stored in a main carrier, and the protected data is also encrypted with an encryption public key into stored data and then stored in a third party, its characteristics In that: the backup carrier stores the encryption public key, an encryption private key corresponding to the encryption public key, a signature public key, a signature private key corresponding to the signature public key, and a signature data; the backup The backup carrier has a hardware security module; when the backup carrier is installed in the working host and enabled for the working host, the working host uses the hardware security module to use the signature private key to the signature data perform decryption, and confirm whether the obtained decrypted data is the encrypted public key; and if the decrypted data is the encrypted public key, use the hardware security module to obtain the stored data obtained by the working host from the third party The encrypted private key is decrypted to obtain the protected data, and the obtained protected data is stored in the backup carrier.

The backup carrier can further store a digital signature and a certification public key that can verify the digital signature, and the digital signature is generated using a certification private key corresponding to the certification public key; when the backup carrier is installed in After the working host is activated for the working host, the working host further performs a digital signature verification process on the digital signature and the certification public key through the hardware security module, and if the digital signature verification process is successful, The working host decrypts the signature data with the signature private key through the hardware security module.

According to the present invention, the hardware security module may further include: a key generation unit that generates a plurality of pairs of encrypted private keys and corresponding encrypted public keys; an encryption unit that encrypts a plaintext with any public key to obtain A ciphertext; a decryption unit, which decrypts the ciphertext with the private key corresponding to the public key performing the encryption to obtain the plaintext; and a digital signature decryption unit, which performs the digital signature on the digital signature and the authentication public key Chapter Verifier.

Preferably, a ring signature (Ring Signature) structure is formed between the signature private key and the signature public key of the plurality of backup carriers. The main carrier and the backup carrier are SIM cards. The working host can be a smart phone, a tablet computer or a wearable electronic device. The third party can be a server, a cloud backup platform or a blockchain storage framework. This protected data may be a digital currency key or a protected private key. The certification public key of the digital signature can be signed by a certification signature.

The present invention also discloses a backup system, which includes: the aforementioned backup carrier; and an authentication host that stores the authentication private key and the authentication public key, generates the digital signature, and provides the generated digital signature and the authentication host. The authentication public key is given to the backup carrier. The authentication host can be any server in a public key infrastructure.

Because the backup carrier will first confirm whether the encrypted public key is encrypted with the signature public key before obtaining the protected data, and then retrieve the original protected data in the primary carrier. In addition, with the digital signature and authentication public key provided by the authentication host, the identity of the backup carrier can also be confirmed.

The present invention will be described more specifically by referring to the following embodiments.

The backup carrier of the data proposed by the present invention can backup a protected data stored in a main carrier after a working host is enabled. Please refer to FIG. 1 for the state of storing and protecting data on the backup primary carrier. According to the present invention, the main carrier can be any device with a storage function that can store protected data, such as digital currency keys or protected private keys, through encryption or hardware configuration means. In this embodiment, the main carrier is a SIM card 1 . The backup carrier is the same hardware as the main carrier, so the backup carrier is also a SIM card. The working host is installed with the SIM card 1, and executes specific tasks through the SIM card 1. In this embodiment, the working host is a smart phone 2 . In other embodiments, the working host can also be a tablet computer or a wearable electronic device. Because the SIM card 1 is installed inside the smart phone 2 and cannot be viewed directly from the outside, it is shown in a dotted line.

The structure of the SIM card 1 is shown in the bottom right of FIG. 1 , which includes a processor 11 , a hardware security module 12 and a storage module 13 . The processor 11 processes instructions from the smart phone 2 through an interface with the smart phone 2 (the pin of the SIM card 1 , not shown), and returns a result. The storage module 13 stores a protected data 133 , which cannot be freely accessed through the settings of the SIM card 1 itself or the smart phone 2 . In addition, the storage module 13 also stores an encrypted public key 131 and an encrypted private key 132 corresponding to the encrypted public key 131 . In order to ensure that the protection data 133 cannot be obtained because the SIM card 1 is broken, the protection data 133 can be encrypted into a storage data 134 by using the encryption public key 131 through the hardware security module 12, and then stored (such as through a mobile network) ) to a third party3. According to the present invention, the third party 3 can be a server, a cloud backup platform (server group and storage device group formed based on data backup), or even a block chain storage structure. In this implementation manner, a cloud backup platform is taken as an example for illustration. Since the cloud backup platform has a corresponding restore program, and even if the cloud backup platform is maliciously leaked, the stored data 134 is also restricted by the encrypted private key 132 to decrypt. Therefore, the protection data 133 is still in a safe state and cannot be stolen.

When an accident occurs and the SIM card 1 (main carrier) is damaged, since there is no encrypted private key 132, the stored data 134 cannot be obtained to decrypt and retrieve the protected data 133, so it is necessary to use the backup carrier 4 proposed by the present invention (also a Another SIM card with the same structure as SIM card 1). Likewise, the redundant carrier 4 also has the same hardware: a processor 11 , a hardware security module 12 and a storage module 13 . The difference from the SIM card 1 is that in addition to storing the encryption public key 131 and the encryption private key 132, the backup carrier 4 also stores a signature public key 135 and a signature private key corresponding to the signature public key 135 136, and a signature material 137. The signature public key 135 and the signature private key 136 are another set of keys used for encryption and decryption, and the signature material 137 is formed by encrypting specific materials with the signature public key 135 . These stored data are stored in the backup carrier 4 in advance in order to damage or lose the SIM card 1 one day. In addition, in order to ensure the security of the signature material 137 , a ring signature (Ring Signature) structure may also be formed between the signature private key 135 and the signature public key 136 . The ring signature structure is generated from the same source as the signature private key and signature public key in other backup carriers, which ensures the unconditional anonymity and correctness of the signature private key 135 and the signature public key 136 in the backup carrier 4. sex and unforgeability.

Since the content of the above-mentioned specific data is not limited, only one kind of data can be used for subsequent operations of obtaining the protected data 133 of the backup carrier 4 : the encrypted public key 131 . That is to say, the signature material 137 encrypted with the signature public key 135 using the encryption public key 131 as plaintext is used in the present invention. The details thereof are explained in detail below.

When the backup carrier 4 is installed in the smart phone 2 and enabled for the smart phone 2, the smart phone 2 decrypts the signature data 137 with the signature private key 136 through the hardware security module 12 . After decryption, the hardware security module 12 can obtain a decrypted data, which is not necessarily the aforementioned encryption public key 131 . At this point, the smart phone 2 can perform judgment work to confirm whether the obtained decryption data is the encrypted public key 131 . If the decrypted data is the encrypted public key 131, since the encrypted public key 131 is the owner of the SIM card 1, only he knows and uses the encrypted public key 131 and encrypts it for storage, so the backup carrier 4 is not installed with a malicious program. Risk of stealing protected data 133 . On the contrary, if not, it means that the backup carrier 4 has been tampered with during the storage process, and the backup carrier 4 is risky and must be discarded. If the decrypted data is the encrypted public key 131 , the smart phone 2 will obtain the stored data 134 from the third party 3 as shown in FIG. 3 . Afterwards, the stored data 134 obtained by the smart phone 2 from the third party 3 is decrypted with the encryption private key 132 through the hardware security module 12 to obtain the protected data 133, and the obtained protected data 133 is stored in a backup carrier 4 in the storage module 13.

In order to facilitate the acquisition of the encryption public key 131, the encryption private key 132, the signature public key 135 and the signature private key 136, as well as the operations of encryption and decryption, the aforementioned hardware security module 12 may further include: a key A generating unit 121 , an encryption unit 122 and a decryption unit 123 . The key generation unit 121 works to generate a plurality of pairs of encrypted private keys and corresponding encrypted public keys, which may also include a signature public key 135 and a signature private key 136 . The encryption unit 122 can encrypt a plaintext with any public key to obtain a ciphertext. In contrast to the encryption unit 122, the decryption unit 123 can decrypt the ciphertext with the private key corresponding to the public key performing encryption to obtain the plaintext.

The backup carrier and its operation mode disclosed in the above embodiments can ensure the correctness of the obtained protection data. However, it is not possible to confirm whether the backup carrier is authenticated and protected from malicious software to steal protected data. The following another embodiment will disclose technical features to solve the aforementioned problems.

Please refer to FIG. 4 , which shows a backup system according to an embodiment of the present invention. The backup system includes the aforementioned backup carrier 4 and an authentication host 5 in addition.

In this backup system, in addition to storing the encryption public key 131, the encryption private key 132, the signature public key 135, the signature private key 136 and the signature data 137, the backup carrier 4 further stores a digital signature 138 and an authentication public key 139 that can verify the digital signature 138. The digital signature is generated using an authentication private key 139' corresponding to the authentication public key 139. When the backup carrier 4 is installed in the smart phone 2 and enabled for the smart phone 2, the smart phone 2 does not directly decrypt the signature data 137, but first signs the digital signature through the hardware security module 12. The chapter 138 and the certification public key 139 perform a digital signature verification procedure to confirm the integrity of the signature material 137 (not tampered with). If the digital signature verification procedure is successful, the smart phone 2 decrypts the signature data 137 with the signature private key 136 through the hardware security module 12 . Therefore, in order to complete the aforementioned tasks, the hardware security module 12 also includes a digital signature decryption unit 124 . The digital signature decryption unit 124 can perform the aforementioned digital signature verification procedure on the digital signature 138 and the authentication public key 139 .

Here, the authentication public key 139 and the authentication private key 139' used by the digital signature 138 signing program are both generated by the authentication host 5. The authentication host 5 is a server connected to the smart phone 2 through the network, which can store the authentication private key 139' and the authentication public key 139, generate a digital signature 138, and provide the generated digital signature 138 and authentication public key 139 to Backup carrier 4. The plaintext content of the digital signature 138 is not limited, and can be determined by the owner of the authentication host 5 . After the backup carrier 4 is produced by the manufacturer, the authentication host 5 (which may belong to the manufacturer or be authorized to use) provides a digital signature 138 and an authentication public key 139 stored in the backup carrier 4 to prove The identity of the backup carrier 4 and cannot be tampered with.

According to the present invention, the authentication public key 139 of the digital signature 138 is signed by an authentication signature which is not generated by the authentication host 5 but by other certificate servers. The purpose of re-signing is to verify the identity of the authentication public key 139 by the certificate server of a higher-level certificate center of a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). Please refer to FIG. 5, which shows a public key infrastructure. The authentication host 5 may belong to the manufacturer, and the authentication public key 139 issued by it is signed by the authentication signature of the certificate server of the design manufacturer. The certification seal of the design manufacturer is signed by the certification seal of the certificate server of the secondary certification authority. Ultimately, the certification seal of the secondary certificate certification body is signed by the certification seal of the certificate server of the root certificate certification body (such as the government certificate management center entrusted by the National Development Commission to manage Chunghwa Telecom). Therefore, according to the present invention, the authentication host 5 can also be any server in the public key infrastructure.

Although the present invention has been disclosed above in terms of implementation, it is not intended to limit the present invention. Anyone with ordinary knowledge in the technical field may make some changes and modifications without departing from the spirit and scope of the present invention. Therefore, The scope of protection of the present invention should be defined by the scope of the appended patent application.

1: SIM card 2: Smartphone 3: Third party 4: backup carrier 5: Authentication host 11: Processor 12: Hardware Security Module 121: key generation unit 122: encryption unit 123: decryption unit 124: Digital signature decryption unit 13: Storage module 131: encrypted public key 132: encrypted private key 133:Protect Data 134: Store data 135: signature public key 136: Signature private key 137: Signature information 138: Digital signature 139: Authentication public key 139': authentication private key

FIG. 1 shows the state of storing and protecting data in a redundant main carrier of the present invention.

FIG. 2 illustrates the appearance and operation of a backup carrier according to an embodiment of the present invention.

FIG. 3 is another operation mode of the redundant carrier.

FIG. 4 illustrates a backup system according to an embodiment of the present invention.

FIG. 5 illustrates a public key infrastructure.

2: Smartphone

3: Third party

4: backup carrier

11: Processor

12: Hardware Security Module

121: key generation unit

122: encryption unit

123: decryption unit

13: Storage module

131: encrypted public key

132: encrypted private key

134: Store data

135: signature public key

136: Signature private key

137: Signature information

Claims (11)

A data backup carrier, which is activated by a working host, backs up a protected data stored in a main carrier, and the protected data is also encrypted with an encryption public key into stored data and then stored in a third party, its features in: The backup carrier stores the encryption public key, an encryption private key corresponding to the encryption public key, a signature public key, a signature private key corresponding to the signature public key, and a signature data; The backup carrier has a hardware security module; When the backup carrier is installed in the working host and activated for the working host, the working host decrypts the signature data with the signature private key through the hardware security module, and confirms the obtained decrypted data whether it is the encryption public key; and If the decrypted data is the encrypted public key, the storage data obtained by the working host from the third party is decrypted with the encrypted private key through the hardware security module to obtain the protected data, and the obtained protected data stored in the backup carrier. The backup carrier of data as described in claim 1, wherein the backup carrier further stores a digital signature and a certification public key that can verify the digital signature, and the digital signature is a certificate corresponding to the certification public key. The authentication private key is generated; when the backup carrier is installed in the working host and enabled for the working host, the working host further performs a digital signature on the digital signature and the authentication public key through the hardware security module. If the digital signature verification procedure is successful, the working host will decrypt the signature data with the signature private key through the hardware security module. The data backup carrier as described in claim 2, wherein the hardware security module further includes: A key generating unit, which generates plural pairs of encrypted private keys and corresponding encrypted public keys; An encryption unit, which encrypts a plaintext with any public key to obtain a ciphertext; a decryption unit, which decrypts the ciphertext with the private key corresponding to the public key performing encryption to obtain the plaintext; and A digital signature decryption unit performs the digital signature verification procedure on the digital signature and the authentication public key. The backup carrier of data as described in claim 1 or claim 2, wherein a ring signature (Ring Signature) structure is formed between the signature private key and the signature public key of the plurality of backup carriers. The data backup carrier as described in claim 1 or claim 2, wherein the main carrier and the backup carrier are SIM cards. The data backup carrier as described in claim 1 or claim 2, wherein the working host is a smart phone, a tablet computer or a wearable electronic device. The data backup carrier as described in claim 1 or claim 2, wherein the third party is a server, a cloud backup platform or a blockchain storage framework. The backup carrier of data according to claim 1 or claim 2, wherein the protected data is a digital currency key or a protected private key. The backup carrier of data as claimed in item 2, wherein the authentication public key of the digital signature is signed by an authentication signature. A backup system comprising: a redundant carrier for the data described in any one of claims 2 to 9; and An authentication host, storing the authentication private key and the authentication public key, generating the digital signature, and providing the generated digital signature and the authentication public key to the backup carrier. The backup system as claimed in claim 10, wherein the authentication host is any server in a public key infrastructure.

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